

## DEWEY'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

### **Also by the author**

John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*, 2000.

John R. Shook, editor, *Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism*, 2003.

John R. Shook, co-editor with Joseph Margolis, *A Companion to Pragmatism*, 2006.

John R. Shook, co-editor with Hugh McDonald, *F. C. S. Schiller on Pragmatism and Humanism: Selected Writings, 1891–1939*, 2008.

John R. Shook, co-editor with Paul Kurtz, *The Future of Naturalism*. Prometheus Books, 2009.

John R. Shook, co-author with James A. Good, *John Dewey's Philosophy of Spirit, with Dewey's 1897 lectures on Hegel*, 2010.

John R. Shook, co-editor with Paul Kurtz, *Dewey's Enduring Impact: Essays on America's Philosopher*, 2011.

John R. Shook, editor, *The Essential William James*, 2011.


John R. Shook, co-editor with Tibor Solymosi, *Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy, and Pragmatism: Brains at Work with the World*, 2014.

John R. Shook, co-editor with Tibor Solymosi, *Pragmatist Neurophilosophy: American Philosophy and the Brain*, 2014.

DEWEY'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY  
DEMOCRACY AS EDUCATION

John R. Shook

palgrave  
macmillan



DEWEY'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY  
Copyright © John R. Shook, 2014.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2014 by  
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®  
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,  
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the  
World, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers  
Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,  
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above  
companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United  
States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-1-137-46734-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shook, John R.

Dewey's social philosophy : democracy as education / John R. Shook.  
pages cm

Includes index.

ISBN 978-1-137-46734-8 (alk. paper)

1. Dewey, John, 1859-1952—Political and social views.

2. Education—Philosophy. 3. Democracy and education. I. Title.

LB875.D5S47 2014

370.1—dc23

2014016787

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Integra Software Services

First edition: October 2014

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

# CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	vii
1 What are Democracy and Education for?	1
2 Pragmatism, Learning, and Democracy	29
3 The Ethical Justification for Democracy	55
4 Equal Opportunity, Education, and Democracy	87
5 Moral Education, Justice, and Punishment	113
6 Democracy, Religion, and Ethical Progress	139
Notes	159
Index	181



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Portions of previously published essays and paper presentations are contained in this book's chapters, in revised and extended form. The original essays and papers are:

“Der philosophische Hintergrund von Deweys pädagogische Credo.” (The Philosophical Context of Dewey's Pedagogical Creed). Translated by Helmut Schreier. In *Rekonstruktion der Schule: Das pädagogische credo des John Dewey und die heutige Erziehungspraxis*, ed. Helmut Schreier (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), pp. 23–55.

“Dewey's Vision of Equal Opportunity for Education in a Democracy,” In William Lawson and Donald Koch, eds., *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 48–72.

“Dewey's Ethical Justification for Public Deliberation Democracy.” *Education and Culture* 29, 1 (Fall 2013): 3–26.

“Dewey's Rejection of Retributivism and His Moral-Education Theory of Punishment.” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 35, 1 (Spring 2004): 66–78.

“Deliberative Democracy and Moral Pluralism: Dewey vs. Rawls and Habermas,” In John Ryder and Emil Visnovsky, eds., *Deconstruction and Reconstruction: The Central European Pragmatist Forum, Volume Two*, (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004), pp. 31–41.

“Entrepreneurship and Values in a Democratic and Pragmatic Economics.” *Journal of Economic Methodology* 10, 2 (June 2003): 181–190.

“Dewey’s Naturalized Philosophy of Spirit and Religion.” In John R. Shook and James A. Good, eds., *John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with Dewey’s 1897 Lectures on Hegel* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), pp. 3–55.

“Pragmatism Caught between Church and State.” Paper read at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy meeting with the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Boston, December 2004.

“Dewey’s Hegelianism and His Repair of the Religious/Secular Divide.” Paper read at the American Academy of Religion, with the Pragmatism and Empiricism in American Religious Thought group meeting, San Antonio, Texas, November 2004.

## CHAPTER 1

# WHAT ARE DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION FOR?

JOHN DEWEY'S INTEGRATION OF EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY ENCOMPASSES, immediately or remotely, not just his social and political principles, but also his commitments across psychology, epistemology, ontology, axiology, ethics, and legal theory. Fully comprehending Dewey's educational theory, including how he defends it and how he would put it into practice, is to fairly understand his entire philosophy. He did assert that "Philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted enterprise."<sup>1</sup>

Dewey is known for his education theories promoting democracy, but what is democracy for? His philosophy advanced democracy as education itself, to reach ever-higher levels of social intelligence. Praising the community and promoting rights are Deweyan priorities, yet they depend on the core of Dewey's visionary philosophy, which seeks everyone's good in a social life that is intelligently lived.

This book explains Dewey's political vision for democracy as a form of deliberative polyarchy based on ethical principles. This kind of democracy amounts to a communal exercise in experimental civic education. This ethical project, successfully pervading all of democratic society and leaving no nondemocratic elements untouched, must be revolutionarily comprehensive. Maintaining the civil peace, a productive economy, a participatory citizenry, an effective penal system, and

a religiously harmonious society are top democratic priorities. The economy needs employees and entrepreneurs who are broadly educated, not merely well trained; education is so crucial for empowerment that it must be a citizenship guarantee; education should be prioritized in law and criminal justice; and education is crucial for ethical communities embracing religious pluralism.

Dewey's core views on humanity's capacities for learning, socializing, problem solving, social intelligence, self-ruling, and flourishing forge a whole far greater than the sum of the parts. For Dewey, a society capable of self-rule is a community of self-creators, responsible for developing their own creative capacities. There is nothing about society beyond the experimental reach of citizens in a genuine democracy. His progressive revolution is yet to be realized, but his philosophy remains just as insightful and relevant as ever.

### EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

Dewey's philosophy has been largely obscured by the educational movement he helped to inspire. Progressive education, by the 1950s and 1960s, came to embody many ideas and values impossible to locate in Dewey's educational writings or elsewhere in his large body of work. Nevertheless, progressive education's advocates and critics alike have tried to perceive those later themes while looking back to Dewey, inspiring a flood of distortions and fabrications about Dewey's thought. There is no need to review that mass of literature here. Querying the culture wars over education closer to our own times cannot be enlightening about the theories Dewey proposed in his time. As cultural exhaustion seems to be approaching, Dewey's robust reforms are still more advanced than anything offered by today's ideological contestants.

Another commonplace query is about education for democracy. Presuming that we know well enough what democracy is, and where it should be going, leaves us asking how well educational institutions are working to further those aims. This simplified situation lets us ponder how well the means

of education fit given ends of democracy. Means–ends practicalities are complex enough, but at least this task can be stated clearly. Where education isn't serving democratic aims, some redesign is in order. Isn't that pragmatic enough?

Pragmatism doesn't regard means–ends thinking as the best we can do. Education *for* democracy is not the best place to begin. Investigators with divergent agendas for democracy happily start from that point and go on to use education as a battleground to advance their different expectations for citizenship.<sup>2</sup> Dewey distanced himself far from that starting point.

First of all, Dewey did not think that educational methods or educational institutions should be democratic, in most ordinary senses of the term “democratic.” Second, as Dewey argued, education isn't really “for” anything taken to be external to itself, including democracy. Third, Dewey recommended educational methods that aren't simply memorizations, rehearsals, or preparations for something else to happen in the future, not excepting democratic citizenship. Fourth, advancing social intelligence, which is the methodical point to education according to Dewey, cannot arbitrarily stop at the boundaries of any social institution, including government, so education and democracy cannot be two separate matters. Fifth, asking how education could advance democracy is like asking how fine cuisine could prevent hunger. Specialized cooking methods can serve specific dietary needs if much is already known about those needs and how to meet them. Similarly, the nature of democracy and under what conditions it functions properly must be the subject of thorough investigation before any inquiry into promoting democracy could be undertaken. Sixth, because divergent views of the nature and proper functioning of democracy abound, inquiries into education's role “for” democracy in some generic sense couldn't be useful. The splintering of educational philosophies, one for each political philosophy, at least respects a need for internal consistency but not the need for society-wide democratic education. Seventh, democratic education is left to be a ghost wandering the surface of the

earth, restless and homeless, while everyone busily worships the empty altar of platitudes about education healing and unifying society.

As Dewey repeatedly warned, it would be unintelligent to define democracy and its aims as one exercise and leave the definition and design of education to some other department of thought. It surely would be a mistake to first work out an educational theory and only later ask how well it can function for democratic aims. Only by adequately understanding the democratic community could we responsibly pursue an educational philosophy for that community.

In the preface of his central text, *Democracy and Education* (1916), he states how democracy and education won't be treated as distinct topics and also why *democracy* comes first.

The following pages embody an effort to detect and state the ideas implied in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the problems of the enterprise of education. The discussion includes an indication of the constructive aims and methods of public education as seen from this point of view, and a critical estimate of the theories of knowing and moral development which were formulated in earlier social conditions, but which still operate, in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal.<sup>3</sup>

*Democracy and Education*, which Dewey later described as the one book containing the principles of his entire philosophy until a burst of books during the 1930s, was published while he was at the peak of his career and influence across education, the social sciences, and the next generation of philosophical pragmatists.<sup>4</sup> It was also composed during the crisis of a world war and a period of mounting worry about democracy's ability to withstand the strains of the modern age. Dewey was just as worried about immature forms of democracy at home as he was about foreign menaces abroad. Readers must recall that in the year his book was published, there were only five democracies on the planet. (Only New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Finland, and Denmark permitted all adults to vote.) Evidently

democracy had a long way to go, and Dewey realized this as well as anyone.

Democracy itself must be fully understood in the course of asking how education can help develop democratic citizens. If unrelated definitions of democracy and education are brought together for comparison, there could be little surprise at their failure to automatically cohere. Yet time and again, political theorists, pundits, and prognosticators are shocked (shocked!) to find out that hopeful educational reforms have been ineffective at advancing democratic aims laid down long ago when “democracy” was ill-defined and ill-fitted for promoting social intelligence. Even admirers of Dewey and progressive education struggle to connect the core purpose of education with the essence of democracy; there seem to be too many cores and essences, and possible combinations abound.<sup>5</sup>

Progressives of all eras face the puzzles inherent to education within democracy. Dewey was hardly the only psychology-trained thinker, among many interdisciplinary reformers, offering educational recommendations during the Progressive era. Some were helping to make education more bureaucratic and managerial, while others were selling intelligence measures and designing standardized tests. As science-based as Dewey’s philosophy was, professional psychologists claimed education as a scientific field that was not to be confused with irrelevant philosophical issues. The specific reforms that Dewey urged, especially about the professionalization of expert teachers and experimental learning centers, were never mainstream, popular, or well funded. Dewey was the most famous, but not the most influential. As one education historian has observed,

[O]ne cannot understand the history of education in the United States during the twentieth century unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey lost.<sup>6</sup>

As much as Thorndike represents the isolation of psychology’s research into education away from broader social contexts, Dewey represents the integration of all educational practices with the surrounding civic life of society.

In Dewey's view, if democracy has any chance of being progressive, which it should by its nature, then its education must be progressive in lockstep. In 1938, reflecting on 30 years of controversy over progressivism and educational reform,<sup>7</sup> Dewey was already trying to correct misconceptions:

If one attempts to formulate the philosophy of education implicit in the practices of the new education, we may, I think, discover certain common principles amid the variety of progressive schools now existing. To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; to learning from texts and teachers, learning through experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill, is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.<sup>8</sup>

Individuality, freedoms, new experiences, relevant needs, changing times—these are all matters easily associated with the democratic way of life. Education needn't be preparation for democracy but democracy itself, in a suitably managed form. Furthermore, if education can be democratic, couldn't democracy itself be educational?

It is still time, as it was in Dewey's day, to demand a democracy worthy of education.

### WHAT IS EDUCATION?

How can a democracy for education be found? If we examine the nature and function of education, we will find dynamic learning, liberating empowerment, and community-oriented concerns. The values of education are values of democracy.

Let us set out one of Dewey's statements on the nature of democracy, to guide us as we look closer at educational goals and values.

From the ethical point of view, therefore, it is not too much to say that the democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. It expresses a postulate in the sense of a demand to be realized: That each individual shall have the opportunity for release, expression, fulfillment, of his distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall further the establishment of a fund of shared values. Like every true ideal, it signifies something to be done rather than something already given, something ready-made. Because it is something to be accomplished by human planning and arrangement, it involves constant meeting and solving of problems—that is to say, the desired harmony never is brought about in a way which meets and forestalls all future developments.<sup>9</sup>

If the people themselves are responsible for undertaking the great task of self-rule, then they must be society's planners and arrangers. Arranging and rearranging society so that no one's capacities are allowed to stagnate or permitted to dominate others is a creative task of immense difficulty. No wonder escapist dreamers wish for a wisdom surpassing all humanity to take charge. It is the case that unless the people as a whole manage to do it, arranging society will be done by a few managers eager to rule so that they can arrange society for their own good. The people seeking the good for all society couldn't do much more evil than tyrants, and probably less evil. Education is what makes the difference for a society accomplishing more good than harm. It is what has made the greatest difference throughout human history.

Education involves learning, the acquisition of useful habits through experience. That encompasses the development of innumerable intelligent capacities and reasoning skills. If "intelligence" denotes an actual generic capacity, then education would be vitally concerned with enhancing it. Many sorts of content- and context-related intelligences can be empirically detected and measured in human conduct. Any common core would involve a process-dependent set of cognitive

functions—functions unable by themselves to suffice for intelligence but when put together could contribute to higher intellectual processes that permit intelligence.

[N]early all of human behavior involves cognitive abilities as these encompass processes that include attention, perception, comprehension, judgment, decision making, reasoning, intuition, and memory, among others.<sup>10</sup>

Reasoning itself is a complex process, capable of multiple forms due to reliance on one set or another of lower-level cognitive abilities. Anticipating consequences arising from given initial conditions is one sort of inferential process; figuring out which conditions gave rise to given effects is another; and inferring a thing's properties and uses from some of its visible traits is still another. Reasoning's advanced forms, such as logic and mathematics, are trainable human capacities, and intricate combinations of strict inference patterns with carefully collected observations yield scientific methodologies.

Although there is no singular mental thing or process pertaining to the term "intelligence," human activities are conducted with greater or lesser intelligence, and education must rely on that feature of intelligence and enhance it when possible. Intelligence can harness most of the brain's functions, at some point or another, so there won't be any specific brain function that reliably permits intelligence by itself. Nevertheless, if one cognitive ability has received the most credit for the power of human intelligence, that ability must be reasoning. Without the ability to form and apply ideas about if-then relationships connecting what is already familiar with other anticipated matters, our other cognitive strengths wouldn't amount to much. Unless the nature and functioning of reasoning is appreciated, little about intelligence could be comprehensible, guiding any learning opportunities would be a haphazard venture, and education would be a realm of speculation and dogmatism.

Pragmatism, the first philosophy to be well informed by behavioral and brain sciences, regards human intelligence

as fundamentally about ends–context–means relationships as they dynamically develop over time. The practicalism of reasonable “means–ends” inference is acceptable enough for short-term progress toward unquestioned goals. Daily life is replete with moment-by-moment judgments of that sort. Yet we can also ponder new opportunities and potential ends and reason out ways to attain them. People can prospectively envision (potentially) achievable goals within (modestly) adjustable contexts in light of (accessible) means shaped for such an achievement. Each factor—goal, context, means—is considered in light of the others during a display of reasonableness, and they receive the closest attention when high intelligence is displayed. We evolved to have reasoning among our cognitive abilities, and we can embody a high degree of intelligence. The achievements of human culture are their fruits.

Pragmatism expects good reasoning to hypothesize how valuable goals, an opportune context, and flexible means can be mutually adjusted to each other, in light of temporal and resource restraints. Often, reliable habits need little adjustment as they deliver desired goods, but high intelligence takes habits to be means, means that can be altered and improved to function better in unusual or difficult situations. What we take to be conscious forethought in our awareness is precisely this intense cognitive activity of dynamic readjustment of habitual means to dubious contexts.<sup>11</sup> What needs to be learned about this odd situation so that some adjusted habits can still yield realistic goals pretty quickly? In such “problematic” situations, nothing goes unaltered: the context is inquired into and modified; bodily and material means are reshaped and redirected; and plans are changed to reach revised goals. The hard work of reasoning and deliberation is precisely that dynamic mutual re-adjustment of three alterable factors into better coordination together. Dewey’s later books, *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1922) and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), elaborate this pragmatist examination into problem-solving and deliberation.

The consistent ability to consciously attend to forging successful coordination is what we also call acting conscientiously.

Being merely conscious and being conscientious are mental capacities located on the same range of awareness, occupying each end of that spectrum. Education is an ethical matter just because it vitally concerns the future welfare and success of children's lives. Education is also ethical in another sense due to its development of a person's conscientious attention to social consequences. Furthermore, education is ethical in a third sense: education can vitally enhance social cooperation overall in a society. Education is intelligence put in service of society, and when education is well designed, it is the engine of social intelligence for the benefit of all society.

Our human capacity for social intelligence and conscientious conduct cannot be denied. Primate biology, cultural anthropology, social psychology, and social neuroscience have together established beyond doubt that the distinctive prefrontal cortex of the human brain evolved primarily to permit intense co-dependent and cooperative sociality within groups. Humans prospectively envision group projects for group benefit, and the enviroing context of greatest relevance for intelligence becomes the social context of partnering cooperators. High social intelligence tries to coordinate available human resources, taking into consideration the skills of each participant. This social intelligence even includes co-optive and punitive strategies for groups to deal with the free-riders, betrayers, and rule-breakers among them.<sup>12</sup>

Because the abilities of participants are taken by high social intelligence to be a matter for adjustment, we spend a great deal of time and effort to improve each other's skills. Gossiping about each other's lives, foibles, and reputations seems to take up a large portion of our communications, but after those engrossing topics, discussing each other's abilities and refining them is another topic of much interest. We know how we can be good at education, and we understand education's crucial value for maintaining communities.

Education, most generally, is a broad label for methods to inculcate skills through direct engagements of guidance between instructor and learner. Education requires a social relationship, and a social relationship implies understood

responsibilities accepted by both parties directed to some joint goal. Haphazard emulation, accidental learning, and rudimentary training do not rise to the level of social education. There is no question that the primate brain is also very good with those building blocks for education which developed later on during the rise of human culture. Education is social intelligence applied to a situation calling for intentional and efficient learning, aiming at the acquisition of capacities permitting more effective social participation. Essentially, education is precisely what social intelligence does to perpetuate and enhance itself, instead of neglecting intelligence as something beyond its powers to manipulate. That is why Dewey was fond of repeating the mantra that education essentially has no substantial aim other than itself. Dewey also denied any interest in education for its own sake, but there's no contradiction here. Dewey rejected any educational philosophy separating education and its methods apart from wider social intelligence. Education serves that wider social intelligence, or it serves no one at all.

Education exists because social intelligence persists. Humans have become so impressively intelligent over its 200,000 years span of survival because intelligence itself became an object of conscientious attention and deliberate development. Education is therefore the cultivation of intelligence for group cooperation and social living. Democracy is the form of communal association extending that cultivation throughout every sphere of life.

#### **DEMOCRACY EMPOWERED BY EDUCATION**

Because the philosophy of pragmatism has a great deal to say about reasoning, learning, and knowledge, it has vast implications for education. Pragmatists starting with Dewey have recommended a variety of reforms to educational methods and institutions. Educational reform must impact, sooner or later, all phases and dimensions of social life. Because pragmatism is grounded in cultural anthropology, social psychology, and cognitive science, these pragmatists have been well aware how

education is assigned civic responsibilities far wider than just teaching practical skills and refining intellectual methods. Education by its nature is the most powerful social force within any society prioritizing the next generations' capacity to perpetuate cultural norms and political structures. The history of civilizations confirms this observation. Education is by no means just a democratic imperative. An aristocracy invests care and resources in the training of its class's youth no less, and probably more, than a laboring class could. Democracies resist aristocracies, yet liberation from autocracy doesn't automatically bring a sound educational system into existence. Many revolutions in the name of freedom revert back to some strict political order in the name of the people, as strict as those of overthrown regimes.

Education itself can easily be undertaken in a rigid and authoritarian manner, even as it is burdened with the task of uplifting the masses.

It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against. For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles.<sup>13</sup>

Any educational philosophy tasked with enlarging freedom must simultaneously be a social philosophy about freedom. Rigidly conformist means cannot serve liberating ends in the long run. On the other hand, mere liberty, the freedom from restraint, is not valuable in itself and has little value for youth.

There can be no greater mistake, however, than to treat such freedom as an end in itself. It then tends to be destructive of the shared cooperative activities which are the normal source of order. But, on the other hand, it turns freedom which should be positive into something negative. For freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result

from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.<sup>14</sup>

Greater negative liberty is hardly the same thing as the enlargement of empowered freedom. If the two can be imaginatively equated, it is only because one first imagines a powerfully capable adult who could accomplish a great many things, if only he were permitted by society. Education does not postulate that children are already powerfully capable adults just waiting to spring free from shackles. Nor should a social theory seriously suppose that everyone of adult age has long possessed vast hidden talents already matured but unable to be expressed in achievements. We are not corporate CEOs, deep down inside, any more than we are pirates, spies, or astronauts. Careers are made through educative experiences and hard lessons learned. In retrospect, one might look back upon a career and glimpse the touch of destiny when one was young. Education must realistically look forward, prospectively, unable to rely on “destiny” to guide personal development.

Youth is a time for desiring sheer liberty, although out of ignorance, but children are not wrong for at least wanting enlarged spheres of meaningful activity. Coordinating educational practices with the actual capacities of children at their own age and maturity levels has proven its practicality as well. Dewey’s critics mistake his emphasis on youth-oriented activities as a license for discarding hard subjects, letting learning be like playing, permitting child-directed learning, or having child-run schools, which is a preposterous slander against his educational writings. Wild liberty is not an educational goal for Dewey, individuality has to be created through guided socialization, and no educational thinker placed more emphasis on extensive control over learning by a professional body of teachers. Later phases of “child-centered” progressive education only had superficial overlaps with Dewey’s views.<sup>15</sup>

Dewey’s social and educational philosophy never regarded sheer liberty, “naturalness,” self-expression, or self-confidence as a guiding ideal of democracy or education. If there is any legitimate accusation to be made here, it must be admitted that

Dewey regarded community as democracy's ideal, not the liberty of households to do whatever they want. The education of children is too important to be left to chance, which is another way of saying that parents should not be assigned control over the education of their children. Like every other sphere of life in the modern age that has any impact on wider society, only scientific and professional expertise should control the development of natural, social, and intellectual resources. Parents aren't guaranteed experts about the education of their children, not the least because children grow up into changing social climates and take on newly invented careers.

If children's lives were certain to repeat those of their parents, perhaps parents could be the experts. We regard static and closed societies with disapproval and regret, unable to see democratic values. In our own democracies, parents couldn't know their children's destinies, and that is a very good thing. Some parents may be ideal at instilling sound virtues; others may be skillful at reading, writing, and arithmetic; while a few parents may do excellent jobs at integrating the child into neighborhood activities and concerns. Parents should always do their best at parenting, but parenting is no longer equivalent to education. This means that even parenting must have inevitable limitations. Each parent may think that he or she knows best, which only proves the point that few among them really could. Not everyone is that far above average.

A view of democracy implying that little social management should be exercised over the development of children is not a view that Dewey could endorse. But democracy means many things: it should principally mean that an adult has acquired both self-control and social capacities in preparation for a productive life that is open with potentiality, not closed by destiny. What we expect from adults, we must inculcate in childhood. Educational principles are therefore social principles. A thoughtful coordination of educational means with social ideals sends a consistent message to youth in ways they can appreciate, a consistency not necessarily evident in the subject matters taught. Social theorists are intensely aware of how one's lifestyle and one's outlook on life can be molded, directly

or indirectly, by formal educational methods as well as by informal social habituations. It could even appear that education has far more to do with social values and cultural sensibilities than just intellectual advancement. Dewey was among the social theorists who agreed with that observation. He repeatedly insisted that conscientiousness, cooperation, and character are goals of education no less than knowledge; indeed, those moral qualities are intrinsic to social knowledge.

What is learned and employed in an occupation having an aim and involving cooperation with others is moral knowledge, whether consciously so regarded or not. For it builds up a social interest and confers the intelligence needed to make that interest effective in practice. Just because the studies of the curriculum represent standard factors in social life, they are organs of initiation into social values. As mere school studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth. Acquired under conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the qualities of mind discussed under the topic of method of learning are all of them intrinsically moral qualities. Open-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted, are moral traits. The habit of identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to authoritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical value of these intellectual attitudes, but the same habit tends to reduce morals to a dead and machine-like routine. Consequently while such an attitude has moral results, the results are morally undesirable—above all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal disposition.<sup>16</sup>

Intelligence and character are intertwined when their social implications are kept in view. Dewey acknowledged how mere intelligence need not be morally worthy. Education has a way of producing intellectuals, of course, but highly educated intellectuals can occasionally be more dangerous to civic stability and harmony than external enemies. Unless the trained use of the intellect is well suited to the prevailing civic life and its cultural ideals, the mind can be disorderly and deviant.

Formal education and its social institutions, from their invention by early civilizations down to the present day, invariably guide the intellect into regulated and habitual channels of thinking congenial to the ruling civic order. Educational "experts" denying this inevitable social fact (and Dewey was not among them), who portray education as a nonconformist method for natural intelligence and liberty of thought, simply prefer a different civic order. Dewey pertinently observed that calls for a more "natural" method of education are heard during eras of educational stagnation. He did not hide the way that his own socio-psychological approach should be classified with a broadly naturalistic approach. Yet he was not among those who judged that the entire society was so stultified that an antisocial education must be the civic remedy, or at the least the private rescue of the children. Educational experts looking only to nature will only see the reflections of their alluring dreams. Judging society harshly may be a sound verdict. But looking to a "natural" education alone as the panacea for society, or the salvation for youth, doesn't account for how natural potential must have a proper social function or be reduced to meaninglessness.

That evil institutions and customs work almost automatically to give a wrong education which the most careful schooling cannot offset is true enough; but the conclusion is not to educate apart from the environment, but to provide an environment in which native powers will be put to better use.<sup>17</sup>

Genuine expertise in education recognizes how methods of intelligence and structures of society should be designed to fit each other with an eye toward the future. Psychology of learning can speak of education for intelligence in the abstract, which is an honest enough inquiry as far as an individual's intellectual level is concerned, but education for intelligence is a thin abstraction compared to the enrichment of actual civic education. Education in the real world will always be primarily about refined values, not raw intellect. Pragmatism agrees, and further adds that good education can find ways for our

intellects and our values to work together, for the enlargement and improvement of both. Not only should we want the intelligent pursuit of our values, but we should also want to pursue intelligent values. That opens the path for freedoms worth wanting.

### **SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, VALUES, AND PSEUDO-DEMOCRACIES**

Despite pragmatism's track record of treating education as the best opportunity for society to train intelligence to conscientiously pursue and achieve values, pragmatism has been depicted as a danger to higher values for life. Fixated on today's practicalities, wouldn't pragmatism amount to encouraging dominant forces of society to regiment education, and thereby regiment people's lives?

Dewey counseled against letting society affix the standards for education, just as he warned against appealing to nature as a standard for learning. The current economic structures, workplace careers, and social strata of wealth and privilege could serve as a set pattern for the design of education. A principled education, by contrast, must coordinate with the forward directions of society, so it has to take a uniform interest in all children. Education alone dictates that concern for children; there is no such thing as inheriting the sins of one's parents as far as intelligence is concerned. Privileged classes have plenty of ways to transfer advantage to their offspring without controlling the education of all of society as well.

It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social control means subordination of individual activities to class authority, there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the *status quo*.<sup>18</sup>

Perpetuating the status quo doesn't deliver what it promises, save for those who already have plenty. It is no more

appropriate for economic powers to control education than private households.

The economic order promises high rewards for those who will compliantly and efficiently work within the existing machinery of productivity. What must be done about vanishing jobs or emerging jobs, due to new technologies and industries, may not be the economic system's responsibility. If that burden falls elsewhere, upon education perhaps, then the supplier of skilled workers may be excused for training youth in all-purpose capacities more than eventually extinct routines. Adults vocationally trained with flexible intelligence will have greater control over the course of their careers, and hence more economic autonomy to effectively participate in the ever-changing economy. As Dewey notes, "an attempt to train for too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its own purpose."<sup>19</sup> Vocational intelligence permits workers to contribute to business processes, organization, and perhaps management, democratizing the economic realm to a certain extent. This capacity partially liberates workers from harsh economic forces, makes them more responsible for their own careers, and brings the satisfactions of empowered participation within an important sector of society.

Despite Dewey's clear insistence that effective freedom, autonomous responsibility, and civic participation are the pragmatic virtues of progressive education, it has always been too easy for critics to scorn the pragmatic element.

For example, pragmatism receives the perennial accusation from idealistic philosophies that a lowly concern with mere "means-ends" reasoning encourages an emaciated and materialistic outlook. Where is the place for understanding the proper ends, those values and ideals worthy of a life striving for higher meaning? Obsessed only with means and more means, the efficient means and the practical means, pragmatism must let the ends go without scrutiny and hence without care. Any far-off end will serve as a destination for pragmatism so long as one's head is always down looking at a road, idealistic thinkers will say. Yet pragmatism was never a philosophy bound to means-ends reasoning. It's definitely not practicalism, limited

to picking among available means to reach preassigned ends. Can existing means be so easily jointed to potential ends? Just imagining that mechanistic task lets one imagine that a pile of means is over here on one side, and a cloud of ends are over there on the other side, and the task is to link up those means in the right way to deliver just the right ends.

Rival philosophies such as idealism (but not pragmatism) presume that as far as reasoning is concerned, those means and ends are intrinsically different. Idealism assumes that ends are the fittest matters for reasoning and judgment, leaving the calculation of rude means to the work of inferior modes of inference. Idealism thus elevates ends as idealized things unstained by material practicalities. Emotivism, by contrast, assumes that only means at hand could be reasoning's materials for figuring out ways to attain ends beyond reasoning's control. Emotivism thus isolates ends as nonrational things unrestrained by intellectual tranquilities. From idealism's stance, pragmatism shamefully deforms reason with degrading labors beneath its station. From emotivism's stance, pragmatism naively assigns reason fanciful tasks beyond its competence.

Expecting that what motivates us and what orients us could not be separate spheres of mental activity, pragmatism realistically takes our conduct to be the product of organically interrelated processes. Neuroscience confirms how cognitive compartmentalization isn't a feature of large-brained animals. Neither driving compulsions nor imagined ideas could be assigned full responsibility for intelligent behavior. Intelligence takes into account how ongoing behaviors are working with the local environs, so that behavior can receive adjustment as enviroing conditions may change. High intelligence seeks to alter local conditions to work better with selected behaviors for more efficient results. Nothing impelling or alluring could by itself entirely dictate the intelligent conduct of an animal coordinating environs and behaviors together simultaneously. Blind drives cannot be sufficiently concerned with actual enviroing conditions, while entrancing hopes cannot be sufficiently linked with actual bodily capacities. Neither

idealism nor emotivism realistically understands how high intelligence accomplishes its impressive results.

Incomplete forms of intelligence abound, of course, especially because time pressures, laziness, distractions, and poor cognitive habits prevent intelligence from performing at full capacity. Ideologies are particularly effective at degenerating intelligence by obstructing communication and encouraging cognitive and social biases. Those biases effectively sever connections among goals, contexts, and means. Excessive fixation upon ideal goals, heedless of context and imperious over means, produces fanaticism. Fixation on current abilities, while demanding changed conditions to easily suit that rigid set of means regardless of goals, generates self-victimization. Admiration for existing conditions, and expecting everyone's goals to help maintain those conditions, produces conservatism. Pessimism about participating citizens, who may not be attentive and competent enough for responsible citizenship, results in an elitist managerial state. Resignation to the surrounding context, predicting that all means will turn out to perpetuate that context no matter what goals are envisioned, produces a fatalistically stoic political attitude. Further examples of ideological distortions to intelligence could be enumerated, but these suffice for drawing contrasts with pragmatism.

These ideologies suppose that pragmatism must be a rival misguided ideology. To a fanatic, pragmatism is promoting compromise with evil instead of prioritizing the exalted good. To a victim, pragmatism unfairly expects capacities to improve and goals to get realistic before cruel society is forced to become more just. To a conservative, pragmatism foolishly loves change for change's sake while disrespecting past achievements and sacrifices. To an elitist, pragmatism is adrift in the shifting tides of ignorant public opinion, which will get manipulated by elites anyways. To a fatalist, pragmatism is lost in a pleasant dream world in which epiphenomenal thoughts somehow suspend universal laws.

Pragmatism has little respect for ideologies in return. As far as pragmatism can tell, instead of developing conscience and responsibility, ideologies subvert intelligence, diminish

autonomy, and reduce people to tools for grand designs not of their own making. Ideologies don't trust populations to deliberate about ends, or the means to attain them, or they simply assert that vast forces beyond most reckoning must control everything anyways. Essentially, ideologies refuse to believe in social intelligence.

Democracy isn't automatically hospitable to broad social intelligence. Political forms of democracy can easily function as ideologies, as Dewey knew well. He understood the historical lesson that most democracies have been more rigidly ideological than civically pedagogical, and he regarded most of what still gets labeled as "democratic" as lingering proto-democratic political forms, antiquated but stubbornly resistant to retirement.<sup>20</sup>

Conceiving democracy as exclusively concerned with some set of absolute rights, rights that cannot be compromised by any circumstances or contingencies, makes democracy fanatical in import and execution. Dewey rejected the political validity of absolute rights, and made no place for them in his ethics. Construing democracy as just a remedy for injustices, especially for victimized persons seemingly deprived of responsibility and power, only drives all citizens toward postures of aggrieved helplessness. Dewey agreed that democracy is the best way to defend justice, when citizens took responsibility for participating as equal citizens regardless of their social circumstances. Constructing democracy as a social contract protecting what possessions there are to protect, with anarchy as the only alternative, conservatively prioritizes those who possess the most. Dewey denied that private wealth and public status must be beyond the reach of social reform by political means. Conducting democracy under the management of educated elites, able to manipulate public opinion enough to make democracy safe for infrequent voting, places great faith in the beneficent intentions of those elites. Dewey observed that competent elites seem preferable to the circuses of unruly commoners, until that inevitable day when elites transition to ruling for their own benefit. Collapsing democracy into a convenient power arrangement, since values and ideals are unreal and ineffective,

allows might to ascertain what is right and turns majorities into tyrannies. Dewey refused to admit that ideals are unreal and outcomes are predetermined, since ideals are most real while people proudly change their social environs pursuing those ideals through struggle and sacrifice.

What has been sketched out as “absolutistic” democracy, “grievance” democracy, “contractual” democracy, “elitist” democracy, and “fatalistic” democracy are forms of governing which once had legitimate proto-democratic services to perform during long periods of struggle against monarchy and aristocracy. By the twentieth century, they had devolved into degenerate forms of democracy, the “pseudo”-democracies. They fail to be genuine democracies because they lack commitment to full social intelligence for all to the benefit of all. Democracy must be consistently inspired by the knowledge that people are socially intelligent due to evolution, culturally endowed thanks to social intelligence, and civically empowered through social intelligence.

### **DEMOCRACY BECOMES EDUCATION**

Social philosophies may regard the breadth and depth of education across a population as a variable. Who will have access to education, and what sort of education will they receive? This is a question for social intelligence, and there is no single answer for all places and times, although there are better and worse answers.

Where social education is not prioritized, unevenly distributed, or denied to some, intelligence deteriorates and ideologies prosper. Indeed, those who promulgate ideologies always denigrate and undermine social education. Social education is the civic body's best resistance to, and disinfectant against, ideology. Ideologies also rely on social intelligence, the social intelligence of some, redirected away from enlarging social intelligence. Ideologues and master classes prize social intelligence no less, but they restrict access to social intelligence to preserve power. Dictators apply acquired military power to next manipulate or destroy modes of social communication and civic education.

Democracies should do the opposite: they constructively develop specialized opportunities for enhancing social communication and civic education among all civic sectors and social spheres, without halting at economic/ethnic subgroups or castes or any other distinctions among people. Democracies that fully respect the potentialities of social intelligence do not respect boundaries restricting some people from full economic and civic participation in the life of the whole society. What competent adults may do with their civic capacities is for them to decide, but their autonomy must not be sought at the price of their competency and responsibility. Only isolation, not effective freedom and empowerment, is to be gained from the liberty of ignorance. Any subsector of society claiming that its members are only answerable to its own delimited norms and rigid ways of life makes itself incompatible with democracy. This incompatibility is no failure of democracy, but rather its proud success. Toleration toward the stagnancy of social intelligence and intelligence's perversion into submission could never be a reason to praise a democracy.

Education is democracy's answer to the charge that democracy simply imposes its own way of life and thinking on its members and hence must not complain when other groups impose theirs. Let some group try to justify the repression of education—either its leaders will rely on education to do so, revealing an unethical hypocrisy, or it cannot produce an educated justification, leaving it incompetent. Democracy, by contrast, easily justifies education because educated people can judge and control everything else about their society, including education itself (assuming no antidemocratic forces still prevail).

Naturally enough, subgroups enjoying their own intellectual and cultural heritage claim that they already possess more than enough wisdom, virtue, and intelligence. Wanting no part of a democracy's invasive social communications and disruptive civic lessons, these subgroups deny that anything is to be gained for their own memberships. If education should be fitted to society, they would say, then let it be so fitted, perfectly. After all, in their view, social ideals are already known, and the remaining task is to fulfill those ideals. Dewey has a great deal

of respect for the power of ideals; his own vision for democracy relies on some. However, the pursuit of ideals must be intelligent and ethical. An insular group's dream that its way of life will go unaltered and undiluted two or three generations from now is as fanciful as a corporation's hope that it will be profitable from the same products for generations. And even if either had the collective force to realize that dream, what values have been sacrificed along the way, and who was prevented from having a say about those values? A group acquiring the forces to impose lasting conformity on its population would have no more ethical justification to that stagnation than a corporation acquiring the forces to make everyone purchase the same product 50 years from now.

A conflict with insular groups over democracy comes down to a conflict over the role of education, from the perspective of Dewey's approach. Just as education is social intelligence trying to deliberately enhancing itself, democracy is education trying to reach its broadest and fullest capacities. Social intelligence requires the helpful cooperation of many social structures and institutions to permit specialized education to function well. Similarly, a democratic society requires the helpful cooperation of all of its subsectors and subgroups to permit the infusion of education's empowering capacities throughout the entire society. That democracy in principle requires a significant degree of cooperation simply follows from the very nature of social intelligence and the whole point of education. This educational cooperation does not demand the surrender of a subgroup's distinctive ways, its traditional forms of life, its values about personal development, its ethical ideals, or its metaphysical tenets. Unless a subgroup does not want to be part of a democratic society at all, which raises a different set of political difficulties, no subgroup should feel threatened. Its survival will depend, after all, on the social intelligence of its members who can adapt to changing conditions. Rejecting social intelligence dooms any group to extinction by gradual dissolution, or to a tenuous life by exerting sheer force. Insular groups, unsurprisingly, are stubborn enough to think that they should be the exception to the rule.

Degenerate pseudo-democratic ideologies can offer a welcoming home for stubbornly undemocratic groups, and offer compromises to those groups that Dewey could never approve of. Absolutist democracy can be hospitable if a guiding principle like toleration or independence is enshrined as inviolable, setting up a situation in which a society is all the more democratic if it hosts many autocratic subgroups. Grievance democracy can be hospitable if subgroups establish their victimization status and demand compensatory exemptions from the uniform rule of law, so that a society is more “democratic” as more and more subgroups can set laws they want to obey. Contractual democracy can be hospitable to subgroups proving their dangerous threat to social order if they don’t get their way, so that a society is more “democratic” where *modus vivendi* deals for power sharing underlie governing. Elitist democracy can be hospitable as well, so long as subgroups are led by their own capable elites maintaining a “multicultural” balance of power. Fatalistic democracy has no interest in any subgroup’s supreme ideals, so any subgroup can be accommodated and function in society so long as it doesn’t disrupt the general security.

Friends of one ideology can even play another ideology off Dewey to make his educational theory appear ineffective or even harmful. For example, elitists wishing that their own religion could control government dislike independently autocratic or multiculturally autonomous subgroups, so blaming Dewey’s respect for ethnic diversity for “dividing” America is a convenient diversion. Proponents of extreme multiculturalism or victim politics, for their part, can just as easily accuse Dewey of advancing assimilationist and hegemonic agendas, even as they themselves enforce group identities. Another example is the way that social conservatives, who dislike the way that managerial elites accelerate the techno-capitalist state, can single out Dewey’s appreciation for scientific knowledge as a dehumanizing accomplice. Proponents of absolute rights or contractual principles, on the other hand, decry Dewey’s pragmatic distrust of foundational truth, the elusive kind of truth admired by dogmatists who won’t ever agree among one another.

When one reads the representation of a broadside attack on Dewey's views, figuring out the critic's own ideological stance and misdirection tactics is always in order. Whether his theory of education can advance democratic ideals as well as he predicted is a legitimate question. However, a feature of Dewey's system designed to work within a democratic society would probably malfunction while separated away and adjoined to nondemocratic or pseudo-democratic forces of society. A comprehensive approach to strengthening democracy is required, in Dewey's estimation. He'd be the least surprised if limited and half-ways measures were perverted by stronger pseudo-democratic elements. After all, he witnessed sufficient illustrations of those undemocratic distortions in his own times.

Pseudo-democratic ideologies effectively withhold robust political power from the people, and rely on mechanisms for manipulating what citizens can encounter and understand. Dewey's vision of democracy as education has the opposite goals, empowering people to undo and remake any of society's conformities. The only subgroups feeling oppressed by that empowerment would be those eager to suppress social intelligence. They will anxiously justify that oppression in the name of static supreme ideals, about which no deliberation is permitted. At least they dimly realize the power of social intelligence, but not its genuine value, and that is the measure of immature incompetence. The anti-education subgroup protesting against democratic oppression of its members is merely complaining about an imagined preemption of its own oppressions.

Democracy as education is the highest ideal that democracy can reach for. Democracy can be much more than conformist expectations for individuality, rigid rules for autonomy, or final sets of rights. When a democratic society embodies education, its civic structures and institutions are educational, first and foremost.

Chapter 2 on Pragmatism, Learning, and Democracy explains how Dewey made revolutionary advances in several philosophical fields, culminating in his educational and democratic theorizing. He established naturalistic empiricism as the

foundation for his pragmatic theories of social psychology, ethical theory, liberal progressivism, and public democracy. This naturalistic empiricism grounds Dewey's approach to education in general and the capacities for value inquiry needed by adults in a democratic society. Education is essential to democracy because it represents the progressive aspect of community problem-solving. Because education is essential to democracy and democracy must be a pervasive force throughout society, all social institutions must support education. The explicitly political institutions of a democracy have an important role in value inquiry and conflict resolution, but education is the more fundamental engine of democracy.

Chapter 3 on *The Ethical Justification for Democracy* describes how Dewey developed sophisticated theories for a liberal civil society and a deliberative democracy. Dewey attempted to formulate a philosophical justification for democracy on moral grounds. Provided with a solid moral foundation, progressive and participatory democracy could become a practical, achievable, and highly rewarding endeavor for citizens. The particular type of participatory democracy designed by Dewey is what is here termed "public deliberation polyarchy." Citizens motivated by common concerns organize into publics for political activism, and compete for the general public's sympathy and the government's attention. Dewey's political philosophy is explained by successively considering seven distinct views about his justification of democracy, culminating in the most adequate assessment.

Chapter 4 focuses on *Equal Opportunity, Education, and Democracy*. Dewey's philosophy can help assess the principles grounding public education and judge reform proposals in light of current social contexts. Public education, provided that it respects racial and ethnic diversity, remains essential to any democracy of genuine equality. From Dewey's perspective on the proper evolution of a progressive democracy, the erosion of public schooling would harm efforts to eliminate racial prejudice, unequal opportunity, and second-class citizenship.

Chapter 5 on *Moral Education, Justice, and Punishment* examines the justice system of a democracy. Dewey viewed

education generally as the integration of people into society by establishing prospective responsibility, and the punishment of adults should be the morally educative effort of reintegration. The details of effective reintegration procedures will emerge from empirical inquiries by the social sciences into the consequences of specific forms of punishment for prospective responsibility, having variable degrees of reparation, deterrent effect, and other valuable features. The justice-centered theory of pure retribution only rationalizes an abandonment of community responsibility for the welfare of every person. The reintegration model of punishment is an exemplary form of nonviolent conflict resolution that democracies should value. A democracy's civic participation in all forms of moral education also provides for punishment's educative effect, not only for the offender, but also for the rest of the community.

Chapter 6 on Democracy, Religion, and Ethical Progress returns to issues about the roles of ultimate values in any democracy. By defending individualism, rethinking the nature and justification of rights, and by showing how both ends and means can be modified by reasoning, Dewey laid the foundations for a social and political theory of democracy quite hospitable to both religions and the religious. Both the church and the unchurched are not only politically protected by Dewey's form of democracy, but also encouraged to actively participate in politics. There are limitations to religious freedom, however. Dewey viewed religious liberty, like all liberties, as organic growths out of successful communities as they learn how to solve their moral problems in ethically responsible ways. Citizens must exercise religious freedoms in a responsible manner consistent with the community's overall welfare, and consistent with the entire community's ethical advancement. Because democracy should be grounded on people's reasonable commitment to equal opportunity for all, liberal democracy converges in aims and methods with the ethical progress of religions.

## CHAPTER 2

# PRAGMATISM, LEARNING, AND DEMOCRACY

JOHN DEWEY MADE REVOLUTIONARY ADVANCES in several philosophical fields during the 1890s. By 1900 he had established naturalistic empiricism as the foundation for his pragmatic theories of social psychology, ethical theory, Christian progressivism, and public democracy. This naturalistic empiricism grounds Dewey's approach to education in general and the capacities for value inquiry needed by adults in a democratic society.

### PRAGMATISM AND EDUCATION

The vital connection between naturalistic empiricism and the other parts of Dewey's pragmatist philosophy is his functionalist theory of human behavior. Functionalism is an empirical and experimental explanation of intelligent goal-directed activity. Intelligent activity displays some degree of learning when new and unexpected obstacles to goals are overcome by imaginatively creative actions. Dewey's functionalist psychology penetrated the details of the process of learning, and showed that it has discernable stages. He also showed that these stages display a development of increased power and flexibility as a person resolves more and more complex difficulties toward

some sort of resolution or another. Learning is not merely the use of a set of mental skills. The most important kind of learning, essential to the progress of human intelligence, has been the deliberate effort to develop the stages of learning, which can only occur during actual problem-solving.

Culture is maintained through the careful emulation of adult skills by youth of the next generation. Culture can be advanced by individual creativity proving worthy of imitation by others. Even faster advancement is achieved when individuals of the social group foster each other's creativity. A variety of kinds of education can be distinguished according to the kinds of activities that members of a society use to assist creativity for the good of the group. What cannot be disputed is that education is essential to the survival and progress of any culture.

Dewey viewed learning, and thus education, as a life-long process. It is not unconventional to view learning as happening throughout life, but it is not as common to understand that education should be just as central to one's entire life. Dewey distinguishes between education in the broad sense and formal education.<sup>1</sup> Education results from the normal interactions of people in their community. Formal education is a controlled and simplified environment for the young, in which social situations are deliberately structured to stimulate and guide problem-solving. What all education has in common is that education does not directly provide learning, but instead indirectly provides learning, through the intermediate stage of the learner's own creative problem-solving. Dewey sees that it is false to assume that for most adults, the ability to learn has reached a final stage of maturation, needing no further modification. All adults need life-long education because the need for improved problem-solving never ends.

Educators largely discarded the dogma that education's purpose is simply the memorization of facts and absorption of ideas. But many academics, including some philosophers of education, still believe that the basic purpose of education is to instill in children the skills for learning. Naturally, one's view of what is to be learned determines how one conceives

the necessary skills for learning. In Dewey's time, most schools tried to instill the habits of self-control, attentive listening, rote memorization, and skill imitation. These habits were best fitted to the kind of learning expected: the mastery of a body of information and skills most relevant to the student's future social role. Dewey contrasted the kind of education for the children destined for labor with the education for the children destined for leadership. The purpose of this contrast was primarily to criticize the deficient education for the laboring class, which suppressed independent and constructive thinking in favor of the passive acceptance of factory conditions. However, Dewey was not recommending that all children instead receive an aristocratic education either.

Dewey's pragmatist critique of both aristocratic and proletariat education questioned how both systems shaped students into adults who could apply a uniform method of evaluating facts. The laborer's stock of fixed knowledge of facts serves as the test of truth. The aristocrat's stock of fixed logical principles in addition to fixed facts likewise provides the method of testing truth. Eternal verities were thus supplied for both sides: an unquestionable body of facts to be accepted, and an unquestionable list of principles to be obeyed. Dewey saw in this division the remnants of a medieval and monarchical form of society in which eternal truths were bestowed by authorities upon an obedient population. Modern democracy needs an educational system that goes beyond information, and also beyond the acquisition of learning skills. Neither a stock of facts nor a body of skills could be the goal of education. Instead, the origin of all facts and skills, which is inquisitive problem-solving, must itself be the goal of education. But since problem-solving and its improvement is a life-long task, education must be life-long as well.

Some education reformers in Dewey's time saw that students did not need the body of information typically given by schools because most of the students were destined for work in industry. But this vocational learning simply substitutes the passive acceptance of facts for the passive duplication of skills. What is missing from all of these systems of education

is the appreciation for the student's need to develop sound skills of problem-solving. Genuine participation in a democracy requires these skills, because a modern democracy does not offer a fixed form of life with guaranteed social structures and relations throughout a person's lifetime.

With the advent of democracy and modern industrial conditions, it is impossible to foretell definitely just what civilization will be twenty years from now. Hence it is impossible to prepare the child for any precise set of conditions.<sup>2</sup>

A democracy cannot make the dangerous assumption that there is some fixed amount of information, or a fixed body of skills, that will permit an adult to function well for an entire lifetime. What then is to be learned in education? In a society of ever-changing social relations and institutions, the most important learning exists within the context of the individual's adjustment to such changes, and the resolution of the inevitable conflicts caused by these changes. Adjustment and conflict resolution are necessarily social endeavors. They are social not only in their effects but also social in the very process of deliberation. Because democracy is a form of life that provides extensive opportunities for intelligent problem-solving, democracy is an education for adults as well as for children.

This explains why Dewey encouraged democratic processes, on a limited scale, in educational settings in the schools. The education of adults and the formal education of children should not be very different processes.

Life is the great thing after all; the life of the child at its time and in its measure, no less than the life of the adult. Strange would it be, indeed, if intelligent and serious attention to what the child now needs and is capable of in the way of a rich, valuable, and expanded life should somehow conflict with the needs and possibilities of later, adult life. "Let us live with our children" certainly means, first of all, that our children shall live—not that they shall be hampered and stunted by being forced into all kinds of conditions, the most remote consideration of which is relevancy to the present life of the child. If we

seek the kingdom of heaven, educationally, all other things shall be added unto us—which, being interpreted, is that if we identify ourselves with the real instincts and needs of childhood, and ask only after its fullest assertion and growth, the discipline and information and culture of adult life shall all come in their due season.<sup>3</sup>

Students will not develop the problem-solving skills needed for participation in a free democracy unless they learn in democratic schools.

What is education for democracy? Answering that question should begin with the principal ideal guiding a democracy. Liberty, equality, and self-rule are examples. Dewey's vision of the purest type of democracy enables all citizens to control the future of society. Education must give citizens the capacities for self-rule. This is an Aristotelian idea, and it is connected with the tradition of republicanism. Traditional republicanism typically presupposed that the population shared a common heritage and culture. However, modern democracy must modify the republican ideal of citizenship. Dewey formed his philosophy in Chicago from 1894 to 1904, during a turn-of-the-century period when his city and many others absorbed hundreds of thousands of immigrants.

American intellectuals tended to accept a forced choice, to advocate either integration or assimilation. Dewey advocated only what can be labeled "functional" integration, and not assimilation. Functional integration aims at enabling all immigrants to function well as both workers and as citizens in a new home country. Immigrants should learn some English, be able to vote, understand their civil rights, use their labor skills, and take advantage of economic opportunities. Education is essential to this functional integration into a pluralistic and democratic society. Education should encourage an equal respect for all humanity, respectful toleration of different cultures, and a developed capacity for thinking about values.

Education for children can build the foundations for democracy. All education begins with the learner's own interests. Dewey rejected the common view that the teacher must

“inspire” and “create” interest in a subject. Unless some type of interest is already present in the child, no real learning will happen. The presentation of information must be set in the context of the child’s existing interests. Dewey also rejected the view that the child’s own interests should determine what happens in school. The teacher should take advantage of the child’s interests to put them in the context of a larger project or learning situation.

Education of the young has three stages according to Dewey.<sup>4</sup>

- (1) The activities of imitation and play, for 3- to 7-year olds. Children have a natural curiosity about everything around them, and directly interact with objects and people. The aim of schooling is to provide opportunities for acquiring basic motor skills and language skills. School activities should encourage social interaction on group interests.
- (2) The activities of productive work, for 8- to 12-year olds. Children focus on specific goals and learn the skills to achieve them. Children become interested in solving more complex human problems, and can learn about all areas of study through learning how other people solved their problems. The relation between means and ends becomes dominant. The different fields of knowledge are introduced, and children use books to provide information.
- (3) The activities of problem-solving, from 13 years into adulthood. Children discover that all knowledge was once discovered by problem-solving, and that new problems need new solutions. Curiosity is redirected from what is already known by adults to what is not yet known. The child is encouraged to be curious and to make discoveries.

Education should not focus only on knowledge in the scientific sense: Dewey rejected any deep separation between facts and

values. Facts are useful for solving problems, and all problems are fundamentally problems of value.

Children should also receive an education in social values. This education follows the same three-step pattern: imitating social norms and learning obedience; discovering why social norms are needed for the stability of society; and becoming curious about the need for new solutions to social problems. If children receive this kind of educational experience in the schools, they will grow up to be adults who are sensitive to social problems and able to assist with their resolutions. The best kind of democracy contains citizens who care about the suffering of others and can work together to change the existing social structure and laws to prevent that suffering. Adults in a democracy should be able to participate in solving the problems of their society.<sup>5</sup>

We will return to the question of how to develop problem-solving in later sections. The next section examines Dewey's philosophy of experience, intelligence, and problem-solving.

### **EXPERIENCE, NATURE, AND MIND**

During the 1890s John Dewey began to consider the sources of social conflict in a democracy and the strategies available to resolve them. With his colleagues at the University of Chicago, including George H. Mead, James H. Tufts, and James R. Angell, Dewey formulated a philosophy that can make sense of democratic life. This philosophy started from a new psychological theory about human behavior. Dewey firmly believed education was essential for both social stability and progress, and that the natural and social sciences would make enormous contributions to the improvement of education.

I believe that with the growth of psychological science, giving added insight into individual structure and laws of growth; and with growth of social science, adding to our knowledge of the right organization of individuals, all scientific resources can be utilized for the purposes of education.<sup>6</sup>

Chicago functionalist psychology holds that human behavior must be studied teleologically, as a goal-directed process that is capable of both habitual and creative phases. Following the advances of evolutionary biology, physiology, and experimental psychology, the functionalists stressed that human psychology cannot be independent of the underlying human neurology. The nervous system has evolved to assist human survival in uncertain and hazardous environments where new problems always arise. From an evolutionary standpoint, psychology must be the study of mental life as an adaptive organic process. The Chicago philosophers followed the many implications of understanding mental processes in a functionalistic way. If thought can only be an aspect of purposive activity, then thought must serve the needs of problem-solving. By grasping that thought is creative problem-solving, the Chicago pragmatists proceeded to challenge older philosophies over the nature of belief, reason, and truth.<sup>7</sup>

Chicago pragmatism opposes rationalism's claim that logical principles have a necessary authority over thought or experience. The common ground between idealism and pragmatism rests in their rejection of metaphysical dualism and their adoption of a voluntaristic stance on the nature of thought. Far from just mysteriously interacting with feelings or desires on the one hand, and behavioral activity on the other, thought is inseparably and organically one with them.

I believe that the active side precedes the passive in the development of the child nature; that expression comes before conscious impression; that the muscular development precedes the sensory; that movements come before conscious sensations; I believe that consciousness is essentially motor or impulsive; that conscious states tend to project themselves in action.<sup>8</sup>

By denying the independence of thought, stressed by older dualistic psychologies and intuitionist sensationalisms, Dewey and Mead could treat thought as a biological phase of the organism's experience. They were prepared by their idealism to subsume reasoning under the wider category of the will,

because their study of idealism persuaded them that thought can be only detected in our purposive activity. Reason, intelligence, or thought—by whatever name, our rational ability is manifested only as an aspect of our goal-directed interactions with the environment, primarily aiming at survival and the enjoyment of natural goods.

I believe that ideas (intellectual and rational processes) also result from action and devolve for the sake of the better control of action. What we term reason is primarily the law of orderly or effective action. To attempt to develop the reasoning powers, the powers of judgment, without reference to the selection and arrangement of means in action, is the fundamental fallacy in our present methods of dealing with this matter.<sup>9</sup>

The stages of thought are functional aspects of practical problem-solving as humans find better instruments for interacting with nature.

#### **THOUGHT, LOGIC, AND PROBLEM-SOLVING**

Functional psychology, by denying dualism, finds a role for the “mental” in the natural world as it is actually experienced by individual persons. But this role cannot expand to overtake experience completely, since pragmatism does not fly to the opposite error of idealism. Dewey’s manifesto of functionalism, “The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology,”<sup>10</sup> argued that the proper understanding of the nervous system as a continuous organic whole implies that experience is not divided into natural objects given as experienced stimuli on one hand and mental thoughts consequently aroused within experience on the other. In “immediate experience,” to use Dewey’s phrase, all things are just as they are experienced to be,<sup>11</sup> and human being proceeds unreflectively and successfully through the actions bringing enjoyment of goods. This is possible because the needed objects triggering the appropriate habits are always at hand. But in problematic situations the needed stimulus is missing, and habitual activity must temporarily halt. The instrumental resources of thought are now brought into play.

The general features and steps of a reflective experience of problem-solving are as follows:

(*i*) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined; (*ii*) a conjectural anticipation—a tentative interpretation of the given elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences; (*iii*) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the problem in hand; (*iv*) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of facts; (*v*) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing something overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the hypothesis.<sup>12</sup>

If habitual activity is restarted successfully, there is a return to immediate experience, which collapses all distinctions between percept and concept and between physical and mental things.

Problem-solving can become habitual, as the stock of acquired meanings of things is ready for use during new problems. Meanings are what Dewey also calls images or ideas. Conjectures apply ideas to problematic things in order to suggest new plans of action to resolve a problem. By providing useful images, education prepares students for imaginative problem-solving.

I believe that the image is the great instrument of instruction. What a child gets out of any subject presented to him is simply the images which he himself forms with regard to it.<sup>13</sup>

I believe that much of the time and attention now given to the preparation and presentation of lessons might be more wisely and profitably expended in training the child's power of imagery and in seeing to it that he was continually forming definite, vivid, and growing images of the various subjects with which he comes in contact in his experience.<sup>14</sup>

Pragmatism reconstructs or demolishes all of the philosophical apparatus that has separated philosophers into opposed schools: nominalist and realist, materialist, dualist, and idealist, and so forth. The early writings of the Chicago pragmatists display an eagerness to attack all other philosophical camps at once, and an awareness that all fields of philosophy must be powerfully affected by their methodology. Dewey's essay "Psychology and Philosophic Method"<sup>15</sup> is a paradigmatic example, when he declares that psychology is a political science. When psychology investigates the experience of the individual person, it must understand "individual" according to whatever prevailing social conditions dictate. Since the significance of the "individual" is quite different across autocratic, aristocratic, and democratic societies, for example, we should expect that psychology might proceed differently and reach different results accordingly. Therefore, psychology and political science are intimately related, notwithstanding the psychologist's protest that only scientifically motivated methods are used. Dewey examines current psychology in the context of the extremely individualist notions of the person that he sees as prevailing in his own country. Just as current democracy treats persons as something over and apart from their ethnic, religious, family, or business commitments and duties, so too does current psychology attempt to scientifically examine the individualized and compartmentalized "consciousness" of persons as something over and apart from their social relations.

Based on this analysis, Dewey offers several criticisms of philosophy insofar as it has heedlessly adopted this extremely individualistic psychology as its own. First, there is no place for socially psychology and its understanding of experience as primarily social shared experience. Psychology should examine consciousness, but with the full awareness that this examination cannot take the experiences of persons as given data for exclusive study but rather as clues taken as meaningful for understanding of people's actual social behavior.

I believe that knowledge of social conditions, of the present state of civilization, is necessary in order to properly to interpret the child's powers. The child has his own instincts and tendencies, but we do not know what these mean until we can translate them into their social equivalents.<sup>16</sup>

Second, in the absence of the corrective pull of social psychology, philosophy is drawn into the error of supposing that psychology and the mental realm it treats is positively irrelevant to purely philosophical issues such as logic, knowledge, truth, moral principles and values, and the nature of reality. Third, as a result of this notion of "pure" philosophy, philosophers are absorbed into the futile task called epistemology of trying to figure out the conditions for knowledge of reality only after the experience of the individual is ruled out as irrelevant. Fourth, by treating knowledge and value as matters independent of anyone's actual experience, thought, and behavior, philosophy has wrongly declared that actual human behavior and the discernment of knowledge and values has nothing to do with the real, prior, and independent existence of the True and the Right.

#### MORALITY AND VALUE INQUIRY

Dewey's philosophy attempted to completely expose and repudiate every vestige of the lingering dualism and rationalism that characterized eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy. Dualism's modes of thought and symptomatic terminology lay everywhere, even in the most unexpected of places. Dewey found it even in the allegedly scientific and empirical discipline of psychology, which had infected philosophy in turn. Even as late as the start of the twentieth century, both psychology and philosophy largely assumed that experience was the possession of individuals and existed only inside personal minds. Philosophers could and did dispute the nature of objective reality beyond the subjectively personal mind. Rationalism also dominated the dispute concerning values. The philosophers who asserted the objective existence of values typically

also held that reason alone could provide knowledge of them. Philosophers who located values within subjective experience typically denied that reason was required to know values, by claiming that experience alone was sufficient for values. The first type of philosopher asserted that things possess value transcendent of human experience, while the second type of philosopher asserted that things possess value only because they are experienced as possessing value.

These philosophies are not the only options. Both assume that if experience has anything essential to do with value, then value must be subjectively mentalistic and personal. Dewey pursued a genuine third alternative by denying this premise. Values are neither subjectively mental nor transcendently objective, but rather must exist in nature where they are experienced to be. Dewey spent a great deal more effort arguing for this metaphysically naturalistic empiricism over subjectivism than arguing for its advantages over transcendentalism. Transcendentalism amounts to either a complete skepticism or an arbitrary dogmatism, since human knowledge of such transcendent values is by definition an utter mystery. Subjectivism, since it uses the resources of psychology, is a more difficult position to criticize.

Subjectivism starts from the assumption that values and goods and the like are all essentially a matter of immediately felt pleasures, or satisfactions, or sensations, or the like. Compare this view with Dewey's own statement that "nothing is a value apart from being enjoyed as a good."<sup>17</sup> The superficial similarity is corrected by asking about the nature of enjoyment, as Dewey does. While enjoyment of goods gives objects their value, a crucial distinction must be made between enjoyments that are had without any deliberate effort made to achieve them, and enjoyments that are had only because deliberate effort was exerted to achieve them. These two kinds of enjoyment are so qualitatively distinct that their conflation leads subjectivism completely astray. Utilitarianism, as an example of subjectivism, relies on their identity in its assertion that what is desired is nothing but what is desirable. This assertion is obviously false upon considering that the enjoyment of

a thing accidentally acquired is not the same sort of enjoyment if that thing is gained only through difficult effort. Put another way, a judgment that a thing is desired is quite different from a judgment that a thing is desirable. A person may desire a thing without considering the means required, and if that person remains innocent of means, then enjoyment will only be accidental and the consequences of enjoyment are disregarded. However, when a person judges that a thing is desirable, both the means required to attain it, and the further consequences of enjoyment, are to some degree taken into account.

Dewey stresses this distinction by referring to a judgment that a thing is desirable as a "valuation" and refers to the thing enjoyed resulting from a valuation as a "value." Thus, while values cannot exist independently of their enjoyment, values are enjoyed only through deliberate efforts that have taken means and consequences into some account.

(1) Experience is primarily an active-passive affair; it is not primarily cognitive. But (2) the *measure of the value* of an experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up. It includes cognition in the degree in which it is cumulative or amounts to something, or has meaning.<sup>18</sup>

No intelligence is involved with simply desiring a thing or judging that a thing has been enjoyed. It is precisely the function of intelligence, according to Dewey, to control the formation of valuation judgments. When intelligence does so, it controls the formation of values and hence of desirable enjoyments.

The possibility that intelligence has anything to do with the construction of values has often been denied by philosophers in the empiricist tradition. Hume notoriously separated the operations of reason from the existence of values, arguing that reason can only judge means of attaining pleasurable ends. Dewey rejected Hume's type of atomistic empiricism because it is inconsistent with genuine scientific knowledge. How does Dewey's philosophy permit an empirical and scientific epistemology of values? First, values must not be equated with

mere enjoyments devoid of any cognitive quality. While values are by definition eventually enjoyed, not all enjoyments are values. Second, values must be recognized as objects that have been intellectually judged to have value. This valuational judgment is characterized by the involvement of considerations on the means required to attain the enjoyment brought by having the object, and the further consequences after the enjoyment of the object. Third, valuation judgments are plans of action that direct the means necessary to attain the enjoyable object. Like any plan of action, a valuation judgment can work well or poorly, because it can work as expected or with unexpected consequences. In summary, values can be objectively and empirically tested, because they are essentially predictions of consequences of actions.

When care is taken to form improved plans of action, inquiry occurs. Dewey's pragmatism asserts that the primary function of human intelligence is to direct inquiry, which is fundamentally problem-solving. Values are naturally problematic, since plans of action to attain enjoyment can go wrong any number of ways. Means can turn out to be insufficient or have other unexpected bad consequences. The enjoyment of the attained object may have unforeseen negative consequences. Values naturally compete, since one plan of action will obstruct many others and not all enjoyments can be had all at once. Values are created by inquiry, and can be altered by further inquiry. Indeed, rarely do values remain stable for long, largely because human inquiry into values always brings experimentation and sometimes produces progress. Inquiry is the opportunity to develop an epistemology of value, in which the methods of value formation come under direct scrutiny.

The methods of value formation can be controlled only because of what Dewey called "the continuity of ends and means."<sup>19</sup> Our ends, our goals, are enjoyments gained through deliberate efforts, and such enjoyment is qualitatively different from an accidental enjoyment, so altered precisely because it has been gained deliberately. Ends should not be deliberated on apart from means, and means should not be deliberated on independently of ends. The labels of "instrumentalism"

and "practical reasoning" are usually applied to deliberation only about the means to achieving a predetermined and independent end. But Dewey's pragmatism is a direct repudiation and refutation of such a portrayal of actual human intelligence. Granted, it is humanly possible either to fixate on an enjoyment so completely that means are forgotten (like behavior displayed by children) or to fixate on a distant end so completely that any and all means necessary are automatically justified to achieve it (like behavior displayed by fanatics and lunatics). But responsible adult behavior illustrates the continuity of ends and means.

The situational and contextual existence of things forces us to recognize that every use of a thing carries far more natural consequences than just immediate enjoyment. These objective consequences may themselves bring further enjoyment, or bring displeasure. As mentioned above, both the means of attaining an object, and the use of the desired object, will usually cause other consequences. The use of a thing imaginatively considered in light of such further consequences is intelligent use. The degree of intelligence displayed is proportional to the extent of consequences considered. The human use of things is always to some degree intelligent, as actual habitual human behavior displays. Indeed, only lower animals and plants are incapable of taking consequences into account. The consideration of consequences in pursuit of an end, which produces valuation judgments, requires a recognition of the continuity of means and ends. This recognition presents the opportunity taken by reflective inquiry to reconsider the means in relation to the end, or to reconsider the end in light of conflict with other ends.

Dewey uses a humorous tale told by Charles Lamb to illustrate the continuity of means and ends. The tale describes the discovery of roast pork.

Roast pork was first enjoyed when a house in which pigs were confined was accidentally burned down. While searching in the ruins, the owners touched the pigs that had been roasted in the fire and scorched their fingers. Impulsively bringing their

fingers to their mouths to cool them, they experienced a new taste. Enjoying the taste, they henceforth set themselves to building houses, inclosing pigs in them, and then burning the houses down.<sup>20</sup>

There is nothing stupid about such behavior if the enjoyment of ends is not affected by the means used to attain them. However, intelligent behavior would proceed from noticing that there is a possibility of attaining the enjoyment without so much wasted effort and time. In other words, the enjoyment as a value, as opposed to being merely an accidental enjoyment, is an enjoyment mediated by the means used. Pork roasted over a small safe cooking fire is a different value from pork roasted in a house fire.

The inevitable objection from sensationalistic psychology claims that this all may be true, but at least the sensation of taste is the same immediate feeling in both cases. This objection is raised in order to lend support to the notion that the end, the good, that is desired is only that immediate feeling, which cannot be colored or altered by intellectual ideas of the means. Dewey's reply to this objection points out that while it may be true that both enjoyments, when analyzed into simpler components, contain the same feeling of taste. But it is the peculiar presumption characteristically made by sensationalism that an element in an experience discerned by later analysis really is distinctly felt in the moment of the whole experience. Only if this presumption were true would this objection have any bearing on this issue. But this presumption is an example of what Dewey and William James called the psychologist's fallacy. We can focus on distinct portions of an experience with effort and concentration, but that portion emerges as distinct only in relations with other portions that are not experienced as relations in the original experience. We do not intelligently desire the immediate feeling, but rather the mediated enjoyment of something valuable.

Because the meaning of a value as an end is mediated by the means chosen to achieve it, where we alter the means we alter the end. This is why Dewey refers to the intelligent choice

of values as the construction of the good. Values do not exist prior to our valuing them, and no value stands as a final value. Values can always be reconstructed or abandoned in light of other choices of means and in light of conflicts with other values. Some values will get elevated over others as intelligence does its work, and for many people a supreme value may control their actions. But this does not affect the general point here: that values, precisely because their existence is mediated by available means and other existing values, are the creation of the intelligent consideration of values' natural contexts. This intelligent consideration can be done well or poorly, depending on the degree of sensitivity to conflicts and the degree of imaginative investigation into ways of resolving conflicts. Insensitivity to conflicts is a primary feature of childish behavior, when ends are haphazardly pursued regardless of the loss of other ends in the process. Small children do not reappraise their ends and hence cannot control or alter them, even though they can choose means in pursuit of ends. The choice of means in light of an end is but a rudimentary ability that does not yet qualify as a value judgment. Only when we notice conflicts between means chosen to an end and other ends, or between the achievement of one end and other ends, can we engage in problem-solving and the intelligent re-evaluation of ends. Problem-solving results in a valuation, where a new end and its means are proposed. This new end is called by Dewey as an end-in-view, because it is still only envisioned and not actually gained.

To emphasize this distinction, Dewey points out that an end-in-view is not a value, because a value is an actual enjoyment at the conclusion of the plan of action, while an end-in-view is a possible enjoyment prior to the execution of the plan of action. This distinction permits the recognition that a plan of action may fail, preventing an end-in-view from becoming a value. Thus a value is constructed by intelligence in a double sense. A value begins as a novel end-in-view proposed in a valuation to solve a conflict problem and hence does not yet exist. And when a value's plan of action is executed, the resulting value could not exist prior to that execution.

This theory that values are constructed by intelligence might seem to be antinaturalistic. Indeed it may seem to be the very opposite of naturalism by qualifying as idealistic instead. But Dewey's empirical metaphysics attempts to establish a constructivist and naturalistic theory of values. Empiricism rescues naturalism from transcendentalism and subjectivism, ensuring that values exist where they are experienced to be: in the natural world we inhabit. For example, a logger experiences a tree as a valuable tree, because the tree is considered in light of housing construction goals. This construction value of a tree does not exist in some supernatural realm apart from human beings and trees, and does not exist in some mental realm ontologically apart from trees. Both metaphysical options are ruled out by the nature of values as existing at the conclusion of valuation plans of action.

The execution of plans of action and their results are objectively real if anything is. A proposition that something is a value is a valuation statement to the effect that if a plan of action is carried out, a certain kind of enjoyment will result. Neither the hypothetical nature of a valuation proposition nor the inclusion of the term "enjoyment" can detract in any way from the objectively natural existence of a value. Science recognizes the factual and objective nature of similar hypothetical propositions such as "if water is cooled in a freezer under normal pressure to 32 degrees, it will become ice." And the mention of the term "enjoyment" cannot be relevant, since the science of medicine recognizes the objective nature of statements like "if a topical anaesthetic is applied to a mild burn, then the pain will subside." Values exist in the mutual interaction of human beings and things in their environment, and not exclusively in one or the other. In the two examples just given, a freezer and an anesthetic are values, just as much as the ice and the relief of pain are values. It might be supposed, wrongly, that neither the freezer nor the anesthetic qualifies as a value because both serve as means in my examples. But that would ignore the point made above concerning the continuity of means and ends. Means can be enjoyed as ends even while they carry us to further ends. There is no absolute categorization

and separation of means from ends, since any means can be enjoyed as an end and any end can be employed as a means to a further end. Dewey's pragmatic ethics likewise surmounts the traditional opposition of deontology and consequentialism. Neither rights nor goods possess intrinsic supremacy over the other, since rights may be means to the good, and vice versa.

Perhaps Dewey's definition of a value as an enjoyment can be turned against him, to argue that at least enjoyments must be values and never means. But it must be recalled that immediate enjoyments in and of themselves possess no value at all, and mediated enjoyments are values that can carry consequences beyond themselves toward other ends. Alternatively, it might be claimed that some things serve exclusively as means. However, the operation of tools can certainly be experienced as an enjoyment or as a suffering long before the operation is completed. Is a violinist unable to enjoy playing her violin before the concerto is done? Is a painter unable to enjoy using his paintbrush before the painting is completed? Now, these offered counter-examples may not strike you as fair, since it is obvious that in both cases, the use of the tool is the accomplishment of the end, since the playing is simultaneously creating the concerto and the painting is the simultaneous creating of the painting. This simultaneous use of means and the attainment of the end is exactly what Dewey means by the continuity of means and ends. If someone gets no enjoyment out of using the means precisely because their use is "merely" the attainment of the end, such a misfortune is just pathological and hardly paradigmatic of human experience. Concertos and paintings, like freezers and anesthetics, are objectively existing values that all can be enjoyed as ends even while they are employed as means to further ends.

#### **A PRAGMATIC METHOD OF DEMOCRACY**

Many if not most goods, such as concertos, are in the shared experience of cooperating people. Dewey often writes as though shared experience encompassed all genuine goods, but Dewey, like James and Ralph Waldo Emerson before him,

was capable of recognizing those experiences of high value that come in more private and reflective moments. Like John Stuart Mill, who opened the question of primacy to those who have sampled all varieties of pleasures, Dewey would only point out that as a matter of fact, most people prefer a good measure of social participation. And in the spirit of Henry David Thoreau, intelligence should be first directed to the study of immediate and communal living. "Self-reliance is significant because it makes you a good neighbor," Thoreau might have said. Community is not necessarily an evil, but what should be avoided is a false community seeking material efficiency through extreme specialization. Dewey's primary objection against industrialization was against its tendency to specialize, individualize, and isolate human experience, and against industrialization's restrictions on the possibility of sharing goods in genuinely communal experience.

Where social goods are concerned, valuation is necessarily social as well. Therefore, social intelligence is required to adjudicate among problematic and conflicting social goods. Social intelligence is pragmatic when people imaginatively reflect on social values together, aiming at the maximization of cooperation and enjoyment of social goods. Social intelligence is not displayed by individuals concerned only for their own happiness who compete for an outcome most favorable to themselves. Dewey's social philosophy therefore rejects Adam Smith's idea that social benefit naturally arises from selfishness, either in the marketplace offering priced goods or in the voting place offering office candidates. If any social goods are created by individual problem-solving, such goods are accidental, not socially deliberate.

The relationship between social goods and social ideals must be made clear. Dewey clearly distinguished their separate characters by explaining that a society does not primarily aim at conformity to social ideals, but rather, society aims at the social goods created by cooperative activity. Social ideals are norms of behavior expected of responsible adults that encourage cooperative activity. The most important moral standards of a society, to which all adults are held accountable, are not

important in themselves, but are important only because they serve to maintain cooperation. The role that ideals play in social intelligence is the same role played by ideas or images in any problem-solving effort. Ideals are available as ways of imaginatively picturing the consequences of possible actions that can be taken to resolve a problem of attaining a social good. We do not ask whether our actions conform to moral ideals as we unproblematically achieve social goods. Moral ideals are valued by a society because they have served in the past to resolve conflict, and moral ideals may be judged less valuable and replaced by other ideals if they should fail to resolve conflict in the future. A society's ability to consistently achieve social goods is the standard by which moral ideals are pragmatically judged. Dewey's Christian progressivism is democratic because he believed that the evolution of social ideals must occur over time as a democracy gradually improves its ability to attain social goods. Because education is essential to social problem resolution, education is therefore essential to the progress of a Christian democracy. Religion is not inconsistent with social intelligence and progress, so long as religious ideals are pragmatically judged by a democracy. Other kinds of political organization do not permit social intelligence to fully flourish.

Charles S. Peirce's categorization of four methods of belief fixation is a good model for studying the kinds of social intelligence. The four methods are tenacity, authority, a priori, and science.<sup>21</sup> Tenacity is the least intelligent, since merely believing something because it has so far been believed will only clash with others' opinions, and never produce cooperation. Fortunately, the clash of opinions is capable of wearing down absolute faith and usually produces doubt. Since doubt is inherently unsatisfactory, what really matters is the way that people may influence others' beliefs toward the reduction of doubt. The method of authority is the most primitive method of social intelligence. Influential institutions can produce high levels of cooperation for long periods of time, by temporarily establishing an illusion of absolute values. However, this illusion will eventually be dispelled because total control is

impossible for any institution, and because some acquaintance with different foreign values is inevitable. Without total control and total isolation, experimentation with novel ways of cooperating and awareness of new shared goods cannot be prevented. Dewey's "faith in the possibilities of human experience" is just his confidence in humanity's curiosity and courage. No single set of social goods or set of rights, particularly if they can only be enjoyed by a limited portion of humanity, can ever stand as the paradigm and proper destiny of human existence.

The unlikelihood (and the undesirability) of a universal authority seems to support social relativism as inevitable and final. The method of appeal to the a priori appears to prevent social relativism, but what is "rationally" chosen as the a priori is ultimately just a matter of relative satisfaction based on one's own prejudices. Peirce and the other pragmatists argued that the scientific method is the highest form of social intelligence. The key to scientific method is the scientific conception of a thing, which consists of all of our conceptions of that thing's effects on experience. Dewey's theory of valuation similarly takes a value to be a conception of the experienced effects of working to acquire, and successfully attaining, some objective. The scientific conception of a thing permits the public empirical testing and objective verification of that thing's value, by proposing a plan of action whose execution and results can be publicly observed. While Peirce understood science in a narrow sense, as concerned solely with the study of natural laws, Dewey found the scientific method in any mode of social intelligence that formulates and tests values scientifically.

Scientific social intelligence requires two features of a society to be present: the society is sensitive to social conflicts, and the society permits public investigation into ways of resolving conflicts. Democracy, according to Dewey, is the way of life that prominently displays both features. Democracy is impossible if there is not enough sensitivity to the problematic experiences of large portions of society, and democracy is also impossible if public investigations into possible conflict resolutions are obstructed. Authoritarian and totalitarian societies, because they rely on either the method of authority

or the a priori method, do not display both features. Only a democracy expects that those people who experience social problems should be the people who participate in the investigation of possible solutions and decide whether the experiments of proposed solutions are successful. Social intelligence is only possible in a democracy. This implies that in a democracy, no social values stand as fixed and final, but only as provisional and fallible. The social values and ideals of a democracy nevertheless possess an objectively natural existence, since they reside in the peoples' social experiences.

Dewey's vision of the proper functioning of democracy is grounded in the possibility that shared goods can be evaluated, reevaluated, and mutually adjusted in an intelligent and experimental social inquiry. For democracy to be intelligent, it cannot be merely the process of polling of individuals who vote only in light of their subjective desires. Democracy must instead be the process of group conflict-resolution using the highest ideals of the society. Democracy is the experimental method applied to the question: How can a community preserve and expand the shared experience of cooperation in the face of inevitable difficulties and conflicts? The community must apply democratic social intelligence in every aspect of its life.

Any component or institution of society that fails to exemplify democratic principles is an obstacle to education and thus an obstacle to genuine democracy.

The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion. And even as far as political arrangements are concerned, governmental institutions are but a mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation.<sup>22</sup>

Education is essential to democracy because it represents the progressive aspect of democratic problem-solving. Because education is essential to democracy and democracy must be a pervasive force throughout society, all social institutions must

support education. The explicitly political institutions of a democracy have an important role in value inquiry and conflict resolution, but education is the more fundamental engine of democracy.

I believe that the community's duty to education is, therefore, its paramount moral duty. By law and punishment, by social agitation and discussion, society can regulate and form itself in a more or less haphazard and chance way. But through education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move.<sup>23</sup>

Dewey advocated democracy in the workplace to liberate the problem-solving capacities of workers, to the benefit of themselves, employers, and all of society. Dewey advocated democracy for the control and operation of school systems, so that the public could evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the schools. Dewey advocated democracy in the classroom so that children will learn cooperative problem-solving by engaging in shared activities that require reflective thought. Dewey's social philosophy is a philosophy of democracy and thus must be a philosophy of education.



## CHAPTER 3

# THE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMOCRACY

INTERPRETATIONS OF JOHN DEWEY'S POLITICAL THEORY grasp his respect for public deliberation, but typically overlook his ethical justification for democracy. Dewey gave two primary reasons why democracy is superior to other forms of government. First, a public educated in the tools of social intelligence can be more effective at managing their social conflicts. Second, all people have an ethical right to become as valuable to their communities as they can become.

Dewey judged that only democracy ensures each person's ethical right to participate in social deliberation for the entire community's benefit. Dewey's model of social deliberation, "public deliberation polyarchy," applies a kind of "logic" for collective action, a process effective because of its ethical foundations.

### **PHILOSOPHICALLY JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY**

John Dewey developed sophisticated theories for a liberal civil society and a deliberative democracy. These theories have recently enjoyed renewed attention, discussion, and practical application.<sup>1</sup> However, no consensus on Dewey's primary theoretical strategies has yet emerged.<sup>2</sup> What precisely was

Dewey's justification for democracy and its superiority over other ways of life and forms of government? This chapter explains how Dewey attempted to formulate a philosophical justification for democracy on ethical grounds, rather than just epistemic or satisfaction maximization grounds alone. Provided with a solid ethical foundation, progressive and participatory democracy could become a practical, achievable, and highly rewarding endeavor for citizens. This chapter offers a detailed exploration of Dewey's attempted justifications for his democratic theory, which have eluded almost all political theorists, and until this essay have not been carefully analyzed. Criticisms of his political theory and its ethical foundations, practical inadequacies, and conceptual confusions are deferred for separate treatment. Deferred as well are comparisons between Dewey's position, classical liberalism, recent cosmopolitanism, and other political theories.

Like many great political philosophers before him, Dewey held that the proper function of politics is to manage social conflict for the benefit of all involved. This view of the proper function of politics alone, while concerned for the general good, does not rise to the ethical level expected in Dewey's political theory. Managed democracies, aristocracies, and the like, composed by those who possess better claim to know what is best for all, or merely those who exercise superior power that luckily benefits the whole, cannot receive approval from Dewey's ethical politics. Dewey did not justify democracy solely on the utility of social intelligence, and therefore his political theory cannot be criticized for overlooking how expert intelligence can sometimes outperform social intelligence. Dewey gave two primary reasons why democracy is superior to aristocracy or any other form of government. First, a people educated in the tools of social intelligence can be more effective at managing their social conflicts than any aristocracy of expertise. Second, all persons have a moral right to become as valuable to their communities as they can become. When combined, these two reasons for democracy's superiority result in Dewey's conclusion that only full participatory democracy can ensure each person's moral right to

participate in social deliberation for the entire community's benefit.

The particular type of participatory democracy designed by Dewey is what is here termed "public deliberation polyarchy." In public deliberation polyarchy, citizens motivated by common concerns organize into publics for political activism, and compete for the general public's sympathy and the government's attention. In Dewey's theory, voting is but one of many important activities that citizens can do to exercise their political power, and therefore pessimistic calculations about either the effectiveness or the rationality of voting are only marginally relevant to judging Dewey's model of democracy. Dewey's model of social deliberation, as will be explained, applies a radically different type of "logic" for collective action. What makes this logic of social deliberation effective for achieving democracy's aims, according to Dewey, is a solidly ethical foundation. Democracy essentially is a practical tool for important moral aims.

Dewey's political philosophy is explained by successively considering seven distinct views about his justification of democracy. We first look at some inadequate views, and in the course of demonstrating their failure to correctly interpret Dewey, we are led to more adequate approaches. The first three inadequate views to be discussed are here labeled the American Tradition Justification, the Rights Justification, and the Freedom Justification. After hearing what Dewey has to say about tradition, rights, and freedom, we then proceed to consider three better theories about how Dewey attempted to justify democracy, here called the Epistemic Justification, the Individualism Justification, and the Ethical Justification.

The Epistemic Justification is the interpretation of Dewey most widely adopted by knowledgeable scholars, and for good reason: it adequately captures Dewey's concerns for rights, freedoms, and social intelligence. However, it is unfortunate that too much of Dewey scholarship has been stalled at this stage of interpretation, because the Ethical Justification view is a far better interpretation of Dewey's justification of democracy. Going one final step further, key aspects of Dewey's ethical

theory, along with provocative writings of his later period, reveal that Dewey ultimately proposed the Moral Community Justification for progressive and participatory democracy. The Moral Community was, according to Dewey, both the practical pathway to democracy's fulfillment and the philosophical justification for democracy's superiority.

### THE AMERICAN TRADITION JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that confidence should be restored in traditional modes of democracy in America, such as the "town hall meeting."

According to this simplistic proposition about Dewey's fondness for democracy, he called for America to preserve its traditions of small town and rural agrarian democracy during a time of accelerating urbanization and industrialization. The American Tradition Justification is a severe distortion of Dewey, because (1) nowhere in his writings does Dewey use small town democracy as a positive inspiration for modern political theory; and (2) Dewey never thought that specific forms of political machinery were sacred or intrinsically better for all times and conditions.

Dewey's political theory does tightly link "community" and "democracy" as mutually supportive structures. Dewey often sought ways to strengthen the social bonds of communities in order to build a workable democratic politics, which in turn fosters the kinds of liberties needed for the growth of new communities. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Dewey's reference to "community" is a sign only pointing backwards to tradition. Critics have perhaps been misled by Dewey's suggestion (in *The Public and Its Problems*) that small town life provides an example of a democratic community.<sup>3</sup> Dewey could not fail to acknowledge a prominent example from the historical origins of democratic community in America. However, after this passage he recounts the emergence of large cities, powerful states, and a strong national government. Noting that this momentum

could not be reversed, and that the founders' image of America is hopelessly inadequate today, Dewey declares that "The community pattern is more complicated, but is not destroyed."<sup>4</sup> Although small-town life can be an example of a genuine community, Dewey did not mean to say that it should be the only or even best form of community life. In *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey explores ways to grow communities appropriate to urban civic life, and offers a vision of a genuinely moral community adequate for large populations, the Great Community.

By taking a historical perspective on democracy's evolution, Dewey never supposed that some specific form of political machinery could be justified for all times and places. Town hall democracy could not be exalted as approaching perfection; indeed, specific democratic institutions must not be confused with the ideal of democracy itself. He wrote, "There is no sanctity in universal suffrage, frequent elections, majority rule, congressional and cabinet government."<sup>5</sup> By sharply distinguishing the "democratic idea" from any concrete democratic institution, Dewey refused to define democracy primarily in terms of some set of political practices.

This distinction provides for Dewey's pragmatic ground from which he can criticize actual institutions, according to whether they serve current needs of advancing democracy. However, what is Dewey's "democratic idea"? Dewey does have a sophisticated idea of democracy, and it has a great deal to do with the rights and freedoms so important for democracy.

### THE RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that democracy is the best form of government because it is grounded in basic rights for citizens, rights that Dewey consistently defended.

Dewey was a staunch and vocal advocate for a wide variety of crucial political and civil rights. He was a founding member of the NAACP and advocated for women's suffrage. No public intellectual of his era was a more vigorous advocate of the

rights of equal protection, free speech, voluntary association, due process, and political activism. However, the Rights Justification wrongly depicts Dewey as a political theorist who supposes that some basic rights can be identified and justified independently from broader social and political contexts. For Dewey, the opposite is the case: the existence of rights is dependent on broader social and political contexts. Dewey continually cast scorn upon any notion, however central to past liberal reforms, that human nature could help justify the existence of "natural" rights and produce any type of democracy: "We cannot continue the idea that human nature when left to itself, when freed from external arbitrary restrictions, will tend to the production of democratic institutions that work successfully."<sup>6</sup> Dewey did not doubt that an evolutionarily robust set of distinctive human instincts and traits characterize the species and permit its sociality. However, such social elements are evidently compatible with a very wide array of social structures and governments proven viable across human history.

The Rights Justification distorts Dewey because (1) Dewey argued that there really are no basic rights in the sense of "absolute," "permanent," or "natural" rights; (2) Dewey always talked of rights as contextual, provisional, and hypothetical tools for dealing with the needs of social organization; and (3) Dewey believed that rights are social artifacts, created by society's bestowal of specialized responsibilities in the course of advancing the common good.

The social context of rights was a consistent theme in Dewey's political theory:

The social factor in rights is made explicit in the demand that the power in question be exercised in certain ways. A right is never a claim to a wholesale, indefinite activity, but to a defined activity; to one carried on, that is, under certain conditions. This limitation constitutes the obligatory phases of every right. The individual is free; yes, that is his right. But he is free to act only according to certain regular and established conditions . . . . Absolute rights, if we mean by absolute those not

relative to any social order and hence exempt from any social restriction, there are none. But rights correspond even more intrinsically to obligations. The right is itself a social outcome: it is the individual's in so far as he is himself a social member not merely physically, but in his habits of thought and feeling. He is under obligation to use his rights in social ways.<sup>7</sup>

Dewey's progressive liberalism does not accept the explanation that the political realm must artificially establish rights, as rights cannot be found in individuals. While rights are not grounded in people as individuals, there is a social sphere of duties and rights that exists prior to, and relatively independent from, any political rights. A government is not instituted to protect individual rights, but rather to advance social welfare, and it undertakes this task by adding a layer of political duties and rights to those already functioning for the social sphere. Not only are there no pre-society property rights or voting rights, all civil rights are likewise outgrowths from social progress: "It must be realized that civil rights, liberty of speech, assembly, publication, are not merely individual rights, but are essential to the welfare, the healthy growth, of society."<sup>8</sup> Government should respect individuals' rights (for example, judges should start from the existence of current rights), but the question of which rights people have must be decided by public deliberation about the social good. Similarly, the search for social progress by various societies will never converge on a single way of life, so there is no reasonable hope for empirically discovering a single best system of rights or of justice.<sup>9</sup>

Dewey does have many things to say about the concept of rights generally, which can only be summarized here. Negative rights, the guaranteed freedoms from public intervention and control, are indeed valuable according to Dewey, but other goods are also important and perhaps sometimes more important. For example, the category of positive rights, those rights that require public aid to provide some needed goods to people who cannot obtain them by themselves, will be valued much more highly by someone in a situation where negative rights alone are leaving them out of work, homeless, and starving.

Defenders of negative rights (such as libertarians) complain that any positive right must violate some negative right, but always prioritizing negative rights is a questionable (and unrealistic) presumption. Dewey's political theory instead finds that it is reasonable for real people in their actual social situations to deliberate over the relative prioritization of negative and positive rights, and to make pragmatic choices depending on their circumstances. Rather than obey some previous generation's list of preferred rights, Dewey expected the people to periodically reconsider the value and efficacy of their rights, and to use all available methods of nonviolent social change from voting and petitioning to marching in order to achieve the modification or supplementation of those rights (Dewey himself took part in a march in New York City for women's suffrage, as biographers recount).

Furthermore, Dewey could not regard negative rights as sufficient for democracy, emphasizing that citizenship rights always carry responsibilities over and above correlate duties to avoid harming others. While Dewey did believe that democracy should deliberate about, and staunchly protect, some robust negative rights and some robust positive rights, Dewey's political theory also proposes a third category of rights. He did not attach a label to this category, so I suggest the label of *empowerment rights*. A simple example is my right to drive a car. This right cannot be easily categorized as a negative right or a positive right, since the government may interfere with the way I drive, and the government requires that I drive responsibly for the good of others as well as my own good. My right to drive a car is a right earned by learning how to drive safely and obey traffic laws. It is also a right with responsibilities attached, since my right can be taken away if I fail to drive safely and legally. Empowerment rights are rights that empower a person to pursue their own good in some specified way under the responsibility requirement that they simultaneously exercise that pursuit in a way consistent with the greater good. A license to practice medicine is another common example of an empowerment right.

It may be the responsibility of the government to help people gain empowerment rights, if having those

empowerment rights is a sufficiently crucial community good. These “community” empowerment rights would therefore be rights in which the government has the duty to empower a person for some capacity because that person can responsibly exercise that capacity for his or her own good and the community good. Dewey regarded three kinds of rights as necessary for the proper functioning of democracy. Dewey’s understanding of freedom is similarly sophisticated, as he also demands that freedoms be understood in their social context, and comprehended as more than just liberties.

### THE FREEDOM JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that democracy’s emphasis on human liberty provides a better opportunity for the people to enjoy freedoms: such as freedom of one’s chosen way of life, or freedom of thought, or freedom to enjoy the growth of experience.

While freedoms in a thin sense exist prior to and independent of any political society, such freedoms have little significance or value. What people really want is never simply freedom in itself but rather real capacities: actual abilities to accomplish chosen goals. Because most of our capacities are developed and maintained by cooperation and instruction from others, capacities are typically social in nature. Like rights, the freedoms worth valuing exist only in a social context. Dewey writes,

Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action.<sup>10</sup>

The freedom justification falls short of capturing Dewey’s approach to politics because (1) Dewey considered negative freedoms (placing restrictions on others from obstructing one’s own efforts to achieve aims) to be inferior to positive freedoms

(one's real capacities to actually achieve intelligently considered aims); (2) Dewey never approved of such freedoms for their own sake, but always talked about freedoms in relation to the ultimate freedom to be intelligent; and (3) Dewey wanted freedoms to empower individuals for positively enhancing the social good. Liberty is indeed a supreme value of life. Yet its social nature, evident in both liberty's causes and consequences, supplies both its justification and its limits. Like his position on civil rights, Dewey was explicit about the social nature and justification of civil liberties:

The only hope for liberalism is to surrender, in theory and practice, the doctrine that liberty is a full-fledged ready-made possession of individuals independent of social institutions and arrangements, and to realize that social control, especially of economic forces, is necessary in order to render secure the liberties of the individual, including civil liberties.<sup>11</sup>

Liberties must be coordinated, not merely with each other, but more importantly with the pursuit of the social good of all:

Unless freedom of individual action has intelligence and informed conviction back of it, its manifestation is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder. The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual to *do* as he pleases, even if it be qualified by adding "provided he does not interfere with the same freedom on the part of others." While the idea is not always, not often enough, expressed in words, the basic freedom is that of freedom of *mind* and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce freedom of intelligence. The modes of freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are all of this nature: Freedom of belief and conscience, of expression of opinion, of assembly for discussion and conference, of the press as an organ of communication. They are guaranteed because without them individuals are not free to develop and society is deprived of what they might contribute.<sup>12</sup>

Freedoms must be harmonized because a person's free activities may interfere with, or completely eliminate, other persons'

opportunities for their own free activities. The attainment of any sort of balancing of freedoms, especially such balances as may improve society, requires thoughtful adjustment of limitations on peoples' freedoms.

There could not possibly be any a priori method of setting such limits, since the modes of human action and types of social relations are innumerable and constantly growing, and the prioritization of those modes would have to be determined in advance for all. An a priori method would therefore proceed only by artificially limiting modes of action and imposing a prioritization on the people. The alternative to totalitarianism is democracy: the people themselves thoughtfully adjusting their freedoms in light of their priorities. For Dewey, this is the genuine significance of liberty:

Liberty to think, inquire, discuss, is central in the whole group of rights which are secured in theory to individuals in a democratic social organization. It is central because the essence of the democratic principle is appeal to voluntary disposition instead of to force, to persuasion instead of coercion. Ultimate authority is to reside in the needs and aims of individuals as these are enlightened by a circulation of knowledge, which in turn is to be achieved by free communication, conference, discussion.<sup>13</sup>

Democracy is essentially the peaceful and thoughtful effort to justly balance freedoms among persons, and therefore is a type of nonviolent conflict resolution. The proper justification of democracy, for Dewey, must be more about ethical social participation than about personal liberty.

### THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey proposed that democracy's mode of public deliberation allows participants to learn how to peacefully resolve their social problems in the political sphere.

Dewey argued that citizenship in a democracy requires a small number of essential community empowerment rights that revolve around key civic virtues that promote tolerance for

diversity, capacity for cooperation, and effectiveness in group deliberation. Dewey's theory of progressive democracy is a vision of the intelligent methods of public deliberation that permit genuine "self-rule" by the body of citizens. Civic education in Dewey's sense, as developing capacities for the problem solving of public conflict resolution, is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy.<sup>14</sup>

The epistemic justification accounts for Dewey's abiding concern for not merely the education and intelligence of the masses, but specifically for people's capacity to participate in group problem solving about social conflicts. Dewey labels this capacity "organized intelligence" or "social intelligence":

Of course, there are conflicting interests; otherwise there would be no social problems. The problem under discussion is precisely how conflicting claims are to be settled in the interest of the widest possible contribution to the interests of all—or at least of the great majority. The method of democracy—insofar as it is that of organized intelligence—is to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately. . . . What generates violent strife is failure to bring the conflict into the light of intelligence where the conflicting interests can be adjudicated in behalf of the interest of the great majority.<sup>15</sup>

Dewey found in social intelligence the resources to reply to the oft-made accusation that decisions by majority rule are only rarely and coincidentally the wisest course. Dewey never thought that participatory democracies always produce the best results, especially according to current standards of justice or public welfare. All the same, our current standards are largely the result of past democratic deliberations and emerging majority decisions, and not from expert punditry or dictatorial fiat.

For Dewey, public conflict resolution is typically improved as more citizens are involved in its deliberations. Where fears

are justified that some given number of citizens are inadequate for resolving a novel problem, such as matters of international or even global concern, expanding the number of citizens involved is preferable to the alternative of handing over decisions of such vast magnitude to self-proclaimed experts. Comparisons with cosmopolitanism are beyond the scope of this article (readers may have noticed considerable overlap with cosmopolitanism already), yet it deserves mention that no one should assume that Dewey designed his theory of democracy solely for domestic politics sequestered within countries. Rather, Dewey insisted that democracy flourishes where all those affected can participate in deliberations regardless of recognized citizenship (in other words, citizenship is a by-product of effective participation, not the other way around). Yet mass deliberations can be slow and unsteady. Aristocracies always pride themselves on their speedy resolutions, since far fewer people are involved, and aristocracies also conveniently self-select their members by pre-established criteria of mutual admiration and agreement. However, these are not conditions favorable to the sort of robust inquiry and deliberation that Dewey has in mind.

Larger majorities have greater epistemic validity than smaller majorities or tiny minorities, where general social welfare is concerned:

The ballot is, as often said, a substitute for bullets. But what is more significant is that counting of heads compels prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion, while the essence of appeal to force is to cut short resort to such methods. Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule. As a practical politician, Samuel J. Tilden, said a long time ago: "The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing": antecedent debates, modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities, the relative satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that next time it may be successful in becoming a majority.<sup>16</sup>

Although Dewey calls for enhancing the social conditions permitting democracy to be more intelligent, many Dewey commentators have complained that he offers no pragmatic theory of the actual “machinery” of democratic deliberation. Perhaps they get distracted by Dewey’s own clumsy political activities and forget to look for political theory in his writings. It is at least clear that Dewey did not intend to hand over the government to expert intellectual elites, unlike critics such as his contemporary, Walter Lippmann. Lippmann derides participatory democracy, describing ordinary citizens as too ignorant, apathetic, and selfish to be capable of helping to govern for the public good.<sup>17</sup> Dewey’s political theory answers each of these charges made against citizens.

The method of intelligence, according to Dewey, is first and foremost the logical process of problem solving. Confidence in democracy is therefore confidence in the intelligence of citizens to resolve social conflicts.

Democracy is a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished . . . . For what is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long run is self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man to respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured by effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free communication?<sup>18</sup>

Commentators have not yet noticed something highly interesting about Dewey’s theory of problem solving and his theory of “publics”: the stages of each process match step for step. This is not a coincidence, but a confirmation that Dewey had concrete proposals for how democracy can pragmatically work in America. First, the stages of *scientific inquiry*, according to Dewey’s *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. (1) A problem with habitual conduct arises. (2) The prevailing natural conditions are surveyed to discover which features of the situation are relevant to the problem.

(3) Hypotheses are formulated to suggest a course of action to resolve the problem. (4) One hypothesis is selected for experiment and its consequences are observed. (5) The problem is either solved, or the process returns to stage 2.

Second, the stages of *public inquiry*, according to Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*. (1) A number of people become collectively aware that they suffer from the same social problem, and if they have sufficient interest and energy to work together on this problem, they form a "public." (2) This new public, perhaps with the aid of social scientists, survey social conditions to identify which are probably responsible. (3) Hypotheses are formulated by this public, perhaps in alliance with other publics, to suggest what modifications to social structures and/or norms may alleviate the social problem. (4) If persuaded, a majority of the Public (the whole body of citizens) agrees to experiment with one of the proposed social modifications, pressures branches of local, state, and/or federal government to implement the modifications, and the experiment's consequences are observed. (5) The social problem is either alleviated sufficiently so that the public loses energy/members, or the process returns to stage 2.

Both processes of inquiry presuppose some degree of community goodwill and respect for all participants, even as these processes encourage fierce competition between subgroup aims. This is the essence of democratic polyarchy: Political power is distributed over many energetic publics competing for community and government attention to their aims (such as political parties, religious organizations, businesses, unions, political action committees, trade groups, grassroots community groups, charities, etc.). Furthermore, both processes of inquiry assume the existence of routes of communication for sustaining both the community over the long run and for supporting the emergence of new publics to compete with each other over the short run.

Robert Dahl proposed the term "polyarchy" as a label for a society with political structures and norms that protected fair and effective competition among politically active citizens and their organized groups. Dewey's theory of political democracy

could be labeled “public deliberation polyarchy.”<sup>19</sup> Dewey does agree with Dahl that a genuine democracy will facilitate the uprising of activist and protest groups, what Dewey labeled publics, by providing conditions for easy communication, free association, and honest media information. Furthermore, a genuine democracy will provide the sort of civic education that fosters mutual respect and appreciation for all members of society, and teaches the skills of collective problem solving. If a democracy can meet these minimal requirements, then those publics that do arise can frequently get a fair hearing before the entire community—the Public. Such a democratic society would also be more resistant to authoritarian temptations, which critics of liberal democracy fear would be irresistible to an undereducated and apathetic populace.

Dewey does not assume that those benefiting the most from the existing social structure will lead the way to progress; indeed, his theory of democratic publics assumes that the opposite will remain the case. This is why he is so skeptical toward elitist theories of democracy (like Lippmann’s) that suppose that a class of comfortable intellectuals will work for the benefit of the entire society. Those benefiting least have the most problems to complain about, and have the most determination to cause change, all other things being equal. Of course, things are rarely so equal—social structure and ideology obstruct the recognition of severe social problems even by the sufferers. Still, Dewey places the primary responsibility for attempting change upon those who suffer the problems. This seems profoundly unjust in spirit, but Dewey feared the alternative even more: placing the primary responsibility for detecting and solving social ills upon the shoulders of those who do not feel that suffering. Those who suffer must organize, protest, and propose change. This is Dewey’s naturalistic theory of cultural evolution: cultural evolution is not pulled by a supreme beneficent power but is instead pushed by the experimental testing of innumerable small and gradual modifications.

Because politics proceeds incrementally, Dewey’s citizens need not each be the all-around political expert that Lippmann

supposes would be required to make participatory democracy work. Against Lippmann's charge of citizen ignorance, Dewey answers that organized publics can be very intelligent, especially when many intellectuals work for them. Against the charge of apathy, Dewey answers that members of publics can be highly motivated, especially when they see evidence that their time, energy, and money is making a difference. Against the charge of selfishness, Dewey expects that citizens who demand that their suffering be recognized also be capable of caring about the suffering of others (here again civic education is crucial), so that publics and the citizens that make up the Public can view the democratic process as a potential win-win situation and not as a zero-sum game.

As demonstrated by this brief sketch of Dewey's theory of public deliberation polyarchy, he was concerned to offer multiple ways of seeing how democratic deliberation, as opposed to the deliberations of elites, could improve the resolution of social conflicts. For many commentators, this ability of democracy constitutes Dewey's best justification for democracy: democracy is the more practical tool for social conflict resolution for the social good. After all, a pragmatist should try to justify the social institution of democracy by its practicality.

Nevertheless, there are four major difficulties with taking the epistemic justification to be Dewey's ultimate justification for democracy. First, Dewey preferred to speak primarily of democracy as "a way of life" for all members of society and only secondarily as a mode of political activity for energized citizens. Second, Dewey regarded universal adult suffrage as essential to genuine democracy, rejecting the notion that only sufficiently capable deliberators should be politically active. Third, Dewey was always concerned that democracy be designed to idealistically search for the welfare of *all* members of society, and not for only what actual adult political participants view as good for themselves individually or collectively. Fourth, democracy considered merely as a practical method for resolving social conflicts supplies but a vague criterion for actually gauging social progress.

Dewey's primary justification of democracy is not its practicality for experimenting with solutions to social conflicts (though he often enough pointed out this virtue). Nor does he justify participatory democracy by claiming that democracies even frequently achieve improved welfare for all society (although that frequency is greater in the long run than any aristocracy or monarchy). Rather, like all other kinds of genuine inquiry, it is the committed search for the general good, and not its guaranteed achievement by some transcendent criterion, that characterizes democracy.

Any advocate, like Dewey, for participatory democracy is targeted by the criticism that "the general good" is hardly a reasonable goal, because the notion is either incoherent or simply impractical. However, his theory of democracy does not require achieving at one stroke the greatest welfare for all (there can't be a formula for determining that), but it only demands our best efforts at incrementally moving toward that ideal goal through social change—and there is no lack of evidence that democratic societies have accomplished such movements. Knowing that one's society has shown fidelity to an ideal ethical goal by eliminating a social problem or conflict is quite possible, even if no one can precisely say what a society entirely fulfilling that ethical goal would look like.

Ethical ideals are too distant and vague for serving as immediate measures of social welfare, yet they still have their proper function for guiding democracies. One wishes for more specific and detailed guidance when democratic progress is unsteady, but there is no precise criterion of "the good" or "the right" to resort to when participatory democracies stumble, stalemate, or stagnate. Complaining that democracies occasionally require supplementation from other sources (pure reason? God?) is far more unrealistic than the hopes for democracy. Besides, democracy at its best, for Dewey, is a gradually self-corrective mode of social inquiry, akin to science. Where do critics of democracy suppose absolute rights and values will arrive from? One might as well complain that scientific inquiry is inefficient compared to simply knowing nature trans-empirically. Science rightly replies that only more scientific inquiry can

supply needed clues for improving scientific methods. Democracy is inefficient, to be sure, but democracy is humanity's own social technology only to be gradually improved by more democracy by the people. Democracy's current foundations consist of our highest ethical ideals and already achieved political structures, and not any sort of transcendent or a priori principles.

Ultimately, Dewey demanded that all of society have equal opportunity to participate in deliberative politics and enjoy the benefits of social progress. His debate with Lippmann demonstrates this appeal. Lippmann's main argument for elitist democracy was precisely that it was the most practical: an intellectual aristocracy could, arguably, best resolve social conflicts for the social good. Dewey rejected such an aristocracy, not by any empirical evidence of participatory democracy's actual effectiveness (although he believed that adequate evidence was obvious), but because Dewey was more interested in defending the essence of democracy by concentrating on the ethical treatment of the actual people that compose society:

For democracy signifies, on one side, that every individual is to share in the duties and rights belonging to control of social affairs, and, on the other side, that social arrangements are to eliminate those external arrangements of status, birth, wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each individual for full development of himself. On the individual side, it takes as the criterion of social organization and of law and government release of the potentialities of individuals. On the social side, it demands cooperation in place of coercion, voluntary sharing in a process of mutual give and take, instead of authority imposed from above. As an ideal of social life in its political phase it is much wider than any form of government, although it includes government in its scope. As an ideal, it expresses the need for progress beyond anything yet attained; for nowhere in the world are there institutions which in fact operate equally to secure the full development of each individual, and assure to all individuals a share in both the values they contribute and those they receive.<sup>20</sup>

Dewey's basic political orientation aligns him with much of the political tradition of republicanism (though he rarely discussed it directly in his writings, for it wasn't as common a political term then). Republicanism stresses that citizenship is not defined by the citizen's relationship to a government, but rather by the citizen's relationship to fellow citizens. That relationship must be one of political equality and non-domination among peers, so that the body of citizens may freely exercise the capacity for self-ruling power.<sup>21</sup>

A republican conception of "equal opportunity" accordingly finds that everyone should have an equal opportunity to become empowered for meaningful political participation. Such opportunity must be provided by the public's attainment of those community empowerment rights, through civic education, needed in the political sphere. If Dewey is related to republicanism, only a very expansive republicanism could serve. Narrow versions of republicanism requiring ethnic homogeneity, nationalistic heritage, and the like cannot find any home in Dewey's political theory.

This broad political equality, with the proviso that Dewey demanded universal adult suffrage, is Dewey's primary understanding of equal opportunity (without denying that there are other needed forms of equal opportunity in the economic or social spheres). Equality of political empowerment and participation comes in many forms; there are numerous capacities for political involvement besides public conflict resolution that will not be discussed here. However, given that democracies will contain many social groups pursuing diverse values and hence causing many social conflicts, stable and peaceful democracies should pursue public conflict resolution.

Civic education for all, according to Dewey, is the instrument making the social intelligence of public deliberation possible in a republican democracy. In this sense, Dewey freely applied the label of "liberalism" to his political theory, writing that "Liberalism has to assume the responsibility for making it clear that intelligence is a social asset and is clothed with a function as public as is its origin, in the concrete, in social cooperation."<sup>22</sup> Dewey's political theory is thus

a version of that fruitful convergence of republicanism and liberal democracy found in many modern thinkers. Dewey's public deliberation polyarchy rests on the grounding principle that the dignity and self-fulfillment of every person should be of community concern.

### THE INDIVIDUALISM JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that democracy's emphasis on individuals is the essence of liberalism, which always seeks to expand opportunities for all individuals.

According to the individualism justification, democracy is justified by its foundational respect for the value and importance of all persons. Dewey repeatedly used the concept of equal opportunity to indicate how every person's capacities for successful living must have social standing and importance. He declared, "The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has."<sup>23</sup> Dewey explicitly connected the practical success of democracy with its promotion of equal opportunity for all. He argued that the effectiveness of social problem solving is diminished if there are some members of society incapacitated for political participation. His theory of public deliberation polyarchy places the burden of noticing social problems and energizing publics upon the common people. Furthermore, there is no good sense in artificially limiting the portion of society fit for public deliberation: the more minds involved, the better, has been the modern scientific motto. Ensuring equal opportunity for civic life makes double sense in a democracy: democracy is supposed to be for the people, and also by the people, to borrow Lincoln's phrase:

As far as I can see, the hope of maintaining democracy lies in using the enormous resources that science has put in our hands to inaugurate not merely an age of material plenty and

material security, but also of cultural equality of opportunity—the opportunity of every individual to develop to his full capacity.<sup>24</sup>

This individualistic foundation for democracy must not be confused with that “rugged” individualism that from time to time has dominated the myths of the American dream. The notion of rugged individualism also appealed to the ideal of “equal opportunity” while ignoring the balancing ideal of social responsibility for enabling such opportunity.

Consistent with his refusal to prioritize negative rights, Dewey sought social harmony and justice elsewhere, as noted above in the discussion of positive rights and empowerment rights. The individualism justification captures Dewey's demand that society take responsibility for people's capacities. For example, Dewey argued that education should be life-long; retraining of adults for new jobs must be state-supported. Dewey's preference for socialism, requiring both legislative restraint upon business and ample state funding for empowering individuals, is accounted for with the individualism justification.

There remain two major problems for the individualism justification. (1) Given Dewey's objections to excessive individualism, what sort of individuality does Dewey want? (2) How does Dewey explain why all human beings should enjoy equal opportunities? Dewey's writings supply his clear answers to these valid questions, by moving to the realm of morality.

### THE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that democracy's equal concern for the welfare of all persons supplies the ultimate ethical ground for the superiority of democracy.

According to this justification, a firm commitment to an ethical principle of moral equality for all people grounds Dewey's variety of individualism. This principle of human moral equality (elaborated in the next section on the Moral

Community) is universal in the sense that Dewey intended to include all humanity regardless of cultural differences and regardless of whether democracy yet prevails in all societies. Dewey's conception of this "human equality" is not grounded in any physical or material equality, supposed or real: we are firmly in the ethical realm of how people should be treated.

Dewey's demand for the universal application of this principle of human moral equality should not be confused with any sort of ethical universalism or absolutism, which instead searches for timelessly and rationally valid moral truths that can never change. As a pragmatist, Dewey had no place in his philosophy for such quests. All the same, his democratic political theory is expressly grounded in a principled morality of human equality. Dewey discerned such a principle in the Founders' intentions:

With the founders of American democracy, the claims of democracy were inherently one with the demands of a just and equal morality . . . . [W]hat they asserted was that self-governing institutions are the means by which human nature can secure its fullest realization in the greatest number of persons . . . . We have advanced far enough to say that democracy is a way of life. We have yet to realize that it is a way of personal life and one which provides a moral standard for personal conduct.<sup>25</sup>

Discovering the fuller import of Dewey's phrase above that "democracy is a way of life" must await the moral community justification (below), toward which the ethical justification leads. What is already apparent is Dewey's effort to bond together morality and politics in a way that modern liberalism has typically avoided. In the next selected passage, Dewey offers one of the most robust and detailed formulations of his ethical principle of equality for democracy:

From the ethical point of view, therefore, it is not too much to say that the democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize the development of each

individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. It expresses a postulate in the sense of a demand to be realized: That each individual shall have the opportunity for release, expression, fulfillment, of his distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall further the establishment of a fund of shared values. Like every true ideal, it signifies something to be done rather than something already given, something ready-made. Because it is something to be accomplished by human planning and arrangement, it involves constant meeting and solving of problems—that is to say, the desired harmony never is brought about in a way which meets and forestalls all future developments.<sup>26</sup>

For Dewey's progressive liberalism, democratic individualism must evolve toward democratic socialism: the expansion of every individual's capacities and powers is precisely the process of social coordination requiring some political management.

Dewey was hardly the first political theorist to identify the function of politics as managing the social coordination of everyone's proper development. This view of politics has resulted in theories across the centuries, which defend autocracy, aristocracy, fascism, communism, as well as varieties of democracy. These theories almost always start from some concrete notion of what constitutes a person's proper development. Dewey's progressive liberalism is nearly unique because it offers no specific concept of what could constitute a person's proper development. Dewey's writings are replete with pleas for the development and empowerment of people's abilities. But nowhere can Dewey say anything specific about the best character traits or the finest virtues or the best way of life for a person in general. There is no specific human *telos* in Dewey's philosophy. Dewey deliberately refuses to give any such specifics: Dewey has no idea what those things are. His ignorance is a key foundation to his theory of democracy. And Dewey would make us see that his ignorance should be our ignorance. No one could know what a human being ought to become.

We can still have some ideas about what a human being ought *not* to become. There should be moral and political constraints upon what a person should become, constraints that follow from the ethical principle that all people should have the equal opportunity to realize their potential. Political theories have typically remained focused on constraints, because that is the far easier problem to solve: given a conception of the human *telos*, and a notion of the social coordination required for groups to attain their *telos* together, the needed constraints on human behavior can be derived fairly easily. Dewey's political theory has no conception of human *telos* and only an understanding of many of the forms of social coordination tried so far. That's how Dewey derives his theory of democracy: the people themselves must take the responsibility for exploring their potentials and coordinating their common search using novel social organizations. Democracy is an endless experiment designed and conducted by the people themselves.

Dewey believed that democracy's equal concern for the welfare of all persons supplies the ultimate ethical ground for the superiority of democracy. Yet this ethical justification stage is not the final stage of understanding Dewey's political theory and his justification for his specific type of liberal democracy. Two crucial questions must be asked. First, even if the welfare of *all* ought to be of supreme concern, how is it possible to find such concern manifested in each person's experience of community life? And second, what would a democracy that actually approaches this ideal of moral equality actually look like?

#### THE MORAL COMMUNITY JUSTIFICATION

The proposition: Dewey believed that democracy is the form of social and political organization that naturally fulfills the ethical criterion of the genuine community: that all people are committed to the principle of moral equality.

This proposition is Dewey's ultimate justification for democracy. This justification does not rest on the principle that

each person possesses supreme moral value. Although Dewey believed this principle to be true, he also viewed it as an inadequate abstraction. Taken too concretely, this principle can lead back to the excessive individualism behind the notions of absolute rights and liberties.

Although each person must have the opportunity for personal development, that development does not take place in a vacuum. The social context of personal development is fairly acknowledged by defenders of individual rights and personal autonomy, who well understand that firm constraints on everyone's conduct are required to prevent society from overwhelming the individual. The evident need for firm restraints facilitated the notion of political equality, while a conception of moral equality required longer germination. Democracy's early forms prioritized political equality to reinforce restraint, upon the peoples' conduct for each other and also upon the government's conduct toward the people. For classical eighteenth-century liberalism, rights and autonomy were deemed sufficient foundations for democratic government. However, the responsibilities of each person were thereby conceived primarily as responsibilities to refrain from certain conduct (e.g., the prevalence of negative rights). Nineteenth-century utilitarianism added the demand that citizens exercising their self-ruling power should also search for ways to increase the common good and overall happiness of the people. Unfortunately, the contradictions between simultaneously trying to protect individuals from society and trying to increase overall social welfare were inescapable and unsolvable. Liberalism and utilitarianism were headed for a collision precisely because they agreed on the centrality of the individual qua individual, making it difficult to justify personal sacrifice for the greater good. Compromise forms of political liberalism then proliferated across the landscape of twentieth-century political theory as various combinations and relations of deontological and utilitarian principles suggested themselves.

Dewey proposed a radical way to transcend this impasse: each person should conceive of his or her own good as integrally connected with the welfare of all others. But why

should people accept this conception? As an empirical question, whether one's good will be positively related to the social good may be statistically evaluated. Even if this positive correlation is valid for the vast majority of people in most sorts of societies, as Dewey believes, this empirical fact is not a sufficiently secure foundation for democracy. Rather, Dewey specifically proposed that a person should highly value the common good precisely because it is the common good and not merely because that person finds the common good to be also good for him or her individually. Dewey realized that a severe obstacle to encouraging people to highly value the common good is the notion that the person *qua* individual is the supreme locus of moral and political value. That individualism obscures the realization of community. A community for Dewey is more than just a voluntary association of people cooperating for some common goal: additionally, the members of this social group all work to sustain this group because they value the fact that all are benefitting, and not merely because they are personally benefitting. In a genuine community, occasional sacrifice for others is easily accounted for; altruism is not mysterious or irrational. The community, defined in this way by Dewey, supplies the way of life vital to democracy:

Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. . . . Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.<sup>27</sup>

On Dewey's definition of community, it is not necessary for people to value others as highly as they value themselves; no radical egalitarianism lurks here. Obviously, communities will fall apart if too many people feel that excessive sacrifice is demanded of them. All the same, communities must be glued together by some powerful form of mutual regard and concern

in order to function well and enjoy longevity. Dewey argued that the political principles of restraint formulated by classical liberalism cannot generate that degree of mutual regard and concern, since they proceed from an excessive regard for personal value.

What foundation for the community could simultaneously supply the justification for political restraint and also the motivation for a high degree of mutual regard and concern? Dewey offers an ethical foundation: the community's members are faithfully committed to the principle of moral equality. This commitment may be manifested in a wide variety of ways, too many to be enumerated. At minimum each person's commitment to moral equality is embodied in his or her moral experience of community life. In *The Public and Its Problems* Dewey envisions a genuinely moral community adequate for large populations: the Great Community. In the Great Community, everyone's moral experience of conducting all social relationships in the spirit of equality supplies the motivation that each citizen's needs for peacefully resolving social conflicts:

[D]emocracy as a way of life is controlled by personal faith in personal day-by-day working together with others. Democracy is the belief that even when needs and ends or consequences are different for each individual, the habit of amicable cooperation—which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competition—is itself a priceless addition to life. To take as far as possible every conflict which arises—and they are bound to arise—out of the atmosphere and medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement into that of discussion and of intelligence is to treat those who disagree—even profoundly—with us as those from whom we may learn, and in so far, as friends. A genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conducting disputes, controversies and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of having one party conquer by forceful suppression of the other.<sup>28</sup>

Dewey's conception of democracy as primarily a cultural way of life is the foundation for his justification of democracy as a political system.

In the democratic way of life, people are already motivated to cooperate for group gain, and motivated to use nonviolent means to overcome obstacles to cooperation. Of course, many people also have motivation to cheat as free riders, harm the interests of others, or use violent means for gain. The sources of social conflict are many, and government can be a tool for managing social conflict. Democratic government ideally should be the formal arrangement of political power that most exemplifies the principles of the democratic way of life. These principles are expressed by the epistemic justification, the individualism justification, and the ethical justification. Each principle by itself incompletely and imperfectly treats an aspect of managing social conflict; when linked together, they blend into an ideal and practical justification for democracy. These three justifications jointly explain how the democratic ideal of equality reaches practical fulfillment in the democratic moral community. The sort of equality essential to democracy is not natural equality, material equality, or political equality; only moral equality is the essence of democracy. However, it must be stressed again this notion of moral equality needed by Dewey is of a peculiar sort, capable of making democracy practical.

Having no fixed, static conception of the moral good for humanity, Dewey can only point to the potentialities and opportunities that each person might explore and develop if social conditions are favorable. The moral equality that democracy promises is basically an equality of opportunity. This equality of opportunity is shallow and hollow if people's capacities are thought of as delimited beforehand; what is important about people is not the question of their actual capacities at any given point in their lives, but rather that of their potential capacities that would be realized under future conditions:

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed. That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every

human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth. This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper unless it is put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents and relations of daily life.<sup>29</sup>

By prioritizing the future development of everyone's potential—especially in the capacities for education, social intelligence, and public deliberation<sup>30</sup>—Dewey hopes to resolve the tension between what is good for the individual and what is good for the community. This tension naturally arises between what is good for the community now, and what may become good for an individual in the future (the community is no longer a good environment for that person). This tension also naturally arises between what is good for the individual now, and what may become good for a community in the future (a person is no longer a good fit with that community). The Platonic solution is to ascertain and fix, once and for all, the capacities of the individual and the needs of the community to ensure adequate conformity forever. The Deweyan solution takes the exact opposite course: neither the capacities of the individual nor the needs of the community are known fixed matters, but these instead require endless readjustment to each other as they ceaselessly evolve. This social evolution has no *telos*—no guaranteed direction or eventual harmony—and Dewey's political theory has no need to idealistically postulate such things, just as biological evolution has eliminated reference to any ideal direction or final harmony. Dewey does postulate continual social conflict and competition. What may be a necessary and tragic conflict between the good of the individual and the good of the community, if either is given a fixed conception, is profoundly transformed by the Deweyan notion of potentiality. There will always be conflicts of many sorts within communities; but no tragic and unalterable antagonism is destined to forever impoverish either the individual's good or the community's good. Furthermore, the social conflicts that do constantly arise can be, with serious effort, successfully mediated and occasionally resolved before erupting into armed

warfare, if participants are in part motivated by concern and respect for others.

Dewey's preferred form of democracy, what has been here termed "public deliberation polyarchy," describes how social conflicts can be managed by citizens for maintaining the Moral Community—what Dewey called the Great Community in *The Public and Its Problems*. A democracy's citizens, educated in the civic tools of social intelligence and motivated by the benefits of cooperation to respect each other, can be effective at managing their social conflicts. Furthermore, all people have an ethical right to the equal opportunity to become as valuable to the community as they can. Dewey concluded that only democracy can ensure each person's right to participate in social inquiry for community benefit.



## CHAPTER 4

# EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION, AND DEMOCRACY

SINCE ITS ORIGINS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, the growth and evolution of public education in America could not go unnoticed or proceed without controversy.<sup>1</sup> Basic questions are now being asked about the purpose and methods of schooling, and the fundamental principles that originated for public education over 100 years ago have been challenged. A multitude of answers to these difficult and pressing questions have been emerging, from a wide variety of sectors of the public.<sup>2</sup>

Among the many social and political issues into which public education has perennially been embroiled is the integration of blacks and voluntary immigrants into American society. Today's calls for reform in public education, and proposals to supplement (or even supplant) public education with private institutions of schooling, will inevitably impact minority and underprivileged portions of society. These groups are increasingly aware that substantial alterations to public education could deeply impact their future in American society. Foremost among the many concerns is how proposed changes will affect the vision of just and equal opportunity that public education has promised, and whether democracy will be weakened as a result.

From Dewey's perspective on the proper evolution of a progressive democracy, the erosion of public schooling would harm efforts to eliminate racial prejudice, unequal opportunity, and second-class citizenship. Freedom, self-reliance, citizenship, opportunity, and many more such traditional democratic values must not be disconnected from any democracy's educational processes, since those values are preserved and transmitted through education. Controversy over education's role in advancing "equal opportunity" can display that disconnection, if "equal opportunity" gets praised without specifying what an opportunity is *for*. Opportunity does not exist in the abstract (neither does freedom) since it exists only in relation to something toward which people can aim. What should people have an "opportunity" to do? The slogan "freedom of opportunity" can further compound confusion if freedom is conceived as an abstract capacity or property as well. A pragmatic approach to social philosophy recommends that a democratic society should examine actual existing living conditions to determine the range and extent of real freedoms of opportunity to achieve various concrete ends of living, so that these freedoms may be usefully compared against social ideals.

Dewey's social philosophy is highly relevant for understanding the possible use of the democratic principle of "equal opportunity" as an argument for reconstructing our nation's public education system.<sup>3</sup> The expanding concern over the proper destiny of public education has raised philosophical questions about the purposes and methods of schooling in America. Many long-held assumptions about public education, from its benefits, costs, and even its necessity, are now being challenged. Should it continue to attempt to be truly public by dominating the educational possibilities and funding in this country? Would reducing public education's scope and systematicity improve student performance and outcomes? Could private education play a larger role in the production of young citizens more capable of adult success? Should there be some uniform standards of educational achievement across the nation? These emerging issues are deeply connected with many other foundations of our democratic society, further elevating

the importance of the debates over education. Naturally, the principle of “equal opportunity for all,” is a major aspect of these debates.

In addition to the main argument that Dewey’s vision of equal opportunity in a democracy remains salient for today’s social problems, two additional pressing issues will also be considered as the discussion proceeds: whether minority groups should pursue integration with the dominant way of life in America, and whether a truly progressive democracy would demand tight ethnic integration instead of a looser, more pluralistic society of broad tolerance and group rights.<sup>4</sup>

The next two sections will treat these issues at a more general level, questioning the function of education in a democracy. The final section will consider the function of one mode of education, the formal institution of the school. The transmission of values and capacities for citizenship undertaken by all of society’s educational processes should be carefully inspected and controlled by the public. Schooling must receive special scrutiny because of its special powers of shaping character and intelligence. The wider context of education will be treated first because most of Dewey’s views on schooling are measured applications of his more general arguments about equal opportunity in democratic education.

### DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION

Dewey distinguished between education in the broad sense and formal education.<sup>5</sup> Education results from the normal contingent interactions of people in their community. Formal education, or “schooling,” constructs a controlled and simplified environment for learners, in which social situations are deliberately structured to stimulate and guide learning. As Chapter 2 recounts, schooling in Dewey’s day prioritized attention to matters for memorization and imitation. Modern democracy, according to Dewey, should instead view education as an opportunity for people to acquire group problem-solving skills. But since problem-solving and its improvement

is a life-long task, education must be life-long even if formal schooling can have a fixed duration.

Life-long participation in the civic life of a democracy requires life-long education in problem-solving skills. Education in this broad sense is even more essential to democratic life that these important considerations can reveal. Dewey's theory of progressive democracy is a vision of the intelligent methods of public deliberation that permit genuine "self-rule" by the body of citizens. Education in Dewey's sense as developing capacities for problem-solving is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy. Any political structure must among other things aim at social problem-solving or what may be accurately referred to as public conflict resolution. Democracy's capacity for conflict resolution is vitally grounded in the citizens' powers of intelligent conflict resolution.

Against rights-based libertarianism, Dewey's theory of democracy does not start from trans-social inherent rights that must define political relations, and thus does not frame political issues in terms of placing limitations on the powers of government. Limitations may be needed; but it is the capacity for citizens to stand equally together as a self-ruling and self-determining group that defines democratic government. Hobbesian liberalism depicts a fragmented aggregate of individual selfish citizens confronting a powerfully unified government capable of either tyranny or peacekeeping. Lockean liberalism likewise ponders how the individualized rights of each citizen can be best protected so that every person may have an opportunity to prosper. But these liberalisms assume that the primary problem is how to guard against unjust interference and enslavement by the state and by other citizens. Negative liberty, the freedom from interference, is the sole type of freedom receiving consideration. However, Dewey and the republican tradition agree that democracies flourish where citizens can meaningfully participate in public deliberation, and hence negative liberty might not be a good measure of democratic life. Merely guarding against interference does nothing to ensure that all, or even many, citizens have the genuine capacity to influence democratic discussion and decision-making. The

parallel in free-market economics is obvious: protection against interference in a capitalist system does little to prevent poverty and economic helplessness. While a free-market economy may be comfortable placing vast economic decision-making power in the hands of a few wealthy citizens, democracies should not be as comfortable doing likewise in the political sphere. Dewey's preferred form of participatory polyarchy has much in common with the roots of republicanism, advocating the establishment of "non-domination" between citizens to guarantee effective political participation.<sup>6</sup>

Dewey's political philosophy attempted to delineate several specific components (especially education) of a republican model of self-rule that could distinguish mere majority rule by simple voting (rightly derided by antidemocratic thinkers since Plato) from the more sensible intelligent practices of group deliberation. It must be noted first that the concept of group deliberation is hardly a settled and stable notion in political theory. Rights-based liberalism, for example, does not lag behind other theories in esteem for group deliberation (or education). However, this type of liberalism naturally shapes this concept to fit its characteristic assumption that a citizen engages in group deliberation only to attempt to protect her own interests. The tempting notion that "group deliberation must have group aims" would be therefore false, because rights-based liberalism would hardly assume that any group aims, other than the aims of factional segments, motivate public deliberation. Rights-based liberalism was, after all, formulated to provide functional governing for a pluralistic country lacking any social agreement on important ends. Strategic and contractual compromise among citizens along broadly utilitarian lines was the natural interpretation of group deliberation's optimum contribution to political progress.

Given an instrumentalist notion of reason, and a country that is sufficiently pluralistic, rights-based political liberalism appears to be the viable option for democracy. Many advocates of republicanism seem impressed by this inference and ally themselves with forms of communitarianism that require in advance some basic values held in common by all in order to

prevent deep pluralism. But Dewey was never forced into these limited options. His social philosophy's staunch opposition to rights-based political liberalism is predicated on the possibility of reasoning about both means *and* ends, plans *and* goals, and ways of life *and* concepts of "the good." Dewey's pragmatic moral theory is designed expressly to show how "final" goals and "highest" goods are amenable to revision in light of practical experience.

The possibility that public deliberation can reasonably modify even the most staunchly held basic values permits Dewey to evade the dilemma of republican communitarianism versus procedural liberalism. Dewey indeed viewed his republican philosophy as following the spirit of liberalism, because his story of liberalism is an account of the pursuit of liberating capacities for meaningful citizenship. Dewey's political theory is a liberal republicanism, and his theory of education is thus founded on the imperative to create free (both free from domination and the will to dominate) citizens capable of participatory self-rule.

The original use of liberal in anything like a technical sense was in connection with schools and studies, when the word meant that which was adapted to the character and needs of free men in distinction from training that was imposed from without, that was routine and that fitted men for mechanical and subservient pursuits. The association of liberalism with liberty remains a permanent deposit. The historic signification of the word is associated also with liberality and generosity, especially of mind and character. It points to an open mind, to emancipation from bigotry and from domination by prejudice.<sup>7</sup>

Dewey must account for the public desirability of public deliberation in the first place, which is something that too many political thinkers have simply taken for granted. If a democracy wants to foster valuable public deliberation, it must strive for intelligent and purposeful deliberation about real problems. What is needed is drawing an explicit connection between democracy and what Dewey termed "social intelligence."

Social intelligence requires two features of a society to be present: the society is sensitive to social problems, and the society permits public investigation into ways of resolving problems. Democracy, according to Dewey, is the way of life that prominently displays both features. His vision of the proper functioning of democracy is grounded in the possibility that goods can be evaluated, reevaluated, and mutually adjusted in an intelligent and experimental social inquiry.

Democracy is a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished . . . For what is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long run is self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man to respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured by effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free communication?<sup>8</sup>

For democracy to be intelligent, it cannot be merely the process of polling of individuals who vote only in light of their subjective desires. Democracy is the experimental method applied to this question: How can a society preserve and expand the shared experience of cooperation in the face of inevitable difficulties and conflicts? The society must apply democratic social intelligence in every aspect of its life.<sup>9</sup>

Education is essential to democracy because it represents the progressive aspect of democratic problem-solving. The explicitly political institutions of a democracy have an important role in value inquiry and conflict resolution, but education is the more fundamental engine of democracy. Dewey's vision of an educational system permits it to teach facts and skills through the activities of problem-solving in group deliberation.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps a fragmented realm of education, divided by public and private, secular and religious, and pluralist and ethnic categories, might deliver problem-solving skills for all children. But, as Dewey explains, such a realm would be much more likely to produce a fragmented society of adults who are

less willing and able to respectfully deliberate with any other adults from a different portion of society. Minority and underprivileged groups would suffer further from the widespread consequences of living in that sort of dysfunctionally segregated society. Of course, our nation today displays appreciable fragmentation. As a result, it suffers from failures of respectful communication, to varying degrees. Democracy can and should promote pluralism, but cannot for long withstand segregation in any form. For Dewey, the most pernicious corrosive to public deliberation is discourse segregation obstructing mutual comprehension and understanding. Constitutional rights can bring down visible barriers to free communication, but effective speech requires respectful listeners.

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature . . . . That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth. This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper unless it is put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents and relations of daily life . . . . Merely legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred.<sup>11</sup>

What is the foundation for mutual comprehension and understanding? Dewey argued that cooperative and productive social interaction (in Dewey's terminology this is "shared experience") is the minimally necessary ground for the sort of mutual appreciation and respect, which can in turn nurture the capacities for mutual comprehension and understanding. The higher levels of collaborative problem-solving, unified consensus, and community solidarity may or may not be possible with further careful and constructive communication.<sup>12</sup> But these prized democratic accomplishments of public "self-rule" by citizens will surely wither if the ground is parched

by a deficiency of shared experience. The following quotation exemplifies Dewey's definition of democracy in terms of a society's capacities for facilitating shared experience and peaceful problem resolution. Education is essential to developing these democratic capacities.

Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal. The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.<sup>13</sup>

Democratic education cannot be value-neutral—indeed Dewey explicitly claims that the central democratic values of respect for free cooperative association, equal political participation, and peaceful social change must be exemplified in the processes of education. Any government or social group that restricts citizens' free association, diminishes political participation, or condones violent behavior violates the foundations of liberal democracy in general and undermines the principles of procedural republicanism in particular. Therefore, both imposed segregation and self-segregation cannot be tolerated and should be equally condemned.

#### **EDUCATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY**

The values inherent in democratic education should be animated by a combination of two axioms. First, moral character

formation is an essential task of any educational process that contributes to the perpetuation of a society. Second, a crucial component of moral character in a democracy is an ability to intelligently reevaluate values and ends in group problem-solving.

Both axioms have been strongly rejected again and again in the long course of debate over education in the United States. Social groups that do not find their own traditional moral principles to be the subject-matter of civic education often complain that moral character cannot result. Many liberals who desire civic education free from any social group's particular moral principles also do not expect production of moral character. The long history of religious conflict behind the American doctrine of separation of church and state is partially responsible for the widespread assumption that moral principles have no place in secular education. Dewey himself did not regret the gradual elimination of religious indoctrination from public education. However, there are numerous nondenominational character norms deserving recognition as "moral" that should be universally held since they make democratic life possible. Among these character norms is the ability to critically reflect on the values of oneself and others'. Value-neutrality liberalism has no place for this ability. To advance mutual toleration for divergent values, it is claimed, criticism of moral values must not be tolerated. Minority social groups that cannot achieve segregated moral education may also understandably prefer value-neutral civic education and its underlying premise that basic moral values are by their nature immune from rational evaluation. Dewey believed that democracy and dogma can never be coherently combined, since the vitality of one automatically limits the range of the other.<sup>14</sup>

Value-neutral liberalism may be inspired by the liberal value of toleration, but toleration for its own sake leads to unacceptable results, such as the toleration of racial prejudice. Determining intolerable values can be accomplished by balancing toleration against other democratic principles mentioned above. This determination should be done democratically. No a priori method could fix the proper boundaries of

toleration since the pragmatic meaning of democratic principles gradually shifts over time. Our present-day legal toleration for demeaning epithets in the name of free speech, for example, must be understood in its proper context of actual conditions of social equality. This particular application of freedom of speech may require alteration in the future if further progress toward full social equality is at stake.

Value-neutral liberalism is constitutionally incapable of formulating a comprehensive philosophy of education for a democracy. Setting all values off-limit for deliberation, by taking some for granted (democratic principles) and placing others in a criticism-free zone (any specific group values like ethnic or religious morals), only guarantees that students will never acquire robust powers of critical inquiry into values. Value-neutral education therefore cannot develop young adults who have the capacities necessary for genuine democratic deliberation. Of course, such capacities are not highly valued by some minority social groups, revealing their illiberal tendencies. Social groups grounded in dogma (religious or otherwise) are perfectly capable of formulating comprehensive philosophies of education, but these would never be philosophies of education for a democracy.

Can a comprehensive philosophy of education for a deeply pluralistic democracy be achieved? Dewey's efforts notwithstanding, some political thinkers suggest that only a rights-based political philosophy, one that prevails over any conception of the good, could ground democratic institutions. Dewey did not agree that "the right" should prevail over "the good." But Dewey did not believe that "the good" should prevail over "the right" either, since he characteristically could not hold that a democracy must first have secured one "good" for all members of society. Communitarians have protested that no conception of the right can be divorced from peoples' actual commitments to life goods. Dewey would find this partly congenial to his project but also somewhat misleading. Dewey did forcefully argue that there is no such thing as individuality in the abstract since real people cannot be justly treated as political units stripped of social relationships. What individuals find

valuable and worthy of effort gains significance only through modes of social experience.

The conditions of a vitally valuable experience for the individual are so bound up with complex, collective, social relationships that the individualism of the past has lost its meaning. Individuals will always be the centre and the consummation of experience, but what an individual actually *is* in his life-experience depends upon the nature and movement of associated life.<sup>15</sup>

This communitarian manifesto implies that education in a democracy must always look to the development of social capacities serving community needs instead of private wants.

As the material of genuine development is that of human contacts and associations, so the end, the value that is the criterion and directing guide of educational work, is social. The acquisition however perfectly of skills is not an end in itself. They are things to be put to use as a contribution to a common and shared life. They are intended, indeed, to make an individual more capable of self-support and of self-respecting independence. But unless this end is placed in the context of services rendered to others, services which they need to the fulfilment also of their lives, skills gained will be put to an egoistic and selfish use as means of a trained shrewdness for personal advantage at the cost of others' claims and opportunities for the good life.<sup>16</sup>

After rights-based justice is set aside, the communitarian perspective cannot be used to force a choice between homogeneous countries grounding justice in one single vision of the good, and heterogeneous countries abandoning justice. There is another alternative sketched in Dewey's writings: a country containing any number of flourishing social groups (including those oriented by race, ethnicity, religion, etc.) that are engaged in a mixture of cooperation and conflict can maintain a working system of justice that protects social equality and non-domination. This system of justice is the unfinished and imperfect product of a society's historical experience of

resolving past social conflicts. A progressive democracy is characterized by the way that its system of justice continues to be improved and expanded. The concrete provisions of justice may usefully be termed “rights” on Dewey’s theory, so long as such rights are not taken to be grounded in some notion of “human nature” or some a priori reasoning from dogmatic premises.

Dewey’s theory of justice is therefore rooted in a democracy’s never-ending construction of deeper and more permanent rights that guarantee non-domination, freedom of cooperative association, and opportunity for participation in peaceful problem-solving. These are the “freedoms of opportunity” worth having. There are social groups in America that do not respect these freedoms—can they justifiably cry “Oppression!” against the establishment of democratic justice? Perhaps these illiberal social groups do not find any irony in desiring freedom for their group from external forces while denying that freedom to their internal members. Be that as it may, the charge of hypocrisy can be supplemented by the observation that very few domestic ethnic/religious groups deserve protections from American liberal democracy, such as special status and group rights. As Will Kymlicka explains, there is an important distinction demarcating three candidates for protection: (1) geographically established “nations” involuntarily enveloped by conquering country, (2) the descendants of involuntary immigrants, and (3) voluntary immigrants. Voluntary immigrants appear to not have sufficient justification for subsequently demanding special group status and protection, while conquered peoples, such as Indian tribes, may likely have such justification. African Americans that fall into the second category, in Kymlicka’s view, may justifiably consider forming a separate “people” and negotiate for special status.<sup>17</sup> The practicalities of such “nation-forming” are weighty and relatively few African Americans at present are seriously interested in that option, preferring to continue the pursuit of integration and fully equal citizenship. If such a nation were formed, it is highly unlikely that it would become an illiberal authoritarian society and represent a threat to any other liberal society. If no

black nation emerges, then it remains the grave responsibility for America to proceed at full throttle toward equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.

The question of whether racial separation is presently justifiable will thus not be debated here. Although Dewey favored integration, he could sympathize with those who believed in his day that separation was the only reasonable option in the face of widespread racial hatred and staunch opposition to any degree of integration.<sup>18</sup> At any rate, Dewey argued that in a sufficiently liberal and tolerant society, the long-term preservation of ethnic traditions and group respect is quite compatible with the erosion of barriers to equal citizenship. Perhaps actual conditions preventing full equality will naturally encourage separatism as a means to ethnic preservation; between the options of fighting for equality or for separation, Dewey's vision of democracy naturally prefers the struggle for equality and freedom of association. Multiculturalism need not be purchased at the price of accepting a separate-but-equal doctrine, and racial integration need not mean the same thing as loss of cultural identity in a process of amalgamation or assimilation.<sup>19</sup>

The subject of Dewey and multiculturalism would require a long book; I will limit the discussion here to the question of what sort of multiculturalism could find support in Dewey's educational philosophy. Many of Dewey's fellow pragmatists and progressives used the terms "pluralism," "multiculturalism," and "melting pot" with a bewildering variety of meanings. Dewey should not be lumped together with those who sought the elimination of distinctive ethnic customs. In one of his earliest statements (1902) on immigration and education, Dewey expressed concern for the loss of native customs and values:

The power of the public schools to assimilate different races to our own institutions, through the education given to the younger generation, is doubtless one of the most remarkable exhibitions of vitality that the world has ever seen. But, after all, it leaves the older generation still untouched; and

the assimilation of the younger can hardly be complete or certain as long as the homes of the parents remain comparatively unaffected. Indeed, wise observers in both New York and Chicago have recently sounded a note of alarm. They have called attention to the fact that in some respects the children are too rapidly, I will not say Americanized, but too rapidly de-nationalized. They lose the positive and conservative value of their own native traditions, their own native music, art, and literature. They do not get complete initiation into the customs of their new country, and so are frequently left floating and unstable between the two. They even learn to despise the dress, bearing, habits, language, and beliefs of their parents—many of which have more substance and worth than the superficial putting on of the newly adopted habits.<sup>20</sup>

Like Horace Kallen, Dewey rejected the “melting-pot” metaphor and “Americanization” as a legitimate goal. Shortly after Kallen published his key essays defending pluralism in 1915, Dewey applauded his efforts, saying that

I want to see this country American and that means the English tradition reduced to a strain along with others. . . . I quite agree with your orchestra idea, but upon condition we really get a symphony and not a lot of different instruments playing simultaneously. I never did care for the melting pot metaphor, but genuine assimilation to one another—not to Anglo-saxondom—seems to be essential to an America. That each cultural section should maintain its distinctive literary and artistic traditions seems to me most desirable, but in order that it might have the more to contribute to others.<sup>21</sup>

Dewey exposed the key issue confronting education by questioning whether the concept of the new “hyphenated American” really respects the individual’s own experience of life in this country.

[T]he American nation is itself complex and compound. Strictly speaking it is interracial and international in its make-up. It is composed of a multitude of peoples speaking different tongues, inheriting diverse traditions, cherishing varying ideals

of life. This fact is basic to our nationalism as distinct from that of other peoples . . . . The way to deal with hyphenism, in other words, is to welcome it, but to welcome it in the sense of extracting from each people its special good, so that it shall surrender into a common fund of wisdom and experience what it especially has to contribute. All of these surrenders and contributions taken together create the national spirit of America. The dangerous thing is for each factor to isolate itself, to try to live off its past, and then to attempt to impose itself upon other elements, or, at least, to keep itself intact and thus refuse to accept what other cultures have to offer, so as thereby to be transmuted into authentic Americanism.

In what is rightly objected to as hyphenism the hyphen has become something which separates one people from other peoples—and thereby prevents American nationalism. Such terms as Irish-American or Hebrew-American or German-American are false terms because they seem to assume something which is already in existence called America to which the other factor may be externally hitched on. The fact is the genuine American, the typical American, is himself a hyphenated character. This does not mean that he is part American, and that some foreign ingredient is then added. It means that, as I have said, he is international and interracial in his make-up. He is not American plus Pole or German. But the American is himself Pole-German-English-French-Spanish-Italian-Greek-Irish-Scandinavian-Bohemian-Jew-and so on. The point is to see to it that the hyphen connects instead of separates. And this means at least that our public schools shall teach each factor to respect every other, and shall take pains to enlighten all as to the great past contributions of every strain in our composite make-up.<sup>22</sup>

In all of his writings on education, despite the setbacks suffered by progressivism in the face of increasing xenophobia after WWI, Dewey consistently demonstrated the compatibility between preserving genuine pluralism, expanding social cooperation, and guaranteeing equal rights. Some critics have tried to depict Dewey's view of education as inimical to individualism because they view the process of promoting social

cooperation as the repression of uniqueness.<sup>23</sup> But Dewey's plan for fostering favorable conditions for voluntary cooperation where individuals find such cooperation valuable is a very different project from coercively congregating people into foreordained social structures. All too often Dewey's critics have come from the standpoint of an established illiberal social group seeking protection for its own field's flock instead of genuine personal freedom and uniqueness. Uniqueness cannot be sensibly equated with aloofness from social relationships; indeed, a larger diversity of possible social relations permits an exponentially greater number of possible life plans. It is democracy, and education for democracy, that permits the only kind of individuality worth seeking, no matter the pleas of illiberal authoritarians claiming to know which life plans possess final validity and which chosen people deserve equality.

#### **SCHOOLING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY**

Dewey's philosophy of democracy requires that all modes of education should,

- (1) Foster the opportunity for cooperative shared experience; and
- (2) Develop the capacity for intelligent problem-solving, especially conflict resolution over values.

We can outline the workings of a mode of education completely antithetical to democracy by reversing these functions. A completely antidemocratic mode of education would

- (3) Tightly constrict a person's opportunity for social engagement with anyone except for those quite similar in background and social status; and
- (4) Carefully restrict a person's material for thought to the memorization of "established" facts and the application of "authoritative" principles to particular situations.

It should be unnecessary to describe at length Dewey's condemnations of the education of his time for embodying these medieval antidemocratic mechanisms. Segregation and dogma, both rooted in elitism, are the degenerative diseases fatal to healthy democratic life. Dewey defended one system of public education, guaranteeing a universal proficiency in respectful public cooperation, discourse, and problem-solving, as the best protection for a democracy against the corrosive powers of elitism of every kind.

Public education in America has had to overcome two primary obstacles: resistance to the notion that public funds should support education for all portions of society, and resistance to the idea that public schools should not be segregated by gender or race or religion. Historically, most minority groups have had to fight these kinds of resistance to truly public education. But the attitude toward public education has hardly been uniform across all minority groups. Minority social groups that cannot achieve a degree of segregation sufficient to implement their own educational systems may appreciate a compromise with the dominant civic educational system if that system centers on basic skills and positive knowledge. The knowledge and skill base useful for functioning in a country's economy has long been regarded by many liberals and minority social groups as the obvious curriculum for all children. In the past two decades in America, such liberals and social groups have been joined by some conservatives for a common cause of advocating that public education should exclusively focus on producing able workers. Paradoxically, this new-found anxiety and energy directed toward public education's basic curriculum of reading, writing, mathematics, and science has been matched in volume by proclamations announcing that the time has come for establishing vigorous competition to public education in the form of private schools.

Conservatives worried about government intrusion into the allegedly private realm of moral values have found allies in liberals worried about the survival and self-respect of minority social groups. Many of these conservatives are also supporters of religious minorities, which have long desired their

own segregated educational systems. The collision of liberal forces backing value-free public education with conservative forces advocating segregated religious education produced a remarkable synthesis of ideas—why should the government be forbidden from using tax money to support private religious educational institutions? So long as that public money is ostensibly paying for the same secular education that a student would have received in a public school, students can at the same time also receive the moral character training approved by parents. Society appears to be repaid thrice over by this arrangement. A student is prepared for entering the workforce; a student has developed moral character; and a student is well-formed for perpetuating a minority social group. Furthermore, the backlash against value-neutral liberalism was inevitable: couldn't the lack of virtue in our children be the result of public education's failure to teach morality? If what this nation needs is more moral virtue, and if public education shouldn't or couldn't teach moral virtue, then the United States must offer an alternative to public education (or abolish public education altogether). If public schools cannot be as effective in teaching the basics, and cannot approach private schools' ability to develop virtue, then private schools deserve consideration.

The equality of opportunity principle is always useful for enhancing this argument's persuasiveness. Suspicious of conservative motives for advocating private schooling, many minority groups wonder how their members could meet the expenses of adequate private schooling. Will poorer segments of society continue to be burdened with impoverished schools, regardless of whether the school is public or private? If the government guaranteed that each student is funded for a certain amount each year, such as a school "voucher," with this guarantee grounded in the principle of equal opportunity ("no child deserves to be trapped in a failing school"), then minority groups might be reassured. However, the wealthy could purchase as much high-quality private schooling as they could afford, and with the government's assistance guaranteed for all students, far more families could suddenly find expensive private schooling within their reach. This arrangement does not

really provide for equality of opportunity, but rather equality of minimum opportunity. Equality of education will not be achieved, since quality of education is (roughly) proportional to expenditures.<sup>24</sup> If competition by private schools will only produce equality of minimum opportunity, where is the advantage over the current public education system? If what is needed is simply equality of minimum opportunity, then that could be probably achieved far more effectively and cheaply by upgrading existing impoverished schools now. The suspicions of minorities are not diminished when it is noticed that proposals to upgrade "failing" schools rarely arouse as much conservative fervor as proposals for funding school vouchers. The chasm between the minimum schooling available for disadvantaged minorities and schooling for elites would only expand if the government supported private schooling.<sup>25</sup>

Another type of argument for privatization encourages family control over education in order to advance freedom of religion. Many parents are hearing a seductive plea for privatization in the claim that private schools rightfully return control over education to them. Instead of education dictated by the government, private schools would provide the education of choice made by each family. This "state of families" kind of argument, as termed by Amy Gutmann, gains its appeal by extolling both freedom of choice and liberation from government. However, this kind of choice and liberation, when practiced by many, would have unintended yet foreseeable consequences. What might be the long-term effects of revived self-segregation? Those who predict among other results a continuation of improving religious and racial harmonies may be making a vital mistake, rashly presuming that past gains may be easily preserved. Gutmann provides a useful thought-experiment demonstrating how public education should receive due credit for lowering religious prejudice.

Many public schools in the mid-nineteenth century were, to say the least, disrespectful of Catholicism . . . Imagine that instead of becoming more respectful, public schools had been abolished, and states had subsidized parents to send their

children to the private school of their choice. Protestant parents would have sent their children to Protestant schools, Catholic parents to Catholic schools. The Protestant majority would have continued to educate their children to be disrespectful if not intolerant of Catholics. The religious prejudices of Protestant parents would have been visited on their children, and the social, economic, and political effects of those prejudices would have persisted, probably with considerably less public protest, to this day. There may be little reason today for Catholic parents to worry that privatizing schools will reinstitutionalize bigotry against Catholics, at least in the short run. But one reason that Catholics need not worry is that a state of families today would be built on the moral capital created over almost a century by a public school system. That moral capital is just now being created for blacks and Hispanics, and even more well-established minorities might reasonably fear that returning to a state of families would eventually squander the moral capital created by public schooling.<sup>26</sup>

The moral capital for blacks and other racial minorities is of recent origin indeed, especially in the South. The staunch resistance to desegregation in the South continued for decades after the 1954 decision *Brown vs. Board of Education* formally eliminated “separate but equal” educational systems. Several states, including Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, funded tuition grant plans, scholarships, and other similar voucher programs that effectively permitted white parents to keep their children in segregated private schools. It required a long series of federal decisions stretching well into the 1970s to close off the more transparent routes funneling public money to segregated private schools in the name of “school choice.”<sup>27</sup> To this day hundreds of private schools in the South, most operated by religious denominations, make freedom of choice a reality for white families that can afford them.<sup>28</sup> Proponents of education’s privatization must struggle with this distressingly resilient feature of contemporary American society. Granted, some private schools are presently more integrated than inner-city schools that draw from ethnic enclaves and ghettos. But unless funding for all schools is roughly equalized,

until private schools compete for inner-city students, and when family racism is neutralized, universal school choice could not magically produce widespread integration.

The recent dramatic elevation of “civic virtues” to political prominence has also become intertwined with the debates over school choice. No less a figure than William Bennett, Secretary of Education in the Reagan Administration, has explicitly stated that private school choice is essential to restoring respect for the civic virtues of liberty and equality, along with a host of specific moral virtues. Bennett holds that (1) schools must instill these civic virtues, and (2) that parents should have the power of school choice aided by government vouchers. As Michael Engel points out, Bennett does not realize the contradictory nature of these two propositions, even as he strangely appeals to nineteenth-century common schools as exemplary models of virtue instruction. The tendency of those common schools to only perpetuate prejudice has apparently been forgotten—replaced by a curious confidence in every American parent to always choose private schools, which instill toleration and respect.<sup>29</sup> Dewey persistently argued that public education, answerable to a democracy and responsive to democratic ideals, is the obvious and natural conduit for shaping virtuous citizens. If today’s public schools do not sufficiently shape virtue, then public forums on curriculum reform is needed, and not a panic retreat toward the hidden agendas of private schools.

Further arguments for privatization portray education’s aim as equality of economic opportunity. When viewed through the lens of economic advantage, two key considerations become paramount. First, how can education be improved through economic forces? Second, how does education deliver economic value to its consumers? The first question may be answered by applying a theory of open markets, in which fair competition (such as private schools) can force improvement or elimination of any educational institution. The central article of faith for open market theorists is that choice automatically forces improvement. However, there is hardly any evidence that private schools, *when teaching the same kind of*

*students*, provide enhanced educational value. Some proficiency increases can be easily measured where the selected students of private schools are compared to the students of public schools which must admit all. But the much-heralded elimination of bureaucracies, teachers unions, tenure, desegregation orders, affirmative action, or due process for student expulsions has had little impact on academic achievement when similar groups of students are compared.<sup>30</sup> The second question may be answered by applying a theory of individual free consumption of goods, in which the consumer prefers some degree of choice over no choice at all, in order to maximize value for each person. Both considerations of market ideology go well beyond the obvious fact that schooling provides valued preparation (more or less) for employment, by treating education as primarily a private good instead of a public good. If schooling produces an important public good that must be provided by the government where private suppliers fail, then market analysis is inappropriate. What public good does schooling produce? If done well, schooling achieves its democratic aims of (1) fostering the opportunity for cooperative shared experience, and (2) developing the capacity for intelligent problem-solving, especially conflict resolution over values. Private schools tend to jeopardize or abandon these aims, while public schools (again, where well-designed) do not. Therefore, schooling should be regarded as a public good immune from market forces.

Gutmann agrees with Dewey's assessment that full political participation must be the primary goal of K-12 education. Tracking, racial segregation, gender discrimination, and narrowly vocational training—all stand condemned, even if they might in some cases improve academic achievement.

The most devastating criticism we can level at primary schools, therefore is not that they fail to give equally talented children an equal chance to earn the same income or to pursue professional occupations, but that they fail to give all (educable) children an education adequate to take advantage of their political status as citizens.<sup>31</sup>

Naturally, many parents and students may individually prioritize other goals, such as achieving employment, or forging a unified ethnic or religious community. Advocates of market ideology do not fail to highlight the desirability of school choice by promising to satisfy individual needs and priorities. As Jeffrey Henig explains, the "choice" label carries associations with freedom of movement, freedom of thought, religious freedom, and cultural pluralism. These associated ideas naturally have a strong appeal for Americans, but in actual practice, the abstract ideals of choice and freedom does not automatically translate into a demand that government withdraw from education. Furthermore, any concrete plan for erecting private schools next to public schools only redistributes choice without increasing the overall amount of choice. In the absence of unlimited funding for education, one family's enhanced educational choice eliminates a possible choice for another. A well-funded magnet school in my neighborhood does not guarantee a place for my child, and my child may instead be bused to a distant poorer school. The ideology of market choice is always blind to preexisting financial and social disparities, and disadvantaged minority groups should carefully examine the reality behind the rhetoric of "choice."<sup>32</sup>

Could private schools in principle satisfy the basic democratic aims and avoid exacerbating the harmful effects of segregation? Undoubtedly so; provided that careful public scrutiny ensures that a private school's admittance policy, educational curriculum, and social atmosphere are all consistent with the promotion of free association, mutual respect, and democratic deliberation. To prevent the evaporation of the precious "moral capital" for minorities, private schools could not be as free from government oversight as market advocates desire. Indeed, under these criteria for operation, private schools would not look very different from public schools, apart from the quality of faculty and facilities.

Dewey was also concerned with the vexing question of class and wealth gaps in relation to education. Minority groups that seek genuinely equal citizenship for their members should not ignore the widening chasm between the wealthy and

middle-lower classes. They rightly view education as a means to achieving and solidifying middle-class status, but this goal requires possessing full citizenship in addition to employment opportunity. Dewey never failed to stress both aspects of social progress. Occasionally Dewey's claim that economic disparity is a source of racial prejudice is taken to be his only analysis.<sup>33</sup> Granted, one must look elsewhere for a psychological analysis of emotional disturbances such as prejudice and hatred, since Dewey never tried to be a philosopher of irrationality. However, the notion that breaking down economic barriers would go a long way toward ameliorating prejudice as well as moving blacks toward full citizenship was hardly mistaken or short-sighted.<sup>34</sup> Since economic class unfortunately has largely determined educational opportunity in America, heightened economic status and its concomitant social integration has been essential to educational progress.<sup>35</sup>

The dismal record of prejudice and violence against blacks perpetrated by whites unwilling to bestow full citizenship has understandably forced numerous black communities to construct separate educational institutions since emancipation. But at this crucial juncture in American, after the slow but sure progress of civil rights and integration during the twentieth century,<sup>36</sup> it may be unwise for any minority group to seek refuge in the kind of educational privatization that would harm democracy if available to all segments of society. Instead, a Deweyan philosophy would recommend that minority groups seek ways to achieve their common interests for improved schooling, which should include increased funding linked to accountability, greater community involvement, higher teacher quality, curriculum reform, and a recentering on civic morality.<sup>37</sup>

Nothing in this analysis and critique of school privatization should be construed as a repudiation of greater parental involvement in schooling. The spirit of Dewey's vision of democratic participation supports parents' participation in schooling as essential to community life. When this valuable activism is supported by the democratic principles of free association and equal citizenship, then citizens can master the

process of deliberative democracy, instead of feeling dependent on government action. It is this capacity for exercising responsible participation in the democratic life of a society that characterizes equal freedom and opportunity. Education multiplies this investment of effort many times over, where it is well-designed to develop the skills of democratic life.

In ultimate analysis, freedom is important because it is a condition both of realization of the potentialities of an individual and of social progress. Without light, a people perishes. Without freedom, light grows dim and darkness comes to reign. Without freedom, old truths become so stale and worn that they cease to be truths and become mere dictates of external authority. Without freedom, search for new truth and the disclosure of new paths in which humanity may walk more securely and justly come to an end. Freedom which is liberation for the individual, is the ultimate assurance of the movement of society toward more humane and noble ends. He who would put the freedom of others in bond, especially freedom of inquiry and communication, creates conditions which finally imperil his own freedom and that of his offspring. Eternal vigilance is the price of the conservation and extension of freedom, and the schools should be the ceaseless guardians and creators of this vigilance.<sup>38</sup>

## CHAPTER 5

# MORAL EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND PUNISHMENT

THE CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL THEORY concerning punishment is thoroughly fragmented and in dire need of reconstruction upon fundamental principles. Although retribution no longer stands as a dominant monolithic theory, its continued influence shapes contemporary discussion over the justification of punishment. Against those who are committed to retaining some tenets of retributivism, Dewey's social philosophy would eliminate any appeal to retribution. While Dewey's extensive writings in moral and social philosophy do not contain a systematic treatment of punishment, his understanding of our moral practices can be used to construct a valuable alternative to retributivism. Because a liberal democracy should aim at enhancing the social responsibility of all citizens, the punishment of offenders cannot simply be a matter of retribution.

Dewey's analysis of the nature of both morality and social responsibility exposes the central flaws of retribution theory and points the way toward a novel version of a moral education approach to punishment. Punishment should play an essential role in moral education by enhancing the ability of offenders to be more socially responsible in the future. The examination of Dewey's arguments against retributivism shows

how he provides an alternative to both deontological and utilitarian approaches to punishment, thereby establishing a novel version of the moral education theory of punishment that has close similarities to reintegration models.

### RETRIBUTION AND THE MORAL PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT

The relationship between punishment, responsibility, and morality can be expressed in a deceptively simple manner: punishment minimally requires the moral disapproval of a person's conduct (broadly understood), for which he or she is responsible. Dewey believed that it is essential to distinguish two divergent notions of responsibility, which in turn ground two very different approaches to morality, and thus to punishment.<sup>1</sup> The past-looking or "retrospective" concept of responsibility is involved when we assess the various relevant factors of the situation leading up to a person's action, to determine whether this person really performed the action. The forward-looking or "prospective" concept of responsibility is involved when we attend to the wider context of the past and future behavior of the person, so that her future behavior might be adjusted by our interventions.

Dewey placed great weight on this distinction. For example, in his 1932 book *Ethics*, he wrote,

Now the commonest mistake in connection with the idea of responsibility consists in supposing that approval and reprobation have a retrospective instead of prospective bearing. The possibility of a desirable *modification* of character and the selection of the course of action which will make that possibility a reality is the central fact in responsibility. The child, for example, is at first held liable for what he has done, not because he deliberately and knowingly intended such action, but in order that *in the future* he may take into account bearings and consequences which he has failed to consider in what he *has* done. Here is where the human agent differs from a stone and inanimate thing, and indeed from animals lower in the scale.<sup>2</sup>

Dewey's claim that "responsibility" is essentially a normative term of moral judgment understandably appears false at first reading. Do we not say that apple trees are responsible for apples, and that the moon is responsible for tides? But Dewey is not arguing that all uses of the term "responsibility" are moral uses. Rather, he is arguing that when a morally normative verdict of responsibility is made on a person's behavior, this moral verdict is essentially made for the purpose of affecting future behavior. It is this future-regarding core to moral evaluation that leads Dewey toward his rejection of retributivism.

It is not absurd to declare a person responsible for an unintended action, so long as responsibility is understood in a sufficiently broad sense that does not require intent. Did the child unintentionally hurt the cat? If punishment requires responsibility, and responsibility requires intent, then we cannot punish a child for thoughtless behavior. However, as every parent well knows, the child's punishments are more often than not earned by *unintentional* conduct. Therefore, while the presence or lack of intent may have a bearing on the degree of moral disapproval, intent is not essential to the sort of responsibility connected to punishment (and the same is true for adults, to be pursued below). This point alone is of course insufficient to discredit retributivism; a retributivist could note that negligent behavior, an act of omission to take greater care, is just as punishable. Dewey quite agrees, and wants to pursue this point further. Since punishment is deserved for failure to take greater care as well as for intentional acts, then *how* we punish should be connected to our more fundamental interest that people take greater responsibility in general for their conduct, instead of connecting merely to our interest that people be punished for intentionally responsible conduct. We punish when people are held responsible in the broad sense *and* we desire to modify their future behavior; both conditions (past *and* forward-looking) are essentially linked together and they must be satisfied (at minimum) to justify punishment.

Dewey's conclusion is that the only way to make sense of our practice of punishing for failures of responsibility in the broad sense (for both commission and omission) is for punishment to

involve future consequences.<sup>3</sup> People can unintelligently punish, and they do misuse punishment. Dewey isn't saying that each act of punishment done by someone is done with future consequences in mind. His theoretical point is about why punishment exists among peoples, not about what may be going on in any individual's intentions while punishing another. The human practice of making morally normative judgments on behavior and applying punishment accordingly must have originated in, and continues to exist for the sake of, efforts to modify people's habits of conduct to make them more morally responsible in the future. Dewey goes on to argue that efforts to enhance future responsibility can be accurately characterized as efforts to form moral character, and thus to morally educate people.<sup>4</sup> For this reason, Dewey's consequentialist approach to punishment is most appropriately categorized with moral education theories of punishment.

The merits and problems of the moral education theory will be considered in a later section. First, we must examine whether Dewey's position on retrospective and prospective views of responsibility and punishment can be effective against retributivism. The first question to be asked is, Why does Dewey use an example of punishing a child to exemplify his approach? After all, we do not regard the punishment of *children* as the primary difficulty calling for philosophical justification. Furthermore, it may be the case that our legal treatments of adults and of children are so distinct as to amount to a difference of kind, and not just degree. Perhaps Dewey is correct concerning our treatment of children, but he fails to appreciate that a quite different kind of punishment is applied to adults.

But where does such an essential difference lie? For both children and adults, moral disapproval involves a desire to try to prevent future offenses. If we disapprove of some event (such as the cat's suffering) and discover a person's responsibility for that event, we naturally transfer our disapproval to that person's conduct as well. Our disapproval is of that *kind* of conduct, and not merely a disapproval of that *particular* action. Our view that such conduct is wrong entails, among other things,

our view that such conduct should not happen (and not merely that this specific instance of conduct should not have happened). To disapprove of someone's behavior today, and yet to be indifferent to that same behavior tomorrow under identical conditions, would be the taking of an attitude that does not fall within the range of moral evaluation. A *moral* evaluation of a person's conduct as wrong is necessarily connected with a desire to see that person's conduct modified for the better in the future. This is as true for adults as it is for children. Because punishment follows from a disapproving moral evaluation, and such evaluations necessarily involve the desire to modify future conduct, punishment for all people must have a future-looking perspective.

To summarize so far, the foundation for Dewey's theory of punishment is his position that the assessment of past responsibility is a necessary first step for attempting to modify a person's future responsibility, which explains how the retrospective and prospective conceptions of responsibility are related. The proper function of first judging someone's past responsibility is to subsequently use that information to engage in a process of altering future responsibility (hopefully) toward more consistent moral behavior. Of course, we do make judgments about the past or "causal" responsibility of non-agents such as an apple tree and the moon. Dewey holds that insofar as we treat human beings as having *only* causal responsibility, we do not treat them as responsible *agents*, and thus we do not treat them as moral agents. Therefore, his primary contention is that when we are concerned with morality, we are concerned with developing the future responsible agency of a person, and thus moral education is the relevant practice involved. Our scrutiny and verdicts upon a person's causal responsibility, when made in the appropriate moral setting, are made for the sake of then attempting to enhance future responsibility. The connection between responsibility and morality rests on the fact that future responsibility is successfully enhanced when a person's habits of conduct more closely conform to moral expectations.

What about the connection between punishment and responsibility? Dewey, like most philosophers, holds that the

judgment that a person should be punished is essentially a normative moral judgment. Given his stance that normative moral judgments are made ultimately for the sake of trying to modify a persons' future conduct, he therefore finds that the essential purpose of punishing an offender is to enhance the offender's future moral responsibility. This view, let us call it the "prospective" theory of punishment, is diametrically opposed to any "retrospective" theory of punishment. A retrospective theory of punishment instead declares that the essential purpose of punishment has nothing to do with enhancing or diminishing the offender's future responsibility. Instead, the retrospective approach holds that ascertaining past responsibility for some offense is sufficient to determine whether, and in what amount, an offender should be punished. Retributivism, at least in its pure form that wants no compromise with utilitarianism,<sup>5</sup> is the classic example of a retrospective theory of punishment. The concept of retribution is vague and proponents cannot agree on its essentials, but it is most often defined as involving either (1) an attempt to remove the stigma, or cancel out the sin, of the offense, or (2) an attempt to restore some sort of balance by causing the offender to suffer in proportion to the offense. In both varieties, (pure) retributivism staunchly denies that the future consequences of punishment should determine the form or severity of punishment. Because retributivism holds that the nature of the crime itself is sufficient to decide such matters, it is a paradigm type of retrospective theory of punishment.

From Dewey's perspective on the proper relationship between assessing past responsibility and enhancing future responsibility, the retrospective theory of punishment effectively removes and isolates the assessment of past responsibility from its proper moral setting. That is the primary reason for Dewey's rejection of (pure) retribution: it ignores the proper moral context that gives our practices of assessing responsibility their meaning, and effectively ceases to treat offenders as moral agents.<sup>6</sup> On Dewey's moral theory, to treat a person as an agent necessarily involves, in part, trying where appropriate to adjust that person's future responsibility. There

is an inherent relationship between making moral judgments and acting on those judgments to attempt to enhance others' moral responsibility. Dewey explicitly connects the responsibility of any person with the responsibility of others to sustain and enhance future moral conduct. Retribution stands condemned as antithetical to the responsible moral treatment of persons.

The persons who employ praise and blame, reward and punishment, are responsible for the selection of those methods which will, with the greatest probability, modify in a desirable way the future attitude and conduct of others. There is no inherent principle of retributive justice that commands and justifies the use of reward and punishment independently of their consequences in each specific case. To appeal to such a principle when punishment breeds callousness, rebellion, ingenuity in evasion, etc., is but a method of refusing to acknowledge responsibility. Now the consequence which is most important is that which occurs in personal attitude: confirmation of a good habit, change in a bad tendency. The point at which theories about responsibility go wrong is the attempt to base it upon a state of things which precedes holding a person liable, instead of upon what ensues in consequence of it. One is held responsible in order that he may become responsible, that is, responsive to the needs and claims of others, to the obligations implicit in his position. Those who hold others accountable for their conduct are themselves accountable for doing it in such a manner that this responsiveness develops.<sup>7</sup>

In short, Dewey convicts the retrospective theory of punishment generally and retributivism in particular for endorsing the unintelligent and irresponsible infliction of suffering on people who are not being properly treated as moral agents. It is contradictory, in Dewey's view, to morally judge a person to have behaved irresponsibly and to be deserving of punishment, and then to carry out the punishment in a manner blind to its effects on that person's future capacity for moral conduct. Even more paradoxical from Dewey's perspective would be any effort to resist Dewey's conclusion by challenging the key premise

exposed above: that to make a moral evaluation of disapproval is to disapprove of that *kind* of conduct, and not merely a disapproval of that *particular* action. A retributivist might prefer to hold that a moral judgment is only made upon a particular instance of conduct that entails nothing about judgments on other such conduct under relevantly similar circumstances. But that sort of particularist moral theory has never been widely accepted and has more in common with emotivist and subjectivist moral theories, which actually conflict with the typical moral orientation of retributivism.

For Dewey, punishment should be a moral practice that respects the offender as a moral agent. This stance removes from consideration two other types of consequentialist approaches, the "incapacitation" and "restitution" approaches to punishment. The incapacitation approach, in which offenders are simply prevented from offending again (using banishment, prison, etc.), is consistent with the principle that punishment should deal with future conduct. However, its application of simple brute force is inconsistent with treating offenders as moral agents. Punishment of *moral* agents would aim at not just the prevention of future wrong conduct, but rather aim at the encouragement of future right conduct. The restitution approach likewise involves the offender's future conduct, by holding that punishment functions to redress the offender's harm by forcing the offender to proportionally compensate the victim(s). But restitution seeks to control the offender's conduct for the short-term and on a case-by-case basis; its essential aim is not to increase the offender's capacity for responsible conduct. Dewey is seeking the consequentialist approach, which best respects offenders as moral agents, and this approach clearly conflicts with retributivism.

The failure of retributivism to sufficiently promote morally right conduct cannot be overcome by emphasizing retributivism's ability to satisfy some abstract principle of justice. Dewey declared that the largest obstacle to improving our system of punishment is the lingering sanctity attached to

retributivist notions. If the justification of government's penal system is simply the sacred principle of justice for its own sake, then it is difficult to repress the idea that there is really no moral justification at all.

It is the sacrosanct character thus attributed to the State's use of force which gives pungency to the Tolstoian charge that the State is the arch-criminal, the person who has recourse to violence on the largest scale. I see no way out except to say that all depends upon the efficient adaptation of means to ends. The serious charge against the State is not that it uses force—nothing was ever accomplished without using force—but that it does not use it wisely or effectively. Our penal measures are still largely upon the level which would convince a man by knocking him down instead of by instructing him.<sup>8</sup>

Dewey rightly distinguished force from violence, and between mere force and intelligently constructive uses of force. Intelligently applied punishment, by enhancing future responsibility in a morally justifiable way, could never be properly construed as mere violence, whereas retribution is nothing but violence, which lacks moral justification.<sup>9</sup> Our commitment to morality must be matched by our commitment to creating and maintaining morally responsible agents.

#### **PUNISHMENT AND THE SOCIAL GOOD**

Justice for its own sake, Dewey argued, has never truly been an abiding principle of democratic life. Citizens of a democracy desire justice, certainly; but they are rightfully suspicious of claims that some particular law, right, or morality transcends any and all considerations of the welfare of society. This is as true for the typical conservative protector of constitutional rights as it is for the most progressive experimenter with novel freedoms. Furthermore, citizens of a democracy do care about the impact of enforcing justice on the future behavior of the punished, and this concern is heightened when the public costs of recidivism are appraised.

From the standpoint of Dewey's philosophy of democracy, justice-centered theories attempt to ground the existence of justice in some nonsocial realm, where it is safe from social evaluation and modification. This attempt, however, only succeeds in isolating justice from human intelligence.

That something called justice is to be done even though it bring down the heavens in ruin, is the final word of an ethics which is resolutely irrelevant to the circumstances of action and the conditions of life. But the skill which invented the phrase dulls by the side of the greater cunning which disguised the fact that the phrase is an ironic summary of every moral code that leaves consequences out of account. For it is only accident if abstract ethics does not always bring wreck in its train. Yet those who recommend this adage of an unswerving morality always wear an expression of superiority though wilfully disregarding the consequences of wreaking vengeance under the plea of vindicating eternal justice.<sup>10</sup>

Dewey does hold that punishment must serve justice. However, for punishment to be morally responsible, the justice that punishment serves must be deeply connected to social good. Justice-centered theories often portray justice and its attendant values of legal duty, or rights, or righteousness, as nonconventional and exempt from human deliberation. The debate between deontologists and utilitarians, from Dewey's perspective, has obscured the most significant issue: the nature and origin of social responsibility. Social responsibility is, first, the only kind of responsibility that democratic society truly cares for; and second, it is grounded in society and its structure, and not in some nonsocial realm.

Dewey steadfastly repudiated any methodology of looking beyond the social sphere to discern moral or legal foundations.<sup>11</sup> For example, that deontological variety of moral theory, which locates moral goodness exclusively within the private space of autonomous motives, ignores how we ascertain and judge the particular motive of a person's act only by judging this act in the wider context of that person's patterns of responsible or irresponsible social conduct. All judgments

of personal character are judgments of that person's social conduct, and vice versa. A "free-will" theory of moral responsibility postulates an individual's free will as the cause for responsible, or irresponsible, moral behavior. But this theory, instead of clearing the space for a justification of punishment, actually makes punishment of the person irrational.

It is a man, a human being in the concrete, who is held responsible. If the act does not proceed from the man, from the human being in his concrete make-up of habits, desires and purposes, why should *he* be held liable and be punished? Will appears as a force outside of the individual person as he actually is, a force which is the real ultimate cause of the act. *Its* freedom to make a choice arbitrarily thus appears no ground for holding the human person as a concrete being responsible for a choice. Whatever else is to be said or left unsaid, choice must have some closer connection with the actual make-up of disposition and character than this philosophy allows.<sup>12</sup>

We do esteem the individual's consciously willful efforts to behave morally. To this extent Dewey agreed with Kant that goodwill is a proper object of moral approbation. However, esteem for such moral efforts of character is justifiable only because we esteem morally responsible *conduct*, and not because willful efforts to perform the good regardless of actual consequences are morally valuable in themselves. Moral consequentialists are correct to claim that we primarily encourage people to perform moral actions and not merely to have moral character. Yet moral consequentialism fails to adequately realize that we esteem *morally responsible* conduct, and not merely isolated and thoughtless actions that just happen to meet our moral standards. Society promotes enhanced responsibility by encouraging the development of autonomously responsible character, which is identical to the development of responsible conduct. If our bad conduct does not match our good intentions then society is willing to recognize excusing conditions. However, society also demands that in the future we take greater care in understanding existing conditions in order to successfully execute our good intentions.

Society naturally demands social responsibility and its members must take the moral responsibility for enhancing such responsibility in all citizens. Justice, according to social-good-centered theories such as Dewey's, exists for the sake of promoting harmonious social cooperation promoting the social good. Justice therefore demands that each member of society receive the social treatment that corresponds to the degree of socially responsible behavior exhibited. Punishable actions are actions of irresponsible noncooperation that impede the production of social goods.<sup>13</sup> Some form of intervention with the offender, interrupting and altering the offender's patterns of conduct, will be sometimes necessary to modify habits of conduct (less severe offenses may only require admonishments and warnings).

Combining Dewey's defense of the prospective theory of punishment with his social-good notion of justice permits us to sketch the outline of a Deweyan model of punishment: Punishment is a type of serious social intervention with the offender, which justly aims at enhancing the offender's future moral responsibility to cooperate in the production of social goods. This is not a complete definition of punishment, since the techniques to be used in such an intervention are not yet delineated. But at minimum the techniques must be carefully designed to serve the purpose of enhancing the offender's future moral responsibility. The techniques typically preferred under retributivist models may haphazardly and partially accomplish this same goal, but retributivism is marked by its failure to prioritize the offender's future conduct.

Dewey's minimal definition of punishment is too simplistic, it may be claimed, because it leaves out other necessary factors to punishment. Rival theories and definitions of punishment would each specify a missing component, such as the need to impose suffering, the recognition by the punished that she has done wrong, the compensation to the victims for losses, the deterrence effect on other citizens, and the legitimate authority conducting the punishment. The Deweyan view of punishment can include these factors. First, the imposition

of suffering, depending on the context and manner imposed, can be a useful means to enhancing responsibility. Second, the recognition of wrongdoing may also turn out be a useful means to enhancing responsibility. Third, the reparations from the offender to the victim would probably be a useful means to enhancing responsibility. Fourth, the calculation of deterrence effect would likely be taken into account since it is another important social need. Fifth, the administration of punishment may be most efficiently performed by an authorized institution. However, some kinds of punishments may be better administered by fellow citizens. And many other components of punishment might be further identified, many of which turn out to be compatible with a Deweyan model of punishment.

So far we have established a minimal definition of prospective punishment, developed from the standpoint of a social-good conception of justice. This definition of punishment is consistent with any kind of society and any sort of conception of the social good. Let us now direct the discussion toward punishment in a democratic society. Dewey had a great deal to say about how a democratic society can intelligently pursue the greater social good.

#### **DEFENDING THE MORAL EDUCATION APPROACH**

Our future responsibility, our capacity to more or less consistently perform moral conduct, is the overriding moral concern for a society according to Dewey. Punishment, because it is a practical expression of this social concern for moral conduct, must essentially aim at enhancing future responsibility. Theories of punishment based on abstract principles of justice, free-will autonomy, or calculations upon the consequences of conduct have obscured this fundamental social concern for future responsibility. Dewey's prospective approach to responsibility and punishment is a much needed third alternative to deontological and utilitarian approaches. The social good requires social responsibility, which in turn requires social interventions in others' conduct as needed. But those

interventions must satisfy justice while at the same time morally treating the offender as a moral agent.

The social good cannot simply and directly justify punishment, since that leaves the (utilitarian) problem of justifying punishment of the innocent. On Dewey's moral theory, society has the moral *duty* to punish only the truly guilty because they are guilty. However, the need to punish the guilty simply and directly *because* they are guilty cannot fully justify punishment, since that leaves the (deontological) problem of determining how punishment should proceed in the face of contextual considerations that weigh against simple "eye for an eye" or proportional punishment. "Punishment only for the guilty" may sound like a damaging concession to retrospective retributivism, but from Dewey's perspective, there is a straightforward explanation needing no retributivist principles: only the guilty need to have their future conduct modified. On Dewey's moral theory, society has the *moral* duty to attempt to enhance future responsibility; if indeed society is committed to any genuinely moral standards. This prospective theory is the start of an explanation why our practices of assigning responsibility, placing moral blame, and determining punishment can be best understood as social practices that together aim at enhancing future responsible conduct for all members of society.

As a type of moral education theory, Dewey's prospective approach to punishment must answer the usual criticisms directed toward that theory.<sup>14</sup> To begin, the moral education theory is sometimes characterized, by proponents and detractors, as opening the way toward an *alternative* to punishment, and not as offering a different justification of punishment. However, such characterizations presume a retributivist essence to the nature of punishment that Dewey rightly calls into question. A variation on this point is the claim that punishment must be a harm to the offender, not a benefit, and thus a moral education theory is really just about replacing punishment. From the Deweyan perspective, merely causing harm to the offender is insufficient to morally justify punishment. Therefore, regardless of whether the offender or society finds

the moral education approach's process of punishment to be harmful, that process remains justified through its attempt to increase the offender's future responsibility. The point of punishment is modification of future conduct, not harm for its own sake. Those unable to countenance a process of punishment that might benefit an offender in the long run should reconsider, as Dewey urges in his antiretributivist arguments, how our genuine moral duties and democratic goals suffer at the hands of retributivism.

Another potential difficulty is that a moral education theory is often defended by appeal to principle(s) of human right or autonomy that are themselves quite controversial and need prior defense. Dewey's moral education approach, however, does not rely on abstract principles of right or autonomy.<sup>15</sup> His approach does rely on the assumptions that societies encourage moral responsibility and that actual punishment techniques can be designed such that they will (often enough) succeed in moral education. This opens the door for the objection that the specific modes of punishment that a moral education approach can endorse are neither severe nor effective enough at preventing future offenses. Like the related rehabilitation theory of punishment, the moral education theory has been reproached for being too soft-hearted and generous toward the offender. How can society show that it takes offenses seriously, retributivists complain, unless a stern suffering is imposed?

Society's reasonable need to promote and display its moral commitments can be satisfied by a moral education theory if we understand with Dewey that our "moral commitment" is our commitment to moral agency (the doer), and not merely to moral conformity (the deed). This understanding of moral commitment helps us to answer the counterpart question of whether moral education theory might instead be far too severe in its pursuit of moral character. It appears to set no boundaries on the invasiveness and length of punishment to achieve the required responsibility, which conflicts with the proportionality principle, our abhorrence of torture and brain-washing, and our fear of unrestrained government power.

Three Deweyan responses are available. First, proportionality would be respected, since the educational effort required should match the degree of increased responsibility needed. Stealing should not be met with decades of reform to achieve moral sainthood. Second, Dewey's moral education approach is grounded in respect for all persons, even offenders, as moral agents, so that morally unacceptable punishment techniques are ruled out. Third, even where the offense is serious and the offender has prolonged resistance to education, punishment should have a preset proportional time limit. Without definite sentence terms, punishers might not be sufficiently motivated to maximize their efforts and the punished would be more likely to resent and resist the punishment process. Of course, for the most serious crimes like murder, some offenders may never earn our trust in their responsibility and might never rejoin normal society. Many rehabilitationists have endorsed these points as well.

Punishment should aim at teaching offenders and potential offenders why certain types of conduct are wrong and how to avoid choosing such conduct in the future. Another close cousin of moral education theory, the reintegration model of punishment (discussed below), also agrees on this principle and shares many essential features with Dewey's approach. This family of consequentialist theories all reject retributivism for its inability to provide for intelligent deterrence strategies. Accordingly, a retributivist's claim that only her theory can supply sufficient justification for deterrence can no longer be convincing. Pure retributivism cares little for future consequences. If a retributivist wishes to join forces with the consequentialists instead, then the issue must be joined on the empirical ground of careful studies comparing the actual deterrence provided by the various models.

#### **DEMOCRACY AND MORAL EDUCATION**

Dewey's philosophy, so centered on the role of education for democracy, requires that punishment should be closely connected with moral education. The idea that the political

institution of democracy should pursue moral education seems inconsistent with the liberal demand that subjective morality is a private matter. However, Dewey did not conceive of democracy simply as a political structure but as a way of communal living, and, for reasons noted above, he held that morality is as objective as social roles. The connection between democracy and moral education, and the subsequent connection between moral education and reintegrative punishment, will be explained in the following order. First, Dewey's definition of the democratic community requires the pursuit of the common good. Second, this pursuit requires the social responsibility of every member. Third, the democratic community must regard as an important common good the enhancement of every citizen's social responsibility. Fourth, the enhancement of adult social responsibility is a type of moral reeducation aiming at the reintegration of the adult offender into the normal functioning of the democratic community.

Dewey's definition of the "democratic community," while abstract, indicates the genuine community's commitment to sustaining every member's participation in, and enjoyment of, group cooperation. In Dewey's 1927 book *The Public and Its Problems*, he concisely defines the community and the democratic community.

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.<sup>16</sup>

Dewey's vision of a *democratic* community emphasizes that this kind of community does not merely aim at some group goal benefiting each member (any temporary association can do this) and not merely because it aims at this goal because all of the members each appreciate the goal as good, but also because the members all intentionally aim at some group goal precisely *because* it is a social good *shared by all*. What are

the implications of a democratic community having a "clear consciousness of a communal life"? There are many, but of great significance is the fact that the members of a genuine community, as Dewey envisages it, will feel and display caring concern for the welfare of each other since they all will strive for social goods *because* these goods benefit all. While it is possible to desire social goods only because they benefit one's self, a member of a genuine community will not participate in social activities for that selfish reason. A member of a genuine community will participate because the goods enjoyed by herself are at the same time goods enjoyed by others. This will be true for mundane social goods like material commodities and also for more abstract goods of human relationships such as belonging and respect. For Dewey, to the extent that a community appreciates the implications of together pursuing the social good, such as the value of establishing procedures of public deliberation and conflict resolution, that community will pursue a democratic life.

Mutual concern in a community does not merely *serve* to promote the social good. Concern exemplified in all of its concrete manifestations of social interactions and deliberations *is* the promotion of the social good in a democracy. Exclusive and overriding concern for others, to the detriment of one's self, is not the paradigm offered by Dewey's philosophy of democracy. Rather, on Dewey's view, there must be a deep connection between the concern for the welfare of all and social justice in a genuine democracy.

The opposition which is frequently instituted between beneficence and justice rests upon a narrow conception of the latter as well as upon a sentimental conception of the former. If beneficence is taken to signify acts which exceed the necessities of legal obligation, and justice to denote the strict letter of moral law there is, of course, a wide gap between them. But in reality the scope of justice is broad enough to cover all the conditions which make for social welfare, while a large part of what passes as charity and philanthropy is merely a makeshift to compensate for lack of just social conditions. The

classic conception of justice is derived from Roman law, and shares its formal legalistic character. It is "rendering to another that which is his." According to the legal conception of what belongs to a man, the idea is limited to rather external matters, material property, repute and honor, esteem for good character, etc. But in its wide meaning the formula only raises a question, instead of affording a solution. What does belong to a man as man? How is what is morally due to a man to be measured? Can it be fixed by conventional considerations? Or is what is owed to a person anything less than opportunity to become all which he is capable of becoming? Suppose a man is detected in violation of the social code. Is what is owed him in the way of justice some retributive penalty, as exactly proportioned as possible to his offense, on the principle of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth? or is it the treatment which will tend to evoke his own efforts at moral betterment? Is "justice" to be measured on the ground of existing social status, or on the ground of possibilities of development? Such questions suggest that social utilitarianism, when freed from its hedonistic handicap, makes justice to be a concern for the objective conditions of personal growth and achievement which cannot be distinguished from beneficence in its fundamental and objective sense.<sup>17</sup>

Dewey tightly links the basic social goods of each individual's growth and achievement with morality and justice. However, any democratic society's understanding of the social good is never static and predictable. Social roles and their inherent responsibilities undergo adjustment. Social roles can dramatically change even within the span of a lifetime, and novel social roles continually emerge. This social evolution places heavy demands on the educational activities of a democratic society. Education must not aim merely at the production of adults capable of responsible conduct in some fixed number of unchanging roles. Education for democracy must aim at the production of adults possessing the skills needed to responsibly engage in numerous mutable social roles, that may conflict and change in unpredictable ways.

According to Dewey, education in its primary sense is therefore always moral education, because the enhancement

of socially responsible conduct *is* the enhancement of morally good behavior. A democracy must collectively engage in the life-long enhancement of morally responsible conduct. Punishment, because it is one method of establishing and improving prospective responsible cooperation for the social good, is a useful tool of education. This requires the careful exercise of social coercive force, which must be performed in a socially responsible manner; otherwise it is merely brute unintelligent violence. The solution to the question of how moral ends can be obtained by *prima facie* immoral means lies in recognizing that punishment can be moral to the extent that it enhances morally responsible behavior by means that are themselves moral.

The means to which [democracy] is devoted are the voluntary activities of individuals in opposition to coercion; they are assent and consent in opposition to violence; they are the force of intelligent organization versus that of organization imposed from outside and above. *The fundamental principle of democracy is that the ends of freedom and individuality for all can be attained only by means that accord with those ends.*<sup>18</sup>

Philosophers enamored with a conception of justice severed from the pursuit of the social good understandably regard democracy as a political institution designed for the pursuit of justice alone. The notion that punishment should primarily be a community responsibility appears perverse to them, and at any rate, what is at issue for these philosophers is the justification of political punishment. Punishment and moral education therefore would have little to do with each other. However, Dewey rejected the separation of justice from the pursuit of the social good. He believed that what should be discussed first is whether, and in what capacity, the democratic community should engage in educating individuals toward social responsibility. Whether some offenses should be investigated, adjudicated, and corrected by an official system of political administrators is a separate question. Dewey had no complaint against the existence of a criminal justice system,

so long as it is democratically supervised. His complaint was that punishment has been distorted into a purely political issue and removed from the realm of community life where social responsibility is grounded. The government and its laws is a moral educator, for better or worse, and the only question is whether its education will be effective. If a government has a justice-centered fixation and a purely retributive methodology then it will likely fail to sufficiently enhance prospective social responsibility.

### THE REINTEGRATION MODEL OF PUNISHMENT

Serious offenses typically call for a major and formal intervention involving some degree of separation from the community. On Dewey's view, this intervention should be some type of moral reeducation aiming at the eventual reintegration of the adult offender into the normal functioning of the democratic community. How can this model be elaborated to explain the particular methodology of effective punishment? Dewey nowhere says. However, we have sufficiently explained the foundations of his model of punishment to locate a more specific methodology: the reintegration theory of punishment best fits Dewey's model.

The reintegration theory of punishment has broad connotations and diverse manifestations, but its essential feature is that it claims that punishment is justified to the extent that it attempts to reintegrate the offender into the community of mutually caring members. We have the advantage of following the path-breaking work of John Braithwaite and Eric Reitan, who have defined and elaborated reintegration theories.<sup>19</sup> Both Braithwaite and Reitan use the family as a model of mutual caring in which shaming punishment can be fully consistent with maintaining caring bonds. Projecting this model upon larger societies, the reintegrative punishment of an offender would occur in those societies where most other members of society care to some degree for the offender's destiny (perhaps only victims and their families and friends may be temporarily excused for not maintaining much regard for the offender).

This continued concern explains this kind of community's delivery of punishment in a caring way that aims at the restoration of the offender's respect for the moral norm of caring, and thus other moral norms and social responsibility, of the community.

Obviously, not just any kind of community exhibits such mutual caring and applies the reintegration mode of punishment. Reitan, following Andrew Mason, explains that what is required is a normative sense of "community" to identify those societies possessing the integrative power of mutual caring among all its members.<sup>20</sup> Reitan helpfully elaborates upon mutual caring, explaining that it is a feeling of concern between people manifested in practical social conduct that avoids exploitation and applies strategies of non-violent conflict resolution seeking the best outcome for all involved. Punishment in the "normative" community would therefore be a particular strategy for dealing with offenders that attempts to develop mutual caring and the practical social behavior that demonstrates this caring, permitting moral reintegration. If successful, this developed mutual caring will be manifested in future conduct that displays greater social responsibility, or in Deweyan terminology, displays enhanced prospective responsibility. Normative communities will therefore naturally esteem and engage in moral education in general, and the moral reeducation and reintegration of adult offenders in particular.

The reintegration theory of punishment is a highly significant type of social-good-centered theory of punishment. The optional ways of further defining specific kinds of mutual caring will give rise to various kinds of reintegration theory. However, there appears to be a central core of principles common to the caring required in reintegration theory. First, an abiding respect for the equal humanity, dignity, and autonomy of everyone should motivate all community activities. Second, the community must strive to inculcate the moral values of the community (these must be consistent with the first principle) in everyone through social means that are consistent with those values. Third, the community will strive for the common

social good in a manner consistent with the first and second principles.

Synthesizing the work of Reitan and Braithwaite, an outline of the five-step process of punishment can be sketched. This sketch is not to be found in these authors' writings, and they should not be held responsible for its faults. By extrapolating from the three central principles of caring, and suggestions from Reitan, Braithwaite, and other writings on shaming practices, five stages of reintegration seem plausible. The process of reintegration will (1) separate the offender from normal social functioning; (2) instruct the offender that a wrong has been done; (3) inspire the offender to take responsibility for the wrong action, and to be sincerely ashamed and sorry for the wrong;<sup>21</sup> (4) direct the offender to undertake a regimen of repentance that will establish and demonstrate a change of character; and (5) reunite the offender with the community in a ritual of forgiveness. Successful reintegration promotes the greater good of the normative community while preserving caring and respect for the offender. Reintegration therefore satisfies the basic principles of any social-good-centered theory of punishment. Because the reintegration theory portrays punishment as a process of learning, as a development of moral character aiming at reestablishing the moral bonds of mutual caring, it can be classified under the broader category of moral education theory.

It must be noted that shaming per se is not the rationale for this kind of reintegrative punishment. Whether shaming is conducive to moral education depends on the actual process in which shaming is imbedded.<sup>22</sup> Also, shaming has been portrayed as a method of punishment that is essentially a public event of exposure and humiliation.<sup>23</sup> The reintegrative theory does not assume that punishment by shaming must be essentially public humiliation. The degree to which the reintegrative process or any phase of that process should be public can only be determined by studying the actual effectiveness of public humiliation.

The most important question of whether the reintegrative process of punishment can morally educate while preserving

the social good cannot be so easily answered. We have seen this process in our own lives—growing up and in turn raising children, for example—and it obviously has widespread effectiveness for a broad range of offenders and offenses. But what of the amoral reprobate? The reintegration theory of punishment does not claim that this process will always be effective. For many criminals, the process may not get beyond the initial separation stage, and at least society would receive protection from them. The reintegration model is not a complete replacement for imprisonment, as if confinement would become entirely obsolete. Furthermore, the entire weight of moral education cannot be placed on adult reintegration, since any society would rightly devote far more resources and energy to the primary process of integrating the young. The extent to which the moral education theory, and the reintegrative process, appears in our eyes to be inadequate to the problem of adult offenders is simply a good measure of our society's failure to fully integrate the young in the first place.

A far more difficult concern for a reintegrative theory is the problem of indeterminate sentencing and potentially lax procedures, which contrasts strikingly with the familiar practice of sentencing for fixed durations. A compromise may be in order here; a preset timeline for reintegration and release (to be strictly followed so long as *some* amount of character change has likely occurred) may ensure more strenuous educative efforts. Further compromises will likely be needed to transition the current penal system toward moral education by reintegration.

What about the other aspects of punishment deemed important by rival social-good-centered theories of punishment? These aspects in some form can be usefully incorporated into the stages of this reintegrating process, guided by the results of research by the social sciences into actual consequences of punishing. For example, the full reintegration process may be a more effective mode of deterrence than incarceration alone, victim involvement and restitution can be a useful mode of repentance,<sup>24</sup> and the treatments explored by rehabilitation theorists may enhance the effectiveness of reintegration's stages.

The social-good-centered theories naturally can find much common ground and should synthesize their approaches to punishment. However, from the perspective of the social-good-centered reintegration theory, justice-centered theories such as pure retributivism offer only dehumanizing violence. The reintegration theory of punishment makes the claim that the process of punishment, although involving some measure of liberty restriction and perhaps suffering for the offender, does not inflict violence, at least in the sense of causing intentional harm by the community without concern for the offender's welfare. Quite the opposite: punishment should be done out of moral concern for the offender, which is to say, done out of concern for the morality of the offender.

It is not just any community, but the democratic community in its fuller development, that would display a normative degree of mutual caring. This mutual caring can ground the reintegration theory of punishment. Dewey argued that democracy as a way of life is the most effective means of intelligent deliberation, and that a democracy should regard justice as a means of determining how each member of society receives the social treatment that corresponds to the degree of socially responsible behavior exhibited. A democracy would naturally pursue moral education for all citizens as the means to promoting responsible cooperation for the social good. The socially intelligent method for interventions with offenders is moral reeducation.

In conclusion, Dewey views education as the integration of people into society by establishing prospective responsibility, and the punishment of adults should be the morally educative effort of reintegration. The details of effective reintegration procedures will emerge from empirical inquiries by the social sciences into the consequences of specific forms of punishment for prospective responsibility, having variable degrees of reparation, deterrent effect, and other valuable features. A genuinely democratic community would not abandon criminal offenders to a life of institutionalized brutalization hidden from public viewing and caring. The justice-centered theory of pure retribution only rationalizes an abandonment of community

responsibility for the welfare of every person. The reintegration model of punishment is an exemplary form of nonviolent conflict resolution that democracies should value. A democracy's civic participation in all forms of moral education also provides for punishment's educative effect, not only for the offender, but also for the rest of the community.

## CHAPTER 6

# DEMOCRACY, RELIGION, AND ETHICAL PROGRESS

JOHN DEWEY WAS AN ATHEIST who argued that no one could reasonably accept the existence of supernatural powers. Religious naturalists may claim him as one of their own if Dewey's peculiar meaning to "religious" as almost synonymous with "ethical" is kept in mind. Although Dewey encouraged a lessening of influence of organized religions over society, he also prioritized full democratic participation for every citizen. His political philosophy never endorses the idea that political discourse should restrict or exclude appeal to religious values or religious faith. Dewey's political liberalism explicitly invites faith, religious experience, and religious values into public discourse and deliberation. The point of democracy is to discuss all values held within a society.

However, that public forum of democracy is for deliberating about values, not preaching them. Are the religious really prepared to reconsider their own values in addition to passing judgment on the values of others? The point of educated democracy, unlike absolutist democracy, is to potentially reconsider any values or ideals bound up with the social good. Religious citizens could no more be justified in bypassing deliberation to wield government for religious domination,

than nonreligious citizens could be justified in excluding the religious from full citizenship.

### CIVIC AND RELIGIOUS UNITY

There is a line of continuity between Hegel's project to reintegrate religion with all experience and life and Dewey's treatment of the religious life. Dewey's 1892 address "Christianity and Democracy" stated his sociological perspective on the genuine nature of religion, from which he never substantially departed.

[E]very religion has its source in the social and intellectual life of a community or race. Every religion is an expression of the social relations of the community; its rites, its cult, are a recognition of the sacred and divine significance of these relationships. The religion is an expression of the mental attitude and habit of a people; it is its reaction, aesthetic and scientific, upon the world in which the people finds itself. Its ideas, its dogmas and mysteries are recognitions, in symbolic form, of the poetic, social and intellectual value of the surroundings.<sup>1</sup>

Religiosity couldn't be private, or even an individual matter, for Dewey. That is so, not because religion had a privileged place in Dewey's philosophy, but rather because nothing about an individual could be isolated apart from society. Dewey's social psychology and social epistemology opposed excessive individualism, absolute personal rights, and the instrumentalist approach to reasoning about values. By scaling back individualism, rethinking the nature and justification of rights, and by showing how both ends and means can be modified by reasoning, Dewey laid the foundations for a social and political theory of democracy hospitable to both religions and religious people.

On Dewey's theory of political participation, religions have taken the form of voluntary social organizations that he calls "publics," which advocate certain ideals and undertake specific social functions. Dewey was also vitally concerned to make

adequate room for the religious: those who lack any commitment to a specific creed or church, but nevertheless exemplify a religiously faithful adherence to ideals and values throughout their lives. Both the churched and the non-churched are not only politically protected by his form of democracy, but they are all additionally encouraged to actively participate in politics.

Such encouragement from Dewey might be surprising, in light of his own attitudes toward religion. Dewey was raised in a strict Calvinist home, but repudiated its categorization of people into the saved and the damned as a teenager. His own preferred religion in his early adulthood was Christian universalism. He identified religious faith with moral commitment, placing him within the Social Gospel movement. By 1900, Dewey joined the religious humanists, viewing any actual belief in the existence of a divine power to be incompatible with naturalism and quite irrelevant for religious commitment toward values.<sup>2</sup> Unlike fellow pragmatist William James, whose mysticism found room in his naturalism for divine powers intruding upon the fringes of individual consciousness, Dewey required religious feelings and beliefs to have only social significance and status. For Dewey, religious experience could only consist of one's communion with others in expressions of commitment, through group practices, to shared social values. In Dewey's *A Common Faith* (1934), the religious are ultimately those who have escaped denominational creeds and supernaturalism and who have joined in the aesthetic appreciation and enjoyment of democracy's civic virtues.

Considering the evolution of Dewey's own views on religion, it might be inferred that his philosophical antagonism with the churches and with supernaturalism would ensure that his political theory of democracy likewise requires political antagonism toward religious communities. That is not the case, as will be demonstrated. Alternatively, since Dewey's mature philosophy makes explicit room for the religious who are also to be simultaneously political, it could be inferred that his theory of democracy might require democracy to become very much like a religion, broadly defined. If this is the case, then

Dewey's political liberalism does not take any neutral stance toward religion in a deeply pluralistic society, but instead erects democracy itself as a religious alternative and competitor to other religions.

Since these two alternatives are oft-heard interpretations of Dewey's ultimate plans for religion and democracy, his pragmatic liberalism might be caught between church and state. He was fond of saying that democracy is a way of life—yet it is a special way of life, one that involves a kind of faith. He writes,

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed. That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth.<sup>3</sup>

Is this democratic way of life a religious way of life, and thus a potential replacement for all churches? Alternatively, is Dewey's democracy just a social institution among others with but a limited scope and responsibility for helping to deal with religious pluralism?

### **CHURCH AND STATE IN A DEMOCRACY**

Dewey's theory of democracy has elements of both church and state. To decide whether Dewey is indeed therefore "caught" in a philosophical dilemma, we have to examine first his understanding of the purpose of democracy. Then we should be able to understand the scope and severity of this church-and-state problem, and be able to appreciate the extent to which his political theory can make progress on the issue of religious pluralism.

Dewey strenuously opposed any political theory that exempted some moral view, some part of society, or some type of activity, from public scrutiny and political action. There is

no realm of life and no segment of society that is not answerable to public concern and public intervention where necessary. If some aspect of society is to be regarded as exempt from legal regulation, that decision itself must be the conclusion of public deliberation and might be revised by future deliberation. Democracy is not complete, according to his political philosophy, unless the extent of possible political legislation is unlimited. This stance on democracy's powers proceeds from his understanding of the supremely moral justification of democracy:

[T]he cause of democracy is the moral cause of the dignity and the worth of the individual. Through mutual respect, mutual toleration, give and take, the pooling of experiences, it is ultimately the only method by which human beings can succeed in carrying on this experiment in which we are all engaged, whether we want to be or not, the greatest experiment of humanity—that of living together in ways in which the life of each of us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others.<sup>4</sup>

Dewey's commitment to unlimited democracy was unbounded. In *Ethics* (1908), written with colleague James Tufts, they declare, "The moral criterion by which to try social institutions and political measures may be summed up as follows: The test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the common good."<sup>5</sup>

Whereas Dewey's theory provides for unlimited democracy, the neo-Kantian theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are committed to limited democracy and some type of absolute individual rights. These neo-Kantian theories are so impressed by moral and religious pluralism that they despair of finding any useful role for deeply held value commitments in the political realm. Rawls, for example, uses the concept of public reason to eliminate deliberation about any fundamental values based on "comprehensive doctrines" of the good or the good

life that have less than universal commitment. Public reasoning by definition can only make appeal to those justifications that could be universally persuasive.<sup>6</sup> For Rawls, the fact of deep pluralism removes the consideration of the most fundamental values from public debate: such deep values can never be used *as* political justification, and they can never *receive* political justification. Habermas does not so sharply separate deep values from politics, but his conception of moral reasoning also effectively removes the consideration of the most fundamental values from public debate. His discourse principle states that "Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse."<sup>7</sup> Habermas constructs a conception of genuinely moral reasoning so that the process of democratic deliberation effectively excludes appeal to any fundamental values that have less than universal assent.

From the pragmatic perspective, the very notion of "deep pluralism" has been hypostatized into a service role for limited democracy: by simply defining as deeply pluralistic any value commitments that could not be modified by democratic deliberation, proponents of limited democracy can claim that only their theory can handle this supposedly "deep pluralism." However, there are at least two very good reasons why this "deep pluralism" is largely a rationalist's fiction. First, most religious groups do use member deliberation from time to time to settle fundamental issues of values, ideals, and principles. Pragmatism itself explains why any group, religious or otherwise, would almost inevitably have recourse to some degree of member deliberation. As Charles Peirce pointed out, the methods of tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning all sooner or later fail to maintain unanimity.<sup>8</sup> For example, it is not a coincidence that denominations in America over the last 200 years, which have relied most heavily on tenacity and authority, such as the supreme authority of God's word in the Bible, are also denominations that have seen innumerable schisms threaten, and have splintered over the decades into dozens or hundreds of branches and independent churches. Deliberative democracy is hardly a scientific method applicable only

for secular society. Indeed, democracy's practices in Western Europe were gradually and imperfectly developed by devoutly religious peoples who understood through long and hard experience that tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning didn't usually serve to solve their common problems.

The second reason why deep pluralism is mostly fictional is because it is simply false that reasoning is always about ends and never means. Deep pluralism's supposed intractability has received much support from the widespread notion in philosophy that people cannot reason about "final" ends or "fundamental values." Religious people can, and do, deliberate about and reevaluate their fundamental values; this fact explains, for example, why today most American Christians no longer approve of racial segregation.

Because democratic deliberation is highly useful for solving group problems and keeping groups together for long durations of time, Dewey did not assume that members of religious groups are automatically incapable of full deliberative participation. For example, almost all religious groups in America during Dewey's time gave some of their members some opportunities to democratically deliberate about their religious beliefs. Therefore, although Dewey's theory of democracy proves inhospitable to groups or individuals rigidly adhering to fixed values, very few people are thereby singled out as less than fully capable citizens. Only groups that never enable their members to ever question any significant values or acquire group deliberation skills are the groups for which Dewey's democracy would be undesirable. Of course, such groups would not want to be part of the wider political society anyways.

Dewey's deliberative democracy is not designed to work for those people who cannot and will not undertake any group deliberation about values. This does not mean that on Dewey's theory, a democracy should treat them with less than the full dignity and respect due any person. Dewey had no major objections to a democratic society harboring within it groups that voluntarily exclude themselves from full civic and political participation. He did not believe that democracies should

aggressively disrupt the internal operations of either internal or external nondemocratic societies (so long as they are themselves peaceful).

### **PLURALISM RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS**

We should return to the debate between Dewey's unlimited democracy and neo-Kantian limited democracies. Although its façade of unique ability to deal with deep pluralism has been torn down, the tradition of liberal limited democracy would rise to its defense by disagreeing that Dewey's "unlimited" democracy is worthy of the name. The proponents of liberal limited democracy would object that a democracy must start by absolutely protecting basic liberty or "negative" rights. The justification of those rights should not appeal to what society believes is in its best interests and does not rest on utilitarian foundations. It is the good of the individual, and not society, that must justify genuine democracy, they would argue, and thus genuine democracy carefully restricts the range of government power. For example, if Dewey truly were interested in providing room for religion in his theory of democracy, then he would endorse the right to practice one's religion without government interference. Therefore, these defenders of political rights would conclude that his distinction between limited and unlimited democracy is quite misleading, since his political system is not even a democracy.

Dewey would not agree that the traditional liberal grasps what really is the good of the individual. Liberty rights, the guaranteed freedoms from public intervention and control, are indeed valuable according to Dewey, but other goods are also important and perhaps sometimes more important. For example, the category of positive rights, those rights that require public aid to provide some needed goods to individuals who cannot obtain them themselves, will be valued much more highly by someone in a situation where negative rights alone are leaving them out of work and starving. Dewey's political theory therefore concludes that it is reasonable for people to deliberate over the relative prioritization of negative and

positive rights, depending on circumstances. The proponent of liberal limited democracy instead argues that no such deliberation is ever reasonable. In the case of economic rights, for example, the liberal limited democrat ignores or regrets the idea of social safety nets for unemployment, injury, or old age, despite the fact that such nets have been deemed quite reasonable by most ordinary Americans through public deliberation (and it was the public; it wasn't an aristocracy that forced such programs upon America).

Although Dewey did believe that democracy should deliberate about, and have, some robust negative rights and some robust positive rights, his political theory, heavily inspired by Hegel's, actually proposes adding a third category of rights. Dewey did not attach a label to these rights, but I suggest the label of "empowerment" rights.<sup>9</sup> A simple example is my right to drive a car in America. This right cannot be properly categorized as a negative right or a positive right, since the government may interfere with the way I drive, and the government requires that I drive responsibly for the good of others as well as my own good. My right to drive a car is a right earned by learning how to safely drive and obey traffic laws. It is also a right with responsibilities attached, such that my right can be taken away if I cannot drive safely and legally. Empowerment rights are rights that empower a person to pursue their own good under the responsibility requirement that they simultaneously exercise that pursuit in a way consistent with the greater good. A license to practice medicine is another common example of an empowerment right. It may be the responsibility of the government to help people gain empowerment rights, if having those empowerment rights is a sufficiently crucial community good. These kinds of "community" empowerment rights would therefore be rights in which the government has the duty to empower a person for some capacity because that person can responsibly exercise that capacity for the own good and the community good.

Dewey argued that citizenship in a democracy requires a small number of essential community empowerment rights that revolve around key civic virtues, education, and

deliberation. Dewey's theory of progressive democracy is a vision of the intelligent methods of public deliberation that permit genuine "self-rule" by the body of citizens. Education in his sense, as developing capacities for problem-solving, is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy.

Not surprisingly, Dewey's theory of education for democracy includes as essential the sort of education needed for democratic deliberation about deeply held values and ideals. Here, his theory's antagonism toward only the most authoritarian and antisocial religious groups becomes obvious. Religious groups that value absolute cognitive dependency on authority will never appreciate Dewey's model of education, but then again, they wouldn't hold democracy or the welfare of the wider society in high regard either. Dewey's theory of democracy is not designed for such groups, and so it is no serious criticism that his theory cannot appeal to them. If by "deep pluralism" we indicate conditions where democratic deliberation can only slowly and haltingly encourage modification of fundamental values, then Dewey's democracy is the best way to politically handle deep pluralism. The rare religious groups that are completely hostile to democracy do not present the problem of deep pluralism: they rather present the problem of "abysmal pluralism." Few forms of governments other than absolute theocracy or fascism could deal with abysmal pluralism, but those governments represent abysmal political theories. Neo-Kantian models of democracy erect a false pluralism to "solve," but then positively obstruct the ways that deep pluralism can be creatively handled in a democracy. Governments that drive religious commitment and religious expression out of the political and public spheres will not only find deep problems much harder to solve, but also will find their policies labeled as oppressively hostile to civil liberty.

To summarize so far, Dewey's "unlimited" deliberative democracy does not regard deep pluralism as absolute. Where deep pluralism causes social problems, he expected that a genuine democracy would deliberate about the fundamental values responsible in order to occasionally modify them. His confidence in unlimited deliberative democracy is grounded in his

confidence that public reasoning can, with needed improvements and empowerments, be capable of rationally evaluating and occasionally modifying fundamental values, so long as sustaining the wider community and the general welfare of society was a shared goal among others.

Dewey, like later communitarians, viewed people as intrinsically connected to a variety of social groups and recommended an inclusive cultural pluralism in which people have group membership while being free to enjoy and adopt other groups' ways. The morality that should be taught in public schools (private schooling encourages antidemocratic tendencies) consists of the civic virtues of respect for the equal dignity of all, cooperative group problem-solving, and loyalty to the ideals and aims of democracy. The only intolerance innate to Dewey's democracy is the rejection of exclusive groups that claim to possess absolute moral norms and values that prevent their members from following democratic civic virtues and incapacitate them for cooperative public deliberation.

It must be stressed that while Dewey gave philosophical arguments against grounding one's religion in a supernatural authority, his political theory is designed to be quite hospitable to diverse religious communities seeking the best form of life. However, his political theory of democracy does demand that religious groups undertake their ways of life in a manner that does not diminish the ability of the entire society to relieve suffering and promote the greater good. Dewey's political theory is analogous to John Stuart Mill's principle that each person should be able to seek their own happiness, in a way consistent with everyone else's opportunity to do the same. Instead of focusing on individuals, Dewey's democracy takes a wider perspective, on groups within society all pursuing their own vision of the good life, provided that pursuit is not an obstacle to any other group's ability to do the same.

Dewey's democracy therefore demands that the religious be prepared to adjust their prioritization of values and even reevaluate their values during some needed kinds of democratic deliberation for relieving suffering from social problems and for maintaining social equilibrium. To live in a fully democratic

society, the religious must abandon sectarian quests for the one True faith and fixed traditional values if such quests prioritizing the interests of their religious group above the need of wider society. All citizens, regardless of religious affiliation, still must fulfill civic and citizenship responsibilities. Religion must never be permitted to absolve a person from responsibilities of caring about the social situation they find themselves in.

Dewey's social version of Mill's utilitarianism answers the question raised at the beginning, of whether Dewey's democracy is more like church or more like state. Since Dewey's democracy is primarily designed to be an intelligent tool for resolving problems of deep pluralism, it is primarily a form of government and not another religion. However, since his democracy requires citizens who are not only empowered to democratically deliberate but are also going to value democratic ideals and the civic virtues for their ability to sustain and advance the wider community, these citizens will have a kind of faith in democracy that can look like religious faith from a very distant perspective.

Dewey in his most philosophical and prophetic moods, like those that surface occasionally in *A Common Faith*, speaks of democratic experience in a reverent tone. He asks us to imagine all of the past beings that have relations with our present existence, along with all of the future beings whose lives will be affected by us. This widest possible community deserves our highest moral attention and devotion.

The continuing life of this comprehensive community of beings includes all the significant achievement of men in science and art and all the kindly offices of intercourse and communication. It holds within its content all the material that gives verifiable intellectual support to our ideal faiths. A 'creed' founded on this material will change and grow, but it cannot be shaken.<sup>10</sup>

However, democratic ideals cannot suffice for a complete set of values and ideals, and Dewey never tried to claim that they did. Democracy, like every other human artifact, is a kind

of improvable technology, useful for some purposes and not others.

Looking ahead further into the twenty-first century, Dewey's liberal pragmatic democracy is best designed for foreseeable conditions and problems. His theory of democracy identifies three different kinds of useful rights—negative, positive, and empowerment rights—which, when properly balanced, can permit effective public deliberation on any and every social problem and religious value. We will need all the democratic deliberation we can get. The alternative will likely be international power politics that decides who gets rights and goods according to imperial expediency.

#### **THE SHARED DESTINY OF RELIGION AND LIBERALISM**

In *Individualism Old and New* (1930), Dewey wrote:

The divorce of church and state has been followed by that of religion and society. Wherever religion has not become a merely private indulgence, it has become at best a matter of sects and denominations divided from one another by doctrinal differences, and united internally by tenets that have a merely historical origin, and a purely metaphysical or else ritualistic meaning. There is no such bond of social unity as once united Greeks, Romans, Hebrews, and Catholic medieval Europe. There are those who realize what is portended by the loss of religion as an integrating bond.<sup>11</sup>

But Dewey doubts that any single creed could reintegrate society today. Communal bonds across a society cannot rest firmly on doctrinal creeds. Creeds are the divisive result of social disunity.

Religion is not so much a root of unity as it is its flower or fruit. The very attempt to secure integration for the individual, and through him for society, by means of a deliberate and conscious cultivation of religion, is itself proof of how far the

individual has become lost through detachment from acknowledged social values. It is no wonder that when the appeal does not take the form of dogmatic fundamentalism, it tends to terminate in either some form of esoteric occultism or private estheticism. The sense of wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be built up and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained a degree of unity. The attempt to cultivate it first in individuals and then extend it to form an organically unified society is fantasy.<sup>12</sup>

Religious pluralism is a reflection of political conditions more than theological controversy. Conversely, theological controversy can be placed in the background to civic unification. Dewey judged in particular that American's political religion amounted to its denomination's shared civic ideals.

Where ideals of civic unity are involved, Dewey thought he could perceive religiosity at work. Consider his 1903 "Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy" and his 1908 "Religion and Our Schools." No religion's indoctrinations should be in the curriculum, but Dewey says,

Our schools, in bringing together those of different nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds, in assimilating them together upon the basis of what is common and public in endeavor and achievement, are performing an infinitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of which in the end genuine religious unity must grow.<sup>13</sup>

Once again, education is essential. Individuals should have the religious freedom to question and inquire into the community's values and ideals *with the aim* of improving the community's welfare.

For Dewey, the improvement of community life is therefore the final pragmatic standard by which values must be compared, reevaluated, and revised when necessary. Liberal, but not conservative, Christianity can still be a positive force for American democracy, where God is no longer regarded as a supernatural king who commands obedience to eternal moral

decrees. Dewey pondered what a Christian civilization would look like that concretely exemplified Jesus' example of mutual love and respect for all people.

Dewey's 1892 address "Christianity and Democracy" announces that beyond proclaiming faith in love, Jesus had no doctrine or creed or church to impose on the world. "Democracy thus appears as the means by which the revelation of truth is carried on."<sup>14</sup> His 1891 *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics* also emphasizes the social significance of moral faith:

Moral interest in others must be an interest in their possibilities, rather than in their accomplishments; or, better, in their accomplishments so far as these testify to a fulfilling of function—to a working out of capacity. Sympathy and work for men which do not grow out of faith in them are a perfunctory and unfertile sort of thing. This faith is generally analyzed no further; it is left as faith in one's "calling" or in "humanity." But what is meant is just this: in the performing of such special service as each is capable of, there is to be found not only the satisfaction of self, but also the satisfaction of the entire moral order, the furthering of the community in which one lives. All moral conduct is based upon such a faith; and moral theory must recognize this as the postulate upon which it rests. In calling it a postulate, we do not mean that it is a postulate which our theory makes or must make in order to be a theory; but that, through analysis, theory finds that moral practice makes this postulate, and that with its reality the reality and value of conduct are bound up.<sup>15</sup>

In 1908 Dewey described democracy as fundamentally erected on faith:

Democracy, the crucial expression of modern life, is not so much an addition to the scientific and industrial tendencies as it is the perception of their social or spiritual meaning. Democracy is an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies.<sup>16</sup>

In 1922 Dewey again connected democracy with faith in the individual.

It may be that the word democracy has become so intimately associated with a particular political order, that of general suffrage and elective officials, which does not work very satisfactorily, that it is impossible to recover its basic moral and ideal meaning. But the meaning remains whatever name is given it. It denotes faith in individuality, in uniquely distinctive qualities in each normal human being; faith in corresponding unique modes of activity that create new ends, with willing acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed by the release of individualized capacities. Democracy in this sense denotes, one may say, aristocracy carried to its limit. It is a claim that every human being as an individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence be the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect.<sup>17</sup>

Dewey believed that democracy's equal concern for the growth of all persons supplies the ultimate moral ground for the superiority of democracy. But he also emphasizes how the capacities of persons and the ways of life people pursue are always evolving (in opposition to conservative theorists who find in some past era the pinnacle of human ability and perfection of lifestyle). This places great demands on democracy.

From the ethical point of view, therefore, it is not too much to say that the democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. It expresses a postulate in the sense of a demand to be realized: That each individual shall have the opportunity for release, expression, fulfillment, of his distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall further the establishment of a fund of shared values. Like every true ideal, it signifies something to be done rather than something already given, something ready-made. Because it is something to be accomplished by human planning and arrangement, it involves constant meeting and

solving of problems—that is to say, the desired harmony never is brought about in a way which meets and forestalls all future developments.<sup>18</sup>

Dewey understood democracy as that form of social and political organization that attempts to fulfill the moral criterion of the genuine community: that all people pursue their personal growth while enjoying the social goods of mutual cooperation that result.

Dewey's liberal *and* social democracy bridges the chasm that confronted John Stuart Mill: how can a desire for the common good be generated from each person's desire for their own growth? The bridge is precisely that each person's realization that his or her own good is mostly dependent on the growth of others, and thus it is reasonable to desire the growth of others. In this way, private interests must become public interests. Because democracy should be grounded in people's reasonable commitment to equal opportunity for all, liberal democracy converges in aims and methods with the moral progress of Christianity.

[T]he future of religion is connected with the possibility of developing a faith in the possibilities of human experience and human relationships that will create a vital sense of the solidarity of human interests and inspire action to make that sense a reality. If our nominally religious institutions learn how to use their symbols and rites to express and enhance such a faith, they may become useful allies of a conception of life that is in harmony with knowledge and social needs.<sup>19</sup>

In this passage Dewey explicitly provides for the permanent role of progressive churches in a modern liberal democracy. This role has two primary functions: (1) to help maintain commitment in moral equality of all and hence in the faith in human growth that democracy requires, and (2) to serve as a source of social and political criticism when existing social and political conditions obstruct progress toward democracy's ideals. Progressive churches must abjure supernaturalism, because the notion of a divine ruler who mysteriously distinguishes

between the saved and unsaved practically denies universal moral equality.

Progressive churches must instead embrace the only alternative, naturalism, in order to be compatible with liberal democracy.

Lip service—often more than lip service—has been given to the idea of the common brotherhood of all men. But those outside the fold of the church and those who do not rely upon belief in the supernatural have been regarded as only potential brothers, still requiring adoption into the family. I cannot understand how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender of the conception of the basic division to which supernatural Christianity is committed. Whether or no we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least all in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite.<sup>20</sup>

Dewey's humanistic naturalism has much in common with John Stuart Mill's search for a Religion of Humanity and the democratic spirit.<sup>21</sup> Dewey's concluding sentences in *A Common Faith* echo Mill's call for a religious humanism that is truly centered on the potential for people to take responsibility for, and the deserved pride in, the future welfare of all humanity.

The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one another and the values contained in these relations. We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race.

Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.<sup>22</sup>

By formulating a naturalized religion of democratic faith, Dewey offers a philosophical way to reconcile morality, religion, and politics. This "reconciliation" necessarily strikes supernaturalists as complete surrender, with Dewey demanding that God be abandoned before democracy can start. But Dewey's philosophical method never works from metaphysics to politics (that was religion's preferred method). Instead, Dewey urged religions to take their pursuit of ideals seriously and intelligently, so that by the time any religious society could undertake full social intelligence, it would no longer look to God for moral assurance. Like any thoughtful compromise, Dewey's religious politics rejects opposed extremes: on the one side, any religion fanatically elevating the faithful above the rest of humanity, and on the other, any liberalism narrowly focusing on private interests or rights that ignore the rest of humanity.

Because he is deliberately protective of pluralism, Dewey's democracy cannot tolerate anyone who refuses the benefits of social intelligence, deny universal moral equality, or obstruct advancing human welfare. For theorists seeking a liberal politics so inclusive as to satisfy the religious bigot or the selfish egoist, Dewey's democracy will appear irredeemably inadequate. However, liberal critics who complain that Dewey's democracy is too narrow are still chasing an impossible liberal dream of a value-free politics or an everlasting nation state. Dewey only hoped that liberalism can return to its ethical ideals, to which a genuinely religious faith may aspire.



# NOTES

## CHAPTER 1

1. *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 342. Citations of Dewey's writings are from *The Collected Works of John Dewey*, 37 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1990). Abbreviations are used as follows. EW: *The Early Works, 1882–1898*; MW: *The Middle Works, 1899–1924*; LW: *The Later Works, 1925–1953*.
2. Readers may consult recent surveys of those battlegrounds: Eamonn Callan, *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy: Political Education and Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David T. Sehr, *Education for Public Democracy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Joel Spring, *The Universal Right to Education: Justification, Definition, and Guidelines* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Diane Ravitch and Joseph Viteritti, ed., *Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); David Bridges, ed., *Education, Autonomy and Democratic Citizenship: Philosophy in a Changing World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Sigal Ben-Porath, *Citizenship under Fire: Democratic Education in Times of Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); David J. Feith, ed., *Teaching America: The Case for Civic Education* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).
3. Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 3.
4. Besides *Democracy and Education*, he later wrote a short book titled *Experience and Education* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1938). Dewey also published long essays and tracts, including *The School and Society* (Chicago: University of

- Chicago Press, 1899; rev. edn. 1915); *The Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902); *Moral Principles in Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909). *Interest and Effort in Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913); *Schools of To-Morrow* with Evelyn Dewey (New York: Dutton, 1915); *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York: Liveright, 1929); *Contrasts in Education* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1929); *American Education Past and Future* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931); *The Way Out of Educational Confusion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931); and *Education and the Social Order* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1934). Collections of Dewey's educational writings include *Education Today*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Putnam, 1940); *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), republished as *Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men)* (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield Adams, 1956); *Dewey on Education*, ed. Martin S. Dworkin (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959); *Selected Educational Writings*, ed. F. W. Garforth (London: Heinemann, 1966); *Moral Principles in Education*, ed. Sidney Hook (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press); *John Dewey on Education*, ed. Reginald Archambault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and *Teachers, Leaders, and Schools: Essays by John Dewey*, ed. Douglas J. Simpson and Sam F. Stack (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010).
5. Exemplary volumes on Dewey on education for democracy, despite their lack of consensus, include Thomas S. Popkewitz, ed., *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David T. Hansen, ed., *John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect: A Critical Engagement with Dewey's Democracy and Education* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); James Scott Johnston, *Inquiry and Education: John Dewey and the Quest for Democracy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Patrick M. Jenlink, ed., *Dewey's Democracy and Education Revisited: Contemporary Discourses for Democratic Education and Leadership* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009); Paul Fairfield, *Education After Dewey* (London and New York: Continuum, 2009); and Rosa Bruno-Jofré, James Scott Johnston, Gonzalo Jover,

- and Daniel Tröhler, *Democracy and the Intersection of Religion: The Reading of John Dewey's Understanding of Democracy and Education* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).
6. E. C. Lagemann, "The Plural Worlds of Educational Research," *History of Education Quarterly* 29 (1989): 185–214, at 185.
  7. For an overview of progressivism, see Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870–1920* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).
  8. *Experience and Education* (1938; repr. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), pp. 19–20. *LW* 13: 7.
  9. *Ethics* (1932), *LW* 7: 350.
  10. Susana Urbina, "Tests of Intelligence," in Robert Sternberg and Scott Kaufman, eds., *The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 35.
  11. Consult Jay Schulkin, *Cognitive Adaptation: A Pragmatist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Joaquín M. Fuster, *The Neuroscience of Freedom and Creativity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tibor Solymosi and John R. Shook, eds., *Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy, and Pragmatism: Brains at Work with the World* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and chapters in John R. Shook and Tibor Solymosi, eds., *Pragmatist Neurophilosophy: American Philosophy and the Brain* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).
  12. John R. Shook, "The Design of Morality," in Liz Stillwaggon Swan, Richard Gordon, and Joseph Seckbach, eds., *Origin(s) on Design in Nature* (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 163–190.
  13. *Experience and Education*, p. 22. *LW* 13: 9.
  14. *Experience and Education*, pp. 63–64. *LW* 13: 41.
  15. Norman Norris surveys harsh critics of progressive education and Dewey in *The Promise and Failure of Progressive Education* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. See also Daniel Tanner, *Crusade for Democracy: Progressive Education at the Crossroads* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), and John Howlett, *Progressive Education: A Critical Introduction* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), chap. 6. Faulting Dewey for anything and everything that has been advocated in the name of progressive schooling, and for anything else about public schooling that conservatives detest, is the perennial sport of religious ideologues; see, for example, Henry

- T. Edmonson, *John Dewey and the Decline of American Education: How the Patron Saint of Schools has Corrupted Teaching and Learning* (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2006).
16. *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 366–367.
  17. *Ibid.*, 125.
  18. *Ibid.*, 126.
  19. *Ibid.*
  20. *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), *LW* 2: 282–303.

## CHAPTER 2

1. *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 9–10.
2. “My Pedagogic Creed,” article one, paragraph 6, *EW* 5: 86.
3. *The School and Society* (1899), *MW* 1.37.
4. Laurel Tanner, *Dewey’s Laboratory School: Lessons for Today* (New York: Teacher’s College Press, 1997), pp. 138–150. Also consult these expositions of Dewey’s educational theory and curriculum design: Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, *The Dewey School: The Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, 1896–1903* (1936; Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007); Harriet K. Cuffaro, *Experimenting with the World: John Dewey and Early Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1994); Douglas J. Simpson and Michael J. B. Jackson, *Educational Reform: A Deweyan Perspective* (New York: Garland, 1997); James Garrison, *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Thinking* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997); Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille P. McCarty, *John Dewey and the Challenge of Classroom Practice* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1998); Naoko Saito, *The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John Puckett, *Dewey’s Dream: Universities and Democracies in an Age of Education Reform* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007); James Scott Johnston, *Deweyan Inquiry: From Education Theory to Practice* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009); and Daniel Stuckart and Jeffrey Glanz, *Revisiting Dewey: Best Practices for Educating the Whole Child Today* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).
5. Initial books to consult on Dewey’s overall theory of democracy as collective search for cooperation and conflict-resolution are: Steven Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and*

- Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Robert Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); David Fott, *John Dewey: America's Philosopher of Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); and William Caspary, *Dewey on Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
6. "My Pedagogic Creed," article five, paragraph 11, *EW* 5: 86.
  7. The development of Dewey's functionalism and pragmatism from organicist idealism is explained in detail in John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000). See also Michael Eldridge, *Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instrumentalism* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998).
  8. "My Pedagogic Creed," article four, paragraph 2, *EW* 5: 91.
  9. "My Pedagogic Creed," Article four, paragraph 4, *EW* 5: 91–2.
  10. "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896), *EW* 5: 96–109.
  11. "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" (1904), *MW* 3: 158–167.
  12. *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 157.
  13. "My Pedagogic Creed," article four, paragraph 5, *EW* 5: 86.
  14. "My Pedagogic Creed," article four, paragraph 7, *EW* 5: 92.
  15. "Psychology and Philosophic Method" (1899). Reprinted as "'Consciousness' and Experience" *MW* 1: 113–130.
  16. "My Pedagogic Creed," article one, paragraph 4, *EW* 5: 85.
  17. *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), *LW* 4: 213.
  18. *Democracy and Education* (1916), *MW* 9: 147.
  19. *Ibid.*, 333.
  20. "Theory of Valuation" (1939), *LW* 13: 226–227.
  21. Charles S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), in Max H. Fisch, ed., *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 242–256.
  22. *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), *LW* 2: 325.
  23. "My Pedagogic Creed," article five, paragraph 6, *EW* 5: 94.

### CHAPTER 3

1. Attention to Dewey's political philosophy has never been greater, evidenced by a proliferation of books about Dewey since 1985 and the numerous articles in philosophical, political science,

and legal journals every year. During Dewey's lifetime, little academic scrutiny was given to his political writings, as documented by James Farr, "John Dewey and American Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (April 1999): 520–541. Plenty of pragmatists were still to be found, to be sure, across the social sciences; the "eclipse of pragmatism" after Dewey's death occurred only in philosophy departments. The most effective philosophers responding to critics of democracy, who were still proliferating into the 1970s, came from defenders of Kantian and Lockean traditions, such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. It was only in the aftermath of that debate, centered mostly on the nature and justification of rights, that some revivers of republican, communitarian, and deliberative models of democracy began to recall Dewey as a leading defender of liberal participatory democracy. Another significant recollection arose from Richard Rorty's repeated appreciation for Dewey in such writings as "Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* 53 (August 1980): 719–738; and "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (October 1983): 583–889. Rorty's sudden impact on political and legal theory in the 1980s and early 1990s is detailed in William G. Weaver, "Richard Rorty and the Radical Left," *Virginia Law Review* 78 (April 1992): 729–757. More recently, Jürgen Habermas has also recognized Dewey; see *Between Facts and Norms*, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 110 and p. 304.

2. For Rorty, Dewey offers a post-metaphysical vision of politics as endless conversation without appeal to "truth" or any principles of justice or morality. Some have rightly protested that Rorty ignores Dewey's pragmatic justifications for applying scientific inquiry to morality and politics. See, for example, Richard Bernstein, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy," *Political Theory* 15 (November 1987): 538–563, and Robert Westbrook, *Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 7. Alan Ryan depicts Dewey's political aspirations as the establishment of a "planning society" to steer between free-market capitalism and communism, in *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), chap. 8. Westbrook finds faith in the Great Community lying behind and morally

guiding the deliberative process of citizen planning, in *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), chap. 9. Like Westbrook, J. T. Kloppenberg perceives how Dewey's lingering Hegelianism protests the artificial liberalism of excessive individuality and instead emphasizes social connectedness; see *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Only a handful of Dewey commentators go further, perceiving that the vocation of citizenship is ultimately moral and humanitarian. Jeffrey Stout admires a Dewey who defends democracy as a moral tradition in *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Melvin Rogers also finds the quest for ethical life within Dewey's democratic society in *The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). William Caspary's *Dewey on Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) traces Dewey's politics to an ethical demand for peaceful conflict resolution; while Judith Green's *Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) grounds Dewey's politics in the ethical quest for pluralism. An outstanding defense of Dewey's theory of deliberative and participatory democracy is by Axel Honneth, "Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today," *Political Theory* 26 (1998): 763–783.

3. *LW* 2: 304–305.
4. *LW* 2: 306.
5. *LW* 2: 326.
6. *LW* 13: 151.
7. *MW* 5: 394–395.
8. *LW* 6: 188.
9. All the same, a minimum set of rights might be defended as pragmatically justifiable for all communities that deserve the name. Dewey, as will be seen below, can be interpreted as undertaking this sort of defense. See also Beth J. Singer, *Pragmatism, Rights, and Democracy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999).
10. *LW* 2: 329.
11. *LW* 11: 375.
12. *LW* 11: 221.

13. *LW* 7: 359.
14. As the epistemic justification is the most common interpretation of Dewey's political theory, only a small sample of scholars in this category can be mentioned here. They all agree that Dewey held that democracy's primary function is to supply a public forum for citizens to intelligently and fairly deliberate about their social problems. Sidney Hook's writings are exemplary of this approach to Dewey's political theory; see *Sidney Hook on Pragmatism, Democracy, and Freedom*, ed. Robert Talisse and Robert Tempio (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002). Hilary Putnam similarly draws attention to this epistemological justification in "A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy," in *Renewing Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 180–200. Some scholars, like Alan Ryan in *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* and Terry Hoy in *The Political Philosophy of John Dewey* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998), fasten Dewey's politics to his concern for citizen fulfillment in the face of the alienating forces of industrial capitalism. A separate and smaller group of scholars in this epistemic category likewise focus on citizen fulfillment but do not fail to note that Dewey was also concerned for the fulfillment of all persons in the community. See, for example, Matthew Festenstein, *Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997). David Fott likewise recognizes the ideal of harmonizing the individual with the community in Dewey's democratic theory. However, Fott is not as optimistic as Dewey about justifying this ideal. See Fott, *John Dewey: America's Philosopher of Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998). Eric MacGilvary also discerns principled moral commitments at the heart of Dewey's pragmatic theory of democracy, but MacGilvary worries that these moral commitments are obstacles to genuine pluralism and liberalism. See MacGilvary, *Reconstructing Public Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), chap. 5.
15. *LW* 11: 56.
16. *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), *LW* 2: 365.
17. Dewey took close notice of Walter Lippmann's scathing critiques of progressive democracy in *Public Opinion* (1921) and *The Phantom Public* (1925). Dewey's own *The Public and Its Problems* (1927) was primarily a response to Lippmann's alarmist

charges against the dangers of excessive public participation in politics.

18. LW 14: 226–227.
19. Dewey's public deliberation polyarchy, by emphasizing the dominant role for self-forming voluntary publics, is only distantly related to Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel's proposal for "Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy," *European Law Journal* 3 (1997): 313–342. Much closer to Dewey is Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism," *Columbia Law Review* 98 (1998): 267–473, who acknowledge Dewey as an important source for their model of incremental and experimental politics. Very few scholars have recognized Dewey's view of publics as credible or significant to deliberative democracy. More common is Eric MacGilvray's view that Dewey's political philosophy is really far more dependent on the Public's unifying conception of its general interests rather than the pluralistic arena of competing publics. See *Reconstructing Public Reason*, p. 142.
20. LW 7: 348–349.
21. Among recent work elaborating a modern republicanism, Philip Pettit's writings have much in common with Dewey's social and political theory; see Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
22. LW 11: 48.
23. LW 14: 226–227.
24. LW 11: 187.
25. LW 13: 154–255.
26. LW 7: 350.
27. *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), LW 2: 328.
28. LW 14: 228.
29. LW 14: 226.
30. See the next chapter on equal opportunity, education, and democracy.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. For surveys of the public school movement, the reader may consult Richard Pratte, *The Public School Movement: A Critical Study* (New York: David McKay, 1973); David Nasaw, *Schooled to Order: A Social History of Public Schooling in the United States*

- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and Charles L. Glenn, Jr., *The Myth of the Common School* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
2. Informative accounts of proposed reforms and their implications are provided by Jeffrey R. Henig, *Rethinking School Choice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Peter W. Cookson, Jr., *School Choice: The Struggle for the Soul of American Education* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); John B. Williams, *Race Discrimination in Public Higher Education: Interpreting Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 1964–1996* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997); William Lowe Boyd, “The ‘R’s of School Reform’ and the Politics of Reforming or Replacing Public Schools,” *Journal of Educational Change* 1 (2000): 225–252; and Lisa M. Stulberg, *Race, Schools, and Hope: African Americans and School Choice after Brown* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2008).
  3. The larger story of public education and the progressive education movement is told by Maurice R. Berube, *American School Reform: Progressive, Equity, and Excellence Movements, 1883–1993* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); Dewey had mixed reactions to the explosion of “progressive” private schools in the 1910s and 1920s. Too many schools, in Dewey’s view, applied suspect formulas of “child-centered” romanticism without designing curricula, involving parents, or considering surrounding social contexts. See Dewey, “How Much Freedom in New Schools?” *LW* 5: 319–325. Dewey’s own Laboratory School, founded at the University of Chicago in 1894, was never meant to be a private school but was a teaching environment designed for studying possible reforms for public schools. See Laurel N. Tanner, *Dewey’s Laboratory School: Lessons for Today* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997). It should also be noted that Dewey’s praise for the achievements of black educators and schools, like that of W. E. B. DuBois, was never intended as an oblique endorsement of the “separate but equal” doctrine.
  4. Dewey’s work on education in relation to countries other than American will not be discussed here. See Ronald K. Goodenow, “The Progressive Educator and the Third World: A First look at John Dewey,” *History of Education* 19 (1990): 23–40; and *Dewey and European Education: General Problems and Case Studies*, ed. Jurgen Oelkers and Heinz Rhyh (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000).

5. See Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, MW 9: 9–10.
6. See Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Pettit does not elaborate on Dewey's contributions to this tradition, but see Blanche H. Brick's discussion of American thinkers on education's impact on the republic's fate in "Changing Concepts of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Comparison of the Views of Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann and John Dewey," *Thresholds in Education* 19 (1993): 2–8.
7. Dewey, "The Meaning of the Term: Liberalism," LW 14: 253.
8. Dewey, "Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us," LW 14: 227.
9. Two books on Dewey should be consulted on Dewey's vision of social intelligence: Michael Eldridge, *Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instrumentalism* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998), and William Caspary, *Dewey on Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
10. Sound expositions of Dewey's educational theory and curriculum design are given by Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille P. McCarty, *John Dewey and the Challenge of Classroom Practice* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1998); Jim Garrison, *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Thinking* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997); Douglas J. Simpson and Michael J. B. Jackson, *Educational Reform: A Deweyan Perspective* (New York: Garland, 1997); and Harriet K. Cuffaro, *Experimenting with the World: John Dewey and Early Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1994).
11. Dewey, "Creative Democracy—The Task before Us," LW 14: 226, 228.
12. The complex relationships between shared experience, fruitful deliberation, and exposure of barriers to respectful communication, especially in light of the power of ideologically or prejudicially encoded rhetoric, are coming under the scrutiny of careful sociological research. See, for example, Tali Mendelberg and John Oleske, "Race and Public Deliberation," *Political Communication* 17 (2000): 169–191.
13. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, MW 9: 105.
14. A penetrating study of moral conflict and deliberation is offered by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
15. Dewey, "What I Believe," LW 5: 275.
16. Dewey, "The Need for a Philosophy of Education," LW 9: 201.

17. See Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
18. For example, see Marcus Garvey, *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey on Africa for the Africans* (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1923).
19. An excellent discussion of this point, and of the long-standing arguments between separationists and integrationists, is Howard McGary, Jr., "Racial Integration and Racial Separation: Conceptual Clarifications," in Leonard Harris, ed., *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 199–211.
20. Dewey, "The School as Social Centre," *MW* 2: 85.
21. John Dewey to Horace Kallen, March 31, 1915, in Larry A. Hickman, ed., *The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 1: 1871–1918*, 2nd edn., (Charlottesville, VA: Intalex Corporation, 2001), p. 03222.
22. Dewey, "Nationalizing Education," *MW* 10: 204–205. On Dewey's multiculturalism see Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam, "Education for Democracy," *Educational Theory* 43 (1993): 361–376; J. Christopher Eisele, "John Dewey and the Immigrants," *History of Education Quarterly* 15 (1975): 67–85; and Ronald K. Goodenow, "Racial and Ethnic Tolerance in John Dewey's Educational and Social Thought: The Depression Years," *Educational Theory* 27 (1977): 48–64. A recent work exemplifying Dewey's vision is Duane E. Campbell, *Choosing Democracy: A Practical Guide to Multicultural Education*, 2nd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000).
23. See, for example, Eamonn Callan, "Education for Democracy: Dewey's Illiberal Democracy," *Educational Theory* 31 (1981): 167–175.
24. This axiom is accepted on all sides; those who prefer private schools despite the higher cost should think twice before challenging public education on the grounds that throwing more money at education does nothing. What is at stake is whether the *structure* of public education prevents greater expenditures from improving education. See Note 33.
25. Of course, funding inequalities have long been an endemic problem in America because of school funding's origin in local property values. See, for example, Alonzo F. Myers's analysis in "The Democratic Ideal of Equality of Education and Equality of

- Opportunity,” *Journal of Educational Sociology* 16 (1942): 3–14. For an argument that funded school choice would naturally result in meritocracy and stratification, leading to schools for elites and schools for mediocre students, see Alexander W. Astin, “Educational ‘Choice’: Its Appeal May Be Illusory,” *Sociology of Education* 65 (1992): 255–260.
26. Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 31–32.
  27. Major judicial cases are summarized by Charles J. Russo, J. John Harris III, and Rosetta F. Sandidge, “*Brown v. Board of Education* at 40: A Legal History of Equal Educational Opportunities in American Public Education,” *Journal of Negro Education* 63 (1994): 297–309.
  28. David Nevin and Robert E. Bills examine post-1950s reactions to desegregation in *The Schools that Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the South* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976). The similarities to post-Civil War developments are striking; see Ward M. McAfee, *Religion, Race, and Reconstruction: The Public School in the Politics of the 1870s* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); and William H. Watkins, *The White Architects of Black Education: Ideology and Power in America, 1865–1954* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001).
  29. This point is emphasized by Michael Engel, *The Struggle for Control of Public Education: Market Ideology vs. Democratic Values* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), pp. 70–74.
  30. See Albert Shanker and Bella Rosenberg, “Private School Choice: An Ineffective Path to Educational Reform,” in Simon Hakim, Paul Seidenstat, and Gary Bowman, eds., *Privatizing Education and Educational Choice: Concepts, Plans, and Experiences* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), pp. 59–73.
  31. Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, pp. 287–288.
  32. Jeffrey R. Henig, *Rethinking School Choice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 189–193.
  33. The key text is Dewey, “Racial Prejudice and Friction,” *MW* 13: 242–254.
  34. This theory was advanced before Dewey; see, for example, W. E. B. DuBois, “The Economics of Negro Emancipation in the United States,” *Sociological Review* 4 (1911): 303–313.

35. This is the conclusion, for example, of Charles H. Thompson, "Race and Equality of Educational Opportunity: Defining the Problem," *Journal of Negro Education* 37 (1968): 191–203.
36. A careful and detailed portrayal of progress and problems is "The Schooling of Black Americans," in Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks in American Society* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), pp. 329–389. An early study was done by Earle H. West, "Progress Toward Equality of Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Education," *Journal of Negro Education* 37 (1968): 212–219.
37. Among the numerous discussions about implications of education reform, only a few can be mentioned here for further reading: Walter C. Farrell, Jr., and Jackolyn E. Mathews, "School Choice and the Educational Opportunities of African American Children," *Journal of Negro Education* 59 (1990): 526–537; Diana T. Slaughter-Defoe, "Parental Educational Choice: Some African American Dilemmas," *Journal of Negro Education* 60 (1991): 354–360; Faustine C. Jones-Wilson and Charles A. Asbury, "Why Not Public Schools," *Journal of Negro Education* 61 (1992): 125–137; Stanley C. Trent, "School Choice for African-American Children Who Live in Poverty: A Commitment to Equity or More of the Same?" *Urban Education* 27 (1992): 291–307; Pedro A. Noguera, "More Democracy Not Less: Confronting the Challenge of Privatization in Public Education," *Journal of Negro Education* 63 (1994): 237–250; Robert S. Peterkin and Janice E. Jackson, "Public School Choice: Implications for African American Students," *Journal of Negro Education* 63 (1994): 126–138; Dan A. Lewis and Kathryn Nakagawa, *Race and Educational Reform in the American Metropolis: A Study of School Decentralization* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Robin D. Barnes, "Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course," *Yale Law Journal* 106 (1997): 2375–2410; Robert D. Winkle, Joseph Stewart, Jr., and J. L. Polinard, "Public School Quality, Private Schools, and Race," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1999): 1248–1253; Salvatore Saporito and Annette Lareau, "School Selection as a Process: The Multiple Dimensions of Race in Framing Educational Choice," *Social Problems* 46 (1999): 418–439; "Is Voucher Education a Good Idea for African Americans?" *Journal of Blacks in*

*Higher Education* 27 (2000): 116–117; Gilberto Q. Conchas and Kimberly A. Goyette, “The Race Is Not Even: Minority Education in a Post-Affirmative Action Era,” *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* 13 (2000–2001): 87–102; Jeffrey R. Henig, Richard Hula, Marion Orr, and Desiree Pedescleaux, *The Color of School Reform: Race, Politics, and the Challenge of Urban Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Peter C. Murrell, Jr., *African-Centered Pedagogy: Developing Schools of Achievement for African American Children* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); William Ayers, Therese M. Quinn, David Stovall, eds. *Handbook of Social Justice in Education* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Gary Orfield, Erica Frankenberg, et al., *Educational Delusions? Why Choice Can Deepen Inequality and how to Make Schools Fair* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Jamel K. Donnor and Adrienne Dixson, eds., *The Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

38. Dewey, “Freedom,” *LW* 11: 255.

## CHAPTER 5

1. A useful examination of Dewey’s work on responsibility and freedom is by Abraham Edel, *Ethical Theory and Social Change: The Evolution of John Dewey’s Ethics, 1908–1932* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), chap. 10.
2. *Ethics* (1932), *LW* 7: 303.
3. In H. L. A. Hart’s terminology, a “consequentialist” justification of punishment is defined as “essentially forward-looking; it considers the future good we can do to society including the criminal.” See Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 159. Hart’s definition is designed with a view toward grappling with utilitarianism. This definition is not used in this essay, and Dewey’s theory (as we will see) is not another utilitarian effort. Dewey is here arguing that the justification for punishment must involve consideration of its consequences; and so it is a consequentialist approach but in a broader sense than Hart’s.
4. See Suzanne Rice, “Dewey on Virtue, Character, and Moral Education,” *Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science* 26 (2000): 75–89.

5. An example of this unification quest is explored by Johann Klaassen, "Punishment and the Purification of Moral Taint," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27 (1996): 51–64.
6. This argument deserves more elaboration than can be afforded here, and it is but one way to attack retributivism. For example, as Russ Shafer-Landau has argued, retribution has no resources for determining why harm, and what amount of harm, is deserved by the offender. See Shafer-Landau, "The Failure of Retributivism," *Philosophical Studies* 82 (1996): 289–316.
7. *Ethics* (1932), *LW* 7: 304–305. Dewey's most fervent diatribe against retributivism (too long for quotation here) can be found in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), *MW* 14: 17–18.
8. "Force and Coercion," *MW* 10: 248.
9. See Joseph Betz, "Violence: Garver's Definition and a Deweyan Correction," *Ethics* 87 (1977): 339–351.
10. "Fiat Justitia, Ruat Coelum," *MW* 10: 281.
11. Dewey never found persuasive any appeal to trans-social rights. He was particularly skeptical about those sorts of alleged rights that have the curious dual properties of being sufficiently general to be possessed by all people simply because they are human, yet particular enough that we can detect when someone's behavior has caused one or more of those rights to evaporate. Daniel McDermott relies on these suspicious dual properties in his attempt to explain why we can harm people simply because a "human" right has somehow vanished. McDermott, "The Permissibility of Punishment," *Law and Philosophy* 20 (2001): 403–432.
12. "Philosophies of Freedom," *LW* 3: 94.
13. The necessity of punishment for developing stable group cooperation is supported by game-theoretic analyses of reciprocity. Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson conclude that if sufficiently large punishments are enforced, moralistic strategies (those which cooperate, punish noncooperators, and punish those who do not also punish cooperators) can be evolutionarily stable strategies. Boyd and Richerson, "Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or anything else) in Sizable Groups," *Ethology and Sociobiology* 13 (1992): 171–195.
14. For a liberal formulation of the moral education theory, see Jean Hampton, "The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,"

- Philosophy and Public Affairs* 13 (1984): 208–238. See also the following. Jeffrie Murphy, “Retributivism, Moral Education and the Liberal State,” *Criminal Justice Ethics* 4 (1985): 3–10; Uma Narayan, “Moral Education and Criminal Punishment,” in Thomas Magnell, ed., *Values and Education* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 69–79; and Ido Weijers, “Punishment and Upbringing: Considerations for an Educative Justification of Punishment,” *Journal of Moral Education* 29 (2000): 61–73. The moral education theory and reintegration theory are in close proximity to the penance model of punishment and restorative justice. See R. A. Duff, *Trials and Punishments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Wesley Cragg, *The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice* (London: Routledge, 1992); Aleksandar Fatić, *Punishment and Restorative Crime-Handling: A Social Theory of Trust* (Aldershot: Avebury-Ashgate, 1995); Francis Schweigert, “Learning the Common Good: Principles of Community-based Moral Education in Restorative Justice,” *Journal of Moral Education* 28 (1999): 163–183; Kent Roach, “Changing Punishment at the Turn of the Century: Restorative Justice on the Rise,” *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 42 (2000): 249–280; Michael L. Hadley, ed., *The Spiritual Roots of Restorative Justice* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Gerry Johnstone and Daniel Van Ness, ed., *Handbook of Restorative Justice* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); and Gerry Johnstone, *Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates*, 2nd edn. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).
15. See *A Common Faith* (1934), *LW* 9: 21–39; and Dewey, “Democracy and Human Nature,” *LW* 13: 136–155. Dewey’s rejection of autonomy for its own sake circumvents Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism that the theory of punishment as moral education is unstably grounded in respect for moral autonomy. Shafer-Landau, “Can Punishment Morally Educate?” *Law and Philosophy* 10 (1991): 189–219.
  16. *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), *LW* 2: 328.
  17. *Ethics* (1932), *LW* 7: 252.
  18. “Democracy Is Radical,” *LW* 11: 298.
  19. Braithwaite, John, *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, *Not Just Deserts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990);

John Braithwaite, "Shame and Criminal Justice," *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 42 (2000): 281–298; Eric Reitan, "The Ethics of Community: The Metaphysical and Ethical Presuppositions of AVP," *The Acorn* 7 (1992): 19–28; Eric Reitan, "Why the Deterrence Argument for Capital Punishment Fails," *Criminal Justice Ethics* 12 (1993): 26–33; and Eric Reitan, "Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26 (1996): 57–81. Braithwaite later portrayed his reintegration model as a mode of restorative justice, aiming at the restoration of community bonds through informal conflict resolution. Restorative justice in Braithwaite's hands has emerged as a community-corrections alternative to criminal justice by penal courts and trials having a formal legal and political structure. If punishment is defined as the product of criminal justice, then Braithwaite offers reintegration as a viable alternative to punishment. See Braithwaite, "A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized," *UCLA Law Review* 46 (1999): 1727–1750; "Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts," in M. Tonry, ed., *Crime and Justice*, vol. 25 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 1–127; and "Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8 (2000): 115–131. However, the term "punishment" is here retained in its originally broader sense as the opposite of reward. Dewey would still have agreed that many, if not most, kinds of offender interventions are best conducted with greater local community involvement. Dewey would also have been intrigued by Braithwaite's exploration of the relationships between restorative justice and republicanism, since his political theory also stressed positive freedom in addition to negative freedom as essential for democratic participation. See John Braithwaite and Christine Parker, "Restorative Justice is Republican Justice," in Gordon Bazemore and Lode Walgrave, eds., *Restorative Juvenile Justice* (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1999), pp. 103–126; and John Braithwaite and Heather Strang, ed., *Restorative Justice and Civil Society* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

20. Reitan, "Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment," pp. 59–61.
21. The deep connection between one's ability to come to take responsibility for one's wrong action, and the ability to arrive at self-forgiveness in addition to community forgiveness, is

explored by Jeffrey Blustein, "On Taking Responsibility For One's Past," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 17 (2000): 1–19. The related question of whether the suffering endured through the process of punishment can be meaningful for the offender is helpfully examined by Steven Tudor, "Accepting One's Suffering as Meaningful Suffering," *Law and Philosophy* 20 (2000): 581–604. One of Tudor's primary conclusions is that punishment should be a communicative interaction between society and the offender that provides the necessary context for inspiring remorse. Tudor persuasively argues that remorse, in turn, is necessary for the offender's ability to come to the recognition that the suffering of punishment has useful meaning for himself. In a striking confirmation of the reintegration theory's claims, Tudor also holds that "in addition to, and supplementing, the communicative function, such withdrawal and isolation can also help to create the right sort of space for inner, moral reform" (p. 602).

22. The significance of context for shaming is explored by several of the essays in Paul Gilbert and Bernice, ed. *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also Andrew Book, "Shame on You: An Analysis of Modern Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration," *William and Mary Law Review* 40 (1999): 653–686.
23. See Stephen Garvey, "Can Shaming Punishments Educate?," *University of Chicago Law Review* 65 (1998): 733–794. Garvey promotes a moral education approach, but his concept of shaming as only harmful to the offender unfortunately assigns it an exclusively condemning and retributively punitive role, and no morally educative role.
24. See Randy Barnett, "Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice," *Ethics* 87 (1977): 279–301; Diane Whiteley, "The Victim and the Justification of Punishment," *Criminal Justice Ethics* 17 (1998): 42–54; and Francis Schweigert, "Moral Education in Victim Offender Conferencing," *Criminal Justice Ethics* 18 (1999): 29–40.

## CHAPTER 6

1. *EW* 4: 3.
2. The full story of the evolution of Dewey's personal religious views is well told by Steven Rockefeller in *John Dewey: Religious*

- Faith and Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). A briefer narrative is included in John R. Shook and James A. Good, *John Dewey's Philosophy of Spirit, with Dewey's 1897 Lectures on Hegel* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).
3. "Creative Democracy—The Task before Us" (1939), *LW* 14: 226.
  4. "Democracy and Education in the World of Today" (1938), *LW* 13: 303.
  5. *Ethics* (1908), *MW* 5: 431. This book goes on to enumerate specific moral principles for economic activity, broadly socialist in nature, in Chapter 23 on "Some Principles in the Economic Order." For example, Principle 7 reads, "Every Member of Society Should Share in Its Wealth and in the Values Made Possible by It." (p. 466).
  6. Rawls later modified his understanding of public reasons in *Political Liberalism* only to the extent that appeals to comprehensive doctrines of the good can indeed be raised in the political sphere, but only if genuinely public reasons are eventually provided to support those appeals. See *Political Liberalism*, 2nd edn. (New York: Columbia University, 1996), pp. 242–252. On Rawls and Dewey, the reader should consult Eric Thomas Weber, *Rawls, Dewey, and Constructivism: On the Epistemology of Justice* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010).
  7. Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 66.
  8. Charles Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), in Peirce Edition Project, ed., *The Essential Peirce*, vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 109–123.
  9. For Dewey's own efforts to define and delineate types of rights, see *Ethics*, *MW* 5: 394–403.
  10. *A Common Faith* (1934), *LW* 9: 56.
  11. *LW* 5: 71–72.
  12. *LW* 5: 72.
  13. *MW* 4: 175.
  14. *EW* 4: 9.
  15. *EW* 3: 321–322.
  16. "Intelligence and Morals" (1908), *MW* 4: 39.
  17. "Individuality, Equality, and Superiority" (1922), *MW* 13: 297.

18. *Ethics* (1932), *LW* 7: 350.
19. "What I Believe" (1930), *LW* 5: 273–274.
20. *A Common Faith* (1934), *MW* 9: 55–56.
21. Consult Joseph Hamburger, *John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), chaps. 3 and 6.
22. *A Common Faith* (1934), *LW* 9: 57–58.



# INDEX

Page numbers with n denote foot notes.

- activity, 6, 9, 13, 19, 29, 36–8,  
49, 60, 71, 81, 129, 142,  
154, 178
- adapt(ation), 24, 36, 92,  
121, 161
- aesthetics, 140, 141
- African Americans, 87, 99, 100,  
107, 111, 168, 172–3
- America, 25, 33, 57, 58, 59, 68,  
76, 77, 87, 88, 89, 96, 99,  
100, 101–2, 104, 107–8,  
110, 111, 144–5, 147,  
152, 169
- education, 87, 88, 104,  
107–8, 111, 169
- ideals, 58, 76, 77, 152
- politics, 57, 96, 99, 100, 110
- Angell, James R., 35
- anthropology, 10, 11
- aristocracy, 12, 22, 31, 56, 67,  
72, 73, 78, 147, 154
- aristotle, 42
- art, 101, 150
- atheism, 139
- attention, 8, 9, 10, 11, 20, 27,  
31, 32, 38, 55, 57, 69, 89,  
101, 114, 122, 150,  
163, 166
- behavior, 8, 19, 29, 35, 36, 39,  
40, 44  
and intelligence, 8, 19  
and mind, 8, 40  
social, 39
- Bennett, William, 108
- biology, 10, 36, 84
- brain, 8, 10, 11, 19, 127, 161
- Braithwaite, John, 133, 135,  
175–6
- Brown vs. Board of  
Education*, 107
- Calvinism, 141
- capitalism, 25, 91, 164, 166
- character, 15, 38, 78, 89, 92,  
95–6, 102, 105, 114, 116,  
121, 123, 127, 131, 135
- Chicago, 33, 35, 36, 39, 101
- child, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 30–6,  
38, 40, 44, 46, 53, 101,  
104, 105, 107, 109, 110,  
114, 115, 116, 117,  
136, 168
- education, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17,  
30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38,  
53, 104, 105, 107, 109,  
110, 168
- values, 14, 33, 35, 117

- Christianity, 29, 50, 140, 141, 145, 152, 153, 155, 156  
and Jesus, 153
- citizen/ship, 1–3, 20, 21, 26–8, 33, 35, 56, 57, 59, 62, 65–71, 74, 80, 82, 85, 88–92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 108–11, 113, 121, 124, 125, 137, 139, 140, 145, 147, 148, 150, 164–5
- civilization, 12, 16, 32, 40, 153, 156
- cognitive science, 11
- common good, 60, 80, 81, 129, 143
- commonsense, 68, 93
- communication, 10, 20, 22, 23, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 93, 94, 95, 112, 150, 177
- communism, 78
- community, 1, 4, 6, 14, 27, 28, 30, 49, 52, 53, 55, 57–9, 63, 65, 69, 70, 74–7, 79, 81–5, 89, 94, 98, 110, 111, 129, 130, 132–5, 137, 138, 140, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 164, 166, 176  
great (moral) community, 58, 59, 76–7, 79, 82, 83, 85, 129, 130, 155, 164  
*see also* society
- conflict, 24, 27, 28, 32, 35, 44, 46, 49–53, 55, 56, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 82–5, 90, 93, 96, 98, 99, 103, 109, 120, 127, 130, 131, 134, 162, 165, 169, 176
- conscientiousness, 9–11, 15
- consciousness, 9, 10, 15, 36, 39, 81, 123, 129, 130, 141, 151
- consequentialism, 48, 116, 120, 123, 128, 173
- cooperation, 10–12, 15, 24, 48–53, 63, 66, 73, 74, 81–3, 85, 93–5, 98, 102–4, 109, 124, 129, 132, 137, 149, 155, 162
- creativity, 2, 7, 29, 30, 36, 148
- culture, 2, 9, 11, 30, 33, 102
- custom, 16, 100, 101, 143
- Dahl, Robert, 69–70
- democracy, 1–7, 11–15, 17–18, 21–8, 29, 31–3, 35, 39, 48–53, 55–85, 87–100, 103, 104, 108, 110–12, 113, 121, 122, 125, 127–33, 137, 138, 139–57, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 176  
and aristocracy, 12, 39, 56  
and education, 2, 5, 6, 12, 13, 22–4, 26–8, 31–3, 35, 52, 53, 87–90, 93, 95, 97, 98, 103, 108, 110, 112, 128, 129, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139  
and free inquiry, 27, 52, 112, 132, 137  
and individual mind, 56–7, 73, 75–6, 78, 93, 95, 96, 132, 137, 142, 150  
as logical method, 32, 48–53, 66, 71, 73, 79, 90, 92, 93, 137, 139, 148, 150, 151

- and morality, 14, 52, 55–85,  
93, 95, 99, 113, 121,  
132, 137, 139, 143
- and philosophy, 13, 53,  
55–85, 88, 97
- and religion, 28, 29, 50, 99,  
140–2, 144, 148, 150,  
152–7
- and social ethics, 11, 13, 14,  
15, 27, 35, 39, 51, 52,  
56–7, 65, 67–8, 71, 74,  
78, 82, 83, 88–90, 92,  
93, 95, 99, 110, 111,  
121, 122, 125, 127, 129,  
130–2, 137, 138, 139,  
143, 144, 145, 148, 149,  
150, 151, 154, 155, 157
- deontology, 48, 80, 114, 122,  
125, 126
- discipline, 6, 33
- discourse, 94, 104, 144
- dogma, 8, 12, 25, 30, 41, 96,  
97, 99, 104, 140, 152
- doubt, 38, 50
- dualism, 36, 37, 39, 40
- DuBois, W. E. B., 168
- economics, 17, 18, 23, 33, 64,  
74, 91, 107, 108, 111,  
147, 178
- education, 1–35, 38, 50, 52, 53,  
55, 56, 66, 70, 74, 76, 84,  
85, 87–93, 95–98, 100–12,  
113, 114, 116–17, 125–9,  
131–8, 147, 148, 152, 160,  
161, 162, 167, 168, 169,  
170, 174–5
- for children, 10, 13, 14, 16,  
17, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35,  
38, 53, 104, 105, 107,  
109, 110, 168
- and democracy, 2, 5, 6, 12,  
13, 22–4, 26–8, 31–3,  
35, 52, 53, 87–90, 93,  
95, 97, 98, 103, 108,  
110, 112, 128, 129,  
131, 132, 137,  
138, 139
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 48
- emotion, 111
- emotivism, 19, 20, 120
- empiricism, 26–8, 29, 40, 42,  
43, 47, 61, 72, 73, 81,  
128, 137
- Engel, Michael, 108
- environment, 16, 30, 36, 37,  
47, 84, 89, 168
- equality, 27, 33, 63, 74, 75–6,  
77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 97, 98,  
100, 103, 105–6, 108,  
155–6, 157
- of opportunity, 75–6,  
105–6
- ethics, 1, 2, 7, 10, 15, 17, 21,  
24, 27, 28, 29, 48, 55–7,  
65, 72, 73, 76, 77, 79, 82,  
83, 85, 114, 122, 139,  
143, 153, 154,  
157, 165
- evolution, 22, 27, 50, 59, 70,  
78, 84, 87, 88, 131, 141
- experience, 6, 7, 13, 35–42, 45,  
47–9, 51, 52, 63, 64, 79,  
82, 92–5, 98, 101, 102,  
109, 139, 140, 143, 150,  
155, 169
- as active, 36, 42
- belief tested by, 36, 38, 64,  
82, 94, 101
- and education, 6, 7, 13, 35,  
38, 52, 92, 93, 95, 98,  
101, 102, 109

- experience—*continued*  
   and individuality, 6, 7, 13,  
     35, 37, 39, 40, 49, 52,  
     63, 64, 82, 93, 95, 101,  
     109, 140, 143  
   and knowledge, 35, 40, 41,  
     42, 155  
   and religion, 139  
   and science, 35, 39, 47,  
     51, 64  
   and self, 13, 38, 49, 63, 143  
   social, 98  
 experiment, 1, 2, 5, 29, 36, 43,  
   51, 52, 69, 70, 72, 79, 93,  
   106, 121, 143, 167  
   and education, 1, 2, 5, 29,  
     52, 70, 93, 106  
   as a stage of science, 5, 51,  
     69, 72  
  
 fallibility, 52  
 fanaticism, 20, 21,  
   44, 157  
 fascism, 78, 148  
 fear, 66, 70, 94, 107, 127  
 force, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23,  
   24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 44,  
   52, 64, 65, 67, 82, 84, 92,  
   94, 97, 98, 99, 105, 108,  
   109, 111, 120, 121, 123,  
   128, 132, 147, 152, 166  
 freedom, 6, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23,  
   28, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65,  
   88, 90, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100,  
   103, 106, 107, 110, 112,  
   121, 123, 132, 146, 152,  
   173, 176  
   and education, 6, 12, 13, 18,  
     23, 88, 95, 103, 106,  
     107, 110, 112, 132, 152  
   of inquiry, 68, 93, 97, 112  
   and religion, 28, 93, 96, 97,  
     99, 105, 106, 107, 110,  
     143, 149, 152, 157  
   and society, 12, 13, 18, 23,  
     63–5, 88, 95, 100, 107,  
     112, 121  
 functionalism, 29, 36, 37, 163  
  
 goods, 9, 37, 41, 48–52, 61, 92,  
   93, 97, 109, 124, 130, 131,  
   146, 151, 155  
 government, 25, 27, 52, 56,  
   58–63, 68, 69, 73, 74, 80,  
   83, 90, 95, 104–6, 108–10,  
   112, 121, 127, 133, 139,  
   146, 147, 148, 150  
 Gutmann, Amy, 106, 109  
  
 Habermas, Jürgen, 143,  
   144, 175  
 habit, 7, 9, 15, 16, 20, 31,  
   36–8, 44, 61, 68, 82,  
   95, 101, 116, 117, 119,  
   123, 124, 140  
 happiness, 49, 80, 143, 149  
 harmony, 2, 7, 15, 64, 76–8,  
   84, 124, 154, 155, 166  
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm  
   Friedrich, 140,  
   147, 165  
 Henig, Jeffrey, 110  
 Hispanics, 107  
 history, 5, 7, 12, 58–60, 92, 96,  
   98, 104, 151  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 90  
 Hook, Sidney, 166  
 human nature, 60, 68, 77, 83,  
   93, 94, 99, 142  
 Hume, David, 42

- idealism, 18–20, 36, 37, 47, 71, 84, 163
- ideals, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 49, 50, 52, 72, 73, 88, 102, 108, 110, 139, 140, 141, 144, 148, 150, 152, 157
- identity, 25, 41, 100
- imagination, 13, 19, 26, 38, 44, 46, 49, 50, 106
- individual, 6, 7, 13, 16, 26, 28, 30, 35, 37, 39, 40, 49, 52, 57, 60–1, 63–5, 71, 73, 75–6, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 90, 93, 95, 97, 98, 101, 103, 109, 110, 112, 116, 123, 132, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 165, 166
- individualism, 36, 57, 75, 76, 80, 83, 98, 140, 151
- democracy and, i, 28, 57, 75, 76, 80, 83, 98, 140, 151
- psychological, i, 16, 35
- inquiry, 3, 9, 16, 27, 29, 40, 43, 44, 52, 53, 67–9, 72, 85, 93, 97, 112, 164
- instinct, 33, 40, 60
- intelligence, 1–5, 7–11, 15–24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 35, 42–7, 49–52, 55–7, 64, 66, 68, 71, 74, 82, 84, 85, 89–93, 96, 103, 116, 119, 121, 122, 125, 128, 132, 137, 148, 150, 153, 157, 166, 169
- and education, 1–5, 7–11, 15–19, 21–4, 26, 29, 30, 32, 35, 50, 52, 66, 74, 84, 89–93, 96, 103, 116, 119, 121, 125, 128, 132, 137, 148, 150, 153, 157, 166, 169
- and experience, 7, 35, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 64, 82, 92, 93, 150
- and morality, 121, 122, 137, 157
- social, 1–3, 5, 10, 11, 17, 21–4, 26, 49–52, 55, 56, 57, 66, 74, 84, 85, 92, 93, 157, 169
- and values, 15–18, 24, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49–53, 74, 89, 96, 103
- intuition, 8, 36
- James, William, 45, 48–9, 141
- judgment, 8, 9, 19, 37, 42–4, 46, 68, 93, 115–20, 122, 123, 139
- justice, 2, 21, 27, 28, 61, 76, 98, 99, 113, 119, 121, 122, 124–6, 130–3, 137, 164, 175, 176
- Kallen, Horace, 101
- kantianism, 143, 146, 148, 164
- Kant, Immanuel, 123
- knowledge, 11, 15, 22, 25, 31, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 57, 58, 65, 80, 104, 119, 155
- and action, 65, 155
- and reality, 40, 155
- Kymlicka, Will, 99
- labor, 31, 33
- Lamb, Charles, 44
- language, 34, 101, 152

- law, 2, 25, 37, 53, 73, 121, 130, 131, 143
- learning, 2, 5–8, 11, 13, 15–17, 26, 29–35, 62, 89, 135, 147
- liberalism, 56, 61, 64, 74, 75, 78, 80, 82, 90–2, 96, 97, 105, 139, 142, 151, 157, 165, 166
- liberty, 12, 13, 16, 23, 28, 61, 63–5, 90, 92, 108, 137, 146, 148
- Lippmann, Walter, 68, 70, 71, 73, 166–7
- Locke, John, 90, 164
- logic, 8, 9, 37, 40, 55, 57, 68
- love, 153
- loyalty, 149
- Mason, Andrew, 134
- materialism, 39
- mathematics, 8, 104
- Mead, George H., 35, 36
- meaning, 13, 16, 18, 38, 39, 42, 45, 74, 90, 92, 97, 98, 100, 118, 131, 139, 151, 153, 154, 176–7
- and action, 38, 176–7
- and experience, 38, 39, 42, 45, 98, 139
- and purpose, 154
- means, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12–14, 17–21, 28, 32, 34, 37, 42–8, 53, 67, 77, 82, 83, 92, 94, 98, 100–2, 111, 121, 125, 132, 134, 137, 140, 142, 145, 151, 153
- memory, 8
- Mill, John Stuart, 49, 149, 150, 155, 156
- mind, 15, 35, 40, 64, 75, 92, 95, 116, 139
- morality, 40, 76, 77, 105, 111, 113, 114, 117, 121, 122, 129, 131, 137, 149, 157, 164
- and freedom, 121
- and religion, 149, 157
- and science, 40, 137, 164
- and value, 40, 105, 122, 149, 157
- naturalism, 16, 26, 27, 29, 41, 47, 139, 141, 156
- nature, 3, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17, 24, 28, 35–7, 40, 41, 47, 60, 63, 64, 68, 72, 77, 83, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 108, 113, 118, 122, 126, 140, 142, 156, 164, 178
- neuroscience, 10, 19
- New York City, 62, 101
- Nozick, Robert, 164
- observation, 8, 12, 15
- opinion, 20, 21, 50, 64, 67, 68, 93
- organism, 36
- pain, 47, 102
- peace, 1, 65, 74, 82, 90, 95, 99, 146, 165
- pedagogy, 21, 152
- Peirce, Charles S., 50, 51, 144
- perception, 42, 153
- philosophy, 1–7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30,

- 33, 35, 36, 39–42, 49, 53,  
55–8, 77, 78, 88, 91, 92,  
97, 100, 103, 111, 113,  
116, 117, 122, 123, 128,  
130, 132, 140–3, 145, 149,  
150, 157, 164, 167
- Plato, 84, 91
- play, 34
- pluralism, 2, 89, 91–4, 97,  
100–2, 110, 142–50, 152,  
157, 165, 166, 167
- politics, 1, 3, 5, 12, 20, 21, 24,  
25, 26, 27, 28, 39, 50, 52,  
53, 55, 56–63, 65, 67–71,  
73, 74, 77–84, 87, 90–3,  
95, 97, 107–9, 128, 129,  
132, 133, 139–49, 151,  
152, 154, 155, 157, 163–4,  
165, 166, 167, 176, 178
- and ethics, 1, 21, 24, 28,  
55–7, 73, 77, 79,  
82, 83, 139, 143, 154,  
157, 165
- and government, 25, 27, 52,  
56, 58–63, 68, 69, 73,  
74, 80, 83, 90, 95, 108,  
109, 133, 139, 146–8
- pragmatism, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11,  
16–20, 26, 29, 31, 36, 37,  
39, 43, 44, 51, 71, 77, 100,  
141, 144, 164
- problem solving, 2, 66, 68,  
70, 75
- progress, 9, 28, 30, 35, 43, 50,  
61, 70–3, 91, 97, 111, 112,  
139, 142, 155, 172
- Protestantism, 107
- psychologist's fallacy, 45
- psychology, 5, 9–11, 16, 27,  
29, 35–7, 39, 40, 41, 45,  
111, 140, 152
- punishment, 27, 28, 53,  
113–29, 132–8, 173, 174,  
175, 176, 177
- Putnam, Hilary, 166
- race/racism, 84, 94, 98, 100,  
104, 108, 140, 142
- rationality, 57, 111
- Rawls, John, 143, 144, 164, 178
- reason, 7–9, 11, 18, 19, 23, 28,  
36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 55, 56,  
57, 61, 62, 72, 91, 92, 99,  
100, 107, 116, 118, 127,  
129, 130, 139, 140,  
143–7, 149,  
155, 178
- and education, 7, 8, 11, 18,  
92, 116, 129
- and practicality, 44
- as pure, 72
- reflection, 16, 38, 44, 49,  
53, 152
- reflex arc, 37
- Reitan, Eric, 133–5
- relativism, 51
- religion, 2, 25, 28, 39, 50, 52,  
69, 93, 96–9, 104–7, 110,  
139–52, 155–7,  
161, 177
- republicanism, 33, 74, 75, 91,  
92, 95, 167, 176
- responsibility, 11, 12, 15,  
18–21, 23, 28, 60, 62, 70,  
74, 76, 80, 100, 113–19,  
121–9, 131–5, 137, 138,  
142, 147, 150, 156,  
173, 176
- right, 1, 21, 25, 26, 28, 33, 40,  
48, 51, 55, 56, 57, 59–65,  
72–6, 80, 85, 89–92, 94,  
97–100, 102, 111, 120–2,

- right—*continued*  
 126, 127, 140, 143, 146,  
 147, 151, 157, 164, 165,  
 174, 177, 178  
 liberty right, 28, 61, 63, 64,  
 65, 90, 92, 146  
 moral right, 56  
 Rorty, Richard, 164
- science, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 19,  
 25, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42,  
 47, 50, 51, 64, 68, 69, 72,  
 73, 75, 104, 136, 137, 140,  
 144, 153, 163–4  
 and education, 4, 5, 8, 10,  
 11, 14, 25, 28, 34, 35,  
 50, 104, 137  
 and experiment, 5, 51, 69  
 selfishness, 49, 68, 71, 90, 98,  
 130, 157  
 sensation, 36, 41, 45  
 slavery, 90  
 socialism, 76, 78, 178  
 society, 1–5, 7, 10, 12–18, 20,  
 23–8, 29–31, 33, 35,  
 49–53, 55, 60, 61, 63–5,  
 69–73, 75, 76, 80, 87–9,  
 93–100, 104, 105, 107,  
 112, 121–8, 131, 133, 136,  
 137, 139, 140, 142, 143,  
 145, 146, 148–52, 164–5,  
 173, 177  
 and education, 1–5, 7, 10,  
 12–18, 23–8, 29–31, 33,  
 35, 50, 52, 53, 70, 76,  
 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 96,  
 97, 100, 104, 105, 107,  
 112, 126, 127, 128, 131,  
 136, 137, 148, 152  
 and freedom, 12, 13, 18, 23,  
 63–5, 88, 95, 100, 107,  
 112, 121  
 and individuals, 7, 16, 26,  
 30, 49, 52, 60, 61, 63,  
 64, 65, 71, 73, 75, 76,  
 80, 93, 95, 97, 98, 112,  
 123, 140, 143, 145, 146,  
 149, 151, 152, 165  
 and morality, 76, 105, 121,  
 122, 131, 137, 149, 157,  
 164–5  
 reason in society, 7, 18, 28,  
 107, 127, 139, 140, 143,  
 145, 149  
*see also* community  
 sociology, 140  
 subjectivism, 41, 47  
 supernatural, 47, 139, 141, 149,  
 152, 155–7
- technology, 18, 73, 151  
 Thoreau, Henry David, 49  
 Thorndike, Edward L., 5  
 thought, 4, 16, 20, 36, 37, 40,  
 53, 61, 63, 65, 83, 103,  
 106, 110, 115, 123  
 Tilden, Samuel J., 67  
 toleration, 23, 25, 33, 96, 97,  
 108, 143  
 totalitarianism, 51, 65  
 tradition, 12, 24, 33, 42, 48,  
 57, 58, 74, 88, 90, 96, 100,  
 101, 146, 150, 152, 164,  
 165, 169  
 truth, 25, 31, 36, 40, 77, 112,  
 153, 164  
 Tufts, James H., 35, 143

- utilitarianism, 41, 80, 118, 122,  
125, 126, 131, 146,  
150, 173
- value, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,  
21, 24, 27, 33, 35, 40–53,  
62, 72–5, 78, 88, 89, 91–3,  
95–105, 108, 109, 134,  
139–57, 170
- virtue, 14, 18, 23, 65, 72, 78,  
105, 108, 141, 147,  
149, 150
- war, 4, 102, 171
- wealth, 17, 21, 73, 84, 91, 94,  
105, 110, 142, 178
- will, 36, 92
- wisdom, 7, 23, 102
- women, 59, 62

