PRAGMATISM

An Annotated Bibliography 1898-1940

John R. Shook

with Contributions by

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Contents

Foreword by Peter H. Hare	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
Introduction	xi
Research Methods	xxi
Abbreviations	xxix
Bibliography	1
Author Index	531
Subject Index	557
About the Author and Contributors	617

Foreword

As we near the millennium, Western philosophy is fragmented to an unprecedented degree. Analytic philosophy no longer dominates the anglophone world. Western Europe is no longer dominated by phenomenology or hermeneutics. The philosophical profession has become so splintered that no philosophical movement enjoys a dominant position. However, if any "ism" can be said to be moving toward dominance, it is pragmatism. The reasons for this are many, too many to explain here. Surely one reason is that economically, politically, militarily, and culturally, the U.S. today is the most influential nation in the world, and approximately half of the academic philosophers on the planet teach in American colleges and universities. It should surprise no one that the American philosophical tradition is treated with increasing respect. But there are other reasons intrinsic to the special intellectual problems of philosophy and related to immediately preceding philosophical tendencies. Some of these reasons were explored in Richard Rorty's landmark book of 1979, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. In 1979, however, no one anticipated how many different sorts of philosophers would embrace pragmatism–not to mention those philosophers unwilling to embrace pragmatism but compelled to publish lengthy critiques of it. Moreover, the participants in this debate have not been limited to members of the philosophical profession. There is no discipline in the humanities and social sciences that has not recently contributed numerous proponents and critics of pragmatism. I hazard a conservative guess that, if a bibliography of pragmatism since 1979 were prepared, it would contain thousands of books and tens of thousands of articles. This massive and still growing interest in pragmatism is one of the reasons that an annotated bibliography (1898-1940) is needed. In his Introduction below, John R. Shook mentions other compelling reasons. Let me add to his litany.

Scholars working today in pragmatism often, indeed usually, are seriously confused about how what they are doing is related to the work of "classical pragmatists." It is commonplace, for example, for philosophers and non-philosophers alike to suppose erroneously that Rorty's pragmatism is fundamentally the same as the pragmatism of Dewey. Use of this bibliography should discourage that misconception; it should also discourage the equally serious misconception that every clever argument concerning pragmatism presented today is original and not to be found in the early literature. Most important, this volume will be a powerful aid in the development of the pragmatist tradition. Philosophers with a clear understanding of how they stand in relation to classical pragmatism will be in a strong position to build on and contribute to that tradition.

In concluding these remarks I must acknowledge the stupendous labor, as tedious as it was intellectually demanding, of Shook, E. Paul Colella, Lesley Friedman, Frank X. Ryan, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Academic philosophers are notoriously unwilling to undertake major bibliographical projects; they condescendingly suppose that such work should be done by historians and librarians. Philosophy, for this reason, is in a sorry bibliographical state compared to other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Even where philosophical bibliographies exist, they are rarely as painstakingly and helpfully annotated as this one. Everyone with a serious interest in philosophy and its history should be grateful to these five academic philosophers for their willingness to do an important job in the face of professional disdain.

Peter H. Hare
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Acknowledgments

The enormous magnitude of this project naturally required a correspondingly large amount of dedicated assistance from many people. First and foremost, my appreciation goes to Richard T. Hull, until recently Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and presently Executive Director of the Texas Council for the Humanities in Austin, Texas. It was his initial suggestion to me, and his convincing endorsement of my book proposal to Robert Ginsberg, the Executive Editor of the Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS), that launched this project. Along the way, Dick's encouragement, and his advice in his capacity as VIBS Stylistic and Format Editor, supplied needed course corrections. Robert Ginsberg deserves my gratitude for his recognition of the value of such a bibliography and his abiding confidence in its success. His commitment of VIBS and Editions Rodopi to the publication of bibliographies, and specifically, one concerning pragmatism, must be applauded.

The author of the Foreword, Peter H. Hare, is the most fitting and capable person to situate this bibliography in the wider context of American philosophy, for several reasons. His prominent stature and long experience in the field, reflected by the 1996 Herbert Schneider Award honoring him for service to American philosophy by the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, provides him an excellent vantage point to survey its significant features and trends. He also has an evident familiarity with bibliographical research and its value, that was inculcated by an influential teacher, Joseph L. Blau, whose bibliographies in Herbert Schneider's *A History of American Philosophy* elevated this form of scholarship for American philosophy to an unprecedented height. Peter's role as my mentor, having chaired my dissertation committee and helped with subsequent publications, links my work with this proud tradition of service. Also, he made several important recommendations improving the breadth of this bibliography. I extend my warmest thanks to Peter for all his assistance.

The contributors were obviously essential to this bibliography's existence and value. Lesley Friedman's early agreement to join such a daunting effort, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis's willingness to write his invaluable annotations for James's works, were the signs of support confirming for me that this project was indeed important and could be completed. E. Paul Collela and Frank X. Ryan added their expertise to considerably enhance the bibliography's scope and quality. My congratulations and admiration goes to the contributors for their very hard work.

The research aspect to this bibliography is indebted to many people. The Lynchburg College Faculty Research and Development Committee awarded a grant to assist Lesley Friedman's research. Jeffrey O'Connell, Scott Hotaling,

and Free Spirit provided me with energetic research assistance. Meg Nyberg, the Interlibrary Loan Officer of Corning Community College, was extremely hardworking and most generous with her time. Pat Riesenman, Reference Librarian at Indiana University, tracked down articles by Italian pragmatists. The staff of the libraries of Cornell University, State University of New York at Buffalo, and State University College at Fredonia were also quite helpful.

The annotations for works about James by Ignas K. Skrupskelis are reprinted, with some changes, with permission of G. K. Hall and Co., an imprint of Simon and Schuster Macmillan, from *William James: A Reference Guide* by Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Copyright © 1977 by Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Extracts from *The Collected Works of John Dewey* are quoted with the permission of The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Unless otherwise noted, the source of other quotations is the original publication, or, if reprinted or translated, from the most recent publication.

I prepared the camera-ready copy on a Gateway 2000 P4D-66 computer using Microsoft Word 6.0c, and printed it on a Hewlett Packard LaserJet 4P on loan from Richard T. Hull. Two colleagues, Paul McNaney and Glenn Harris, generously supplied their proofreading time.

The completion of this bibliography was accompanied by a curious mixture of emotions; relief, to be sure, and pride, but also humility for its shortcomings. Hundreds of partial references must remain in notebooks for now; the potential for further research seems limitless. No one could be more aware than I that this bibliography is really only able to provide a launching pad for the reader's own investigations into the diverse modes of thought gestured at by the label "pragmatism." My thanks in advance hence goes to readers for their suggestions for expansions or their corrections of errors.

Finally, my wife's support and patience made, as with all else, this work possible. To Karen and our new daughter, Adrienne, whose arrival created delays but much joy, this book is dedicated.

Introduction

This bibliography contains 2,794 main entries, and more than 2,000 additional references, for publications by pragmatists and commentators on pragmatism, written from 1898 to 1940. 2,101 of these works are annotated. The more significant works by the twelve major figures of pragmatism are included, along with those of dozens of minor pragmatic writers. This bibliography's international scope focuses on writings in English, French, German, and Italian; a small number of works in other languages are also referenced. Almost every significant philosopher of the period had something to say about pragmatism; their comments are referenced here. This bibliography encompasses writings not only about pragmatism as an alliance of philosophical theories of meaning, inquiry, belief, knowledge, logic, truth, ontology, value, and morality, but also as an intellectual and cultural movement through art, literature, education, the social and natural sciences, religion, and politics.

1. Why a Bibliography for Pragmatism?

Aside from the historical fact that the last truly international and comprehensive bibliography on pragmatism was published in France in 1922, the need today for an annotated bibliography on pragmatism has arisen due to four main factors. (1) While bibliographies for many of the pragmatists have been published, these typically do not include the many books and articles which do not specifically address them by name. This results in the exclusion of hundreds of writings which instead discuss pragmatism as a philosophical trend or theory without narrowing attention to individual pragmatists. (2) These bibliographies (with one exception) do not have an international scope. Pragmatism was not a philosophy limited to the United States. Original contributions to, and critical reactions against, pragmatism were heard from countries in every continent of the world. (3) Annotation has far greater value in this "information age," since the vast (and rapidly growing) amount of available data tends to obscure the significance of any single piece of information. (4) Interest in pragmatism has been rising in America and Europe for two decades, and this trend shows no signs of abating. A bibliography covering the first four decades of pragmatic thought will assist the studies of those who are already interested, and, hopefully, it will generate new interest.

2. The Contributors' Responsibilities

E. Paul Collela [EPC] supplied publication information for the Italian pragmatists and wrote 60 annotations for their works and works about them. He also wrote the Italian pragmatism portion of the historical survey in section

five. Lesley Friedman [LF] researched French works about pragmatism and wrote 101 annotations for them and for Peirce's writings. Frank X. Ryan [FXR] wrote 125 annotations for most of John Dewey's post-1920 works and many works about Dewey. Ignas K. Skrupskelis [IKS] wrote 62 annotations for James's works, to accompany 419 annotations for works about James first published in his *William James: A Reference Guide* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977). The contributors also found additional references and advised me on the selection of works for inclusion. However, I [JRS] am solely responsible for final selection decisions, errors or incomplete information, and the editing of all material.

3. Selection Criteria

Bibliographers occasionally claim that they did not have to make any difficult selection choices, since they included anything of even questionable value or glancing reference. Pragmatism, like any significant school of philosophical thought, permeated deeply into intellectual life and was debated widely. At the height of its prominence, professional journals in America, England, France, Germany, and Italy found a more than ample supply of authors eager to defend, refute, borrow from, or dismiss pragmatism. In the areas of metaphysics, theology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics, a new book would be quite unusual if it had nothing to say about pragmatism. Serials for a more popular audience also contributed to the proliferation of writings on pragmatism and its application to all aspects of culture, from education and economics to affairs of church and state. Since any attempt at comprehensiveness would therefore be daunting, this bibliography uses three selection criteria.

First, the period covered is from 1898 to 1940, inclusive. The 1898 date is the traditional year of the beginning of the "movement" or "school" of pragmatism. While Peirce, James, and Dewey themselves were espousing pragmatist doctrines prior to that date, their work and the critical responses to them in the pre-1898 period are already fully covered by the existing bibliographies for each philosopher. The 1940 date permits the publication of this bibliography as a single volume. Furthermore, the *Philosopher's Index* starts with 1940, providing the researcher with an excellent resource.

Second, this bibliography does not attempt to include all the publications of the pragmatists themselves. The foremost pragmatists already have their own primary bibliographies. The numerous book reviews by Peirce, Dewey, Mead, and Schiller, James's extra-philosophical writings, Mead's essays on education, and Dewey's commentaries on educational, social, and political topics of his day, are the basic areas that received pruning. However, the most significant works in these areas are included. For C. I. Lewis, A. W. Moore, and John E. Boodin, this bibliography is the most complete guide to their publications. This bibliography is also the most extensive English-language guide to the works of the Italian pragmatists as a group.

Third, the "significance" of the work is evaluated. A work must relate in some way to the major figures of pragmatism, listed below.

Charles Sanders Peirce	(1839-1914)
William James	(1842-1910)
John Dewey	(1859-1952)
George Herbert Mead	(1863-1931)
Giovanni Vailati	(1863-1909)
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller	(1864-1937)
Addison Webster Moore	(1866-1930)
John Elof Boodin	(1869-1950)
Mario Calderoni	(1879-1914)
Giovanni Papini	(1881-1956)
Guiseppe Prezzolini	(1882-1982)
Clarence Irving Lewis	(1883-1964)

Many more thinkers professed pragmatic themes during a part or the whole of their career, including Jane Addams, Antonio Aliotta, Giovanni Amendola, H. Heath Bawden, Boyd H. Bode, Harry T. Costello, Irwin Edman, Charlotte P. Gilman, Sidney Hook, Horace M. Kallen, Howard V. Knox, Charles W. Morris, Max C. Otto, Donald A. Piatt, Joseph Ratner, John E. Russell, Hu Shi, Alfred Sidgwick, Henry W. Wright, and William K. Wright. Only their work bearing directly upon pragmatism is referenced here.

Books, journal articles, essays in a collection or anthology, book reviews, and encyclopedia articles are included if they give an extended treatment of any of the above members, or of pragmatism in general. An extended treatment is a significantly critical, comparative, or supportive exposition of at least one paragraph in length. Book reviews offering significant comments on a book's treatment of pragmatism receive annotation. The large number of reviews of the pragmatists' books preclude annotation for all, so a representative sample is selected for annotation. Dissertations and very significant master's or honors theses are treated as books.

Considerable effort has been made to find and annotate significant works on pragmatism published in French, German, and Italian. Works in other languages have been included if found, and annotated where possible. While this bibliography aims to record as entries only works published from 1898 to 1940, two exceptions are made: collections of letters, if written during this period, and lectures or public addresses delivered during this period, but published after 1940.

4. Annotation Style

The "art" of writing annotation has no single genre and displays no fixed style. Those who have tried their hand at it quickly discover its limitations. For

example, have you ever wondered who writes those one-sentence blurbs on a television show for the newspaper listings? I especially pity the person who tackles movies. For "The Wizard of Oz" the TV listings once read, "A girl's adventures with a scarecrow, a lion, and a tin man." There is no way to catch all of the essence, the magic, with brevity. Besides, if a movie could be so captured, no one should want to see it anyway. Matters are made worse where a bibliography is concerned, since many articles or books discuss pragmatism only in the course of pursuing other issues and other conclusions. The annotation, by distilling out the comments on pragmatism, will necessarily distort or often completely obscure the author's original intentions. Those Munchkins are lovable, aren't they? The blurb might instead read, "A peaceful village of short people witness the extraordinary visit of a nice stranger." The moral of this story is that the readers should view the annotation as an invitation to read the work for themselves, and not as a substitute.

Assessments, comparisons, or other types of commentary to help the reader are placed in a concluding "Notes" section at the end of an entry. This section may also direct the reader to a related item in the bibliography, or to relevant post-1940 literature.

5. Historical Studies of Pragmatism

Inquiry into pragmatism's history should begin with H. S. Thayer's panoramic treatise, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981). Max Fisch, "American Pragmatism Before and After 1898," reprinted in *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 283-304, should also be consulted. Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), and Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey, *A History of Philosophy in America* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977) situate pragmatism in American thought and give helpful references. Other important surveys include S. Morris Eames, *Pragmatic Naturalism* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977); Charles Morris, *The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy* (New York: George Braziller, 1970); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *Pragmatism and Feminism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Philip Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949). More specialized studies of the history of pragmatism are given below, selected for their comprehensiveness, diversity of viewpoint, and ability to guide the reader to other studies.

A. Cambridge

The quasi-official story of pragmatism's inception as a philosophical movement is well-told by Max Fisch. It finds Harvard professor William James in

Berkeley in August 1898, where he addressed the Philosophical Union of the University of California. His paper, titled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," announced his chosen direction "to start upon the trail of truth": the principle of "pragmatism," as enunciated by Charles S. Peirce. James described how Peirce used the term in philosophical conversation in Cambridge, Massachusetts back in the early 1870s, and he mentioned Peirce's 1878 publication of an essay, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear." In that essay is found, not the term "pragmatism," but Peirce's method to maximize a concept's clarity: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" [*CP* 5.402].

James's philosophical efforts were hardly founded on only and exactly this principle. His psychological and metaphysical inquiries (resulting in "radical empiricism") and religious and moral interests (represented by the "will-to-believe" doctrine) complemented his unique version of pragmatism. By the time of his death in 1910, James had aroused a public interest in philosophy in general, and pragmatism in particular. He had also influenced a generation of philosophers, who repaid their debt to James by developing selected aspects of his philosophy into principles for their own independent thought. The exploration of other aspects of Peirce's multi-faceted philosophy, sparked by James's enthusiasm, accelerated through the 1910s and 1920s. His place alongside James in the pantheon of American philosophers was firmly established after his *Collected Papers* were edited in the 1930s.

Among the many philosophers indebted to Peirce and James, several can arguably be called "pragmatic." Josiah Royce profited from the study of both Peirce and James. He incorporated several pragmatic tenets into his system of absolute idealism, which has often been termed "pragmatic idealism" or "absolute pragmatism." John E. Boodin studied under James and Royce. His treatises on epistemology and metaphysics develop a realistic pragmatism in the context of an evolutionary theism. Harvard also nurtured Horace M. Kallen, who advocated pragmatism for decades, and C. I. Lewis, whose "conceptual pragmatism" synthesized many pragmatic strands. And while George Santayana may not have enjoyed the label, many scholars comprehend his thought in a pragmatic context.

Authors focusing on the Cambridge pragmatists are A. J. Ayer, *The Origins of Pragmatism* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, and Co., 1968); Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy–Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Books concerning Peirce include Douglas Anderson, *Creativity and the Philosophy C. S. Peirce* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993); Vincent Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach to the Self* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); James Feibleman, *An*

Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); Carl Hausman, *Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Christopher Hookway, *Peirce* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Murray Murphey, *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); Sandra Rosenthal, *Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Peter Skagestad, *The Road of Inquiry: Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

For James, these studies can be consulted. Gay W. Allen, *William James: A Biography* (London: Rupert Hart-Davies, 1967); Graham Bird, *William James* (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); Gerald Myers, *William James: His Life and Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Ruth Anna Putnam, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to William James* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Ellen Kappy Suckiel, *Heaven's Champion: William James's Philosophy of Religion* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996; John Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1969).

Other Cambridge philosophers are discussed by John Clendenning, *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Bruce Kuklick, *Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); Milton R. Konvitz, ed., *The Legacy of Horace M. Kallen* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1987); Henry Levinson, *Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); John McCormick, *George Santayana: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Mary Mahowald, *An Idealistic Pragmatism: The Development of the Pragmatic Element in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); Charles H. Nelson, *John Elof Boodin: Philosopher-Poet* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1987); Sandra Rosenthal, *The Pragmatic A Priori: A Study in the Epistemology of C. I. Lewis* (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1976); Paul A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968); T. L. S. Sprigge, *Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).

B. Chicago

The development of John Dewey's "instrumentalist" or "experimentalist" version of pragmatism occurred largely during his ten years at the University of Chicago (1894-1904). Dewey was stimulated by James's novel approach to psychological inquiry and later dedicated his first major work in pragmatism in 1903 to James. This development was also nourished by the psychological

research and theorizing of Dewey and four of his philosophy colleagues, G. H. Mead, James Tufts, James Angell, and A. W. Moore. Challenging the dominant "structuralist" psychologies, they formulated the doctrines of "functionalism," in which mental entities are interpreted in terms of phases of purposive organic action in an environment. Dewey and Mead explored the philosophical consequences of this viewpoint: Chicago functionalism evolved into Dewey's naturalistic instrumentalism and Mead's social behaviorism. Moore's polemical defenses earned him the nickname, the "bulldog of pragmatism." Other members of the Chicago branch of pragmatism include Jane Addams in education and social theory, E. S. Ames in religion, H. Heath Bawden in psychology, Boyd H. Bode in education, and William Wright and Sidney Hook in philosophy. The 1930s saw Charles Morris's announcement of his "neo-pragmatism," which promised a collaboration of pragmatism with logical empiricism.

General works describing philosophy at the University of Chicago are Andrew Feffer, *The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Darnell Rucker, *The Chicago Pragmatists* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969).

Studies of Dewey include Raymond D. Boisvert, *Dewey's Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); James Campbell, *Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1995); George Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973); Ulrich Engler, *Kritik der Erfahring: Die Bedeutung der asthetischen Erfahrung in der Philosophie John Deweys* (Wurzburg: Konigshausen und Neuman, 1992); Christopher B. Kulp, *The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectator Theory of Knowledge* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992); Steven Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1995); R. W. Sleeper, *The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); J. E. Tiles, *Dewey* (New York: Routledge, 1988); Jennifer Welchman, *Dewey's Ethical Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Concerning other Chicago pragmatists and their influence, see Edward Scribner Ames, *Beyond Theology: The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames*, ed. Van Meter Ames (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Gary Cook, *George Herbert Mead: The Making of a Social Pragmatist* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Emily Cooper Johnson, ed., *Jane Addams, A Centennial Reader* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); J. David Lewis and Richard Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic Interactionism* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980).

C. Great Britain

F. C. S. Schiller recognized a kindred spirit in James, linking his similar rebellion against rationalism with the "will-to-believe" principle. Preferring the term "humanism" to pragmatism, Schiller centered his philosophy on the fundamental reality of the personal self. Throughout the first two decades of this century, European philosophers perceived Schiller and James as the leaders of the pragmatic movement. At his post as Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, Schiller assigned himself the task of dogging the British idealists' every published word, probing for evidence of their failures and of pragmatism's superiority. Ready assistance was found in Alfred Sidgwick, Howard Knox, and Henry Sturt; together they provided "Bradley and Co." with a more than ample barrage of polemical attacks. Schiller's constructive efforts awaited his later years, focused on the effort to systematically elaborate the principles of voluntaristic logic. In the 1920s the brief career of F. P. Ramsey was marked by his occasional expression of agreement with several pragmatic themes.

Further research into Schiller and Ramsey can profitably start with Reuben Abel, *The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1955); Nils-Eric Sahlin, *The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kenneth Winetrout, "F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937): Some Centennial Thoughts," Personalist 45.3 (July 1964): 301-315.

D. Italy

When William James traveled to Rome in the spring of 1905, he spent an afternoon with a small band of enthusiastic pragmatists who made quite an impression on their famous American mentor. For his part, James memorialized that afternoon and lionized its leader, Giovanni Papini, in a publication of his own on returning to the United States, "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy." The key figures in the Italian movement besides Papini are Giuseppe Prezzolini, Papini's close friend and intellectual collaborator, and the two "Peircean" members of the circle, Giovanni Vailati and his student and colleague, Mario Calderoni. The movement was quite short-lived, however. Papini and Prezzolini had shed their pragmatism by 1907, moving on to the next stage of their complex intellectual itineraries. Vailati and Calderoni produced only a modest literary output, and both were dead by the outbreak of the Great War. Giovanni Amendola, who would later suffer tragically and fatally at the hands of the fascists, is an interesting minor figure in the movement. A significant later thinker who identified himself with pragmatism is Antonio Aliotta.

Crucial to the study of Italian pragmatism is the review *Leonardo,* launched, co-edited, and sometimes entirely written by Papini and Prezzolini from 1903 to 1907. Many of the seminal essays by these thinkers, as well as important contributions by Amendola, Calderoni, and Vailati, first appeared in its pages. Schiller and James both published in it, and James spared little praise for the review in his correspondence. The more political essays of these thinkers are to be found elsewhere, most notably in the review *Il Regno.* Both Papini and Prezzolini wrote autobiographical statements which, together with their correspondence and diaries, provide an excellent picture of these two extraordinary cultural figures, who for a brief time called themselves pragmatists.

Some studies of Italian pragmatism are Giovanni Gullace, "The Pragmatist Movement in Italy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962): 91-105; H. S. Thayer, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism,* 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 324-346; Antonio Santucci, *Il pragmatismo in Italia* (Bologna: Società editrice il Molino, 1963); C. P. Zanoni, "Development of Logical Pragmatism in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40.4 (Oct-Dec 1979): 603-619.

E. France

Three interrelated schools of thought already making waves in French philosophy warmly greeted James's writings: the "school of action" inspired by Maurice Blondel, the scientific constructionism of Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem, and the neocritical school inspired by Émile Boutroux and Henri Bergson. The first, an important component of Catholic Modernism, came to a quick end with the condemnation of Modernism in 1907 by Pope Pius X. The second argued that scientific theories must be judged only with regard to their ability to account for experimental evidence and to solve practical difficulties. The third was exemplified by Édouard Le Roy, who termed his philosophy "pragmatisme." These schools never completely abandoned the notion of an absolute truth and reality, and they never fully agreed with James's or Schiller's tenet that truth should be identified with the practical. French interest in pragmatism quickly faded after James's death. One exception is Georges Sorel, who gave qualified approval to James's pragmatism and used pragmatic tenets to support his political syndicalism.

The relations of pragmatism with French thought is described by Walter Horton, *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York: New York University Press, 1926); Richard Humphrey, "Pragmatism and a Pluralist World," chap. 5 of *Georges Sorel: Prophet without Honor* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 117-142; H. S. Thayer, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism,* 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 314-323.

F. Germany

Unlike France or Great Britain, Germany had no ongoing native movement struggling against rationalism, and accordingly it treated pragmatism with minimal respect at best. The reaction against absolutism had erupted four decades before and was already spent: neo-Kantianism presently reigned. Content to dismiss pragmatism as an undigested remnant of Fichte or Nietzsche, or as a crass utilitarian spin-off, most mainstream academics trumpeted the obvious inferiority of American thought. Wilhelm Jerusalem and Günther Jacoby prior to the First World War, and Arnold Gehlen and Eduard Baumgarten prior to the Second World War, figure as the significant sympathetic interpreters of pragmatism.

The best study of the German reaction to pragmatism is Hans Joas, "American Pragmatism and German Thought: A History of Misunderstandings," translated by Jeremy Gaines, in *Pragmatism and Social Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 94-121.

6. Reference format

The reference style for serial articles and reviews is as follows:

[Journal Title] [volume].[number] ([day] [month] [year]): [pages]

example: J Phil 13.6 (3 March 1916): 214-221

The "number" of a volume's issue is calculated by assigning "1" to the first issue of that volume, "2" to the second, and so forth. Most British and American journals and magazines have long used this convention. Some serials instead number their issues from the very first issue, for example, vol. 4, no. 16, even though each volume only has four issues. Such issues are re-numbered according to the above formula. Other serials do not offer numbers; in these cases a number is assigned to an issue, using this formula.

The present-day convention that assigns each volume number to one full year's worth of issues did not generally prevail decades ago. Where a serial assigns a volume number a different way (usually by having two or three volumes a year), the serial's convention is followed. Sometimes a serial only assigns issue numbers; in those cases the volume number represents the decision of the particular research library used which bound that journal for its shelves. Accordingly, volume numbers might vary at other libraries.

Research Methods

Research for this bibliography took four primary forms: the searching of bibliographies, indexes, and electronic database catalogs, and the direct examination of journals and books. The last method, while tedious, is the most rewarding. Reading through journal volumes yielded many articles, and by way of the book reviews a large number of books that comment on pragmatism were discovered. The works listed in the historical section of the introduction were also consulted. Nearly all of the publication information in the bibliography was verified by the direct inspection of each item.

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RLG (The Research Libraries Group) Bibliographic Database, accessed using Eureka. A union catalog of over 68 million items held in member institution libraries.

5. Journals Examined

Mind	1898-1920
Open Court	1898-1913, 1921
International Journal of Ethics	1898-1938
The Monist	1898-1936
Philosophical Review	1898-1920
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series	1900-1940
Hibbert Journal	1902-1920
Journal of Philosophy	1904-1942
University of California Publications in Philosophy	1904-1940
Thought	1926-1940
Analysis	1933-1940
Journal of the History of Ideas	1940
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	1940
American Journal of Psychology	1898-1940
Psychological Review	1898-1920
British Journal of Psychology	1904-1940
Psychological Bulletin	1904-1920
Journal of General Psychology	1928-1940
Journal of Modern History	1929-1940

Social Research	1934-1940
American Sociological Review	1936-1940
Journal of Politics	1939-1940
Congregationalist	1898-1906
Hermathena	1898-1940
Sewanee Review	1898-1940
Proceedings of the British Academy	1903-1940
Studies: Irish Quarterly Review	1922-1938
New England Quarterly	1928-1940
Symposium	1930-1933
The American Scholar	1932-1940

Abbreviations

1. Abbreviations for Serials

Amer J Psych	*American Journal of Psychology*
Arch Gesch Phil	*Archiv für Geschichte de Philosophie*
Arch Syst Phil	*Archiv für systematische Philosophie*
Int J Ethics	*International Journal of Ethics*
J Phil	*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (1904–1920)
	Journal of Philosophy (1920–)
Phil Rev	*Philosophical Review*
Proc Arist Soc	*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series.
Psych Bull	*Psychological Bulletin*
Psych Rev	*Psychological Review*
Rev Méta	*Revue de métaphysique et de morale*
Rev Phil	*Revue philosophique*
Rev de Phil	*Revue de philosophie*
Riv Filo	*Rivista filosofica* (1899–1908, v. 1-11), *Rivista di filosofia* (1909– , v. 1-)
Z Phil Ph Krit	*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*
Zeit für Psych	*Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sennesorgan. I. Abteilung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie*

2. Abbrevations for Collected Works and Critical Editions

CP *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 1-6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), and vols. 7-8, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). References provide volume and paragraph numbers.

Collected Papers *Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis*, ed. John Goheen and John Mothershead, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

Dewey and His Critics *Dewey and His Critics: Essays from the Journal of Philosophy*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser. New York: The Journal of Philosophy, 1977.

EW *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898*, 5 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1972.

MW *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, 15 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-1983.

LW *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, 17 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-1990.

Writings of WJ *The Writings of William James*, ed. John J. McDermott. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977.

The Nation *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to The Nation*, 4 vols., compiled and annotated by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1975-87.

Philosophy of JD I *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, vol. 1: *The Structure of Experience*, edited with an Introduction and Commentary by John J. McDermott. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973.

Philosophy of JD II *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, vol. 2: *The Lived Experience*, edited with an Introduction and Commentary by John J. McDermott. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973.

Pure Experience *Pure Experience: The Response to William James*, edited and introduced by Eugene I. Taylor and Robert H. Wozniak. Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996.

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Writings 1 *William James: Writings 1878-1899*. Text selections and Notes by Gerald E. Myers. New York: The Library of America, 1992.

Writings 2 *William James: Writings 1902-1910*. Text selections and Notes by Bruce Kuklick. New York: The Library of America, 1987.

Works *The Works of William James*. Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor, Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, Ignas K. Skrupskelis, Associate Editor. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975-1984.

Works ECR	*Essays, Comments, and Reviews*, 1987
Works EPh	*Essays in Philosophy*, 1978
Works EPR	*Essays in Psychical Research*, 1986
Works EPs	*Essays in Psychology*, 1983
Works ERE	*Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 1976
Works ERM	*Essays in Religion and Morality*, 1982
Works MT	*The Meaning of Truth*, 1975
Works Prag	*Pragmatism*, 1975

Bibliography

1898

1 Angell, James R. Habit and Attention. Psych Rev 5.2 (March 1898): 179-183.

Habit involves the anticipation of proper stimulus. Attention arises from a need to acquire such stimulus. This functional theory is based on the study of reaction-times. JRS

Notes

Angell's psychological functionalism was first published in his and A. W. Moore's article, "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," Psych Rev 3.3 (May 1896): 245-258. There they credit John Dewey and G. H. Mead for its interpretative standpoint. See Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," Psych Rev 3.4 (July 1896): 357-370 [*EW* 5: 96-109], in which Dewey in turn refers the reader to Angell and Moore's paper for "an excellent statement and illustration" of Dewey's theory of the sensori-motor circuit.

2 Baillie, James B. Theory and Practice. Int J Ethics 8.3 (April 1898): 291-316.

Theory is hardly less reliable because it is not instinctive or of mental origin. A belief, which is generally a guide to action, a unification of the means to achieve an end, can only be tested by experience. "The end is simply the summing up and completed expression of all the details which constitute the means and make them organic elements in the whole." The practical and the theoretical are inseparable, and truth cannot be isolated or pursued for itself. Philosophy seeks "to realize concretely and state abstractly and in essence the entire experience possible to man." JRS

3 Baldwin, James Mark. On Selective Thinking. Psych Rev 5.1 (Jan 1898): 1-24. Reprinted as "Selective Thinking" in *Development and Evolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 238-268.

Truths are habits which have been selected by "the test of fact." The necessities of the environment are manifested socially. James rightly rejected Spencer's cumulative "race-experience" explanation of knowledge; the "organic selection" upon individual variations proceeds alongside cultural tradition. JRS

Reviews

Stella E. Sharp, Phil Rev 7.2 (March 1898): 200-201.

Notes

James referred to this essay as "an unusually well written pragmatic manifesto," in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, p. 121n [*Works MT*, p. 70n], but Baldwin took a critical stand against pragmatism. See his "The Limits of Pragmatism" {153}.

4 Brunschvicg, Léon. De quelques préjugés contra la philosophie. Rev Méta 6.4 (July 1898): 401-421.

Summaries

Vida F. Moore, Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 73.

5 Caldwell, William. Philosophy and the Activity Experience. Int J Ethics 8.4 (July 1898): 460-480. Extracts were reprinted in *Pragmatism and Idealism* {1159}, pp. 109-115.

Recent philosophy has taken a "practical turn," trying to "grasp the significance of the world from the standpoint of the moral and social activity of man." A survey of philosophers (including James) concludes with the assertions that "the real object of knowledge is to store up reality or experience in conceptions that may, in the form of motives, influence or determine conduct," and that "the mind itself is a dynamic thing." JRS

Summaries

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 7.5 (Sept 1898): 538-539.

Notes

See John Watson's response, "The New 'Ethical' Philosophy" {44}.

6 **Dewey, John.** Evolution and Ethics. Monist 8.3 (April 1898): 321-341. Reprinted in *EW* 5: 34-53.

T. H. Huxley surprisingly distinguishes evolutionary progress (survival of the fittest) from ethical progress (survival of as many as possible), but this clashes with his accurate placing of the ethical struggle within the larger evolutionary struggle. Mankind uses one part of nature to control another part. A society may benefit more from the protection of the weak in the fostering of group economy and loyalty. Instincts should be controlled and directed, not rejected as some evil "self-assertion." Morality is a conscious struggle to reconstruct behavior in a changing environment. JRS

Summaries

Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 423-424.

7 **Dewey, John.** *Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics, 1898.* Donald F. Koch, ed. New York: Hafner Press, 1976.

A transcript of lectures delivered by Dewey at the University of Chicago during the Winter and Spring quarters of 1898, with a prefatory note and introduction by Donald Koch, pp. xix-l. Psychological ethics originates with the true individual, who can modify social custom in response to new demands. To avoid the psychologist's fallacy, aims and habits must be functionally analyzed. The organic circuit and the intellectual process are described. Moral deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal of imagination, in which the self is projected into a possible resolution of competing interests. Conduct is stressed by utilitarianism and character is stressed by intuitionalism, but they are reciprocal notions, distinguished as self-development becomes understood. The role of emotions in volition is central. The determinism debate and the egoism/altruism debate both rely on a false division between the self and its actions, since, following James, the self is "defined in terms of what it can do." The basic virtues are conscientiousness, courage, temperance, and justice-love.

Political ethics has historically denied that individuals are part of a common social process and rooted in biological, economic, and ethical contexts. Biologically, organisms possess functional identity through change, by an evolving habitual accommodation to the environment. Consciousness is "mediation of action in the reconstruction of function." Society is an organism and consciousness has a social structure. The social organism can make progress when the individual is free to act for the common good. Economically, the role of science and exchange value invalidates socialism. The modern division of labor makes social institutions problematic. Ethically, sovereignty is "the working organization of the social consciousness," based on a consensus on rights and obligations, which in turn arises out of social re-adjustment. JRS

8 Dewey, John. The Primary-Education Fetich. Forum 25 (May 1898): 315-328. Reprinted in *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 18-35. *EW* 5: 254-269.

9 Dewey, John. Review of James Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology*. Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 398-409. Reprinted in *EW* 5: 385-399.

Baldwin shifts from a search for social elements in individual consciousness to an examination of individual psychical processes in terms of their social origin and function. This shift results in a circular definition of personality, and a contradictory theory of moral and social progress. JRS

Notes

Social and Ethical Interpretations (New York: Macmillan, 1897). See Baldwin's reply, "Social Interpretations: A Reply," Phil Rev 7.6 (Nov 1898): 621-628 [*EW* 5: lxxxvi-xciv], and Dewey's rejoinder, Phil Rev 7.6 (Nov 1898): 629-630 [*EW* 5: 399-401]. See also Dewey's second review of this work, New World 7 (Sept 1898): 504-522 [*EW* 5: 402-422]. William Caldwell discusses these articles in "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development," American Journal of Sociology 5.2 (Sept 1899): 182-192.

10 Dewey, John. Review of William Torrey Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*. Educational Review 16.1 (June 1898): 1-14. Reprinted in *EW* 5: 372-385.

Notes

Psychologic Foundations of Education (New York: D. Appleton, 1898).

11 James, William. *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898. New edition, with replies to criticisms, 1899. Reprinted in *William James on Psychical Research*, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 279-308. *WJ Writings 1*, pp. 1098-1127. *Works ERM*, pp. 75-101.

While not himself interested in immortality, James defends the possibility of belief in personal immortality against recent materialistic objections. Thought, on the first objection, is entirely dependent on the brain and ceases with its death. Granting that physiology comes closer and closer to showing how thought is a function of the brain, the function need not be a productive one but could be a transmissive or permissive one. The brain need not bring thought into existence, but only allow portions of the "preexisting larger consciousness" to appear. This possibility allows for either individualistic or pantheistic conceptions of immortality. The second objection arises from the continuity between human beings and other living things made prominent by evolution. If there is continuity, not only humans would enjoy immortality, resulting in a very populated heaven. James replies that this objection expresses only a personal distaste and that he is willing to share immortality with as many creatures as the divine wants. IKS

Reviews

J. C., Revue Néo-Scolastique 8.4 (Nov 1901): 430-431. James's willingness to let every leaf that has ever existed become immortal is too paradoxical to be advanced without proof. IKS

Thomas Davidson, Int J Ethics 9.2 (Jan 1899): 256-259. James's position is unclear. Almost two pages of questions are listed, raised by James's notion of the "transmissive function." IKS

C. W. Hodge, Psych Rev 6.4 (July 1899): 424-426. For James thought is a function of the brain, but the function is transmissive and not productive. However, if the brain only transmits a pre-existing consciousness, the term "function" loses its meaning. IKS

Albert Lefevre, Phil Rev 9.1 (Jan 1900): 109-110. The "transmissive function" seems inconsistent with James's pluralism. JRS

"μ", Open Court 14.11 (Nov 1900): 702-703. His expositions have the irresistible charm of "emotional mysticism." Immortality erases individuality. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Nation 67.22 (1 Dec 1898): 416-417. James answers the materialistic objection to immortality by accepting all the facts while insisting that the conclusion does not follow. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 8.2 (April 1899): 261-263. James's application of modern psychological methods to this topic gives sorely needed "ventilation" to "one of the darkest and dustiest" provinces of philosophy. JRS

12 **James, William.** Introduction. To Boris Sidis, *Introduction to the Psychology of Suggestion* (New York: D. Appleton, 1898). Reprinted in *Works EPs*, pp. 325-327.

Personality has generally been studied by metaphysical methods, but Sidis instead uses empirical material compiled since the hypnotic state was recognized as genuine. He discusses suggestibility, double personality, and the psychology of crowds in an original way. IKS

13 **James, William.** Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results. University of California Chronicle 1 (Sept 1898): 287-310. James made extensive revisions and deleted the critical remarks about Kant for reprinting as "The Pragmatic Method" {178}. *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 406-437. *Writings of WJ*, pp. 345-362. *Writings 1*, pp. 1077-1097. *Works Prag*, pp. 257-270.

The words of both philosophers and poets mark the beginning of the trail and point out a direction, but cannot give the fullness of the forest of truth. For James, the starting point is the principle formulated in the 1870s by Charles Sanders Peirce called practicalism or pragmatism: since beliefs are rules of action, to know the meaning of a belief we must know what conduct it is fitted to produce. This rule–which he prefers to restate in terms of experiences to be expected–reveals the idleness of philosophical disputes or their point at issue. In the dispute between materialism and theism, it shows that materialism cannot offer a permanent warrant for our ideal interests. It also defines the differences between monism and pluralism. Traditional English philosophy has always tended towards pragmatism and has produced important results. On the other hand, Kant and present day English idealism have produced nothing of permanent value in philosophy. Philosophic progress is not "*through* Kant as *round* him." IKS

14 **Mead, G. H.** The Child and His Environment. Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child Study 3 (1898): 1-11.

15 Milhaud, Gaston S. *Le Rationnel: Études complémentaires à l'essai sur la certitude.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898.

Notes

James recommends this work, among others, to readers who "wish to read farther" on the general subject of pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}.

16 Miller, Dickinson S. Review of William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.* Int J Ethics 8.2 (Jan 1898): 254-255.

A "most striking and powerful product" with numerous temptations for the critic. IKS

Other reviews of *The Will to Believe*

Anon, Dial 23.6 (16 September 1897): 149-150. That faith is often needed before its object can exist, while undeniable as a "general proposition," is a dangerous guide for "untrained seekers." James himself in his comments on psychical research carries too far his principle of believing what one wants to believe, but it is a well-written book, the product of a "rich and acute mind." IKS

A. C. Armstrong, Psych Rev 4.5 (Sept 1897): 527-529. For the psychologist, the chief interest of the book lies in the emphasis placed on "emotional and volitional elements in consciousness," the recognition of the "interplay of the several phases of consciousness." In spite of its originality, it can be compared with many contemporary works. One looks forward to the promised treatise on epistemology. IKS

John Jay Chapman, "On Prof. James's Will to Believe," The Political Nursery (July 1899): 2-3. Any plumber knows more psychology than James. James gives no picture of life because he has not studied people who have faith. IKS

Benjamin Lewis Hobson, Presbyterian and Reformed Review 9 (1898): 726-730. If we cannot know when we have truth, why should we bother having faith that it exists? James omits a sufficient definition of God and does not clarify psychological determinism. James's utilitarianism is regrettable. JRS

Alfred Hodder, Nation 65.2 (8 July 1897): 33-35. James's views, in spite of appearances, must be distinguished from the sophistry of subordinating "intelligence to desire" in the name of God and morality. If James invokes the will as a last resort, it is within narrow limits and only within the practical sphere. James's thought is a celebration of the "strenuous mood." IKS

Thomas J. McCormack, Monist 8.4 (July 1898): 616-621. James has "an air of blankest despair," offering only subjectivism. Desires surely produce beliefs, but we want justified beliefs. James has an obligation to offer a theory of explanation. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 6.4 (Oct 1897): 547-554. While a collection of essays, this work reveals a remarkable degree of unity. It is held together by a "strong and picturesque personality." The essays are popular for they appeal to the many without ceasing to stimulate the few. James's work is a protest against "reckless rationalism." It is thus far only a raid upon philosophy, but one which promises "solid conquests." IKS

Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 7.1 (Jan 1898): 86-88. James opens our eyes to the "ultimate mysteriousness of the universe." Religious faith is no more irrational that science's confidence in the uniformity of nature; for both, verification cannot be theoretical but "by its fruits." A suspension of belief is incompatible with sound philosophy. JRS

James Seth, American Journal of Theology 2.2 (April 1898): 393-396. James expands the notion of empiricism to include the moral and the aesthetic. He reaches a "moral and aesthetic idealism." IKS

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria 25.3-4 (1899) [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 267-272]. Vailati gives an essay by essay summary of James's book, commenting most favorably on James's obvious skill at presenting philosophical ideas with a vitality not usually found in the discipline. EPC

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Italiana Sociologica 3.6 (Nov-Dec 1899) [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 273-277]. Vailati concentrates on the sociological importance of James's essays, restricting his comments to "The Importance of Individuals" and "Great Men and Their Environment." EPC

Giovanni Vailati, Riv Filo 2 (Jan-Feb 1900) [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 282-286]. Vailati's third distinct review is again more explicatory than critical. It examines the title essay as well as "On Some Hegelisms," with much praise for James. EPC

Reviews of the German translation by Th. Lorenz, *Der Wille zum Glauben* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1899)

Erich Adickes, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 21 (4 Aug 1900): 2074-2077. James is more prudent than others who hold similar views. He holds that decisions are based on inner need. IKS

H. Bromse, Zeit Phil Ph Krit 118 (1901): 247-254. Bromse summarizes the contents, with special emphasis on James's preface. While James is eager to defend the having of faith, he gives no details as to its contents. IKS

Julius Kaftan, Theologische Literaturzeitung 25 (9 June 1900): 375-377. It deserves serious attention and is appropriate for the modern spiritual situation. However, there are many doubts and questions which could be raised. IKS

Notes

William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897). It was reprinted as *The Works of William James: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). See Friedrich Paulsen's introduction to the German translation, *Der Wille zum Glauben* {40}.

17 Moore, A. W. *The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1898. *The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902).

Locke represents the tension between the older scholastic view of knowledge as the statement of a completed system of reality, and the newer scientific view of knowledge functioning in relation to practice. He tries to separate the origin of ideas from their function. However, simple ideas are stimuli to action, and complex ideas stand for problems to be solved. Locke's other classifications of ideas (distinct/confused, adequate/-inadequate, etc.) suffer from difficulties arising from a failure to recognize their functional significance. "Passive empiricism," either of the empirical or rationalistic type, ignores the role of the future in an analysis of experience, and thus makes verification "either needless or impossible." Moore concludes his discussion with a functional account of knowledge. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 114. A "refreshing advance" which makes "a valuable and important contribution" to pragmatism. JRS

Notes

Moore notes that this dissertation is "the outcome of work done in Professor Dewey's seminar in advanced logic." An earlier dissertation which was presumably also done under the direction of John Dewey is Waldemar Read's *John Dewey's Conception of Intelligent Social Action* (University of Chicago, 1897).

18 Peirce, C. S. *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner, with an Introduction by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Lectures given at the Cambridge Conferences, February 10 - March 7, 1898, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their titles are "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life," "Types of Reasoning," "The Logic of Relatives," "First Rule of Logic," "Training in Reasoning," "Causation and Force," "Habit," and "The Logic of Continuity." JRS

Notes

Includes Putnam's "Comments on the Lectures," pp. 55-102. "Training in Reasoning" was first published as {2056}. Other portions of the manuscripts of these lectures were first published in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 6: *Scientific Metaphysics* {2442}. See the "Bibliography of the Works of Charles Sanders Peirce," *CP* 8, p. 288.

19 Phillips, D. E. Some Remarks on Number and Its Application. Pedagogical Seminary 5.4 (April 1898): 590-598.

Phillips replies to Dewey's "Some Remarks on the Psychology of Number," Pedagogical Seminary 5.3 (Jan 1898): 426-434 [*EW* 5: 177-191]. Dewey's remarks were directed at Phillips' "Number and Its Application Psychologically Considered," Pedagogical Seminary 5.2 (Oct 1897): 221-281 [*EW* 5: xxviii-lxxxv], which criticized Dewey and James A. McLellan, *The Psychology of Number* (New York: Appleton, 1895). JRS

Notes

See M. V. O'Shea, "The Psychology of Number–A Genetic View," Psych Rev 8.4 (July 1901): 371-383.

20 Ritchie, D. G. The One and the Many. Mind n.s 7.4 (Oct 1898): 449-476.

Ritchie defends idealism and the doctrine of necessity from the criticisms of James's *The Will to Believe* (1897). JRS

Summaries

Ira MacKay, Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 70-71.

21 Rogers, Arthur K. Epistemology and Experience. Phil Rev 7.5 (Sept 1898): 467-484.

Dewey's functional theory of judgment and knowledge is defended and used to retain the common sense distinction between the judgment process and independent reality. When we experience immediate and unproblematic activity, this "concrete" experience is neither subjective nor objective. This distinction arises only in the thought process, aroused by problems. The Hegelian finds one inclusive experience, as does the subjective idealist, but real experience, and hence reality itself, must be pluralistically individualized. In this sense there is an independent reality of experiences beyond my own unified whole of immediate experience, while my thought is an inadequate representation of reality. JRS

22 **Royce, Josiah.** *Studies in Good and Evil: A Series of Essays upon the Problems of Philosophy and of Life.* New York: D. Appleton, 1898. Reprinted, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964.

In chap. 8, "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature," Royce uses the concept of "habit." He describes and rejects Peirce's hypothesis of "tychism" (p. 237), instead supporting the position that "our conscious life is the inner aspect of a physical process of what is called our adjustment to our environment." JRS

23 **Russell, John E.** Epistemology and Mental States. Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 394-396.

Russell comments on James H. Tufts's "Can Epistemology Be Based on Mental States," Phil Rev 6.6 (Nov 1897): 577-592. Tufts rejects any theory of knowledge that relies on a trans-mental reality, preferring one that interprets experience within consciousness. This confuses "the criterion of truth with truth itself, the reason or grounds of cognitive certainty with the objective validity of cognition," and approaches subjective idealism. JRS

Notes

See Tufts's reply, Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 396-397.

1899

24 **Blanchard, D. H.** Some Deterministic Implications of the Psychology of Attention. Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 23-39.

James uses voluntary self-determination and the notion of chance to defend free-will, but neither can rebut determinism. The self cannot be influenced by the nothingness of chance, and "the faculty of the will is left without a function." JRS

25 **Brown, George P.** The University Elementary School. School and Home Education 18 (1899): 98-99.

The title refers to the University of Chicago, where Dewey chaired the departments of Philosophy and Pedagogy. The latter opened its experimental elementary school in the fall of 1895. JRS

26 **Caldwell, William.** The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt. Int J Ethics 9.3 (April 1899): 373-378.

Caldwell comments on D. S. Miller's "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" {39}. James's apparent irrationalism, if properly understood, is a protest against the limitation of experience to the level of the understanding, with its "antitheses and its enumerations of abstract possibilities." James's position can be compared with Hegel's and that of many religions. IKS

Notes

See Brown's "Dr. John Dewey's Educational Experiment," Public-School Journal 16 (1897): 533-537.

27 **Dewey, John.** *John Dewey's "Lectures in the Theory of Logic."* Edited with an introduction by Stephen Alan Nofsinger. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1989.

These lectures were delivered at the University of Chicago, during the Fall 1899 and Winter 1900 quarters. The seven chapters are titled "A Preliminary Account of Thinking," "Psychology and Logic," "Experience and its Controls," "Discussion of the Nature of Judgment," "The Subject of the Judgment," "The Predicate of the Judgment," and "Discussion of the Copula." Nofsinger's detailed introduction describes the development of Dewey's thought in these lectures towards his *Studies in Logical Theory* {118}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey, *Lectures in the Philosophy of Education, 1899*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1966).

28 **Dewey, John.** Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy. Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child-Study 4 (1899): 65-83. Reprinted in *MW* 1: 175-191.

29 **Dewey, John.** Psychology and Philosophic Method. University of California Chronicle 2 (Aug 1899): 159-179. Reprinted with "slight verbal changes" as "'Consciousness' and Experience" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 242-270. *MW* 1: 113-130.

Psychological inquiry does not find states of consciousness "given" as data, and hence it cannot be scientifically isolated from philosophical issues. However, such issues are not independent of larger social and political concerns. The present stress on individual consciousness is a manifestation of democracy. JRS

30 **Dewey, John.** *The School and Society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899. London: P. S. King and Sons, 1900. 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915. Reprinted in *MW* 1: 1-109.

The school must adapt to the modern industrial needs of society. Education develops the child's natural curiosities into socially useful skills. Theoretical knowledge should be learned in its functional relation to practical human activities, not by rote memorization. Dewey relates the organization and teaching of the University of Laboratory School. JRS

Reviews

B. A. Hinsdale and A. S. Whitney, Dial 29.4 (16 Aug 1900): 97-99. This work "has virtue" regardless of the future of the school. JRS

Thomas J. McCormack, Open Court 14.9 (Sept 1900): 564-569. A detailed and approving exposition. While "institutions for the stupefaction of the public" will always be with us, Dewey's plans are "in the interests of advancing civilization." JRS

Anon, Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child-Study 4 (1899): 100-101; Anon, University of Chicago Record 5 (1900): 159-160; A. W. Moore, Review of Education 7 (1901): 31; Laura Louisa Runyon, Chautauquan 30 (1900): 589-592; William S. Sutton, Educational Review 20 (1900): 303-306.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Anon, Education 36 (1915-16): 123; Anon, Elementary School Journal 16 (1915): 67-69; Anon, Journal of Education 82 (1915): 357.

31 James, William. Preface. To E. D. Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* (London: W. Scott; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 4th ed., 1914), pp. v-x. Reprinted in *Works ERM*, pp. 102-104.

When Starbuck first proposed a statistical study of religion, James was sceptical because the "question-circular method" had become a nuisance. He expected Starbuck to receive descriptions of peculiar experiences reflecting the "Protestant Volkgeist," but did not expect the statistical treatment to be important. However, there are interesting statistical results. For example, experiences of conversion are not limited to rare cases, but correspond to common events of moral and religious development. Where some scientists find only hysterics and evangelical extremists find supernatural events, Starbuck discovers "normal psychologic crises." The book adds much to the current psychological and sociological stock-taking. IKS

32 James, William. *Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals.* New York: Henry Holt; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1899. Translated by L. S. Pidoux as *Causeries pédagogiques* (Paris: Felix Alcan; Lausanne and Paris: Payot, 1900), with a preface by Jules Payot {54}. Translated by G. C. Ferrari as *Gli ideali della vita: discorsi ai giovani e discorsi ai maestri sulla psicologia* (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1902. 2nd ed., 1906). Translated by F. Kiesow as *Psychologie und Erziehung* (Leipsig: Englemann, 1900; 2nd ed., 1908). New edition, with an Introduction by John Dewey and William H. Kilpatrick [*LW* 14: 337-340] (New York: Henry Holt, 1939). Reprinted in *WJ Writings 1* pp. 705-887. *The Works of William James: Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

This work is a popular restatement of the psychology of his *Principles of Psychology* (1890), depicting mental lives in a manner most useful to teachers. In their desire for professional training teachers are turning to the new psychology in search of basic principles, but there is no new psychology, only the old one with some physiology added to it. Furthermore, no principles of teaching can be deduced from psychology, since teaching is an art. Psychology helps to prevent mistakes by showing which methods will not work, but does not guarantee good teaching, since that requires ingenuity and tact. Fundamental is the biological view of mind, as an organ of adaptation, selecting appropriate responses to impressions received from the environment so as to best avoid harm. The mind is conditioned by the brain, "runs parallel therewith," while currents enter from organs of sense into the brain and leave into muscles and glands. It is best to treat brain and mind as having the same structure and purpose.

All thinking, even the most abstract, influences practice. The aim of education is to develop "powers of conduct," fitting a human being into his physical and social world. The task of the teacher is to supervise and direct the acquisition of reactions. Hence, the great maxim of teaching is that there should be no "reception without reaction." Human beings have many native reactions, and every acquired reaction is either a "complication grafted on a native reaction" or a substitution for it. The art of the teacher is to bring about appropriate complications or substitutions. Pupils begin with native reactions of fear, love, curiosity, imitation, ambition, pugnacity, pride, ownership,

collecting, constructiveness, and many others. Teachers must remember the transitoriness of instincts: impulses ripen at a certain time and fade away if no objects are provided. Teachers must try to recognize the "proper pedagogic moment" when impulses are at their strongest and begin attaching appropriate habits, lest the opportunity be lost. Because habit is second nature and the nervous system must be trained into an ally, useful actions must be made automatic and habitual. To this end, teachers should not so much preach as lie in wait for practical opportunities. Daily routines free the higher powers of the mind for their own proper work. Instincts make certain objects automatically interesting, while other interests have to be acquired. Children are originally interested in novel sensations, in what moves and suggests danger. New interests can be acquired only by association with such native interests. Teachers should strive to recognize native interests, offer objects immediately connected with them, and then gradually introduce the more remote ideas they wish to instill. Attention is either passive or voluntary; the latter cannot be continuously sustained. Teachers have to develop various techniques for gaining and keeping voluntary attention, but once attention is gained, teachers should strive to make the subject itself excite attention. Change and novelty here are very important. People differ in their capacity for concentration as well as the capacities of memory, reasoning, inventiveness, observation. Mental life is dependent upon all of them, and a weakness in an elementary faculty should not be considered decisive. Thus, scatter-brained children can achieve as much as others, provided the objects are interesting enough to attract attention time and time again.

Memory training can only be the acquisition of specific additional associations. Most people forget rapidly, but even things once known and forgotten influence our conduct. Association also lies at the bottom of apperception. It is governed by the law of economy: new experiences are received so as to least disturb the old "apperceiving mass." The tendency to economize grows with age and leads to "old fogyism": the incapacity to learn anything new. The education of the will–the formation of character–must also be treated. All ideas lead to movement. Willful action properly so-called follows deliberation, which occurs when one idea inhibits another in preventing the natural motor consequences of another. Teachers must instill many ideas, making sure not to inhibit the capacity for vigorous action in their pupils. Moral effort is voluntary attention, the effort to keep in focus an idea which otherwise would be driven out by other tendencies. Thus, character formation involves the acquisition of good ideas, the development of moral effort, and habits. The picture of mind thus drawn is mechanistic, but James himself claims to not be a materialist since while the brain is condition of consciousness, it is not the producer of consciousness. Freedom remains possible because the amount of voluntary attention is indeterminate. Free will consists of our ability to make more or less of an effort to keep certain ideas in focus.

Talks to Teachers includes three talks to university students: "The Gospel of Relaxation," "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," and "What Makes a Life Significant?" James especially wants to draw attention to the second talk since it is closely connected with James's philosophy of pluralism and individualism. For it, there is no universal point of view and "private and uncommunicable" perceptions always remain. This philosophy leads to a "democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality," to the outward tolerance of different behaviors. IKS

Reviews

Charles DeGarmo, Science n.s. 9 (30 June 1899): 909-910. It is well that books on education are being written by "real leaders of thought." This is an important contribution to education, but why did James copy a chapter from his earlier book? Nobody wants to buy the same book twice. James holds that from a science one cannot directly derive an art. A "mediator" is required, a "mind full of tact and invention." IKS

Edward H. Griffin, Psych Rev 6.5 (Sept 1899): 536-539. It is dangerous in psychology to have partial points of view obtained by abstracting from the whole. James views humans biologically, as organisms which adapt to their environment, and this obscures "the free activity of mind." Still, it is the work of a "master," never dull, and full of "whole-some and timely" instruction. IKS

B. A. Hinsdale, Dial 27.8 (16 October 1899): 275-279. One of the best new works on the subject, full of good sense. It takes away the "terrors" of psychology for teachers. IKS

Alfred Hodder, Nation 68.25 (22 June 1899): 481-482. James explains the value of psychology for teachers in a "popular" work marked by "sincerity and conviction." IKS

Thomas J. McCormack, Open Court 14.2 (Feb 1900): 125-126. The addresses "abound in practical insight and unconventional wisdom." JRS

Cornelia Atwood Pratt, "Teachers, Students, and Professor James," The Critic 36 (Fall 1900): 119-121. James correctly recognizes that teaching is an art, the practice of which depends upon the personalities of the students and teachers, and which is thus not derivable from the science of psychology. James also correctly holds up character as the goal of education. IKS

Reviews of the Italian translation

Giovanni Vailati, "Sull'arte d'interrogare," Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905) [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 572-576].

Reviews of the German translation

M. Offner, Zeit für Psych 52 (1909): 319-320. James warns against the overemphasizing of psychology in education. For him, man is an active being and the mind is an instrument of adaptation. IKS

Notes

Ten chapters also appeared in Atlantic Monthly. Chapters 1-3, Atlantic Monthly 83 (Feb 1899): 155-162; chapters 4-7, Atlantic Monthly 83 (March 1899): 320-329; chapters 10 and 11, Atlantic Monthly 83 (April 1899): 510-517; chap. 15, Atlantic Monthly 83 (May 1899): 617-626. "The Gospel of Relaxation" was also published in Scribner's Magazine 25 (April 1899): 499-507. "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" is reprinted in *The Moral Philosophy of William James*, ed. John K. Roth (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), pp. 214-232.

33 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. *Einleitung in die Philosophie.* Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1899. 2nd ed., 1903. 3rd ed., 1906. 4th ed., 1909. 5th and 6th eds., 1913. 7th and 8th eds., 1919. 9th and 10th eds., 1923. The authorized translation of the 4th ed. was by Charles F. Sanders as *Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1910). The 10th ed. was also translated by Charles F. Sanders (New York: Macmillan, 1932).

In the fourth edition "my distinctive views have...been brought together and stated coherently." An empirical, genetic, and biological and social interpretation of mind "has brought me rather close to pragmatism in epistemology." (p. vi) The section "Pragma-

tism" (pp. 98-102) is a summary, mentioning the principal pragmatists. "Genetic and Biological Epistemology" (pp. 102-134) offers a psychology of knowledge starting from apperception. "The truthfulness of a judgment is nothing more nor less than its practical value for the determination of the means necessary to human welfare." (p. 117) Further sections treat aesthetics and ethics. JRS

Reviews

Ellen Bliss Talbot, Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 218-219.

Reviews of 3rd edition

Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 16.2 (March 1907): 212.

Reviews of 5th edition

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 23.1 (Jan 1914): 146-147.

Reviews of 1909 translation

Jay William Hudson, Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 107-109; D. L. Murray, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 436-437; Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 8.8 (13 April 1911): 220-221; Wilmon H. Sheldon, Amer J Psych 22.4 (Oct 1911): 588-589.

Reviews of 1932 translation

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 313.

34 Lee, Vernon (pseud. for Violet Paget). The Need to Believe: An Agnostic's Notes on Professor Wm. James. Fortnightly Review n.s. 72.11 (1 Nov 1899): 827-842. Reprinted with alterations as "Professor James and the 'Will to Believe'," in *Gospels of Anarchy* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908), pp. 193-231.

The author's own need to *not* believe can refute James's philosophy. The will to believe cannot direct us to any one religion, but anywhere our aesthetic faculties can take us. Theism is too self-contradictory to be desirable, and James's God is really "a man of war," providing us with the best of all possible worlds. More preferable is the satisfaction of peaceful harmony with a loving Creator. JRS

35 Le Roy, Édouard. Science et philosophie. Rev Méta 7.4 (July 1899): 375-425; 7.5 (Sept 1899): 503-562; 7.6 (Nov 1899): 708-731; 8.1 (Jan 1900): 37-72.

Le Roy gives an exposé on the way in which those inclined toward the positive sciences can understand the unity of knowledge and the mutual *rapports* of the various orders of knowledge. (p. 375) A contributor to the Theory of Knowledge must first be concerned with its foundation: an initial position to function as a solid base of operations. Using Bergson as a model, Le Roy dedicates the first part of this work, "The Given of Common Sense," to this topic. Included is a discussion of the ideas of space and time. He concludes that everyday knowledge (*connaissance commun*) is the sole field for knowledge, and that the words "reality," "truth," and "certitude" are defined by the use common thought gives to them. It is therefore a mistake to raise questions about other, more subtle, meanings. The foundation of everyday knowledge is solid and indubitable, but the form, *toute pratique*, is not to be trusted.

In the second part, Le Roy takes up an analysis of science (and a critique of common sense). He concludes that: (1) science itself is nothing but a form–it is common sense that gives it its organization, (2) science begins by collecting materials in its "positive stage," then moves to an experimental stage, and finally comes to a rational

stage in which it attempts to construct a model of the world, and (3) the rationalistic method of completed science is limited to symbolic representation and the laws of its origin and genesis restrict the rational truth of science to contingency and relativity. In the final two parts, Le Roy turns his attention to philosophy, and considers its definition and the question of whether it consummates and perfects knowledge. The Bergsonian critique makes an important point that the difficulty of responding to questions generally attends those which are ill-posed. Philosophical truth is what can be lived and put into practice; philosophical knowledge is thus a living and true knowledge. (p. 70) From a social point of view, the function of philosophy is to begin the education of common sense anew.

Ultimately there exist three representative doctrines of given reality: common sense, science, and philosophy. There are thus three points of view: that of bodily action and social relations, that of a reductive analysis and rigorous discourse, and that of sympathetic intuition and of internal life. The course of these methods are connected by three successive orientations of mind, and all rest on the liberty of the mind. (p. 71) There is a response in the final portion of this work by Couturat on pp. 223-233. LF

Summary of the first two sections

E. A., Phil Rev 9.2 (March 1900): 211-212.

Notes

James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther" on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}. See also Le Roy, "Un Positivisme nouveau" {66} and "Sur quelques objections adressées à la nouvelle philosophie" {67}.

36 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. Belief and Will. Int J Ethics 9.3 (April 1899): 359-373.

Marshall sides with James in the controversy raised by D. S. Miller's "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" {39}. IKS

37 Mead, G. H. The Working Hypothesis in Social Reform. American Journal of Sociology 5 (1899): 367-371. Pp. 369-371 are reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 3-5.

38 Miller, Dickinson S. Professor James on Philosophical Method. Phil Rev 8.2 (March 1899): 166-170.

James associates pragmatism with empiricism, but empiricism is only interested in the origin of a concept, not its destiny. Is James prepared to accept the consequence that the truth of a concept lies in its utility? JRS

39 Miller, Dickinson S. "The Will to Believe" and the Duty to Doubt. Int J Ethics 9.1 (Jan 1899): 169-195.

Kant, Fichte, and Arthur Balfour appeal to the will to overcome religious skepticism. James goes further by refusing to sanction faith by reason. The will to believe is the "will to deceive." James's method is to take as certain what is not, to "hypnotize" the mind. IKS

Summaries

Boyd H. Bode, Phil Rev 8.2 (March 1899): 195-196.

Notes

See Caldwell's comments, "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt" {26}, and Henry R. Marshall, "Belief and Will" {36}.

40 Paulsen, Friedrich. Introduction. To *Der Wille zum Glauben* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1899). This work is the German translation by Theodor Lorenz of William James's *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897).

41 Rogers, Arthur Kenyon. *A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1899.

The final chapter, "Scepticism and the Criterion of Truth," argues that any truth is at best a probable hypothesis and serves active experience. JRS

Reviews

James B. Baillie, Int J Ethics 10.4 (July 1900): 525-530. Too many contradictions infect Rogers' offered experimental criterion of truth. JRS

42 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life.* Mind n.s. 8.4 (Oct 1899): 540-543.

Notes

See J. Mark Baldwin's response, "Prof. Münsterberg's *Psychology and Life*," Mind n.s. 9.2 (Jan 1900): 143, and Schiller's reply, ibid., pp. 143-144.

43 Vailati, Giovanni. *Alcune osservazioni sulle questioni di parole nella storia della scienza e della cultura* (Prolusione ad un corso libero di Storia di Meccanica, 1898-99.) Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1899. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 203-228.

An examination of the clarity of meaning in scientific and cultural discourse, this essay draws most heavily on Aristotle. While there is no mention of the American pragmatists, Vailati does refer to Lady Welby's "Sense, Meaning, and Interpretation," Mind n.s. 5.2 (April 1896): 186. EPC

44 Watson, John. The New "Ethical" Philosophy. Int J Ethics 9.4 (July 1899): 413-434.

Watson responds to William Caldwell's "Philosophy and the Activity-Experience" {5}. Intellectual idealism's identification of knowledge and being is defended against "ethical" idealism, which, in proclaiming the relativity of knowledge, is inherently skeptical and contradictory. James's view that reality is only partly intelligible, and hence requires the supplement of faith, is only partly correct. Experience is wider than knowledge, but "no theory of reality can be true which is based upon a particular aspect of reality." Thus there can be no unintelligible aspect of experience. This doctrine actually supports free-will; resting free-will on mere feeling is hardly philosophical. JRS

Notes

See James Lindsay's response, "Ethical versus Intellectual Idealism," Int J Ethics 10.2 (Jan 1900): 235-240. Caldwell's "Pragmatism" {46} answers both Watson and Lindsay.

45 Boodin, J. E. The Reality of Religious Ideals. In *Unit* (Iowa College), vol. 5 (1900), pp. 97-109. Reprinted in Harvard Theological Review 2.1 (Jan 1909): 58-72. *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 307-326.

46 Caldwell, William. Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 9.4 (Oct 1900): 433-456. Portions were reprinted in *Pragmatism and Idealism* {1159}, pp. 109-115.

James's "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" {13} gives us Pragmatism, a fortunate "blankly utilitarian and flatly commonplace" term, which can be applied to recent "ethical" tendencies in philosophy. A generally supportive exposition is followed by a statement of seven necessary but missing assumptions, chief being a criterion for judging consequences and a statement of our present experience of the world. German metaphysicians have long agreed that reality is what stands in a verifiable relation to us; why should James cast them aside? Pragmatism is an expression of current science and psychology, but it requires a criticism of categories and a theory of ideas. Then it would be a worthy "attempt at an ontology through the door of a teleology." JRS

Reviews

Warner Fite, Psych Rev 8.2 (March 1901): 197-198. Has not James simply "overlooked the limiting conditions of activity?" How could John Dewey be omitted from the list of pragmatists? JRS

Summaries

N. E. Truman, Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 204-205.

47 Dewey, John. *Lectures on Ethics, 1900-1901.* Donald F. Koch, ed. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991.

A transcript of lectures delivered by Dewey at the University of Chicago in 1900 and 1901. Three sets of lectures are included, from his "The Logic of Ethics," "The Psychology of Ethics," and "Political Ethics" courses. It contains a preface and introduction by Donald Koch, pp. vii-lvii. JRS

Reviews

James Campbell, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 29.1 (Winter 1993): 107-114; K. J. Dykeman, Choice 29 (Nov 1991): 462; Abraham Edel, Ethics 102.3 (July 1992): 851-853.

48 Dewey, John. *Mental Development.* Chicago: University of Chicago, 1900. Reprinted in *MW* 1: 192-221.

From age two to twenty-four, the mind progresses from play activity through intellectual interest to independent inquiry. JRS

49 Dewey, John. Psychology and Social Practice. Psych Rev 7.2 (March 1900): 105-124. Also published in Science n.s. 11 (2 March 1900): 321-333, and as *University of Chicago Contributions to Education*, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1901). In *Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Practice*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 295-315. *MW* 1: 131-150.

Teaching today assumes that the child's psychology is fundamentally different from adults, and that schooling should impart to the child those specialized skills of adulthood.

Instead, psychology should use the school to test developmental theories of social personality. Psychology can thus contribute to an ethical understanding of that institution. Similarly, psychology should study all social institutions in their relations of value to all members of society, lest we fall victim to the alternative of aristocratic hierarchy. JRS

Reviews

L. M. Aldrich, Phil Rev 9.3 (May 1900): 340-341.

50 Dewey, John. Review of Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual, First Series: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being.* Phil Rev 9.3 (May 1900): 311-324. Reprinted in *MW* 1: 241-256.

Royce prefers the Absolute to contradictory and meaningless experience, but he ignores Kant's *critical* rationalism, in which possible experience tests the validity of ideas. "What we need is a reconsideration of the facts of struggle, disappointment, change, consciousness of limitation, which will show *them*, as they actually are experienced *by us* (not by something called Absolute) to be significant, worthy, and helpful." JRS

Notes

The World and the Individual, First Series (New York: Macmillan, 1900). See Dewey's review of the second part of this work {89}.

51 Dewey, John. Some Stages of Logical Thought. Phil Rev 9.5 (Sept 1900): 465-489. Reprinted with revisions in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 183-219. *MW* 1: 151-176.

Thought is a doubt-inquiry function, that aims at settled assurance. Thought proceeds through four stages: fixed social attitudes, reflective reconstruction, the Aristotelian quest for first premises, and finally inductive and empirical research. Aristotelianism, empiricism, and transcendentalism all confine inquiry's material and extent, and hence fail to capture modern science's instrumental aims. A new practicality theory of thought would reinterpret the terms of thought as "divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process." JRS

52 Mead, G. H. Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines. Phil Rev 9.1 (Jan 1900): 1-17. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 6-24.

Dewey's theory of the reflex arc holds that sensations result from the fixing of attention on a problematic experience. When this theory is philosophically applied, metaphysics is the statement of a problem, deductive logic idealizes the past meaning of the object, psychology takes up the subjective immediate experience, and inductive logic forms new meanings of objects. Ethics is the application of these methods to conduct, and aesthetics treats the representations of the object. "Finally, the general theory of the intelligent act as a whole would fall within that of logic as treated in works such as that of Hegel." JRS

Notes

See Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," Psych Rev 3.4 (July 1896): 357-370 [*EW* 5: 96-109].

53 Moore, A. W. Review of James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* American Journal of Sociology 5.4 (Jan 1900): 553-556.

Ward does not consistently apply a teleological interpretation to the subject-object relation within experience. JRS

Notes

Naturalism and Agnosticism (London and New York: Macmillan, 1899).

54 Payot, Jules. Preface. To *Causeries pédagogiques* (Paris: Felix Alcan; Lausanne and Paris: Payot, 1900). This work is the French translation by L. S. Pidoux of William James's *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* {32}.

The preface consists primarily of quotations illustrating the great merits of James's work. For James, psychology is a science, while teaching is an art. IKS

55 Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual, First Series: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being.* Nation 70.14 (5 April 1900): 267. Reprinted in *The Nation*, Part Two, pp. 239-241.

The purpose of Royce's "important book" is "to say what it is that we aim at when we make any inquiry or investigation." (p. 239) Peirce focuses here on the doctrine of possible experience, the only view Royce takes to be "essentially different" than his own. Peirce describes this view, explains Royce's four objections to it, and voices his opinion that these positions are more consonant than Royce admits. LF

Notes

The World and the Individual, First Series (New York: Macmillan, 1900). See Peirce's review of the second part of this work {72}.

56 Robertson, John M. The Ethics of Opinion-Making. Int J Ethics 10.2 (Jan 1900): 173-193.

Robertson describes James's "will to believe" thesis as "risk one error rather than risk another error." Even Pascal avoided "the false proposition that a man can of conscious choice set up the habit while believing or fearing that the given belief is baseless, and may so reach hallucination." JRS

57 Rogers, Arthur K. The Hegelian Conception of Thought. Phil Rev 9.2 (March 1900): 152-166; 9.3 (May 1900): 293-310.

The psychology of the struggling organism displays a distinction between the object prior to thought and the object known. Purposive activity binds experience; no timeless Absolute is needed. Reality is distinct from our knowledge, though it can be known. JRS

Notes

Rogers further critiques Hegelianism in "The Neo-Hegelian 'Self' and Subjective Idealism," Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 139-161.

58 Schiller, F. C. S. On Some Philosophical Assumptions in the Investigation of the Problem of a Future Life. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 15.1 (Feb 1900): 53-64. Reprinted in expanded form as "Philosophy and the Scientific Investigation of a Future Life" in *Humanism* {139} pp. 266-289.

There could be empirical evidence of continuity between this life and the next. JRS

Notes

See his "Do Men Desire Immortality" {73}.

59 Schiller, F. C. S. On the Conception of 'ΕΝΕ'ΡΓΕΙΑ 'ΑΚΙΝΗΣΙ'ΑΣ. Mind n.s. 9.4 (Oct 1900): 457-468. Reprinted as "Sur la conception de l'ἐνέργεια ἀχινησίας" in *Bibliothèque du congrès international de philosophie. IV. Histoire de philosophie* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1902), pp. 189-209. In "revised and considerably expanded" form as "Activity and Substance" in *Humanism* {139} pp. 204-227.

A discussion and defense of Aristotle's elevation of energy/activity/process to the highest conception of reality. Life tends toward a perfectly harmonious adjustment of activities, providing eternal happiness. Philosophers cannot fail to "appreciate the great practical value of putting before men a metaphysical ideal of being which stimulates us to be active and to develop all our powers to the utmost." JRS

Summaries

Warner Fite, Psych Rev 8.2 (March 1901): 201-203; W. A. Heidel, Phil Rev 12.4 (July 1903): 474-477; N. E. Truman, Phil Rev 10.1 (Jan 1901): 88.

1901

60 Balfour, Arthur J. *The Foundations of Belief.* 8th ed., revised, with a new introduction and summary (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901).

Both naturalism and transcendental idealism are condemned by their incompatibility with the existence of ethical ideals and moral practice. Science and religion can be reconciled, so long as the notion that "all beliefs ultimately trace their descent to non-rational causes" is firmly rejected. Theism provides the soundest basis for this reconciliation. JRS

Reviews

Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 11.2 (March 1902): 213-214. Balfour's restatement of his position in this edition, that the harmony between the knower and reality arises by common design, better distinguishes it from James's "will to believe" position. JRS

61 Bonatelli, F. Il movimento prammatistico. Riv Filo 3.2 (Spring 1901): 145-151.

62 Calderoni, Mario. *I postulati della scienza positiva ed il diritto penale.* Florence: Stab. tipo-litografico pei minori corrigendi, 1901. Florence: Ramella, 1901. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 33-168.

Calderoni's thesis for the laureate degree in law shows an interesting predisposition towards examining the meanings of words pragmatically. The question of free will is located at the center of the current debate between the positivist and classical schools of jurisprudence. Calderoni maintains that the dispute between these two schools has much to do with confusion over the meaning of the term. Imprecision of language renders the dispute so complicated so as to be nearly unresolvable. Without invoking Peirce specifically, Calderoni urges the careful examination of the meanings of concepts and ideas in order to resolve problems and conflicts in jurisprudence. EPC

Reviews

G. C. Ferrari, Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria 39.2 (1902): 405-406; E. Juvalta, Riv Filo 4.2 (1901): 256-263; G. Lombroso, Archivo di Psichiatria, Scienze Penali ed Antropologia Criminate 23 (1902): 656; Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Italiana di Sociologia 4 (March-June 1902): 2-3 [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 421-428].

63 Howison, George H. *The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1901. 2nd ed., 1905.

In chap. 6, "Human Immortality: Its Positive Argument," pp. 279-312, Howison declares that James's *Human Immortality* {11} barely leaves room for faith. Howison attempts to raise this "ideal hypothesis" to the level of demonstrated fact. Only once does James approach the "idealistic doctrine of an eternal pluralism." On the whole, for James, our personalities are only fragments, transmitted by our brain, of the vast "mind-ocean" beyond our consciousness. And once the transmitter dies, our personalities will die with it and "vanish into nameless nothing." IKS

In chap. 7, "The Harmony of Determinism and Freedom," pp. 313-380, Howison rejects James's dilemma of pessimistic determinism vs. optimistic subjectivism. Personal self-determination aiming at God's atonement reconciles necessity and choice. JRS

Reviews

Norman Kemp Smith, Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 451-455.

64 James, William. Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 17 (May 1901): 13-23. Reprinted in Popular Science Monthly 59 (Aug 1901): 380-389. *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 145-170. *William James on Psychical Research*, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 213-225. *Works EPR*, pp. 192-202.

While searching for evidence of human immortality, Myers contributed to the psychological study of mind. Cultivated by academics, past psychology studied mind as an abstraction and only described normal adult consciousness. Myers was among the romantics types, who in recent years have uncovered a mass of phenomena lurking at the fringes of normal mind. For them, the normal mind is only an extract from a larger whole. Myers's central notion was that of the subliminal self, and his problem was to establish the precise constitution of the subliminal. His hypothesis is very important, but James has not studied the matter sufficiently to express a definite opinion. IKS

65 James, William, James Mark Baldwin, *et al.* Experience. Article in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 1, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1901. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), pp. 360-362. James's contribution (pp. 360-361) is in *Works EPh*, p. 95.

Experience is the totality of present data, taken in its immediacy before reflective analysis. Other meanings invite question-begging, making discussion impossible. IKS

66 Le Roy, Édouard. Un Positivisme nouveau. Rev Méta 9.2 (March 1901): 138-153.

On the threshold of the 20th century we are witnessing the birth and growth of a new Critique, which attempts to substitute the ancient conceptions with an altogether different theory of science's nature, meaning, scope, value, and methods. In light of several objections, not the least of which is that its advocates are accused of not believing in truth, Le Roy argues that this new critique is a reaction against the old positivism, which was too simplistic, too utilitarian, and too encumbered with *a priori* principles. As well, he holds that the new view is the point of departure of a new positivism which is more realistic, and more confident in the powers of the mind. LF

Notes

James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther" on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}.

67 Le Roy, Édouard. Sur quelques objections adressées à la nouvelle philosophie. Rev Méta 9.3 (May 1901): 292-327; Rev Méta 9.4 (July 1901): 292-327.

In the first part Le Roy is concerned to provide an explanation of the "new philosophy" so that there will no longer be any uncertainty about its leanings, and to make it evident that it constitutes real progress without sacrificing anything that was acquired in the past. The new philosophy is understood as both an attitude and a discipline. Le Roy's conclusions include the following: 1) understanding is not a purely intellectual act, since a truth is only fully understood if it is lived, 2) living a truth consists in making it an object of an inner life in which one believes, lives on, and fully embraces, and 3) far from having skeptical leanings, this doctrine founds the only effective means of reconciling the critical mind with the positive spirit.

In the second part, Le Roy discusses the production of knowledge itself, its results, and its signification. Serious objections have been leveled against his position on the contingency of what we call the Laws of Nature. The objections center on a central question: Why does science succeed? From what is the obvious fact of its success derived? In response, Le Roy develops several views on the nature of matter. LF

Notes

James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther" on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}.

68 Leuba, James H. The Contents of Religious Consciousness. Monist 11.4 (July 1901): 536-573.

Whether we have the right or duty "to act as if we believed what seems best," as James claims, everyone surely behaves this way. Religious consciousness operates on "working hypotheses." JRS

69 Leuba, James H. Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion. Monist 11.2 (Jan 1901): 195-225.

Religious experience is the foundation for "corporate religion," embodied in "beliefs and ceremonies." Definitions of religions have all suffered from over-intellectualizing. The existence and character of the divine is less important than our relation to it. Psychology has revealed the inseparability of feeling, thought, and will. A religious psychology will study all three aspects. JRS

70 Marshall, Henry R. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Self. Mind n.s. 10.1 (Jan 1901): 98-113.

Marshall offers a theory of self as one limited psychical system operating among others. He defends James's view that "belief is essentially an act of volition." JRS

71 Mead, G. H. A New Criticism of Hegelianism: Is It Valid? American Journal of Theology 5.1 (Jan 1901): 87-96.

A review of Charles D'Arcy, *Idealism and Theology* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1899). Hegel deserves credit for his thesis that "entities are but formulations of thought at different phases of experience." "Reality lies in immediate experience" and "thought can only make us conscious of how we act." Hegelianism can be misused to postulate a supreme conscious entity, as the author argues, but is the only alternative a vision of independent personalities, divided by an ontological and epistemological chasm? A social conception of the self, in the true spirit of Hegel, forbids all modern idealisms. Philosophy is "a statement of the method by which the self in its full cognitive and social content meets and solves its difficulties." JRS

72 Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual, Second Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order.* Nation 75.5 (31 July 1901): 94-96. Reprinted in *The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 81-86.

The aim of this second and more persuasive volume, is to introduce into the Hegelian philosophy of religion the new "scientific conceptions" (logical, psychological, and mathematical) recently worked out. The new mathematical ideas about infinity, and particularly our conceptions of it, are of the most interest to Peirce. "As a first serious attempt to apply to philosophical subjects the exactitude of thought that reigns in the mathematical sciences," Royce's book "will stand a prominent milestone upon the highway of philosophy." (p. 82) Peirce provides a rough sketch of Royce's views, including an account of the distinction between internal and external meaning, Royce's map analogy to explain how an idea can be of the nature of an "entire life," the connection of selves, and God. He also discusses possibility in Hegel and Royce, representation, and Royce's refutation of realism. On the last issue, Peirce argues that Royce has been led astray by Hegelian logic, that he has a wrong definition of realism, and that he has conflated "to be" with "to be represented." LF

Notes

The World and the Individual, Second Series (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

73 Schiller, F. C. S. Do Men Desire Immortality? Fortnightly Review 76.3 (Sept 1901): 430-444. Reprinted as "The Desire for Immortality" in *Humanism* {139}, pp. 228-249.

A study of people's thoughts on death would likely reveal that few are preoccupied by it, requiring the devaluation of immortality and any religion using it. A questionnaire about life after death is accompanied by Schiller's explanation that the results will assist a "change of tactics" by the American Society for Psychical Research. JRS

Notes

The questionnaire, with Schiller's statement that the results will measure the emotional bias in favor of surviving death, and test the doctrine of a "will to believe," comprises his

"Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life," Int J Ethics 12.1 (Oct 1901): 115-117. See also his "Note on a Questionnaire on Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life," Mind n.s. 10.3 (July 1901): 433; his "The Desire for Future Life," Independent 57 (15 Sept 1904): 601-604; and his "The Answers to the American Branch's Questionnaire Regarding Human Sentiment as to a Future Life," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 18.4 (Oct 1904): 416-453.

74 A Troglodyte [pseud. for F. C. S. Schiller], editor, with the cooperation of THE ABSOLUTE and others. *Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. London: Williams and Norgate, 1901.

The best philosophical humor of that era, Schiller's "Special Illustrated Christmas Number" substituted for the *Mind* October number of vol. 10. The cover is a "Portrait of Its Immanence The Absolute," offering a uniform disk of "the very pink of perfection." The articles satirize typical contributors and topics, especially the narrow historian and the Hegelian idealist. JRS

75 Seth, James. The Utilitarian Estimate of Knowledge. Phil Rev 10.4 (July 1901): 341-358.

James has rightly shown the practical value of knowledge, so that "the value of knowledge depends...upon the character of the will that uses it." This is common business sense, but was denied by the Greek philosophers, who, with Kant, said that "all practical virtue is an expression of intellectual virtue." To reverse this, we should say that ideas which have no expression in action are valueless. However, if this implies that practice *determines* truth, then all beliefs are mere opinions. This agnostic tendency is incompatible with the disinterested curiosity of strictly intellectual life. "The destiny of the intellect is independent" from worldly practical needs and wishes, but is instead devoted to the higher ethical goal of the common truth and love for God. JRS

Reviews

John Grier Hibben, Psych Rev 9.1 (Jan 1902): 99-100. The true scholar follows the "categorical imperative" of science: the pursuit of scientific truth should be for its own sake. JRS

76 Stratton, George M. A Psychological Test of Virtue. Int J Ethics 11.2 (Jan 1901): 200-213.

Stratton discusses John Dewey's analysis of good and evil conduct in *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus* (1894) [*EW* 4: 219-363]. It seems "profoundly true" that good acts are in accord with one's whole nature, but the strict psychologist sees the true self in every act, foolish or deliberate. Dewey instead identifies the true self with an ideal self, leaving bad acts without a real origin or explanation. Dewey fails even to offer a definite criterion of goodness, so his "whole nature" test is passed even by the consistent sinner, who, on Dewey's theory, could claim that *he* did not do the evil. We judge people, not by their progress toward their ideals, but by their ideals. Where is Dewey's theory of higher and lower ideals? JRS

Summaries

Warner Fite, Psych Rev 9.2 (March 1902): 203-204; N. E. Truman, Phil Rev 10.3 (May 1901): 317.

77 **Bawden, H. Heath.** The Functional View of the Relation between the Psychical and the Physical. Phil Rev 11.5 (Sept 1902): 474-484.

The history of philosophy displays a progressive hypostatization of mental functions, leaving parallelism as the modern insoluble problem. Functionalism instead holds that "all our reflective distinctions arise within the life of action." The physical is the habitually controlled means, and the mental is unrealized ideals. Their separation occurs when direct experience is broken up by a problem and the process of its resolution. "Reality and experience are one organic whole" and "is capable of growth or transformation." JRS

Notes

This essay is a companion to a prior article, "The Functional Significance of the Terms 'Sensory' and 'Motor'," Psych Rev 7.4 (July 1900): 390-400. Bawden continues such themes with reference to Ernst Mach and James Mark Baldwin in "The Functional Theory of Parallelism," Phil Rev 12.3 (May 1903): 299-319.

78 **Bergson, Henri.** L'effort intellectual. Rev Phil 53.1 (Jan 1902): 1-27. Reprinted with significant alterations in his *L'Energie spirituelle: Essais et conférences* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1919). Translated by H. Wildon Carr as *Mind-Energy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), pp. 186-230. This revised essay was also reprinted in *Oeuvres*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), pp. 930-959; and in *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 519-550.

Bergson argues that intellectual work takes an idea "through different planes of consciousness...from the abstract to the concrete." He applies Dewey's thesis, presented in "The Psychology of Effort," Phil Rev 7.1 (Jan 1897): 43-56 [*EW* 5: 151-163], that effort results from the use of acquired habits in learning new habits. JRS

Reviews of *L'Energie spirituelle*

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 29.3 (July 1920): 350-354.

79 **Berle, A. A.** Professor James on Religious Experience. Congregationalist and Christian World 87.51 (20 Dec 1902): 933.

James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} contains "supposed concessions to Christian experience," but cannot distinguish the "pseudo-experiences" of Christian "cults" from "genuine spiritual enlightenment." James's "scientific credulity" values all evidence equally, but the churches use contemporary witnesses to judge religious veracity. Scientific research into immortality and spiritualism cannot replace the New Testament. JRS

80 **Boyce Gibson, W. R.** The Problem of Freedom in Its Relation to Psychology. In *Personal Idealism*, ed. Henry Sturt (London and New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 134-192.

The "soft" determinism of James, throwing us into the "shapeless arms of indeterminism," results from an unnecessary psychological admission that "only matter in motion can be a determinant of material change." Instead, an indirect proof that mind can affect matter will best defend free will. The pursuit of such a proof comprises the bulk of the essay. James's psychology, which holds that an individual's experience should be explained by something beyond his personality, has simply made the necessary postulate

leading to the determinist/indeterminist dilemma. An alternative psychology, aiming to defend the unity of the self's immediate experience, will not make volitional activity a mere delusion. James's indeterminism fails to relate choices to a person's personality. JRS

Reviews

William James, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 93-97 [*Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 442-444; *Works ECR*, pp. 540-545]. Gibson distinguishes two kinds of psychology: the inductive and the direct. The former describes things from the outside, while the latter places itself in the position of the subject. Direct psychology describes an "active inwardness" and this is what Gibson means by freedom. For this conception, indeterminism is not essential. IKS

Charles S. Peirce, Nation 76.23 (4 June 1903): 462-463 [*The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 125-127]; Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 577-580.

81 Bradley, F. H. On Active Attention. Mind n.s. 11.1 (Jan 1902): 1-30. Reprinted in *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 408-443.

James's theory of attention is criticized in several footnotes. In another footnote, Bradley explains his rejection of the idea that all thought is ultimately practical. JRS

82 Bradley, F. H. On Mental Conflict and Imputation. Mind n.s. 11.3 (July 1902): 289-315. Reprinted in *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 444-475.

James's defense of free will is criticized in a long footnote. James wrongly creates a false alternative between determinism and pure chance, and does not see that pure chance is just as incompatible with our moral experience of responsibility. JRS

83 Carus, Paul. Theology as a Science. Monist 12.4 (July 1902): 544-567.

James's "will to believe" represents the pre-scientific psychological elevation of the will into a metaphysical entity. Intellectual progress harnesses the will and formulates new religious doctrines to fit science. JRS

Notes

Part two of this article is Monist 13.1 (Oct 1902): 24-37.

84 Crozier, John Beattie. The Problem of Religious Conversion. Fortnightly Review n.s. 78.12 (1 Dec 1902): 1004-1018.

James's contention that conversions are due to the presence of God is contradicted by the fact that adherents of different religions in their mystical states experience only what they expect and that similar states can be induced by other means. Conversions are better explained by the fact that some centers of the brain become detached from others and cease to be subject to their control. IKS

85 Dewey, John. *The Child and the Curriculum.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902. Reprinted in *MW* 2: 271-292.

Against both the "traditional" and "child-centered" pedagogies, Dewey argues that the child's active experience contains the elements of mature practices. The child's interests have value only where they can be directed by education toward social occupations. JRS

86 Dewey, John. The Evolutionary Method Applied to Morality. Phil Rev 11.2 (March 1902): 107-124; 11.4 (July 1902): 353-371. Reprinted in *MW* 2: 3-38.

Dewey makes a rebuttal of the separation of historical fact and spiritual value, proceeding from the principle that historical logic permits the study of "the conditions under which moral practices and ideals have originated." Scientific experimental logic similarly studies the origins of particular things under specified conditions. The idealists rightly complain that materialism sets up the initial conditions as ultimate fact and misplaces the "cause" superior to the "effect"; however, idealism just as wrongly reverses priorities. Evolution places these factors in their proper unity and continuous reality. Morality as a fixed ideal is useless; as a part of a "larger historic continuum" its understanding makes possible the future practical control to resolve actual conflicts. Intuitionism gives moral belief ultimate value. Empiricism analyses belief into valueless states, and resorts to intuitionism. The genetic method aims to control moral judgment, and indirectly, moral conduct. JRS

Notes

See Theodore De Laguna's discussion, "Evolutionary Method In Ethical Research" {163}. See also A. Seth Pringle-Pattison's review of Henry Sidgwick's *Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations*, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 83-93, where he proclaims the "really transforming and vitalising effect of the historical method" on ethics, and comments that in this article by Dewey, "this function of history is convincingly vindicated." (p. 93)

87 Dewey, John. Interpretation of Savage Mind. Psych Rev 9.3 (May 1902): 217-230. Reprinted with alterations as "Interpretation of the Savage Mind" in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 173-187. *Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Practice*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 281-294. *MW* 2: 39-52.

With civilization as the standard, primitive traits are only incapacities. Viewed genetically, they are developments relative to cultural occupations. The hunting and agricultural modes of life are contrasted, explaining their different mental abilities and resulting religions. The transition to civilization requires the strengthening of social interests, especially the objective and idealized pursuits of "truth, beauty, virtue, wealth, social well-being, and even of heaven and of God." JRS

Summaries

M. S. MacDonald, Phil Rev 11.5 (Sept 1902): 529-530.

88 Dewey, John. Philosophy. Article in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), pp. 290-296. Reprinted in *MW* 2: 190-202.

Philosophy is the theory of "*the* unity, Experience–to the universe or whatever is taken as a systematic whole." A historical survey, as Dewey provides, is the best pedagogy for learning philosophical classifications. Modern difficulties involve the uncertain placement of psychology and the logic of history. The widespread distinction made between genetic and analytic questions (how things come to be vs. what they are) is a remnant of an older non-historical age. Genesis is a "controlled, orderly, and complete analysis." JRS

Notes

Dewey also wrote entries on 118 other terms for this dictionary, from "Natural" to "World." Significant entries include "Nature," *MW* 2: 142-148, "Organic," *MW* 2: 177-178, "Pluralism," *MW* 2: 203-204, "Possibility, Impossibility, and Possible," *MW* 2: 210-212, "Realism," *MW* 2: 218-223, "Relation," *MW* 2: 224-230, "Subject," *MW* 2: 248-252, "Tychism," *MW* 2: 259, and "Understanding and Reason," *MW* 2: 259-261.

89 Dewey, John. Review of Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual, Second Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order*. Phil Rev 11.4 (July 1902): 392-407. Reprinted in *MW* 2: 120-137.

Royce requires individual experiences to give meaning to the Absolute, but the Absolute denies all meaning to individual fragments. There is no criterion to distinguish a "self" from its own states. Royce's Absolute erases the difference between goodness and evil, but the individual is trapped in dissatisfaction and evil. The German transcendentalists at least used the Absolute to give our experiences greater meaning and worth. JRS

Notes

The World and the Individual, Second Series (New York: Macmillan, 1901). See Dewey's review of the first part of this work {50}.

90 James, William. *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902. Translated into Italian by G. C. Ferrari and Mario Calderoni, with Robert Ardigo's preface {151}, as *La varie forme della coscienza religioso* (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1904). Translated into French by Frank Abauzit as *L'Expérience religieuse: Essai de psychologie descriptive* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1906. 2nd ed., 1908). Translated into German by Georg Wobbermin with an introduction {500} as *Die Religiöse Erfahrung* (Leipzig: J. C. Heinrichs, 1907. 2nd ed., 1914). Reprinted in *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1-477. *The Works of William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

Medical materialism has tried to discredit religion by tracing its roots to pathological neurological states. Nevertheless, all thought is neurologically dependent: pathological states connected with religion, for all we know in advance, might be just the ones best suited for revealing higher truth. The origin of a truth is not important; religious beliefs must be tested by the same empirical tests: "immediate luminousness," reasonableness, and moral helpfulness. Institutional religion, ecclesiastical organizations, and theologies will not be discussed; instead, these lectures will discuss personal religion: the experiences in solitude of individuals face to face with what they consider the divine. As distinguished from moralism, religion is a strong feeling, an enthusiasm, a solemn happiness, the feeling of power and freedom, with the "keynote of the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes."

Religion involves experiences of presence which carry conviction. These experiences are more like sensations than intellectual operations. Rationalists reject the testimony of feelings, but those who have them are not generally moved by arguments. Religious feelings in different degrees combine feelings of expansion and joy of complete self-surrender with feelings of contraction and fear. Where the former predominate, we have the religion of healthy-mindedness, of the once-born. Where the

90 (cont.)
latter predominate, we have the religion of the sick soul, of the twice-born. Healthy-mindedness is an optimistic view for which evil is not an ultimate part of reality. The sick soul, with its conviction that the meaning of the world is best revealed by taking evil seriously, leads to the difficult problem of evil. Popular theism tends towards polytheism, making God just the highest, and not the sole, principle. Philosophical theism tends towards pantheism, making a good God responsible for evil. The resulting paradox that evil must have a function in the final good can be eliminated only by giving up monism. In its profounder form, evil is seen as a radical wrongness in one's essential nature for which only supernatural remedies suffice. One source of pessimism is the sense of insecurity and failure which accompanies even the greatest successes. Another is the contemplation of approaching death; because of this, every naturalistic view of life is sad, lacking a permanent meaning to a human life. The deepest source of pessimism is pathological melancholy. It is sometimes an incapacity for joyous feeling; in its worse form, an "active anguish"; and in its worst form, a "panic fear" of the universe. The latter was experienced by a French correspondent [in fact, William James himself] and Henry James, Sr. When compared with healthy-mindedness, the sick soul yields the more inclusive view. Healthy-mindedness is good as long as it works, but it breaks down in the face of melancholy. It is also inadequate philosophically because the evil which it dismisses is a genuine portion of reality. Pessimism yields more complete religions for which man must die to an unreal life in order to be born into real life. The process whereby a consciously unhappy self through the espousal of religious realities becomes unified and happy is called conversion, in which religious ideas become the "habitual" center of "personal energy." Central to all kinds of conversion is self-surrender, the throwing of oneself upon the mercy of higher powers.

The discovery in 1886 of mental processes lying beyond the margin of consciousness is the most important step in psychology in recent decades. The subliminal, to use a term proposed by F. W. H. Myers, can break into our conscious lives. This discovery casts light upon many phenomena of religious biography. In cases of sudden conversion, we may be dealing with psychologically peculiar individuals with large subliminals. For persons with small subliminals, conversion will come gradually, if it comes at all. Most important are the "fruits for life" of conversion: if they are good they should be venerated even if produced naturally, and if evil, rejected although coming from a supernatural source. Conversion involves feelings of peace, the sense of perceiving unknown truths, and the finding of a "clean and beautiful newness" in reality. But what are the fruits for life of conversion? To answer this question we must describe the fruits of religious life, collectively called "saintliness," and judge their value. In all religions the saintly character is made up of a belief in the existence of an ideal power, a sense of self-surrender to it, a sense of elation and freedom, and a shift of the emotional center toward loving and harmonious feelings. The practical consequences of these conditions are asceticism, strength of soul, purity, and charity. These fruits now have to be evaluated, and the test proposed is that of fitting human needs, which yields no final judgments and concludes that different people need different religious beliefs. The vices generally charged against religion are the vices of churches, not of inner religious life, which yields steadfastness, charity, sympathy, dutifulness, purity, happiness, patience, and self-severity. Saints, often admired for abiding by their principles, are not imitated because most people want more balance in their lives.

Personal religious experience has its roots in mystical states, which are ineffable, transient, passive, and have a noetic quality. To mystics, these states appear to yield insights not available under ordinary circumstances. Mystical states have much in common with states produced by alcohol and drugs. While James himself has no mystical leanings, some years ago under the influence of nitrous oxide he had experiences which convinced him that ordinary consciousness is only one form of consciousness. Mystical consciousness is generally pantheistic, optimistic, anti-naturalistic, and best harmonizes with twice-bornness. Does it yield evidence in support of the truth of such conceptions? Mystical states are absolutely decisive for the mystics themselves but have no authority for those lacking in mystical experiences. Furthermore, they show that ordinary consciousness is only one kind of consciousness and indicate the possibility of different orders of truth. Mysticism is too private to make religion a public truth. It is philosophy which seeks to turn the private and mysterious into "truth objectively valid for all thinking men." What is the role of philosophy? The intellectualization of religion is valuable and important as long as it is content to be interpretation and elaboration of religious feeling, but religious philosophy should be discredited where it constructs religious objects using logic and objectively valid facts. Current philosophy, both scholastic and idealistic, fails to produce general agreement, fails to prove both God's existence and His attributes, and leads to the formation of schools and sects (in this, it is just like religious feeling). It must be remembered that human thinking is always connected with conduct; C. S. Peirce calls this principle "pragmatism," which holds that beliefs are rules for action and that the meaning of a thought is determined by what conduct it is fitted to produce. By the pragmatic test, God's metaphysical attributes, even if we were logically coerced into believing in them, would lack all significance. The intellect is helpless and represents a "relatively superficial" and unreal path to the divine. Philosophical reflection can help purify religious belief from local and accidental accretions and eliminate doctrines absurd from science's viewpoint. The outcome will be a collection of testable hypothetical doctrines.

Prayer is the central religious act, distinguishing religion from moral and aesthetic sentiment. To the believer prayer appears a mutual relation in the course of which something is transacted. Another religious fact is that of inspiration. From the fact that inspiration is so widespread, religion must have close ties with the subliminal part of consciousness. We must now ask whether religion is true. The god of science can only be a god of universal laws that cannot accommodate the convenience of individuals. This point of view, however, is shallow; when dealing with the general we are dealing only with symbols of reality. We deal with realities in the fullest sense of the term only when dealing with the private and personal. And religion, because it keeps in contact with the only absolute realities we know of, is destined to be a permanent part of human history. The faith state has proved itself of great subjective utility in respect to our actions and endurance.

As for religion's intellectual content, is there a common nucleus to all the different creeds? All creeds teach that we can be saved from our natural wrongness only by establishing a proper connection with "higher" powers. The notion of the subliminal is a hypothesis that the "higher" is the subconscious continuation of conscious life. It appears to be "literally and objectively true" that the conscious self is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come. To go any further than this requires

90 (cont.)
over-beliefs, but to some extent, the unseen world is real and can be called God. In all religions, God is a guarantee of an ideal order which shall be permanently preserved even when the present world is destroyed. The hypothesis of a God who figures only in someone's experience of union is not a real one, because it has no properties other than those it is invoked to explain. A God placed in "wider cosmic relations" represents a real hypothesis. Religion in this sense is not only an explanation of facts given elsewhere, but requires the postulation of new facts; if religion is true, different events can be expected. James's own over-belief, a "crasser" kind of supernaturalism, is that our consciousness is only one of many worlds of consciousness and that at times higher energies enter our own from the other worlds. His view agrees with popular religion in rejecting monism, and leans towards a polytheism in which the universe contains a plurality of godlike selves. As for personal immortality, it is essentially a question of facts; psychical research has achieved impressive results but nothing final. IKS

Extended reviews

A. A. Berle {79} and {106}; J. B. Crozier {84}; Henri Delacroix {110}; James Leuba {182}; Eric Waterhouse {387}; C. C. J. Webb {101}.

Reviews

Anon, Congregationalist and Christian World 87.28 (12 July 1902): 65. This book is a "natural history of religious experience." James's conclusions nowhere contradict "the great central teachings of Christianity." JRS

Anon, Independent 54.12 (18 Sept 1902): 2251-2253. James presents an extraordinary "collection of intimate spiritual confessions" and an essay on the "truth of religion," containing the grounds of James's "own belief in the fundamental tenets of religion." There is much to dissent from, but more valuable than specific doctrines is the author's spirit. IKS

Anon, Outlook 72 (27 Dec 1902): 991-995. James subjects religion to scientific scrutiny, something which is almost never done. James is devoted to people "in their highest life" and writes dramatically. He can put himself in the place of his subjects. The effects James describes can only be explained by spirit and they necessitate belief in a "personal God," although James himself does not draw this conclusion. IKS

D. Baines-Griffiths, "Professor James and the Prophets," Congregationalist and Christian World 88.9 (28 Feb 1903): 303-304. Baines-Griffiths mounts a defense of James's religious views against Berle's essay {79}. Christians should respect others' religious experiences. JRS

William Samuel Bishop, "Religion Within the Bounds of Strict Psychology," Sewanee Review 10.4 (Oct 1902): 493-497. A "mass of testimony" to the power of religious belief, but as a psychological study, it cannot contribute to the "objective content" of religion. In Lecture 18, James makes "short work" of positive doctrines concerning God. IKS

T. D. A. Cockerell, Dial 33.10 (16 Nov 1902): 322-323. "One of the great books of our time" which finds the origin of religion in "feelings and impulses of individuals." The fact that a religious experience may originate in a psychopathological condition does not rule out the "influx of some external spiritual force." IKS

George Albert Coe, Phil Rev 12.1 (Jan 1903): 62-67. James takes us for a walk through a great forest. We enjoy the variety and detail and the sense of not always knowing where we are going. It is hoped that the promised second volume will consider the "criterion" of the truth of religious consciousness. IKS

Théodore Flournoy, Rev Phil 54.5 (Nov 1902): 516-527 [reprinted in *La Philosophie de William James* {947}, pp. 217-244]. James's philosophy of religion is empirical and practical. He wishes to embrace all the detail of the world and considers vain all mere speculation. This last view is called pragmatism. Flournoy emphasizes James's refutation of "medical materialism" and his efforts to justify religion. IKS

P. Gardner, Hibbert Journal 1.1 (Oct 1902): 182-187. James works on a higher level than others who have dealt with the psychology of religion. Of special interest is his attempt to justify religious beliefs. IKS

John Grier Hibben, Psych Rev 10.2 (March 1903): 180-186. James makes a permanent contribution to our understanding of "religious experience and of human nature." Emphasis on the exceptional pushes aside "common experiences" expressed in "institutional religion," which, however, are the final court of appeal. James's view that the divine operates through the subconscious is suspect, since the subconscious may be the "region of chimeras." James's suggestion that everyone may have their own God does away with the unity of religion. IKS

"μ," Monist 13.1 (Oct 1902): 147-151. James makes the commonly ignored distinction between the "existential facts" of a revelation's origins and the "spiritual values" in our judgments upon a revelation. JRS

John Henry Muirhead, "Professor William James's Philosophy of Religion," Int J Ethics 13.2 (Jan 1903): 236-246. A major contribution to psychology, but it is defective philosophically. James totally misrepresents idealists, for no serious writer attempts to construct religious objects by means of logic. James himself appeals to the "full fact," but this leads to idealism, like Royce's. James's proposed substitute for idealistic philosophy is the science of religion. This can give us the "subliminal," but never the "sublime." IKS

Wilhelm Ostwald, Annalen der Naturphilosophie 2 (1903): 142-143. An unusually interesting work, filled with a wealth of observations. IKS

Guiseppe Prezzolini (signed as Giuliano il Sofista), "Le varie forme della coscienza religiose," Leonardo 2.2 (June 1904): 29. Prezzolini calls James "the greatest and most original living philosopher" in the world. James's book is praised for having restored the philosophical value to the question of the supernatural. EPC

Hastings Rashdall, Mind n.s. 12.2 (April 1903): 245-250. James undertakes a worthwhile task and does it well. He makes prominent kinds of human experience undreamed of by philosophers and theologians, but he overemphasizes exceptional cases and does not realize that their social uselessness may be due to their abnormality. By exaggerating the mystical side, he misses the true significance of some religious figures. In his philosophical conclusions, James revives "Pyrrhonism," abandons the search for truth, and hands religion and morality over to the "sway of willful caprice." IKS

Georg Runze, Zeit für Psych 37 (1904): 129-143. James's work is interesting, but disappointing to the exact thinker. Runze discusses the treatment of James in Baumann's *Deutsche und ausserdeutsche Philosophie der letzen Jahrzehnte* {104}. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Nation 75.8 (Aug 21 1902): 155. Scientific methods are introduced into a field which hitherto contained nothing but "dogmatizing." We only get glimpses of the new philosophy; hopefully James can write the promised work on pragmatism. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 17.4 (Feb 1903): 403-411. Mystical states should be judged by rational tests. Most such states "produce nothing of value for practical life." Neither the "transmarginal self" nor the communication with spiritual powers has an explanatory role beyond psychical research. JRS

Frank Sewall, "Professor James on Religious Experience," New Church Review 10 (April 1903): 243-264. James seems to view religion as a disease, overemphasizing the morbid. In a book full of surprises, a major surprise is the absence of references to Swedenborg. James's style is "engaging," marked by a "catholicity of spirit." IKS

Edwin D. Starbuck, Biblical World n.s. 24 (1904): 100-111. James turns the psychology of religion into a science. He finds the sources of religion in feeling, but this is unexpected considering his theory of emotion. The feelings themselves are manifestations of "life-movements" in the organism, which are the sources of religion. IKS

George B. Stevens, American Journal of Theology 7.1 (Jan 1903): 114-117. James proposes utility as a test of religion and offers a "rather succinct volume of dogma" yielded by empirical psychology. IKS

Reviews of the French translation

Edgar Janssens, Revue Néo-Scolastique 14.1 (Feb 1907): 136-140. James's method of valuing religion by its moral results contains much truth, but is not as harmless as it appears. It leads James into certain contradictions and to concentrate on the affective side of religion, excluding the intellectual and voluntary. IKS

E. Michaud, Revue Internationale de Théologie 14 (1906): 351-354. It is not reasonable to emphasize abnormal cases and ignore metaphysics and theology. It is a valuable book, especially in its refutation of medical materialism. IKS

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 16 (1905): 214-219. Pillon praises the translation and primarily gives extended quotations. IKS

H. Norero, Revue de L'Histoire des Religions 53.2 (March-April 1906): 65-78.

Reviews of the German translation

K. Oesterreich, Kant-Studien 13.4 (28 Dec 1908): 474-478. Kant would have found it interesting, but would have insisted on a critique of religious experience. IKS

[?] Schott, Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie 2 (1908): 220-229. A chapter by chapter summary of the contents. IKS

Reviews of 2nd edition of German translation

Heinrich Scholz, Preussische Jahrbucher 167 (1917): 478-483. James overemphasizes pathological details which are of secondary interest in the study of religion. Germans, influenced by different traditions, will be dissatisfied with the treatment of truth. IKS

Notes

The French translation contains Abauzit's preface, citing a letter from James authorizing the translation, and an introduction by Émile Boutroux, later published separately as *L'Expérience religieuse selon William James* {409}.

91 Jastrow, Joseph. Belief and Credulity. Educational Review 23.1 (Jan 1902): 22-49.

On pp. 23-28, Jastrow explains Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), which gives a "most attractive" account of belief as the settlement of opinion. Various types of credulity contrast sharply with "strenuous rationality," while "a divorce of theory and practice is disastrous." JRS

92 Logan, J. D. The Optimistic Implications of Idealism. Int J Ethics 12.4 (July 1902): 494-501.

James, like other idealists, is an example of how religious optimism is always based on a hope for afterlife personal happiness. JRS

93 Peirce, Charles S., William James, James M. Baldwin. Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism. Article in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), p. 321-323. Peirce's two sections, on p. 321 and on p. 322, are reprinted in *CP* 5.1-4. James's paragraph, coming between Peirce's on p. 321, is reprinted in *Works EPh* p. 94.

Peirce endorses his 1878 formulation of pragmatism: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." He remarks on some misunderstandings of it (the end of man is action) and on the reality of general objects, and mentions his synechism. LF

James states that pragmatism is the doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception lies in its practical consequences, either in the form of recommended conduct or expected experiences. IKS

Notes

Peirce made numerous contributions to the *Dictionary*; see especially "Sign," vol. 2, pp. 527-528. The list of his contributions is in Kenneth Ketner, *A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Published Works of C. S. Peirce with a Bibliography of Secondary Studies*, 2nd rev. ed. (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1986), pp. 116-118, 120-135.

94 Peirce, Charles S., G. E. Moore, James M. Baldwin. Truth and Falsity (1) and (2) Error. Article in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), p. 716-720. Peirce's section, pp. 718-720, is reprinted in *CP* 5.565-573.

Peirce's entry is on logical truth. It includes remarks on the distinction between truth and reality; positive scientific truth; truth in the normative sciences, in pure mathematics and in practical life; and some general remarks on this category called "complex truth or truth of propositions." He concludes by remarking on some historical uses (for example, by Plato and the Scholastics) of the word "truth." LF

95 Sage, M. *Mme Piper et la société anglo-américaine pour les recherches psychique*. Paris: Leymarie, 1902. Translated in abridged form as *Mrs. Piper and the Society for Psychical Research*, by Noralie Robertson (New York: Scott-Thaw, 1904).

Contains many references to James's work with Mrs. L. Piper, a medium. IKS

96 Schiller, F. C. S. Axioms as Postulates. In *Personal Idealism*, ed. Henry Sturt (London and New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 47-133. Translated by Rudolf Eisler as "Axiome als Postulate," chap. 1 of *Humanismus: Beiträge zu einer pragmatischen Philosophie* (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911), pp. 32-103.

All experience is individual and reveals a world in evolution, growing through experiments by nature, God, and us. We cannot assume the existence of any rigid limits or fixed truths. The growth of experience overthrows any "facts." James has traced out the

need to believe that the world is amenable to human desires, but the doctrine of "apriorism" blocks the path. While presuppositions do organize experience, this hardly demonstrates their existence prior to any mental content or their unchangeable nature. They are instead temporary postulates, that are useful as hypotheses enabling us to control experience for our purposes. Kant presupposed empiricist psychological atomism; his resulting system is admittedly complete, though aesthetically arbitrary. The plain facts of experience are hardly explained by a principle prior to all experience. Kant's Practical Reason should absorb theoretical reason. Apriorism ignores the activity and wholeness of the organism.

James's "will to believe" is misunderstood if the risks and tests of belief are ignored. Postulates are ranked in value; the oldest and most widely held deserve respect as successful survivors, but none are immutable, if even more successful ones arrive. The postulates of personal consciousness, the external world, and the uniformity of nature are especially valuable. Euclidean geometry has been competent to date, but other geometries may be real too, when new experiences may require them. "Objective" time, while necessary for "intersubjective intercourse," is still relative to "the synchronism of motions and the assumptions of physical constants," while Newtonian absolute time is of limited practicality. The postulate of an intelligent agent designing nature is hardly defeated by a successful mechanistic biology, since the latter theory is but a device of our own, and its success shows how nature does somewhat conform to our purposes. To stop short of requiring nature to be completely teleological is not warranted, in light of our achievements and moral needs. The objector who questions the logical validity of postulation, while accepting its psychological manifestation, offers the nothingness of truths which are never conceived. The "method of origins" should not reduce the reality of the result to a more ultimate reality than the starting-point. This is why knowledge, though starting from postulation, has a value connected to its goal of practical success. Our will is only to blame for our theoretical mysteries; we must vow that there are no unsolvable problems. JRS

Reviews

William James, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 93-97 [*Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 442-444; *Works ECR*, pp. 540-545]. These essays promise a middle ground between naturalism and absolutism. Schiller's essay is radical. The world for him is a gradual construction. There is a resisting factor, but even that "*is* only what is made of it." Mental categories also evolve. They were at first postulated for the sake of practice and later became "truths" through successful use. Human nature is the key to nature and intellectualism fails because it ignores human goals. IKS

Charles S. Peirce, Nation 76.23 (4 June 1903): 462-463 [*The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 125-127]. Schiller's method has influenced all the writers of this collection, and his essay is the "liveliest" and the "most brilliant." He believes that philosophy is a matter of "personal fancy," and does not think that there are any facts independent of what we think about them; "they change with every phase of experience." With Schiller's claim that axioms are explanatory hypotheses, Peirce does not quarrel, though he is not altogether satisfied with the application of this notion. LF

Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 577-580. Schiller avoids the "believe what we please" interpretation, but by stressing the world's readiness to satisfy us, he ignores another source of knowledge in nature's occasional refusal to be affected. JRS

J. Ellis McTaggart, Int J Ethics 13.2 (Jan 1903): 246-251; Charles B. Upton, Hibbert Journal 1.2 (Jan 1903): 403-407.

97 Schiller, F. C. S. 'Useless' Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 11.2 (April 1902): 196-215. Reprinted with "some additions" in *Humanism* {139}, pp. 18-43.

In an ideal-worldy interview with Plato, Schiller confesses that, like the liberated cave-dweller, few will later believe his story of what he has seen. His only method of persuasion must be to display the usefulness of his learning. Schiller contrasts four positions on truth: Plato's view that "Goodness was born of Truth," Aristotle's separation of truth from usefulness, Kant's duty to "believe and practically act on what we do not know to be true," and Pragmatism's view that speculative wisdom arises from practical wisdom. In the ensuing debate with Aristotle, objectivity is identified with socially useful postulates. Mere self-evidence is an accident of mind. "Useless truths" are only useless for some purposes, some truths exist for purposes not yet discovered, and no real truth can be useless for all purposes. Many useless beliefs parade as knowledge, such as the "Unknowable." JRS

98 Spiller, Gustav. *The Mind of Man: A Text-Book of Psychology.* London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1902.

Experimental introspection shows that mental processes are organically interrelated, continuous, teleological, and dynamic. These processes function to satisfy of natural needs, requiring prolonged organic readjustments to the environment. The psychologist cannot admit any dualistic metaphysics, since the "data of existence" are only artificially placed in "mind" or "matter" categories. This Machian monism solves the problems of free-will, causality, energy, etc., by viewing them as only "short formulæ" for observable and definable changes. James is extensively referenced with general approval. JRS

Reviews

I. Madison Bentley, Amer J Psych 16.2 (April 1905): 243-246.

99 Tufts, James H. On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories. *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 5-14. Reprinted in Phil Rev 12.1 (Jan 1903): 1-15. *Selected Writings of James Hayden Tufts*, edited with an introduction by James Campbell (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 47-59.

The aesthetic consciousness arises not from nature, but from social relations, which in turn originate in the social "struggle for existence." It has qualitative universality, a free detachment of contemplation, and "an appreciation for the broadly significant." JRS

100 Vailati, Giovanni. Scienza e filosofia. Rivista Populare di Politica 8 (15 April 1902). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 417-420.

Vailati gives a brief overview of the philosophical climate in Italy, especially in regard to problems of science. A proposal to revive philosophical culture in Italy is discussed. It is interesting to contrast this with Papini's proposal for a philosophical revival in *Leonardo* one year later, in which pragmatism has a central role. EPC

101 Webb, Clement C. J. Psychology and Religion. Journal of Theological Studies 4.1 (Oct 1902): 46-68.

An approving explication of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}. JRS

102 Young, Ella Flagg. *Some Types of Modern Education Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902.

Dewey was influenced by Young, a pedagogy department colleague and the supervisor of the Chicago Laboratory School until 1904. Chap. 5 of this work is "The Philosophy of Education, 1895-1902. John Dewey," pp. 53-67. JRS

Notes

See also Young's dissertation at Chicago, *Isolation in the School* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1901); "Scientific Method in Education," in *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), First Series, vol. 3; and *Ethics in the School* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1906).

1903

103 Angell, James R. The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy. In *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 55-73. Reprinted as "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," Phil Rev 12.3 (May 1903): 243-271.

Structural psychology's analytic search for stable contents of consciousness commits the "psychologist's fallacy." A functional description must involve structural elements, and vice versa, due to psychology's teleological basis. Further structural doctrines must then fall. Logic and epistemology cannot be isolated from psychology, and knowledge, truth, morality, and beauty are psychological values relevant to practical success. JRS

104 Baumann, Julius. *Deutsche und aufserdeutsche Philosophie der letzten Jahrzehnte dargestellt und beurteilt.* Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1903.

James's thought is surveyed in two sections, pp. 474-489 and pp. 510-528. JRS

105 Benedict, W. R. Religion as an Idea. Int J Ethics 14.1 (Oct 1903): 66-80.

Understanding and emotion certify the highest conception of God as "Supreme Self-Conscious Intelligence," but James has no positive conception of God. Pragmatism locates a concept's meaning in the specific inquiry, but this fails if a meaning for all existence is sought. Faith is insufficient, since the "logical intellect" cannot be coerced. JRS

106 Berle, A. A. The Psychology of Christian Experience. Bibliotheca Sacra 60.1 (Jan 1903): 1-27.

The *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} must be judged by whether it deepens and strengthens one's religious life. James fails, in blunders obvious to anyone practiced in the "cure of souls." Yet, it is good to see a professor taking such experiences seriously. IKS

107 Bosanquet, Bernard. Imitation and Selective Thinking. Psych Rev 10.4 (July 1903): 404-412.

Baldwin's genetic psychology pragmatically makes practice a test of truth. JRS

Notes

See J. Mark Baldwin's reply that he, like Peirce, rejected pragmatism for its inability to explain the universal aspects of reality, Psych Rev 10.4 (July 1903): 412-416.

108 Bradley, F. H. The Definition of Will. II. Mind n.s. 12.2 (April 1903): 145-176. Reprinted in *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 515-551.

James's theory of consent is rejected. In a footnote, Bradley recognizes a British "primacy of will" movement, denouncing Schiller's "Axioms as Postulates" {96}. JRS

109 Creighton, James E. The Standpoint of Experience. Phil Rev 12.6 (Nov 1903): 593-610. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 71-92.

Descriptions of experience must pass the intellectual tests of completeness and consistency. Any "pure" experience, prior to thought, is thus ruled out. Purposes are limited and corrected by the stubbornness of reality. JRS

110 Delacroix, Henri. Les Variétés de l'expérience religieuse par William James. Rev Méta 11.5 (Sept 1903): 642-669.

An extended account of the contents is given. James and others have placed the study of religion within the study of human nature. James exaggerates the importance of individual experience and ignores the social aspects of religion. IKS

111 Dewey, John. Democracy in Education. Elementary School Teacher 4 (Dec 1903): 193-204. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 229-239.

The servility of teachers to the mechanical education system is inconsistent with the purpose of public education in democracy: the freeing of mental activity for its proper purpose. JRS

112 Dewey, John. Emerson–The Philosopher of Democracy. Int J Ethics 13.4 (July 1903): 405-413. Reprinted as "Ralph Waldo Emerson" in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 69-77. *MW* 3: 184-192.

Emerson belongs to that class of philosophical *and* poetical intellects. His respect for the creativity of intelligence joins with a concern that "every individual is at once the focus and channel of mankind's long and wide endeavor, that all nature exists for the education of the human soul." JRS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 574.

113 Dewey, John. Introduction. To Irving King's *The Psychology of Child Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. xi-xx. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 299-304.

114 Dewey, John. Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality. In *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 115-139. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 211-249. *MW* 3: 3-39.

Science can find regular controls on the formation of moral judgments, provided that we assert a continuity within moral experience (denying moral "intuitions"), and a reference by science to individual acts of value judgment (denying disinterested pure

"universality"). A moral judgment is concerned with the character of the judger, and in the context of such concern, moral terms (such as "good," "duty") must receive standard functional definitions. These in turn permit objective generic statements of conditions, with testable consequences. These conditions will be specifically social, but can also include biological and environmental factors. JRS

Notes

See Albert Schinz, "Professor Dewey's Pragmatism" {602}.

115 Dewey, John. The Psychological and the Logical in Teaching Geometry. Educational Review 25.4 (April 1903): 387-399. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 216-228.

116 Dewey, John. The Psychological Method in Ethics. Psych Rev 10.2 (March 1903): 158-160. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 59-61.

Genetic psychology can study the conditions and consequences of the moral value component to the stream of consciousness. Such understanding would permit a functional test of any claimed moral ideal. JRS

Summaries

Phil Rev 12.2 (March 1903): 173-174.

117 Dewey, John. Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy. *Proceedings of the Religious Education Association*, vol. 1 (Chicago: Executive Office of the Association, 1903), pp. 60-66. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 210-215.

118 Dewey, John, *et al.* *Studies in Logical Theory. Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Second Series, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). Dewey's contributions, chapters 1-4, are revised as chapters 2-5 of *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 75-182. These four chapters, with Dewey's preface, are in *MW* 2: 293-375. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The General Problem of Logical Theory," pp. 1-22, was revised as chap. 2, "The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter," *Essays*, pp. 75-102. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Antecedents of Thought," pp. 23-48, was revised as chap. 3, "The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking," *Essays*, pp. 103-135. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Datum of Thinking," pp. 49-64, was revised as chap. 4, "Data and Meanings," *Essays*, pp. 136-156. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Content and Object of Thought," pp. 65-85, was revised as chap. 5, "The Objects of Thought," *Essays*, pp. 157-182.

The preface states the contributors' agreement that judgment is the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge is linked with practice, implying that psychological functionalism is the proper standpoint for logic. The only standard of truth is one designed with reference to "readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life." The writers owe a "pre-eminent obligation" to William James. Chap. 1 explains that just as thought itself arises from specific practical needs, logical theory (the "generic account of our thinking behavior") arises in a historical period where reflective processes fail to meet practical needs. Since thought always deals with a concrete problem at hand, so too must logical theory remain tied to

specific conditions. The opposite view, that logic is the science of universal forms of thought, dealing with the relation of thought to a separate reality, is "epistemology." The standpoint of "naïve experience," from everyday life to scientific inquiry, has no place for such universal thought, and stays within a continuous realm of experience. Evolutionary biology and psychology sees life's structures as instruments of dynamic adaptation to a specific changing environment. Thought is a life structure, and as the study of this changing and relative structure, logic cannot "guarantee any particular reality or value."

Chap. 2 describes how thought's subject-matter goes through three stages. First, a "whole dynamic experience" has both a "pervasive identity of value," yet also has an inner tension of confusion and uncertainty. This emphasis on the continuity of thought with the antecedent problematic experience is developed as a remedy to the contradictions inherent to the epistemologist's account of thought (represented by the German philosopher H. Rudolf Lotze). With Lotze's conviction that thought (universal forms providing value and meaning), has nothing in common with experience (particular existents lacking value and meaning), comes two problems. First, how can thought interact with something unthinkable? Second, even if experience does have some initial coherence, as Lotze occasionally intimates, why is a distinct process of thought required to re-work it?

Chap. 3 explains that the problematic experience in its second stage contains assured, secure elements (the given datum), and doubtful, precarious elements (the ideas). The goal is to re-attain the unification of practical experience; the two types of elements have a functional existence, each with a proper destiny of transformation for re-integration. From the perspective of the final stage, where experience is re-unified, both properly appear to be merely mental, as sensations and ideas, while the re-unified experience is the "reality." The epistemologist however is trapped by a fixation on the second stage, making them independent mental realities of their own. He cannot help but give to the datum the responsibility of providing a link to physical reality, and to the ideas the responsibility of providing all value and meaning. That this fact/value dichotomy is repugnant is felt even by Lotze, for whom the activity of thought is a progressive realization of systematic meaning inherent in experience. Since epistemology lacks a genetic and historical understanding, thought is set loose from its concrete stimulating conditions.

Chap. 4 finds the epistemologist in deeper contradictions, as the givens of experience require a preliminary elevation by thought from the purely subjective and transitory to the objective and permanent. Thus the impression of "blueness" becomes "that blue thing," ready to participate in thought's further categorizing. But when the epistemologist says that thought requires experience to give it content, and declares that prior to thought, experience is without any relations or form, then the method by which thought "picks out" that bit of experience for investiture with the category of "blue" must be completely mysterious. The functionalist solution is to see both elements as functionally related in one content or object of thought. The epistemologist might try to guarantee the objectivity of thought by a correspondence to experience, but there can be no correspondence between bare particulars of experience and abstract forms of thought. It follows that thought cannot be tested by experience, much less by a reality beyond experience. The functionalist instead treats ideas as provisional transformations of given but partial meanings, designed to give "standpoints and methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of experience." In so far as ideas succeed in this office, they are verified. The modes of judgment and inference are "processes of reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized whole is given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with which thought as

its sets out is supplied." They too must be judged instrumentally, and their present value arrives from their survival in the historical evolution of life's effort to maintain the integrity of experience.

A. W. Moore's essay, "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose," pp. 341-382, critiques Josiah Royce. Royce blithely agrees with pragmatism on the purposiveness of ideas, without requiring that purposes must always be tied to specific situations. For Royce, limited purposes only result in limited truths, and ultimately, ideas represent the Absolute.

Also of interest are the other essays in this work: Helen Bradford Thompson, "Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment," pp. 86-126; Simon Fraser MacLennan, "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment," pp. 127-141; Myron Lucius Ashley, "The Nature of Hypothesis," pp. 142-182; Willard Clark Gore, "Image and Idea in Logic," pp. 183-202; William Arthur Heidel, "The Logic of Pre-Socratic Philosophy," pp. 203-226; Henry Waldgrave Stuart, "Valuation as a Logical Process" pp. 227-340. JRS

Extended reviews

William James {173}; J. A. Leighton {181}; Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison {196}; Arthur K. Rogers {199}.

Reviews

Edwin Norton, Educational Review 28.3 (Oct 1904): 310-313. Norton gives an appreciative outline of the main tendencies: evolution, empiricism, pragmatism, and the value of logic and psychology to education. JRS

Charles S. Peirce, Nation 79.11 (15 Sept 1904): 219-220 [*CP* 8.188-190 and *The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 183-186]. Dewey is opposed to the German school (Sigwart, Wundt, Schuppe, Erdmann, and Husserl), and seems to regard what he names "logic" as a "natural history of thought." Though he considers it to be a project which will potentially form valuable knowledge, Peirce cautions the Chicago School not to overlook the lesson of the great American thinker Dr. James Rush, and the already well established natural histories of chemistry, botany, and zoology: to abandon the "trivial language of practical life" in favor of an entirely new vocabulary. LF

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 13.1 (Jan 1904): 100-106. These essays are "an independent attainment of the pragmatist point of view." Fundamental agreement forbids a criticism of details. JRS

W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 1.4 (18 Feb 1904): 100-105. One aspect of experience (purpose) and one of the sciences' methods (biology's genetic method) have here been applied to all reality and knowledge. Theoretical need is met only by beliefs representing an external and unchanging reality. Pragmatism must admit an independent standard to judge which needs can or ought to be met, lest every satisfier of any whim be real. Success (and truth) is due to external conditions, but the pragmatist has no respect for causation. In actual experience, we deal with more than our own advantage, and use other *a priori* categories than "purpose." JRS

Anon, Monist 14.2 (Jan 1904): 312; Théodule Ribot, Rev Phil 58.6 (Dec 1904): 655-661; Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 36.10 (16 May 1904): 328-329.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Bernard Bosanquet, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 435.

Notes

See Peirce's letters to Dewey about this work, in *CP* 8.239-244. See also C. E. Ayres, "Dewey: Master of the Commonplace" {2655}.

119 Fite, Warner. *An Introductory Study of Ethics.* New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903.

Reviews

Norman Wilde, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 377-379.

120 Fite, Warner. The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 10.6 (Nov 1903): 633-644.

James does not develop a functional role for pleasure and pain. They arise from conflict, and are transient states of succeeding, or failing, to resolve a conflict, respectively. Harmony lacks any definite feeling; pleasure then cannot be a goal. JRS

Summaries

Annie D. Montgomery, Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 241-242.

Notes

Contrast Fite's conclusion with Schiller's portrait of the happiness of ultimate harmony in *Humanism* {139}.

121 James, William. Address of William James. In *The Centenary of the Birth of Ralph Waldo Emerson as Observed in Concord May 25 1903 under the Direction of the Social Circle in Concord* (Concord, N.H.: Riverside Press for the Social Circle, June 1903), pp. 67-77. Reprinted as "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord" in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 19-34. As "Emerson" in *Works ERM*, pp. 109-115.

In death, a man's whole personality gradually shrinks into a "mere phrase suggestive of his singularity." Emerson's life is that of loyalty to "his own personal type and mission." He was a scholar whose mission was to report each perception, but he was also an artist in words. In the name of his mission, he avoided involvement in public affairs, including the controversy over slavery. For Emerson, Universal Reason is expressed in each individual. Hence, everyone strives to perceive realty in a fresh and personal way, unencumbered by institutions and human history. Such individualism, his belief that even the commonest act, only if genuine and sincere, can be an "epitome of reality," is at the heart of Emerson's electrifying message. IKS

122 James, William. The Ph. D. Octopus. Harvard Monthly 36 (March 1903): 1-9. Reprinted in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 329-347. *Works ECR*, pp. 67-74.

Because as yet few have doctorates, smaller institutions have come to emphasize degrees as a means of adding prestige to their generally young and obscure faculty. Graduate institutions, in their turn, make doctoral examinations increasingly more difficult. Harvard takes pride in the number of failed candidates. Graduate degrees help to stimulate learning, but the system also hides possibilities of corruption. There can be good teachers without degrees and many with degrees will fail as teachers. The system also creates a class of victims: those with slight abilities who aspire to degrees but cannot pass examinations. The remedy is to lower standards so that more can obtain degrees and encourage men of talent not to work for degrees. IKS

123 James, William. The True Harvard. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 12 (September 1903): 5-8. Reprinted in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 348-355. *Works ECR*, pp. 74-77.

Because not a graduate of Harvard College, he has always felt himself something of an outsider. The College fosters social bonds, but the true Harvard is the one which fosters "independent and lonely thinkers." Harvard leads in producing them and should be proudest of its "undisciplinables." IKS

124 Jones, Henry. The Present Attitude of Reflective Thought Towards Religion. Hibbert Journal 1.2 (Jan 1903): 228-252; 2.1 (Oct 1903): 20-43.

James's *The Will to Believe* (1897) is Jones's primary example of current philosophical skepticism, which is incongruous with science's confident progress and religion's firm hold. Radical empiricism's inconsistent world abandons philosophy and theology, and supports religion by rashly limiting reason. Separating practical faith from reason only injures religion. Jones offers their integration: intelligence is a process aiming at an ideal system, involving the presumption of an objective order. The monist vs. pluralist debate is, as James says, the deepest philosophical question. Human will and intelligence cannot be separated and experience is a unified whole; the pragmatist's "intellectualist" is a "phantom of their own creation." JRS

Notes

See Schiller's response to the first part {141}.

125 King, Irving. Pragmatism as a Philosophical Method. Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 511-524.

James and Peirce emphasize the practical. The test of concrete experience is attractive to those impatient with the "vagaries" of metaphysics, but pragmatism has not analyzed adequately the relations between thought and action. The ambiguities of pragmatism would disappear if pragmatists realized that thought arises out of definite crises in activity. IKS

Notes

See J. A. Leighton, "Pragmatism" {181}.

126 Koekebakker, Willem. *Willen en Kunner gelooven: Opmerkingen naar Aanleiding van "The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy by William James."* Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1903.

127 Koons, Willian George. The Psychology of Conversion. Church Quarterly Review (April 1903).

128 MacLennan, Simon F. Existence and Content. Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 78-82.

Bradley sets up knowledge as abstractly relational, and then resolves such knowledge's contradictions in a trans-human Absolute of pure experience. If knowledge serves human control, and ideas are but expectations of new concrete experiences, then the "question of the ultimate content of Reality" is "useless." JRS

129 Mead, G. H. The Definition of the Psychical. In *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago: 1903), pp. 77-112. Pp. 77-78 and 92-112 are reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 25-59.

130 Moore, A. W. *Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology. The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903).

A condensation of *The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay* {17}. Locke separates mental value from physical existence and then attempts to re-join them to account for truth, but at the cost of failing to explain doubt and error. Moore reconstructs Locke's doctrines using the Chicago functional psychology. The past must be as contingent as the future, and reality is growing experience. JRS

Review

Henry Sturt, Mind n.s. 13.1 (Jan 1904): 130. While on the right path, functionalists shouldn't forget that objective reality limits human activity. JRS

131 Papini, Giovanni (signed as Gian Falco). Morte e ressurezione della filosofia. Leonardo 1.11-12 (20 Dec 1903): 1-7. Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}.

Papini allied himself with Pragmatism at the same time as he launched *Leonardo*, and his pragmatism must be understood in the light of the review's design: to provoke action from literate young Italians which would result in the creation of a new Italian culture. This project remained constant in Papini's imagination throughout his pragmatist phase. It can be seen in his *Il Crepuscolo* {351} and "Campagna per il forato risveglio." {349}. It is at work in his Futurist phase five years later, and it is most destructively present in his agitation in favor of Italy's involvement in the Great War. Philosophy in the traditional sense is dead; its desire for universality, for complete rationality, and for the total grasp of the real is futile. A resurrected philosophy–here Papini has a voluntaristic brand of pragmatism in mind–redirects itself towards the practical remaking of the world. EPC

Notes

See Carlo Golino, "Giovanni Papini and American Pragmatism," Italica 32.1 (1955): 33-48.

132 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). La miseria dei logici. Leonardo 1.4 (8 Feb 1903): 5-7; 1.6 (8 March 1903): 7-8. Reprinted in *La culture italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 132-134.

Prezzolini attacks the conception of mind as purely a logical and rational instrument, and rejects the view that there is one, single logical model for the human mind. Prezzolini examines the role of sentiment in the process of action. There is passing reference to James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890). EPC

133 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). Scetticismo e sofistica. Leonardo 1.11-12 (20 Dec 1903): 9-15.

A detailed examination of the creative mind, as opposed to the logical, categorizing mind. This article is essential to understanding Prezzolini's intellectual development, which takes him from Bergson to pragmatism in late 1903 and early 1904. Modern positivism is bankrupt and can only lead us into skepticism. The modern sophist, on the other hand, subordinates reason to the practical and sentimental ends of humanity. The sophist is free of the skeptic's pessimism. Recognizing the creative and sentimental powers of the mind, the sophist is an optimist, aiming at the enlargement of human creative powers over the external world. EPC

134 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). L'uomo dio. Leonardo 1.3 (27 January 1903): 3-4. Reprinted in *La culture italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 115-119.

While James praises Papini for his articulation of this new model for the creative human being, Prezzolini actually precedes Papini in the exploration of the new superman, the Uomo-dio. Armed with an omnipotently creative will while remaking the world as it desires, the Man-god represents the future of humanity. Jamesian pragmatism, writes Prezzolini, is an expression of this same creative impulse. EPC

Notes

See James, "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy" {328}.

135 Prezzolini, Giuseppe. *La vita intima.* Florence: Pei tipi di Giovanni Spinelli, E. C., 1903.

At the urging of Papini, Prezzolini traveled to Paris to attend the lectures of Henri Bergson. The discovery of Bergson, as Prezzolini records in *L'Italiano inutile*, marked something of a revolution in his thinking. In Bergson Prezzolini believed that he had found the key to the universe: the notion of the hidden, innermost self. Prezzolini's captivation with this notion remains a constant in his thinking well into his pragmatist phase. *La vita intima* is a brief statement of Prezzolini's Bergsonian outlook just as he was founding *Leonardo* with Papini. While not itself concerned with pragmatism, this book is vital for the proper understanding of Prezzolini's intellectual attitude as he discovered William James and F. C. S. Schiller. One can say that Bergson's metaphysics of the self was at the root of Prezzolini's attraction to the Will-to-Believe; his rhetorical excesses concerning pragmatic voluntarism can only be understood if this Bergsonian orientation is kept in view. Prezzolini remained a Bergsonian until his Crocean conversion in 1908. EPC

136 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). Vita trionfante. Leonardo 1.1 (4 January 1903): 4-5. Reprinted in *La culture italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 96-100.

There is no mention at all of pragmatism in this contribution by Prezzolini to the inaugural issue of *Leonardo*. It is a discussion of the French "Philosophy of Contingency" drawn from Henri Bergson. Nevertheless, Prezzolini signals things to come when he describes this philosophy as an effective instrument of liberation, a theme to which he will soon harness pragmatism. EPC

Notes

The *Leonardo* was published from 4 January 1903 to August 1907, totaling 25 issues.

137 Sadler, Michael Ernest. The Ferment in Education on the Continent and in America. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1903), pp. 81-94.

Dewey's "most disturbing criticisms" fail to identify the social order toward which schools should aim. Artistic ability is "pathetically unnecessary" to industry. JRS

138 Schiller, F. C. S. The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics. Int J Ethics 13.4 (July 1903): 431-444. Reprinted with "a few additions" in *Humanism* {139}, pp. 1-17.

Pragmatism refutes the charge of irrationalism by rejecting "pure" reason, favoring a purposive reason which offers practical, testable hypotheses. Neither Peirce, James, nor Baldwin has a comparably defined pragmatism. Facts are based on values; values are both limited to human purpose and diversified across human purposes. This explains the variety of scientific and religious theories. Pragmatism offers a universe compatible with our efforts and progress, but attaches moral responsibility to every judgment we make. JRS

Summaries

A. D. Montgomery, Phil Rev 12.6 (Nov 1903): 674.

139 Schiller, F. C. S. *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*. London and New York: Macmillan, 1903. 2nd ed., with four new chapters, 1912. Four essays, with some from *Studies in Humanism* {490}, were translated by Rudolf Eisler for inclusion in *Humanismus: Beifräge zu einer pragmafischen Philosophie* (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911).

Seven chapters reprint articles published before 1898. One, "The Ethical Significance of Immortality," was translated for *Humanismus*, pp. 385-400. Six chapters are articles published after 1898: "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics," pp. 1-17 {138} [*Humanismus*, pp. 122-137]; "'Useless' Knowledge," pp. 18-43 {97}; "On Preserving Appearances," pp. 183-203 {140}; "Activity and Substance," pp. 204-227 {59} [*Humanismus*, pp. 341-363]; "The Desire for Immortality," pp. 228-249 (2nd ed., pp. 313-334) {73}; "Philosophy and the Investigation of a Future Life," pp. 266-289 (2nd ed., pp. 351-374) {58}.

The "Preface," pp. vii-xxv [pp. xv-xxi in *Humanismus*, pp. 180-196], "Truth," pp. 44-61 [*Humanismus*, pp. 180-196], and "Concerning Mephistopheles," pp. 166-182, were written for *Humanism*. The preface orients the reader to the Pragmatic movement. Schiller has been a pragmatist since 1892, but prefers the wider name of "humanism." "Truth" rejects correspondence (this makes knowledge of the correspondence impossible) and systematic coherence (which cannot rule out the possibility of multiple systems). Logic cannot be independent of psychology, and truth is the recognition of a practical value. The apparent chaos of values is gradually harmonized, as the useless drops away. Pragmatism announces social objectivity, in which "the useful" is the consistently practical for all. The 2nd edition adds four articles: "Humism and Humanism," pp. 228-248 {484}; "Solipsism," pp. 249-267 {716}; "Infallibility and Toleration," pp. 268-282 {596}; "Freedom and Responsibility," pp. 283-312, Oxford and Cambridge Review (Nov 1907). JRS

Extended reviews

J. A. Leighton {181}.

Reviews

A. R. Ainsworth, Int J Ethics 14.4 (July 1904): 520-522. Evolution might settle what is useful, but then could evolution be just a useful postulate? Usefulness presupposes the law of causality. JRS

John Dewey, Psych Bull 1.9 (15 Sept 1904): 335-340 [*MW* 3: 312-318]. Dewey proclaims his "almost total dissent" from the positions in "Activity and Substance" and "Philosophy and the Investigation of a Future Life." Still, Humanism is "not only sane and sensible, but inevitable." While no scientist or philosopher can transcend their own experience, the "universal and objective factors" of humanity repulse solipsism. Humanism adopts the methods and results of science without reducing philosophy to naturalism. Values are facts and all experiences are real, preserving the "continuity of experience." Dewey's preferred "genetic" method, of which Schiller seems ignorant, lies between a "broader Humanism" and a "narrower Pragmatism." Schiller does affirm that knowledge, like any action, actually alters reality, instead of simply revealing a pre-existent reality. This central view is an experimental, ethical, and metaphysically evolutionary idealism. It applies purpose as a category without denying others, broadens "practice" into a wider notion of conduct, and rejects the critics' deceptive attempts to portray knowledge as the special practice of representing reality. JRS

A. W. Moore, "Humanism," Monist 14.5 (Oct 1904): 747-752. Moore provides a supportive survey of this latest contribution to the pragmatic movement. JRS

William James, Nation 78.9 (3 March 1904): 175-176 [*Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 448-452. *Works ECR*, pp. 550-554]. In imitation of logic and mathematics, it has been generally assumed that truth consists of a system of eternally true propositions depicting things as they are. However, some philosophers have shown that our thoughts, even when incongruent with things, nonetheless often handle them successfully. Furthermore, the doctrine of evolution has weaned us from "fixities and inflexibilities," while the sciences of recent years have shown that approximations are the best we can achieve. These developments have called forth the pragmatic movement, of which Schiller's humanism is a part. At its core is the claim that all our categories have "evolved because of their fruitfulness for life." In this collection, Schiller proposes an empiricist notion of the ultimate as a "changeless consciousness." He hints at the central problem facing humanism: accounting for the stubbornness of things which limits the range of humanistic explanations. The "*that* of things" should be conceived "non-humanistically," but we have no such categories. IKS

F. B. Jevons, Hibbert Journal 2.3 (April 1904): 621-623; H. Léard, Rev de Phil 6.4 (1 April 1905): 463-468; J. Legond, Rev Phil 57.6 (June 1904): 640-644; Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 36.10 (16 May 1904): 328-329; Alfred Sidgwick, Mind n.s. 13.2 (April 1904): 262-268.

Review of 2nd edition

Willard C. Gore, J Phil 11.5 (26 Feb 1914): 137-139.

140 Schiller, F. C. S. On Preserving Appearances. Mind n.s. 12.3 (July 1903): 341-354. Reprinted with additions in *Humanism* {139}, pp. 183-203.

Bradley's commitment to the principle of non-contradiction, a special case of the natural desire for mental harmony, hardly warrants his metaphysical conclusion that our experience must be an illusion. Experience is broad and continuous enough to contain both unsatisfactory and satisfactory portions, and there is no ultimate barrier to a complete

and perfect satisfaction. "Higher" realities could not be asserted to exist if appearances had no reality at all; similarly, theories have value only in their ability to transform immediate experience. The first postulate of cognition is "Ultimate reality must be absolutely satisfactory," unifying appearance and reality. JRS

Summaries

Grace Mead Andrus, Phil Rev 12.6 (Nov 1903): 674-675.

141 Schiller, F. C. S. Professor Henry Jones on "Reflective Thought and Religion." Hibbert Journal 1.3 (April 1903): 576-578.

Schiller responds to the first part of Henry Jones's "The Present Attitude of Thought Towards Religion" {124}. The so-called "sceptics" are revolting against idealism's "approved and tested sterility." Pragmatists offer a new understanding of truth based on psychology. Indeed, Jones's own defense of science by appealing to how well it works makes his condemnation of pragmatism most curious. Pragmatism is equally friendly towards religion and science. JRS

142 Stettheimer, Ettie. *Die urteilsfreiheit als grundlage der rechtefertigung des Religiösen Glauben, mit besonderer berucksichtigung der lehre von James.* Wittenberg: Herrose und Ziemsen, 1903. Translated by Ettie Stettheimer as *The Will to Believe as a Basis for the Defense of Religious Faith: A Critical Study*, no. 2 of the *Archives of Philosophy* (New York: Science Press, 1907).

An extensive criticism of James's *The Will to Believe* (1897), based primarily on the grounds that this doctrine results in subjectivism. IKS

Reviews of the translation

Bernard C. Ewer, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 564-566. Stettheimer's Neo-Fichtean standpoint is the real cause of the alleged inconsistencies in James's position. JRS

Edward E. Richardson, Psych Bull 6.6 (15 June 1909): 200-202.

Notes

This work was Stettheimer's inaugural dissertation at Frieburg University in 1903.

143 Sturt, Henry. The Logic of Pragmatism. *Proc Arist Soc* 3 (1903): 96-122.

The intellectualist takes mathematical deduction as the ideal system of knowledge, while the pragmatist adopts the "system of human purpose." While truth might be a correspondence with reality, reality is an immense flux, and our slender knowledge is relative to our weak efforts to grasp hold of it. Statements possess meaning insofar as they are generated for a purpose, and their truth is tested by their ability to function accordingly. The intellectualist's eternal completed system of true judgments is irrelevant and lacks meaning. Science, requiring standardized concepts, creates them in line with a specific purpose. Judgments are not necessary, universal, or a reference to reality. Sturt aligns other logical distinctions with pragmatism, and finds the essence of knowledge in "if-then" judgments. JRS

144 Taylor, Alfred E. *Elements of Metaphysics.* London: Methuen; New York: Macmillan, 1903.

Reviews

J. A. Leighton, J Phil 2.8 (13 April 1905): 213-218.

Notes

See Schiller's comments in "Empiricism and the Absolute" {282}.

145 Vailati, Giovanni. Sull'applicabilità dei concetti di cause e di effetto nella scienza storiche. Rivista Italiana di Sociologia 7.3 (May-June 1903). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 459-464.

This essay treats a number of different theories of causality as articulated in the history of science. While not specifically about pragmatism, this essay reveals Vailati's turn of mind which brings him into sympathy with C. S. Peirce. EPC

Notes

See C. P. Zanoni, "Development of Logical Pragmatism in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40.4 (Oct-Dec 1979): 603-619, and G. Villa, "Sul pragmatismo logico di Vailati e Calderoni: la questione della varieta del pragmatismo," Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna s.v. 10 (1962): 187-213.

146 Vailati, Giovanni. La teoria aristotelica della definizione. Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini 5 (Nov-Dec 1903). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 485-496.

Vailati was a student of Peano, interested in the logical and linguistic dimensions of philosophical problems. The work of C. S. Peirce was hence especially attractive to him. This essay shows Vailati at work in the texts of Aristotle, foreshadowing his later attitude towards Peirce as the true, and James as the derivative, pragmatist. EPC

1904

147 Alexander, Hartley B. The Concept of Consciousness. J Phil 1.5 (3 March 1904): 118-124.

James's "stream of consciousness" is discussed in a survey of philosophies. This stream of fleeting qualities is on poor metaphysical foundations. JRS

148 Andrus, Grace Mead. Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical. Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 429-444.

Bawden has four mutually incompatible views: experience contains functions, the organism has functions, the psychical is the meaning of reality while reality is the physical, and both the psychical and physical are just energy. A limited biological standpoint is being raised to an all-inclusive philosophy, culminating in metaphysical speculation. JRS

Notes

See Bawden's reply, "The Physical and the Psychical" {156}.

149 Angell, James R. *Psychology.* New York: Henry Holt, 1904. 2nd ed., London: Constable and Co., 1905. 4th ed., New York: Henry Holt, 1908.

This principal text of Chicago functionalism treats at length the various aspects of thinking as a purposive activity in problematic situations. Of special interest are the chapters "The Consciousness of Meaning and the Formation of Concepts," "Judgment and the Elements of Reasoning," "The Forms and Functions of Reasoning," "Relation of

Volition to Interest, Effort, and Desire," and "Character and the Will." A concept is defined as "a working hypothesis, a tentative manner of thinking about things, and is subject at need to revision." (p. 221) Reasoning is defined as "*purposive thinking*, that is to say, thinking carried on in the interests of some plan which we wish to execute, some problem which we wish to solve, some difficulty which we wish to surmount." (p. 223) Mind is "an engine for accomplishing the most remarkable adjustments of the organism to its life conditions." (p. 379) JRS

Reviews

I. Madison Bentley, Amer J Psych 17.3 (July 1906): 415-418; H. C. Stevens, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1906): 14-16; Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 14.4 (July 1905): 481-487.

Reviews of 2nd ed.

William McDougall, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 277.

Notes

Angell's relationship with Dewey and the Chicago School is described in his contribution to *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, vol. 3 {1936}.

150 Anon. The Human Sympathy of William James. The Critic 44 (March 1904): 244.

A poem written after reading James's "The Diversities [*sic*] of Religious Belief." IKS

151 Ardigo, Roberto. Preface. To *La varie forme della coscienza religioso*, translated by G. C. Ferrari and Mario Calderoni (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1904).

152 Bakewell, Charles M. Latter-Day Flowing Philosophy. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 92-114.

Absolute idealism agrees that thought is tied to practice, but voluntarism invites skepticism or anarchy. Dependable reality is exposed by the transformation of experience by universalizing thought. James's fallacy infers, from the undoubted association of feeling with thought, that mere feeling grounds all thought. JRS

Reviews

H. Heath Bawden, J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 238-245; A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 18-25.

153 Baldwin, James Mark. The Limits of Pragmatism. Psych Rev 11.1 (Jan 1904): 30-60.

Like Baldwin's own views, pragmatism makes thought, truth, and reality relative to evolution and ends, and denies dualism. But what of things missed or poorly apprehended by cognition, or types of thought overlooked by pragmatism? Pragmatism avoids idealism by asserting restrictions on thought, coming from external conditions. The "environment" plays this role, but the pragmatist owes an independent account of the relationship between cognition and the environment. This objectively pragmatic standpoint (which Baldwin adopts) explains the self/not-self contrast, but must also provide for an experience/trans-experience distinction (to account for error and undiscovered realities). Pragmatism might try to meet this demand, but will fail, since it only subsumes the environment under the "reality" term when consciousness is divided between thought and

reality. This "genetic fallacy" reveals how pragmatism is a monism when thought needs an environment, but in explaining error, falls back on a dualism. Another failure lies in pragmatism's contradictory assertions that time is just a cognitive construction, and is also a real feature of dynamic reality. Psychology can deny dualism, but metaphysics and logic cannot. Pragmatism demotes general judgments as non-testable, and so sides with nominalism. JRS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 236.

Notes

See A. W. Moore, "Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal" {188}. Baldwin's relationship to pragmatism is described in his autobiographical contribution to *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, vol. 1, ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, 1936. Rpt., New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), pp. 1-30.

154 Bawden, H. Heath. The Meaning of the Psychical from the Point of View of the Functional Psychology. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 298-319.

Experience is action in process, and consciousness is a tension in activity that creates reflective contents. These static contents can be objectively studied by psychology, but they are not experience. Consciousness is social, and growing more so. Morton Prince, Charles Strong, and Josiah Royce are discussed. Consciousness is the "complete organic circuit" which involves the nervous system *and* its external world context. JRS

Reviews

Mary Whiton Calkins, Psych Bull 2.5 (15 May 1905): 174-175.

Notes

See Grace Andrus, "Professor Baldwin's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical" {148}, and Morton Prince, "The Identification of Mind and Matter," Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 444-451.

155 Bawden, H. Heath. The Necessity From the Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of the Psychical and the Physical. J Phil 1.3 (4 Feb 1904): 62-68.

Science has replaced matter with energy, and evolution sees the universe as a dynamic whole, possessing progressive degrees of organization. Mind must shape matter, just as matter shapes mind. Consciousness is not some entity among others, but just meaning for an organism. The paradox, "if the world cannot exist except for consciousness, how can biology assert that evolution only lately produced consciousness" is dissolved when we view consciousness not as an entity or force, but as functional significance for an organism. Only by taking methodological distinctions as fixed and distinct realities (establishing parallelism) can the paradox be generated. JRS

Notes

Bawden outlines Mead's "The Definition of the Psychical" {129} in his next article, "Recent Tendencies in the Theory of the Psychical and the Physical," Psych Bull 1.4 (15 March 1904): 102-117.

156 Bawden, H. Heath. The Physical and the Psychical. Phil Rev 13.5 (Sept 1904): 541-546.

Bawden replies to Grace Mead Andrus, "Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical" {148}. Andrus has taken these two functional terms for the aspects of reality, but experience is wider than the meanings of those terms. "Reality *is* only as it *is experienced*" and transcends the contents of reflective thought. JRS

Notes

See Andrus's reply, "Professor Bawden's Functional Theory: A Rejoinder," Phil Rev 13.6 (Nov 1904): 660-665.

157 Bawden, H. Heath. What Is Pragmatism? J Phil 1.16 (4 Aug 1904): 421-427.

An overview of pragmatism at an early stage, distinguishing the doctrines of Schiller's "Humanism," James's "Pragmatism," and Dewey's "Instrumentalism." Dewey's is the best formulation, since it places needs within the functional cycle of experience. James instead subordinates thought to needs. Critics have rightly focused attacks on James's version, but Dewey avoids that error. JRS

158 Boodin, J. E. *Time and Reality*. Psychological Review Monograph Supplements, vol. 6, no. 3. New York: Macmillan, October 1904.

A "clearer and completer" statement of Boodin's 1899 Harvard dissertation. Time is "absolute and dynamic non-being," requiring contradictory judgments on the same quality in space. Time is not serial, nor mere duration. Peirce's notion of continuity is "a double begging of the question," as an attempt to define it in static terms. (pp. 43-45) Time is absolute novelty, essential to "habit-forming reality," and accounts for real change. Idealists and realists use only static concepts, but truth must be "relative to process...and truth can never exhaust reality." Knowledge is instrumental to anticipating the environment. JRS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 730-731; Percy Hughes, J Phil 2.8 (13 April 1905): 218-220.

Notes

Boodin continues this anti-idealist thesis with "The Concept of Time," J Phil 2.14 (6 July 1905): 365-372.

159 Bradley, F. H. On Truth and Practice. Mind n.s. 13.3 (July 1904): 309-335. "The greater part" is reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 75-106.

The practical does not determine reality, since ideas need a separate reality to work with. Truth lies in "this forced agreement of my ideas with a nature other than my volition." If practice is just a change in my existence, the quality of my life becomes irrelevant. Our goal should instead be "the fullest and most harmonious development of our being" which will, only incidentally, be manifested in our activity. Truth will satisfy wants, but it is not thereby created by such satisfaction. "You might as well demonstrate to me that plainly I can love nothing beyond me, because my love after all must be a piece of myself." (p. 323) How might truth be subordinated to practice? Pure theory may be declared ineligible for truth, but this very doctrine is purely theoretical. If theory is just the means to practical ends, there can be no real error or argument. Reality itself might be will,

but will implies an "other." A plurality of wills faces the problem of how one bare will could be a firm reality for another will. Reality might be just the individual will, as James and Schiller imply, but then "reality and truth are what I want and are that which at any time I choose to make them." Such solipsism hardly explains why the pragmatists try so hard to persuade others. Pragmatism has failed, for all Schiller's brash talk, to produce a coherent thesis. JRS

Reviews

Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 693-695; Alban D. Sorensen, Psych Bull 2.3 (15 March 1905): 105-108.

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.1 (Jan 1905): 84-85.

Notes

See Schiller's response, "In Defense of Humanism" {202}.

160 Brown, Francis Theodore. William James and the Philosophy of Emerson. Methodist Review 76 (Sept 1904): 747-756.

James has avoided the half-truths of Emersonian monism by his emphasis on activity and human personality. James overlooks Christianity's uniqueness, though his *The Will to Believe* (1897) belongs in an "admirable modern library of Methodist apologetics." IKS

161 Calderoni, Mario. Le varietà del pragmatismo. Leonardo 2.3 (Nov 1904): 3-7. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 209-222.

Prezzolini came to pragmatism after a brief yet intense study of Henri Bergson. He, together with Papini, articulated a militantly voluntaristic version of pragmatism which fused the Bergsonian notion of inner self with James's "will to believe." The ideal type of the *Uomo-dio,* or Man-god, began to appear in the writings of both men, denoting a kind of pragmatic superman whose will stood as an omnipotent shaper of the external world. Calderoni uses this essay to delineate the various branches of pragmatism, urging his reader to understand the movement in terms of its Peircean variety, and especially in terms of the wording of the pragmatic maxim. According to this essay, Prezzolini's Will-to-Believe variety of pragmatism is derived from Peirce's "original" pragmatism, built upon the pragmatic maxim. Calderoni asserts that Peirce's pragmatism was meant to discourage the excesses found in the derived form. He accuses the Will-to-Believists of behaving like the worst kind of theological metaphysician; that is, they create worlds in which contradictories can exist side by side! Calderoni's essay sparked a response from Prezzolini, and for a while a lively ongoing debate continued in the pages of *Leonardo.* EPC

Notes

See Prezzolini's reply {195}. See also E. Paul Colella, "Two Faces of Italian Pragmatism: The Prezzolini-Calderoni Debate, 1904-1905," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 30.4 (Fall 1994): 861-896, and Vincent Colapietro, "'Tell your Friend Giuliano...': Jamesian Enthusiasms and Peircean Reservations," ibid. pp. 897-926.

162 Creighton, James E. Purpose as Logical Category. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 284-297. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy,* ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 93-109.

Pragmatism is part of a general tendency to use personal need as the key to reality. While knowledge and action are connected, knowledge requires a detachment from personal interest, and can become an end in itself. Ideas may be only functions of experience from a limited biological viewpoint, but philosophically, thought gives experience its significance; hence, no practical purpose could be the final end for a rational being. Pragmatism accuses other metaphysical systems of abandoning experience, but the real issue between them is the nature of experience. While we should reject reason as an independent abstraction, pragmatism flies to the opposite extreme by reducing it to a plurality of experiences. Truth is an ideal of reason, and its universality and necessity permits the practical evaluation of ideas. Pragmatism cannot talk of social purposes without presupposing metaphysical constructions, and thus the objective nature of experience is lost. Dualism is retained, since experience can exist without thought, and has the novelty of thought thrust upon it. JRS

163 De Laguna, Theodore. Evolutionary Method in Ethical Research. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 328-337.

De Laguna critiques Dewey's "The Evolutionary Method Applied to Morality" {86}. Experiments do not essentially involve genetic methods, introspection into value cannot be so easily dismissed, and the validity of an intuition holds independently of its origin. Empiricism can survive Dewey's criticisms. JRS

164 Dewey, John. Notes Upon Logical Topics. I. A Classification of Contemporary Tendencies. J Phil 1.3 (4 Feb 1904): 57-62. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 484-489. *MW* 3: 62-68.

Formal, empirical, transcendental, mathematical (here Peirce is mentioned), grammatical, and scientific method logics are distinguished. A seventh type examines the "working logic of practical life, and of scientific investigation and verification," and is exemplified by Alfred Sidgwick. JRS

165 Dewey, John. Notes Upon Logical Topics. II. The Meanings of the Term "Idea." J Phil 1.7 (31 March 1904): 175-178. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 68-72.

The history of philosophy reveals that ideas, originally objective, have become subjective objects. For James, they are devices for controlling knowledge. JRS

166 Dewey, John. The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer. Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 159-175. Reprinted as "Herbert Spencer" in *Characters and Events* {1929}, vol. 1, pp. 45-62. *MW* 3: 193-209.

Spencer's single-minded system of evolution mirrored his social and intellectual isolation. It is a return to 18th-century French progressivism and German organicism, against the British empiricist tradition. Spencer is a transitional figure, pointing away from fixed values toward "self-organizing reality." JRS

167 Dewey, John. The Psychology of Judgment. Psych Bull 1.2 (10 Feb 1904): 44-45. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 351.

James's notion of consciousness as a stream, having a focus and fringe, is used to interpret the logical judgment's subject and object. JRS

Notes

Abstract of a paper read at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association at St. Louis, Missouri, in December 1903.

168 Dewey, John. The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education. In the *Third Yearbook* of the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education, Part One (1904), pp. 9-30. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 249-272.

Teaching should imitate other professions, where training develops the intellectual methods to acquire mastery without trying to bestow all the skills of a profession. Theory and practice would be reunited, and teachers could focus on the child's own interests while still maintaining order and progress. Dewey outlines how educational and moral psychology should be taught in the context of a "practice school." JRS

169 Galloway, George. *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.* Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1904.

James forgets that feeling and will are useless without thought. JRS

Reviews

F. C. French, Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 193-199.

170 Gentile, Giovanni. Religione e prammatismo nel James. La Critica 2.6 (20 Nov 1904): 471-482. Reprinted in his *Il modernismo e i rapporti fra religione e filosofia* (Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1909), pp. 159-183.

171 Herrick, C. L. The Logical and Psychological Distinction Between the True and the Real. Psych Rev 11.3 (May 1904): 204-210.

Functionalism, as espoused by Dewey, Baldwin, Bawden, and Herrick, reforms philosophical terms. Reality, a "primary feeling-cognition" extends beyond thought (and its true/false judgments). Truth is the organic system of judgments, but reality is direct experience; a blind person lacks the visual experience which even all truth cannot replace. Psychological terms (concept, percept, etc.), if taken as mental contents, create the old debate over universals. Functionalism instead takes them as parts of processes and dissolves that debate. JRS

172 Hobhouse, L. T. Faith and the Will to Believe. *Proc Arist Soc* 4 (1904): 87-110.

The two replacements for "vital" religious belief are metaphysics and scientific skepticism. The rejection of the authority of reason in preference for the "will to believe" in faith "would be voluntarily to embrace a self-contradiction." The "flowery paths of imagination" have a role as the "forerunner of thought," but thought should not be surrendered to feeling. JRS

173 James, William. The Chicago School. Psych Bull 1.1 (15 Jan 1904): 1-5. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 445-447. *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1136-1140. *Works EPh*, pp. 102-106.

A review of Dewey *et al.*, *Studies in Logical Theory* {118}. Some universities have much thought, others, much school, while Chicago has both. John Dewey and ten

collaborators have produced an original and important new system of philosophy. Dewey is an evolutionist and an empiricist. For him there are no unknowables and absolutes, and biology and psychology are continuous. Thought results from a situation in experience of conflict between the old and the new. For the sake of action, such a situation must be reconstructed. Judgment and knowing occur in reconstruction and are only incidents in the wider activity of adjusting. For Dewey, fact and theory differ only in their functions: when we hesitate we use "theory," when we are steady, "fact." Thus, truth is in process of formation; it is not an agreement with some eternally standing system, but the maximum of stability in belief. This view is saved from caprice by the "object-factors" in situations which are common to many knowers. The system has two gaps: it lacks a cosmology and an account of our sharing a common world. IKS

174 James, William. Does "Consciousness" Exist? J Phil 1.18 (1 Sept 1904): 477-491. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 1-38. *McDermott*, pp. 169-183. *WJ Writings* 2, pp. 1141-1158. *Pure Experience*, pp. 1-17. *Works ERE*, pp. 3-19.

The soul, once conceived as a substance and person, has become mere consciousness, a ghostly substance about which nothing definite can be said. Consciousness is a vestige of the older mind-body dualism, which can be eliminated entirely by showing that consciousness simply does not exist. There remains, however, the function of knowing, which must be accounted for without using the concept of consciousness. Immediate experience has no dualistic structure; it is pure experience, a collection of mere *thats*. These bits can be treated as either mental or physical, becoming one or the other depending upon the system of relations into which they are placed. A perceived table is physical when placed in a chain leading from a tree to the finished product, and mental, when viewed as a part of a given biographical stream. Knowledge does not take place in a non-experienceable consciousness, but is a relation which certain experiences have with each other. IKS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 383-384; L. A. Weigle, Psych Rev 2.2 (15 March 1905): 99-102.

175 James, William. Herbert Spencer. Atlantic Monthly 94.1 (July 1904): 99-108. Reprinted as "Herbert Spencer's Autobiography" in *Memories and Studies* {1911}, pp. 107-142. *Works EPh*, pp. 107-122.

For some, Spencer was the greatest of philosophers, for others, someone who combined generally known facts into an incoherent system, full of contradictions hidden behind an imposing terminology. His autobiography reveals a man of great erudition and civic courage and also a petty man, "lukewarm in all his tastes and passions," writing with tones of "pedantic rectitude." To him belongs the credit of discovering that evolution is universal, but his works are a "museum of blundering reasoning." James was at first much impressed by Spencer, but his opinion reversed after listening to criticisms proposed by C. S. Peirce and using Spencer's works in classes. IKS

Notes

James's other discussion of Spencer is "Herbert Spencer Dead," New York Evening Post (8 Dec 1903) [*Works EPh*, pp. 96-101].

176 James, William. Humanism and Truth. Mind n.s. 13.4 (Oct 1904): 457-475. Reprinted with additions taken from "Humanism and Truth One More" {245}, in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 51-101. *Works MT*, pp. 37-60.

James restricts "pragmatism" to the method of C. S. Peirce, that of testing an abstract concept by considering the "concrete difference to someone which its being true will make." In England "pragmatism" is used in a wider sense as a theory that the truth of a statement consists of its consequences, and for this, F. C. S. Schiller's proposed "humanism" is a good name. Instead of defending Schiller and John Dewey against critics such as F. H. Bradley, James will develop his own understanding of humanism while "playing sympathetically" with the subject. Experience is not received in a pure form, but the chaotic "first" is enveloped by a "second" in the form of categories–time, space, thing–devised by common sense. Reality is an accumulation of human intellectual inventions, and the problem of truth is the problem of inserting new experiences among the old, while changing the latter as little as possible. Opponents of humanism are too "lazy" to make their abstractions concrete, something which in any case could be done only in humanistic terms. Thus, reality is experienced as an inability to control aspects of experience. Whether behind experienced reality there lurks some absolute, humanism does not say. In any case, the absolute could serve as a standard for thought only as the experience of resistance to concrete errors. Contrary to what its critics charge, humanism shows why we should be devoted to truth, for truth stands for whatever is valuable in our lives. To replace truth conceived abstractly as copying, humanism offers the concrete idea of beneficial interaction between the conceptual and the sensational parts of experience, with copying included among the interactions and theoretical satisfaction among the benefits. IKS

Reviews

Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 693-695. Recognition is lacking that reality also shapes thought and that religious knowledge mirrors the real being. JRS

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 111-113.

Summaries

Grace Mead Andrus, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 385.

Notes

See H. W. B. Joseph's comments {253}.

177 James, William. Introduction. To G. T. Fechner, *The Little Book of Life after Death*, trans. Mary C. Wadsworth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1904), pp. vii-xix. Reprinted in *Works ERM*, pp. 116-119.

Fechner's is a rare mind, combining "patient observation and daring imagination." His central thought is panpsychism: the claim that matter is not dead but alive and conscious. For him, God is the total consciousness of the universe and has a genuine history. The scheme is based on the idea of the span of consciousness. IKS

178 James, William. The Pragmatic Method. J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 673-687. Partly reprinted in *Pragmatism* {438}, pp. 97-108. *Works EPh*, pp. 123-139.

Notes

This essay is a lightly revised version of "Philosphical Conceptions and Practical Results" {13}.

179 James, William. Remarks at the Peace Banquet. In *Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress* (Boston: Peace Congress Committee, 1904), pp. 266-269. Reprinted with revisions in Atlantic Monthly 94.12 (December 1904): 845-847. *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 299-306. *Works ERM*, pp. 120-123.

While philosophers emphasize reason, it plays only a small role in the settlement of disputes. Human beings are by nature belligerent, the most formidable of all beasts of prey. Historians and clergymen idealize war. Civilization was built in the shadow of wars. Men live for "thrills and excitements." In the face of the human desire for war, we should emphasize prevention rather than radical cure: leave open the general possibility of war, but strive to prevent each occurrence. IKS

180 James, William. A World of Pure Experience. J Phil 1.20 (29 Sept 1904): 533-543; 1.21 (13 Oct 1904): 561-570. An extract was reprinted under the title "The Relation Between Knower and Known," in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 102-120 [*Works MT*, pp. 61-69]. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 39-91. *McDermott*, pp. 194-214. *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1159-1182. *Pure Experience*, pp. 18-40. *Works ERE*, pp. 21-44.

Philosophy is being rearranged, creating an opportune time to sketch a view which has grown up in James to such an extent that he cannot "see things" in any other way. Radical empiricism admits into its constructions everything that is directly experienced and only that. Differing from ordinary empiricism, it asserts that relations are matters of experience. Among conjunctive relations, mere "withness" is the most external and involves no further consequences. The relations of transition between mental states in a person's history, co-conscious transitions, are of strategic importance through which all the corruptions of rationalism can pour in, if they are not taken at "face-value." As for the cognitive relation, it is either a matter of acquaintance in which knower and known are identical, or of description, where experienceable paths of conjunctive relations connect knower and known. The logical function of substitution is very important: some experiences better fulfill the purposes of others by leading to further experiences, and can be functional substitutes. Objective reference is experienced as continuity, the transition from experiences themselves felt as insufficient to others. These transitions are a part of the fringe of consciousness. Radical empiricism does not have affinities with Berkeley or John Stuart Mill but with natural realism, as it allows different minds to meet in common objects. IKS

Reviews

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 111-113.

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 384-385; L. A. Weigle, Psych Rev 2.2 (15 March 1905): 99-102.

181 Leighton, Joseph Alexander. Pragmatism. J Phil 1.6 (17 March 1904): 148-156.

Schiller confuses the psychological conditions of truth with the criterion of attained truth. Leighton says, "I regard the number-system of algebra as true, but it has no practical value for me and, not being a mathematician, I have not discovered that it produces in me

any emotional thrills." (p. 151) There are a pluralism of personal harmonies, but all must face reality's determinate nature. Dewey's genetic account of thought does not explain the universal and objective marks of truth. Logic should distinguish intellectual harmony from all aesthetic harmonies. Truth must be timeless and all striving must be toward a final value, but pragmatism's evolving reality abolishes both. JRS

182 Leuba, James H. Professor James' Interpretation of Religious Experience. Int J Ethics 14.3 (April 1904): 322-339.

What James concludes about the universal element in religion is already well-known. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} is a preparation for a startling pluralism, akin to polytheism. The way to the other world is through the subliminal consciousness; hence James emphasizes mystical states. But why substitute spirits who "crawl in through the subliminal door" for an omnipotent God? IKS

183 MacLennan, Simon F. Two Illustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic. J Phil 1.15 (21 July 1904): 403-411.

F. H. Bradley is criticized for his failure to appreciate a functional analysis of ideas. Royce assumes that psychic experience is an entity, and then accuses the pragmatist of limiting knowledge to "the magic limits of psychical insufficiency." The whole process of experience contains "self-conscious factors," so that similar aims requires similar means. This provides for objectivity without presupposing eternally fixed conditions. JRS

184 Marron, William R. A. Pragmatism in American Philosophy. Catholic University Bulletin 10.2 (April 1904): 211-224.

Pragmatism finds a proposition's truth in its "service-capacity," and sees the essence of anything real in the end it serves. Its inspiration lies in Peirce, Lotze's teleological idealism, and Ritschl's ethical theology. Royce relies on these conceptions to support absolutism, while James instead defends empiricism. Pragmatism has no future prospects since it destroys speculation, though it is inspiring a new generation of religious believers. JRS

185 Mead, G. H. Image or Sensation. J Phil 1.22 (27 Oct 1904): 604-607.

Mead comments on Willard Gore, "Image or Sensation" J Phil 1.16 (4 Aug 1904): 434-441. Gore has a functional theory of sensation, in close agreement with Dewey, but wrongly locates images in our responses. JRS

Notes

See Gore's response, "Image or Sensation," J Phil 2.4 (16 Feb 1905): 97-101.

186 Mead, G. H. The Relations of Psychology and Philology. Psych Bull 1.11 (15 Oct 1904): 375-391.

Wundt's voluntarism and theory of the community-life properly finds in the gesture the origin of language. Mead describes several problems with Wundt's specific philological tenets. JRS

187 Moore, G. E. Jahresbericht über "Philosophy in the United Kingdom for 1902." Arch Syst Phil 10.3 (July 1904): 242-264.

188 Moore, A. W. Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal. Psych Bull 1.12 (15 Nov 1904): 415-423. Reprinted with revisions as "The Pragmatic Universal," in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 174-194.

Moore responds to Baldwin, "The Limits of Pragmatism" {153}. Pragmatism rejects Baldwin's transcendent abstract universals. Universals are mediating, experienced, and hypothetical, providing continuity to the process of experience. Logic cannot describe all reality, only thought's role in it. A pragmatist "confesses that the only reality he can find in which thought is playing a discoverable part is just the world of instinctive, emotional, volitional, social, 'real life,'...without prejudice to the conviction that this world of 'real life' may have in it things not dreamed of in our philosophies." JRS

Reviews

Mary Winifred Sprague, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 102.

Notes

See Baldwin, "A Word of Rejoinder to Professor Moore," Psych Bull 1.12 (Nov 1904): 424-429.

189 Moore, A. W. Review of Armand Sabatier, *Philosophie de l'effort.* Phil Rev 13.5 (Sept 1904): 569-572.

Despite its title this work is not pragmatic, as it argues for an eternal ideal that teleologically orders universal evolution. How can this ideal be applied to concrete life, and how does its existence make the universe any less "mechanical" than materialism? JRS

190 Noble, John H. Psychology on the "New Thought" Movement. Monist 14.3 (April 1904): 409-426.

James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} praises the practical focus on spirit, the emphasis on the subconscious identity with the Divine, and the use of mystical experiences, made by "mind-cure" practitioners. JRS

Notes

The Christian Scientists emerged as a major element of the New Thought movement.

191 Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, *Outlines of Psychology.* Nation 79.13 (29 Sept 1904): 264-265. Reprinted in *The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 186-189.

This "short text-book"–bound to "seduce a young person into close observation and close reasoning"–is about the "essential unity of conduct and...cognition." Peirce describes how this above unification "cuts deep into the theories of psychology," discusses Royce as an automatist, and remarks on the division of mentality into feeling, volition, and cognition. LF

Notes

Outlines of Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1903).

192 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). Un compagno di scavi (F. C. S. Schiller). Leonardo 2.3 (June 1904): 4-7.

While philosophical systems are likened to prisons, Schiller is praised for a philosophy which leads to freedom. He sees philosophy as something as personal as the fit

of one's clothes, and he recognizes the fluidity of the world and the experimental character of human responses to it. Humanity is made into a god. There is much mention of Schiller's "Axioms as Postulates" {96}. Schiller is the philosophical miner, burrowing under experience to unearth its secret core: the supremely creative self. EPC

193 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). Dalla sorgente alle foci dello spirito. Leonardo 2.3 (June 1904): 18-24.

Prezzolini offers a detailed analysis of the psychology of habit. Drawing heavily from the work of Bergson and James, he develops a view of habit as originating in creative inspiration and sharpening in conscious and determined effort. Social life requires stability and order; through habit this is assured. EPC

194 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). Il David della filosofia inglese (F. C. S. Schiller). Leonardo 2.1 (March 1904): 1-3.

James wrote about the Italian pragmatists' debt to Schiller and himself in a letter of 30 April 1905 [*The Letters of William James* {1580}, p. 227]. This article is Prezzolini's first lengthy treatment of a specific pragmatic thinker, and he chose Schiller rather than James as his subject. Schiller plays the David to the Goliath of British Hegelianism, slaying the logical and intellectualist giant with his humanism. An article concerning his more positive contributions is promised; see his "Un compagno di scavi (F. C. S. Schiller)" {192}. EPC

195 Prezzolini, Giuseppe. Le varietà del pragmatismo (Riposte a Calderoni). Leonardo 2.3 (Nov 1904): 7-9.

Prezzolini replies to Mario Calderoni's "Le varietà del pragmatismo" {161}. Prezzolini launches his attack against Calderoni over the nature of pragmatism by maintaining that the foundation of pragmatism is the realization that the will acts on belief. Pragmatism is connected to Prezzolini's earlier attachment to Bergson's philosophy. Beliefs are not adopted solely on rational evidence. Rather, they are adopted because they respond to desires in the human will. Responding to a specific point raised by Calderoni, Prezzolini argues that there is much in the pragmatisms of James and Schiller which is not to be found in Peirce, and hence it is wrong to think of Peirce as the founder of the family, and James and Schiller as degenerate descendants. James and Schiller actually represent an enlargement of Peirce. What emerges here is Prezzolini's understanding of pragmatism in terms of the Man-god. It is a philosophy of radical voluntarism, unwelcome to limitations upon the efficacy of the will. EPC

Notes

Peirce made a brief remark on this debate and Prezzolini's voluntarism, in *CP* 5.497-5.501, particularly 5.497 note 1.

196 Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth. Review of John Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*. Phil Rev 13.6 (Nov 1904): 666-677. Reprinted in *The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1907), pp. 178-194.

A review of {118}. Idealism too rejects representational epistemology and stresses the continuity of experience, so why is Bosanquet misunderstood in Thompson's essay?

Dewey fixes the limited practical role for thought by definition. No experience, however aesthetic, leaves intelligence's sphere. Dewey's criticism of Lotze's logic is incisive. JRS

Reviews of *The Philosophical Radicals*

S. H. Mellone, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 97-104; W. R. Sorley, Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 212-215.

197 Rieber, Charles H. Pragmatism and the A Priori. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 72-91.

Knowledge requires necessity; without certain facts, the pragmatist cannot arrive at truth. Idealism protests the pragmatic view of minds as "mere phenomena among phenomena." Thought and action must be related in time, from a standpoint beyond immediate experience. Pragmatists accuse metaphysicians of erecting an impassable barrier between thought and reality, but the pragmatic account of judgment requires a similar leap from the present into the past and future. Pragmatism offers a materialism, has no method to tell good from bad effects, and cannot find reasonable wants. Pragmatism's psychology is epiphenomenal, since thoughts exist for acts. Their protest against idealism, that there is no complete system of truth, ignores the fact that nothing can be known as partial unless the outline of the complete reality is also known. JRS

Reviews

H. Heath Bawden, J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 238-245; A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 18-25.

198 Rogers, Arthur K. Rationality and Belief. Phil Rev 13.1 (Jan 1904): 30-50.

The "real" is what satisfies needs, and our recognition of real things arises from a check to activity, a lack of the proper stimulus to a habit. In the resulting search for the stimulus, self and world are distinguished. Both social and physical realms are due to "a postulate of the will," since no demonstration is possible. Emotion is more than mere physiological stimulus; it flourishes as spiritual needs are met, and as the "sentiment of rationality," it demands harmonized experience and practical consistency. In the face of this demand, mere present appeal to a feeling cannot justify a truth, but the opposite view that feeling is irrelevant to reason cannot stand either. The common-sense separation of the useful from the true is just the difference between limited success and "a satisfactory outcome in the case of *every* activity, actual or possible, that enters into experience in its widest sense." JRS

Notes

See also his "Scepticism," Phil Rev 13.6 (Nov 1904): 627-641.

199 Rogers, Arthur K. The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic. J Phil 1.8 (14 April 1904): 207-212.

Rogers reviews Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory* {118}. Functional psychology transforms every concept applied by its critic, thereby avoiding serious debate and ignoring "natural instincts of belief." Why should we abandon external reality, and its ability to account for novel interruptions in experience, religious attitudes, and other persons, for a theory which holds that "the earth was really flat...so long as men found it satisfactory to believe it so." Pragmatism escapes solipsism only by making thought impossible. JRS

200 Royce, Josiah. The Eternal and the Practical. Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 113-142. Reprinted in *The Development of American Philosophy* {2786}, pp. 246-261.

All judgments are expressions of activity in response to our needs, as pragmatism asserts, but "pure" pragmatism declares that they completely determine truth and reality. Pure pragmatism cannot appeal to evolution, since all science would be the product, not the prior conditions, of judgment. When one makes a judgment, one is telling others they ought to believe too; but pure pragmatism reduces judgments to expressions of personal attitude, and strips judgments of their ability to contradict. A completed pragmatism would preserve the striving for objectivity using the Absolute perspective. JRS

Reviews

H. Heath Bawden, Psych Bull 1.9 (15 Aug 1904): 320-324.

Notes

See Simon MacLennan's comments in "Two Illustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic" {183}.

201 Schiller, F. C. S. Dreams and Idealism. Hibbert Journal 3.1 (Oct 1904): 83-102. Reprinted with revisions in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 452-486.

Absolute idealism rests on fallacies. The pragmatic test shows that reality cannot be either a single knowing spirit or be independent of experience. Dreams are not as real as waking experience, because dreams have less internal harmony. Higher-level experiences will gain in harmony; ultimate harmony permits a synthesis of idealism and realism. JRS

Summaries

Mary Winifred Sprague, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 389-390.

202 Schiller, F. C. S. In Defence of Humanism. Mind n.s. 13.4 (Oct 1904): 525-542. Reprinted in "considerably altered" form as "Truth and Mr. Bradley" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 114-140.

Schiller replies to Bradley's "On Truth and Practice" {159}. Bradley substituted misrepresentations and absurdities for Schiller's position, while Bradley's own position has been destroyed by the impracticality and irrelevancy of the correspondence theory of truth. Pragmatism does not separate theory from practice and "enslave" one to the other. Kant did express pragmatism in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Bradley deceptively cloaks himself in religious terms for rhetorical gain. JRS

203 Spiller, Gustav. Voluntarism and Intellectualism: A Reconciliation. Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 420-428.

Pragmatism ends in sheer fancy and moral chaos, and intellectualism is refuted by science. A properly "organic conception of human nature" instead makes truth social. Pragmatism should rightly deny science's claim to legislate all reality without making all beliefs equally justifiable. JRS

Reviews

J. A. Leighton, J Phil 1.18 (1 Sept 1904): 500-501.

204 Stratton, George M. The Difference Between the Mental and the Physical. Psych Bull 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 1-9. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 123-132.

Stratton discusses recent theories of consciousness, including James's "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" {174}. JRS

Notes

See his "The Character of Consciousness," Psych Bull 3.4 (15 April 1906): 117-124 [*Pure Experience*, pp. 113-141].

205 Strong, Charles A. A Naturalistic Theory of the Reference of Thought to Reality. J Phil 1.10 (12 May 1904): 253-260.

The James-Miller theory of cognition, formulated by James in "On the Function of Cognition" (1885) and Dickinson S. Miller in "The Meaning of Truth and Error" (1893) has been too long ignored. With pragmatism's rise it is time for this theory to be revived. IKS

206 Stuart, Henry W. The Logic of Self-Realization. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 9 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 175-205.

207 Tawney, Guy A. Utilitarian Knowledge. J Phil 1.13 (23 June 1904): 337-344.

Pragmatism makes truth subjective and inferior to its objects. Yet, "the heart craves the permanent and the universal," and a reflective mind will view ideas as limitations on a wider reality. When pragmatism appeals to evolution, either a pragmatic metaphysics supplements pragmatism, or pragmatism offers a circular proof in describing how evolutionary theory arises in relation to an individual's needs. Facts, meanings, *and* needs all arise from concrete experience. JRS

208 Taylor, Alfred E. Some Side Lights on Pragmatism. McGill University Magazine 3 (April 1904): 44-66.

James infers the truth of a belief from its existence, but this is illegitimate, even though the belief enjoys universal consent. James ignores the fact that we can possess evidence without complete proof, and forgets that to adopt something as a working hypothesis is far from holding it to be true. James admits that some truths can be proved, and this is a fatal admission. The existence of a truth independent of my will shows that to be true means something different from being willed. IKS

209 Tyrrell, George. *Lex Orandi, Or Prayer and Creed.* London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904.

The conclusion offers universal fruitfulness as the test of religious truth. Religious life determines religious creed. JRS

Notes

Tyrrell distances his view from pragmatism in *Lex Credendi* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906) and *Through Scylla and Charybdis: Or, The Old Theology and the New* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907).

210 Vailati, Giovanni. La più recente definizione della matematica. Leonardo 2.2 (June 1904): 7-10. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 528-533.

Vailati debates with Bertrand Russell concerning the nature of fundamental mathematical definitions. Vailati uses the example of non-Euclidean geometries to show the creative side of intellectual work in mathematics. EPC

211 Van Becelaere, L. *La Philosophie en Amérique: depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours, 1607-1900.* New York: The Eclectic Publishing Co., 1904.

It contains Josiah Royce's "Introduction," pp. ix-xvii, a section on John Dewey in the chapter "Écoles contemporaines: Idéalistes," p. 117, and a section on William James in the chapter "La Psychologie," pp. 150-153. JRS

212 Wells, H. G. Scepticism of the Instrument. Mind n.s. 13.3 (July 1904): 379-393.

Concepts cannot grasp unique individuality, thought wrongly attempts to use negative concepts to characterize reality, and reason cannot accommodate different levels of reality. From this view, the resulting skepticism towards any universal validity is in line with pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 391.

213 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Field of Logic. Science n.s. 20.18 (4 Nov 1904): 587-600. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 56-78.

Pragmatism is part of the tendency to force logic and knowledge to yield to treatment by evolutionary biology. It cannot support relativism or rid itself of metaphysics. Knowledge must be practically valid, but remains independent of its discovery. Reality does not change through becoming known. JRS

1905

214 Anon. What They Think of Our Dewey. School Journal 71 (30 Sept 1905): 322.

This article consists of quotations from two foreign articles, each lauding Dewey's educational methods. JRS

215 Bakewell, Charles M. The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.25 (7 Dec 1905): 687-691.

Bakewell replies to Dewey's "Immediate Empiricism" {233}. Dewey confusingly equates an object conceived in all of its relations with an object immediate experienced. Such an object is perfectly compatible with idealism. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "The Knowledge Experience Again" {234}. See also Schiller's comments on this exchange, "Thought and Immediacy" {374}.

216 Bakewell, Charles M. An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning Immediate Experience. J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 520-522. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 390-392.

An immediate experience cannot refer beyond itself, so how can one "correct" another? JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Immediate Empiricism" {233}.

217 Bellonci, Goffredo. Le Pragmatisme et la morale. In *Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus* (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 670-673.

A series of conclusions given in six paragraphs. They claim that (1) living signifies acting in diverse ways, and that from the point of view of knowledge no theory expresses anything, and hence there are neither true nor false theories, (2) there is frequently a confusion between the cause of a thing and the condition of a thing, (3) logic has no necessity, but rather is, like law, an intermediate between two liberties, (4) morality...is nothing other than the condition which permits that passage of cause to effect, of ideality to fact, (5) the moral man is not living: one must continuously create new "idéalitiés," and (6) life and art force us, at every moment, to be something and someone, under pain of not being anything at all. LF

Notes

Subsequent discussion by Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, Allesandro Levi, and Odoardo Campa is reported on pp. 673-674.

218 Bergson, Henri. Lettre au Directeur de la Revue Philosophique sur sa relation à James Ward et à William James. Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 229-230. Reprinted in *Ecrits et paroles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 239-240. *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 656-658.

In his report, "Le Congrès international de psychologie," Rev Phil 60.7 (July 1905): 67-87, Gaston Rageot remarked that (1) it was a result of the influence of James Ward and William James that Bergson developed his doctrine of real duration (what Rageot calls his "écoulement intérieur,") and (2) "it is impossible to see anything other than the Bergsonian doctrine of the primacy of action in...James." (p. 229) In this letter, Bergson takes exception to both these claims. LF

Rageot is mistaken in attributing similarities between James and Bergson to accidental influences. They are due to general and profound causes. James's "stream of thought" and Bergson's "durée réelle" have different meanings. IKS

Notes

See Rageot's reply, Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 230-231.

219 Bode, Boyd H. Cognitive Experience and Its Object. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 658-663. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 398-404.

James's radical empiricism is but one mode, a functional role for feelings of relation, of the common appeal to experience made by all philosophies. This mode is individualistic, and James's resulting logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are consequently confused with psychology. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's response, "The Knowledge Experience Again" {234}.

220 Bode, Boyd H. The Concept of Pure Experience. Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 684-695.

How can Dewey's functionalism explain the difference between ideas and perceptions, and the inability of some people to call up images? This theory supposes both that distinct sensations arise from conflict in experience, and that conflict can only originate in the experience of discriminated sensations. James's account of attention similarly suffers. The admitted continuity in experience from silence to thunder cannot be functionally explained. It must be instead attributed to basic relations in consciousness, which refutes "pure experience." JRS

221 Bode, Boyd H. 'Pure Experience' and the External World. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 128-133. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 55-60.

"Thoroughgoing" empiricists find unacceptable the theory that thought refers to a reality beyond itself. James's is the latest attempt to do away with "objective reference" and to reduce everything to pure experience. Such efforts are futile since they lead to solipsism. IKS

Notes

See James's response, "Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?" {247}.

222 Bush, Wendell T. An Empirical Definition of Consciousness. J Phil 2.21 (12 Oct 1905): 561-568. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 98-106.

James's functional concept of consciousness is the first step towards dissolving any credibility to idealism. JRS

223 Brunschvicg, Léon. *L'Idéalisme contemporain.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1905.

Of interest is Brunschvicg's remarks about Le Roy, whose position the former takes to be a kind of pragmatism. In developing his own view the author opposes his spiritualism to the "new philosophy" of Le Roy *et al.*, arguing that although science has its origin in the demands of practice, it develops by discarding these origins and turning toward the unity and continuity of reason. (p. 131) See especially "La Philosophie nouvelle et l'intellectualisme," pp. 98ff. LF

Reviews

Adam Leroy Jones, Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 426-430.

224 Calderoni, Mario. De l'utilité "marginale" dans les questions éthiques. In *Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus* (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 619-620. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 207-208.

Notes

Subsequent discussion by Goffredo Bellonci is reported on pp. 620.

225 Calderoni, Mario. Du role de l'evidence en morale. In *Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus* (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 616-617. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 205-206.

Notes

Subsequent discussion by Pétavel-Oliff, D. Metzger, Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, and E. Peillaube is reported on pp. 617-618. See also E. Peillaube, "Le V^E congrès international de psychologie" Rev de Phil 6.6 (1 June 1905): 698-704.

226 Calderoni, Mario. Il senso dei non sensi. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 102-104.

Calderoni provides a detailed discussion of what he believes is the essential core of pragmatism, Peirce's pragmatic maxim, in reaction against Prezzolini's negligent interpretation. Calderoni builds the continuum between the experience of the scientist and the experiences of ordinary human beings, thereby establishing the relevance of Peirce's maxim to all facets of human experience. He also offers some discussion of the peril into which philosophy must fall by ignoring precision of conceptual meaning. EPC

227 Calderoni, Mario. Intorno alla distinzione fra atti volontari ed involuntari. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 125-127. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 267-274.

This article seems to have been written in response to the militantly voluntaristic pragmatism of Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini. Having just concluded a skirmish with Prezzolini over the essence of pragmatism in the pages of *Leonardo* (see his "La varietà del pragmatismo" {161}), Calderoni steps back to examine the general problem of the relationship between will and action. Prezzolini endows the human being with virtually infinite power of action stemming from an omnipotent will. Calderoni once again employs the pragmatic method in his more Peircean understanding of it to attempt definitive solution to the problem. Philosophers fall into the trap of taking the will as a given and then proceeding to define other more complex states. Calderoni maintains that this is not a legitimate approach. The meaning of will needs to be clarified with some greater care. Calderoni concludes, quite pragmatically, that the belief that an act is voluntary or involuntary will manifest itself in different practical consequences. In addition, Calderoni severs Prezzolini's Will-to-Believe pragmatism from the Peircean variety entirely, maintaining that the tradition of James and Schiller is distinct from that of Peirce! The latter is seen to be articulating a kind of positivism, in that they both root out useless and futile questions. EPC

228 Calderoni, Mario. Variazioni sul pragmatismo. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 15-21. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 239-258.

Calderoni expands his polemic with Prezzolini in this essay, describing the relative positions of C. S. Peirce and William James. The most telling lines are reserved for the closing paragraphs, where Calderoni maintains that Peircean pragmatism based on the pragmatic maxim, and the Will to Believe variety which had been argued by Prezzolini, are "truly opposites and antagonists" to each other. EPC

Notes

For an interesting overview of the two camps, with a decided preference towards the "Peirceans," see Giovanni Gullace, "The Pragmatist Movement in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 23.1 (Jan-March 1962): 91-106.

229 Calò, Giovanni. Intorno al progresso odierno del prammatismo e ad una nuova forma di esso. Riv Filo 8.2 (March-April 1905): 182-209.

Reviews

Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 528-530.

230 Chadwick, Cabell Wright. *The Theology of James.* Dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1905.

231 Christie, R. Humanism as a Religion. Contemporary Review 88.5 (Nov 1905): 683-702.

232 Dessoulavy, C. Le Pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 7.1 (1 July 1905): 89-94.

A brief but dense sketch of pragmatism: "a vigorous system destined for a more than just a momentary existence." (p. 89) The dispute between its defenders–including part of the English religious community–and its critics still continues. "Pragmatism should be envisaged as the culminating point of modern philosophy and the different tendencies that were made manifest during the nineteenth century: Kantianism, Evolutionism, [and] Utilitarian philosophy." (p. 90) "In agreement with the Kantian, the pragmatist strongly (re)doubts pure metaphysics; with the evolutionist, he admits the provisional...character of our faculties of knowledge, and in agreement with the English moralists, he distinguishes two kinds of goods, but he further identifies them with the true." This discussion is followed by several examples of pragmatism and pragmatic truth, and the suggestion the pragmatism is just Leibnizism in disguise. There is a discussion of the categorical imperative, and of the difference between pragmatism and empiricism. Dessoulavy concludes that the advantages of the pragmatic system are numerous, and that notes that the Scholastic assumption that the good is the useful is the very affirmation in which pragmatism consists. LF

233 Dewey, John. Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.22 (26 Oct 1905): 597-599. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 168-170.

A reply to Charles Bakewell's "An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning Immediate Empiricism" {216}. Bakewell takes immediate experience to be unchanging and unrelated to other experiences. We must be able to directly experience something as mediating between other experiences. Transcendentalism fails to account for the experience of reality's continuity and growth. JRS

234 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience Again. J Phil 2.26 (21 Dec 1905): 707-711. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 183-187. *MW* 3: 178-183.

A reply to Bakewell's "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" {215} and Bode's "Cognitive Experience and Its Object" {219}. The recognition of the full meaning of an experience cannot itself be beyond experience; it is another type of experience intermediating towards a "new aesthetic-moral attitude." Knowledge does involve mediation, but when Bakewell mistakenly assumes that all experience must be knowing experience, he wrongly concludes that no experience can be immediate. JRS

235 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience and Its Relationships. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 652-657. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 177-182. *MW* 3: 171-177.

Dewey replies to F. J. E. Woodbridge's "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" {297}. Knowledge is not needed to experience the various qualities of things, but begins as things are experienced as able to influence other things, and ends in an experience of an object's "knowness" when it resolves a doubtful situation into a "stable, dependable state of affairs." In this sense, a knowledge experience transcends the doubtful experience. JRS

236 Dewey, John. Philosophy and American National Life. In *Centennial Anniversary* of the Graduation of the First Class, July Third to Seventh, 1904 (Burlington, Vermont: University of Vermont, 1905), pp. 106-113. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 73-78.

Philosophy serves the democratic concern with working solutions for citizens. JRS

237 Dewey, John. The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.15 (20 July 1905): 393-399. Reprinted with a concluding note answering critics, in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 226-241. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 167-173. *Pure Experience*, pp. 107-114. *MW* 3: 158-167.

Things are what they are experienced as. Since knowing is not the only way of experiencing, then there is nothing subjective or unreal about experienced unknown things. Known things are not "more" real, but instead more valuable. The "cognitive" encompasses the experiences involved the process of inquiry, culminating in a known object. Illusions can be detected only if they are as real as their causes. JRS

Summaries

Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 350.

Notes

See Woodbridge's response, "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" {297}.

238 Dewey, John. The Realism of Pragmatism. J Phil 2.12 (8 June 1905): 324-327. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 153-157.

Dewey responds to Stephen S. Colvin's remark that pragmatism results from a solipsistic psychology in "Is Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View for Psychology?" J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 225-231 [*MW* 3: 382-389]. Dewey states that pragmatism is doubly realistic: experience is "naïvely realistic" when thought is not needed, and ideas are "realistically conceived" in physiological terms. Empiricism eliminates the threat of metaphysical dualism. JRS

239 Dickenson, G. Lowes. The Newest Philosophy. Independent Review (Aug 1905).

240 Herrick, C. Judson. A Functional View of Nature As Seen by a Biologist. J Phil 2.16 (3 Aug 1905): 428-438.

An activity process, a "total situation," can be objectively viewed either temporally (functionally) or spatially (structurally). One type of process, the organism, is the "sum

total of the reaction of protoplasm and environment," and its experience ought to be studied in the same objective modes like any other process. It is easy to fall into the fallacy of deriving structure from function, or vice-versa, arriving at idealism or materialism. JRS

241 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. Pragmatism V. Absolutism. Mind n.s. 14.3 (July 1905): 297-334; 14.4 (Oct 1905): 441-478.

This conflict is the Anglo-American phase of the wider post-Hegelian debate between voluntarism and intellectualism. Pragmatism differs from its German metaphysical or ethical counterparts (Schopenhauer, Sigwart) by focusing on epistemology: its doctrine is that consciousness is purposive, and the intellect serves wider natural demands for ethical, religious, and aesthetic harmony. Hoernlé pursues several major criticisms of Bradley; on the nature of error, he praises pragmatism's concern with our ability to detect error, and faults Bradley's Absolute for making all human pursuits pointless and impossible.

When pragmatism's critic declares that a theory's *success* is due to its *truth*, and not the reverse, pragmatism must respond by raising this dilemma: is the acceptance of a theory as "true" independent of reasons for its acceptance, or not? The first horn portrays the label "truth" as a purely "formal endorsement," and permits one to declare a theory true without any supporting reasons or any recognition of its truth. The better alternative is the second horn: to reject "crude realism" and see that "when we discover the answer to a problem, the solution and the acceptance of the solution are for us one and the same," and that the intellectual process which culminates in such acceptance cannot be artificially isolated and cast off as incidental: "to make the working of a theory responsible for its truth, or the truth for the working, is to deal in tautologies." (p. 449n) We can only claim that someone else's judgment is false, and distinguish "the truth" from their reasons, when we believe that we have better reasons to judge differently. Experience has objective and subjective aspects, relative to our ability to control them. The realist forgets that interaction is reciprocal, and that just as we must change to gain knowledge, reality must change to become known. All "laws of thought" are limited to some definite range of experience, and susceptible to revision. James's doctrines of "will to believe" and "indeterminism" illustrate how faith is practically justified through successful living.

Pragmatism cannot arbitrate among various successful theories spawned by conflicting values, yet envisions an ultimate objective harmony. Psychology will no longer assist the pragmatist, since it treats only subjective facts of psychical existence, facts irrelevant to the search for validity. Our common interests, made possible by our sharing in a wider, objective experience (absolute idealism), allow the search for universal truths. JRS

Summaries

Grace Bruce, Psych Bull 3.4 (15 April 1906): 135-138; F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 450-453.

Notes

Schiller praises this essay as "the best general account of the Pragmatic movement which is extant" in "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," *Studies in Humanism* {490}, p. 71n.

242 James, William. The Essence of Humanism. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 113-118. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 121-135. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 190-205. *Works MT*, pp. 70-77. *Works ERE*, pp. 97-104.

Humanism is neither a hypothesis nor based on discovery of new facts, but is rather a change in perspective, leading to change in the sizes and values of things. Its formulations are provisional as yet and its definitions are incomplete. Its leading advocates, F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, have only published fragmentary programs. Its central assertion is that experience is self-contained and depends upon nothing. The formula can be read atheistically but his own reading is theistic, with God being an experience of "widest actual conscious span." Humanism eliminates the typical monistic problems of evil and freedom, and the sterile absolute of idealism. It analyzes knowledge as a relation between portions of experience, agreeing with common sense as to the identity of knower and known in perception, and in case of representative knowledge, asserting an experienceable "leading" from knower to known. For common sense, the perceptions in which chains of leadings terminate are the real objects. Philosophers view these perceptions as not quite reaching reality. For humanism, the reality beyond, whether conceived as viscera and cells, or atoms, or mind-stuff, is just further possible experience. Since the subject of truth is discussed elsewhere, here it is enough to emphasize that truth lies wholly within experience and is always a matter of apperception: if new experiences are too incongruous with old experiences they are always treated as false. IKS

Reviews

Giovanni Vailati, Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 73 [*Scritti* {1018}, p. 596].

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 383.

243 James, William. The Experience of Activity. Psych Rev 12.1 (19 Jan 1905): 1-7. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 155-189. *McDermott*, pp. 277-291. *Works ERE*, pp. 79-95.

The problem of activity involves a psychological question, whether we perceive activity, and a metaphysical question, whether there is activity. For radical empiricism, either the word "activity" has no meaning, or it must be possible to point out concrete experiences which serve as "type and model" of its meaning. In the case of activity, we find experiences which contain desire, goal, and resistance, but many writers have insisted that behind phenomenal activity there must be real agents. Three kinds of theories have been proposed concerning such agents and they have to be examined in terms of the pragmatic method. If one holds real agents to be consciousnesses of wider span than ours, their purposes become ours. If they are understood in religious terms, they do not "de-realize" activity but corroborate it. The real agents are by others thought of as of lesser span, either as "ideas" or nerve-cells. In both cases, the real agents would have to be thought of as indifferent to the larger outcome. Thus, pragmatically, our interest is in outcomes. The metaphysical question centers around causality, for real activities are those which create things which otherwise would not be. Causality must be accepted as an ultimate category and what we feel it to be. IKS

Reviews

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 111-113

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 381-382.

Notes

An abstract is in Psych Bull 2.2 (15 Feb 1905): 39-40 [*Works ERE*, pp. 257-258].

244 James, William. How Two Minds Can Know One Thing. J Phil 2.7 (30 March 1905): 176-181. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 123-136. *McDermott*, pp. 227-232. *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1186-1192. *Works ERE*, pp. 61-67.

Radical empiricism's claim that a bit of pure experience becomes mental or physical, by entering into relations with other portions of experience, can be extended to explain how the same thing can be known by different knowers: a pure experience can also enter many streams of thought. But how is this possible? Since a thought is as it is felt, it seems possible for it to exist only once; if so, we return to ordinary dualism for which insulated minds "representatively know a third thing." The analysis of personal identity in *Principles of Psychology* (1890) instead shows that an experience becomes mine by appropriation, by having a feeling of warmth added to it. Many such feelings can be attached to the same object. IKS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 739.

245 James, William. Humanism and Truth Once More. Mind n.s. 14.2 (April 1905): 190-198. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 244-265. *Works ERE*, pp. 127-136.

James replies to H. W. B. Joseph, "Professor James on 'Humanism and Truth'" {253}. Humanism is not a thesis which can be refuted, but a shift in opinion which can survive the errors of its advocates. To understand it one must abandon ideals of rigor and finality and be content with "on the whole." Critics such as Joseph are like scholastics trying to refute Darwinism on the grounds that the higher cannot come from the lower. Their "truth" is conformity to a non-human archetype, a sterile formula for which humanism substitutes concrete motives. Humanism is not complete subjectivism and does not deny trans-perceptual reality. Some truths are subjective and made in the assertion. At other times, it is more satisfactory to assert the past existence of the object. All truths are subject to future revision. The history of belief is the substitution of more for less satisfactory opinions, but on the side of the object, humanism is not alone in facing various difficulties. Some humanists are dualists, but James himself affirms a pure experience to resolve the difficulties. Concerning knowledge, Joseph claims that the most important satisfaction is to believe what is true, making truth prior to satisfaction. However, an analysis of intellectual satisfaction shows that it is a felt consistency among our beliefs; such satisfaction in consistency can be explained in beings who develop mental habits. Theoretical interests have arisen from our practical ones. IKS

246 James, William. Introduction. To Edward L. Thorndike, *The Elements of Psychology* (New York: A. G. Seiler, 1905. 2nd ed., 1907), pp. v-vii. Reprinted in *Works EPs*, pp. 328-330.

Textbooks of psychology follow an established pattern, and many of them are so filled with expository machinery as to frustrate the "natural movement of the mind when reading." Thorndike's book is fresh, concrete, and gives a "first-hand" acquaintance with the workings of the human mind. IKS

247 James, William. Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic? J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 235-238. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 234-240. *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1203-1205. *Works ERE*, pp. 119-122.

James replies to B. H. Bode's "'Pure Experience' and the External World" {221}. Bode argues that without self-transcendence there can be no objective reference, and without that, it is impossible for a subjective stream to lead to an objective order. Radical empiricists deny self-transcendence but a complete analysis shows that their concept of pointing means the same as that of self-transcendence, because in the case of pointing, the future term, while not experienced, must nevertheless be present noetically; Bode thus concludes that this is exactly self-transcendence. James replies that pointing is as an aspect of "experience's living flow." Bode rationalisically substitutes for that flow a static object. Bode's analysis is retrospective; radical empiricists insist on "understanding forwards." Whether called self-transcendence or pointing, objective reference is something which occurs within experience and that a definite description can be given of it. Rationalists deny this, insisting either that objective reference occurs without an experienceable medium or that the mediation takes place in some super-empirical realm. IKS

248 James, William. La Notion de conscience. In *Archives de Psychologie* 5.17 (June 1905): 1-12. Also published in *Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Psicologia* (Rome: Forzani e C. Tipografi del Senato, Editori, 1905) pp. 146-154. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 206-233. *Works ERE*, pp. 105-118. A translation is provided in *Works ERE*, pp. 261-271.

All philosophical schools accept the dualism of ideas and things. Scientific psychology has achieved important results by beginning with this dualism. However, while we can allow dualism for practical purposes, we cannot admit that ultimately ideas and things are made of different kinds of stuff. Whatever may be true in respect of their private lives, in the public lives of things, in perception, we find identity and not dualism. We also find identity in those qualities of things which we appreciate such as beauty, and, as Santayana has shown, in respect for them we prefer not to draw a distinction between subject and object. The same holds for secondary qualities and emotions. However, dualism lingers because experience not only is, but is reported. The notion of "pure experiences" allows for non-dualistic description because it makes the reporting simply another part of experience. On this view, consciousness as an entity does not exist. IKS

Reviews

Giovanni Vailati, "La 'concezione della coscienza' di William James," Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1 (June-Aug 1905) [Scritti {1018}, pp. 643-645].

Notes

The *Atti del V Congresso* publication was followed by a report of discussion by Bulliot, Lipps, Beaunis, Itelson, and Claparède, pp. 154-156 [*Works ERE*, pp. 259-260].

249 James, William. The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience. J Phil 2.11 (25 May 1905): 281-287. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 137-154. *McDermott*, pp. 271-277. *WJ Writings 2*, pp. 1206-1214. *Works ERE*, pp. 69-77.

Common sense is dualistic, taking the opposition of thoughts and things as ultimate since the two are made of different kinds of stuff. Radical empiricism treats the opposition as only an affair of function. Fear, love, valuations, and other affectional facts seem merely mental, lacking physical function. James argues that affectional facts as concretely experienced are ambiguous. They often remain "pure" and unclassified when there is no need to decide whether they are mental or physical. The existence of such ambiguity supports radical empiricism over dualism. IKS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 99.

250 James, William. The Thing and Its Relations. J Phil 2.2 (19 Jan 1905): 29-41. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 92-122. *McDermott*, pp. 214-226. *Works ERE*, pp. 45-59.

Experience as lived gives rise to disappointments but no paradoxes, which arise only in reflection. Rationalists claim that the flux of pure experience is conceptualized for theoretical reasons. Naturalists emphasize practice: conceptualization is needed for prediction and control of experience. Hence, rationalists such as F. H. Bradley want concepts to leave experience behind, while naturalists use them to return to concrete experience. Rationalists use dialectical arguments to attack the common sense belief that several minds can know one thing and introduce the Absolute to restore unity. Such arguments are purely verbal; a thing can stand in several relations while remaining the same. Some conjunctive relations are more intimate, some more external; radical empiricism accepts "concatenated union," the partial "hanging-together" of things. Because external relations seem so numerous, it tends towards pluralism. Bradley, on the other hand, finding external relations irrational, asserts that there must be a deeper unity, an internally related whole. IKS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 382.

251 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. *Gedanken und Denker: Gesammelte Aufsätze.* Leipzig and Vienna: W. Braunmuller, 1905.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 391-393. An "interesting and vigorously written" collection of popular reviews and essays, from 1888-1905. JRS

Grace Neal Dolson, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 92-93; J. L. McIntyre, Mind n.s. 15.1 (Jan 1906): 118-119.

252 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. *Der Kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik.* Leipzig and Vienna: W. Braunmuller, 1905.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 391-393. Jerusalem's psychological treatment of logic "arrives at very nearly the same conclusions as the pragmatists" but he risks affirming a metaphysical realism. JRS

C. Cantoni, "Sull' idealismo critico: Saggio di una difesa del sapere volgare," Riv Filo 9 (Jan-Feb 1906): 3-23; Grace Neal Dolson, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 92-93; J. L. McIntyre, Mind n.s. 15.1 (Jan 1906): 118-119.

253 Joseph, H. W. B. Professor James on 'Humanism and Truth'. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 28-41.

Joseph comments on James's "Humanism and Truth" {176}. Truths may have practical consequences, but we want to settle questions of truth or falsity apart from them. Do pragmatists identify truth with the consequences of an assertion's truth, or the consequences of believing it true, or with a beneficial reaction to an idea? If our categories evolve, how can the conception of man as adapting to his environment be taken as true "anteriorly" to them? IKS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 740-741.

Notes

See James's reply, "Humanism and Truth Once More" {245}.

254 Judd, Charles H. Radical Empiricism and Wundt's Philosophy. J Phil 2.7 (30 March 1905): 169-176. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 61-69.

Wundt agrees with James that mind and body are logical constructs from the one reality of immediate experience. However, Wundt's explanation of experience's stable patterns and processes of thought is not "naïve" or "radical" but instead "critical." Wundt offers better theories of the future, objective space, and other minds. JRS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 739-740.

255 King, Irving. The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 248-261.

Pragmatism's functional account of belief reveals how religious dogmas are only symbols of faith. Real religious faith originates in, and only serves, immediate practical crises. JRS

Notes

See also King's *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness* (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1904. Rpt., Psychological Review Monograph Supplement vol. 6, no. 4. New York: Macmillan, January 1905).

256 Lindsay, A. D. Moral Causation and Artistic Production. Int J Ethics 15.4 (July 1905): 399-417.

There is no need to follow James's indeterminism in order to defend morality, since, like the skill of an artist, moral judgment requires the creative transformation of tradition in the pursuit of character perfection. JRS

257 Lloyd, Alfred H. The Personal and the Factional in the Life of Society. J Phil 2.13 (22 June 1905): 337-345.

Pragmatism violates the *a priori* foundations of any specialized field, whether of science, business, morality, religion, etc., which all demand of its respective participants a conformity to some necessary rules for experience. Pragmatism instead respects the freedom of the individual, and the personal demands made on institutions. Conformity and freedom are relative aspects of social unity; pragmatism provides a needed balance to absolutism. JRS

258 Marchesini, Giovanni. *Le Finzioni dell' anima.* Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1905.

Reviews

E. Ritchie, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 734.

259 McTaggart, John M. E. The Inadequacy of Certain Common Grounds of Belief. Hibbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 116-140. Portions reprinted in his *Some Dogmas of Religion* (London: Edward Arnold, 1906).

McTaggart rejects, among many others (and without openly mentioning pragmatism), these arguments for religious belief: any dogma without which we could not act must be true, and that the practical desire for a conclusion is sufficient to make it true. JRS

260 Mead, G. H. Reviews of D. Draghiscesco, *Du Rôle de l'individu dans le déterminisme social*, and *Le Problème du déterminisme social.* Psych Bull 2.12 (15 Dec 1905): 399-405.

Draghiscesco assumes that sociology and psychology treat the same individual, reducing psychology to the teleological laws of sociology, and concluding that sociology cannot be one of the mechanistic natural sciences. However, reflective consciousness treats all areas of knowledge teleologically. JRS

261 Mellone, S. H. Is Humanism a Philosophical Advance? Mind n.s. 14.4 (Oct 1905): 507-529.

If postulates are the start to knowledge, where is the origin of postulates? It cannot be in feeling, will, or pure experience, as Schiller and James suggest, but in some "embryonic" intellectual function. Only reason can apprehend and judge purposes, and if humanism cannot supply one highest purpose, it "sinks to the level of the crudest naturalism." While reality is not static, it cannot be "constructed" out of our efforts either, and humanism must admit some objective order. JRS

Summaries

F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 563-564.

262 Montague, William P. The Relational Theory of Consciousness and Its Realistic Implications. J Phil 2.12 (8 June 1905): 309-316. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 70-78.

263 Moore, A. W. Pragmatism and Its Critics. Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 322-343. Reprinted with revisions in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 128-173.

Moore surveys idealistic criticisms of pragmatism made from 1903 to 1904, in light of pragmatism's accusation that idealism's definition of truth is disconnected from, and irrelevant to, standards used to test particular judgments. Moore shows how several idealists appeal to pragmatic-sounding criteria only to unreasonably add that the absolute system must be the fixed and final standard of truth. Moore then defends pragmatism from their criticisms that it is subjective, unable to find permanence in the flux of experience, too dependent on teleology, abuses evolution, and leads to skepticism. JRS

Summaries

Gertrude L. Besse, Psych Bull 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 15-18.

264 Papini, Giovanni. Agire senza sentire e sentire senza agire. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 2.2 (May-June 1905). Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 92-104.

This essay is another exploration into the complex problem of human activity. Drawing upon a dizzying array of sources which include Kant, Aristotle, Ignatius Loyola, Campanella, Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, Papini offers a sketch of the various ways in which action and sentiment are related. EPC

265 Papini, Giovanni (signed as Gian Falco). Atena e Faust. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 8-14. Reprinted as "Unico e Diverso" in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 26-44.

Papini found much he liked in William James, not the least of which was James's aversion to philosophies that cast reality into total, unified systems. This is the theme of Papini's present essay. Philosophy is defined at the outset as "one of the instruments created by man for the appropriation of the world." He lays out two opposing systems of thought: the Classical, summarized in qualities such as universality, being, and passivity on the one hand, and the Romantic, embracing such attributes as particularity, evolution, and activity on the other. The post-Romantic problem takes philosophy out of the realm of the speculative and into the realm of the active augmentation of power. The power of the "subliminal self" must now be expanded so as to remake the world. This must be the project of the new philosophical culture. EPC

266 Papini, Giovanni. Les Extrêmes de l'activité théorique. In *Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus* (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 473-480.

To understand truly, it is necessary, as James well know, to exaggerate. The discovery of truth happens in extreme circumstances; and for this reason Papini proposes a study of the extremes of *l'activité theorique*, that is to say, the form of an activity that consists in "knowing objects" and not in "experiencing pleasure or pain from doing so, or in wanting to change those objects." (p. 473) "The extremes are: intuition–gnostic fact, elementary, immediate–and concept, an idea general and universal, the abstract that is expressed in symbols, simple and definite." (ibid.) Until now, the concept triumphed over intuition in philosophy, and philosophy has been rationalistic. Papini sketches this idea from Heraclitus to the present. Recently, he argues, there has been an anti-rationalistic turn, which is a move away from symbols to things (*choses*). This movement affirms the humanity of the philosopher and critiques intellectualism and its instruments (language and logic). The advocates of this view then wish to "return to the particular, to plurality, to the individual, to action." (p. 479) "...Pragmatism subjugates theoretic truth to practical needs (Peirce, James, Brunetière, Sigwart, Simmel, Schiller, Eucken, Prezzolini, and Singer). Because it is not a matter of knowing but rather a matter of making (Remacle). It is not a question of knowing the world, but of possessing and creating it." (ibid.) LF

Notes

The subsequent discussion by Frédéric Rauh and Giovanni Papini is reported on pp. 480-481.

267 Papini, Giovanni. Il pragmatismo e i partiti politici. L'Idea liberale (28 May 1905). Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 114-118.

Of all of the essays selected for inclusion in *Sul pragmatismo*, this one stands apart. It is not a theoretical inquiry into an abstract set of problems, but rather an attempt to introduce clarity into the confusing world of Italian politics by classifying political parties using the pragmatic method. The advantage that the pragmatic approach has is that it classifies on the basis of "real differences of action," rather than on the misleading basis of slogans and phrases. EPC

268 Papini, Giovanni. Influenza della volontà sulla conoscenza. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 127-128. Reprinted as "Volontà e conoscenza" in *Sul Pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 88-91.

In this essay Papini discusses some recent theories of the will, including those of Schopenhauer, Herbart, and Mach. He urges that we abandon discussion of the will, and focus instead upon voluntary actions. In the little that follows, he is eager to establish the reciprocal influence of will and intellect. Paraphrasing Bacon, he asserts that not only is knowledge power, but power is knowledge as well. EPC

269 Papini, Giovanni (signed as The Florence Pragmatist Club). Pragmatismo messo in ordine. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 45-48. Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 67-72.

This essay is Papini's intervention into the published dispute between Prezzolini and Calderoni concerning the true nature of pragmatism. Papini opens by saying that while it is impossible to define pragmatism in a univocal and precise manner, it is possible to articulate its essential characteristics. Ever the pluralist (and one might add, ever the consummate editor as well), Papini urges the view that pragmatism embraces both the pursuit of clarity of meaning as Calderoni would have it, as well as the expanded power of the will to create, as Prezzolini had argued. This is the essay in which Papini first offers the corridor metaphor. Like a corridor in a grand hotel, pragmatism opens into many different rooms. The occupants of these rooms all use the same corridor, and it is likely that they will converse and even argue with one another on their way to their own rooms. EPC

270 Peirce, C. S. Issues of Pragmaticism. Monist 15.4 (Oct 1905): 481-499. Reprinted in *CP* 5.438-463.

Peirce opens this second of three *Monist* articles with a restatement of his pragmaticism. In the first eleven pages he discusses six points concerning his Critical Common-sensism: (1) the claim that there are indubitable propositions and inferences, which leads Peirce to a discussion of the *Cogito*, (2) his affinity to Thomas Reid's philosophy, (3) several remarks on instinctive beliefs, (4) his insistence "that the acritically indubitable is invariably vague" (p. 486) which leads him to discuss the determinate and the indeterminate, (5) the value that he attaches to *genuine* doubt, and (6) his modified Kantianism. Peirce explains his version of scholastic realism–the opinion that "there are real objects that are general, among the number being the modes

of determination of existent singulars...[and]...the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real *vagues*, and especially real possibilities"–and its relation to his pragmatism. (p. 492) Peirce also mentions his original formulation of pragmatism, and reconsiders the case of the untested diamond. Pp. 492-497 are concerned with real necessity and possibility. LF

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 565-566.

271 Peirce, C. S. Notes. Nation 81.5 (3 Aug 1905): 97. Reprinted in *The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 233-234.

Peirce remarks on the interest in pragmatism in Italy, and on the value of James's "La Notion de conscience" {248}, in which he "maintains that the distinction between thing and thought is exclusively functional." LF

272 Peirce, C. S. What Pragmatism Is. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 161-181. Reprinted in *CP* 5.411-5.437.

Peirce begins with a discussion of his own views as an experimentalist, his interest in methods of thinking, and a statement of his pragmatism. This leads him to discuss his ethics of terminology and to the reasons for changing the name of his position to "pragmaticism." He holds that his version is superior to others since it "more readily connects itself with a critical proof of its truth." (p. 166) Of the several preliminary positions "without which pragmatism would be a nullity," Peirce focuses on the stricture to "dismiss make-believes." He provides definitions of "doubt," "belief," and "truth," remarking on the fundamental characteristics of a rational person. On p. 170 he takes up pragmatism explicitly, via a dialogue between a questioner and a pragmatist. These interlocutors reveal that Peirce's method is intended to show that "almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish...or...downright absurd..." (p. 171); that pragmatism is a species of prope-positivism; that it accepts instinctive beliefs; and that it insists on the truth of scholastic realism. Their discussion then turns to the nature of experiments, experimental phenomena, the meaning of propositions, and phenomenalism. The pragmatist in the discussion provides a list of points with which he will agree, and gives accounts of the distinction of objective and subjective generality, the reality of generals, and predication, respectively. On the final pages, Peirce remarks on Hegel and on the reality of continuity and Thirdness. LF

Reviews

Henry Ruger, J Phil 2.25 (7 Dec 1905): 694-695; Giovanni Vailati, Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 139-140 [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 639-640].

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.5 (Sept 1905): 628-629.

Notes

See Harold Henderson, *Catalyst for Controversy: Paul Carus of Open Court* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), pp. 125-141, for a discussion of Peirce's relationship with *The Monist* and its editor, Paul Carus.

273 Peirce, C. S. Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology. Nation 81.3 (20 July 1905): 56-57. Reprinted in *The Nation*, Part Three, pp. 229-233.

A review of Wilhelm Wundt's *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, vol. 1, translated from the fifth German edition (1902) by Edward B. Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1904). Peirce begins with a discussion of the "malady of psychology": the slow pace at which this science is progressing compared to every other, experimental or otherwise. He then turns to the common experience of all people which Bentham called *cenoscopy*, and the Philosophy of Common Sense, "of which analytical mechanics and analytical economics are branches." (p. 231) Pragmatism is only an attempt to give "the philosophy of common sense a more exact development, especially by emphasizing the point that there is no intellectual value in mere feeling *per se*, but that the whole function of thinking consists in the regulation of conduct." (ibid.) Wundt was not gifted as a philosopher; he views common sense as "an imperfect kind of science," and overlooks "the value of the pragmatist analysis in binding together nerve-physiology and psychology." LF

274 Perry, Ralph B. *The Approach to Philosophy.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905.

Pragmatism is discussed in connection with Kant and Fichte on pp. 151-152 and 404-408. JRS

Reviews

Walter T. Marvin, J Phil 2.18 (30 Aug 1905): 497-499; F. H. Melville, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 119-120.

275 Prezzolini, Guiseppe (signed Giuliano il Sofista). Il mio prammatisto. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 48. Reprinted in *La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 230-231.

In the next stage of his dispute with Mario Calderoni, Prezzolini accuses his antagonist of being more Peircean than Peirce himself! Calderoni, writes Prezzolini, imagines the world to be populated by logical marionettes rather than flesh and blood human beings. The intellectualist interpretation of pragmatism which Calderoni proposes is suited only to the well-appointed studies of the universities, having little relevance for the particular human individual. EPC

Notes

For an account of Peirce's reaction to Prezzolini's position, see Max H. Fisch and Christian J. W. Kloesel, "Peirce and the Florentine Pragmatists: His Letter to Calderoni and a New Edition of his Writings," Topoi 1-2 (Dec 1982): 70-73.

276 Read, Carveth. *The Metaphysics of Nature.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1905. 2nd ed., 1908.

Hume rejected Pyrrhonist skepticism by appealing to the pragmatic grounds of action. However, pragmatism is still a form of skepticism, since its foundation is nothing but feeling and will, which "puts the conviction of Reason solely upon any ground other than cognition." (p. 93) Why can't "disinterested curiosity" pursue knowledge? JRS

Reviews

Charles M. Bakewell, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 324-333; David Morrison, Mind n.s. 15.4 (Oct 1906): 554-559; David Phillips, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 393-397; Thomas Whittaker, Hibbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 205-209.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Charles M. Bakewell, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 206-211; David Morrison, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 287-288; H. A. Overstreet, J Phil 6.25 (9 Dec 1909): 689-692.

Notes

William James refers to Read as a new member of "the pragmatistic church," in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, p. xli(n) [*Works MT*, p. 9(n)].

277 Russell, Francis C. Substitution in Logic. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 294-295.

Notes

Peirce may be the author; see the "Bibliography," *CP* 8, p. 298.

278 Sabine, George H. Radical Empiricism as a Logical Method. Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 696-705. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 79-89.

Radical empiricism is an empirical method for solving metaphysical problems with emphasis on "introspection" and observation of individual experiences. This can only yield psychological facts and not principles of unity and explanation. The method is inappropriate for metaphysics. IKS

279 Santayana, George. *The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress.* 5 volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905-1906. Reprinted as vols. 1-5 in the Triton edition, *The Works of George Santayana*, 14 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936-1937).

Reviews of vols. 1-2

John Dewey, Science n.s. 23 (9 Feb 1906): 223-225 [*MW* 3: 319-322]. Santayana's "naturalistic idealism" overemphasizes natural impulses and makes facts indifferent to ideas. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 462-464. This work will "probably rank as one of the most systematic applications of the pragmatic method to philosophy," despite its pronounced naturalism. JRS

Ernest Albee, Phil Rev 14.5 (Sept 1905): 602-607; Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 38.10 (May 1905): 349-351.

Reviews of vols. 1-4

A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.8 (12 April 1906): 211-221. A confusion between consciousness and reflective thought leads Santayana to first affirm, then deny, the instrumentality of reason. Is reason both the expression and controller of impulse? JRS

Reviews of vols. 3-4

Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 40.3 (1 Feb 1906): 87-89. This work is the first attempt to "give systematic expression to that new group of tendencies which, under the name of Pragmatism, or Humanism, is causing a ferment in the philosophical world." JRS

Reviews of vols. 3-5

F. C. S. Schiller, Hibbert Journal 4.4 (July 1906): 936-940. The "only flaw" in Santayana's pragmatic theory of knowledge is the overly irrational status given to the data. The pragmatic value of science should not be used to defend a naturalistic metaphysics. JRS

Reviews of vol. 5

A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.17 (16 Aug 1906): 469-471. The "discordant note" of Platonic fixity taints an otherwise forceful statement of the "*vital* character of reason." JRS

Reviews of vols. 1-5

John Dewey, Educational Review 34.2 (Sept 1907): 116-129 [*MW* 4: 229-241]. Santayana displays a "direct sense" for experience's realities, but then he rejects them as subjective. He commits the "initial fallacy of vicious metaphysics" by forgetting that philosophy is a human effort in a historical context. As a survey of intelligence's attempt to learn from struggle to direct further achievements, his philosophy "will permanently count." JRS

G. E. Moore, Int J Ethics 17.2 (Jan 1907): 248-253. So much "confused thinking" may be suggestive, but not useful. JRS

Notes

Vol. 1: *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense* (1905), vol 2: *Reason in Society* (1905), vol. 3: *Reason in Religion* (1906), vol. 4: *Reason in Art* (1906), vol. 5: *Reason in Science* (1906). See Santayana's reply to Moore's first review, "The Efficacy of Thought," J Phil 3.15 (19 July 1906): 410-412; and Moore's reply to Santayana, "The Function of Thought," J Phil 3.19 (13 Sept 1906): 519-522.

280 Schiller, F. C. S. The Definition of 'Pragmatism' and 'Humanism'. Mind n.s. 14.2 (April 1905): 235-240. Portions reprinted in "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 1-21.

The narrow pragmatism of Peirce can be expanded into a wider "general view of the mind" by the realization that only practical consequences are needed to "account" for current truths. The wider pragmatism is an epistemological method which, however, does not force the acceptance of the general philosophical principle called humanism. Thus, Schiller would like to dissent in part from the limits proposed by James in "Humanism and Truth" {176}. IKS

Notes

See A. E. Taylor's response, "Truth and Consequences" {381}.

281 Schiller, F. C. S. The Definitions of Pragmatism. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 44-45. Portions were reprinted in "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 1-21. Reprinted in full in *Opere: Dal "Leonardo" al Futurismo*, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 755-757.

282 Schiller, F. C. S. Empiricism and the Absolute. Mind n.s. 14.3 (July 1905): 348-370. Reprinted with "modifications, additions, and omissions" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 224-257.

Schiller responds to criticisms made by A. E. Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics* {144}. Taylor represents a bridge from narrow intellectualism to humanism. He uses teleological language, speaks of intellectual demands, agrees that science uses unproven postulates, and recognizes the instrumentality of thought and the reality of only experience. Still, his dominant intellectualist assumption–the "system" of unchanging reality–overwhelms these improvements, without any practical benefit in return. JRS

Summaries

William L. Raub, J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 80-81; George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 564-565.

283 Schiller, F. C. S. The Progress of Psychical Research. Fortnightly Review n.s. 77 (2 Jan 1905): 60-73. Reprinted with additions in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 370-390.

284 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Edgar Janssens, *Le Néo-Criticisme de Charles Renouvier*. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 125-126.

Janssens's fundamentally unsympathetic and Catholic-oriented exposition overlooks Renouvier's pioneering voluntaristic psychology. This psychological standpoint led to James's humanism. JRS

285 Shenk, William Washington. *Pragmatism in Its Philosophical and Theological Relations*. Dissertation, Boston University, 1905.

286 Sidgwick, Alfred. Applied Axioms. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 42-57.

Sidgwick defends Schiller's position that McTaggart misuses the Law of Contradiction, and thoroughly describes the pragmatic view of "laws of thought." JRS

Notes

Schiller's critique of Taylor is in "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process," reprinted in *Humanism* {139} pp. 95-109.

287 Taylor, Alfred E. Truth and Practice. Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 265-289.

In the discussion of truth, three separate issues arise: what is the meaning of "true" and "false"; to which propositions are they to ascribed; and how in a given case we consider a proposition true. "True" cannot mean the same thing as "useful" and it is false that utility is always a sign of truth. IKS

288 Tower, Carl V. A Neglected 'Context' in 'Radical Empiricism'. J Phil 2.15 (20 July 1905): 400-408.

In James's "Does 'Consciousness' Exist" {174}, James correctly discards consciousness as an entity and keeps it as a function. We can accept its definition of consciousness as a "context of experience." However, radical empiricism ignores one context, the "total context," which includes an indefinite fringe of objects. IKS

Summaries

Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 563.

Notes

See his "The Total Context of Transcendentalism," J Phil 2.16 (3 Aug 1905): 421-428.

289 Tyrrell, George. Notre attitude en face du "Pragmatisme." Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne 4th series 1.3 (Dec 1905): 225-232.

A discussion of apologetic theology and pragmatism in which Tyrrell argues that pragmatism is–"especially in the hands of W. James and F. Schiller"–"clear, seductive and one that can be managed with particular ease by the apologist." (p. 225) Tyrrell further holds that truth is an agreement of attribute with subject, and that one cannot think of objects outside of mind. It is as easy to confuse thought that contains things with the things themselves, as it is to confuse a sentiment with things sensed. Our lives are such that we can *act* on external objects, alter our experience, and thus govern pain

and pleasure. "In a word, feeling transforms into action..." (p. 227) There is a discussion of Reason and truth on pp. 228-231, and Tyrrell concludes that where pragmatism has been severely criticized by the intellectualists and the Hegelian school, it is partly the fault of the pragmatists, and also partly due to the association of "pragmatism" with the similar sounding "Moralism." If at all a sympathetic view, pragmatism is to be understood as a first sketch, to be revised and corrected. (p. 231) LF

290 Vailati, Giovanni. La caccia alle antitesi. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 53-57. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 582-589. Translated as "The Attack on Distinctions," J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 701-709.

291 Vailati, Giovanni. La distinzione fra conoscere e volere. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 128-129. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 626-629. Translated with some additions as "Distinction entre connaissance et volonté," Rev de Phil 6.6 (1 June 1905): 642-648.

Reviews of the translation

Wilmon H. Sheldon, J Phil 2.23 (9 Nov 1905): 641-642.

292 Vailati, Giovanni. L'Influenza della matematica sulla teoria della conoscenza nella filosofia moderna. Riv Filo 7 (May-June 1905). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 603-618.

293 Vailati, Giovanni. I tropi della logica. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 3-7. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 564-571. Translated as "On Material Representations of Deductive Processes," J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 309-316.

294 Vailati, Giovanni. La ricerca dell'impossibile. Leonardo 3.4 (Oct-Dec 1905): 146-150. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 659-666.

295 Ward, James. Mechanism and Morals: The World of Science and the World of History. Hibbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 79-99.

Ward mentions Peirce's objective idealism. JRS

296 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Nature of Consciousness. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 119-125. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 307-315. *Pure Experience*, pp. 90-97.

James is right to find consciousness in relations, but how can functionalism assert that only one field of experience encompasses consciousness? JRS

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 390-391.

297 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience? J Phil 2.21 (12 Oct 1905): 573-576. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 320. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 174-177.

Woodbridge comments on Dewey's "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" {237}, defending the transcendence of knowledge by arguing that the alternative, the alteration of things by knowledge, leads to absolute idealism. JRS

298 Wright, Henry W. Evolution and Ethical Method. Int J Ethics 16.1 (Oct 1905): 59-68.

Evolution is a process of differentiation and integration. Evolutionary morality finds purposive conduct to be both individually impulsive and socially organized, thus reconciling hedonism and intuitionism. JRS

1906

299 Adams, Elizabeth Kemper. *The Aesthetic Experience: Its Meaning in a Functional Psychology.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1906. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907.

The value of re-organized experience is the aesthetic culmination of logical or ethical judgment, just as the doubt of interrupted activity marks its origin. It should not be generalized into an absolute goal (Schiller) or standard (some idealists). JRS

Reviews

W. D. Furry, Psych Bull 5.11 (15 Nov 1908): 363-366.

300 Baillie, James B. *An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1906. Reprinted, New York: Garland, 1984.

In chap. 1, conscious purposiveness is used to unify conception and existence, and provides the "sentiment" of rationality which, when directed toward the needs which all people share, forms objectively valid knowledge. (p. 10-11) Pragmatism's individualistic psychology cannot explain such knowledge, which requires universal experience (though humanism does talk of "social" consciousness). JRS

Reviews

Ernest Albee, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 538-543; H. N. Gardiner, Amer J Psych 18.3 (July 1907): 371-373; John S. Mackenzie, Int J Ethics 18.2 (Jan 1908): 256-260; Edward Elliott Richardson, J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 331-334; J. W. Scott, Hibbert Journal 5.4 (July 1907): 933-937.

301 Baldwin, James Mark. *Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic.* Vol. 1. *Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Macmillan; London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1906.

The problem of knowledge must be interpreted by the evolutionary view of life as continuous adjustment to environments, without going to the extreme of "cruder" pragmatism. On p. 50, Baldwin argues that objects resist our active processes, and do not, as Dewey holds, emerge from them. Knowledge at the instrumental stage is only hypothetical, not universal, but pragmatism (including Peirce himself–see p. 222n) mistakes this stage for the end of knowledge. JRS

Reviews

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 68-75. By opposing pragmatism with a dualistic account of judgment, Baldwin seems to assert a "most primitive realism." JRS

A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 4.3 (15 March 1907): 81-88. Can Baldwin avoid static absolutism? Even new objects must fit into the "active system of habits and attention." His hypothetical/universal distinction is confusing. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 247-251. Baldwin commits the "psychologist's fallacy," and offers only one of many possible "genetic" logics. JRS

Notes

See Baldwin's reply to Moore's review, "Thought and Things" {393}. See also Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, vol. 2 {509}, and *Thought and Things*, vol. 3 {905}.

302 Bawden, H. Heath. Evolution and the Absolute. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 145-156.

Our conception of a thing is our understanding of that thing's gradual origins and successive operations, demarcated from the rest of reality's processes only by our particular interest in it. An absolute understanding of anything, much less the whole of reality, is impossible. JRS

303 Bawden, H. Heath. Methodological Implications of the Mind-Matter Controversy. Psych Bull 3.10 (15 Oct 1906): 321-349.

A detailed survey of psychology, portraying the growing dissatisfaction with parallelism. Bawden describes the positions of numerous thinkers, including Dewey and James, who argue that reality and experience are identical and provide a functional account of consciousness. Charles Strong's idealism receives lengthy scrutiny. JRS

304 Bentley, I. Madison. The Psychology of Organic Movements. Amer J Psych 17.3 (July 1906): 293-305.

An overview of the current psychological emphasis on motor activities. The functional psychology of John Dewey, J. R. Angell, A. W. Moore, and J. M. Baldwin is described in historical and present-day contexts. JRS

305 Blondel, Maurice. Le Point départ de la recherche philosophique. Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne 4th series 1 (1906): 337-360; 2 (1906): 225-249.

Notes

James recommends this work, among others, to readers who "wish to read farther" on the general subject of pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}. See Blondel, *L'Action II* {2539}.

306 Blondel, Maurice (signed as Bernard de Sailly). La Tâche de la philosophie d'après la philosophie de l'action. Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne 4th series 3 (1906): 47-59.

Notes

James recommends this work, among others, to readers who "wish to read farther" on the general subject of pragmatism, in his "Preface" to *Pragmatism* {438}.

307 Bode, Boyd H. Realism and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.15 (19 July 1906): 393-401. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 77-85.

Realists assert that the consciousness "is not a constituent element of extramental objects," but they have traditionally had difficulty separating the "acquaintance with" and "knowledge-about" types of knowledge. Pragmatists can easily do so, but must attempt to show how the latter can originate out of the former. This attempt will always fail. JRS

Summaries

Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 108.

308 Boodin, J. E. Mind as Instinct. Psych Rev 13.2 (March 1906): 121-138. Reprinted in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 15-42.

309 Boodin, J. E. Space and Reality. J Phil 3.20 (27 Sept 1906): 533-539; 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 589-599.

310 Calkins, Mary W. A Reconciliation Between Structural and Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 13.2 (March 1906): 61-81.

Self-consciousness requires both types of psychological explanations. Dewey, Mead, Angell, and Bawden are referenced as functionalists. JRS

Reviews

I. Madison Bentley, J Phil 3.11 (24 May 1906): 303-305.

Summaries

Elsie Murray, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 351.

Notes

Calkins continues her criticisms of functionalism in "Psychology: What Is It About?" J Phil 4.25 (5 Dec 1907): 673-683.

311 Calò, Giovanni. *Il problema della liberta nel pensiero contemporaneo.* Milan: Remo Sandron, 1906.

312 Colvin, Stephen S. Certain Characteristics of Experience. Psych Rev 13.6 (Nov 1906): 396-403.

Pragmatism agrees with idealism that experience is the "ultimate essence of the universe," but pragmatism hopelessly searches for an experience beyond consciousness. Colvin explains his non-absolutist idealism. JRS

313 Colvin, Stephen S. Pragmatism, Old and New. Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 547-561.

Pragmatists should only assert, what all philosophers but pessimists would admit, that satisfaction in the long run will coincide with truth. If pragmatists identify the two, the critics' charges of subjectivism and solipsism are likely justified, and pragmatism is only a renewed empirical nominalism and utilitarianism. The pragmatist cannot arbitrarily halt the transcendence of thought to human experience in the rational search for complete knowledge, but must assert, with the idealist, the existence of the Absolute to permit intellectual satisfaction. JRS

314 Creighton, James E. Experience and Thought. Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 482-493. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 110-123.

Idealism maintains that all experience is had by a rational, conscious subject. Pragmatism's stress on "pure experience" and the specificity of judgment are only abstractions produced by functional psychology. Experience must "be a unity, and not just a continuity," and the distinction between experience and judgment is one made within thought. JRS

315 Dewey, John. Beliefs and Realities. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 113-119. Reprinted with "verbal revisions" as "Beliefs and Existences" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 169-197. *MW* 3: 83-100.

Philosophers have disabled belief by going against the common view of belief as referring to both the world's value and the person's evaluation. Epistemologists have a "ready-made reality," to determine and produce belief. Every school, from idealist to materialist, "are at one in their devotion to an identification of reality with something that connects monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook." The rejected features (need, uncertainty, choice, novelty, and strife) were hence set apart, in personal faith's realm of subjectivity. Scientific inquiry now contradicts such subjectivism, despite philosophy's claim that psychology, sociology, etc., are irrelevant to issues regarding truth and knowledge. Pragmatism does not arbitrarily restrict knowledge to let some privileged belief (in immortality, freedom, God, etc.) claim validity; any belief is subject to testing and possible elimination. When beliefs are as natural as anything else, no fear that science will eradicate "spiritual values" could take hold, and no professionalized fortifications are needed. JRS

316 Dewey, John. Experience and Objective Idealism. Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 465-481. Reprinted with "slight verbal changes" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 198-225. *MW* 3: 128-144.

Objective idealism has inherited an unstable attitude toward experience. With the Greeks and Kant, idealism portrays thought as providing universal objectivity and value to experience. Granted, experience must already have some degree of organization so that reflection can produce more order, but all order in experience, from the smallest habit to the greatest social institution, is "teleological and experimental, not fixedly ontological." Could the objective idealist show how "his immanent 'reason' makes any difference as respects the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthful?" In reflective thought, observation and description are functionally distinguished. Idealism survives only by perpetuating the false identification of ordinary perception with the "sharply analyzed" elements of scientific observation. Experience always displays transitions of meaning and value, which permit intelligent control. JRS

Reviews

Grace Bruce, Psych Bull 4.7 (15 July 1907): 230-232.

Notes

See John E. Russell's response, "Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism" {364}. See also McGilvary's comments in "Pure Experience and Reality" {450}.

317 Dewey, John. The Experimental Theory of Knowledge. Mind n.s. 15.3 (July 1906): 293-307. Reprinted with "considerable change" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 77-111. *MW* 3: 107-127.

A feeling is an experience distinct from being knowingly conscious of something. We can further distinguish 1) the cognitive experience of feeling-movement-gratification, and 2) the cognitional experience (knowledge as acquaintance) in which a recurrent cognitive experience is supplemented by the feeling anticipating the gratification. Such anticipation, an experience of "present-as-absent," is the meaning. A "knowledge as assurance" experience is marked by the possession of two elements, the first meaning the second, and the second fulfilling the intent of the first. A cognitional experience could, alternatively, end in disappointment, infecting the first element with doubt instead. Truth and falsity are properties only of specific knowledge attempts, but modern epistemology searches for the conditions of knowledge by reference to a subjective mind separated from extra-empirical reality. The subjectivity arose early in philosophy from a need to locate error, and the extra-empirical reality then became the place for the purity of truth. Pragmatism "explains the dominating importance of science; it does not depreciate it or explain it away." JRS

Summaries

Mary W. Sprague, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 107-108.

318 Dewey, John. Reality as Experience. J Phil 3.10 (10 May 1906): 253-257. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 101-106.

Hopeless metaphysical puzzles can be avoided if experience is viewed as just a state of reality. This state is the culmination of a continuous transition from earlier stages of reality. The earlier stages are known only through the conditions in present experience. In this way, knowledge does have a transcendent aspect, which permits both verification and error correction. JRS

319 Dewey, John. The Terms "Conscious" and "Consciousness". J Phil 3.2 (18 Jan 1906): 39-41. Reprinted in *MW* 3: 79-82.

Six meanings are enumerated. Structural psychology takes consciousness "in itself," while functionalism avoids metaphysics altogether, by using the term for "a *personal* being or agent, as distinct from a stone or a plant." JRS

320 Farley, J. H. Unity and the World Ground. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 651-656.

Farley comments on Schiller's "Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality" {370}. The controversy between pluralism and absolutism cannot be "total disjunction *versus* non-diferentiation," but instead concerns the nature of the required relations between minds. JRS

321 Fite, Warner. The Experience-Philosophy. Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 1-16.

Pragmatism is a subjective idealism, since it denies the conceptually independent object in space and time. Present experience is not immediately given, and past experience is not more immediately given than the world of things, since all experience is in a world of bodies. Knowledge needs no "given" or absolute "data," but is instead a coherent system. The two opposed standpoints of metaphysics, the agent's subjective view and the

external observer's objective view, are mutually dependent and one cannot eliminate the other. JRS

Summaries

Helen Gardner Hood, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1907): 29-30; Robert Morris Ogden, J Phil 3.10 (10 May 1906): 275-277.

322 Fullerton, George S. Pragmatism. Section 64 of *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1906. Rpt., New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 219-222.

Reviews

H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 217-219; Carveth Read, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 116-118.

323 Gerrard, T. J. The Spiritual Value of Christianity. Catholic World (Aug 1906).

324 Gore, Willard C. The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist. J Phil 3.21 (11 Oct 1906): 575-577.

Gore responds to Schiller's "Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality" {370}. The absolute is the underlying harmony and unity to the pluralistic phenomena. Does it not appear that it is Schiller's pluralism which offers only madness? JRS

Notes

See William James's comments, "The Mad Absolute" {329}.

325 Hocking, William E. The Transcendence of Knowledge. J Phil 3.1 (4 Jan 1906): 5-12.

Dewey's request that cognition be defined and empirically studied is answered by Hocking's own theory of "systematic continuity." JRS

326 Höffding, Harald. Preface. To *Religiose Erfaringer*, translated by E. Lehmann and C. Monster (Copenhagen: T. Branner, 1906).

327 Hollands, Edmund H. The Relation of Science to Concrete Experience. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 614-626.

Pragmatists, among others, deny that science describes actual reality. If thought has only internal goals, pragmatism is just an idealism, but if thought's goals are externally given, then pragmatism will either get trapped in a will-thought identity, or take refuge in an uncritical naturalism. JRS

328 James, William. G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy. J Phil 3.13 (21 June 1906): 337-341. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 459-466. *Works EPh*, pp. 144-148.

Italy is undergoing an intellectual rebirth. An illustration of this is the vigorous defense of pragmatism in Giovanni Papini's journal *Leonardo*. Contrasted with American academic pedantry, the journal has youthful "frolicsomeness and impertinence."

Papini's book *Il crepuscolo dei filosofi* {351} marks him as very radical pragmatist, clearing as he does accumulated philosophical rubbish. For him, the pragmatic attitude is nominalistic, utilitarian, positivistic, voluntaristic, and fideistic. It affirms with Kant the primacy of the practical reason. Papini conceives of pragmatism as only a method and is neutral among doctrines, being like a corridor leading to many rooms. For Papini, the whole of human life is a search for instruments of action, "the quest of power," to bring the world closer to the ideal. Man becomes a kind of god. Philosophy should be made fully pragmatic and become a general theory of human action. IKS

329 James, William. The Mad Absolute. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 656-657. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 467-469. *Works EPh*, pp. 149-150.

James comments on W. C. Gore's "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" {324}. Gore argues against F. C. S. Schiller that the absolute remains one and sane and that it is we, the finite forms, who are mad. Gore needs to explain how our madness came about and by what kind of return to the absolute it is to be cured. The dispute is welcome because it makes the hypothesis of an absolute a matter of concrete discussion. IKS

330 James, William. Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'. J Phil 3.26 (20 Dec 1906): 712. Reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 241-243. *Pure Experience*, pp. 122. *Works ERE*, pp. 123.

James replies to W. B. Pitkin's "A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism" {356}. The refusal by radical empiricism to admit into its theories anything not experienced is only a methodological postulate and does not involve the claim that noumenal objects are impossible. Noumenal objects may exist and may be admitted into philosophy should their pragmatic value be shown. IKS

Notes

See Pitkin's reply, "In Reply to Professor James" {475}.

331 James, William. Preface. To Harald Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy, translated by G. M. Fisher* (New York: Macmillan, 1906), pp. v-xiv. Reprinted in *Works EPh*, pp. 140-143.

The book is Harald Höffding's philosophic testament. For rationalism, parts are explained through the whole and reality forms a unit, with every part linked with others in intimate and not external ways. Empiricism proceeds from parts to wholes and claims that some parts are merely added to others, linked by "and" and nothing more. Höffding is an empiricist, but has the manners of a rationalist. His critical monism is really a pluralism, because the unity is still in process of completion. His idea of truth is dynamic and can be understood in terms of what "works" taken in its widest sense. In religion, he interprets belief as conservation of what has value, a formula which covers much of the concrete history of human religion. IKS

332 James, William. Stanford's Ideal Destiny. In *Founder's Day Addresses* (Leland Stanford Junior Publications, Trustees' Series No. 14, 1906), pp. 5-8. Reprinted in Science n.s. 23 (25 May 1906): 801-804. *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 356-367. *Works ECR*, pp. 102-106.

Wealthy American businessman have become benefactors of universities, usually with only a vague understanding of what a university is. Leland Stanford and his wife saw the opportunity for an "absolutely unique creation." The campus reminds one of the classic scenery of Greece. As a private university Stanford has the opportunity to nurture personalities of genius, especially by breaking the American tradition of low pay for faculty. It should strive to train scholars. IKS

333 Joachim, Harold H. *The Nature of Truth.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.

Pragmatism will not be considered, since it emphasizes some "elementary theses" which idealism also holds, and does not offer a theory of truth but only "a denial of truth altogether." (p. 4) JRS

Reviews

John S. Mackenzie, Int J Ethics 17.2 (Jan 1907): 264-265. The reasons given for the omission of pragmatism are inadequate. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, J Phil 3.20 (27 Sept 1906): 549-557 [reprinted in "somewhat expanded" form as "The Nature of Truth" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 163-178]. This work is the "final breakdown" of the contradictory attempt to explain absolute truth while deprecating human knowledge. Pragmatists will "rejoice that Mr. Joachim has unequivocally said a multitude of things they had long suspected their opponents of believing, and desired to see stated in cold print." JRS

P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 18.4 (Oct 1907): 524.

334 Jones, Henry. The Working Faith of the Social Reformer. III. The Metaphysical Basis–Mine and Thine. Hibbert Journal 4.3 (April 1906): 550-569. Reprinted in *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, and Other Essays* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1910).

Our purposes do define the meaning of things, as pragmatism holds, but this subjectivism must be enfolded within an encompassing social consciousness. JRS

Reviews of *The Working Faith*

James B. Baillie, Hibbert Journal 10.2 (Jan 1912): 495-501.

335 Lalande, André. Philosophy in France (1905). Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 241-266.

A summary of philosophy in France for the 1905 year, including several pages on the word "pragmatism" and its independent origin in France, the entry for the word "action" in the *Vocabulaire philosophique*, and Blondel's *L'Action* (1893). Also of interest is pp. 244ff on the "intimate connection" between French pragmatism and religious ideas. LF

336 Lalande, André. Pragmatisme et pragmaticisme. Rev Phil 61.2 (Feb 1906): 121-146.

The pragmatism of Peirce and James is a revolt against philosophical dilettantism, a reclaiming of a strict homogeneity between scientific truth and philosophic truth, and an absolute experientialism (empiricism). It is, accordingly, a rejection of Kantian pure Reason. Pragmatism is a realism–generals are to be found in nature–though particulars are countenanced as well. James's radical empiricism involves the claim that relations

are objects of experience. (p. 127) There is a comparison of Peirce, James and Schiller, and references to Le Roy and Dessoulavy. Lalande then gives a personal exposé on pragmatism as a reaction to intellectualism, and the subordination of individual to collective thought. LF

Summaries

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 673-674.

Notes

See Pierre Mesnard's *Notice sur la vie et les travaux de André Lalande (1867-1963)* (Paris: impr. Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1966).

337 Lang, Sidney Edward. *A Primer of General Method: Being an Introduction to Educational Theory and Practice on the Basis of Logic.* Toronto: The Copp, Clark Co., 1906.

Logic "deals with the mind as performing certain acts with a purpose in view–the good of the organism." Knowledge is a systematic explanation of facts that serves as a guide for action, and is pursued for practical and aesthetic interests. Ideas are plans of actions, which undergo organic growth. Judgments are instruments to gain goods and when used as hypotheses they are testable by the inferences drawn from them. Education is a process of reconstructing knowledge toward an ideal system, and should be guided by social needs. JRS

Reviews

John Grier Hibben, J Phil 4.21 (10 Oct 1907): 577-580. Lang's position is "unqualified pragmatism," which ignores logical necessity, distorts the role of hypotheses, and confuses practical interest with interest in a subject-matter. JRS

Notes

See Lang's reply, "Logic and Educational Theory," J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 709-713.

338 Leighton, Joseph A. Cognitive Thought and 'Immediate' Experience. J Phil 3.7 (29 March 1906): 174-180.

James's doctrine of pure experience confuses logical and psychological treatments of thought. What holds only of "possible" experience is asserted of "actual" and "personal" experience, and vice versa. IKS

Dewey's version of immediate empiricism denies possible experience and ignores thought's mediating and transcending activities. JRS

339 Lyman, Eugene William. The Influence of Pragmatism upon the Status of Theology. In *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, by the former students of Charles Edward Garman, ed. James H. Tufts *et al.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press; New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906), pp. 219-236.

Pragmatism offers a new type of empiricism by recognizing ethical life as integral to reality, which provides an alternative to theological dogmatism. It meshes with recent historical methods applied to religion, resulting in a "religious search for an ethical universe." Religion's claim to absolutism is proper within its sphere, since the personal conviction of the solution of a vital problem must be verified by the community, and in the process of history all humanity will have the opportunity to converge towards one religion. JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 312-321 [*MW* 4: 217-228]. Lyman's essay is "free from both the sentimentalism and arbitrary 'fideism' which sometimes accompany a professedly pragmatic view of religion." JRS

A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.23 (8 Nov 1906): 631-637. This application of pragmatism to theology does credit to both fields. JRS

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 140-141; Arthur O. Lovejoy, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1907): 18-24.

340 Mallet, F. Le Philosophie de l'action. Rev de Phil 9.3 (1 Sept 1906): 227-252.

341 Mead, G. H. The Imagination in Wundt's Treatment of Myth and Religion. Psych Bull 3.12 (15 Dec 1906): 393-399.

342 Mead, G. H. The Teaching of Science in College. Science n.s. 24 (1906): 390-397. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 60-72.

343 Moore, A. W. Experience and Subjectivism. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 182-186. Portions reprinted in "Pragmatism and Solipsism" in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 220-244.

Moore replies to Warner Fite's "The Experience-Philosophy" {321}. Fite wrongly imputes to the pragmatist the position that all experience is experience given to a subject. Pragmatism agrees with Realism that reality extends beyond cognitive experience. JRS

344 Münsterberg, Hugo. *Science and Idealism.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906.

Pragmatism, while rightly devaluing mechanistic science, has abandoned all absolute values, and somehow misunderstood idealism. Reality is independent of our wishes, and science aims to conceive the world as a permanent system. JRS

Reviews

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 95-96.

345 Nichols, Herbert. Professor James's 'Hole'. J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 64-70. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 142-149.

Having rejected the soul and association, James uses the notion of continuous transition to preserve the unity of the self. Past states no longer exist when new ones have replaced them. However, when James talks of two minds knowing one thing, he returns to the reality of past states. Nichols tries to explain what leads to this error. IKS

346 Norero, H. L'experience religieuse d'aprés William James. Revue de l'Histoire des Religions (July-Aug 1906).

347 Nunn, T. Percy. *The Aim and Achievements of Scientific Method: An Epistemological Essay. Proc Arist Soc* 6 (1906): 141-182. London: Macmillan, 1907.

On p. 43-44 Nunn rejects James's relational theory of space. On pp. 136-138 he asserts that scientific theories are distinct from factual certainties, against James's and Dewey's emphasis on their continuity. JRS

Reviews

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1908): 446; T. Loveday, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 274-275.

348 Ormond, Alexander Thomas. *Concepts of Philosophy.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1906.

Philosophy aims to unify truth. Only beliefs are judged by the practical good (p. 704), while knowledge is a theoretic certitude. James's "will to believe" cannot produce certitude, but only personal "make-believe." Where theoretical reason can supplement a social interest in practical belief (for example, God is both rationally supportable and a universal object of interest), the combination provides "the highest credence." JRS

Reviews

Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 425-433.

349 Papini, Giovanni. Campagna per il forzato risveglio. Leonardo 4.3 (Aug 1906): 193-199. Reprinted in *La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 312- 316.

This essay is perhaps Papini's most famous from the *Leonardo* period. It is a clarion call to reawakening, summoning "a few hundred young Italians" from their slumbers to rise up and re-make the world. Pragmatism appears as an instrument of this remaking, wielded by a generational elite who will transform their will into concrete reality. Among the qualities that this new elite must possess is the distrust of "the exaggerated love of useless words." The traditional rhetorical excesses must be cast aside. In this, pragmatism becomes useful, since it is the enemy of "all vacuous discourses and illusory problems." A close reading reveals that pragmatism is an "ally" to Papini in this endeavor, suggesting perhaps that he himself is outside of the movement, even though willing to enlist its aid. EPC

350 Papini, Giovanni. Dall'uomo a dio. Leonardo 4.1 (Feb 1906): 6-15. Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 45-54.

This essay centers on another one of Papini's core conceptions, the Uomo-dio, which so attracted the attention of William James that he specifically wrote about it in his "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy" {328}. Prezzolini employed this idea first in 1903, using it to capture the essence of the new Pragmatic Superman whose will stood as the omnipotent re-maker of the world. For Papini, the idea of the Uomo-dio becomes at once the philosophical ideal and an autobiographical self-revelation. James's "will to believe" is transformed into Papini's program for the Man-god's re-making of the world, in order that objective reality may conform to his will. The essay, like "Compagna per il forzato risveglio" {349} is directed to the elite few: those who want to prepare for "a new *plastic* age of the world." Taken in isolation, the essay seems to suffer from excessive rhetoric. Understood politically, the links to Futurism and Fascism are not hard to find. EPC

Notes

The entire February issue of *Leonardo* deserves special mention because of a remark made by James in a letter to F. C. S. Schiller on 7 April 1906. James states that "What I really want to write about is Papini...and the February number of the 'Leonardo'." [*The Letters of William James* {1580} vol. 2, pp. 245-246]. This issue is replete with articles on pragmatism, offering the broad spectrum of viewpoints from those of Papini and Prezzolini on the one hand, to those of Giovanni Vailati on the other. Papini offers a brief survey of recent events concerning the development of Pragmatism ("Cronaca Pragmatista"), including a report of discussions on pragmatism held at the American Philosophical Association meeting at Cambridge during December of 1905.

351 Papini, Giovanni. *Il crepuscolo dei filosofi.* Milan: Società editrice Lombarda. 2nd ed., Edizioni di "Lacerba", 1914. 4th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1921. 7th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1953. 7th ed. reprinted, Florence: Vallecchi, 1976. Selections reprinted in *Opere: Dal "Leonardo" al Futurismo*, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 503-555.

Written as his pragmatist phase was coming to an end, this book contains one of Papini's favorite methods for expressing his ideas. He devotes a chapter each to significant modern philosophers, including Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Comte, remaking them into something akin to Vico's imaginative universal, as concrete embodiments of ideas and intellectual tendencies which he finds compelling. Most important, however, is the final chapter which James identified to Schiller as having completely captured his interest. It is a manifesto of the Man-god in which the entire movement of modern philosophy issues forth in the creation of the new superman. Pragmatics is identified as the supreme theory of action into which all other branches of theoretical philosophy must lead. A careful reading finds a subtle and somewhat sobering foreshadowing of fascism amid all of the references to the human becoming divine. Papini writes that the book contains a program which is both a criticism of the past and "a terrible program for the future" in which the will is omnipotent in remaking reality. EPC

Reviews

Jean Bourdeau, *Pragmatisme et modernisme* {629}, pp. 49-65.

352 Papini, Giovanni. La volontà di credere. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 2.2 (March-April 1906): 77-84. Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 105-113.

Papini stays very close to James in the early part of this essay. Much of the controversy surrounding the "will to believe" is, according to Papini, the result of there being no Italian language translation of James's *The Will to Believe* (1897). He gives a careful explication of James's position, together with the limiting conditions that James had placed upon the will to believe. What follows is a protracted discussion of the various lines of influence that connect will, belief, reality and action. Papini concludes by praising James for having contributed one of the most fecund constructions to contemporary philosophical theory. EPC

353 Peirce, Charles S. Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion. Monist 16.1 (Jan 1906): 147-151. Reprinted in *CP* 5.610-614.

Peirce comments on James B. Peterson's proposal to start a "discussion of philosophical terminology" in "Some Philosophical Terms," Monist 15.4 (Oct 1905): 629-633. Peirce gives an account of the term "experience," and the history of its use from Polus the Acragentine and Aristotle to Locke. LF

Notes

Erratum, Monist 16.2 (April 1906): 320.

354 Peirce, C. S. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism. Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 492-546. Reprinted with supplementary material in footnotes, *CP* 4:530-572.

In this last of three articles written for the *Monist*, Peirce takes up the construction of "diagrams to illustrate the general course of thought." (p. 492) In his introduction he asserts that the object of investigation is the "form of a relation" (p. 494), and that "by experimentation upon some diagram an experimental proof can be obtained of every necessary conclusion from any given Copulate of Premises..." (ibid.) To prove this claim he begins with an analysis of the essence of a sign, though the division that he provides is only one of ten that he has devised. On p. 503, Peirce states his intention to defend pragmatism by way of his System of Existential Graphs. He then defines "sign," "object," "interpretant," the type-token distinction, "pheme," and "argument." This is followed by one of several discussions on the objects of perception, and percepts. "No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise..." Pp. 517ff distinguishes categories from universes, and describes the nature of real possibility. Proper analysis, Peirce contends, must be thorough by separating "the compound into components each entirely homogeneous in itself..." (p. 518) On p. 524 Peirce explains the five "Conventions": the determinations of "the forms and interpretations of the existential graphs." He concludes with several examples of existential graphs to "illustrate the method of interpretation, and also the *Permissions of Illative Trans-formation* of them." LF

Summaries

G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 564-565.

Notes

Errata at Monist 17.1 (Jan 1907): 160.

355 Piazza, G. La mistificazione "pragmatista". Avanti della domenica 4 (1906): 24.

356 Pitkin, Walter B. A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 645-650. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 115-121.

Experience is autonomous for the radical empiricist. Both the physical and the psychical is said to fall within experience, but experience itself must rest on nothing. Arguments in support of radical empiricism fail since description is confused with evidence. IKS

Notes

See James's reply, "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'" {330}.

357 Pitkin, Walter B. The Relation Between the Act and the Object of Belief. J Phil 3.19 (13 Sept 1906): 505-511.

As Dewey holds in "Beliefs and Realities" {315}, beliefs are real, but the metaphysician cannot accept that beliefs are just a matter of comparative convenience. Beliefs must be convictions about objects in independent reality, and, as pragmatism contends, "every distinction in value must be a distinction in the nature and behavior of those objects." JRS

358 Pitkin, Walter B. The Self-Transcendency of Knowledge. Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 39-58.

James says that both he and transcendentalists find continuous transitions in experience, but the latter has a quite different psychological view. Pitkin distinguishes six meanings for "self-transcendent knowledge." JRS

359 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). Pragmatismo e occultismo. Leonardo 4.4 (Oct-Dec 1906): 354-356. Reprinted in *La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste*, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Edi-tore, 1960), pp. 329-331.

Prezzolini gives a very brief treatment of the true meaning of pragmatism, this time, in the last issue of *Leonardo*, and in proximity to his abandonment of pragmatism as his official creed. Prezzolini is careful to establish that pragmatism can mean many things. It is a method for clarifying meanings, certainly, but it is more. Its voluntaristic side (drawn from James's "will to believe") means that to be a pragmatist is to be open to a higher plane of reality and to acknowledge the creative power of the will. An occultism which rises above mere verbalism refers to such creative power. EPC

360 Raub, William Longstreth. Pragmatism and Kantianism. In *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology* by the former students of Charles Edward Garman (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906), pp. 203-217.

The important doctrines of pragmatism were "completely expressed" by Kant: the chaos of given experience, the substitution of orderly thought using fundamental categories, the plasticity of reality, and the practical criterion of truth. Like Kantianism, pragmatism still must explain how individuals all belong to the same universe. JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 312-321 [*MW* 4: 217-228]. Kant's difficult *a priori* categories are dealt with simply by noting that some pragmatists accept the Spencerian theory of racial acquisition. JRS

A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.23 (8 Nov 1906): 631-637. Kant's second "Kritik" must "contain a very rich vein of pragmatism." Intellectual harmony cannot be isolated from the wider "development and dissolution of tensions." Pragmatism has no difficulty accounting for the interaction among individuals. JRS

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 140-141; Arthur O. Lovejoy, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1907): 18-24.

361 Rogers, Arthur K. Professor James's Theory of Knowledge. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 577-596.

Discussions of pragmatism leave many questions unanswered. While pragmatism as a method is acceptable, its metaphysics is questionable. How are we to interpret the view that "reality is actually in every sense created" in the process of knowledge? IKS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 4.7 (28 March 1907): 192-194. Rogers is "clear and forcible," but does not handle well James's thesis that knowledge can be reduced to a resemblance leading to a "beneficial reaction towards an object." IKS

362 Rotta, Paolo. D'una psicologia pragmatica della credenza. Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini 15.1-3 (July-Sept 1906): 542-554.

363 Rusk, Robert R. *Der Pragmatische und humanistische Strömung in der modernen englischen Philosophie.* Leipzig: Frommann, 1906.

364 Russell, John E. Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 627-633.

Russell comments on Dewey's "Experience and Objective Idealism" {316}. Kant committed no contradiction; he asserted that the *a priori* categories are not beyond experience, but only underived from sensation. As for error, "*a priori* thought is not bound to be infallible, nor to do work that needs no correction or revision" (p. 630-631), and "*a priori* thought supplies those elements in the constitution of our experience that need not and suffer not correction or revision." (p. 631) Value resides both in the Eternal and in us. Dewey's empiricism offers only a fragmentary reality, momentary thought, no truth, no final meaning, and no ultimate standard of value. JRS

365 Russell, John E. The Pragmatist's Meaning of Truth. J Phil 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 599-601.

Only on the supposition that it is the objective truth which causes satisfaction, can the existence of satisfaction be properly explained. JRS

366 Russell, John E. Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 606-613.

For radical empiricism, experience alone is real and reality is known only by experience. It forgets that experience must be mine; it cannot provide for the experience of others. IKS

Summaries

Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 4.6 (14 March 1907): 164-165.

367 Russell, John E. Some Difficulties with the Epistemology of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 406-413. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 164-171.

Pragmatism confuses logic with psychology, knowledge with the situation in which knowledge arises, and truth with the consequences of truth. It eliminates all relations, excepting "nextness." Its interpretation of truth leads to a dilemma. An idea is not true unless it has been verified, but once verified, it no longer exists, since the transition from the idea to the terminus has taken place. Finally, radical empiricism involves solipsism. IKS

368 Schiller, F. C. S. The Ambiguity of Truth. Mind n.s. 15.2 (April 1906): 161-176. Revised and expanded in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 141-162.

The intellectualists stress the logical requirement that truths be non-contradictory, while ignoring the problem of how a truth is verified. Truth is a valuation made in reference to a purpose. Can pragmatism's opponents give one example of how a doubtful assertion could come to be a truth, though any non-pragmatic process? JRS

Summaries

F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 674-675; Helen Gardner Hood, Psych Bull 4.3 (15 March 1907): 88-89.

369 Schiller, F. C. S. Faith, Reason, and Religion. Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 329-345. Reprinted with revisions in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 349-369.

James revives the traditional religious appeal to emotional faith with a novel psychological emphasis on the dependence of reason on values. Faith is not "belief without knowledge," but is best defined as "the mental attitude which, for purposes of action, is willing to take upon trust valuable and desirable beliefs, in the hope that this attitude may render possible their *verification*." Religious faiths, like scientific theories, have survived this severe test; however, one ultimate truth is highly unlikely to emerge. The psychological evidence of personal religious consciousness should not be ignored. JRS

Reviews

William Hallock Johnson, J Phil 3.7 (29 March 1906): 189-190.

370 Schiller, F. C. S. Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality. J Phil 3.18 (30 Aug 1906): 477-482. Reprinted as "Absolutism and the Dissociation of Personality" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 266-273.

The chaos of conflicting personalities in the world cannot be explained by idealistic monism, unless it portrays the absolute as suffering from a universal mental illness. JRS

Notes

See J. H. Farley, "Unity and the World Ground" {320} and Willard C. Gore, "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" {324}.

371 Schiller, F. C. S. Is Absolute Idealism Solipsistic? J Phil 3.4 (15 Feb 1906): 85-89. Reprinted as "Is 'Absolute Idealism' Solipsistic?" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 258-265.

A carefully defined solipsism asserts only that some *one* experiencer is the complete reality. Absolute idealism fits this definition, revealing its contradictory nature. JRS

Notes

Walter B. Pitkin criticizes Schiller's treatment of solipsism in "Why Solipsism is Rejected," J Phil 3.13 (21 June 1906): 344-350.

372 Schiller, F. C. S. Plato and His Predecessors. Quarterly Review 204.1 (Jan 1906): 62-88. Reprinted with additions as "From Plato to Protagorus" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 22-70.

A critical review of five works on Plato and ancient philosophy, followed by an investigation into the Greek's curious progression from religion, to scientific reasoning, and culmination in intellectualist theology. Plato's theory of Ideas receives special condemnation. JRS

373 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 15.3 (July 1906): 375-391.

Schiller responds to A. E. Taylor's "Truth and Consequences" {381}. JRS

Summaries

Mary W. Sprague, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 107.

374 Schiller, F. C. S. Thought and Immediacy. J Phil 3.9 (26 April 1906): 234-237.

Schiller responds to Bakewell's "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" {215}. Dewey's position would be better appreciated if the psychological facts were admitted by all. Most perceptual experiences are not permeated by thought's mediating categories, and hence do not require the idealist's rationalist account. Where thought does enter into perception, it is gradually absorbed in a continuous process, culminating in the immediate "rapid insight" type of perception. "Instead of saying that perception is made by thought, why not say that thought is perception in the making?" JRS

375 Schiller, F. C. S., Bernard Bosanquet, Hastings Rashdall. Can Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking? *Proc Arist Soc* 6 (1906): 224-270. Schiller's contribution is material for "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 71-113.

A symposium; parts 1, 4, and 6 are by Schiller (pp. 224-237, 255-262, 265-270). Schiller's negative answer is founded on the contention that without the psychological feeling of certainty, logical "necessity" would lack meaning. Bosanquet's affirmative answer in part two accuses Schiller of confusing logic and ethics. Rashdall's affirmative answer in part three asks logic to examine the truth of judgments without reference to any individual mind, which pragmatism makes impossible. No one denies that thought is accompanied by willing and feeling. Schiller's response in part four points out that Bosanquet took a stance from established logic, without appreciating the concern for its psychological origins. Bosanquet's part five makes no reply to Schiller, but explains that a science can "only be judged by itself at a further stage." In part six, Schiller comments on Rashdall. Even Bradley has come to deny that "no psychological idea has validity and no logical idea has existence." The logician's task is to evaluate those claims to truth, as described by psychology. Rashdall's accusation that both James and Schiller are Humian sensationalists is refuted, and his warning that pragmatism threatens morality and knowledge is merely an unfair attempt to prejudice the discussion–revealing how Rashdall can resort to a pragmatic argument from consequences! JRS

376 Sheldon, W. H. The Quarrel About Transcendency. J Phil 3.7 (29 March 1906): 180-185.

The realist can assert a reality beyond any empirical knowledge, without having to deny the pragmatist claim that our beliefs must be formulated in experiential terms. JRS

377 Spaulding, Edward G. Pure Science and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 75-76.

Pragmatism is inconsistent with the practice of physical science, which places the "ground of the validity of knowledge" external to the self-transcending cognition. JRS

Notes

An abstract of a paper. A substantially different abstract of this paper is in Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 169-170.

378 Spaulding, Edward G. Review of Pierre Duhem, *La Théorie physique.* J Phil 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 606-610.

Pragmatists will be pleased by this physicist's similar views, but Duhem does not draw their ontological conclusions. JRS

379 Stuart, Henry W., Boyd H. Bode, Stephen S. Colvin. Discussion: Recent Arguments for Realism, with especial reference to the Relations of Realism and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.12 (7 June 1906): 319-321.

Stuart praises pragmatism's non-representational view of knowledge, which defines truth without making it impossible to identify truths. Bode views pragmatism's distinction between pure experience and consciousness as a failure. Colvin argues that pragmatism is essentially idealistic. JRS

Notes

An abstract of a discussion during the 1906 meeting of the Western Philosophical Association. Bode's contribution was published as "Realism and Pragmatism" {307}.

380 Sturt, Henry. *Idola Theatri: A Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1906.

Sturt declares that the future lies with voluntarism (experience is dynamic) and personalism (individuals are fully real), allying himself with F. C. S. Schiller's "humanism" and James's "pragmatism." Chapters 4-7 attack "Intellectualism," "Absolutism," "Subjectivism," and "German Idealism." Chapters 8-10 critique T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. JRS

Reviews

Alfred E. Taylor, Mind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 424-430. Many idealists believe that "there is something seriously amiss with the foundations" of idealism, but Sturt's criticisms are less than thorough. JRS

John Watson, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 78-83. Sturt lacks the requisite knowledge of Hegel to attack idealism. Examples abound of "inept criticism." JRS

A. Mackie, Int J Ethics 17.3 (April 1907): 403-404; J. W. Scott, Hibbert Journal 5.1 (Oct 1906): 212-216.

381 Taylor, Alfred E. Truth and Consequences. Mind n.s. 15.1 (Jan 1906): 81-93.

Taylor responds to F. C. S. Schiller's "Empiricism and the Absolute" {282} and "The Definition of 'Pragmatism' and 'Humanism'" {373}. Two mathematical examples are offered to support the view that some truths are independent of all practical consequences. If Schiller would still object, he ought to better define what is meant by "practical" and "consequences." The allegations of borrowing from humanism are without basis. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism" {373}.

382 Vailati, Giovanni. Per un'analisi pragmatistica della nomenclatura filosofica. Leonardo 4.2 (April 1906): 103-115. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 701-708.

Vailati, like his student Mario Calderoni, identified Peirce's pragmatic maxim as the genuine core (and horizon) of pragmatism. Given the perceived excesses of Papini and Prezzolini in the name of this philosophical doctrine, it comes as no surprise that Vailati would attempt to restore order of meaning to the realm of philosophy. Once again, the presence of this article in *Leonardo* shows that not only were its editors open-minded with regard to their philosophical adversaries, but also that the review was the place to look for philosophical debate on the latest developments from outside of Italy. EPC

383 Vailati, Giovanni. Pragmatismo e logica matematica. Leonardo 4.1 (Feb 1906): 16-25. Translated by Herbert D. Austin as "Pragmatism and Mathematical Logic," Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 481-491. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 689-694.

384 Vailati, Giovanni. Uno zoologo pragmatista: Andrea Giardini, *Le discipline zoologiche e la scienza generale delle forme organizzate.* Leonardo 4.4 (Oct-Dec 1906): 329-338. Translated by Herbert D. Austin as "A Pragmatic Zoologist," Monist 18.1 (Jan 1908): 142-151. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 728-735.

Notes

Le discipline zoologiche (Pavia, 1906).

385 Veblen, Thorstein. The Place of Science in Modern Civilization. American Journal of Sociology 11.5 (March 1906): 585-609.

Technology is the pragmatic aspect to our culture, but modern science is purely theoretical, marking our civilization's progress away from the "pragmatic-barbarian" way of life. JRS

386 Vitali, Guilio. Note pragmatische. Ressegna nazionale (16 Dec 1906): 646-662.

387 Waterhouse, Eric S. The Religious Philosophy of William James. London Quarterly Review 106.1 (July 1906): 82-94.

Waterhouse reviews James's *The Will to Believe* (1897) and *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}. James has "an impartial desire to give due attention to every shade in the prism of experience" which collides with scientific "dogmatism." JRS

Notes

Extensive quotations from this essay are given in Anon, "The Religious Philosophy of William James," Literary Digest 33.10 (8 Sept 1906): 319.

388 Wolf, Abraham. Le "Dieu" des pragmatistes. Revue Augustinienne 8.6 (June 1906): 727.

389 Angell, James R. The Province of Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 14.2 (March 1907): 61-91. Reprinted in *Readings in the History of Psychology*, ed. W. Dennis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1948), pp. 439-456.

Functional psychology and pragmatism "spring from similar logical motivation." JRS

Summaries

Felix Arnold, J Phil 4.10 (9 May 1907): 276-277; Margaret K. Strong, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 568-569.

390 Anon. The Philosophy of a Renunciation. Harper's Weekly 51 (21 Sept 1907): 1370.

James's "The Energies of Men" {437} is used to recommend that Theodore Roosevelt renounce his ambition for a third term. IKS

391 Arniaz, Marc. Pragmatismo y humanismo. Cultura española 7 (Aug 1907).

392 Baldwin, J. Mark. On Truth. Psych Rev 14.4 (July 1907): 264-287. Most of this essay is reprinted as chap. 13, "Truth and Falsity," of *Thought and Things*, vol. 2 {509}. Eight paragraphs on pp. 271-274 are reprinted in chap. 14, "Control Through Knowledge" of *Thought and Things*, vol. 2, pp. 379-382.

Baldwin stresses his distinction between "knowledge through control" and "control through knowledge." Pragmatism perceives only the former, but actually the self controls knowledge for the good. Baldwin objects to Dewey's characterization of knowledge offered in "The Control of Ideas by Facts" {421} and to Moore's review of *Thought and Things*, vol. 1 {301}. JRS

Summaries

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 665-666.

393 Baldwin, James M. Thought and Things. Psych Bull 4.4 (15 April 1907): 123-126. Reprinted in revised form as appendix 2, "Certain Explanations," in *Thought and Things*, vol. 2 {509}, pp. 421-425.

Baldwin replies to Moore's review of Baldwin's *Thought and Things*, vol. 1 {301}. "Is a discrete unintelligible dynamic any better than a contentless formal static?" The absolute aesthetic experience reconciles logical dualisms. JRS

Notes

See Moore's reply, "Experience, Habit and Attention" {459}.

394 Barbour, G. F. Progress and Reality. Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 47-62.

Pragmatism, like Hegelianism, affirms the dependency of God on mankind's spiritual development, despite its conflict with the perfect God of common sense. JRS

395 Beals, Charles Elmer. Pragmatism and Determinism. Department of Philosophy Story Prize, Dartmouth College, 1907.

Pragmatism, with absolutism, guards human teleology from scientific determinism. Pragmatism also defends human freedom by denying the Absolute. JRS

396 Besse, Clément. Lettre de France. Pour l'intellectualisme. Revue Néo-Scolastique 14.3 (Aug 1907): 281-303.

397 Billia, Lorenzo-Michelangelo. L'Idéalisme n'est-il pas chrétien? Rev de Phil 11.2 (1 Aug 1907): 155-181.

398 Bjorkman, Edwin. Interview with William James. New York Times (3 Nov 1907): 8.

James's books are "selling by the thousands," "business men are caught disputing over their lunches," while "matrons and maids display equal eagerness." IKS

399 Blanche, F. A. Un Essai de synthèse pragmatiste: L'Humanisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 1.3 (1907): 433-448.

400 Blanche, F. A. Pragmatisme et humanisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 1.1 (Jan 1907): 105-129.

401 Boodin, J. E. The New Realism. J Phil 4.20 (26 Sept 1907): 533-542.

Both realism and idealism falsely assume that "only like can act upon like," and that "what is not stuff cannot be real." The real must be what is intelligibly known through our purposes, and is never perceptions or constructions of them. JRS

402 Boodin, J. E. The Ought and Reality. Int J Ethics 17.4 (July 1907): 454-474. Reprinted with revisions as "Form and the Ought" in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 326-359.

Ideals have meaning only in oriented, teleologically changing universe. Neither personal satisfaction, self-realization, nor reason can provide ideals, but only the "absolute direction" of the time process. Pragmatism requires its affirmation. This "Ought" provides immortality, the categorical imperative, and rational thought. We are led by its current incarnation in human history. JRS

403 Boodin, J. E. The Ultimate Attributes of Reality. J Phil 4.11 (23 May 1907): 281-289.

Pragmatism is too subjective. The attributes are "stuff, time, space and direction." JRS

404 Borrell, Philippe. La Notion de pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 11.6 (1 Dec 1907): 587-590.

Borrell replies to Mentre, "Note sur la valuer pragmatique du pragmatisme" {457}. LF

Notes

See Mentre's reply, "Complément a la note sur la valeur pragmatique du pragmatisme," ibid., pp. 591-594.

405 Bourdeau, Jean. Agnosticisme et Pragmatisme. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des Débats 14 (30 Aug 1907): 401-403; 14 (27 Sept 1907): 592-594. Reprinted in *Pragmatisme et modernisme* {629}, pp. 49-65.

This article is an exposition of Spencer's agnosticism, including his background, a brief comparison of Kant and Spencer, and a discussion of science and religion. "The originality of Spencer's agnosticism is that it does not conclude with pure skepticism. The relativity of knowledge supposes the existence of something positive..." (p. 52) Science is relegated to the domain of the knowable, and religion to the domain of the unknowable. Bourdeau writes that the "agnostic and anti-rationalistic character of Spencer's philosophy opened the way to the American pragmatism of William James and the philosophy of Bergson." In part two the author focuses on the sense in which Spencer and pragmatism are connected, and the sense in which they are opposed. "Pragmatism is a philosophy of action, a philosophy that consists in proving our ideas by living them..." (p. 62) LF

406 Bourdeau, Jean. L'Illusion pragmatiste. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des Débats 15 (28 Feb 1907): 400-402. Reprinted in *Pragmatisme et modernisme* {629}, pp. 76-83.

"Pragmatism," Bourdeau writes, "is at once an orientation and a theory of truth." (p. 76) It is in accord with rationalism on the point that truth is born out of the agreement of our ideas with reality. We can get to that reality only by a relative knowledge. Protagoras' aphorism "man is the measure of all things" serves as an epigraphy of pragmatism. There is discussion of meliorism, monism and pluralism. "By dint of our efforts and failures, we can ultimately succeed in saving the world, that is to say in changing it for the better. Is this not the illusion and the hypothesis which we need for daily life? Between the two extremes of...naturalism and absolute transcendentalism, pragmatism makes room for emotions as much as it does for ideas." (p. 81) LF

407 Bourdeau, Jean. Le Pragmatisme contre le rationalisme. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des Débats 15 (24 Jan 1907): 161-163. Reprinted in *Pragmatisme et modernisme* {629}, pp. 66-75.

Bourdeau gives a short history of the rationalism and French intellectualism that dominated the 18th century, and the schools that have opposed it. "Pragmatism is a mediatory system that, like rationalism, purports to satisfy the religious intellect, and like empiricism, retains a most cordial intimacy with the facts..." (p. 73) "Pragmatism has nothing in common with eclecticism. It is not a system, but a method for resolving philosophical questions..." (ibid.) LF

408 Bourdeau, Jean. Une Sophistique du pragmatisme. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des Débats 14 (8 Nov 1907): 880-882; 14 (22 Nov 1907): 975-977. Reprinted in *Pragmatisme et modernisme* {629}, pp. 84-101.

Bourdeau discusses the work of Prezzolini, whose work "combats the intellectualist prejudice so widespread in France." (p. 101) Pragmatism is understood as a "philosophy without words, a philosophy of gestures and acts..." (p. 85) LF

409 Boutroux, Émile. *L'Expérience religieuse selon William James.* Nimes: La Laborieuse, 1907.

Of interest are his remarks on habits and James's pragmatic empiricism; "action that we perform is the only reality that we immediately apprehend." (p. xii, xivf)

Thought is only a method for producing habits of action. According to Boutroux, James grapples with several of the great religious philosophical questions in an original and profound way. LF

Notes

First published as the introduction to *L'Expérience religieuse*, the French translation of James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}.

410 Bradley, F. H. On Truth and Copying. Mind n.s. 16.2 (April 1907): 165-180. Reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 107-126.

Pragmatism separates truth from knowledge (pp. 167-168). James has abandoned placing the essence of truth in its practical results (p. 177). While truth must have practical effects, reality is not just its consequences, and satisfaction is never an indication of ultimate truth. James agrees that reality is comprised of finite mind, but should explain the "practical" side of mind, and the relationships between minds. JRS

Summaries

G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 665.

Notes

See Schiller's response, "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Truth" {486}.

411 Brown, William Adams. The Pragmatic Value of the Absolute. J Phil 4.17 (15 Aug 1907): 459-464.

James has admitted that the notion of the absolute satisfies some people by eliminating evil, but its greater force lies in stimulating action (similar to Puritanism). Why can't absolutism pass the pragmatic test? JRS

Notes

See James, "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life" {435}.

412 Burckhardt, R. *Biologie und Humanismus*. Jena: Diedrichs, 1907.

413 Calderoni, Mario. La previsione nella teoria della conoscenza. Il Rinnovamento (Milan) 1.2 (Feb 1907): 190-207. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 1-24. Translated as "La Prévision dans la théorie de la connaissance," Rev Méta 15.5 (Sept 1907): 559-576.

414 Calò, Giovanni. L'umanismo. La cultura filosofia 1 (1907): 38-44.

415 Castro, Matilde. *The Respective Standpoints of Psychology and Logic*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1907. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1913.

416 Cattell, James McKeen. Review of Leo Koenigsberger, *Hermann von Helmholtz*. J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 715-717.

In the concluding note, Cattell offers to the readers of *The Journal of Philosophy*, "a journal devoted largely to the exploitation and suppression of pragmatism," a quotation from Helmholtz on causation: "We must anticipate the consequences; then the consequences will be its confirmation." JRS

417 Cesca, Giovanni. *La filosofia dell' azione.* Milan, Palermo, Naples: Biblioteca "Sandron" di Scienze e Lettere, 1907.

Reviews

A. W. Benn, Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 151-152; E. Ritchie, Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 406.

418 Colvin, Stephen S. The Ultimate Value of Experience. Psych Rev 14.4 (July 1907): 254-263.

Pragmatism, like hedonism, must offer an independent standard to judge satisfactions. Lacking this, experience cannot be systematized, and no objective truths exist. Since experience exhausts reality, this standard is within experience. JRS

419 Crespi, Angelo. Il problema religioso nella luce del pragmatismo. Coenobium (July 1907).

420 Davies, Arthur. Ernest Imagination and Thought in Human Knowledge. J Phil 4.24 (21 Nov 1907): 645-655.

The cognitive role of imagination has historically been ignored, save for Hume and the pragmatists (especially Dewey). JRS

421 Dewey, John. The Control of Ideas by Facts. J Phil 4.8 (11 April 1907): 197-203; 4.10 (9 May 1907): 253-259; 4.12 (6 June 1907): 309-319. Reprinted with revisions in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 230-249. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 188-212. *MW* 4: 78-90.

A poor theory of facts has led to epistemological dualism, common to both realism and idealism. This dualism makes knowledge impossible, but monism is not the remedy. The truth of ideas lies in their agreement with reality, but functionalism construes ideas as extended meanings given to present facts, and facts as present experiences selected to fit into ideas. An idea is a plan of action to a goal, and if the goal is so achieved, then the idea is verified. This process requires facts and ideas to be mutually adaptable, and relative to the specific problems that called for their development. JRS

Summaries

Robert Morris Ogden, Psych Bull 5.10 (15 Oct 1908): 336-337; C. H. Williams, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 104-105.

422 Dewey, John. Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer. Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 419-422. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 120-124.

Dewey replies to McGilvary's "Pure Experience and Reality" {450}. Things do exist when they are not being experienced, and they condition present experience. The denial that objects of thought exist prior to thought is designed to correct both empiricism (thought is only an organization of sensations) and idealism (thought is reality itself). Thought does control objective situations, to the limited extent of reorganizing specific situations for successful action. This theory takes a "naturalistic, biological, and moral attitude." JRS

Notes

See McGilvary's reply, "Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion" {451}.

423 Dewey, John. Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas. Mind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 317-342. Reprinted with "many changes" as "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 112-153. *MW* 4: 50-75.

Present-day idealism, exemplified by F. H. Bradley, defends an absolute reality of fused "intellectual, affectional and volitional features" by curiously appealing only to the purely intellectual aspects of human experience. Bradley's theory of relational judgment confines all knowledge to appearance; a transcendent reality is then logically inferred! His devotion to formal logic has another source, driving an ontological argument for the absolute. Instead, let thought's standard be harmony, but find it in experience, growing as thought does its practical work. On truth itself, the intellectualists "describe so little in analytical detail" and confuse three separate conceptions of truth. Why is "making truth" such a "blasphemy"? The "verification" is the process of idea development and testing, which is called "truth" when viewed as an accomplished product. The intellectualist only begs the question against pragmatism by declaring truths to exist before verification, since pragmatism instead treats all ideas as hypotheticals. Most truths cease to exist after they have solved minor difficulties and are forgotten. Others successfully operate in so many inquiries (for example, scientific hypotheses) that they get an "eternal" status as "proved" ideas, but this special pragmatic status can only "indicate *prospective* modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated." The conclusion summarizes the pragmatic theory of intellect and truth. JRS

Summaries

Mary S. Case, Psych Bull 5.5 (15 May 1908): 166-167; G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 103-104.

424 Douthat, Robert William. *Pragmatism: The Newest Philosophy.* Morgantown, West Virginia: Robert W. Douthat, 1907.

A thoroughly metaphysical and religious vision, offering a categorical explanation of "both the Physical and Intellectual Universe." That "working force, which we call Pragmatism, is now at work and has been since the dawn of creation in the production of Harmonious Relations in every part of the Universe of God." (p. 14) JRS

425 Duprat, Émile. L'attitude pragmatiste. Coenobium 2.1 (Nov 1907): 13-17.

426 Eisler, Rudolf. *Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie: Darstellung und Kritik der erkenntnistheoretischen Richtungen.* Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1907.

Reviews

E. C. Wilm, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 657-659. There is only a limited recognition of pragmatism. JRS

427 Eucken, Rudolf. *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung.* Leipzig: Veit, 1907. Translation by Alban G. Widgery as *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1911).

Reviews of the translation

Winifred Hyde, Phil Rev 22.1 (Jan 1913): 74-80.

428 Farges, Albert. *La Crise de la certitude: Étude des bases de la connaissance et de la croyance avec la critique du Néo-Kantisme, du Pragmatisme, du Newmanisme, etc.* Paris: Berche et Tralin, 1907. 2nd ed., 1908.

Farges attempts to do for certainty what Aristotle did for physiology and anatomy (created a theory of movement and bequeathed it to the science of sciences: philosophy). "After having observed, thought, reasoned, and more than once attained certainty, it remains only to reflect on our observations, our thoughts, our reasonings; to show not only that certainty is attainable, but also why and how it is[:] in a word, to construct a critical theory of knowledge and belief." (p. 18) Part of this project involves a critique of pragmatism (pp. 57-69 esp.), including the voluntarism of Renouvier and psychological pragmatism. According to Farges, the pragmatist's effort to achieve a pure subjectivism leads to its defeat, for "the only logical conclusion one can draw from the fact of action...is to admit and recognize the power of the mind to apprehend real objects, since it is the mind that shows them to the will, and the will that controls their reality." (p. 62) The two powers of the mind, intelligence and the will, are equally effective and objective in the pragmatist's "lame system." Discussion of "moral dogmatism" follows, along with a section about the role of the will and instinct, and the attempt to collapse the distinction between the true and the useful. LF

429 Foster, George Burman. Pragmatism and Knowledge. American Journal of Theology 11.4 (Oct 1907): 591-596.

Religion's symbols have lost cognitive function and any claim to truth, but pragmatism has similarly altered science's facts and laws. Pragmatism is doctrinally nominalistic but faithfully realistic. The cognitive function cannot be discarded, since either science cannot make predictions (which is obviously not the case), or science does gain knowledge. Besides, action is not science's exclusive goal, and scientists do not freely create scientific facts. JRS

Notes

Foster authored *The Finality of the Christian Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906).

430 Fullerton, George Stuart. The Right to Believe at One's Own Risk. Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 408-418.

Fullerton reflects on the freedom to act, stimulated by James's "right to believe." JRS

431 Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. Le Dieu fini du pragmatisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 1.2 (April 1907).

432 Hodges, George. William James: Leader in Philosophical Thought. Outlook 85 (23 Feb 1907): 448-451.

Hodges surveys James's thought, emphasizing his empiricism and open-mindedness. James is one of the most religious of philosophers. IKS

433 Inge, William R. *Personal Idealism and Mysticism.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907.

434 Jacks, Lawrence P. The Universe as Philosopher. Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 18-36. Reprinted in his *The Alchemy of Thought* (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), pp. 79-105.

Philosophers, including pragmatists, forget their position in the world when they try to survey the whole. Such speculations "appear to 'work' only so long as they and their authors are...in two absolutely separate and unrelated worlds." JRS

Summaries

Edmund H. Hollands, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 568-569.

Reviews of *The Alchemy of Thought*

"κ," Monist 24.1 (Jan 1914): 158-160; S. H. Mellone, Hibbert Journal 9.2 (Jan 1911): 427-431.

435 James, William. The Absolute and the Strenuous Life. J Phil 4.20 (26 Sept 1907): 546-548. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 226-229. *Works MT* pp. 123-125.

James replies to W. A. Brown's "The Pragmatic Value of the Absolute" {411}. In response to James's claim that the hypothesis of the absolute allows for moral holidays, Brown shows that it also permits a life of effort and striving. This must be admitted, because the absolute can be used to justify any form of life. Pragmatism or pluralism, on the other hand, because for it the world is unfinished, demands ultimate hardihood, a willingness to live without assurances. Absolutism offers consolation to sick souls, something which pluralism cannot do. IKS

436 James, William. A Defense of Pragmatism. Popular Science Monthly 70.3 (March 1907): 193-206; 70.4 (April 1907): 351-365. Part one, "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," was also published as Lecture 1 of *Pragmatism* {438}, pp. 3-40 and reprinted in *Works Prag* pp. 9-26. Part two, "What Pragmatism Means," was also published as Lecture 2 of *Pragmatism* {438}, pp. 43-81, and reprinted in *Works Prag* pp. 27-44.

Notes

For annotation see *Pragmatism.*

437 James, William. The Energies of Men. Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 1-20. Also published in Science n.s. 25 (1 March 1907): 321-332. *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 229-264. *Writings 2*, pp. 1223-1241. *Works ERM*, pp. 129-146. This essay was also published with omissions and additions as "The Powers of Men," American Magazine 65 (Nov 1907): 57-65 [*Works ERM*, pp. 147-161].

The difference between structural and functional psychology can be understood as the difference between the analytical and the clinical points of view. The two are not contradictory. However, the clinical picture, such as that of Pierre Janet, is more concrete and of greater practical importance. One of its concepts is that of the "amount" of available energy. We have much more of it than appears on the surface, because of the inhibiting effects of some ideas upon others. We have reservoirs of energy that can be tapped, for wars and other excitements. Through ascetic practice such as Yoga training, we can develop abilities to tap into these reservoirs at will. IKS

Reviews

William I. Thomas, J Phil 4.10 (9 May 1907): 268-271. James suggests that we can remain in equilibrium while living at a much faster pace. He discloses the technique of Yoga and "its patent bearing on educational theory." IKS

438 James, William. *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907. Translated into German by Wilhelm Jerusalem as *Pragmatismus* (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1908). Translated into French by E. Le Brun as *Le Pragmatisme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1911), with Bergson's introduction {907}. Translated into Italian as *Saggi pragmatisti,* with an introduction by Giovanni Papini (Lanciano: R. Carabba, 1911). Reprinted in *WJ Writings 2,* pp. 479-624. *The Works of William James: Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).

Philosophical differences reflect differences in temperament between the tough-minded (empiricist) and the tender-minded (rationalist and religious). Pragmatism is religious while remaining intimate with facts. It was proposed in the 1870s by C. S. Peirce as a method of settling intellectual disputes: to attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object we must consider what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we are to prepare. The conception of the effects is our sole conception of the object. The principle remained unnoticed until 1898 when James stated it in his "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" {13}, but the method is not new and was used by Aristotle and many British philosophers. It is an anti-intellectualist attitude, a turning away from origins, abstractions, and fixed systems towards consequences, concreteness, and action. Pragmatism has also become a theory of truth. Theories are instruments, and scientific laws are no longer viewed as representing the eternal workings of the universe but as useful approximations, a conceptual shorthand.

Reflecting this revision of scientific logic, F. C. S. Schiller declared that truth is what works, while John Dewey developed instrumentalism. Noting that new ideas are assimilated so as to least disturb old beliefs, they argue that true ideas are those which help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of experience. English philosophers have used the pragmatic method to demolish scholastic conceptions of matter and spiritual substance. They reduced "soul" to the experienceable fact that all experiences belong to personal histories. Pragmatism shows that the conflict between materialism and theism is in part a conflict of aesthetic preferences. Theists regard matter as gross, but science has shown it to be active and subtle. It makes no difference whether we think of the world as run by the lower (matter) or by the higher (spirit): it is for ever what it is. According to materialism, all human artifacts will disappear, while the designer offered by theism holds out the promise of a permanently preserved moral order. The pragmatic meaning of free will lies in the possibility of novelty and the promise of something better. In respect of the ancient problem of the one and the many, that most pregnant of philosophical differences between monism and pluralism, the method shows the world to be one in the sense of namable by one name and in the sense of being in one time and space. When we consider causal lines of influence we find many unifying chains and also many separations. For monists all things have unity of origin, while pluralists find many units with no common origin.

In view of the existence of evil, it is dogmatism to assert that the universe enjoys a single unity of purpose. With respect to aesthetic union, the pluralistic view that reality

contains many stories which do not form a single meaningful whole is more natural. While the absolute knower of idealism is a useful belief allowing us to take moral holidays, logical proofs in its favor fail and it must be treated as a hypothesis, along with the pluralistic hypothesis that there is no single point of view from which the universe can be understood. Perhaps some parts of reality are connected by nothing stronger that the copula "and." Pragmatism favors neither absolute monism nor absolute pluralism, but asserts there to be neither more nor less unity than we can make out in the concrete. It also recognizes that human energy is making the world more unified. The pragmatic view that our theories are only instruments is supported by the existence of unadjudicable conflicts between various levels of thinking. The categories of common sense discovered by ancient geniuses and turned into a system by scholasticism still stand for many purposes. However, science has developed the corpuscular view, which has led to astonishing inventions, and the critical or idealistic philosophy has produced systems yielding great intellectual satisfactions.

The pragmatic view of truth is attacked as absurd, but when compared with the intellectualist view, it is the more reflective and analytic philosophy. Both begin with the dictionary notion of truth as agreement, as a kind of copying, but what is agreement and what is to be done with ideas which in no definite sense are copies of reality? Pragmatists insist that truth is not a stagnant property of ideas but is something made by events, by processes of assimilation, validation, verification. True ideas are valuable instruments of action in dealing with often harmful realities. Pragmatism generalizes and thinks of truth as "a leading that is worth while" from one experience to another. Such leadings are not always carried out because truth lives on a system of credit where verifiability is enough. Absolute truth obtains only among relations between purely mental ideas. Schiller has proposed "humanism" as the name of the view that all formulas have a human twist. He conceives reality as something plastic and still in the making. His humanism sharpens the alternative between humanism and rationalism by questioning the structure of the universe. Humanism thinks of it pluralistically, as unfinished and growing. Rationalists think of it monistically, as having many editions, only one of which is real. In this luxury edition all finite imperfections are overcome. This optimistic view appeals to the tender-minded and suits the idea of religion as self-surrender. For optimistic monists, the universe needs even my "sick soul and heart." The pragmatist cannot rule out this view because questions are decided by faith and not logic; still, James himself prefers a more dangerous and dramatic world, uncertain of salvation, with the outcome depending in part on human action. Such meliorism bests fits the pragmatic attitude, standing as it does between crude naturalism and religious idealism. His view is not atheistic; he believes that human experience is not the highest thing in the universe. IKS

Extended reviews

G. E. Moore {575}; Bertrand Russell {592}.

Reviews

Henry M. Alden, "Editor's Study," Harper's Monthly Magazine 115.4 (Sept 1907): 645-648. Philosophy has been more tolerant of generalities than science, but now science has forced its hand. James brings philosophy from "her aerial heights to the ground." IKS

James R. Angell, Int J Ethics 18.2 (Jan 1908): 226-235. Pragmatism has aroused much controversy. With age, it promises to become one of the "real progressive factors" in the history of thought. James does not pay enough attention to the stubbornness of reality, to

438 (cont.)
which our truths must conform. James also tends to slur over the social aspects of establishing truths. IKS

Anon, "Comments on Pragmatism," Expository Times 19 (Oct 1907): 1-3. After James's classification of temperaments, we expect a treatise on philosophical predestination. Instead, he insists that in philosophy we are free to come and go as we please. IKS

Anon, "The Fascinations of the Pragmatic Method," Current Literature 43.2 (Aug 1907): 182-186. Pragmatism is "in the air" and can be found in many writers who themselves may be unaware of it. James is perhaps its ablest exponent. IKS

Anon, "A New Philosophy," Harper's Weekly 51 (31 Aug 1907): 1264. James is the "high priest" of a new philosophy and provides "racy reading for the common man." IKS

Anon, "A Practical Philosopher," Literary Digest 34.15 (13 April 1907): 584. The author gives two quotations illustrating the pragmatic method. JRS

Anon, "Official Pragmatism," Nation 85.3 (18 July 1907): 57-58. This philosophy of the "average man" must turn to intellectualism to solve the problem of how expediency can determine truth. Its error "lies in a kind of intellectual laziness or shiftlessness, a desire to shuffle off the responsibility of the mind." JRS

Anon, "Pragmatism," Independent 63.11 (12 Sept 1907): 630-631. Pragmatism is a unifying point for different fields. Many find that they have been pragmatists all along. James left his Harvard chair to appeal to wider audiences, showing his "faith in pragmatism as a philosophy for the people." IKS

Anon, "Pragmatism," Spectator 99.1 (6 July 1907): 9-11. With a reputation as a psychologist and defender of religious belief, James "in what many think was an evil day" turned his attention to metaphysics. *Pragmatism* contains a bold creed. James's style, often brilliant, is at times obscure. James insists on the practical value of truth. But how many theories lead to no direct application and yet help us to understand experience? IKS

Anon, "Pragmatism, the Newest Philosophy," Current Literature 42.6 (June 1907): 652-653. James is "prophet-in-chief" of pragmatism in America and gave up his professorship to devote himself to its propaganda. The body of the article consists of quotations from Slosson's review (below). IKS

Anon, "The Pragmatist Microbe," Current Literature 43.4 (Oct 1907): 418-420. Surveys remarks on *Pragmatism* with many quotations and an emphasis on criticism. IKS

Anon, "Professor James's 'Pragmatism'," Harvard Illustrated Magazine 16 (Sept 1907): 20-25. Everyone should read this book; it is bound to arouse much controversy. At present, philosophers say it is not philosophy, psychologists say it is not psychology, and theologians say it is not theology. IKS

Charles M. Bakewell, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 624-634. James's depiction of the "intellectualists" is a caricature of their views. Philosophical problems are ignored and not solved. James gives us unobjectionable advice to be cautious and patient, but not a method. Like positivists, James seeks to turn philosophy into a science, but one with more scope than the other sciences. IKS

Günther Jacoby, Kant-Studien 13.4 (28 Dec 1908): 478-480. This long awaited work is a disappointment because it does not make clear the basis of James's thought. James's conclusions are not based upon scientific investigation, but upon his preferences. IKS

Charles H. Judd, Psych Bull 5.5 (15 May 1908): 157-162. A psychologist can review this book since pragmatists approach their problems from a psychological point of view. The distinction between the tough-minded and the tender-minded is psychological and

shows that philosophical disputes are a clash of temperaments. Pragmatism risks subjectivism. In spite of James's claims, it is hard to distinguish pragmatism from his other philosophy. IKS

John M. E. McTaggart, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 104-109. Pragmatism is said to look away from "principles" and "necessities" and turn towards "consequences." But all philosophers consider consequences, while James uses principles and asserts necessities. James's exposition of a theory of truth, while "picturesque," is not "lucid." IKS

Max Meyer, Zeit für Psych 48 (1908): 279-280. The term pragmatism is not known in Germany, but the idea is. It can be found in Avenarius, Mach, and G. Heymans. IKS

Wilhelm Ostwald, Annalen der Naturphilosophie 7 (1908): 510-512. James's lectures are popular and filled with humor. Ernst Mach has recently presented similar views. IKS

I. Woodbridge Riley, Bookman 26.1 (Oct 1907): 215-217. Pragmatism "rids one of Puritanism" and sets us "if not on the road to perfectibility, at least into the fresh fields of independent action." James's meliorism is a reversion to religious mysticism. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 16.4 (Oct 1907): 598-604. Novel are James's recognition that correspondence within experience is acceptable to pragmatism and his discussion of potential truth. We also receive new hints about James's metaphysics. James's description of pragmatism as anarchic is misleading. That each man ought to interpret his own experience is only a long overdue recognition of "human freedom and responsibility." IKS

Carolyn Shipman, North American Review 185.8 (16 Aug 1907): 884-888. Pragmatism is "infinitely superior to either rationalism or materialism." JRS

Paul Shorey, "The Equivocations of Pragmatism," Dial 43.9 (1 Nov 1907): 273-275. James does not satisfy his own insistence on clear definition and consistency. Pragmatism stands condemned by deriding the "precious gift" of the "dry light of the intellect." JRS

Edwin Emery Slosson, "Pragmatism," Independent 62.8 (21 Feb 1907): 422-425. Pragmatism is not yet a school but a focus of converging lines of thought. This new humanism does not originate in the humanities but is the "gift of modern science." The fact that both James and Schiller engage in psychical research is giving rise to the fear that pragmatism will bring with it "Mrs. Piper" and "the whole host of devils." IKS

"Student," "Pragmatism," Century Path 10 (14 July 1907): 4. Pragmatism is a "new darkness." It begins by ruling out the soul and ends with "eat, drink, and be merry; for tomorrow we die." A pragmatist sets aside controversies over materialism and idealism. But two men, alike except one is a spiritualist and the other a materialist, would in a few years differ greatly: one will be "fine" and the other "gross." IKS

"Student," "Pragmatism and Chaos," Century Path 10 (3 November 1907): 4. Materialism has receded, leaving a "lot of seaweed" with the "well-sounding name of Pragmatism." For it, there is no universe with its laws, "except what I think there is." IKS

Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 3 (July-Aug 1907): 284-286 [*Scritti* {1018}, pp. 791-793]. This brief review is replete with quotations from James. Vailati concludes the review with a brief criticism of James's willingness to speak of the will to believe as a "right" to believe. EPC

Robert M. Wenley, Science n.s. 26 (11 Oct 1907): 464-468. Pragmatism is only the raw material for a philosophy and one hopes that James and his allies will actually state one. It represents a "Protestant attitude" towards orthodox university philosophy, but the work "fails to rise to the level of its author's reputation" and contains "cheap stuff." IKS

P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 18.4 (Oct 1907): 524. The "confusion of truth with the knowledge of truth" is not cleared up. JRS

Reviews of the German translation

Hermann Lange, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Padagogik 16 (1909): 155-158. It is desirable that James's work have an influence in Germany like it has had elsewhere. His method needs elaboration. IKS

Otto Neurath, Der Kunstwart 23 (Oct 1909): 138-141. The basis of pragmatism is the view that theories test themselves in practice. Jerusalem is the major representative of this view in Germany. IKS

Reviews of the French translation

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 22 (1911): 213-214. The traditional conception considers truth after truth has been established, while pragmatism deals with it before verification. It is difficult to see how James deals adequately with all kinds of truths. IKS

Maurice Serol, Rev de Phil 20.1 (1 Jan 1912): 94-97. A sense for the concrete may suffice for experimental psychology, but does not go far in philosophy. James's radical empiricism is sterile. IKS

Notes

See "The Alleged 'Decay of Responsibility' in America" {503}.

439 James, William. Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. J Phil 4.6 (14 March 1907): 141-155. Also published as Lecture 6 of *Pragmatism* {438}, pp. 197-236. *Writings of WJ* pp. 429-443. *Works Prag* pp. 95-114.

Notes

For annotation see *Pragmatism.*

440 James, William. Professor Pratt on Truth. J Phil 4.17 (15 Aug 1907): 464-467. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 162-179. *Works MT*, pp. 90-98.

James replies to J. B. Pratt's "Truth and Its Verification" {477}. The views which Pratt attributes to pragmatists are asinine. In fact, for pragmatists an idea is true or false only when it refers to an object. Otherwise, it is simply non-cognitive or irrelevant. Truth is a relation constituted by a "*fundamentum of circumstance*" which can be traversed at length or short-circuited as needed. Where this fundamentum exists, the idea both is true and has been true of its object. For Pratt, the fundamentum is likely only a test of truth, while truth is defined as copying. However, few of our abstract ideas resemble objects. Pratt thinks of James as a modified pragmatist, and of Schiller and Dewey as radical. But in fact, all three agree. IKS

441 James, William. A Reply to Mr. Pitkin. J Phil 4.4 (14 Feb 1907): 105-106. Appended to "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'" {330}, for reprinting under that title in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, pp. 241-243. *Works ERE*, pp. 125.

James replies to W. B. Pitkin's "In Reply to Professor James" {475}. Pitkin's reply is perplexing because of his obscurity of style, a characteristic of many of the younger philosophers. James agrees that many things are experienced as "that which they are not." While experience cannot preclude the possibility of something not experienced or of action of experience upon noumena, in philosophy it is wisest to remain with the experienceable. IKS

442 James, William. A Word More About Truth. J Phil 4.15 (18 July 1907): 396-406. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 136-161. *Works MT*, pp. 78-89.

James will try once again to give an exposition of pragmatism, a view he first stated in 1885 in "The Function of Cognition." Knowledge is an ambulatory relation and is "made" by the ambulation from an idea to the vicinity of its object, both of which meanwhile are parts of reality. It is a saltatory relation only when taken abstractly. Such abstractions can be useful as long as in their name concrete reality is not denied. Pragmatists are erroneously accused of confusing logic with psychology, but they only claim that truth conceived logically is a "saltatory abstraction" in need of "ambulatory concreteness." Critics dwell on the supposed subjectiveness of "satisfactoriness" and of "the will to believe." However, should such critics state exactly what they mean by objective truth, such truth would still fall within the field of pragmatic analysis. IKS

443 James, William and John E. Russell. Controversy About Truth. J Phil 4.11 (23 May 1907): 289-296. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 470-483. *Works ERE*, pp. 145-153.

Letters between James and John Russell on truth reveal that at the heart of the controversy lies Russell's claim that verification does not make an idea true but only proves that it was true. James agrees that before verification a true idea was true in the sense of being verifiable but demands that Russell define "was true." James claims that no definition is possible without terms such as leading, guiding, "getting there." Russell responds that truth is "agreement," which cannot be further defined. IKS

444 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. Image, Idea, and Meaning. Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 70-100.

445 Kaltenborn, Hans von. William James at Harvard. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 8 (Feb 1907): 93-95.

Contains anecdotes about James's last class and his examination for the degree of M.D., written to mark James's retirement. IKS

446 Labeyrie. Rôle de la volonté dans la connaissance–Pragmatisme et humanisme. Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques (April-May 1907).

447 Lalande, André. La Mouvement logique. Rev Phil 63.3 (March 1907): 256-288.

Notes

See also Louis Couturat, "La Logique et la philosophie contemporaine," Rev Méta 14.3 (May 1906): 319-341.

448 Levi, Allesandro. Il prammatismo religioso. La cultura filosofia 1 (1907): 305-310.

449 Lloyd, Alfred H. Some Important Situations and their Attitudes. Psych Rev 14.1 (Jan 1907): 37-53.

Lloyd discusses the moral, artistic, practical, and natural types of situations. Each is dependent on the next, with the spiritual attitude taken in natural situations of fundamental importance. The pragmatic/dogmatic distinction arises relative to situations. JRS

450 McGilvary, Evander B. Pure Experience and Reality. Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 266-284. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 295-313.

James accepts the existence of reality beyond experience, but Dewey holds that "the pre-experiential something is not to be considered completely real." His position that known objects have reality only through present experience mistakenly identifies "making real" with "recognizing as real," and makes knowledge of the past impossible. The object is independent of the reflective process, unless the pragmatist holds that the "mighty thought" of Copernicus really altered the earth's position. Some of our knowledge is representative, some mental images refer to things never experienced, and truth is correspondence with reality. JRS

Summaries

Helen G. Hood, Psych Bull 5.7 (15 July 1908): 239-240.

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer" {422}.

451 McGilvary, Evander B. Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion. Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 422-424.

McGilvary replies to Dewey's "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer" {422}, stating that his article contains no misconceptions. It described his experience of Dewey's logical philosophy, and (since reality is what it is experienced as) hence must be the truth. Dewey's past realities "have a way of *now* undergoing *past* changes every time they are differently experienced." JRS

452 McGilvary, Evander B. Realism and the Physical World. J Phil 4.25 (5 Dec 1907): 683-692.

Non-realists have argued that since objects change in our experience they cannot be objectively real. Realists counter by distinguishing objects' real and subjective qualities. This distinction is not in immediate experience. The conviction that objects persist before and after experience is supported by others' testimony, the test of coherence, and further pragmatic criteria. A pragmatically realistic theory of knowledge is thus possible. JRS

Summaries

C. H. Williams, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 567-568.

453 McGilvary, Evander B. The Stream of Consciousness. J Phil 4.9 (25 April 1907): 225-235. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 152-163.

Consciousness is a continual stream, not a succession of pulses of thought or little egos. James errs in *Principles of Psychology* (1890) because he attributes to the ego the discreteness found in the objects of thought. "Feelings of transition" and the "quality of warmth and intimacy" try to restore unity, but they work as badly as Hume's association. IKS

Summaries

Robert Morris Ogden, Psych Bull 5.10 (15 Oct 1908): 333-334.

454 Mackenzie, John Stuart. *Lectures on Humanism with Special Reference to Its Bearings on Sociology.* London: Swan, Sonnenschein and Co.; New York: Macmillan, 1907. Reprinted, New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.

An exposition of humanism, in a wider sense than pragmatism offers. If pragmatism ignores the universal principles guiding individual choice, or the objective conditions that determine life, then it lands us in "absolute scepticism." (p. 194) JRS

455 Mead, G. H. Concerning Animal Perception. Psych Rev 3 (1907): 383-390. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 73-81.

456 Mead, G. H. Review of Henri Bergson, *L'Évolution créatrice.* Psych Bull 4.12 (15 Dec 1907): 379-384.

Why has Bergson not recognized the "creative power of consciousness?" JRS

Notes

L'Évolution créatrice (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907).

457 Mentré, Françoise. Note sur la valeur pragmatique du pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 11.1 (1 July 1907): 5-22.

Reviews

F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 666-667.

Notes

See Borrell's response, "La Notion de pragmatisme" {404}.

458 Mitchell, William. *Structure and Growth of the Mind.* London, Macmillan, 1907.

Reviews

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 255-264. With regard to truth Mitchell is a pragmatist, but he does not discuss this position's controversial aspects. JRS

459 Moore, A. W. Experience, Habit and Attention. Psych Rev 14.5 (Sept 1907): 292-297. Reprinted as "The Social Character of Habit and Attention" in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 245-256.

Moore replies to Baldwin's "Thought and Things" {393}. JRS

Notes

See Baldwin, "Comment on Professor Moore's Paper," Psych Rev 14.5 (Sept 1907): 297-298.

460 Moore, A. W. Professor Perry on Pragmatism. J Phil 4.21 (10 Oct 1907): 567-577. Reprinted with revisions in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 195-219.

Moore responds to R. B. Perry's "A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization" {472} and "A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge" {473}. Perry separates cognitive interest from ideas, and the subject from objects. He is not free from correspondence assumptions, and his criticisms rely on obscurities. Pragmatism only asserts that knowledge re-makes the world. JRS

461 Münsterberg, Hugo. Professor James as a Psychologist. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 7 (8 Feb 1907): 97-98. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 106-110.

Written to mark James's retirement. James's basic method is "self-observation." He is more of a descriptive than explanatory psychologist. IKS

462 Neilson, William Allan. William James as Lecturer and Writer. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 8 (Feb 1907): 98-99.

Occasioned by James's retirement. James is concerned with thought, not form. Harvard English professors were envious of the writing ability of the philosophers. IKS

463 Nichols, Herbert. Pragmatism Versus Science. J Phil 4.5 (28 Feb 1907): 122-131.

James is willing to infer other minds, but he reduces physical objects to experiences. Science distinguishes objects from perceptions of them. James has no reason to reject the hypothesis that reality is one complex mind; science only has good reason to accept it. JRS

464 Noël, Léon. Bulletin d'épistémologie: Le Pragmatisme. Revue Néo-Scolastique 14.2 (May 1907): 220-243.

French publications have shown a growing interest in the new philosophical positions of England and America. Of the "Anglo-French" philosophy, and the hearty understanding of recent years, Noël writes: "it is at least permissible to declare that...if the Anglo-Saxons prove themselves sympathetic, it is France who frets and fumes." (p. 221) After a discussion of the pragmatisms of Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey, the author covers the work of the *chef* of Italian pragmatism, Papini, and of the French pragmatists Le Roy and Blondel. LF

465 O'Donnell, M. J. Faith and Will. Irish Theological Review (Jan 1907).

466 Paetz, W. *Die erkenntnis-theoretischen Grundlagen von William James "The Varieties of Religious Experience."* Eilenburg: Ewald Lesske, 1907.

Paetz quotes from *Varieties* {90}, focusing on the problem of knowledge. He examines James's claim that the science of religion can be given an exact basis. IKS

467 Papini, Giovanni. *Il tragico quotidiano.* Florence: Libreria della Voce, 1907. 2nd ed., 1913. 4th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1920. 5th ed., 1927.

Reviews

I. Woodbridge Riley, Nation 85.23 (5 Dec 1907): 521.

468 Papini, Giovanni. Introduzione al pragmatismo. Leonardo 5.1 (Feb 1907): 26-37. Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 55-66.

"Whoever would state in few words a definition of pragmatism would be doing something more anti-pragmatic than it is possible to imagine." With these words,

Papini begins the essay whose title promises so much. Pragmatism is far too rich a philosophical movement to be captured so easily in a single sentence. Part of the difficulty also lies in the fact that pragmatism is not a philosophy in the sense of a mechanism for building a metaphysical system. Rather, it is a means for relying less upon philosophy in this system-building sense, considering that such metaphysical activity is bound to collapse into confusion. Papini goes on to discuss the relationship between pragmatism and positivism. From the beginning of *Leonardo*, both Papini and Prezzolini had declared war on Italian positivism precisely because it accepted the world as it is, while they wanted to remake the world after the pattern supplied by the will residing in the deeper-lying self. Pragmatism shares positivism's distaste for empty, metaphysical phrases, but pragmatism proves to be a much more effective lever to action since it has less loyalty to the world as it is. EPC

Reviews

Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 4.23 (7 Nov 1907): 639-641. How does a pragmatist distinguish genuine from real problems? JRS

469 Papini, Giovanni. Non bisogna esser monisti. In *Ricerche di psichiatria e neurologia, antropologia e filosofia dedicata al prof. Enrico Morselli nel 25 anno del suo insegnamento universitario* (Milan: Dottor F. Vallardi, 1907), pp. 685-696. Reprinted in *Sul Pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 73-87.

A cautionary essay against the tendency to reduce all reality to some fundamental metaphysical unity. Papini attacks what he calls "monistic" philosophy, then propounded with vigor in Italy by Enrico Morselli. During his pragmatic period, Papini was a committed pluralist, and this essay is perhaps the most sustained discussion he provides for this position. EPC

470 Papini, Giovanni. What Pragmatism is Like. Translated by Katharine Royce. Popular Science Monthly 71.10 (Oct 1907): 351-358.

471 Perry, Ralph B. Professor James as a Philosopher. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 7 (Feb 1907): 96-97. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 119-203.

Occasioned by James's retirement. James dislikes sharp distinctions and finds "food" for both psychology and philosophy in an event. He is in the tradition of British empiricism. Even his "nearest disciples" would not claim that his right hand always knows what his left is doing. IKS

472 Perry, Ralph B. A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization. J Phil 4.16 (1 Aug 1907): 421-428.

Though truth has practical corollaries, they must remain distinct. Clearness is not gained by restricting the meaning of concepts to their practical implications. Satisfaction lies in accommodating ourselves to reality, not the reverse. Knowledge cannot have any affect on reality. If pragmatism would be a truly empirical philosophy, it can only lead to subjective skepticism. If pragmatism would be a relativism, it can only lead to transcendental idealism. JRS

473 Perry, Ralph B. A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge. J Phil 4.14 (4 July 1907): 365-374. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 213-222.

The locus of pragmatism is the "experience of arriving at belief." True knowledge somehow lies at its conclusion, when the "cognitive structure" collapses back into immediate experience. How can knowledge be relative to intention unless the content intended is already known? While true knowledge is sought and found in one "self-sufficient process," any theory of it must include the known object; because "it is *truth* it must envisage reality." In these criticisms, there has been no resort made to "a general and vague insistence that true knowledge must 'correspond' to its object." JRS

474 Pillsbury, Walter B. An Attempt to Harmonize the Current Psychological Theories of Judgment. Psych Bull 4.8 (15 Aug 1907): 237-242.

Dewey's theory of judgment generally agrees with four other recent theories. JRS

475 Pitkin, Walter B. In Reply to Professor James. J Phil 4.2 (17 Jan 1907): 44-45. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 150-151.

Pitkin replies to James's "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'" {330}. The "common-sense realism" of some passages in the radical empiricism essays cannot be reconciled with the idealism of other passages. IKS

Notes

See James's reply, "A Reply to Professor Pitkin" {441}.

476 Porret, J. Alfred. *Au sujet de la conversion: remarques sur la théorie émise par M. William James, dans son livre "L'Expérience religieuse."* Geneva: H. Robet, 1907.

Porret discusses conversion as described in the *Varieties* {90}. James thinks it only possible that conversion involves divine intervention, but certain facts cannot be explained without God and intervention is necessary. IKS

477 Pratt, James B. Truth and Its Verification. J Phil 4.12 (6 June 1907): 320-324. Reprinted in *William James's Pragmatism in Focus*, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 156-160.

It is "non-pragmatic" to define truth in terms of verifiability since verifiability is not something found in an individual's experience, but is a "general condition" which "transcends every single finite experience." IKS

Notes

See James's response, "Professor Pratt on Truth" {440}.

478 Prezzolini, Giuseppi. *L'arte di persuadere.* Florence: Biblioteca del Leonardo, volume settimo, Francesco Lumachi Editore, 1907. 2nd ed., Naples: Liguori, 1991.

Extended reviews

Giovanni Vailati {497}

Reviews

Anon, Rev de Phil 7 (1907): 296.

479 Prezzolini, Giuseppe. *Il sarto spirituale.* Florence: Biblioteca del Leonardo, F. Lumachi Libraio Editore, 1907.

480 Rogers, Arthur K. *The Religious Conception of the World.* New York: Macmillan, 1907.

On pp. 19-27 Rogers argues that pragmatism's reduction of knowledge to human experience escapes solipsism only if it takes experience to be inherently social. Rationality requires feeling and will, since it is "the impulse to harmonize our experience." (p. 71) Freedom lies in the individual's acts, as determined by character. James's indeterminism is unnecessary, since the truth of determinism is compatible with the practical human ignorance of outcomes. (p. 225) JRS

Reviews

George Galloway, Hibbert Journal 6.2 (Jan 1908): 442-446; H. W. Wright, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 555-557.

481 Russell, John E. Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic Doubt. J Phil 4.3 (31 Jan 1907): 57-64.

For pragmatism to persuade non-pragmatists, some non-pragmatic justification is necessary. Pragmatism cannot account for others' experiences, and must consider truth as agreement with reality. JRS

Summaries

Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 567-568.

Notes

See F. C. S. Schiller's response, "The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt" {488}.

482 Russell, John E. A Reply to Dr. Schiller. J Phil 4.9 (25 April 1907): 238-243.

Russell replies to Schiller's "A Pragmatic Babe in the Wood" {487} and "The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt" {488}. On Schiller's definition of "lost," an injured traveler who had a map would be lost. The truth of a doctrine is one thing, and what produces certainty in that doctrine another. Schiller's prescription is like the command to experience being cured, and if a satisfying experience follows, that experience is called the medicine that cures. Pragmatism does not deal with reason or logic, anymore than mysticism. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Pragmatism versus Skepticism," J Phil 4.18 (29 Aug 1907): 482-487; Russell's "A Last Word to Dr. Schiller," ibid. pp. 487-490; and Schiller's reply, "Ultima Ratio?" ibid. pp. 490-494.

483 Sabine, George H. The Concreteness of Thought. Phil Rev 16.2 (March 1907): 154-169.

Reality consists of partially organized experience, and thought implies the Absolute. Functionalists and instrumentalists rely on "givens" of pure experience which cannot possibly exist, hence forbidding any pre-reflective/reflective distinction. JRS

Reviews

F. S. Wrinch, Psych Bull 5.4 (15 April 1908): 123-125. Sabine avoids the "anarchistic tendencies of pragmatism" while satisfying science. JRS

Notes

These themes are continued in Sabine, "The Material of Thought," Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 285-297.

484 Schiller, F. C. S. Humism and Humanism. *Proc Arist Soc* 7 (1907): 93-111. Reprinted in *Humanism*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 222-248

Humanism replaces Hume's atomistic and passive empiricism with voluntarism. Hume's attack on voluntary causes and powers should be rejected on the grounds of immediate experience. Kantian idealism, not humanism, uses mental powers to defend the objectivity of physical causation. JRS

Summaries

Edwin B. Holt, J Phil 5.16 (30 July 1908): 439; H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 17.3 (May 1908): 342-343.

485 Schiller, F. C. S. The Madness of the Absolute. J Phil 4.1 (3 Jan 1907): 18-21.

Schiller replies to W. C. Gore's "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" {324}. A pluralist must admit the existence of some madness, but not that madness infects everything, which is instead implied by monism. JRS

486 Schiller, F. C. S. Mr. Bradley's Theory of Truth. Mind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 401-409.

Schiller comments on Bradley's "On Truth and Copying" {410}. Bradley has clarified his views on the correspondence of truth to reality, absolute mind, error, and pure thought. Pragmatism does not deny correspondence, but finds it within human experience. Bradley has wrongly portrayed pragmatism, by separating theory from practice, making will, thought, and feeling independent faculties of the mind, and assuming that pragmatism is a metaphysical method. Bradley's absolute truth is only an idea in many minds. JRS

487 Schiller, F. C. S. A Pragmatic Babe in the Wood. J Phil 4.2 (17 Jan 1907): 42-44.

Schiller responds to John E. Russell's "The Pragmatist's Meaning of Truth" {365}. The "right" solution depends on the purpose of the seeker, which is not determined by any "objective conditions." JRS

Notes

See Russell's reply {482}.

488 Schiller, F. C. S. The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt. J Phil 4.9 (25 April 1907): 235-238.

Schiller responds to John E. Russell's "Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic Doubt" {481}. Russell's inability to try pragmatism is created by unreal theoretic doubt; a case of "paralysis of the will proceeding (probably) from chronic *intellectualitis*." Postulates are not presuppositions, and pragmatism is not inconsistent with Russell's notions of correspondence and reality. JRS

Notes

See Russell's reply {482}.

489 Schiller, F. C. S. Psychology and Knowledge. Mind n.s. 16.2 (April 1907): 244-248.

Schiller comments on H. A. Prichard's "A Criticism of the Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge," Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 27-53. Schiller objects to Prichard's assumptions: what is known is independent of knowledge, truth is correspondence, and objects can be abstracted from the cognitive process. Prichard cannot account for illusion and error. JRS

490 Schiller, F. C. S. *Studies in Humanism.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1907. 2nd ed., 1912. Translated into French by S. Jankélévitch as *Étude sur l'humanisme* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1909). Nine essays were translated by Rudolf Eisler for inclusion in *Humanismus: Beifräge zu einer pragmafischen Philosophie* (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911).

"The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," pp. 1-21 [*Humanismus*, pp. 104-121], is "based in part" on {280} and {281}. "From Plato to Protagorus," pp. 22-70, is an expansion of {372}. "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," pp. 71-113 [*Humanismus*, pp. 138-179], is partially based on {375}. "Truth and Mr. Bradley," pp. 114-140, is an expansion of {202}. "The Ambiguity of Truth," pp. 141-162 [*Humanismus*, pp. 197-217], is an expansion of {368}. "The Nature of Truth," pp. 163-178 [*Humanismus*, pp. 218-233], is an expansion of Schiller's review of {333}. "The Making of Truth," pp. 179-203 [*Humanismus*, pp. 234-258], and "Absolute Truth and Absolute Reality," pp. 204-223 [*Humanismus*, pp. 259-279], were written for this book. "Empiricism and the Absolute," pp. 224-257, is a revision of {282}. "Is 'Absolute Idealism' Solipsistic?" pp. 258-265, is a reprint of {371}. "Absolutism and the Dissociation of Personality," pp. 266-273, is a reprint of {370}. "Absolutism and Religion," pp. 274-297, "The Papyri of Philonous," pp. 298-301, "Protagorus the Humanist," pp. 302-325, and "A Dialogue Concerning Gods and Priests," pp. 326-348, were written for this book. "Faith, Reason, and Religion," pp. 349-369 [*Humanismus*, pp. 364-384], is a revision of {369}. "The Progress of Psychical Research," pp. 370-390, is a revision of {283}. "Freedom," pp. 391-420 [*Humanismus*, pp. 280-309], and "The Making of Reality," pp. 421-451 [*Humanismus*, pp. 310-340], were written for this book. "Dreams and Idealism," pp. 452-486, is a revision of {201}. JRS

Reviews

Anon, "The Pragmatic Philosophy," Independent 62.10 (4 April 1907): 797-798. The "most comprehensive" exposition of humanism yet; the possibilities suggested are more fascinating than its theories. JRS

Anon, Nation 84.19 (9 May 1907): 436-437. The more Schiller explains pragmatism, the more "elusive and unsatisfactory must this doctrine appear to his critics." JRS

Henry Barker, Phil Rev 17.3 (May 1908): 323-332. Schiller's polemics attack a non-existent "intellectualism," and encourage a "revolutionary attitude" toward logic. Schiller confuses reality with our knowledge of it, but rightly argues for psychology's relevance to logic. JRS

Carveth Read, Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 387-394. Humanism is just empiricism with some accidental and dubious additions. JRS

Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 4.12 (6 June 1907): 328-334. Basing the account of knowledge on the psychology of truth cannot be objected to. Is Schiller also offering a meta-

physics? A metaphysics is necessary to judge pragmatism, and to provide independent objects to which knowledge refers. Schiller's panpsychism seems impractical, and his attack on absolutism only defends irrationalism. JRS

Herbert L. Stewart, Hibbert Journal 5.4 (July 1907): 938-942. Perhaps the uniformity of nature is no mystery, and even if it were, pragmatism has no solution, since the origin of a belief is not its justification. JRS

G. F. Stout, Mind n.s. 16.4 (Oct 1907): 579-588. Schiller's doctrine is highly coherent, but it has a mistaken conception of experience as "primary reality," and it reduces the reality of others to their value to me. JRS

M. R., Rev de Phil 10.6 (1 June 1907): 607-610.

Reviews of the French translation

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 20 (1909): 208-209.

Notes

Schiller wrote a new introduction for *Humanismus*, pp. 1-15.

491 Sellars, Roy Wood. Professor Dewey's View of Agreement. J Phil 4.16 (1 Aug 1907): 432-435. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 223-225.

Sellars comments on Dewey's "The Control of Ideas by Facts" {421}. People have purposes, not ideas, and not all ideas are plans of action. The "practical realist" will find a gap in his knowledge filled by the true idea, solving the problem. Common sense corrects pragmatism's emphasis on the personal. JRS

492 Sidgwick, Alfred. Humanism. Albany Review 1 (Aug 1907): 575-587.

As a revolt against absolutism, now a "stale and lifeless orthodoxy," humanism insists that any statement capable of being true must have a meaning that "consists in its intended application." Absolutists have not revealed whether their claims have meaning, but instead attack humanism using the assumption that the term "theoretical" can be opposed to the "merely" practical. The humanist logic states that "*all* propositions stand in a context and therefore are in need of an interpretation which fixes their actual meaning." The independence of truth is sometimes a valuable assumption and hence not meaningless, but metaphysical issues lacking any relevance to "the actual distinguishing of truth from error, or good from evil" are a waste of time. JRS

493 Talbot, Ellen Bliss. The Philosophy of Fichte in Its Relation to Pragmatism. Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 488-505.

Notes

See Talbot, *The Fundamental Principle of Fichte's Philosophy* (1906).

494 Troiano, P. R. *Le base dell' umanismo.* Turin, Rome, Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1907.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 133-134. His pragmatic arguments, and his anti-intellectualist positions, place Troiano closest to the British personal idealists. His rejection of pragmatism results from his separation of theory and practice. JRS

495 Vailati, Giovanni. Dal monismo al pragmatismo. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 3.4 (July-Aug 1907). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 787-790.

Vailati comments on Giovanni Papini's "Non bisogno esser monisti" {469}. According to Vailati, this essay, together with Papini's *Il crepuscolo dei filosofi* {351}, represents an all-out attack against systematic philosophy. The nominalistic bent of Papini's position comes in for much criticism, as one would expect from a thinker with such a Peircean turn of mind as Vailati. EPC

496 Vailati, Giovanni. De quelques caractères du mouvement philosophique contemporain en Italie. La Revue du Mois 3 (Feb 1907): 162-185. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 753-769.

497 Vailati, Giovanni. Un manuale per i bugiardi: a proposito dell'*Arte di persuadere* di G. Prezzolini. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 3.2 (March-April 1907). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 770-776.

A review of Prezzolini's *L'Arte di persuadere* {478}, contrasting his more scientifically minded pragmatism with Prezzolini's enthusiastic voluntarism. This interchange makes an interesting complement to the debate between Prezzolini and Mario Calderoni over the nature of pragmatism, fought earlier in the pages of *Leonardo*. EPC

498 Valle, Guido della. Le premesse dell' umanismo. Riv Filo 10.2 (March-April 1907): 184-200.

499 Watson, John. *The Philosophical Basis of Religion.* Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1907.

Pp. 138-164 discuss James. James returns to the Kantian claims that the intellect cannot grasp true reality, and the world can still be understood through its response to "the claims of our fundamental needs." James rejects our taking as true what "suits us personally to believe." A close summary of *The Will to Believe* (1897) is followed by the criticism that James, in following Kant, overlooks the actual teleological basis of nature. James's theory of the subliminal origins of religion arbitrarily rejects many ordinary intellectual forms of experience. "No one is more emphatic than he in affirming that a theory of religion must be based upon 'experience,' and no one, as a matter of fact, has made so little use of it." Such a method is hardly respectful to all experiences, or to the responsibility to unify them, and only "tries to find in the aberrations of unbalanced emotion the secret of life." James has no justification for the elevation of "this invertebrate state of mind" to the status of religious evidence. Religious experience is a cultural and historical teleological process, not an isolated individual event. Novel religious experiences must be philosophically interpreted in the light of the long-term consequences for the whole of human life. Such intellectual reflection only empowers emotional inspiration. We can agree with James's *Pragmatism* {438} that ideas become true when found to be in agreement with the facts, but verification can only take place because reality is a self-consistent and rational system. Therefore, this system settles truth independently of, and only incidentally causes, our satisfactory experiences. Our provisional "categories," if so contingent as pragmatism claims, would throw us into an irrational universe, where neither common-sense, science, nor philosophy could claim priority. JRS

Reviews

Henry Jones, Hibbert Journal 6.3 (April 1908): 676-682; John S. Mackenzie, Mind 17.4 (Oct 1908): 554-559; Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 529-532.

500 Wobbermin, Georg. Introduction. To the German translation by Georg Wobbermin of James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} as *Die Religiose Erfahrung* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1907. 2nd ed., 1914.)

Wobbermin explains the views of F. D. E. Schleiermacher, arguing that James is much like Schleiermacher. The second edition has an additional introduction by Wobbermin, who replies to criticisms, especially from Wundt's *Probleme der Völkerpsychologie* {1020}. Wundt criticized the whole of James's work in terms of pragmatism, but that is only a part of James's thought. It is necessary to combine Schleiermacher's critique with James's psychological approach to attain an adequate standpoint. IKS

501 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Pragmatism and Education. Educational Review 34.3 (Oct 1907): 227-240.

The pragmatic method remains obscure, due to the term "practical." Pragmatism abolishes the separation between ideas and facts and claims that experience knows no distinct "orders of existence." This is unobjectionable if kept within proper limits, but it is sometimes extended to mean that ideas produce the whole realm of facts. In education, pragmatism urges us to make ideas clear by showing where they lead to and emphasizes the principle of continuity. IKS

1908

502 Amendola, Giovanni. La Philosophie italienne contemporaine. Rev Méta 16.5 (Sept 1908): 635-665.

503 Anon. The Alleged "Decay of Responsibility" in America. Current Literature 45.4 (Oct 1908): 424-426.

Contains quotations from James G. Huneker's disapproving "recent essay on pragmatism" in the New York *Sun*, and from an unidentified reviewer in *The Mirror*, who castigates James's *Pragmatism* {438} as "damnable," "abominably vulgar," and "the most insidiously immoral book." JRS

504 Armstrong, A. C. The Evolution of Pragmatism. J Phil 5.24 (19 Nov 1908): 645-650. Reprinted in *Berichte über den III. Internationalen Kongress fur Philosophy zu Heidelberg* {656}, pp. 720-726.

Controversies over pragmatism have begun to clear up. Pragmatists agree that it is primarily a method, although it may not be distinct from a theory of truth. Pragmatism is not subjectivism, and less open to metaphysics than Schiller's humanism. IKS

505 Armstrong, A. C. Issues of Pragmatism. Methodist Review 68 (March 1908): 258-268.

506 Bakewell, Charles M. On the Meaning of Truth. Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 579-591.

Truth, like all philosophical concepts, is vaguely used but not satisfactorily defined. Pragmatism's loosely worded doctrines are quite acceptable; "we can all join the choir of

the pragmatists, and with them sing the praises of truth and its practical value." But the real issue is whether ideas are true or false *before* they are tested, or only *after*, as pragmatism claims. Thought seeks the unified and permanent, not an "anarchy of opinions." A true judgment of a thing is "conceiving it in its total context" in transcendent experience. JRS

Notes

This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 182-183.

507 Baldini, P. La religosità secondo il pragmatismo. Il Rinnovamento 3.1 (1908): 43-66.

508 Baldwin, James Mark. Knowledge and Imagination. Psych Rev 15.3 (May 1908): 181-196. Portions reprinted in *Thought and Things*, vol. 3 {905}, pp. 3-14.

509 Baldwin, James Mark. *Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic.* Vol. 2. *Experimental Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought.* New York: Macmillan; London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908.

The "pragmatic" interest is in the motives involved in cognition and action, considered from an objectively psychological view (p. 10), and pragmatism emphasizes only this partial aspect of knowledge. (p. 165) Baldwin critiques Dewey's theory of knowledge in chapters 13 and 14; see Baldwin's "On Truth" {392}. "The 'problem' is a problem, a proposal, to a self; the adjustment is of a self to a situation." (p. 385) JRS

Reviews

Guy A. Tawney, J Phil 8.7 (30 March 1911): 187-194. Baldwin identifies pragmatism with his theory of "inner control" and "treats it as though the pragmatists held that it is the only control–an altogether disappointing procedure." JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 423-424; W. H. Sheldon, Psych Bull 6.4 (15 April 1909): 133-139.

510 Balthasar, N. Le Problème de dieu, d'après la philosophie nouvelle. Revue Néo-Scolastique 14.1 (Feb 1908): 449-489.

Summaries

M. Molloy, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1908): 454-456.

511 Bawden, H. Heath. The New Philosophy Called Pragmatism. Popular Science Monthly 73.5 (July 1908): 61-72. Material used in *The Principles of Pragmatism* {752}.

Pragmatism meets the needs of the "man of affairs...the religious mystical man, and ...the man of science." It is empiricist: it does not depart from experience, it does not distinguish mind as a separate entity, and does not take all experience or reality as given. It is idealistic: it finds the "key to the nature of reality in ideas" and emphasizes thinking in human progress. Pragmatism finds consciousness to be "essentially social in its content" and sees philosophy's purpose in "the control of cultured living." JRS

512 Berthelot, René. Sur le pragmatisme de Nietzsche. Rev Méta 16.4 (July 1908): 403-447; 17.3 (May 1909): 386-412; 17.5 (Sept 1909): 654-702. Reprinted as *Un Romantisme utilitaire: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste. Le Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincaré* {909}.

513 Bjorkman, Edwin. William James, The Man and the Thinker. American Review of Reviews 37.1 (Jan 1908): 45-48.

James, the leading exponent of pragmatism, has retired from Harvard to devote himself to writing. James became well-known through his *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) which states the James-Lange theory of emotion. He first announced his pragmatism in *The Will to Believe* (1897). IKS

514 Bode, Boyd H. Some Recent Definitions of Consciousness. Psych Rev 15.4 (July 1908): 255-264. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 189-200.

James's theory of consciousness is ambiguous where subjectivity is concerned. Dewey's theory, in avoiding solipsism, collapses into common sense realism. The issue is too dependent on other fundamental problems to allow an adequate definition. JRS

515 Boodin, J. E. Consciousness and Reality. J Phil 5.7 (26 March 1908): 169-179; 5.9 (23 April 1908): 225-234.

Consciousness, like time, space, and direction, "must be stated as a non-stuff dimension of reality." It cannot be reduced to relations, energies, or interactions. There can be no "subconscious mental activity." Consciousness only adds awareness to reality and permits meaningful activity. It cannot really be divided, subjective, or created. JRS

516 Boodin, J. E. Energy and Reality. J Phil 5.14 (2 July 1908): 365-375; 5.15 (16 July 1908): 393-406.

517 Boodin, J. E. Philosophic Tolerance. A Winter's Revery. Monist 18.2 (April 1908): 298-306. Reprinted in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 3-14.

Philosophy could never satisfy in one system the soul's moods and needs. James's unfinished structure at least provides for creative and active work. JRS

Notes

Paul Carus's "Editorial Comment" following this article on p. 306 notes that it "is a typical instance" of pragmatism, "the philosophic temperament that is at present in its ascendancy."

518 Boodin, J. E. Truth and Meaning. Psych Rev 15.3 (May 1908): 172-180. Reprinted with revisions as "Meaning and Validity" in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 200-213.

The "true" cannot be classified as the "useful" or "satisfactory." Often the truth arrives as defeat. Certainty is no justification of belief. The "social satisfaction of our meanings" is temporary, due to evolutionary changes. JRS

519 Boutroux, Émile. *Science et religion dans la philosophie contemporaine.* Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1908. Reprinted, Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1947.

Translated by Jonathan Nield as *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1909; New York: Macmillan, 1911). Translated by Emilie Weber as *Wissenschaft und Religion in der Philosophie unserer Zeit*, with an introduction by H. Holtzman (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910).

The Introduction surveys the history of religion and science. Part One describes the "Naturalistic Tendency." Chap. 1 discusses Comte and the religion of humanity; chap. 2, Herbert Spencer and the unknowable; chap. 3, Haeckel and monism; and chap. 4, psychology and sociology. In Part Two, "The Spiritualistic Tendency," chap. 1 is about Ritschl and Radical Dualism, and chap. 2 is on "Religion and the Limits of Science." Chap. 3, entitled "The Philosophy of Action," includes a short section on pragmatism, pp. 278-281, and a discussion of the idea of a philosophy of human action on pp. 281-298. Here, science is understood as the "creation of man's activity," and religion is the "realization of the human soul's deepest want." Chap. 4, "William James and Religious Experience," pp. 298-339, also has three sections. First, James on religion: his point of view of religion as personal and inward, his radical empiricism as method, mysticism, the value of religious experience, the pragmatistic point of view, and the subliminal self. Second, James on the relation between religion and science, including their difference as "concrete" vs. "abstract." Third, Boutroux comments on the objective value of religious experience. The last chapter discusses the conflict between the scientific and religious spirit. LF

Extended reviews

François Pillon {588}.

Reviews of the English translation

Archibald A. Bowman, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 550-559; Irving King, Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 1911): 93-94; John H. Muirhead, Int J Ethics 21.1 (Oct 1910): 92-97.

Reviews of the German translation

Nima Hirshensohn, J Phil 8.5 (2 March 1911): 134-138.

520 Boutroux, Émile. William James et l'experience religieuse. Rev Méta 16.1 (Jan 1908): 1-27. Reprinted in *Science et Religion dans le Philosophie Contemporaine* {519}, pp. 298-339.

For James, consciousness is a field containing multiplicity, fluid and continuous. He deals with the truth of religion pragmatically by considering its fruits. For understanding the religious object, James uses F. W. H. Myers' theory of subliminal consciousness. Boutroux asks whether this treatment of religion is scientific and how it compares with other sciences. James's emphasis on the inner life gives us the soul of religion, but we also need the body of religion, the system of beliefs and institutions. IKS

Reviews

Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 569-570.

521 Bradley, F. H. On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism. Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 226-237. Reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 127-142.

It is difficult to say whether Bradley himself has always been a pragmatist, because James and Dewey are so unclear as to what pragmatism is. "Practice and "practical" can be given narrow or broad interpretations. If understood in the latter way, pragmatism would hardly exclude anyone. IKS

Notes

See Schiller, "Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist?" {597} and Alfred Sidgwick, "The Ambiguity of Pragmatism" {605}. A curious use of the term "pragmatism" by Bradley occurs in his *The Presuppositions of Critical History* (Oxford: J. Parker and Co., 1874), reprinted in his *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), p. 49. There Bradley labels some historian's attempts to complete historical records with "the creation of causes and motives" as "overstrained Pragmatism."

522 Burke, John Butler. Fashionable Philosophy at Oxford and Harvard. Living Age 257 (30 May 1908): 559-561.

Pragmatism offers nescience in the form of a revived Schopenhauerian idealism. JRS

523 Butler, Nicholas Murray. *Philosophy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1908.

A "just appreciation" of pragmatism requires "considerable philosophical knowledge." (p. 43) JRS

Reviews

Anon, Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 156-157.

524 Caldwell, Morley Albert. *Does Pragmatism Involve Indeterminism?* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1908.

525 Cantecor, Georges. Le Pragmatisme. In *L'Année Psychologique*, volume 14 (Paris: Masson et Cie., 1908), pp. 355-379.

Notes

See Cantecor's *Le Positivism* (Paris: P. Delaplane, 1906).

526 Carus, Paul. Pragmatism. Monist 18.3 (July 1908): 321-362. Reprinted in *Truth on Trial* {925}, pp. 4-45.

A survey of the pragmatism of Peirce and James, emphasizing its relativism and skepticism. James's love of idiosyncrasies is "desirable in a poet, but not in a philosopher." JRS

Notes

See Harold Henderson's *Catalyst for Controversy: Paul Carus of Open Court* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), pp. 148-152, for a discussion of Carus's writings on William James.

527 Chandler, Albert Richard. *Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge.* Dartmouth College, Department of Philosophy Story Prize, 1908.

The intellect's "cool and dispassionate attitude" controls will and emotions. An idea's success is due to its correspondence to reality. Pragmatism lapses into solipsism. JRS

528 Chide, Alphonse. Pragmatisme et intellectualisme. Rev Phil 65.4 (April 1908): 367-388.

The clear thought exalted by Cartesians is undergoing a crisis: Descartes simply substituted ancient mistakes for modern ones. Rationalism is as dogmatic as theology,

and results in contradictions. Pragmatism, born out of a reaction against intellectualism, goes too far itself in accepting "obscure thought." A version of moderate pragmatism, consonant with rationalism, is then described by Chide. LF

Summaries

A. H. Jones, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 680.

529 Coe, George Albert. The Sources of the Mystical Revelation. Hibbert Journal 6.2 (Jan 1908): 359-372.

James argues for a spiritual reality by appealing to common features of mystical experience. This argument fails because James only examines a small number of unusual people, anything can be a "direct perception of fact," and the common features are best explained as the result of "self-hypnosis." The special intuition that James defends arbitrarily excludes more specific religious dogmas, of which people can feel equally certain. A closer investigation of the will's role in religion is needed. JRS

530 Creighton, James E. The Nature and Criterion of Truth. Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 592-605.

Pragmatism fails to give any systematic account of experience, which is necessary for an adequate understanding of truth. While pragmatism's definition of truth in practical terms has been refuted, it rightly protests any formally logical criterion of consistent truth. "It is only in so far as our desires and purposes are capable of being universalized that they can participate in the nature of truth and goodness." JRS

Notes

This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 181-182.

531 Cristiani, Léon. *Le Problème de dieu et la pragmatisme.* Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1908.

Almost as a historical law, Cristiani tells us, the Church absorbs, and thereby destroys, its heretics. The goal of this book is to determine what the Church adopts and what it rejects in the Modern Pragmatist thesis on the subject of God. The first chapter is a sketch of pragmatism, including the English branch (James and Schiller) and the French branch (Bergson and Le Roy). Chap. 2 discusses the classic proofs of the existence of God (proof by contingency, by final causes, and moral proofs). Chap. 3, "The Positive Thesis of Pragmatism," describes Le Roy's claims about how God is perceived. The author concludes in chap. 4 that pragmatism receives condemnation "because it denies the value of the traditional proofs...in favor of personal experience..." (p. 57) LF

532 De Roberty, Eugène. *Sociologie de l'action.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908.

Of special interest is a discussion of pragmatism on pp. 249-256. After a brief survey of its history, De Roberty argues that pragmatism has developed in three main directions during our time: esthetic, philosophic (as a work of feeling or imagination, an abstract poetry), and scientific. It is the first of these "aspects" that is taken up in the discussion. The author is an anti-pragmatist, arguing that the position involves a confusion of "teleological" with "causal." LF

Reviews

A. W. Moore, Phil Rev 18.6 (Nov 1909): 669-672. The author of this work–the last in a series on "ethics as elementary sociology"–is considered as "the celebrated founder of the new school of neo-positivism." De Roberty holds that "the goal of science, philosophy and art appears to be in practical social thought (*pensée pratique*) which probably is 'pragmatic' enough for most cis-Atlantic pragmatists." LF

533 De Tonquébec, J. *La Notion de la vérité dans la philosophie nouvelle.* Paris: Beauchesne et Cie., 1908.

Reviews

Bernard Bosanquet, Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 143-144.

534 Dewey, John. The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education. Progressive Journal of Education 1.2 (Dec 1908): 1-3; 1.3 (Jan 1909): 5-8; 1.4 (Feb 1909): 6-7. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 178-191.

Education has been dominated either by a rationalistic emphasis on theoretical knowledge for its own sake (for the leisure class), or an empiricist emphasis on obedient and uniform acceptance of facts (for the masses). Intelligence for pragmatism is the instrument of social coordination, and education accordingly must be based on social activity, observation, and experimentation, in a context of practical occupations. JRS

535 Dewey, John. Does Reality Possess Practical Character? In *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, by his Colleagues at Columbia University (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), pp. 53-80. Reprinted as "The Practical Character of Reality" in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 36-55. *Philosophy of JD I*, pp. 207-222. *MW* 4: 125-142.

Dewey finds that "in current philosophy, everything of a practical nature is regarded as 'merely' personal." The objection to pragmatism from realists and idealists that knowledge cannot alter reality rests on their commitment to a static universe. They fallaciously take pragmatism to mean that knowledge "makes a difference in the object *to be* known, thus defeating its own purpose." If reality is changing, only a "kodak fixation" would distort reality. The assimilation of scientific and moral judgments hardly violates common sense. Awareness involves "a relation between organism and environment," but this relation supports neither the idealistic nor the agnostic "relativity of knowledge" philosophies, and cannot by itself offer knowledge. Knowledge's object is "a prior existence changed in a certain way" by an adapting organism to "expand adequate functioning." Psychologically, awareness is attention; attention is the conflict of habits in a problematic situation, and exists as part of the "successive states of things." The "intellectual lock-jaw called epistemology" is bypassed when we see that things assume "new relations in the process of inquiry." The desire to contemplate the eternal only results in a philosophy forgotten in time. Philosophy should be active "in the living struggles and issues of its own age." JRS

Reviews

Horace M. Kallen, Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 97-105. How can knowledge be distinguished from its object? Prior existences are transcendent unknowables. Dewey implies that all knowledge relations are internal, but a more consistent pragmatism holds that such relations are external. JRS

Bertrand Russell, Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 203-207. Dewey defends a Kantian unknowable. He accuses epistemologists of affirming a static universe, but even if the universe changes, *truths* about specific changes would not change. JRS

A. C. Armstrong, Psych Bull 6.5 (15 May 1909): 171-174; H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 204-215.

Notes

See E. B. McGilvary's response, "Professor Dewey's 'Action of Consciousness'" {973}.

536 Dewey, John. *Ethics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908. Reprinted with revisions as "Intelligence and Morals" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 46-76. *MW* 4: 31-49.

Greek philosophy stressed personal character and intelligence in its conducive role for a free, stable society; its limitations lay in the uncritical acceptance of the Greek division between the wise (contemplating fixed, eternal reality) and the ignorant (working with mutable, impermanent material). Moral philosophy has only recently freed itself, just as science has; this "revolution...of the applied and experimental habit of mind" deals only with the present possibilities of social life. True democracy will rely on this moral psychology. Utilitarianism and German idealism have taken steps toward placing moral reason "within the struggles of life." "If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end, and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man...to converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics, and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot." (p. 45) JRS

537 Dewey, John. The Logical Character of Ideas. J Phil 5.14 (2 July 1908): 375-381. Reprinted with revisions in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 220-229. *MW* 4: 91-97.

Logic must be freed from "metaphysical psychology–the assumption of consciousness as an existent stuff or existent process" which portrays knowledge as a relation between things and states or functions of consciousness. A behavioral psychology examines ideas as hypotheses created in the process of inquiry. Deductive logic relies on fixed symbolic meanings, rendering it useless for inquiry. Modern inquiry requires "personal (i.e. intra-organic) events to have, transitively and temporarily, a worth of their own" which will terminate in objective experimental conditions. JRS

538 Dewey, John. Religion and Our Schools. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 796-809. Reprinted in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 504-516. *MW* 4: 165-177.

539 Dewey, John. What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical? J Phil 5.4 (13 Feb 1908): 85-99. Revised and without the last paragraph as "What Pragmatism Means by Practical" in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 303-329. *MW* 4: 98-115.

This essay offers a discrimination of meanings of "practical," stimulated by James's confusing usage in *Pragmatism* {438}. Practical "meaning" has three senses: the definition of an object, the existential reference of an idea, and the actual value of a truth.

Pragmatism must enforce these distinctions. James rightly emphasizes the "personal" nature of truth, though humanism takes the individual to be metaphysically real, while according to the "Chicago School" the personal "is to be analyzed and defined biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and functioning side." (p. 113) When the tremendous role of the personal is recognized, "a new era in philosophy will begin." The different aspects of pragmatism have been "uniquely" united by James, and further progress lies in "more analytic clearing up and development of these independent elements." "Possibly 'pragmatism' as a holding company for allied, yet separate interests and problems, might be dissolved and revert to its original constituents." (J Phil, p. 99) JRS

Notes

Dewey's understanding of the pragmatic movement is also preserved in two syllabi from this time. A privately printed syllabus for his classes in 1909 at Columbia University, "The Pragmatic Movement of Contemporary Thought," is reprinted in *MW* 4: 251-263. Dewey later gave a course of lectures in January and February, 1910, on "Aspects of the Pragmatic Movement of Modern Philosophy," reprinted in *MW* 6: 175-176.

540 Dewey, John and James Hayden Tufts. *Ethics.* New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1908. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1909. Reprinted as *MW* 5.

Part 1, "The Beginnings and Growth of Morality," was authored by Tufts. Part 2, "Theory of the Moral Life," was authored by Dewey. To determine which situations are distinctly "moral," we must look beyond acts engrossed in immediate ends or indifferent to the effects on others. Instead, distinctly moral conduct involves the deliberate arbitration of conflicting values. The product of such deliberation is commonly called "good," but philosophy has long been divided as to whether such "good" truly resides in a proper moral *attitude* or in the procurement of beneficial *consequences*. Good is the product of the union of attitude and consequences, for a proper moral attitude channels behavior toward beneficial consequences. A moral attitude or disposition, in turn, is a mark of a properly developed character–a pattern of growth from a "narrow self" absorbed in self-interest, to a "larger self" that acknowledges a duty to the "tacit contract we have with others." A virtuous individual possesses habits of character that sustain the common good. Although the virtues are innumerable, their cardinal traits are in fact developments of the original Greek ideals: 1) temperance, as the control and direction of excitement; 2) courage, as the vigorous pursuit of long-range goods; 3) justice, as equity, fairness, impartiality and honesty, and 4) wisdom, as conscientiousness. Part 3, "The World of Action," was jointly authored. FXR

Reviews

William Caldwell, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 221-229. "The fault alike of our Western (or American) civilization and the general Pragmatist outlook on life and morals is their eternal belief in 'experimentation' and 'setting free', instead of in the *legitimacy* or the *illegitimacy* of certain kinds of 'experiments' that are unfortunately continually made with human life and with conduct and with morality." This book does not account for the moral person's attempt to lead a life without endless "re-formations." JRS

Evander B. McGilvary, Psych Bull 6.1 (15 Jan 1909): 14-22. McGilvary gives a detailed approving analysis. JRS

Norman Wilde, J Phil 5.23 (5 Nov 1908): 636-639. The naturalistic idealism is J. S. Mill's philosophy "freed from the illogical hedonism." Where is a discussion of judging conduct, freedom, or mysticism? JRS

Anon, Amer J Psych 20.1 (Jan 1909): 151; Anon, Monist 20.3 (July 1910): 478; Anon, Sewanee Review 17.1 (Jan 1909): 118-120; Charles Abram Ellwood, Economic Bulletin 1 (1908): 335-336; Arthur O. Lovejoy, American Journal of Theology 13.1 (Jan 1909): 140-143; Frank A. Manny, Survey 22 (1909): 217-218; Walter T. Marvin, Educational Review 37.4 (April 1909): 413-416; Irving E. Miller, School Review 17 (1909): 204-206; Guy Allen Tawney, American Journal of Sociology 14.5 (March 1909): 687-690; Frank Thilly, Science n.s. 30 (1909): 89-92.

Notes

See the revised edition {2227}. See also a collection of Dewey's writings on morality drawn from other major works, *The Moral Writings of John Dewey*, edited with an introduction and notes by James Gouinlock (New York: Hafner Press, 1976). Tuft's contributions are summarized by James Campbell in *Selected Writings of James Hayden Tufts* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 371-373.

541 *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James.* By His Colleagues at Columbia University. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908.

Essays of interest are: John Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character," {535}; Dickinson S. Miller, "Naïve Realism; What Is It?" pp. 233-261 [*Pure Experience*, pp. 172-188]; Kate Gordon, "Pragmatism in Aesthetics," pp. 461-482; James McKeen Cattell, "Reactions and Perceptions," pp. 571-584; and Edward L. Thorndike, "A Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will," pp. 587-610. JRS

Reviews

Anon, "Some American Philosophers," Spectator 101.8 (22 Aug 1908): 267-268; A. C. Armstrong, Psych Bull 6.5 (15 May 1909): 171-174; Horace M. Kallen, Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 97-105; H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 204-215; Bertrand Russell, Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 203-207; P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 19.3 (July 1908): 400-405.

542 Eucken, Rudolf. *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker: Eine Entwickelungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschkeit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart.* 7th ed., Leipzig: Veit, 1908. Translated by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson as *The Problem of Human Life: As Viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909).

Reviews of the translation

Frank Granger, Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 900-904.

543 Fouillée, Alfred. *Morale des ideés-forces.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908.

Fouillée defends an ethical theory based on his philosophy of the ideés-forces. In his review, Everett notes that part and parcel of the theory is that "the intensity of a mental state at once constitutes and determines its force in action"; thus it is a theory related to pragmatism. Fouillée briefly explains this relationship (pp.xxii-xxiii), although it is an explanation to which Everett takes exception. LF

Reviews

Walter G. Everett, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 656-661.

544 Galdi, M. *Il pragmatismo en il diritto civile.* Naples: 1908.

545 Gardiner, H. N. The Problem of Truth. Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 113-137.

If we confine discussion to propositional truth, all truths are particular and "must be judged with reference to its own unique meaning and intent." Truth does not have degrees and cannot be affected by related truths. *That* an object has some character should not be identified with the object's character, and truth is not the same as recognized truth. Truth is intellectually reflected fact and must be a purely logical relation. Pragmatism rightly tests truth by use, requires that truth at least be potentially experienced, and holds that all truths are particular, but ignores the distinction between cognition and the object of cognition. Truth must be structural, not instrumental, for there must be a relationship between a verified idea and the facts. Pragmatism cannot account for the universality of truth. JRS

546 Gifford, A. R. The Pragmatic "ΥΛΗ of Mr. Schiller. J Phil 5.4 (13 Feb 1908): 99-104.

Schiller combats idealism and realism with a reduction of all reality not constructed by conscious agents to an indeterminate potentiality. This concept conflicts with humanism's identification of reality with experience, and since such an indeterminate could not be real, reality must be either material or psychical. JRS

Notes

See H. M. Kallen, "The Pragmatic Notion of ὕλη" {562}.

547 Gutberlet, Const. Der Pragmatismus. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 21.4 (1908): 437-458.

Pragmatism is a new fashion from the land of the dollar. It is a religion, but one built on sand. IKS

548 Hawtrey, Ralph. Pragmatism. New Quarterly 1 (March 1908): 197-210.

James can define words as he pleases; the word "true" means what James says it does. If so, we will use "correctness" to mean what we ordinarily mean by truth. "Correctness" would not mean what pragmatists mean by "truth." IKS

Notes

James's reply, "Two English Critics," is in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 272-286 [*Works MT*, pp. 146-153].

549 Hébert, Marcel. *Le Pragmatisme: Études de ses diverses formes, Anglo-Américaines, Françaises, Italiennes, et de sa valeur religieuse.* Paris: Émile Nourry, 1908. 2nd ed., 1910.

This account of pragmatism includes discussions of the work of Peirce and Papini (chap. 1), William James (chap. 2), and Schiller, Le Roy, and Poincaré (chap. 3). Chap. 4 surveys the precursors to pragmatism–from Socrates to Nietzsche–along with the work of Blondel and Bergson. Chap. 5 is a survey of the various forms of religious pragmatism (the moralism of Secrétan and Ménard, the fideism of Pascal *et al.*, the symbolism of Loisy, Le Roy, Laberthonnière, and Tyrrell, and the religious positions of James and Schiller), and a discussion of pragmatism's failings. Hébert holds that "Anglo-American pragmatism did not demonstrate that the true was exclusively limited to the useful, any more than that action be singly limited to a given tendency." (p. 123)

Ultimately pragmatism is subjectivism–it falls short of affording one knowledge. There are six appendices on pragmatism and esthetic, pragmatism and morals, Rousseau and Chateaubriand, Le Roy, Berthelot, and Durkheim. LF

Reviews

William James, J Phil 5.25 (3 Dec 1908): 689-694 [*The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 230-245. *Works MT*, pp. 126-133]. According to Hébert, pragmatism holds that beliefs can have utility without having cognitive value; actually, utility follows upon cognitive value. Hébert's subjectivist interpretation arises because James, while treating truth on its subjective side, identified truth and expediency and did not mention objective reference. James did not believe that critics could attribute to him a view as silly as the denial of "realities outside." For he and other pragmatists, truth is a relation between realities which is concretely experienceable and definable. Some hold that Schiller denies external realities even if James does not, but their views are identical. Schiller offers more of a psychological description while James gives a logical definition. IKS

H. C. Corrance, Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 218-220; François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 19 (1908): 202.

Notes

The 2nd edition contains William James's review with his slight revisions, pp. 139-153, and Hebert's reply, pp. 155-163. See Paul Carus, "A Postscript on Pragmatism. In Comment on Professor James' Review of Marcel Hébert's Book" {639}.

550 Hibben, John Grier. The Test of Pragmatism. Phil Rev 17.3 (July 1908): 365-382.

Pragmatism fails its own test: it is insufficient as a working hypothesis, it is subordinated to other considerations, and its alleged creative function is limited. JRS

Notes

This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 183-184.

551 Hoeck, Louis G. Pragmatism in Its Relation to Religious Thought. New-Church Review 15 (Oct 1908): 548-555.

Pragmatism has encouraged religion to re-connect faith and works and to expose false doctrines for their harmful errors. Swedenborg's truly Christian revelations would benefit humanity more than any other religion, and thus have full pragmatic justification. JRS

552 Horne, Herman H. The Problem of Sin. Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 179-180.

The modern social problem of sin "can be solved on absolutistic principles and at the same time in accord with legitimate pragmatic demands." JRS

Notes

Abstract of a paper read in 1907.

553 James, William. Hegel and His Method. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 63-75. Also published as Lecture 3 of *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}, pp. 85-109.

Notes

For annotation see *A Pluralistic Universe*.

554 James, William. The Meaning of the Word Truth. Privately printed, 1908. Also published as "The Meaning of the Word 'Truth'," Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 455-456. *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 217-220. *Works MT*, pp. 117-119.

Pragmatism's account of truth is realistic and follows common sense dualism: at its basis lies the notion of an independent reality taken from ordinary social experience. To be true, statements must agree with such realities; and by "agreeing" pragmatists mean "working." One cannot define what is meant by calling certain statements "true" without reference to their "workings," to their "functional possibilities." IKS

Notes

This essay is summarized as "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 180-181 [*Works MT*, pp. 291-292]. The explanation of this summary's relationship to the entire essay is given in *Works MT*, pp. 210-213.

555 James, William. Pluralism and Religion. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 721-728. Also published as the "Conclusion" to *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}, pp. 303-316.

Notes

For annotation see *A Pluralistic Universe*. See Paul Carus's comments, Monist 19.2 (April 1909): 317-318.

556 James, William. The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders. Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 1-17. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 180-216. *Works MT*, pp. 99-116.

Pragmatism is neither positivism nor skepticism. Pragmatism seeks to define truth, while skepticism accepts the dogmatic idea of truth and concludes that at best we have merely phenomenal truth, good enough for practical purposes. The name "pragmatism" has been unfortunate; it has played into the hands of those who want to dismiss pragmatism as not philosophy but a crude world-view for men of action. Meanwhile, the pragmatists concern themselves with theoretic questions. Pragmatists can believe in ejective realities, they can be epistemological realists, they offer an account of truth itself, and they do not ignore theoretic interests. The term "practical" can and does cover intellectual perplexities. Pragmatists are not solipsists. IKS

557 James, William. The Social Value of the College-Bred. McClure's Magazine 30 (February 1908): 419-422. Reprinted in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 309-325. *Works ECR*, pp. 106-112.

Any subject can be given humanistic value by teaching it historically as the achievement of human geniuses. Humanistic study, as distinguished from technical training, teaches us to "*know a good man when we see him.*" In a democracy, humanists should be able better than others to identify the more worthy leaders. IKS

558 James, William. "Truth" Versus "Truthfulness." J Phil 5.7 (26 March 1908): 179-181. Reprinted, the last two paragraphs omitted, as "The Existence of Julius Cæsar" in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 221-225. *Works MT*, pp. 120-122.

The claim that truth cannot be defined without reference to its workings is purely logical. In cases such as "Caesar really existed," for truth to occur, the specific person must be singled out. Transcendentalists invoke the absolute, while James insists on a concrete medium as certifying the reference. IKS

559 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Der Pragmatismus: Eine neue Philosophische Methode. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 29.4 (25 Jan 1908): 198-206.

560 Johnson, W. Hallock. Pragmatism, Humanism and Religion. Princeton Theological Review 6 (Oct 1908): 544-564.

Pragmatism is friendly to religion and has helped it by revitalizing philosophy. Pragmatism emphasizes personality and the right to believe, but it appeals only to the strong and offers nothing to sick souls. It fails to see that man is dependent on God. IKS

561 Kallen, Horace M. *Notes on the Nature of Truth.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1908.

562 Kallen, Horace M. The Pragmatist Notion of ὕλη. J Phil 5.11 (21 May 1908): 293-297.

A defence of pragmatism against Gifford's "The Pragmatic 'ΥΛΗ of Mr. Schiller" {546}. JRS

563 Lalande, André. Pragmatisme, humanisme, et vérité. Rev Phil 65.1 (Jan 1908): 1-26.

In the first two parts of this article Lalande discusses James's *Pragmatism* {438} and Schiller's *Studies in Humanism* {490}. In the third part Lalande adds his own remarks, though he refrains from calling them objections because he believes that "the essential thesis of pragmatism is useful and just." (p. 13) Belief in the final unity as a pragmatic act of faith is to be emphasized: "we cannot pass from our needs to our truths, but from the truths unanimously conceived to the needs they satisfy." (West, p. 567) In the concluding pages a distinction is drawn between two social relations: interdependence and community. LF

Summaries

C. West, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 567.

564 Latta, R. Purpose. *Proc Arist Soc* 8 (1908): 17-32.

What is the meaning of this oft-used term? A thing has purpose to the degree that it has systematic unity, and self-conscious purposes presuppose an ability to rationally select within a larger system of order. Schiller's insistence that purposes can only be had by an agent who is aware of them is not well-founded. JRS

Reviews

W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 6.12 (10 June 1909): 328-333.

565 Lloyd, Alfred H. Radical Empiricism and Agnosticism. Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 175-192.

Most types of agnosticism are logically fallacious, as they manage to conceive the unknowable in some fashion. Pragmatism is a Kantian agnosticism which finds the unknowable in "the direct and immediate reality of positive experience." Kant's use of the *a priori* to find the *noumenon* made him a pragmatist. Pragmatism is not a solipsism. The "knowable and the unknowable correspond respectively to structure and function." The pragmatic psychologist understands experience to be "the vital intimacy of structure and function," which permits the recognition of subject and object. JRS

Summaries

Elijah Jordan, Phil Rev 18.1 (Jan 1909): 97-98.

Notes

Lloyd's philosophy at this time is expressed at length in *The Will to Doubt* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1907).

566 Lorenz-Ightham, Theodor. Der Pragmatismus. Internationale Wochenschrift fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 2 (1908): 943-990.

567 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pragmatism and Theology. American Journal of Theology 12.1 (Jan 1908): 116-143. Reprinted in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 40-78.

James proposes as a criterion of meaning that propositions refer to concrete future experiences. However, some propositions are meaningful without any such reference; pragmatism must be restated as a test of verifiability. When this fails, we realize that James is proposing a test for the importance of a belief. Connected with pragmatism is the belief in a genuine future, which is pragmatism's contribution to theology. IKS

568 Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Thirteen Pragmatisms. J Phil 5.1 (2 Jan 1908): 5-12; 5.2 (16 Jan 1908): 29-39. Reprinted in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 1-39.

Pragmatists have made thirteen logically independent contentions, due to their originality and failure to carefully make distinctions. 1. A proposition's meaning is the anticipated future consequences in experience. Pragmatists often confusingly apply this thesis also as a criterion of truth and knowledge. 2. A proposition's meaning is the anticipated future consequences of believing it. This second thesis in incongruous with the first, but James often vacillates between them. 3. A proposition becomes true only when its anticipated future consequences are realized. This "sterile" doctrine deprives gained knowledge of any meaning. 4. True propositions are those generalizations which have been found to "work" in the past. This "evolutionary empiricist" criterion of truth contrasts with the next similar thesis. 5. True propositions are those which contribute to increase the energies or chances of survival of the believers. Many beliefs do this, yet they cannot be empirically verified. 6. The future is indeterminate and contingent, permitting real creativity in choice and action. 7. Belief arises in the satisfaction of the resolution of doubt. 8. The criterion of truth is the satisfaction of the resolution of doubt. 9. Beliefs arising from intellectual or theoretic satisfaction should have priority. This thesis is not distinguishable from intellectualism. 10. Axioms are postulates expressing practical needs and providing working presuppositions. 11. There are some indubitable and *a priori* truths (James has admitted this class) which must be supplemented by postulates. 12. Postulates include

those of natural science and the moral/religious life. 13. All objects of thought contain a reference to some subjective purpose or plan. JRS

Summaries

F. A. Peek, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 680-681.

Notes

See Max Meyer, "The Exact Number of Pragmatisms" {573}, and Léon Noël, "Bulletin d'épistémologie: Aurour du pragmatisme" {699}.

569 McGilvary, Evander B. British Exponents of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 6.3 (April 1908): 632-653.

British pragmatism blindly strikes out at other positions, instead of imitating American pragmatism by allying itself with potential friends. F. C. S. Schiller, Henry Sturt, H. V. Knox, and Alfred Sidgwick actually would find many other sympathetic philosophers. Almost all philosophers agree (including Bradley, Ward, and Stout) that "the meaning of a rule lies in its application" and that actual knowing is purposive. However, no one could hold that all meaning and mental life must be purposive. Schiller does not consistently apply the doctrine that truth is decided by its consequences. A wide variety of philosophers (though not Dewey) agree with Schiller that knowledge makes reality. British logicians since Darwin have held that axioms are postulates. Pragmatism has no reason to support indeterminism, and Schiller's metaphysics is at least as odious as that of absolutism. JRS

Notes

See F. C. S. Schiller's response, "British Exponents of Pragmatism" {595}.

570 McGilvary, Evander B. The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism. J Phil 5.22 (22 Oct 1908): 589-597. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 317-327.

Dewey redefines "fact" and "idea" to fit his theory of judgment and knowledge. This theory appears to regard "all reality as embraced within experiences or within Experience" and is thus idealistic. If Dewey's understanding of "experience" does permit the existence of things not in experience, how is his view different from objective realism? Thought cannot create or ignore given scientific facts. JRS

Summaries

Edith H. Morrill, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 246.

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary" {653}.

571 Mead, G. H. The Philosophical Basis of Ethics. Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 311-323. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 82-93.

Moral consciousness is the most concrete and inclusive experience. The pragmatic grounding of metaphysics on ethics is one corollary, but two other implications are explored: the moral motive is the recognition of purpose in consciousness, and "the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience itself." Moral conduct cannot be dependent on external ideals. JRS

Summaries

C. H. Williams, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 690-691.

572 Mead, G. H. Review of William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Psych Bull 5 (1908): 385-391.

573 Meyer, Max. The Exact Number of Pragmatisms. J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 321-326.

Meyer responds to Lovejoy's "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" {568}. A pragmatist could distinguish many more types. A truth cannot be separated from its meaning. Lovejoy has found insignificant differences. JRS

574 Moore, A. W. Truth Value. J Phil 5.16 (30 July 1908): 429-436. Reprinted with revisions in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 110-127.

Truth and error "are values belonging to the experience of judging." Metaphysical disagreements turn on the diverse psychological and logical accounts of this type of experience. The intellectualist is content with a *petitio* definition: true judging is the satisfaction of the cognitive need. Cognition must go beyond mere logical formalisms. Pragmatists assert (with Bradley and Royce) a "continuity between the process and content of thought," deny that thought can produce its own content, and instead find that the content can "produce its own thought" as judgments are formed in the readjustment of values for conflict resolution. Some statements have the form of judgments (for example, perceptual statements) but are judgments no longer. Pragmatism does not subordinate the intellect to other values. JRS

575 Moore, G. E. Professor James' "Pragmatism." *Proc Arist Soc* 8 (1908): 33-77. Reprinted in *Philosophical Studies* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 97-146. *William James' Pragmatism in Focus*, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 161-195.

James finds a connection between truth and verification and usefulness, but not all true ideas can be verified, not all true ideas are useful, and not all useful ideas are true. For James, truth is mutable and truths are man-made. However, it is reality that is mutable. When James talks about man-made truths, he seems to be talking about the process of coming to believe. IKS

Reviews

W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 6.12 (10 June 1909): 328-333. Moore is unfair to James concerning verification and usefulness, since James clearly says that utility is relative to some environment. Moore is right to reject the mutability or the man-made notions of truth. JRS

Notes

Vivian McGill defends James in "Some Inquiries Concerning Moore's Method," in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1942), pp. 483-514. D. C. Phillips asks "Was William James Telling the Truth After All?" Monist 68 (1984): 419-434, reprinted in *William James' Pragmatism in Focus*, pp. 229-247.

576 Morris, Bertram Jasper. *Pragmatism and Its Limitations*. Dissertation, Boston University, 1908.

577 Müller-Freienfels, Richard. William James und der Pragmatismus. Philosophische Wochenschrift und Literaturzeitung 9.1 (Jan 1908): 14-27.

578 Nelson, Leonard. *Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem.* Göttingen: Vanderhoek und Ruprecht, 1908. 2nd ed., Göttingen: Offentliches Leben, 1930.

Reviews

A. D. Lindsay, Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 464-466. Nelson convincingly argues that all intellectualist and pragmatist theories of knowledge must fail, since they try to "*explain away* the independence and uniqueness of the objectivity of knowledge and to reduce it to something other than knowledge." JRS

579 Parodi, Dominique. Le Pragmatisme d'après MM. W. James et Schiller. Rev Méta 16.1 (Jan 1908): 93-112. Reprinted as chap. 2 of Parodi's *Du Positivisme à l'idéalisme: Philosophies d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* {2130}.

580 Parodi, Dominique, *et al.* La Signification du pragmatisme. Bulletin de la Societé Française de Philosophie 8 (July 1908): 249-296. Parodi's portion is reprinted as chap. 3 of his *Du Positivisme à l'Idéalisme*: *Philosophies d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* {2130}.

Parodi's remarks on problems with Anglo-Saxon pragmatism (pp. 249-265) are followed by a report of the subsequent discussion by Parodi, René Berthelot, Bouglé, Leon Brunschvicg, Hadamard, Elie Halévy, Lucien Laberthonnière, André Lalande, Édouard Le Roy, Georges Sorel, and Jules Tannery. A letter from Max Leclerc is appended. LF

581 Peillaube, E. Programme d'études sur le problème de la connaissance. Rev de Phil 12.5 (1 May 1908): 449-462.

The editor announces a series of articles on epistemology on the basis of Aristotle and St. Thomas. "Pragmatism, which is essentially anti-rational, dissolves the notion of truth, confounding it with its practical consequences, that is to say, with utility, and, in spite of the noblest efforts, replunges us into scepticism." JRS

582 Peirce, C. S. A Letter from Mr. Peirce. Open Court 22.5 (May 1908): 319.

Peirce endorses an article on modern theology in the previous issue of *Open Court*. Peirce finds most agreeable the idea that Christianity is not just a "Jesus legend," but rather an evolution of the Christ-idea based on the development of Human Reason. LF

583 Peirce, C. S. A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 90-112. Reprinted in *CP* 6.452-485.

Peirce begins with an account of the terms "real," "experience," "argument," and of the three Universes of Experience. "If God really be, and be benign," there should be an argument, obvious to all minds, whose conclusion is presented "not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth." These criteria, Peirce suggests, are best fulfilled by the Neglected Argument. "...in the Pure Play of Musement the idea of God's Reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy," and in pondering it, the Muser will desire it for its "thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his whole threefold environment." This hypothesis of God is vague, and will grow, and one will be led to think of the features of each universe as purposed. One will also be led to believe: to "shape one's conduct into conformity" with this hypothesis. The rest of the

paper divides into three unequal parts: (1) an outline of the different steps of every "well-conducted and complete inquiry," (2) an account of the logical validity of deduction, induction, and retroduction, and (3) a discussion of the "place of the Neglected Argument in a complete inquiry into the Reality of God." LF

584 Peirce, Charles. Some Amazing Mazes. Monist 18.2 (April 1908): 227-241; 18.3 (July 1908): 416-464. Reprinted in *CP* 4.585-593, 4.594-642.

Notes

See Peirce, "Some Amazing Mazes, A Second Curiosity," Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 36-45 [*CP* 4.643-646]. See also Francis C. Russell, "Hints for the Elucidation of Mr. Peirce's Logical Work" {593}.

585 Perrier, Joseph Louis. The True God of Scholasticism. J Phil 5.26 (17 Dec 1908): 708-714.

Thomistic theology corrects James's portrayal of "old fashioned theism." The scholastics understood God as involved in the world's affairs, not "remote and vacuous." JRS

586 Piat, Claude. *Insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition.* Paris: Plon, 1908.

587 Pikler, Julius. *Zwei Vorträge über dynamische Psychologie.* Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1908.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 593-595. Pikler shares with Dewey the principle that "*tension* is the normal condition of psychical existence, and that doubt and conflict are the stimuli to mental development." JRS

A. P. Weiss, Psych Bull 7.9 (15 Sept 1910): 305-306.

Notes

The second part is also published in *Berichte über den III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg* {656}.

588 Pillon, François. Un Ouvrage récent sur les rapports de la science et de la religion. L'Année Philosophique 19 (1908): 111-195.

Pillon gives an extended exposition and criticism of Boutroux's *Science et religion dans la philosophie contemporaine* {519}, and develops his own idealistic philosophy. JRS

Reviews

E. L. Hinman, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 76-79.

589 Pratt, James B. Truth and Ideas. J Phil 5.5 (27 Feb 1908): 122-131.

Pragmatists offer two incompatible interpretations of truth. Dewey holds that truth is an experienced relation of the working of a truth. James finds truth in the relation between ideas and reality, so long as there is an experiential matrix linking them, and says that truth can exist apart from utility. Intellectualists construe ideas as judgments, not as plans of action, and admit the reality of things beyond private consciousness. Dewey's work has been written from the standpoint of solipsism. JRS

590 Rey, Abel. *La Philosophie moderne.* Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1908. Reprinted, 1927.

Rey offers a "statement of the form which the great problems of philosophy assume at the present time": the problems of math (chap. 2), matter (chap. 3), life (chap. 4), mind (chap. 5), morality (chap. 6), and knowledge (chap. 7). Throughout the text, Rey opposes "scientism" to pragmatism. The former notes the progress made in science, does not claim to possess all truth, holds the scientific method sacred (as the means of attaining truth) and affirms that "science alone as that which permits of knowledge." (p. 4) As Elkus remarks in her review: "Either scientific method is the only path to the attainment of truth (positivism, rationalism, 'scientism') or there are other sources of true knowledge, such as 'religious feeling, moral ideas, sentimental intuitions'. According to this latter point of view, science is an artifice whose sole validity consists in its practical utility [pragmatism]." (p. 51) Rey discusses Poincaré, Bergson, James, and, (primarily) French pragmatists. Anglo-American pragmatism has the distinction of putting mind back into Nature and establishing the theory of the continuity of consciousness. Rey's position, however, is anti-pragmatic: "science is not true because it succeeds, but succeeds because it is true." LF

Reviews

Savilla Alice Elkus, J Phil 6.2 (21 Jan 1909): 51-53.

591 Royce, Josiah. *The Philosophy of Loyalty.* New York: Macmillan, 1908. Edited and with an introduction by John J. McDermott (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995).

Lecture 7, "Loyalty, Truth, and Reality," explores "the world of truth" for the loyal, which points to a higher spiritual unity. James's pragmatism (outlined on pp. 316-323) agrees with idealism that assertions are deeds and receive verification in one's experience of the practical results. But what constitutes success? "Are the loyal seeking only the mere collection of their private experiences of their personal thrills of fascination?" Idealism offers the highest ideals, which live beyond personal experience. Assertions are attempts to state truths, not mere conditions of expediency or states of mind. Many undeniable truths are unverifiable. The eternal unity satisfies the needs of the loyal. JRS

Reviews

David Saville Muzzey, Int J Ethics 19.4 (July 1909): 509-510; J. W. Scott, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 270-276; Frank Chapman Sharp, J Phil 6.3 (4 Feb 1909): 77-80; Amy E. Tanner, Amer J Psych 19.3 (July 1908): 409-412; Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 541-548; James H. Tufts, Psych Bull 5.12 (15 Dec 1908): 394-396.

592 Russell, Bertrand. Transatlantic "Truth." Albany Review 2.10 (Jan 1908): 393-410. Reprinted as "William James's Conception of Truth," in *Philosophical Essays* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910), pp. 127-149. Reprinted in the revised edition (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 112-129. *William James' Pragmatism in Focus*, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 196-211.

A review of James's *Pragmatism* {438}. Many of James's views are shared by all empiricists. James states them in an "insinuating, gradual, imperceptible" manner. They seep in like "hot water running in so slowly that you don't know when to scream." If the

pragmatic definition of truth is to be useful, we must be able to know that a belief pays without knowing that it is true. It is often easier to know whether a belief agrees with the facts than to know its consequences. IKS

Reviews of *Philosophical Essays*

Evander B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 422-426. Russell's type of realism has not faced the problem of meaning raised by pragmatism. JRS

Notes

The preface of Russell's *Philosophical Essays* includes a tribute to James written shortly after his death [reprinted in *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 387]. Annotations to "Transatlantic 'Truth'" are published in appendix four of *Works MT* pp. 299-310. James's reply, "Two English Critics," is in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 272-286 [*Works MT*, pp. 146-153]. F. C. S. Schiller responded with "The Tribulations of Truth" {600}. See also Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, "Russell and the Pragmatists" in *Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with His Contemporaries* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), pp. 170-214.

593 Russell, Francis C. Hints for the Elucidation of Mr. Peirce's Logical Work. Monist 18.3 (July 1908): 406-415.

Russell comments on C. S. Peirce's "Some Amazing Mazes" {584}. JRS

594 Salter, William M. Pragmatism: A New Philosophy. Atlantic Monthly 101.5 (May 1908): 657-663.

Pragmatism has created such controversy not seen since Darwinism thirty years ago. A survey of James's and Dewey's pragmatic doctrines is followed by the complaints that experience cannot be self-contained and faith cannot be sheer belief. JRS

595 Schiller, F. C. S. British Exponents of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 903-905.

Schiller replies to E. B. McGilvary's "British Exponents of Pragmatism" {569}. McGilvary must have hoped that his "misapprehensions and misrepresentations...would escape confutation." JRS

Notes

See McGilvary's reply, "British Exponents of Pragmatism" {686}.

596 Schiller, F. C. S. Infallibility and Toleration. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 76-89. Reprinted in *Humanism*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 268-282.

The recent Papal condemnation of Catholic Modernism raises many questions about Papal infallibility, logic, and absolute truth. The spiritual craving for absolute truth leads some to the Pope and others to rationalistic absolutism, but such craving really only ends in skepticism. Let us be satisfied with *humanized* truth, as the Modernists ask, and let absolute truth be only an ideal. JRS

Notes

See Thomas S. Jerome's response, "Dr. Schiller on Infallibility and Toleration," Hibbert Journal 7.2 (Jan 1909): 437-438, and Schiller's reply, "Infallibility and Toleration," ibid. 7.3 (April 1909): 670-671.

597 Schiller, F. C. S. Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist? Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 370-383.

Schiller comments on Bradley's "On Memory and Judgment," Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 153-174, and "On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism" {521}. Bradley has made several key concessions to pragmatism, but inconsistently remains a skeptic on knowledge and an absolutist in metaphysics. JRS

598 Schiller, F. C. S. *Plato or Protagorus?* Oxford: Blackwell; London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1908.

The subtitle reads "Being a Critical Examination of the Protagorus Speech in the *Theaetetus* with some Remarks Upon Error." JRS

Reviews

John Burnet, Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 422-423.

Notes

See Schiller's reply to Burnet's review, "Plato or Protagorus?" Mind 17.4 (Oct 1908): 518-526.

599 Schiller, F. C. S. *Science and Religion.* Published for the *Pan-Anglican Papers, Being Problems for consideration at the Pan-Anglican Congress.* London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1908. Reprinted in his *Riddles of the Sphinx* {879}, pp. 463-474.

Reconciliation is possible when the recognition of their common goal–to transmute reality into useful forms–makes the scientific understanding of religion possible. A psychological view finds religion and science both using postulates of faith (the conservation of energy, the Divine Helper) to control experience, and each should be tested pragmatically. Pragmatism has been misunderstood as offering a mere "as-if" personal whim or making a Kantian divorce between theoretical and practical reason; it instead stands for a test of effectiveness in human experience. A purely rational religion has never proven to have much value to many people, and a God that sympathizes and aids us in our suffering (the ideal is the Christian God) is more emotionally appealing than the march of science. Religion cannot eliminate science, but should incorporate its knowledge into a vision of "the growing fulfillment of a divine purpose." JRS

600 Schiller, F. C. S. The Tribulations of Truth. Albany Review 2 (March 1908): 624-635. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 182-193.

Schiller responds to Bertrand Russell's "Transatlantic 'Truth'" {592}. Russell has missed the "essential point" of pragmatism, which goes beyond the banality that any assertion claims to truth, but instead actually tries to discriminate real truth from error. Russell simply "treats truths as givens" but the notion of "fact" is history. Russell does confess that experience alone cannot be trusted, requiring the selection of "evidence," but doesn't see that this fallible method dissolves his "absolute" truth. JRS

601 Schinz, Albert. Anti-Pragmatism. Rev Phil 66.3 (Sept 1908): 225-255; 66.4 (Oct 1908): 390-409. Materials used in *Anti-Pragmatisme* {719}.

Summaries

Helen M. Clarke, Phil Rev 18.3 (May 1909): 359-360; 18.4 (July 1909): 462-463.

602 Schinz, Albert. Professor Dewey's Pragmatism. J Phil 5.23 (5 Nov 1908): 617-628. Reprinted as "The Dewey Case" in *Anti-Pragmatism* {719} pp. 88-109.

Dewey argues in "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" {114} that scientific judgments have the same basic traits (including the personal involvement of character) as moral judgments. Pragmatism emphasizes the morally subjective (and hence irrational) element, but Dewey keeps morality logically independent from science, by arguing that personal character is relevant only to morality. This contradictory stand on the personal factor was avoided by James (in his rejection of logic) and by Peirce (in pragmaticism's rejection of any "extra-logical" order). JRS

603 Sellars, Roy Wood. Critical Realism and the Time Problem. J Phil 5.20 (24 Sept 1908): 542-548; 5.21 (22 Oct 1908): 597-602. Portions are reprinted in *Principles of Emergent Realism*, ed. W. Preston Warren (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1970), pp. 68-75.

Dewey's position that "things are what they are experienced as" is commendably objective, but fails as a metaphysics, since it is susceptible to pluralistic psychology. (p. 543) Dewey has "taken refuge in the impersonal objectivism of science." (p. 598n) JRS

604 Seth, James. The Alleged Fallacies in Mill's 'Utilitarianism'. Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 469-488. Reprinted in *Essays in Ethics and Religion*, ed. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926), pp. 22-46.

Many commentators, including Dewey, have misunderstood Mill's attempt to show that general happiness is desirable. JRS

605 Sidgwick, Alfred. The Ambiguity of Pragmatism. Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 368-369.

Sidgwick comments on Bradley's "On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism" {521}. JRS

606 Stein, Ludwig. Der Pragmatismus. Arch Syst Phil n.s. 14.1 (27 Feb 1908): 1-9; 14.2 (25 May 1908): 143-188. Material used in *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart* {607}.

The first part, "Ein neuer name für alte Denkmethoden," surveys the pragmatism controversy and praises James for maintaining a high level. The second part, "Versuch einer Geschichte des Terminus Pragmatismus," traces the history of pragmatism. It is the outcome of certain English tendencies, nominalism, voluntarism, and utilitarianism. The controversy between pragmatists and idealists parallels the controversy between psychologists and logicians in Germany. IKS

Notes

This essay is summarized, with extensive translations, in Carus, "A German Critic of Pragmatism," Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 136-148 [*Truth on Trial* {925}, pp. 113-126].

607 Stein, Ludwig. *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart.* Stuttgart: Enke, 1908. Translated by Shishirkumar Maitra as *Philosophical Currents of the Present Day*, 3 vols. (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta, 1918-1924).

In chap. 2 of the first volume, "The Neo-Positivistic Movement (The 'pragmatism' of William James)," pp. 44-100, Stein examines this new American philosophy, which revives nominalism using "excellent wit and brilliant satire." He offers a history of the term "pragmatism," and shows why Kant would not support pragmatism and why Aristotle would. Stein describes how "positivism, radical empiricism, nominalism, voluntarism, ethical individualism and political liberalism are logically most connected with one another." James's genetic and biological basis for truth would have been strengthened if he had read Semon's *Mneme*. Pragmatic truth finds its terminus in the ideal future, while transcendentalists place truth in an ideal past. This "warm philosophy of feeling has again raised its head against the 'mathematical' intellectual philosophy of the rationalists, logicians, and idealists." Criticism of pragmatism begins with the fact that teleology is only a regulative, not constitutive, principle of nature, but pragmatism assumes teleology *a priori*. Pragmatism should "concentrate itself and discipline its troops of thought logically" in order to present a comprehensive "energistic-voluntaristic view of the world." JRS

Reviews

Walter T. Marvin, J Phil 6.24 (25 Nov 1909): 668-669; Henry W. Stuart, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 69-76.

Reviews of vol. 1 of the translation

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 29.2 (April 1920): 244.

608 Strong, Anna L. Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism. American Journal of Theology 12.2 (April 1908): 231-240.

Pragmatism must give theology a special scientific status, and makes God either the whole process of reality, or a part of reality. Since pragmatism identifies reality with experience, and sets time as a form of all experience, then time and change will be real for God. This God can satisfy the needs of "ordinary religious consciousness." JRS

609 Strong, Charles A. Pragmatism and Its Definition of Truth. J Phil 5.10 (7 May 1908): 256-264.

Pragmatism succeeds best as a theory of "why we think things true," not of "what truth means." JRS

Notes

A portion of this essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 184-186.

610 Thilly, Frank. La Philosophie américaine contemporaine. Rev Méta 16.5 (Sept 1908): 607-634.

611 Vailati, Giovanni. Il linguaggio come ostacolo alla eliminazioni di contrasti illusori. Rinnovamento 2.5-6 (May-June 1908). Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018} pp. 895-899.

This essay makes no explicit mention of pragmatism, but its topic, the need for clarification of meanings and the positive impact that this would have on intellectual inquiry, is of interest. The danger of assigning one's own personal meanings to important philosophical terms is addressed. EPC

612 Walker, Leslie J. Martineau and the Humanists. Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 305-320.

Martineau's philosophy bears a close resemblence in several respects to Schiller's humanism. JRS

Summaries

Edith H. Morrill, Phil Rev 18.4 (July 1908): 464-465.

Notes

See Schiller's response, "Humanism and Intuitionism" {713}.

613 Waterhouse, Eric S. Pragmatism; Or, The Method of Common Sense in Philosophy. London Quarterly Review 109.2 (April 1908): 241-253. Material used in Part One, chap. 8, of *Modern Theories of Religion* {891}, pp. 266-288.

Waterhouse writes a heartily sympathetic exposition of several central pragmatic doctrines. JRS

614 Whately, Arnold Robert. *The Inner Light: A Study of the Significance, Character, and Primary Content of the Religious Consciousness.* London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908.

615 Witmer, Lightmer. Mental Healing and the Emmanuel Movement. Psychological Clinic 2 (15 Dec 1908): 212-223; 2 (15 Jan 1909): 239-250; 2 (15 Feb 1909): 282-300.

Witmer critically reviews the mental healing movement associated with the work of Richard C. Cabot and Elwood Worcester. James is singled out in the third part. His support of psychical research and his opposition to medical licensing are tactics in his campaign against science. The *Principles of Psychology* (1890) is a work for beginners and its popularity is evidence for the low level of science. In the last edition of his *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* (5th ed., Leipzig: Englemann, 1902-1903), Wundt refers to James only three times, and not a fact or theory is introduced on James's authority. James is the "spoiled child" of American Psychology, "exempt from all serious criticism." IKS

Notes

Quotations are reprinted in "Is the Psychology Taught at Harvard a National Peril?" {620}. In the anonymous "Münsterberg Replies to Criticism," Psychological Clinic 3 (15 Jan 1910): 248, the rumor is reported that Hugo Münsterberg asked the American Psychological Association to expel Witmer for publishing this article, and threatened to not invite the Association to meet at Harvard.

616 Wright, Henry W. Evolution and the Self-Realization Theory. Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 355-363.

The moral agent should be understood in an evolutionary way. The self is gradually realized, through "rigorous obedience to duty and continual self-sacrifice," into conformity with the true good. JRS

Notes

See Wright, "Religion and Morality," Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 87-92.

617 Aars, Kristian B. R. Pragmatismus und Empiricismus. Z Phil Ph Krit 135.1 (May 1909): 1-10.

618 Alexander, Samuel. Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe. Hibbert Journal 8.1 (Oct 1909): 47-66.

Absolutism and pragmatism defend an experienced-centered reality. Theism can only be supported by the opposed metaphysics of independent reality and passive mind. JRS

Notes

See Cryrus H. Eshleman's response, Hibbert Journal 8.2 (Jan 1910): 428-429, and Alexander's reply, Hibbert Journal 8.3 (April 1909): 667-668.

619 Aliotta, Antonio. Il pragmatismo anglo-americaine. La Cultura Filosofica 3.2 (March-April 1909): 104-134.

620 Anon. Is the Psychology Taught at Harvard a National Peril? Current Literature 46.4 (April 1909): 436-438.

A summary of Witmer's article {615} and a long quotation from Raymond Perrin's article in *The Bang*. IKS

621 Anon. Philosophy in the Open. Bookman 29.6 (Aug 1909): 661-662.

Critics would "rather thump a pragmatist than explain him," which makes it easier to follow for "we simple folk." "Time spent in understanding is time lost in battle," and "no good word-fighter will ever seek an enemy's meaning when there are verbal shifts by which that enemy can be proved insane." JRS

622 Anon. Pragmatism and Religion. Spectator 102.2 (9 Jan 1909): 45-46.

Pragmatism is more favorable to religion than naturalism or absolutism. JRS

623 Baldwin, James Mark. The Influence of Darwin on Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy. Psych Rev 16.3 (May 1909): 207-218. Reprinted with additions in *Darwin and the Humanities* (Baltimore: Review Publishing Co., 1909. Rpt., New York: AMS Press, 1980). 2nd ed., London: Swann Sonnenshein and Co., 1910.

The Darwinian conquest results in instrumentalism or experimental logic, which "holds that *all truth is confirmed hypothesis*, and that all *reason is truth woven into mental structure*." Pragmatism is a radical and self-defeating extension of this logic into metaphysics, which denies reality to anything unconfirmed or useless. JRS

624 Baron, E. La Théorie de la connaissance dans le pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 14.6 (1 June 1909): 617-634.

625 Baudin, E. La Méthode psychologique de W. James. The preface to *Précis de psychologie*, translation of James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) by E. Baudin and G. Bertier (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1909. 3rd ed., 1912). Also published in Rev de Phil 14.6 (1 June 1909): 635-658.

James's psychology studies the living individual. He accepts physiological research as preliminary, but for psychology itself he uses introspection. James attempts to find the immediately given, which for him is the stream of consciousness. IKS

Reviews of *Précis de psychologie*

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 20 (1909): 195-196. Pillon expresses reservations on several points. IKS

626 Blanche, F. A. La Notion de vérité dans le pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 15.1 (1 July 1909): 5-25.

Summaries

Helen M. Clarke, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 99-100

627 Boodin, J. E. Truth and Agreement. Psych Rev 16.1 (Jan 1909): 55-66. Reprinted with revisions in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 214-229.

Pragmatism sets aside "the real question–the relevancy of knowledge to its object." There is a lower stage of purposive thought, but that does not mean that nature itself is purposive. The higher stage of "sharing" knowledge copies the real object. Instrumentalism gives meaning to a moment of life only in so far as this moment is an instrument to another moment, and hence it is unable to give meaning to life as a whole. JRS

Summaries

John B. Kent, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 572.

628 Boodin, J. E. What Pragmatism Is and Is Not. J Phil 6.23 (11 Nov 1909): 627-635. Reprinted with revisions in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 186-199.

Pragmatism would scientifically test any philosophical hypothesis, and tries to specify the nature of a truth's agreement with some portion of reality. A pragmatist's conclusions drawn from pragmatism should not be assimilated to pragmatism itself. Pragmatism does not make the true and the useful coincide, nor does it reduce reality to what is humanly known. Truth does not always originate in practical demands or any and all satisfactions. Pragmatism is realistic "in so far as it intends a world beyond our finite cognitive purposes" but will not make any untested assertions about the mental or material, unified or plural, nature of this world. Nor will pragmatism commit to any *a priori* theory of ideas or the mind. It is unpragmatic to declare that ultimate truth will, or won't, be realized, or that time and chance are real, or unreal. JRS

629 Bourdeau, Jean. *Pragmatisme et modernisme.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909.

There are three parts: Agnosticism, Pragmatism, and Modernism. Bourdeau notes in the preface that this work is for specialists, not amateurs. He writes that "in the face of a radical powerlessness of pure reason, the American philosophers, Peirce and James, propose a new method: pragmatism..." (p. vi) In Part One, chap. 4 (pp. 30-38) is "Le Crépuscule des philosophes," a reprint of a review of Papini's *Il crepuscolo dei Filosofi* {351}. In Part Two, chap. 1 (pp. 39-48), "Nouvelles modes en philosophie," is an exposition of the pragmatist as the "new style of philosopher," who is at once a kind of positivist and whose work is derived from English Utilitarianism. Authors mentioned include Peirce, James, and Bergson–whose original philosophy has affinities with the work of the former two–Blondel, Papini, Lalande, and Schiller. Pragmatism is

a philosophy of adventurous and daring young intellects. Chap. 2, "Agnosticisme et pragmatisme" (pp. 49-65) is a reprint of {405}. Chap. 3, "Le Pragmatisme contre le rationalisme" (pp. 66-75) is a reprint of {407}. Chap. 4, "L'illusion pragmatiste" (pp. 76-83) is a reprint of {406}. Chap. 5, "Une Sophistique du pragmatisme: Le Manuel des menteurs" (pp. 84-101) is a reprint of {408}. In Part Three, chap. 2, "La Logique des sentiments" (pp. 112-121) describes Ribot's logic of emotions. Chap. 7 is entitled "Le Modernisme et l'orthodoxie" (pp. 122-186), in which Modernism is understood as an "application of pragmatism to religious beliefs." (p. vii). Chap. 8, "Inquiétude religieuse" (pp. 187-204) focuses on Boutroux's work. The first appendix is by Dr. Louis Rénon, "Le Pragmatisme en médicine," pp. 215-220. LF

Reviews

Grace N. Dolson, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 563-564; Xavier Moisant, Rev de Phil 14.1 (Jan 1909): 101; François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 19 (1908): 202.

630 Boyce Gibson, W. R. *God With Us: A Study in Religious Idealism.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1909.

In chap. 7, "Fruition and Action," pp. 128-144, Peirce's theory that "the real stimulus to action is not belief, but doubt" is accepted save for religion, which requires faith. In chap. 9, "Pragmatism and Religious Idealism," pp. 174-206, James's positions on the "will to believe" and religious mysticism are considered. Pragmatism's "greatest service" to Religious Idealism is its stand on the psychological basis of personality, but it offers pluralistic mysticism instead of an "all-inclusive spiritual life." (p. 196-197) Schiller's metaphysics resembles Aristotle's. Chap. 10, "Universalism and the Problem of Evil," pp. 207-229, compares James's "meliorism" and "indeterminism" with Religious Idealism's "optimism." Possibilities are real, and human possibilities are spiritual (making evil possible). JRS

Reviews

George Galloway, Hibbert Journal 8.2 (Jan 1910): 460-462.

631 Bradley, F. H. Coherence and Contradiction. Mind 18.4 (Oct 1909): 489-508. Reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 219-244.

Truth must satisfy the intellectual need for consistency. Judgment ascribes multiple, and hence contradictory, relations to objects, and hence must fail to attain complete truth. In a footnote on p. 505-506, Bradley comments on difficulties understanding James and his *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}. JRS

632 Brown, Harold C. The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 6.2 (21 Jan 1909): 44-51.

A report of papers and discussions, including several about pragmatism, at this meeting. JRS

633 Brumas, E. Humanisme et pragmatisme. Revue Thomiste 17 (May-June 1909): 341-342.

634 Buckham, John Wright. The Organization of Truth. Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 63-72.

The "world of values" offers a "center" for truth. Lotze's appreciation for the role of feelings in truth led to Ritschl's value-based theology, and was paralleled in philosophy by pragmatism. Their common appeal to the individual's experience rejects any universal standard of value. This standard must instead be sought in the ethics of "universal moral selfhood." JRS

635 Calderoni, Mario. Una difficoltà del metodo pragmatista. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.3 (May-June 1909): 234-238. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 125-132.

Calderoni treats difficulties with the verification of past or historical facts. EPC

636 Calderoni, Mario. Giovanni Vailati. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.5 (Sept-Oct 1909): 420-433. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 161-180.

Calderoni's memorial essay gives biographical information and shows the development of Vailati's thought. Vailati's role in the turbulent years of *Leonardo* and the debates over the meaning of pragmatism are mentioned. Calderoni maintains that Vailati's philosophy was a pragmatism taken in its "original" and most "serious" form, following the lead of C. S. Peirce. It is also interesting to see how Calderoni views Vailati's pragmatism as a reaction against Italian positivism. Positivism was also an object of revulsion to Papini and Prezzolini, whose voluntaristic version of pragmatism was based upon an aggressive re-interpretation of James's "will to believe." EPC

637 Carr, H. Wildon. Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. *Proc Arist Soc* 9 (1909): 41-60.

Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice*, while depicting reality as activity and intelligence as practical, does not agree with pragmatism that the truth is "what works," or that we make truth, or that truth is mutable. JRS

638 Carus, Paul. The Philosophy of Personal Equation. Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 78-84. Reprinted in *Truth on Trial* {925}, pp. 46-64.

Individual irregularities cause fluctuations in scientific measurement. In like manner, pragmatism allows the vagaries of subjective interest to control cognition. JRS

639 Carus, Paul. A Postscript on Pragmatism. In Comment on Professor James's Review of Marcel Hébert's Book. Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 85-94.

James's review of {549} complains that his critics see subjectivism in pragmatism, but an examination of his *Pragmatism* shows how he confuses the real issues. James is merely "fixing belief" to relieve doubt, as Peirce long ago outlined. Pragmatism usefully investigates the psychological origins of belief and the practical applications for truth, but as a theory of truth, it will "deny the value of theory, of consistency, systematization, etc." JRS

640 Chiappelli, Alessandro. Naturalisme, humanisme, et philosophie des valeurs. Rev Phil 67.3 (March 1909): 225-255.

Summaries

John B. Kent, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 568-569.

641 Cook, E. A. *Christian Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Believing.* 1909.

Notes

See also his *Christian Faith for Men of Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913).

642 Cox, Ignatius W. Pragmatism. American Catholic Quarterly Review 34.1 (Jan 1909): 139-165.

Pragmatism is not merely a synthesis of old errors; "it advances a few new ones of its own." Truth is declared to be mutable, but what of the truth of pragmatism? James ambiguously says that truth is "to agree in the widest sense with reality," which allows a distinction to be made between some absolute truths and the remaining provisional theories. To "copy reality" is just to know reality "*as it is.*" Truth can grow in a relative sense, as knowledge of relations between objects expands. Pragmatism drives us to subjectivism and skepticism, and defines reality as sensations and our constructions from them. Logic and ontology become one, dropping pragmatism into a subjective idealism which cannot account for our experience of a common external world. An intellectualist realism and a representational cognitivism is far more practical. Hypotheses work because they are true. Pragmatists must admit that an external reality explains why sensations are mostly beyond our control. "It is pleasant for lovers of Catholic philosophy to contemplate in her doctrine on reality another victory" and "may we not say that she is true because the Divine Hand of Eternal Truth is guiding her." JRS

643 Creighton, James E. Darwin and Logic. Psych Rev 16.3 (May 1909): 170-187. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 180-201.

The impact of evolution on logic is evident in the work of the pragmatists and J. M. Baldwin. JRS

Notes

See J. M. Baldwin's response, "Darwinism and Logic: A Reply to Professor Creighton," Psych Rev 16.6 (Nov 1909): 431-436.

644 Creighton, James E. Knowledge and Practice. Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 29-48. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 24-44.

The value of knowledge *is* connected with practice: "the practical life becomes the means and instrument of reason" when the desire for truth overcomes selfish passions. The current popular demand that knowledge serve only the expedient material needs of society threatens all aspects of the university's real purpose: truth, free inquiry, moral character, devotion to scholarship, philosophical intellect, and liberal culture. JRS

645 Croce, Benedetto. *Filosofia della practica, economia ed etica.* Vol. 3 of *Filosofia come scienza dello spirito.* Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1909. 3rd rev. ed., 1923. 8th ed., 1963. Translated by Douglas Ainslie as *The Philosophy of the Practical* (London: Macmillan, 1913. Rpt., New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1967).

"Psychological" philosophy may affirm practical activity, but only the complete abstraction of philosophy, achieving universal consciousness, can judge it properly. The theoretical cannot be reduced to volition, since practical activity presupposes theory, and vice versa. (p. 33) Pragmatism, "the school of the greatest confusion that has ever appeared in philosophy," has at least seven forms. 1. The theoretical depends on the practical. 2. The true is the production of the will. 3. Only the sciences and mathematics offer any well-being for life. 4. Knowledge is limited to positivistic formulas. 5. The principle of human creative power should be elevated to universal spirit. 6. It is useful to make one's illusions and believe them to be true. 7. Superstition, the occult, and spiritism. Pragmatism falsely assumes that it possible to know the end and then will it, but the ends do not justify the means. The concepts of "the good" and "value" are not "original facts." Theory and practice are correlated. "Knowledge is not an end, but an instrument of life: knowledge that did not serve life would be superfluous and harmful" but it is also true that "activity, if it does not wish to become an irrational and sterile tumult, must lead to contemplation." (p. 304, 305) The recognition of this bond between theory and practice results in a "new pragmatism," which can show that all thought, including philosophy, is historically conditioned. Philosophy itself reflects its historical situation, not in its solutions, but its problems. JRS

Reviews of the translation

Bernard Muscio, Int J Ethics 24.4 (July 1914): 455-457; H. J. Paton, Mind 23.3 (July 1914): 428-432; James H. Tufts, Phil Rev 24.3 (May 1915): 321-325.

646 **De Bussy.** *Gedachten over het Pragmatisme.* 1909.

647 **De Laguna, Grace Andrus.** The Practical Character of Reality. Phil Rev 18.4 (July 1909): 396-415. Reprinted as appendix 2 of *Dogmatism and Evolution*, by Theodore and Grace A. De Laguna {790}, pp. 235-255.

Pragmatism cannot hold that universals are immediately experienced, and hence must deny that they are real. Doubt cannot be immediately experienced either, nor can illusions. The better theory explains these matters by holding that reality is only functionally ideal, which also accounts for the practical advantages of scientific hypotheses. JRS

648 **Dewey, John.** Darwin's Influence Upon Philosophy. Popular Science Monthly 75 (July 1909): 90-98. Revised as "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 1-19. *Philosophy of JD I*, pp. 31-40. *MW* 4: 3-14.

The significance of the debate generated by Darwinism does not involve its opposition to the typically conservative and unoriginal theology, but rather to the historically scientific understanding of nature as possessing fixed, purposive forms. Darwin extended the modern scientific denial of such forms to biology, by applying a genetic logic to the conception of organisms. Evolution takes place within natural constraints; it is not mere chance, but successful variation, which undermines the appeal of the argument from design. Intelligence can similarly throw off the restrictions of formal logic and bondage to transcendent reality without falling back on experience as mere "flux." This defeat of absolutism is a matter of a "growing recognition of its futility." JRS

649 Dewey, John. The Dilemma of the Intellectualist Theory of Truth. J Phil 6.16 (5 Aug 1909): 433-434. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 226-227. *MW* 4: 76-77.

The intellectualist insists that ideas have the property of truth prior to their verification. This theory implies that truths come into existence when true ideas are first conceived. If the intellectualist responds that truth lies in the idea's agreement with things, then ideas are portrayed as "concretely lighted upon their intended objects so that their truth or falsity was self-luminous." If the intellectualist instead describes truth as a property solely of objects or events, then a system of absolutistic rationalism is offered. JRS

650 Dewey, John. Discussion: Realism and Idealism. Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 182-183. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 116-117.

Both positions result from an exaggeration of the role of observation and ideas, respectively. Their reconciliation lies in giving up "the attempt at wholesale characterizations of 'Reality' as such." JRS

Notes

Abstract of a paper. This discussion and subsequent debate is described in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632}.

651 Dewey, John. Is Nature Good? A Conversation. Hibbert Journal 7.4 (July 1909): 827-843. Reprinted as "Nature and Its Good: A Conversation" in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* {793}, pp. 20-45. *MW* 4: 15-30.

A dialogue in which a pragmatist ("Eaton") rejects the notion that an absolute reality can support values. It is the absolutist who cannot distinguish good and evil, not the pragmatist. Values are experienced only by sentient organisms, which use intelligence to maintain and increase goods in a precarious world. JRS

652 Dewey, John. *Moral Principles in Education.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 265-293.

An "elaboration" of Dewey's earlier "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," in the *Third Yearbook of the National Herbart Society* (Chicago: The Society, 1897), pp. 7-33 [*EW* 5: 54-83]. JRS

Reviews

Anon, *Proceedings* of the Second International Moral Education Congress (1912), pp. 184-187; Frank A. Manny, Elementary School Teacher 10 (1909): 204; Carl E. Seashore, Journal of Educational Psychology 1 (1910): 117-118.

653 Dewey, John. Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary. J Phil 6.1 (7 Jan 1909): 13-21. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 146-155.

Dewey replies to McGilvary's "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism" {570}. The existence of data prior to reflection is essential, but McGilvary confuses such data with ideas within judgments created by reflection. Science must keep them distinct, but intellectualism conflates them and enfolds reality within ideas. Dewey points out that if realism rejects such a move, then he is a realist. The real issue is the status of data, and McGilvary's own position forces *him* into a dilemma: an act of experiencing will be either a particular, fragmentary, meaningless sensation (requiring the idealistic conceptual laws to

create the ordered world) or a full and complete cognitive knowing (leaving no purpose for scientific investigation). What does McGilvary mean by "experience"? Since philosophy should only deal with experienced things, in that sense it should be idealistic. "I know shamefully little about 'all reality', since my empiricism is precisely that the only realities I do know anything about or ever shall know anything about are just experienced realities." JRS

Notes

On this exchange between Dewey and McGilvary see John R. Shook, "John Dewey's Struggle with American Realism, 1904-1910," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 31.3 (Summer 1995): 542-566.

654 Doan, Frank Carlton. An Outline of Cosmic Humanism. J Phil 6.3 (4 Feb 1909): 57-64. Reprinted as appendix 1 of *Religion and the Modern Mind* {655}.

Notes

Abstracted in Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 173-174, and mentioned in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632}.

655 Doan, Frank Carlton. *Religion and the Modern Mind and Other Essays in Modernism.* Boston: Sherman, French, and Co., 1909.

Reviews

F. C. French, J Phil 7.5 (3 March 1910): 133-135. This treatise is a "gospel of humanism, on the basis of the pragmatic philosophy." JRS

656 Elsenhans, Theodore, ed. *Berichte über den III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg.* Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1909.

The papers discussing pragmatism are the following. Josiah Royce, "The Problem of Truth in Light of Recent Discussion," pp. 62-90 [see {709}], and the subsequent discussion by W. Jerusalem, Itelson, W. M. Kozlowski, G. Störring, F. C. S. Schiller, J. Waldapfel, and A. Döring, pp. 91-93. Kristian B. R. Aars, "Energie-lehre und Pragmatismus," pp. 494-501. Julius Pikler, "Die Funktion des Interesses bein Strewn und die PRAGMATISCHE Streitfrage," pp. 622-629, [also published in his *Zwei Vortrage über dynamische Psychologie* {587}] and the subsequent discussion by Josiah Royce, Waldapfel, Döring, and Pikler, pp. 629-630. F. C. S. Schiller, "Der rationalistiche Wahrheitsbegriff," pp. 711-719 [the translation of "Rationalistic Conception of Truth" {717}]. A. C. Armstrong, "The Evolution of Pragmatism," pp. 720-726 [also published as {504}], and the subsequent discussion of both Schiller's and Armstrong's papers by Dürr, Arnold Ruge, E. Mally, Pikler, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Boris Jakowenko, Otto Karmin, W. M. Kozlowski, G. Störring, and F. C. S. Schiller, pp. 726-729. Further discussions of pragmatism by Leonard Nelson, Rudolf Goldscheid, Theodore Elsenhans, E. Mally, Dürr, Oskar Ewald, Boris Jakowenko, W. M. Kozlowski, Paul Carus, Abel Rey, J. Waldapfel, M. Grelling, and F. C. S. Schiller are reported on pp. 729-740. Schiller remarks on Rudolf Goldscheid's "Die Willenskritische Methode," p. 762. Wilhelm Jerusalem, "Apriorismus und Evolutionismus," pp. 806-814, and the subsequent discussion follows on pp. 814-815. JRS

Notes

This congress took place in Heidelberg, 31 Aug-5 Sept 1908. Klaus Oehler refers to it as "the official starting point of pragmatism's influence in Germany" in "Notes on the Recep-

tion of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 17.1 (Winter 1981): 25-35. The proceedings of the congress were reported by A. C. Armstrong, "The Third International Congress of Philosophy," Phil Rev 18.1 (Jan 1909): 48-58; Henri Delacroix, "Le Troisieme congrès internationale de philosophie," Rev Phil 66.5 (Nov 1908): 528-545; G. Seliber, "Der Pragmatismus und seine Gegner auf dem III. Internationalen Kongreß für Philosophie," Arch Syst Phil 15.3 (27 Aug 1909): 287-298; and Giovanni Vidari, "Terzo congresso filosofico internazionale," Riv Filo 11.5 (Sept-Oct 1908): 543-553. Vidari declared that "the Heidelberg proceedings illustrate the tendency to profit by what is helpful in Pragmatism without adopting the extreme conclusions of its advocates."

657 Eshleman, Cyrus H. Professor James on Fechner's Philosophy. Hibbert Journal 7.3 (April 1909): 671-673.

Eshleman comments on James's "The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul" {671} with the regret that James did not give a fuller account of the soul-life. IKS

658 Eucken, Rudolf. *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.* 4th rev. ed., Liepzig: Veit, 1909. Translated by Meyrick Booth as *Main Currents of Modern Thought* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912).

In a section entitled "Pragmatism" (pp. 75-79) Eucken is "compelled to regard it, when we consider it as a whole and in its ultimate bearings, as an error." If truth is viewed as a mere means, and not an end in itself, it loses "all the power of conviction" and brings only disharmony. Pragmatism assumes a great "optimistic enthusiasm" for human culture. In the succeeding section on "Our Own Position: Activism" Eucken contrasts pragmatism with his desire for the higher spiritual life. JRS

Reviews

A. C. Armstrong, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 230-231.

Reviews of the translation

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 86-93.

Notes

The first edition was titled *Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart* (1878). The material on pragmatism was added in the fourth edition. On Eucken, see W. R. Boyce Gibson's *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906).

659 Eucken, Rudolf. *The Life of the Spirit: An Introduction to Philosophy.* 2nd ed.. Translated by F. L. Pogson. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909.

Pragmatism's emphasis on solely human goals and experiences is inadequate to "the irresistible power of man's innate spirituality." (p. 323) Truth should be in a "closer connection with the whole of life," but this life is "cosmic." JRS

Reviews

Anon, Amer J Psych 20.3 (July 1909): 463.

Notes

The first edition was titled *Einfuhrung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens* (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1908).

660 Ewald, Oscar. German Philosophy in 1908. Translated by William A. Hammond. Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 514-535.

Ewald briefly describes the debates on pragmatism at the Third World Congress of Philosophy. Royce's position mirrored the Neo-Kantian and Neo-Fichtean opposition to pragmatism. JRS

661 Ewer, Bernard C. Paradoxes in Natural Realism. J Phil 6.22 (28 Oct 1909): 589-600.

A footnote on p. 595 complains that Dewey's pragmatic definition of reality does not refute independently existing realities, and indeed, his disagreement with idealism must rely on processes lying beyond consciousness. JRS

662 Fawcett, Edward D. *The Individual and Reality: An Essay Touching the First Principles of Metaphysics.* London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909.

In two sections on pp. 27-33, Fawcett describes pragmatism's "subordination of truth to practice" as a later phase of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will, and points out that reality can be "disastrous." JRS

Reviews

H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 541-548.

663 Foston, Hubert. The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity. *Proc Arist Soc* 9 (1909): 100-118.

Pragmatism tends to evade its difficulties with the "activist fallacy of making process cover the whole of being." (p. 116) JRS

664 Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. *Le Sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques.* Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie., 1909.

In Part 1, chap. 1 especially, the author presents and attacks Édouard Le Roy as a nominalist and sensist, and pragmatism as "worthless and heretical." The end of the chapter includes remarks on Bergson's and Boutroux's positions. Chap. 2 develops his own conceptualist-realist view of common sense, which is inexorably linked to Scholastic philosophy and eternal truth. See also pp. 242ff on Le Roy's critique of Thomistic proofs of the existence of God, and pp. 282ff on Le Roy's pantheism. LF

Reviews

Joseph Louis Perrier, J Phil 7.22 (27 Oct 1910): 612-614. Perrier argues that, *pace* Garrigou-Lagrange, pragmatism is neutral with respect to realism/nominalism and conceptualism/sensism; and that there is "in pragmatism a profound meaning and a good deal of truth which [the author] has never suspected." LF

665 Hermant, P. and A. Van de Waele. *Les Principales théories de la logique contemporaine.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909.

A critical survey of theories of knowledge by German, English, and French schools. The English are divided into realists, idealists and pragmatists. Peirce, James, Dewey, and Schiller are discussed (pp. 207-230). American Pragmatism is regarded as a "local expression of a general philosophical tendency," and as an "adversary of absolutist theories." (pp. 229ff) See pp. 231f for remarks on Renouvier and Fouilleé. LF

Reviews

G. W. T. Whitney, Phil Rev 19.2 (March 1910): 218-221. Whitney argues that Hermant and Waele's concluding position has "much in common with pragmatism and positivism," and that the authors' criticisms of pragmatism can be leveled against their own view (see esp. pp. 265ff). LF

666 Huizinga, Arnold van C. P. The American Philosophy Pragmatism. Bibliotheca Sacra 66.1 (Jan 1909): 78-104. Materials used for *The American Philosophy Pragmatism* {954}.

667 Hume, James G. The Import of Pragmatism for the History of Philosophy. Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 176-177.

Notes

An abstract of a paper; also summarized in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632}.

668 Inge, William R. *Faith and Its Psychology.* London: Duckworth, 1909. New York: Scribner's, 1910.

Reviews

Douglas C. Macintosh, "Pragmatism and Mysticism," American Journal of Theology 15.1 (Jan 1911): 142-146. The criticism of pragmatism "is not based on a more intelligent appreciation," identifying it with the "pseudo-pragmatism of modernist Catholics." JRS

Arnold R. Whately, Hibbert Journal 9.1 (Oct 1910): 212-215.

669 Jacoby, Günther. *Der Pragmatismus: Neue Bahnen in der Wissenschaftes-lehre des Auslands.* Liepzig: Durr, 1909.

Reviews

A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 7.9 (15 Sept 1910): 301-303. Germany is starting to notice the pragmatic movement. JRS

Wilhelm Jerusalem, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 31 (1910): 789-792.

670 James, William. The Confidences of a "Psychical Researcher." American Magazine 68 (Oct 1909): 580-589. Reprinted as "Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher," in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 173-206. *Writings 2*, pp. 1250-1265. *William James on Psychical Research*, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 309-325. *Works EPR*, pp. 361-375.

The English founders of the Society for Psychical Research expected immediate results, but after more than 25 years, everything still is uncertain. Yet the failure of orthodox science to persuade people that psychic phenomena are mere frauds suggests that there must be something genuine and baffling. The English researchers followed the rule that once a cheat, always a cheat. This is a wise rule, yet irrelevant as a test of truth because most of us sometimes cheat for the sake of a higher truth. A better test is one's sense of the "dramatic probabilities." While swindling predominates, it is likely to imitate genuine phenomena. The best theory is panpsychism. If there is an enveloping cosmic reservoir of consciousness, then apparitions, presentiments, extraordinary

knowledge exhibited by mediums, and other phenomena could be thought of as leaks. Mediums may be able to tap into the reservoir telepathically. The hypothesis of telepathy, first proposed by Frederic Myers, is a useful, unifying hypothesis. IKS

671 James, William. The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings Intermediate between Man and God. An Account of the Philosophy of G. T. Fechner. Hibbert Journal 7.2 (Jan 1909): 278-294. Also published with slight changes as "Concer-ning Fechner," in *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}, pp. 145-176.

Notes

See Eshleman's reponse, "Professor James on Fechner's Philosophy" {657}.

672 James, William. *The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. Reprinted as *Works MT.* Translated into French as *L'Ideé de vérité*, by L. Veil and Maxime David (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913).

A collection of polemical articles in the controversy over pragmatism. James's "Preface," pp. v-xx [*Works MT*, pp. 3-10], explains that in his *Pragmatism* he gave some grounds for misunderstandings concerning religious beliefs by saying that they consist in their "feeling good" to us. But he had only meant to say that among competing beliefs in all other respects equal, sane men will choose the one which satisfies a vital human need. The pragmatic conception of truth is important in establishing radical empiricism. Such empiricism consists of a postulate that philosophers should debate only in terms drawn from experience, a factual claim that relations are matters of direct experience, and a generalized conclusion that the universe because held together by relations which are themselves parts of experience needs no support outside itself. Rationalists use the truth-relation as an obvious case of something resting on something outside experience, while pragmatism shows it to have a content definable in experiential terms. Schiller, Dewey, and he agree in the existence of objects because such are as much needed to explain the falsehood of ideas as their truth.

"The Function of Cognition," pp. 1-42 [*Works MT*, pp. 13-32], is included because much of the analysis of truth developed in *Pragmatism* is in this 1885 article. It places the truth function within experience and provides for an experienceable environment between idea and object. However, the essay places too much emphasis on resemblance and lacks a generalized notion of workability. "The Tigers in India," pp. 43-50 [*Works MT*, pp. 33-36], is an extract from "The Knowing of Things Together" (1895). It defines representative knowledge with reference to a context which leads to an object. In intuitive knowledge, there is simply the datum, the experience, which later is considered either thing or mind, depending upon the context in which it is placed.

"Humanism and Truth," pp. 51-101, is a reprint, with additions, of {176}. "The Relation Between Knower and Know," pp. 102-120, is an extract from {180}. "The Essence of Humanism," pp. 121-135, is a reprint of {242}. "A Word More About Truth," pp. 136-161, is a reprint of {442}. "Professor Pratt on Truth," pp. 162-179, is a reprint of {440}. "The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders," pp. 180-216, is a reprint of {556}. "The Meaning of the Word Truth," pp. 217-220, is a reprint of {554}. "The Existence of Julius Cæsar," pp. 221-225, is a reprint of {558}. "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life," pp. 226-229, is a reprint of {435}. "Professor

Hébert on Pragmatism," pp. 230-245, is a reprint of a review of {549}. "Abstractionism and 'Relativismus'," pp. 246-271, is a reprint of {673}.

In "Two English Critics," pp. 272-286 [*Works MT*, pp. 146-153], James argues that the attacks upon pragmatism by Bertrand Russell and Ralph Hawtrey are examples of vicious intellectualism: the rigoristic assumption derived from mathe-matics that words can be exactly defined and their full context ignored. Russell repeats the slanders that for pragmatists any truth-claimer must know the consequences of the belief and that a belief can be true even when its object does not exist. But to say that a belief is true and define truth by workings is not to claim the belief to be one about workings, as Russell claims. Furthermore, pragmatists have repeatedly argued that for beliefs to be true their objects must exist. Hawtrey identifies truth with expediency and proposes to use "correctness" to designate the fact that an object is as the belief declares it to be. This makes the term ambiguous, sometimes indicating a property of beliefs and at other times, that of facts. The word "proposition" proposed by G. E. Moore and others is also defective.

In "A Dialogue," pp. 287-298 [*Works MT*, pp. 154-159], James argues that a belief about a past events, which by hypothesis will never come to be known, is true now in this sense: any knower, were he to come to know the event, would find himself coming into satisfactory relations with it and devising substitutes for it, and in this be partially constrained by the nature of the event. An analysis of the intellectualist view reveals three entities: the reality, the knowing, and the truth. Pragmatists recognize only the first two, since "what truth is known as" cannot be distinguished from them. IKS

Extended reviews

Paul Carus {773}.

Reviews

Anon, Amer J Psych 21.1 (Jan 1910): 172-173. The critics' difficulties in interpreting James is caused by his "off-hand, slap-dash, vivacious way of after-dinner table talk, instead of in the method of severely reasoned, logical thinking." JRS

Anon, Athenaeum 4280 (6 Nov 1909): 549-550. Compromise is now in the air. James acts as if he had never left the fold. There are almost no traces of the pragmatic appeal to the individual conscience. James "abjures subjectivism." IKS

Anon, North American Review 193.2 (Feb 1911): 298-300. With James, for the first time, ideas originating in the United States have influenced thinkers in Europe. IKS

Anon, "Pragmatism Again," Nation 90.4 (27 Jan 1910): 88-90. James at last clarifies that pragmatism is only a doctrine of epistemology, not ontology. JRS

E. Baron, Rev de Phil 16.4 (1 April 1910): 426-428. James is an ardent propagandist of the gospel and gives us a collection of essays on its most controversial point. Pragmatism, it become clear, is not a matter of believing what one wants to believe, but recognizes an object with which we come to agree through the working of our ideas. Pragmatism should not be confounded with the metaphysics (Schiller's humanism, James's pluralism) which makes it possible. IKS

Pierre Bovet, Archives de Psychologie 9 (1910): 149-150. James's humanism seems to be nothing else than his radical empiricism. IKS

John Grier Hibben, Educational Review 40.2 (Sept 1910): 201-207. Pragmatism offers students the lure of expediency and would cause them to "fall into slovenly and lax methods of inquiry." It confuses the ground of truth with its verification, and forgets that practical endeavors are conducted with the prior assurances of constant truths. The pragmatic test cannot deal with truths of logical or mathematical relations. JRS

George T. Ladd, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 63-69. James shifts from question to question and alters the meaning of terms. Pragmatists claim that truth is agreement with reality, thus making reality authoritative over our ideas. But in trying to explain how we recognize truth, James claims that truth is the agreement of portions of experience with other portions and thus approaches solipsism. IKS

André Lalande, Rev Phil 71 (Jan 1911). A summary of the major aspects. It is an ingenious book. However, James at times uses poor arguments. IKS

James Lindsay, Arch Syst Phil 17 (1911): 133-134. James is too polemical and the result is not very satisfying. Some rationalists are absurd, but this is no reason to "proscribe the legitimate place" of the intellect. IKS

Evander B. McGilvary, Int J Ethics 20.2 (Jan 1910): 244-250. To one who has suspected that James was capable only of "random excursions," this work proves that behind them stands a "thoroughly systematic plan." James shows that he is not a subjectivist. However, James's attribution of truth to ideas which never intended to be true or false confuses the issue. Schiller's account which begins with claims to truth is preferable even if unsatisfactory. IKS

Richard Müller-Freienfels, Zeit für Psych 57 (1910): 195-196. James answers accusations that pragmatism leaves no room for an external world. He wants a radical empiricism. Pragmatism does not clarify the difference between established truth and personal belief, even where this difference would be useful. IKS

John E. Russell, J Phil 7.1 (6 Jan 1910): 22-24. In his anti-pragmatist days, Russell would have viewed the volume differently. Now he finds it a challenge to the rejectors of pragmatism. James opposes a concrete conception of truth to the empty abstraction of the anti-pragmatists. He answers critics' claims that radical empiricism leads to solipsism. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.2 (April 1910): 258-263. This treatise shows how the "pragmatic conceptions actually grew up in a first-class" mind. James upholds the solidarity of the leading pragmatists, although he seems to be somewhat hesitant about Dewey. This is due to a realistic strain in James: his views on "real objects." Here, James is not pragmatic enough, for he does not ask what is meant by real objects. Schiller cannot agree with James that his own contributions to humanism are primarily psychological. IKS

A. Wolf, Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 904-908. Pragmatists write as if their doctrine was the only alternative to Absolute idealism, but the pragmatic view of truth is "hardly more akin to empirical realism than to solipsism." Under the spell of modern science's skeptical tendencies, pragmatism has identified verity with verification. JRS

Lionel Dauriac, Rev Phil 70.6 (Dec 1910): 643-649.

Reviews of French translation

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 24 (1913): 202-203. A summary of the contents. James protests against the view that pragmatism ignores theoretical interests and is a philosophy of action. IKS

673 James, William. On a Very Prevalent Abuse of Abstraction. Popular Science Monthly 74.5 (May 1909): 485-493. Reprinted as "Abstractionism and 'Relativismus'," in *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, pp. 246-271. *Works MT*, pp. 134-145.

Abstract concepts are useful because they allow us to anticipate experience, and philosophers have rightly prized them. Abstractionists abstract a feature of an object and then insist that the object is nothing but that. G. S. Fullerton engages in abstractionism in his attack on free-will, arguing that free-will involves disconnection while the admission of any point of disconnection involves the denial of all connection. McTaggart treats the "will to believe" as an abstraction. In the concrete, the will is the right to choose between attractive alternatives in cases where complete evidence is lacking. McTaggart reduces the situation to the silly premise "all good desires must be fulfilled," thereby loosing sight of the complexity of the motives which in the concrete are at work. A similar fault is present in the attacks on "relativismus" by H. Rickert and Hugo Münsterberg. In attacks on pragmatism, the notion of truth is taken as self-evident. Pragmatists try to explain the concrete meaning of truth and treat beliefs not as abstractions but as "opinions in the flesh." IKS

674 James, William. The Philosophy of Bergson. Hibbert Journal 7.3 (April 1909): 562-577. Also published in revised form as "Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism," in *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}, pp. 223-272.

675 James, William. *A Pluralistic Universe.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. Translated into French as *La Philosophie de l'expérience* by E. Baudin and G. Bertier (Paris: Flammarion, 1910). Translated into German with an introduction {1254} by Julius Goldstein as *Das pluralistische Universum* (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner, 1914). *The Works of William James: A Pluralistic Universe*, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

Philosophy expresses a vision in argumentative form: philosophers find reasons for what they believe on instinct. The vision is the important thing, and philosophers should be careful that their thinking not become mere technique, as is the case in Germany. Philosophy is undergoing a revival, as empiricism arises and challenges the dominant rationalistic idealism. Rationalism proceeds from wholes to parts and tends towards monism, while empiricism, beginning with the parts, leans towards pluralism. Another opposition, perhaps the most interesting one, is that between materialism and spiritualism, resulting from a clash between cynical and sympathetic temperaments. From a pragmatic point of view, spiritualism is an attitude of trust in the universe, while materialism leaves us on guard and suspicious. Spiritualism has two forms: dualistic theism and pantheism. The former leaves man and God totally different, and often depicts God in legalistic and monarchic terms; truth is a passive acquiescence to the order established by Him. Scientific evolutionism has opened up for our time vast vistas, and the rise of social democratic ideals has made monarchism strange, pushing our thinking towards pantheism for which God is the indwelling divine.

Pantheism is the more intimate type of spiritualism. Its vision of the union of man and God develops pluralistic and monistic forms. Pluralism or radical empiricism conceives the divine in the "each-form," denying that everything is collected into totality and taking the reals separately and distributively. Monism or absolutism thinks in the "all-form": the divine exists authentically only when reality is experienced as a totality. Monism fails to establish real intimacy between man and the divine. It declares time

675 (cont.)
itself to be unreal. Its absolute remains strange to us because it has no history, cannot suffer, cannot strive, which exist only in time, for the relative and finite point of view. Absolutists such as Hermann Lotze, Josiah Royce, and F. H. Bradley try to establish absolutism dialectically, by arguing that only the extremes of absolute chaos or absolute unity are logically possible. Their arguments are merely verbal and tainted by vicious intellectualism: the habit of thinking that names exclude from the facts which they name anything not stated in their definitions. Absolutists begin with the healthy belief that the world is rational, but they cling to the faith that sensations are not rational and that therefore conceptions must be substituted for them. They lose the "innocent continuity" of sense-experience, and because they treat concepts intellectually, cannot find continuity on the conceptual level. They then have no recourse but to bring in the absolute in order to reestablish continuity. The issue can be reduced to the problem of external relations. Bradley denies their possibility, while to James they undoubtedly exist.

Hegel is the source of much current absolutism. He cultivated obscurity and ambiguity, but like other philosophers, is simple to understand once one gets to the center of his vision. His mind was impressionistic and saw reason as all-inclusive and things as dialectical. His dialectic accurately portrays the fact that any equilibrium is but temporary and is rushing towards destruction within a larger system, and that things cannot be isolated but are always being invaded by their environment. Hegel unfortunately clung to rationalistic ideals and expressed his vision in what he called logic, thereby claiming coercive necessity for his system. Finding the logic of identity sterile, he began to move from the different to the different as if by the necessity of thought, found things to negate themselves, and made self-contradiction the "propulsive logical force that moves the world." He correctly observed that many paradoxes are reconciled in higher syntheses, but he was dogmatic and clung to the notion of the one truth. In concepts, the dialectic serves the need for an absolute and final truth because any affirmation implies its negations, thereby leaving no room for any alternatives outside itself. Hegel's dialectic, a case of vicious intellectualism, is rejected even by many of his followers. James also rejects it, leaving Hegel as "one of the great types of cosmic vision." Hegel wants to substitute concepts for the data of experience because he treats experience itself intellectualistically, making the data of sense "untrue" because they are not their own others. But the flow of experience, when taken in its own terms, reveals some realities being their own others. This is the view of Bergson.

Leaving aside Hegel's method, it must be noted that the Absolute is not the God of popular religion, because the latter is always a member of a pluralistic system. Does the Absolute exist? It is alleged to make the world more rational, but rationality has at least four dimensions: intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and practical. The conception of the absolute is beautiful aesthetically and intellectually because by making the universe static, it yields the feeling of peace. Yet the absolute gives rise to the problem of evil and cannot make rational the existence of finite knowers making imperfect copies of reality. Rationality fails at this point because a perfect whole requires perfect parts and we cannot see how imperfect parts can constitute a perfect whole. A better way of conceiving reality in spiritual terms is proposed by G. T. Fechner. Working by analogies, to greater bodies such as planets and suns he attributed greater consciousnesses. Himself a monist, Fechner develops the possibility that the universe contains many

consciousnesses of grades above the human, with each larger consciousness made up of many more limited consciousnesses. The method of analogy allows him to fill in many details, making his vision thick in contrast with the thin vision of various idealisms. Fechner assumes that consciousnesses freely compound and separate themselves; this assumption must be examined. The same assumption is made by those empiricists who view the human mind as a compound and by absolutists explaining the relation of our minds to the eternal mind.

James himself in *Principles of Psychology* denied the possibility of mental compounding and held that higher mental states are new and more complex functions standing alongside the simpler states and sharing only the same object with the simpler states. The view developed by James in finite psychology, when applied in metaphysics, makes current conceptions of the absolute self-contradictory, but it also makes the universe irrational. A universe made up of consciousnesses following each other and having nothing but objects in common is too discontinuous. James's logical conscience struggled with the problem for years and led to many filled notebook pages. He came face to face with a trilemma. First, he could turn his back upon his "psychological and Kantian education" by positing souls which know the mental states sometimes singly and sometimes in combination and provide the needed continuity. Second, he could give up the intellectualistic logic of identity and adopt some other form of rationality. Third, he could declare life logically irrational. The first alternative may become a serious one should someone discover the pragmatic value in psychology of the idea of soul. At present, it must be set aside.

James's own solution is the second option. He came to realize that logic has many practical uses but cannot lead to the essential nature of reality: life, experience, and immediacy exceeds and overflows our logic. In reaching his conclusion, he was much helped by Henri Bergson. As for the problem of compounding, he now holds that this sometimes takes place; however, the doctrine of the *Principles of Psychology* holds for many of our higher mental states. Beginning with Zeno's paradoxes, Bergson comes to challenge the authority of intellectualistic logic. He denies that conceptual logic can tell us what in the world of fact is possible and what impossible. Concepts which cut up experience are useful in practice and in scientific knowledge, but they yield no insight into reality and do not lead to the deeper or speculative knowledge aspired to by most philosophers. Conceptual knowledge is only surface knowledge about things and is not "living contemplation or sympathetic acquaintance" with them. To know the thickness of reality we must have either immediate experience or divine sympathetically the inner life of someone else. Bergson thus inverts the Platonic doctrine that intellectual knowledge is more profound. In reality one state is not totally replaced by another. Rather, we find processes of decay and growth in which from a relatively constant nucleus bit by bit aspects drop off and to which new aspects are added, leading in time to something totally new. Such processes take place although they violate our logical axioms.

Many in the audience will not agree with Bergson because they think of philosophy as a vision from above, whereas Bergson asks for immersion in the concrete. He himself for years hoped for an intellectualistic solution of the problem of the compounding of consciousness. After reading Bergson, he now admits that compounding is possible and must concede that the absolute is a logically possible hypothesis. We must try to decide as to its reality by analogy and induction. Facts uncovered by abnormal psychology and psychical research as well as ordinary religious experience make probable

675 (cont.)
the existence of superhuman consciousness. Religious experience gives us the feeling of continuity with such a power; in this way, Fechner's ideas receive some direct verification. We must rule in favor of the pluralistic conception of God. IKS

Extended reviews

W. P. Montague {857}; John Watson {894}.

Reviews

Anon, "Professor James's New "Pluralistic" Philosophy," Current Literature 46.6 (June 1909): 647-650. Tired of academic life, James gave up his professorship to engage in "free-lance propaganda." *Pragmatism* was the first result; this second effort is bound to be less popular since it lacks immediate application. Many will discover that they have been pluralists without knowing it. IKS

Anon, Amer J Psych 21.1 (Jan 1910): 172. This book is a "plea" that we "do not need any theory that has cosmic dimensions." JRS

Anon, Athenaeum 4255 (15 May 1909): 577-578. James insists on intimacy with the divine, but consciousness surely does not offer intimacy. James's approach to religion is experiential and sometimes seems no more than "analogy tinged with emotion." IKS

Anon, "Comments on James's Pluralistic Philosophy," Current Literature 47.2 (Aug 1909): 182-185. This review surveys and quotes from a variety of other reviews. JRS

F. W. Hubback, Int J Ethics 20.3 (April 1910): 366-369. James does not separate what ought to be from what is, as does G. E. Moore. James shows that if we believe strongly enough, what ought to be will influence what is. IKS

Louïs-Léda, Rev de Phil 16.2 (1 Feb 1910): 194-199. A chapter by chapter summary. Why does James try to persuade us with syllogisms if philosophy is simply the expression of character? IKS

James Lindsay, Arch Syst Phil 17 (1911): 133-134. James is too polemical and extreme. James confuses theism with deism and gives a "discreditable travesty" of theism. IKS

A. W. Mitchell, Review of Theology and Philosophy 6 (1910): 178-187. An exposition with little criticism. Pluralism seems to have room for both the human and the divine and is superior to the absolute unity of the Hegelians. IKS

Richard Müller-Freienfels, Zeit für Psych 55 (1910): 215-217. Having in other works made usefulness the criterion of truth, James turns to a different problem, the controversy between monists and pluralists. IKS

James Seth, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 536-542. James prefers the method of "vision" to "technical argumentation" and his desire for philosophy to match concrete experience is poetical, not philosophical. James does not exhaust the metaphysical options, and thus fails to adequately characterize absolute idealism or pluralism. JRS

W. R. Sorley, Hibbert Journal 8.1 (Oct 1909): 204-208. His valid attack on Hegelian dialectic is accomplished using logic, so his success cannot defend irrationality. Generally, his criticisms against idealism (for example, things change because the experience of them changes) rely on a questionable premise shared by many idealists: "the thing known must be of the same nature as the knowledge by which it is known." James's theology is far closer to monism than pluralism. JRS

Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 18.4 (Oct 1909): 576-588. James does what he accuses others of doing. He defines monism and then attributes to every monist everything implied by his definition. Monism should not be identified with intellectualism. What James really hates

is logic, the "habit of asking for reasons." James misunderstands Zeno's paradoxes. They were intended as a *reductio ad absurdum* of pluralism and prove only that our logic is crude. Surprising is James's adherence to Bergson. James does not dive into the stream of experience; he carries analysis up to a point, but never explains why it should not be carried further. IKS

Sydney Waterlow, "The Philosophy of Henri Bergson," Quarterly Review 216.1 (Jan 1912): 152-176. Waterlow reviews works by and about Bergson, and also James's *Some Problems of Philosophy* {958}. Waterlow tries to discuss the ties between James and Bergson beyond the fact that both have a "strongly emotional cast of mind" and both are in revolt against their predecessors. IKS

André Lalande, Rev Phil 69.1 (Jan 1910): 70-78.

Reviews of French translation

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 21 (1910): 211-213. The English title indicates the object studied. The French title indicates the method used: radical empiricism. IKS

Federigo Enriques, Scientia (Série physico-mathématique) 9 (1911): 226-228. In spite of James's declared opposition to science and rationalism, his position is closer to them than that of the pseudo-rationalists he opposes. James simply states that we also need an artistic understanding of reality, and what scientist could object? IKS

Félix Le Dantec, Grande Revue 62.13 (10 July 1910): 1-16.

Reviews of the German translation

Wilhelm Metzger, Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftlihe Philosophie und Sociologie 38 (1914): 259-261. James does not give proofs, but attempts to persuade by describing the attractive features of his views. IKS

676 James, William. Report on Mrs. Piper's Hodgson-Control. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 23 (June 1909): 1-12. Also published in Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research 3 (July 1909): 470-589. Portions reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 484-490. *William James on Psychical Research*, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 115-210. *Works EPR*, pp. 253-360.

After Richard Hodgson's death, Leonora Piper, a medium extensively investigated by James, Hodgson, and others, reported messages from Hodgson, giving various details of Hodgson's life unknown to Mrs. Piper. After investigating her reports as to their truth and ruling out the possibility of normal sources of information, he concludes that through Mrs. Piper a "will to personate" shows itself, drawing upon supernormal sources of information. The medium seems to tap either the memories of the sitters, or those of distant human beings, or some cosmic reservoir of memories which could exist in the shape of spirits. But there seems to be more than can be accounted for by telepathy. The "dramatic probabilities" suggest a "will to communicate" by something in some way connected with Hodgson. IKS

677 Judd, Charles H. Motor Processes and Consciousness. J Phil 6.4 (18 Feb 1909): 85-91.

A comparison of Dewey's early (1896) statement of the dependence of consciousness on motor activities with subsequent psychological theories. JRS

678 Kallen, Horace M. The Affiliations of Pragmatism. J Phil 6.24 (25 Nov 1909): 655-661.

Kallen comments on Lovejoy's "Pragmatism and Realism" {685}. Pragmatism's relational theory of consciousness is not nominalistic but conceptualistic, resulting in realism and epistemological dualism. JRS

679 Kallen, Horace M. Dr. Montague and the Pragmatic Notion of Value. J Phil 6.20 (30 Sept 1909): 549-552.

Kallen comments on Montague's "The True, the Good, and the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint" {691}. His misinterpretation of pragmatism rightly portrays its emphasis on the divergent methods for organisms to achieving harmonious adjustment, but falsely assumes that these methods must have divergent goals. JRS

680 Knox, Howard V. Pragmatism: The Evolution of Truth. Quarterly Review 210.2 (April 1909): 379-407. Reprinted in *The Evolution of Truth* {2113} pp. 40-81.

James's *The Will to Believe* (1897) was misinterpreted as an attempt to "glorify Faith by the sacrifice of Reason," though James did not emphasize that beliefs had to verified by experience. Schiller's application of verification to logical theory produced his attack on absolutism: the distinction between two senses of truth condemns absolutism to a concern for merely formal truth (the claim to truth common to any and all assertions) and real truth (the possession of truth, not error). Joachim's *The Nature of Truth* {333} reveals how a coherence view of truth cannot explain or detect error. Bradley's Absolute, vindicated by the "suicide" of thought, is defeated by "that conception of the nature of meaning which we owe to Alfred Sidgwick...'meaning lies in application'." When "a formal inquiry into the general nature of judgment is...made to do duty as a critical inquiry into the nature of the distinction between true judgments and false, what can result but verbalism and confusion?" Logic can deal with real truth and error only if it is the "science of criticism," revising previously accepted "truths" in light of progressing experience. If truth is conceived statically, the relationship between thought and object remains formal, and the thought remains only a truth-claim. Conceived dynamically, truth acquires real meaning when tested practically in personal experience. JRS

681 Ladd, George T. The Confusion of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 7.4 (July 1909): 784-801.

Pragmatism makes assumptions regarding the "method and aim of philosophy," the "nature and guarantee of truth," and the scope of the ideas of value. In all three cases, what is actually taken for granted differs from what is said to be so taken. While it is good that pragmatism seeks to satisfy the "deeper needs of humanity," its disregard of intellectual obligations will defeat its good intentions. IKS

682 Ladd, George T. *Knowledge, Life and Reality: An Essay in Systematic Philosophy.* New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1909. Reprinted, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918.

Pragmatism does not offer anything new; its elements were in far older systems. "To men who do not care to think, Pragmatism may appear the least expensive, through-

express route" to a "reasoned conception" of Being and ideals. (p. 55). Only as a psychological theory of reason's growth in "immature intellectual life" can pragmatism give "any faintest semblance of an adequate solution to the problem of knowledge." (p. 140) JRS

Reviews

Charles H. Rieber, J Phil 7.8 (14 April 1910): 218-219.

683 Leclère, Albert. *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme.* Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1909.

There is presently a crisis of faith. Modernism–initiated by Ollé-Laprune, Cardinals Deschamps and Newman, and developed by Blondel, Laberthonnière, Le Roy, Tyrrel, and Loisy–is only a form and a case of the "pragmatist malady." If prolonged, it will not only banish all religion from the heart of man, but also entirely taint philosophy and science itself. (p. 3) Luckily, one can be certain that science and logic will be saved. Chapter titles include: "The Secondary Causes of Pragmatism," "Philosophical Doubt and Religion," "The True Cause of Pragmatism," "The Crisis of Idealism," "The Initiators of Modernism," "The Development of Modernism," and "Protestant Modernism, and Catholic Modernism." The appendix treats pragmatism and positivism, dogmatism, Kantism, Cournot, contingency, and Modernism. LF

684 Lorenz-Ightham, Theodor. Das Verhältnis des Pragmatismus zu Kant. Kant-Studien 14.1 (16 April 1909): 8-44.

Kant's practical reason and James's will to believe coincide. Both postulate a supersensible world as a basis for moral actions. Kant's conception of the regulative function of the ideas, his views on teleology and the ideas of reason, and his distinction between appearances and things in themselves, are important for pragmatism. IKS

Notes

See Ewald, "German Philosophy in 1909" {803}.

685 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pragmatism and Realism. J Phil 6.21 (14 Oct 1909): 575-580. Reprinted in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 30-39.

Lovejoy comments on Montague's "May a Realist be a Pragmatist?" {690}. Pragmatism is a complex of historical motives and tendencies, but one central doctrine must be identified for philosophical classification. Its unique feature is its combination of nominalism with instrumentalism. Montague takes these to be inconsistent, which only reveals his realistic presumptions. The demand that knowledge must fit future experience will either result in an idealistic metaphysics, or will transcend the traditional subject-object dualism upon which the realist-idealist controversy depends. JRS

Notes

See Kallen, "The Affiliations of Pragmatism" {678}.

686 McGilvary, Evander B. British Exponents of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 7.2 (Jan 1909): 443-447.

McGilvary replies to Schiller's "British Exponents of Pragmatism" {595}. McGilvary defends himself against the charge of obscuring Schiller's meaning. James himself sees an Absolute in Schiller's version of the Ultimate reality. JRS

687 Margreth, Jacob. Amerikanische Religionspsychologie, in ihrer Grundlage Gepruft. Katholic 4th series 4 (1909): 223-229.

A very critical commentary on James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}. James's work is marked by a poor selection of cases. His treatment is light. His basic mistake is a completely false epistemology that denies reason's power to know truth. IKS

688 Mead, G. H. Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology. Psych Bull 6.12 (15 Dec 1909): 401-408. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 94-104.

689 Miller, Irving Edgar. *The Psychology of Thinking.* New York: Macmillan, 1909.

Reviews

Howard V. Knox, Mind 19.2 (April 1910): 263-266. Miller delivers "a very powerful indictment of the abstract distinction between psychology and logic." JRS

J. B. Miner, Psych Bull 7.3 (15 March 1910): 96-100. This text "takes from the pragmatic school of thought what is perhaps best in it." JRS

E. N. Henderson, J Phil 7.14 (7 July 1910): 389-390.

690 Montague, William P. May a Realist be a Pragmatist? J Phil 6.17 (19 Aug 1909): 460-463; 6.18 (2 Sept 1909): 485-490; 6.20 (30 Sept 1909): 543-548; 6.21 (14 Oct 1909): 561-571.

Part one, "The Two Doctrines Defined," defines the realist as holding that objects can exist apart from consciousness or any cognitive relation, and that objects can participate in producing knowledge of themselves and can be changed, by means of the knower, in becoming known. Four distinct version of pragmatism will be compared with realism in the following parts. Part two, "The Implications of Instrumentalism," concludes that this biological view of knowledge originating in the useful adaptations by organisms to the environment is quite realistic. Since it must obviously presuppose an independent objective world, it cannot support any criteria of truth other than the traditional inductive or deductive methods, and it would not reduce thought to subjective desires. However, its value and probable truth has no bearing on logic or epistemology. Part three, "The Implications of Psychological Pragmatism," argues that the identification of the truth of a belief with its verification in experience fails to explain why beliefs work or fail. This type of pragmatism would likely appeal to a "possibility of verification" to account for the success of a belief, but this "possibility" is either an independently existing truth or only exists subjectively. To avoid such problems, the realist defines verification as follows: "*When a thing is experienced by a person to be both a fact and a thing believed, then the belief in that thing is* VERIFIED." Psychological pragmatism confuses, with Berkeley, the reason for the knowledge of a thing with the reason for that thing's existence. It has assumed that its victory lies in the defeat of absolutism.

Part four, "The Implications of Humanism and of the Pragmatic Criterion," discusses humanism, or "ontological" pragmatism, and "logical" pragmatism. Humanism takes reality to be what cognition finds, which is determined by our emotions, desires, and needs. It is more easily interpreted subjectively, but the objective form depicts knowledge arising in the evolutionary selection from nature's various aspects, and hence is realistic.

Logical pragmatism asserts that "the truth of a proposition depends on the value of its consequences." The degree of a proposition's utility does not correlate with the degree of its truth. Why doesn't a pragmatist empirically test this alleged dependency of truth on value? Where are the statistics demonstrating how many useful beliefs are also true, and how many are false? Logical pragmatism is independent of the truth or falsity of realism. JRS

Summaries

René Jeannière, "Un realiste peut-il être pragmatiste?" Rev de Phil 16.2 (1 Feb 1910): 133-155; Corrine Stephenson, Phil Rev 19.4 (July 1910): 468-469.

691 Montague, William P. The True, the Good, and the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint. J Phil 6.9 (29 April 1909): 233-238. Reprinted in *The Ways of Things* {2776}, pp. 550-559.

These three types of human value correspond to the ways humans can attain equilibrium with the environment. Pragmatists should therefore not try to reduce one to another. JRS

Notes

Abstracted in Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 174-175, and summarized in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632}. See H. M. Kallen, "Dr. Montague and the Pragmatic Notion of Value" {679}.

692 Moore, A. W. Absolutism and Teleology. Phil Rev 18.3 (May 1909): 309-318. Reprinted as "The Ethical Aspect" in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 257-278.

The basic issue is whether the laws of development themselves develop, or alternatively, is the *ideal* itself in *process*? Moore pursues this debate between the evolutionist and the absolutist across issues of morality and responsibility. JRS

Reviews

Abstracted in Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 175, and mentioned in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632}.

693 Moore, A. W. Pragmatism and Solipsism. J Phil 6.14 (8 July 1909): 378-383. Material used for "Pragmatism and Solipsism," in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 220-244.

How can philosophy make progress, when an opponent of pragmatism (Pratt, in his *What Is Pragmatism* {705}) charges pragmatism with solipsism, premised only on his own notion of consciousness as subjective? Pragmatists have consistently defended a social conception of consciousness. Pratt faults pragmatism's lack of an explanation for why some hypotheses successfully guide action and why some fail, but then innocently proclaims his solution that true hypotheses succeed simply because the pre-existing and corresponding reality guides them. JRS

694 Moore, Thomas Verner. The Pragmatism of William James. Catholic World 90 (Dec 1909): 341-350.

James is like a lawyer skillfully defending a guilty criminal. At first pragmatism seems innocent, but when we understand it fully, it is guilty of all the charges which "so many philosophers have heaped upon it." IKS

695 More, Paul Elmer. A New Stage of Pragmatism. Nation 88.18 (6 May 1909): 456-459. Reprinted as "The Pragmatism of William James," in his *Shelburne Essays*, Seventh Series (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), pp. 195-212.

A philosopher of flux, when attacked, just flows into another form. It is amusing to watch a rational defense of an attack on "rationalism." In *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} James's main purpose is to discard metaphysics. IKS

Notes

See a letter to the editor by "A Subscriber," reacting to this article with an alternative view on pragmatism's origins, Nation 88.22 (3 June 1909): 558.

696 Münsterberg, Hugo. *The Eternal Values*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909.

This book is a revised version of *Philosophie der Werte* (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1908). The inquiry for truth cannot be conceived as a quest for merely conditional truths; pragmatism itself presupposes absolute truth in all its arguments and demonstrations. (p. 37) JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, Phil Rev 19.2 (March 1910): 188-192 [*MW* 6: 167-171]. The "ultimate" reality found by any monism loses all distinguishing traits, becomes useless for explaining anything else, and erases novelty and difference. Monism can offer no method to judge character and conviction. JRS

Rowland Haynes, J Phil 7.9 (28 April 1910): 241-245. Royce confuses "general validity" with "absolute validity," thus failing to convict pragmatism of relativism. JRS

Reviews of *Philosophie der Werte*

Alfred E. Taylor, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 191-203; M. W. Wiseman, Amer J Psych 19.3 (July 1908): 408-409.

697 Münsterberg, Hugo. The Opponents of Eternal Values. Psych Bull 6.10 (15 Oct 1909): 329-338.

A discussion of various criticisms, including those by James, on *The Eternal Values* {696}. JRS

698 Murray, D. L. Pragmatic Realism. Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 377-390.

Pragmatism starts from a naive realism, as it sets aside as non-existent anything non-experienceable. The pragmatically constructed objective order of experience will not consign some experiences into unreality: "saying for instance that the 'real' blade of grass is the one seen through the microscope and not the one seen at the entrance to the field." The thing/thought distinction should be "related to the purpose and context of judgment," but objective reality should not be construed as mere potentiality, lacking any fixed laws. Idealism suffers, as does intellectualistic realism, from an inability to resolve "the contradictions inherent in the collective experiences" and an irrelevancy to actual human thinking. Pragmatic realism does not lead to "individualistic anarchy" and protests the skepticism brought on by other philosophies. JRS

699 Noël, Léon. Bulletin d'épistémologie: Aurour du pragmatisme. Revue Néo-Scolastique 16.3 (Aug 1909): 451-474.

Limiting his discussion to the publications of recent months, Noël examines Lovejoy's claim in "The Thirteen Pragmatisms {568} that under the name of pragmatism there are a multitude of very different systems. Other writings discussed include Armstrong, "The Evolution of Pragmatism" {504}; Dewey, "What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical" {539}; Schiller, "Solipsism" {716}, "Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist?" {597}, and "Logic or Psychology?" {714}; and publications by E. Baron, Aars, I. Woodbridge Riley, Walker, Lorenz, Schinz, Paul Sollier, and Sentroul. LF

700 O'Sullivan, John Marcus. *Old Criticism and New Pragmatism.* Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909.

The first two parts critically discuss Kant and Hegel. Part 3, "Pragmatism as an Epistemological Method, in its Relation to Criticism," describes how pragmatism's functional treatment of categories and truth could be understood as a critical development of Kantianism, though historically, pragmatism more probably arose from voluntaristic psychology and Darwinian evolution. O'Sullivan offers a highly supportive exposition of pragmatism's theory of knowledge and ethics, followed by a comparison with Kantianism. Part 4, "General Comment on Criticism and Pragmatism," complains that from the fact that some axioms are postulates, pragmatism should not conclude that all are. Pragmatism forgets that science should deem desires to be irrelevant, and that it cannot solve the problem of ultimate values, which are required to judge the relative value of satisfactions. JRS

Reviews

G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 19.3 (May 1910): 332-338. The affinities between Kant and pragmatism are small compared to the differences. JRS

Warner Fite, J Phil 7.18 (1 Sept 1910): 499-501; C. Murphy, "Old Criticism and New Pragmatism," Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 4th series, 27.1 (Jan 1910): 36-55; Reginald A. P. Rogers, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 574-577.

701 Paulhan, Frederic. Antipragmatisme et hyperpragmatisme. Rev Phil 67.6 (June 1909): 614-625.

702 Phillips, John Herbert. *Pragmatism.* Birmingham, Alabama: City Paper Company Printers, 1909.

A brief overview of pragmatism, including its principal thinkers and central doctrines on knowledge, truth, and religion. JRS

703 Pradines, Maurice. *Critique des conditions de l'action. L'Erreur morale établie par l'histoire et l'evolution des systèmes.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909.

This work and the subsequent *Principes de toute philosophie de l'action* {704} are published together, reviewed together, and constitute one continuous pragmatic argument, in which the author attacks "not reason but rationalism, and disparag[es] not intelligence but intellectualism." (Schiller, p. 423) "In order for action to be possible, that is to say intelligible, it is necessary that to know is to act." (p. iii) If knowledge is not the product of an action, but rather the image of a thing–the intellectualists' thesis–only that which is determined is knowable. That which is determined is opposed to that which becomes (or happens), which is action. On the hypothesis that knowledge is an image, action thus ceases to be knowable. "It ceases...to be intelligible; a theory of

action, an intelligent organization of conduct, becomes impossible and absurd by definition." (ibid.) Pradines believes that all theories of morality are founded on systems of knowledge that take truth to be an image, and not an action; they are thus condemned to absurdity by their own principles. In the first six-hundred pages of this doctoral thesis, Pradines systematically attacks the philosophical traditions from Plato to Spencer, including, but not limited to, critiques of Epicurus, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Newton, Hume, Kant, and Mill. Pradines also critiques the pragmatist's position, directed primarily at Bergson and Le Roy. LF

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 422-425. Schiller praises Pradines's positions that action is the source of all knowledge; that knowledge a form of action; that "laws, necessities, determination, truth, ends, goods, mathematics, [and] novelty, are all its creations and its instruments"; that action is free and undetermined as is all reality; and that we are thus only acts of the universe. Schiller further compares Pradines's pragmatism to Dewey's and to his own: "In particular his insistence that all knowledge is an action, and that no knowledge becomes intelligible until it is conceived as a personal choice, seems to me to be of paramount importance. And I cannot regard his repudiation of scepticism and irrationalism as differentiating his pragmatism from mine, since I have all along insisted that it is as a *theory* of knowledge that intellectualism fails, and contended that scepticism and irrationalism are the inevitable consequences of absolutism, while it is only by recognizing action as the *whole*, and not the (?better) half, of life that a rational theory of life becomes possible at all." (p. 425) LF

704 Pradines, Maurice. *Critique des conditions de l'action. Principes de toute philosophie de l'action.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 422-425.

705 Pratt, James B. *What Is Pragmatism?* New York: Macmillan, 1909. Reprinted, New York: Macmillan, 1977.

Pragmatism arises from two sources. Less influential is Kant's emphasis on the practical reason; more important, the "modern scientific view of the meaning of hypotheses." James's moderate pragmatism holds that the object of a true assertion actually exists, that the assertion can be true before it is verified, and that the workings only verify it. Dewey's radical pragmatism does not require an object and holds that verification makes the truth. IKS

Reviews

George Rowland Dodson, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 79-83. Pratt clearly explains and refutes pragmatism's claims using an opposing viewpoint, but cannot be blamed for this technique, since "in philosophy an explanation is sometimes inevitably a refutation, and a clear distinction an epitaph." JRS

Howard V. Knox, Mind 18.4 (Oct 1909): 597-603 [*The Evolution of Truth* {2113}, pp. 82-94]. Pratt give a fair explanation, despite his admission that he no longer is a pragmatist. His faulty intellectualist logic requires a trans-human element, a *Ding-an-sich*, for truth which the pragmatists reject. No absolute and unchanging reality will ever aid efforts to distinguish truth from error. JRS

A. W. Moore, "What Is Pragmatism?" American Journal of Theology 13.3 (July 1909): 477-478. Pratt's disregard for the pragmatist's social conception of consciousness invalidates his criticisms. JRS

Albert Schinz, Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 117-120. Pratt "devotes many pages to refuting this sophistry, when one single sentence of his would have sufficed." JRS

Helen Thompson Woolley, J Phil 6.11 (27 May 1909): 300-302. Pratt's criticisms are driven by the assumption that reality is independent of, yet correspondent to, true belief. His refutation thus merely "consists in showing that the conclusions to be drawn from it are not in accord with a metaphysics which pragmatism expressly repudiates." JRS

Anon, Amer J Psych 20.3 (July 1909): 460; Louïs-Léda, Rev de Phil 16.1 (1 Jan 1910): 95.

Notes

See A. W. Moore's criticisms of this work, "Pragmatism and Solipsism" {693}.

706 Randle, E. H. Truth. Open Court 23.10 (Oct 1909): 632-634.

No one could receive enlightenment from James's definition of truth. JRS

Notes

See Paul Carus, "Editorial Comment," Open Court 23.10 (Oct 1909): 634.

707 Riley, I. Woodbridge. Transcendentalism and Pragmatism: A Comparative Study. J Phil 6.10 (13 May 1909): 263-266.

Both James and Emerson reject tradition and intellectualism, and attempt to revive individualism and "emotional responsiveness." IKS

708 Rowland, Eleanor Harris. *The Right to Believe.* Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1909.

James's "will to believe" doctrine is used to defend Christian views and activities. JRS

Reviews

Ettie Stettheimer, J Phil 7.12 (9 June 1910): 330-333. This work's "religious creed for unimaginative persons" merely foists a "perfectly arbitrary definition of religion" on the reader. JRS

709 Royce, Josiah. The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion. In *Berichte über den III. Intenationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg* {656}, pp. 62-90. Reprinted in *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life* {996}, pp. 187-254. *Royce's Logical Essays*, ed. Daniel S. Robinson (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1951), pp. 63-97. *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 681-710. *MW* 7: 413-444.

Pragmatism is part of a recent motivation to regard human judgments as organic adaptations. It makes ethics a branch of "evolutionary sociology." Ideas are used for their practical effects, but many significant truths require a suprapersonal, supra-temporal unity of experience. If truth were to actually consist solely in personal experience, absolute and universal truth as an ideal is abandoned, leaving pragmatism to contradict its own claims. Royce explains that "all logic is the logic of the will," the will seeks absolute truth, and that pragmatism is thereby reconciled in this "deeper harmony." JRS

Notes

The discussion following Royce's paper is reported in *Berichte* {656}, pp. 91-93. See also Dewey, "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism" {1046}.

710 Russell, Bertrand. Pragmatism. Edinburgh Review 209 (April 1909): 363-388. Reprinted in *Philosophical Essays* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910), pp. 87-126. Revised ed., London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, pp. 79-110. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 260-284.

A critical discussion of pragmatism, in the context of reviewing the five principal works of James, Schiller, and Dewey, and the *Essays in Honor of William James* {541}. The "will to believe" confuses "acting on a hypothesis and believing it," treats knowledge as mere believed truth, and cannot sanction any one religion. Pragmatism does give due consideration to error, as "philosophy has always regarded it as its business to prove...that everything is true, rather than to distinguish between truth and falsehood." Pragmatism looks for the meaning of "truth" in the answer to the question, what traits of beliefs cause people to regard them as true? With respect to the working of scientific theories, pragmatism ignores the proper role of data and distorts the *theoretical* working of science. Truth has a different meaning than "furthering our purposes," as Schiller would seem to admit, but their identification is the basic fallacy of pragmatism. The metaphysical implications of pragmatism are not as permissive as James says; Schiller's humanistic "primacy of the will" vision is the "natural result," but really only offers the undoubted thesis that "it would be heavenly to live in a world where one's philosophy was true." Pragmatism feeds on skepticism, evolution, and democracy, resulting in a revolt against finality in favor of unlimited progress. This "love of contest" leads to the "worship of force," making it evident that "ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth." JRS

Summaries

Evander B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 422-426.

Notes

See F. C. S. Schiller's letter to Russell about this essay, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6, pp. 380-383. See also Santayana, "Russell's Philosophical Essays. II. The Critique of Pragmatism" {998}.

711 Sanborn, Herbert Charles. *Über die Identität der Person bei William James*. University of Munich thesis, 1909. Leipzig: Bohme und Lehmann, 1909.

On personal identity, James tries to take the middle ground between the views of Hume and those of Leibniz and Kant. His theories do not agree with empirical data. Much attention is devoted to problems of terminology. IKS

712 Schiller, F. C. S. Choice. Hibbert Journal 7.4 (July 1909): 802-812. Reprinted: In his *Riddles of the Sphinx* {879}, pp. 463-474.

Determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with morality, but a very limited moral indeterminism, operating when multiple reasonable options exist, will not threaten the rest of our scientific knowledge. As James claims, some free play between the parts of

the universe permits real growth and progress. Moral progress requires the development of virtuous habits under conditions of unpredictability. A person in the grip of evil, or in the opposite state of perfected virtue, is beyond the moral realm of choice. JRS

Notes

See G. T. Sadler's response, "Choice," Hibbert Journal 8.1 (Oct 1909): 193-194.

713 Schiller, F. C. S. Humanism and Intuitionism. Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 125-128.

Schiller responds to Leslie J. Walker's "Martineau and the Humanists" {612}. Walker has overlooked major differences, while misconstruing humanism. JRS

Notes

See Walker's reply, "Humanism and the Ethics of Martineau" Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 407-410, and Schiller's rejoinder, "Humanism, Intuitionism and Objective Reality," Mind 18.4 (Oct 1909): 570-575.

714 Schiller, F. C. S. Logic or Psychology? Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 400-406.

Schiller comments on H. H. Joachim's "Psychical Processes," Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 65-83. Joachim soundly protests against partitioning the study of cognition into logic and psychology, but he has not inquired into the origin of objective meanings in individual mental processes, and hence has not fully grasped the scientific problem of cognition. JRS

715 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatismo e umanismo. Coenobium 3.6 (June 1909): 34-42.

716 Schiller, F. C. S. Solipsism. Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 169-183. Reprinted in *Humanism*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 249-267.

Humanism is not solipsistic, but many other "crypto-solipsist" philosophies exist: absolutism, Aristotelianism, and New Realism. Admittedly, the pragmatic justification for the belief in other minds cannot refute solipsism, but the practical behavior of would-be solipsists sufficiently indicates their real beliefs. JRS

Summaries

H. E. Weaver, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 96-97.

717 Schiller, F. C. S. The Rationalistic Conception of Truth. *Proc Arist Soc* 9 (1909): 85-99. The German translation was published in *Berichte über den III. Intenationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg* {656}, pp. 711-719.

Rationalism holds that objective truth transcends thought, and that knowledge or verification does not affect the truth known. Truth would be independent even of God, and some truths might be completely unverifiable, though by definition there can be no proof of such truths. The rationalists cannot agree among themselves on the nature of this absolute, though they all can easily dismiss the humanist. The metaphysical transcendence of thought is just a "misrepresentation" of its pragmatic transcendence, and leads to skepticism. JRS

718 Schiller, F. C. S., J. H. Muirhead, and A. E. Taylor. Why Pluralism? *Proc Arist Soc* 9 (1909): 183-225.

In part one (pp. 183-193) Muirhead argues that if pragmatism allies with pluralism it abandons systematic knowledge and logic. A metaphysics that accommodates the reality of time accounts for human freedom better than pragmatism's indeterminism. In part two (pp. 193-201) Schiller confesses that "some sort of Monism may turn out to be ultimately true," though the rational desire for unity possesses no guarantee. The idealist's requirement that we must have faith in the universe's rationality sounds like "a naive humanism." (p. 196) The monists forget that the postulate of monism needs verification and not ontological argumentation: "Their gay assumption is that if they want the world to be one, why, then, hey presto, it is one!" The concept of an infinite *whole* is nonsense, and opponents of pluralism distort the term. Taylor offers in part three (pp. 201-216) a reconciliation between monism and pluralism. In part four (pp. 216-220) Muirhead agrees with Schiller that "what we are constrained by all that as men we value to accept–that is true." (p. 218) Schiller's view should be supplemented "by a fuller admission of the reality of the potential." Schiller complains in part five (pp. 221-225) that the idealistic endowment of the absolute with purpose introduces a dualism. Muirhead confuses postulation with verification by experience, and has no basis for claiming that humanism finds individuality unintelligible. Taylor's position is "almost entirely" agreeable; his courageous "repudiation of the Absolute as a necessity of thought" is a "noble example." JRS

719 Schinz, Albert. *Anti-pragmatisme: Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la democratie sociale.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909. Translated by Schinz as *Anti-Pragmatism: An Examination Into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy,* with Appendices (Boston: Small, Maynard, and Co., 1909).

The central theme is the fact of inevitable conflict between intellectual and moral truth. (p. xx) Chap. 1 of Part One, "The Principles of Pragmatism," refutes the pragmatist's three arguments: intellectualism has failed, humans can only reason practically, and pragmatism alone can unify philosophical speculation. Pragmatism only profits where reason is limited, as in science, and turns to logic when pragmatic results contradict. Chap. 2, "Le Cas Dewey," pp. 72-93 ["The Dewey Case," pp. 88-109] is a reprinting with minor changes of "Professor Dewey's Pragmatism" {602}. Chap. 1 of Part Two, "Social Phenomena Explaining the Appearance of a Pragmatic Philosophy," points to democracy's tendency to limit thought to practical consequences. Pragmatism naturally supports a utilitarian religious attitude. Chap. 2, "Pragmatism of the Middle Ages and Modern Scholasticism," places Pascal, Rousseau, and Kant as pragmatic precursors who supported practical theology, and who, together with the medieval scholastics, formulated superior systems to modern pragmatism. In chap. 1 of Part Three, Schinz predicts "The Triumph of Pragmatism" which will occur because its falsehoods serve the large inferior classes of democracies. Chap. 2, "Salvation from Pragmatic Philosophy Possible but not Probable," faults "that absurdity, social democracy" for its false conception of individualism, which ignores at its peril the "principle of intellectual superiority" and "the principle of the natural inequality of men." A "system of castes" is preferable to the "self-poisoning" of democracy. Chap. 3, "Is William James a Pragmatist?" distinguishes James's loftier pragmatism from the "bourgeois pragmatism of the pygmy scientists around him."

Appendix A of the translation, "Answers to Some Criticisms," complains about the work's reviews, and particularly about the pragmatists' typical responses to the effect that they have been misunderstood. In the translation's preface, "Warning to the Readers of

this Edition," Schinz remarks on the work's reception and declares, "against a pragmatic conception of life I do not protest, but only against pragmatic philosophers." (p. x) JRS

Reviews

Anon, "Pragmatism as a Strangler of Literature," Current Literature 46.6 (June 1909): 637-639. Schinz supports the notion that Americans are hostile to any writing that does not descend to the common level. JRS

John Dewey, Phil Rev 18.4 (July 1909): 446-449 [*MW* 4: 245-249]. Schinz's "refutations" follow an "unusually abstract" and "highly formal" logic. JRS

A. W. Moore, "Anti-Pragmatisme," J Phil 6.11 (27 May 1909): 291-295. It is interesting to find such a reactionary, "caste" system of society frankly preached as "the only gospel of social salvation." Schinz's criticisms of Dewey rely on complete reversals of his meaning. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 423-429. Schinz cannot see that pragmatism does not separate logic from psychology and morality from science. Pragmatism is hardly a reflection of national character, and due to the desperation of its "intellectualist enemies," "no view in the whole history of thought...has ever had a harder fight winning its way to the front." JRS

Anon, Amer J Psych 20.3 (July 1909): 459-460; Anon, Monist 19.3 (July 1909): 474-475; Alfred Bertaud, Int J Ethics 19.3 (April 1909): 394-397; François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 20 (1909): 210-211.

Reviews of the translation

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.3 (July 1910): 431-432. Schinz's replies to critics continue to misquote and misinterpret pragmatists. JRS

Anon, Monist 20.3 (July 1910): 477; Boyd H. Bode, Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 671; A. W. Moore, J Phil 7.26 (22 Dec 1910): 717-719.

Notes

See Schinz's reply to Moore's first review {720}.

720 Schinz, Albert. A Few Words in Reply to Professor Moore's Criticism of "Anti-Pragmatisme." J Phil 6.16 (5 Aug 1909): 434-438.

Schinz replies to Moore's review of Schinz's *Anti-Pragmatisme* {719}. There was no attempt to accuse pragmatism of "breeding crass materialism," but it does ignore useless truths and the law of contradiction. JRS

721 Schinz, Albert. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism. Monist 19.4 (Oct 1909): 481-513. Reprinted with additions and three new appendixes (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1909).

The only distinct pragmatic position holds that philosophical theories should be judged by their ethical results. Like James, Rousseau studied science and psychology, and was similarly repelled by the moral consequences of the theory that emotions are physically conditioned. They both concluded that moral action and human happiness relies on supportive belief; thus they both tried to disguise their quite similar subjective philosophies as the objective, natural truth. JRS

Summaries

Helen M. Clarke, Phil Rev 19.2 (March 1910): 233.

Reviews of the book

Anon, Monist 20.4 (Oct 1910): 640; Anon, Open Court 24.4 (April 1910): 256.

722 Schneider, Karl. Die Philosophie des Pragmatismus. Die Grenzboten jahr 68 4.13 (23 Dec 1909): 584-591.

Pragmatism is a philosophy which denies itself and wishes to serve the practical ends of life. IKS

723 Shackleford, Thomas Mitchell. What Pragmatism Is, As I Understand It. Popular Science Monthly 75.12 (Dec 1909): 571-585. Portions reprinted as "What is Pragmatism?" Scientific American Supplement 70 (30 July 1910): 78-79.

Numerous quotations from James's various works illustrate its principles. Its "honor and glory" lies in its appeal to the "common people." JRS

724 Sharga, Ikbal Kishen. *Examination of Prof. William James's Psychology.* Allahabad, India: Ram Narain Lal, 1909.

Beginning students should not "take everything on trust," when studying James's shorter *Psychology* (1892). Concerning the mind-body relation James wanders between materialism, dualism, idealism, and skepticism, but favors materialism. It is hoped that in the future James will "steer clear of the rocks and shallows of materialism." IKS

725 Sidgwick, Alfred. Notes on a Note. Mind 18.4 (Oct 2 1909): 639-640.

Sidgwick comments on Bradley's "On Truth and Coherence," Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 329-342 [*Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 202-218]. If Bradley had troubled himself to study Schiller's collection of Bradley's confusions, he would have learned that pragmatism does not exalt the "merely practical" over something else, and that it does not "remove" a valuable distinction between theory and practice. Bradley's argumentative methods are only advancing pragmatism's cause. JRS

726 Sobotka, V. *Aby se vlk nazral a koza zustala.* Praha: Nakladem vlastnim, 1909.

Sobotka discusses James's pragmatism and T. G. Masaryk's realism. JRS

727 Sollier, Paul. *Le Doute.* Paris: Alcan, 1909.

Reviews

Anon, Amer J Psych 21.1 (Jan 1910): 170.

728 Sollier, Paul. Le Voluntarisme. Rev Phil 68.1 (July 1909): 1-16.

Summaries

Harvey G. Townsend, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 97.

729 Sorel, Georges. La Religion d'aujourd'hui. Rev Méta 17.2 (March 1909): 240-273; 17.3 (May 1909): 413-447.

730 Spaulding, Edward G. The Postulates of a Self-Critical Epistemology. Phil Rev 18.6 (Nov 1909): 615-641.

Pragmatism asserts the absolute truth of itself and evolution, effectively refuting itself and violating the criteria for a theory of knowledge. JRS

731 Talbot, Helen Bliss. Humanism and Freedom. J Phil 6.6 (18 March 1909): 149-155.

Talbot constructs three objections to Schiller's essay "Freedom," in his *Studies in Humanism* {490}, pp. 391-420. JRS

732 Tattvabhúshan, Síttánáth. *The Philosophy of Bráhmanism.* Madras: Higginbotham and Co., 1909.

Reviews

John S. Mackenzie, Int J Ethics 21.2 (Jan 1911): 244-245. The author's recognition of James's similar views on immortality overlooks several Hegelian writers. JRS

733 Tausch, Edwin. William James, The Pragmatist–A Psychological Analysis. Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 1-26.

A philosophy is best understood in terms of genetic psychology. This is difficult in James's case, since he has published no autobiography. James is an "ethical voluntarist," a "dualistic pluralist," an "active optimist," and an anti-intellectualist. IKS

Notes

The editor of *The Monist*, Paul Carus, offers "A Letter from Professor James," Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 156. Carus thanks James for the suggestion to publish Tausch's essay, and reprints a portion of a letter from James commenting on Tausch's analysis.

734 Tawney, Guy A. Kinds of Value of Consistency. Psych Bull 6.10 (15 Oct 1909): 339-346.

Tawney describes essays by Dewey, J. H. Tufts, A. W. Moore, and W. P. Montague which discuss the role of value in psychology, morality, and cognition. JRS

735 Taylor, Alfred E. *Elements of Metaphyics.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1909.

736 Urban, Wilbur M. The Will to Make-Believe. Int J Ethics 19.2 (Jan 1909): 212-233.

Genuine make-believe is inevitable and desireable. It is lawful and moral when the realization of an end requires it. JRS

737 Vailati, Giovanni and Mario Calderoni. Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del pragmatismo. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.1 (Jan-Feb 1909): 10-29. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 920-932. *Il pragmatismo* {1471}, pp. 19-49. *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 99-124.

This essay is a lengthy examination of the fundamental meaning of pragmatism. Calderoni identifies pragmatism with Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and analyzes the core ideas contained in that maxim. The conditional character of practical consequences receives much attention, as does Calderoni's constant reference to the classical British forerunners of Peirce's philosophy, especially George Berkeley. There is also a comparison of Peirce's position with that of J. Pikler's *The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence* (1890). This essay is a superb statement of faith from the Peircean

wing of Italian pragmatists, and has special significance since by that time the spokespersons for the more voluntaristic version of pragmatism, Papini and Prezzolini, were no longer pragmatists. With the departure of these two major cultural voices from the pragmatist camp, the doctrine becomes less of a fixture in the debates over contemporary social and cultural issues carried out in the more popular reviews. This essay, together with "Il pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente" {738}, was intended to be the first two chapters of a projected book by the two men, provisionally titled *Il pragmatismo e le sue principale applicazioni*. The death of Vailati brought work on the book to a halt. EPC

738 **Vailati, Giovanni and Mario Calderoni.** Il pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.4 (July-Aug 1909): 264-285. Reprinted in *Scritti* {1018}, pp. 933-941. *Il pragmatismo* {1471}, pp. 51-85. *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 133-160.

This essay's focus is primarily historical. The history of the analytic/synthetic distinction is discussed, including the ideas of Locke, Berkeley, Kant and Leibniz. The recommendation that abstractions be translated into concrete experiences, attributed by Vailati to both Locke and Leibniz, is found to be at work in pragmatism as well. Vailati concludes that pragmatism is nothing but "an amplification and a complement" to this tradition. EPC

739 **Vaz Ferreira, Carlos.** *El pragmatismo: Exposicion y critica.* Montevideo: Tip. de la Escuela Nacional de Artes y Oficios, 1909. Translated into French by C. B. as *Le pragmatisme: exposition et critique* (Montevideo: Tall. graf. A. Barreiro y Ramos, 1914). Reprinted as *Conocimiento y accion* (Montevideo: Imprenta "El Siglo Ilustrado," 1920). Incorporated into his *Tres filosofos de la vida: Nietzsche, James, Unamuno* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1965).

740 **Watson, John.** The Idealism of Edward Caird. II. Phil Rev 18.3 (May 1909): 259-280.

Caird's type of idealism is compared with James's radical empiricism. Caird's philosophy rejected any "stream" of feelings, though the doctrine that relations between experiences are also experienced is a vast improvement over ordinary empiricism. Why does radical empiricism, on finding some unity, reject the total unity of the universe? Such rejection only admits the irrational into reality. JRS

741 **Windelband, Wilhelm.** *Der Wille zur Wahrheit.* Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1909.

Notes

See Ewald, "Germany in 1909" {803}.

742 **Wodehouse, Helen.** Professor James on Conception. J Phil 6.18 (2 Sept 1909): 490-495.

James holds that concepts cut up and distort reality, but they do no such thing. There is more agreement between James and Bradley than James allows. IKS

743 Wolf, Abraham. Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy. *Proc Arist Soc* 9 (1909): 141-182.

Pragmatism defends scientific modesty: theories "give us no image of reality" but only predict future events. (p. 142) By common sense, truth and reality is independent of knowledge, and it is "assumed as a matter of course that truths can be known or discovered." (p. 175) James's examples of "making truth" only demonstrate how truths are discovered. Action "may work changes in the world" but mere belief has no power. Pragmatism gains its plausibility by confusing a belief's truth with its verification. The pragmatist's insistence that truth is verifiability *in the long run* is disguised "unverifiability." The unity of Truth is a more inspiring religious concept than the toleration of plural truths. JRS

744 Woodworth, R. S. Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences. J Phil 6.8 (15 April 1909): 208-214.

A report of the meeting includes a discussion of "The Concept of Sensation" between John Dewey, W. P. Montague, and F. J. E. Woodbridge. Dewey's remarks are reprinted in *MW* 4: 118-119. JRS

1910

745 Abauzit, Frank. William James. La Semaine Littéraire (Geneva) no. 872 (17 Sept 1910): 445-447; no. 873 (24 Sept 1910): 457-460.

James was more of a psychologist than a metaphysician. Abauzit reconstructs James's reply to a question in 1901 about James's intent to develop a philosophical system. IKS

746 Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull House. New York: Macmillan, 1910.

The Hull House settlement and its educational and social philosophy had a mutually influential relationship with Chicago pragmatists, especially John Dewey. JRS

Notes

See also Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1902); *Newer Ideals of Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1907); *The Long Road of Women's Memory* (New York: Macmillan, 1916); *Peace and Bread in Times of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1922); and *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House* (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

747 Albertini, C. El Pragmatismo. In *Anales del inst. de enseñanza general* (1910), p. 43.

748 Anon. Death of Professor James. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 4.9 (Sept-Oct 1910): 526-528.

James died before scientifically deciding the truth of "spiritistic theories." IKS

749 Anon. Our Foremost Philosopher. Current Literature 49.4 (Oct 1910): 415-418.

Surveys opinions occasioned by James's death. James was "one of the freshest, most vital, most fascinating minds of our time." IKS

750 Archibald, Warren S. William James. Nation 91.14 (6 Oct 1910): 312.

A letter to the editor. In "A Pluralistic Mystic" {820} James's closing words, among the last he wrote, ring with the "lure of enchanted cities." IKS

751 Bawden, H. Heath. Mind as a Category of Science. Psych Bull 7.7 (15 July 1910): 221-225.

752 Bawden, H. Heath. *The Principles of Pragmatism: A Philosophical Interpretation of Experience.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin; London: Constable and Co., 1910.

Pragmatism attempts to reconstruct the intellect to meet the needs of the "deeper emotional and volitional nature of man." Instrumental logic tries "to make philosophy scientific and science philosophic." Thinking is action in the process of becoming more adequate, and its focus on ideas make pragmatism an idealism, though in a new functional sense. Experience is synonymous with the universe; "to be" and "to be experienced" are identical, and experience cannot be explained in reference to something else. Experience is social, and the individual's experience "has only a functional identity." Functional psychology examines the organism's nervous activity in relation to the environment, and finds that consciousness is but the dynamic tension in experience created by conflict in motor co-ordination. Thought arises in consciousness as the doubt-inquiry process seeks a return to harmonious experience. The forms of thought (sensations, memories, imagination, symbolic language, judgments, inferences, etc.) are functional distinctions within thought. Knowing is the act of successfully testing the results of inquiry. There is no final Truth to which thought must correspond; ideas are tools designed for a purpose, and there are as many truths as working tools. The question "Is a razor a better tool than a hammer?" has no meaning.

Since consciousness is not confined to the individual, there is an organic connection between knowledge of an object and the object itself. Objectivity exists within social experience; objects and categories like space and time do not depend on experience *qua* individual. The paradox of how time emerges from consciousness, while consciousness itself evolves through time, is generated only by assuming that consciousness is an entity. A biologist would similarly get trapped if he abstracts the function from the structure of an organism and then tries to conceive how the function caused the structure to come into existence. The standpoint of continuity and systematicity resolves structure/function and cause/effect difficulties. Mechanical evolution is replaced by organic evolution: experience grows, in expanse and in complexity. This resolves the mind/matter dualism. JRS

Extended reviews

Horace Kallen, "Pragmatism and Its 'Principles'" {963}.

Reviews

Anon, Monist 21.3 (July 1911): 477-478. Clarifying pragmatism during its current "process of fermentation" is more difficult than Bawden thinks. When this stage is done, pragmatism "will appear very much less original than now." JRS

Boyd H. Bode, Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 642-647. It is uncertain whether Bawden's pragmatism is "anything more than an idealism somehow amalgamated with a functional epistemology." JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.3 (July 1910): 430-431. Bawden offers little on "principles" or the controversial issues. His perspective is closest to Dewey's, though he independently

declares that "reality is *Value*." His analysis of causality makes it "scientifically worthless and philosophically unmeaning." JRS

E. D., Rev de Phil 17.6 (Dec 1910): 631-632.

753 Bergson, Henri. A Propos d'un article de Mr. Walter B. Pitkin intitulé: "James and Bergson." J Phil 7.14 (7 July 1910): 385-388. Reprinted in *Ecrits et paroles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 356-357. *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 820-824.

Bergson defends James against W. B. Pitkin's "James and Bergson; or, Who Is Against Intellect?" {867}. James's exposition of Bergson's theory of concepts and of the place of the intellect in reality is correct. IKS

Reviews

A. Blanché, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 5.1 (1911): 128-130.

Notes

See René Jeannière, "La Théorie des Concepts chez M. Bergson et M. James" {822}.

754 Bieganski, Wladyslaw. Prewidzm i Pragmatyzm. Przeglad Filozoficzny 13.3 (1910): 319-324.

755 Björkman, Edwin. William James: Builder of American Ideals. American Review of Reviews 42.4 (Oct 1910): 463-467.

James was unusually "charming" with the "power to move and inspire." His life was marked by "watchful calm and quiet application." He tried to bring philosophy back to the service of life. IKS

756 Bode, Boyd H. Objective Idealism and Its Critics. Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 591-609.

Current debate is frustrated by an inadequate definition of idealism. If it is Kantian transcendentalism, taking the subject to be the principle of organization of experience, then Dewey's theory of "reality as concrete experience" is an instrumental interpretation of idealism, which refuses to treat thought as a constitutive *a priori* power of mind. The Humean "atomism" vs. Kantian "transcendentalism" dilemma is a false one; thought consists of the "reference of a given experience to some other specific experience as its fulfillment." Realism denies that knowing makes a difference to reality. JRS

757 Bode, Boyd H. *An Outline of Logic*. New York: Henry Holt, 1910.

The ultimate test of truth is the convergence, or coherence, of truth. JRS

Reviews

Philip H. Fogel, Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 1911): 89-91; W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 7.23 (10 Nov 1910): 635-638.

758 Boodin, J. E. The Nature of Truth. Phil Rev 19.3 (July 1910): 393-417. Reprinted with revisions as "The Postulates of Truth" in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 123-145.

While thought arises "in the stress and strain of environment," many questions remain. Four laws are implied by knowledge: the law of consistency, the law of totality, the representativeness of knowledge, and the law of finitude. Thought is transcended by life; it is "machinery in the service of faith." JRS

Notes

See Radoslav A. Tsanoff, "Professor Boodin on the Nature of Truth" {886}.

759 Boodin, J. E. Pragmatic Realism. Monist 20.4 (Oct 1910): 602-614. Reprinted with revisions in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 251-268.

Realism holds that the object's existence is independent of its significance to consciousness. The old realist/idealist debate (both assuming the "qualitative identity of cause and effect") must be replaced by pragmatism: "to carry the scientific method into metaphysics." The real is known through "our purposive attitudes or conceptual construction" and not "compounds of sensations." JRS

Notes

See Paul Carus, "Editorial Comment," Monist 20.4 (Oct 1910): 614-615.

760 Boodin, J. E. Truth and Its Object. J Phil 7.19 (15 Sept 1910): 508-521. Reprinted as "The Object and Its Contexts" in *Truth and Reality* {916}, pp. 269-290.

Due to reality's individual and changing nature, absolute fact is a "conceptual limit," but truth "always *means* to be eternal." JRS

761 Bornhausen, Karl. William James als Philosoph. Die Christlich Welt nr. 34 (25 Aug 1910): cols. 794-801.

A popular survey of James's psychology and pragmatism. Pragmatism is an American philosophy which emphasizes practice. It is pure utilitarianism. IKS

762 Boutroux, Émile. Décès de M. William James. In the *Transactions* of the Académie des Sciences Morale et Politiques (Paris: Institut de France, Oct-Dec 1910). Reprinted, Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1910.

763 Boutroux, Émile. William James. Rev Méta 18.6 (Nov 1910): 711-743. Materials used in *William James* {918}.

764 Bovet, Pierre. *La Définition pragmatique de la vérité.* Saint-Blaise, 1910.

765 Bovet, Pierre. *William James psychologue: L'Interet de son oeuvre pour des educateurs.* Neuchâtel: Rossier et Grisel, 1910.

766 Bowne, Borden Parker. Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation. Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 884-893.

Belief has been freed by pragmatism from the syllogistic logic of belief. "Religion has a free field for manifesting itself in life and action." JRS

767 Bradley, F. H. A Disclaimer. J Phil 7.7 (31 March 1910): 183. Reprinted in *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 695.

Bradley replies to James's "Bradley or Bergson?" {816}. He renounces the originality attributed to him; Hegel saw that immediate feeling is not "all disconnectedness." IKS

768 Bruce, H. Addington. William James. New Outlook 96 (10 Sept 1910): 68-70.

A general survey of James's career with some emphasis on psychical research. James was the "most influential of present-day American philosophers." IKS

769 Caldecott, A. The Work of William James. I. As a Pragmatist. Sociological Review 3.4 (Oct 1910): 310-314.

James was a leader of thought, but after his death, his work appears impermanent. It is too literary. He emphasized the subject of knowledge and had a supreme trust in the emotional side of human nature. IKS

Notes

See McDougall, "II. As a Psychologist" {842}.

770 Campa, Odoardo. William James. Coenobium 5 (1910): 3-6.

771 Carus, Paul. The Nature of Logical and Mathematical Thought. Monist 20.1 (Jan 1910): 33-75.

Notes

Contains a portion of a letter by C. S. Peirce, p. 45. See Carus, "Non-Aristotelian Logic," Monist 20.1 (Jan 1910): pp. 158-159, which offers more comments on Peirce and another portion of a letter by Peirce on p. 158.

772 Carus, Paul. Person and Personality. Monist 20.3 (July 1910): 364-401.

James overlooks the "higher type" of person, whose intellect is able to control will and character. (p. 375) JRS

773 Carus, Paul. The Pragmatist View of Truth. A Problem Without a Solution. Monist 20.1 (Jan 1910): 139-144. Reprinted as "Critics of Pragmatism Rebuked" in his *Truth on Trial* {925}, pp. 126-131.

A stinging review of James's *The Meaning of Truth* {672}. Although "he lacks clearness of thought, the first requisite for a philosopher, his writings possess a charm that is unrivaled." JRS

774 Carus, Paul. Professor William James. Monist 20.4 (Oct 1910): 638.

775 Carus, Paul. Truth. Monist 20.4 (Oct 1910): 481-514. Reprinted as "The Nature of Truth" in his *Truth on Trial* {925}, pp. 78-109.

Pragmatism denies the existence of objective, consistent truth. (p. 501) JRS

776 Cassirer, Ernst. *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff.* Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910. Translated by William C. Swabey and Mary C. Swabey in *Sub-*

stance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1923), pp. 1-346.

Cassirer condemns the identification of truth with utility (p. 317) but praises Dewey's "finer and more subtle" pragmatism which finds verification in the active process of thought itself. Still, only the "critical" view of knowledge can tackle its purely theoretical goal. James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) is noted on pp. 292, 332, 341, and 343. JRS

777 **Caviglione, Carlo.** William James. Ressegna nazionale (1 Oct 1910): 384-395.

778 **Chapman, John Jay.** William James: A Portrait. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 19 (Dec 1910): 233-238. Reprinted in *Memories and Milestones* (New York: Moffat, Yard, 1915), pp. 19-28. *The Selected Writings of John Jay Chapman*, ed. Jacques Barzun (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957). In *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 50-57.

In spite of his playfulness, James was deeply sad. Perhaps he hated philosophy and pursued it only as a distasteful but necessary task. James did not have the gift of expression, but rather the "gift of suggestion," and his audiences never grasped what James actually meant. IKS

779 **Charles, Paul.** Étude sur les théories de la connaissance. Pragmatisme de l'école française. Rev de Phil 10.4 (1 April 1910): 393-422.

780 **Chaumeix, André.** Les Critiques du rationalisme: A propos des idées de M. Bergson et M. William James. La Revue Hebdomadaire 19.1 (1 Jan 1910): 11-33.

781 **Chaumeix, André.** William James. Revue des Deux-Mondes 59 (15 Oct 1910): 836-864.

Chaumeix surveys James's character and thought. James is the heir of British empiricism and fought against intellectualism. IKS

782 **Chelpanov, G.** Dzhams, Kak Psikholog. Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii 21 (1910): 437-456.

783 **Chesterton, G. K.** Our Notebook. Illustrated London News 47.10 (3 Sept 1910): 432. Reprinted as "William James" in *The Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton*, ed. Lawrence J. Clipper (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), and in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 259-265.

James was a "childishly unworldly" man who marks a turning point in the history of our time in his manner of teaching philosophy. James forced metaphysics to "join the undignified dance of commonsense." "Pragmatism *is* bosh" because in the ordinary way of thinking we always separate utility from truth. IKS

Summaries

Anon, "An English View of William James," The Literary Digest, 41.13 (24 Sept 1910): 494-495.

784 Chiappelli, Alessandro. Les Tendences vives de la philosophie contemporaine. Rev Phil 69.3 (March 1910): 217-248.

785 Chiappelli, Alessandro. William James e la sua opera di filosofo. Il Marzocco 15 (4 Sept 1910): 1.

786 Chiocchetti, Emilio. La teoria della verita e della realita nel prammatismo. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 2.4-5 (Oct 1910): 431-451.

787 Chiocchetti, Emilio. W. James e F. C. S. Schiller (pragmatismo inglese-americano). Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 2.2 (April 1910): 142-158.

788 Cockerell, T. D. A. Is Pragmatism Pragmatic? Dial 48.12 (16 June 1910): 422-423.

Cockerell argues that philosophy should balance science, not join forces with it, in the context of mentioning some themes of James's *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, Schinz's *Anti-Pragmatism* {719}, and Bawden's *The Principles of Pragmatism* {752}. JRS

789 Cohen, Morris R. The Conception of Philosophy in Recent Discussion. J Phil 7.15 (21 July 1910): 401-410.

Since Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory* {118} American philosophy has changed its role from uniting the special sciences to debating its own independent problems in a more scientific way, becoming a "modest social science." This new role has not diminished irreconcilable philosophic differences. JRS

790 De Laguna, Theodore and Grace Andrus De Laguna. *Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1910.

Part Three is titled "The Pragmatist Revolt." Chap. 1, "The Principles of Pragmatism," faults the rationalist's definition of thought's essence and the absolute idealist's dialectical logic for impeding evolutionary explanations of thought. Pragmatism is the application of empirical, scientific methods (particularly those of functional psychology) to philosophy. Its problems arise from the retention of views from 18th-century dogmatic empiricism. Chap. 2, "Examination of the Principles," criticizes pragmatism for assuming that "new ends must be interpreted simply as means to old ones." This gives "adaptation," "survival," "behavior," and "need" absolute priority and permanent meaning. Such utilitarianism cannot explain the uselessness of particular truths. Pragmatism stresses the influence of temperament beyond proper bounds, offers a static and vague definition of truth, and forgets that judgments vary in exactness and universality. Chapters 3 and 4, "The Developing Concept and Its Functions I" and "II" examines the relations (which pragmatism has ignored) between the value and content of an idea. Pragmatism relies on immediativism: percepts *are* the objects, and cannot represent objects. Pragmatism cannot explain inference and does not "distinguish between the *correctness of an inference* and the *truth of its premises*." Appendix 2, "The Practical Character of Reality," is a reprint of {647}. JRS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, Amer J Psych 22.2 (April 1911): 304-307. The authors' criticisms of Dewey reveal that it is *they* are "in bondage" to the traditional separation of universal and particular. Unless the function and content of concepts are immediately experienced, as Dewey holds, we must choose between Mill's sensationalism and Absolute idealism. JRS

Harold C. Brown, J Phil 8.20 (28 Sept 1911): 556-558. The authors have not considered the possibility of "interpreting relations in a new (pragmatic?) sense." JRS

Arthur O. Lovejoy, Phil Rev 20.5 (Sept 1911): 535-545. The most successful criticism made shows that ideas are more useful as they lose any reference to specific action. Pragmatists have always rejected the notion that *any* satisfaction, regardless of other considerations, constitutes truth. The authors should have pointed out that biology today rejects the older Darwinian requirement that all organic functions must be valuable to survival. Their offered compromise, "pure forms of thought" set down by early evolution, either returns us to idealism or agrees with pragmatism. JRS

791 Delbos, Victor. Le pragmatisme au point de vue religieux. In *Questions du temps present: Conférences de foi et vie* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910).

792 Dewey, John. *How We Think.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1910. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 177-356. Revised ed. {2295}.

Educational practice will benefit from applying the scientific habit of thought. Part One, "The Problem of Training Thought," defines reflective thought as the "active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends." (p. 187, italics deleted) Reflective thought aims to resolve perplexity by using past experience and prior knowledge to form suggested solutions, and to search for facts and relate them so that the suggestions can be tested. Reflective thought gives objects values by making them into meaningful signs of other absent things. Proper control over thought resists the common sources of error by refusing to assent to untested beliefs. The training of thought begins with curiosity and suggestion, and must introduce orderliness and consistency in view of some goal. Education must also consider the teacher's own mental attitudes and habits, the subjects to be studied, and the educational goals. The thesis that education gives training in logic ("the formation of careful, alert, and thorough habits of thinking") is denied by both the "natural" and "subject-matter" theories of education. The first stresses freedom, self-expression, spontaneity, etc., while the second expects the student's mind to conform to the abstract concepts and relations provided by a field of knowledge. *Intellectual* discipline provides true freedom of mind and respects the natural growth of thought's powers.

Part Two, "Logical Considerations," analyses the five logically distinct steps of reflective thought: "(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief." These steps involve the inductive and deductive movements of thought, as discrete facts are combined into a coherent whole of meaning, giving rise to premises and a conclusion. Scientific induction is "all the processes by which the observing and amassing of data are regulated with a view to facilitating the formation of explanatory conceptions and theories." (p. 247, italics deleted) Scientific deduction per-

mits the testing of hypotheses by categorizing facts and relating them to principles and definitions. The selection of relevant facts requires sound judgment, which is acquired through long experience. Ideas are the tentatively entertained meanings used as tools of judgment, and can later lose intellectual quality if habitually relied on, as they fuse with their object. Judgments are analytic *and* synthetic: they are formed through the selection of emphasized factors, which are then organized in relation to a conclusion. From the perspective of meaning, thought is provoked by the conjunction of understood and non-understood objects or events, and ends when the already meaningful is extended to explain the doubtful. This distinction is expressed by "acquainted with" versus "knows about." The really new and strange presents us with James's "blooming, buzzing confusion," while the familiar has had its meaning absorbed into it, so its value is contained in its perception. Conceptions are not formed by retaining common qualities of objects, but by retaining only those portions of an experience with a thing that later satisfy the raised expectations. Definitions are of three progressively abstract types: denotative, expository, and scientific. The "empirical" and "scientific" methods are distinct. The first uses constant conjunction to make predictions, but degenerates into blind custom, fails to be applicable to new circumstances, and ignores failures in favor of exaggerating successful confirmations. The second analyzes the observed facts into discrete unobservable processes, and uses controlled experiments to test hypotheses which synthesize the processes to explain the facts. Scientific thought provides greater certainty, wider generality, and future progress. Education allows individuals to acquire these qualities in experience, relieving them from a dependence on empirical rigidity.

Part Three, "The Training of Thought," describes the relations of action to thought. The stages of activity, language skills, observation, and formal instruction are examined for their involvement with reflective thought. The conclusion stresses the requirement that inquiry must question unconsciously accepted beliefs and meanings, but balance requires that reflection and activity alternate, as the familiar is used to conquer the unknown. JRS

Reviews

Max Eastman, J Phil 8.9 (27 April 1911): 244-248. Critics may be surprised by Dewey's encouragement of strictly intellectual interests. "What is the difference between an organized and an unorganized situation?" JRS

Walter B. Pillsbury, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 441-442. This summary of Dewey's logical theories is the "first attempt to apply the modern logic." JRS

E. D., Rev de Phil 19.1 (July 1911): 86-87.

793 Dewey, John. *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought.* New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1910.

The "Preface" (pp. iii-iv) is reprinted in *LW* 17: 39-41. "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" (pp. 1-19) is reprinted from {648}. "Nature and Its Good: A Conversation" (pp. 20-45) is reprinted from {651}. "Intelligence and Morals" (pp. 46-76) is reprinted from {536}. "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" (pp. 77-111) is reprinted with revisions from {317}. "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth" (pp. 112-153) is reprinted with revisions from {423}. "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth" (pp. 154-168) is reprinted in *MW* 6: 3-11. "Beliefs and Existences" (pp. 169-197) is reprinted with revisions from {315}. "Experience and Objective Idealism" (pp. 198-225) is reprinted with revisions from {316}. "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" (pp. 226-241) is reprinted from {237) with an endnote to critics. "'Consciousness' and Experience" (pp.

242-270) is reprinted with revisions from {29}. "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge" (pp. 271-304) is revised from its initial publication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897). JRS

Reviews

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 219-221. Pragmatism's distinction lies in its ambiguous use of the term "practical." Misunderstandings arise from the lack of pragmatic metaphysics. JRS

D. C. Macintosh, "Pragmatism and Mysticism," American Journal of Theology 15.1 (Jan 1911): 142-146. One basic motive of this work is to eradicate any "positively religious view of the universe" leaving only psychology and social ethics. The "largely justified" instrumentalist version of logic becomes confusing when Dewey treats truth as a property of ideas, instead of judgments; only the latter involve the relation of ideas to reality. JRS

Henry Sturt, J Phil 7.20 (29 Sept 1910): 557-559. Pragmatism's defense of "workable ideals" is its strength. Its weakness is its failure to offer a metaphysics to satisfy the "plain philosophic man." JRS

794 Dewey, John. *Philosophy and Education in Their Historic Relations.* Edited with an introduction by J. J. Chambliss. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

A transcript of Dewey's lectures for his course at Columbia University, October 1910 to May 1911. JRS

795 Dewey, John. Science as Subject Matter and as Method. Science n.s. 31 (28 Jan 1910): 121-127. Reprinted as "Science and the Education of Man," in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 765-775. *MW* 6: 69-79.

Reviews

William Chandler Bagley, Journal of Educational Psychology 1 (1910): 419.

Notes

See the New York Evening Post's editorial on 5 Feb 1910.

796 Dewey, John. The Short-Cut to Realism Examined. J Phil 7.20 (29 Sept 1910): 553-557. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 138-142.

Dewey comments on Edwin Holt *et al.*, "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," J Phil 7.15 (21 July 1910): 393-401 [*MW* 6: 472-482]. Dewey declares his alliance with anti-idealism, agreeing that "knowledge always implies existences prior to and independent of their being known." But the realists' use of "external relations" to positively state their position (an object is not changed when it becomes known–the object and the knowledge are only "externally" or contingently related) suffers from ambiguities. If what is meant is that the meaning of term does not change during the process of inquiry, this is false, but if instead what is meant is only that the known object does not change when it is referred to in a proposition, this is obviously true. Knowledge as a natural event requires the alteration of the object known in the process of inquiry. If the realist holds that knowledge requires no alteration, then either the realist believes that "to *be* a thing and to *be* a term of a proposition are identical," or that "the relation of the knowing process to the existence it deals with can be settled by an analysis of the relation of terms" of the very proposition at issue, which is just "begging the question." JRS

797 Dewey, John. Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism. J Phil 7.18 (1 Sept 1910): 477-481. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 86-90.

Pragmatism can take on two forms of anti-intellectualism. The first holds that "things *are* what they are *known* to be," but it "upholds the superior claims of non-rational, non-logical factors in constituting the web of things known," and hence denies a higher reality. The second, "instrumental pragmatism," also denies any higher reality, by finding the function of knowledge in its context of organic adjustments. The "intellectualist fallacy" converts the discriminated subjective and objective factors into real existences, creating metaphysical puzzles. For example, Perry's "ego-centric predicament" identifies the "self" with "consciousness," setting apart the "object" known, thereby creating epistemology. JRS

Summaries

J. Reese Lin, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 239.

798 Dewey, John. Valid Knowledge and the "Subjectivity of Experience." J Phil 7.7 (31 March 1910): 169-174. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 80-85.

Objective idealism and realism try to explain valid objective knowledge by inferring from the alleged subjectivity of meager experience that an enduring wider reality (absolute mind or independent matter) exists. Such an inference is impossible. Not coincidentally, philosophy cannot offer any way to relate an instance of valid knowledge with an instance of experience, or to account for error. The empiricist is concerned with conceptions only if they are relevant to methods of testing particular instances of knowing. JRS

Summaries

J. R. Tuttle, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 563.

799 Dewey, John. William James. The Independent 69 (8 Sept 1910): 533-536. Reprinted as "William James. II." in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 111-117. *MW* 6: 91-97.

James wrote for "semi-popular" audiences because for him philosophy was a "human affair." He did not need to write a treatise on ethics, because he was everywhere a moralist. In psychology, his great achievement was the "union of the physiological and laboratory attitude with the introspective method." IKS

800 Dewey, John. William James. J Phil 7.19 (15 Sept 1910): 505-508. Reprinted as "William James. I." in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 107-111. *MW* 6: 98-102.

An appreciative notice. James's most marked trait was his sense of reality, his refusal to ignore or reject experience for the sake of theory. IKS

801 Drahn, Hermann. *Prüfung des "Pragmatismus" von William James als Philosophie.* Greifswald: H. Adler, 1910.

The effective principle of James's metaphysics is the will. Our decisions are conditions of a better universe. James's metaphysics is not entirely free of psychology. It would be better if pragmatism freed itself of a one-sided emphasis on practice and realized that science is an expression of the whole person. IKS

802 Enriques, Federigo. Il pragmatismo. Scientia: Rivista di Scienza 7 (1910): 110-128, 146-164.

803 Ewald, Oscar. German Philosophy in 1909. Translated by William A. Hammond. Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 481-504.

Ewald summarizes Windelband's examination of pragmatism in *Der Wille zur Wahrheit* {741}, Royce's "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion" {709}, and Lorenz-Ighthan's "Das Verhältnis des Pragmatismus zu Kant" {684}. JRS

804 Ferrari, Giulio Cesare. William James. Rivista di Psicologia 6 (1910): 361-363.

805 Forsyth, Thomas M. *English Philosophy: A Study of Its Method and General Development.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910.

Pragmatism is approvingly discussed in chap. 8, "Knowledge as Relative to Practice," pp. 162-184. The "inexhaustible suggestiveness" of experience, and the infinite character of reality, shows that knowledge is "engaged in the endless task of guiding life and furthering experience." (p. 184) JRS

Reviews

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 671-673.

806 Gillespie, C. M. The *Truth* of Protagorus. Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 470-492.

A critique of Schiller's "From Plato to Protagorus" in *Studies in Humanism* {490}, and his *Plato or Protagorus* {598}. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "The Humanism of Protagorus" {1001}.

807 Goddard, Harold C. Literature and the "New" Philosophy. J Phil 7.5 (3 March 1910): 124-133.

James's writings call philosophy back to the poetic appreciation for the senses. JRS

808 Goldstein, Julius. William James. Deutsche Rundschau 145.3 (Dec 1910): 455-461.

James is the first original American thinker, an empiricist with religious interests. James wrote to Goldstein that *Some Problems of Philosophy* {958} would be his last work and would bring peace and completion. IKS

809 Goodsell, Willystine. *The Conflict of Naturalism and Humanism.* New York: Teachers College, Columbia University Press, 1910. Reprinted, New York: AMA Press, 1972.

The historical contrast between naturalism and humanism is discussed, culminating in a chapter on "The Pragmatic Solution of the Problems of Naturalism and Humanism," pp. 163-178. JRS

Reviews

Anon, Amer J Psych 23.1 (Jan 1912): 152-153; Elsie Ripley Clapp, J Phil 9.15 (18 July 1912): 413-415; H. H. Foster, Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 678-679.

810 Groos, Karl. Was ist Wahrheit? Betrachtungen über die Erkenntnistheorie von William James. Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft 4 (1910): 1351-1364.

For James, truth is what has proven itself in practice. Experience contradicts James's contention that all truths are plastic. IKS

811 Gruenberg, Benjamin. William James. Scientific American 103 (10 Sept 1910): 198-199.

James founded a functional psychology with a dynamic view of life and conduct. IKS

Notes

See also a memorial by Anon, "William James," Nature 84.9 (1 Sept 1910): 268-269.

812 Herrick, C. L. *The Metaphysics of a Naturalist: Philosophical and Psychological Fragments.* Granville, Ohio: Denison University, 1910.

Reviews

DeWitt H. Parker, J Phil 7.24 (24 Nov 1910): 665-666. The essay on immortality formulates good criticisms of James's *Human Immortality* {11}. JRS

813 Hudson, Jay William. The Classification of Ethical Theories. Int J Ethics 20.4 (July 1910): 408-424.

A survey of recent works on ethics, including Dewey and Tuft's *Ethics* {540}, aiming to define the subject and refine its categories. JRS

814 Jacobson, Edmund. The Relational Account of Truth. J Phil 7.10 (12 May 1910): 253-261.

Jacobson defends a "purely cognitive" theory of systematic truth against the pragmatic definition. JRS

815 Jacobsson, Malte. *Pragmatismen: Sarskilt i dess Forhallande till Kriticismen.* Lund: Berlingska boktryckeriet, 1910.

816 James, William. Bradley or Bergson? J Phil 7.2 (20 Jan 1910): 29-33. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 491-499. *Writings 2*, pp. 1266-1271. *Works EPh*, pp. 151-156.

Bradley rejects the traditional idealistic view in which all connection, unification, and meaning is conceptual. He argues that conceptualization infects felt realities, such as change, personality, and causation, with contradiction. Bergson, while less radical, also holds that concepts, since they are static, make reality in flux less intelligible. Admitting the practical value of concepts, he concludes that deep knowledge results from the sympathetic enlargement of perceptual data by the imagination. Bradley, on the other hand, remains faithful to rationalism and refuses to allow the designating of particular feelings, which is an activity prominent in life and ordinary knowledge. IKS

Summaries

J. R. Tuttle, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 564.

Notes

See Bradley's reply, "A Disclaimer" {767}.

817 James, William. A Correction. J Phil 7.7 (31 March 1910): 183-184. Reprinted in *The Works of William James: A Pluralistic Universe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 469.

James replies to W. P. Montague's "'A Pluralistic Universe' and the Logic of Irrationalism" {857}. James claims that the discussion of "The Compounding of Consciousness" in *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} was based on idealistic assumptions and that a realistic solution was among the possibilities he had suggested. IKS

Notes

See Montague's reply, "An Explanation," J Phil 7.7 (31 March 1910): 184-185.

818 James, William. A Great French Philosopher at Harvard. Nation 90.13 (31 March 1910): 312-314. Reprinted in *Works EPh*, pp. 166-171.

Émile Boutroux is a leader in the movement away from the abstract and towards the concrete point of view in philosophy. For a scholastic, concepts are fully expressed by their definitions and there is only one set of thoughts which reveal the truth. To appreciate Boutroux, we must realize that he is not a scholastic. Lecturing at Harvard on "Contingency and Liberty," he said that reality is growing and ever producing genuine novelty. It is marked by contingency, an element of spontaneity, and is best expressed in biography and history. Many theories are equally possible. All are partly adapted and partly non-adapted to reality. They are changed by the "world-situation" and in turn change it. Like Peirce, Dewey, Bergson, and others, Boutroux calls for a return to the "fullness of concrete experience." IKS

819 James, William. The Moral Equivalent of War. International Conciliation No. 27 (Feb 1910): 3-20. Also published in McClure's Magazine 35 (Aug 1910): 463-468, and Popular Science Monthly 77 (Oct 1910): 400-410. Reprinted in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 267-296. *Writings 2*, pp. 1281-1293. *Works ERM*, pp. 162-173.

Summaries

Anon, "Dr. James on the Moral Equivalent of War," Sociological Review 3.4 (Oct 1910): 315-316.

820 James, William. A Pluralistic Mystic. Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 739-759. Reprinted in *Memories and Studies* {957}, pp. 371-411. *Writings 2* pp. 1294-1313. *Works EPh* pp. 172-190.

Primarily extracts from the writings of Benjamin Paul Blood, a little known poet and writer living in Amsterdam, N.Y. Blood began as a monist, but ends as a pluralistic mystic, with emphasis on the sheer givenness and incompleteness of things. Blood's mysticism confirms James's more intellectual pluralism. To summarize his own view of reality, James liked to quote Blood's words: "the universe is wild-game flavored as a hawk's wing" and "ever not quite." IKS

821 James, William. A Suggestion About Mysticism. J Phil 7.4 (17 Feb 1910): 85-92. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews* {1579}, pp. 500-513. *Writings 2*, pp. 1272-1280. *Works EPh*, pp. 157-165.

Mysticism is best viewed as a sudden extension of consciousness, making one aware of the transmarginal, what ordinarily lies beyond the threshold. A conscious field usually consists of present sensations surrounded by a "cloud" of feelings, memories, emotions, and concepts. When the threshold falls, some of this subconscious comes "into view all at once." This accounts for mystical feelings of enlargement, insight, and unification. James describes four of his own episodes in which he felt a sudden opening, enabling him to perceive portions of reality previously unperceived. Because the opening came so rapidly and the perceptions vanished like dreams, the truths revealed could not be conceptualized and preserved. There remained, however, an unshakable feeling that something connected with his own life had been revealed. IKS

822 Jeannière, René. La Théorie des concepts chez M. Bergson et M. James. Rev de Phil 17.6 (Dec 1910): 578-598.

Summaries

Christian A. Ruckmich, Phil Rev 20.5 (Sept 1911): 577-578.

823 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. William James. Die Zukunft 73.6 (5 Nov 1910): 186-190.

An obituary notice, emphasizing James's conception of mental life. James is through and through an American. IKS

824 Kallen, Horace M. Is Belief Essential in Religion? Int J Ethics 21.1 (Oct 1910): 51-67.

825 Kallen, Horace M. James, Bergson, and Mr. Pitkin. J Phil 7.13 (23 June 1910): 353-357. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 209-213.

Kallen responds to W. B. Pitkin's "James and Bergson; or, Who is Against Intellect?" {867}. James is against *intellectualism*, not against the intellect. Pitkin has misunderstood both Bergson's theory of cognition and James's conception of experience. JRS

826 Kallen, Horace M. William James. Nation 91.10 (8 Sept 1910): 210-211.

James is the only American philosopher whose work is studied in China and Finland, and everywhere where there is concern about "human destiny." James had a strong capacity for "immediate intuition" of reality. He insisted that ideals are not irrelevant. IKS

827 Kaltenbach, Jacques. William James: Souvenirs personnels. Foi et Vie 13 (1910): 582-584.

James was one of the least abstract of philosophers. He valued French thought highly and affirmed the usefulness of religion. IKS

828 Keane, W. M. *Pragmatism and the Scholastic Synthesis.* Dublin: 1910.

829 Kern, Berthold. *Das Erkenntnis Problem und Seine Kritische Lösung.* Berlin: August Hirschwald, 1910.

Reviews

A. D. Lindsay, Mind 19.3 (July 1910): 440.

830 King, Irving. *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology.* New York: Macmillan, 1910.

Many references to William James's work on functional consciousness and religious experience. JRS

Reviews

Edmund H. Hollands, Phil Rev 19.3 (July 1910): 435-440; James B. Pratt, Int J Ethics 21.1 (Oct 1910): 100-104.

831 Kleinpeter, H. Der Pragmatismus im Lichte der Menschen Erkenntnislehre. Wissenschaftliche Rundschau 2 (1910): 406.

832 Kotliarevskii, S. Pragmatisz i Problema Terpimosti. Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii 21 (1910): 368-379.

833 L., Th. Positivisme et pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 17.5 (1 Nov 1910): 515-521.

834 Lalande, André. Philosophy in France, 1909. Translated by Edmund H. Hollands. Phil Rev 19.3 (July 1910): 373-394.

French philosophers appear to have taken pragmatism in stride. Their interest in pragmatism is considerable diminished. Boutroux's *Science et religion* {519} is examined. JRS

835 Lee, Vernon [pseud. for Violet Paget]. The Two Pragmatisms. North American Review 192.4 (Oct 1910): 449-463. Reprinted in *Vital Lies: Studies of Some Varieties of Some Recent Obscurantism* {1084}, vol. 1, pp. 7-49.

Pragmatism imports into philosophy a test of truth by "the standards of worldly practicality," thereby passing off as truths what are "merely useful or inspiriting delusions." Quotations of Peirce are contrasted with those from James and Schiller. Peirce's "truth" is an "intellectual imperative" which would impose itself on opinion, while James's and Schiller's "truth" is only "beneficial or agreeable" opinion. JRS

836 Leighton, Joseph A. On Continuity and Discreteness. J Phil 7.9 (28 April 1910): 231-238.

Bergson and James rely on a false dilemma (their "immediate feeling" vs. Bradley's Absolute) to defend pluralism and irrationalism. The third alternative is "an organic or functional and social conception of experience" in which thought is "a movement which unites in differentiating, and differentiates in uniting." JRS

837 Léo, Albert. William James chez lui. Foi et Vie 13 (20 Nov 1910): 664-666.

Reminiscences by a student at Harvard in the fall of 1904. IKS

838 Lewis, C. I. *The Place of Intuition in Knowledge.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1910.

839 Lippman, Walter. An Open Mind: William James. Everybody's Magazine 23 (Dec 1910): 800-801. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 252-258.

James would evaluate every idea no matter its source, as his interest in psychical research shows. James agreed to try after his death to communicate with the living. IKS

840 Lloyd, Alfred H. The Possible Idealism of a Pluralist. American Journal of Theology 14.3 (July 1910): 406-421.

Pragmatism, as a pluralistic empiricism, is idealistic, since it "infers the nature of reality from the formal evidence of empiricism" and implies a wider and deeper "reason" or "harmony." Its idealism is that of Kant's, which denied both consistency and conformity in favor of "the test of working." Its idealism is volitional: a heroic and empirical assertion of self, that can reject any limitations on its activity. JRS

841 Lyman, Eugene William. *Theology and Human Problems: A Comparative Study of Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism as Interpreters of Religion.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1910.

Theology is judged by its service to the real problems of life. Absolutism contributed the notion of an immanent (but timeless) God, and Ritschlian Kantianism emphasized the origins of religious knowledge in faith and moral consciousness (but separated it from scientific knowledge). Pragmatism derives knowledge from purposive action occurring in natural and social surroundings, and finds the experience of faith grounding both religious and scientific knowledge. It accepts time as a fundamental reality, and explains the history of religion as the practical search for truth. These four principles of pragmatism make it superior to other philosophies of religion: it "retains the advantages of the other two and at the same time avoids certain grave difficulties which they involved." JRS

Reviews

Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 8.8 (13 April 1911): 218-221; Edward L. Schaub, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 221-224.

842 McDougall, William. The Work of William James. II. As a Psychologist. Sociological Review 3.4 (Oct 1910): 314-315.

James has done more than anyone since Aristotle to make psychology the "basis for all the humanities." IKS

Notes

See Caldecott, "The Work of William James. I. As a Pragmatist" {769}.

843 MacEachran, John M. *Pragmatismus.* Leipzig: Kreysing, 1910.

Little can be said in pragmatism's favor. Philosophy is a matter of intellect and it is not its business to create moral standards. The term humanism is not appropriate here. Pragmatism is a reaction against the idealism which has dominated Oxford. While pragmatists accuse idealists of writing in a technical way, their own popular, rhetorical style is not an improvement. IKS

844 McGiffert, A. C. The Pragmatism of Kant. J Phil 7.8 (14 April 1910): 197-203.

The pragmatists' indifference to Kant is surprising. They should be interested in Kant's pragmatic approach to moral values, the construction of reality, and religion. JRS

Summaries

Corrine Stephenson, Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 689.

845 Macintosh, Douglas C. Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology? Harvard Theological Review 3.1 (Jan 1910): 125-135.

Pragmatism cannot not ignore theistic religion. Theism satisfies fundamental spiritual needs, and it involves the immediate experience of transcendent reality. JRS

Summaries

George T. Colman, Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 692-693.

846 Macintosh, Douglas C. The Pragmatic Element in the Teaching of Paul. American Journal of Theology 14.3 (July 1910): 361-381.

Paul made "an appeal to experience" and was "guided by a sort of transfigured or spiritual utilitarianism." His doctrine of justification by faith was "eminently pragmatic," applying the "will to believe." JRS

847 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. William James. Science n.s. 32.16 (14 Oct 1910): 489-492.

James's most "striking traits" were those that "men of science hold as their ideals"; he could have spent his life in "pure science." Had he lived longer, he would have developed the ethical implications of pragmatism. IKS

848 Mauthner, Fritz. Pragmatismus. In *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Munich: 1910).

849 Mead, G. H. The Psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction. Science n.s. 31 (1910): 688-693. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 114-122.

850 Mead, G. H. Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning. Psych Bull 7.12 (15 Dec 1910): 397-405. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 123-133.

Meaning arises in the relation of one's gestures to the responses of others. JRS

Summaries

A. S. Edwards, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 466-467.

851 Mead, G. H. What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose? J Phil 7.7 (31 March 1910): 174-180. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 105-113.

Notes

An abstract is in Psych Bull 7.2 (15 Feb 1910): 52-53.

852 Ménard, Alphonse. *Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologie de W. James*. Lyon: Imprimeries réunis, 1910. Reprinted, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911.

James abandons atomism and gives a better interpretation of the psychical datum in terms of continuity and the stream of consciousness. As a result, psychology becomes primarily descriptive. Here, radical empiricism accepts the risk that psychology as a rigorous science may become impossible. James differs from Bergson on the question of memory, recognition, and attention because he explains mental phenomena in sensory-motor terms. James and Wundt together define the double task of psychology, empirical description and the analysis of conditions, and thus are not opposed to each other. IKS

Reviews

H. M. Kallen, J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 357-361. Ménard exhibits the "internal consistency and articulation" of James's psychology. JRS

Robert M. Ogden, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 658-662. Ménard views James through Bergsonian glasses. His work lacks criticism. IKS

Françoise Mentré, Rev de Phil 19.1 (July 1911): 93-94.

853 Ménard, Alphonse. *Le Phenome religieux: essai de psychologisme pragmatique au suject des expériences religieuse d'après W. James.* Lyon: A. Meloine, 1910.

854 Milhaud, Gaston S. Cournot et le pragmatisme scientifique contemporain. Scientia 5.20 (1910): 370.

855 Miller, Dickinson S. Some of the Tendencies of Professor James's Work. J Phil 7.24 (24 Nov 1910): 645-664.

For James, psychology is the study of human nature. His work is either a contribution to psychology or takes inspiration from its point of view, for he did not allow philosophy to "ignore the way life feels." He approached psychology as a doctor, artist, and a sympathetic human being. IKS

856 Molina, Enrique. *El Pragmatismo o la Filosofia práctica de William James.* Santiago, Chile: Cervantes, 1910. Reprinted in his *Filosofia Americana: Ensayos* (Paris: Garnier Harmanos, 1914), pp. 167-216.

857 Montague, William P. "A Pluralistic Universe" and the Logic of Irrationalism. J Phil 7.6 (16 March 1910): 141-155.

A review of James's *A Pluralistic Universe* {675}. James gives us a convincing critique of absolutism, but a very unconvincing defense of Bergson's critique of intellectualism. Montague gives a general criticism of Bergson. IKS

Notes

See James's response, "A Correction" {817}. See also Jared S. Moore, "Irrationalism and Absolute Idealism," J Phil 7.8 (14 April 1910): 215-216.

858 Montgomery, George R. *The Unexplored Self: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine for Teachers and Students.* New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.

859 Moore, A. W. How Ideas "Work." J Phil 7.23 (10 Nov 1910): 617-626.

Summaries

J. Reese Lin, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 237-238.

Notes

First published in *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}, pp. 87-109.

860 Moore, A. W. *Pragmatism and Its Critics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

Chap. 1, "The Issue," outlines pragmatism as the "logical regeneration of voluntarism." Chap. 2, "The Rise of Absolutism," explains pragmatism's opposition to static concepts. Chap. 3, "Some Difficulties," reveals the absolutist dualisms. Chap. 4, "The Rise of Pragmatism," points out pragmatism's rejection of final causes and its theory of ideas as relations in experience. Chap. 5, "How Ideas 'Work'," describes how absolutism and realism agrees, and why pragmatism disagrees, that knowledge does not change reality. Chap. 6, "Truth-Value," is reprinted from {574}. Chap. 7, "Pragmatism and Its Critics," is reprinted from {263}. Chap. 8, "The Pragmatic 'Universal'" is reprinted from {188}. Chap. 9, "Professor Perry on Pragmatism" is reprinted from {460}. Chap. 10, "Pragmatism and Solipsism" combines material from {343} and {693}. Chap. 11, "The Social Character of Habit and Attention," is reprinted from {459}. Chap. 12, "The Ethical Aspect," is reprinted from {692}. JRS

Reviews

D. L. Murray, Mind 20.4 (Oct 1911): 566-570. Moore cannot escape the imputation of solipsism, since he denies the transcendent character of knowledge. Psychology's rejection of solipsism is irrelevant, for the objectivity of science itself is at issue. JRS

Charles B. Vibbert, J Phil 8.17 (17 Aug 1911): 468-471. The objective, social situation is the pragmatist's "absolute," in which any individual thought develops. But how can Moore convincingly prove this first assumption? JRS

Anon, Nation 92.1 (5 Jan 1911): 13-14; Mary W. Calkins, Int J Ethics 22.2 (Jan 1912): 222-226; E. D., Rev de Phil 12 (Feb 1912): 189-191; Lionel Dauriac, Rev Phil 72.5 (Nov 1911): 546-552; Theodore De Laguna, Phil Rev 21.2 (March 1912): 234-236.

Notes

Chap. 5 was later published as {859}. See Moore's response to De Laguna's review, "Professor De Laguna on 'The Chicago School'" {1103}, and his response to Murray's review, "Thought and Function" {1104}.

861 Moore, G. E. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1953.

Moore delivered the twenty chapters as lectures given in Winter 1910-11. Chap. 15, "True and False Beliefs," takes up challengers to the correspondence theory of truth. Pragmatists are unclear and sometimes contradictory on how beliefs "work." They often seem to assert that a belief is true if and only if it "leads up to some kind of satisfactory effect." (p. 307) Thus it might be possible for a belief "that I have gone off for my holidays" to be "true" even if "I had *not* gone away." But this objection loses its force; pragmatists are more likely offering a test or criterion of truth, not a definition of truth, which holds that "the property of leading to satisfactory results always goes with the property of corresponding to a fact." However, this criterion is attacked in later chapters, where Moore identifies truths with facts, possessing a reality independent of human minds. JRS

862 Noël, Léon. Les Frontières de la logique. Revue Néo-Scolastique 17.2 (May 1910): 211-233.

863 Palmer, George H. William James. Science n.s. 32 (11 Nov 1910): 659-660. Reprinted in Harvard University Gazette 6 (1910): 29-30.

A minute on the life and services of James. It appeared anonymously, but Palmer asserts his authorship in "William James" {1590}. IKS

864 Papini, Giovanni. William James. La Voce 2 (8 Sept 1910): 391.

865 Perry, Ralph B. Realism as a Polemic and a Program of Reform. J Phil 7.13 (23 June 1910): 337-353; 7.14 (7 July 1910): 365-379.

The second part gives a realist critique of pragmatism (pp. 369-370). The pragmatic "phenomenology of truth," if it is "strictly and narrowly construed," has the realist's sympathies. Generalizations from it are "tainted" with subjectivism, nominalism, and anti-intellectualism. JRS

866 Perry, Ralph B. William James. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 19 (Dec 1910): 212-225.

867 Pitkin, Walter B. James and Bergson: Or, Who Is Against Intellect? J Phil 7.9 (28 April 1910): 225-231. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 201-208.

In *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} James mistakenly represents his position to be like Bergson's. In spite of some similarities, the two are sharply opposed, particularly concerning conceptual knowledge. James is an anti-intellectualist, while Bergson is not. For Bergson, concepts make things more intelligible. IKS

Notes

See Bergson, "A propos d'un article de Mr. Walter B. Pitkin intitulé: 'James and Bergson'" {753}; H. M. Kallen, "James, Bergson and Mr. Pitkin" {825}; and I. Woodbridge Riley, "La Française en amérique" {1639}.

868 Putnam, James Jackson. William James. Atlantic Monthly 106.6 (Dec 1910): 835-848. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 7-26.

Reminiscences by James's fellow student at the Harvard Medical School, hiking companion, and life-long friend. Excerpts from James's letters to Putnam are quoted. IKS

869 Quick, Oliver C. The Humanist Theory of Value: A Criticism. Mind 19.2 (April 1910): 218-230.

Neither truth nor reality can be value, though they can be valuable. Many beliefs (religious, historical, etc.) have significance only if they are believed to true irrespective of any value they have for us. The pragmatist test for truth can avoid skepticism, but it should hold that the truth is responsible for useful beliefs, not the reverse. JRS

Notes

See John E. Russell's reply, "The Humanist Theory of Value" {874}.

870 **Rein, E.** *Erkenntnistheorie.* Leipzig: 1910.

871 **Robins, Sidney Swain.** *Hegel's Pragmatism.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1910.

872 **Royce, Josiah.** A Word of Greeting to William James. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 18 (June 1910): 630-633. Reprinted in *William James Remembered,* ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 36-42.

A speech at a dinner, 18 January 1910, celebrating the completion of James's portrait for Harvard University. Royce recalls his relations with James. IKS

873 **Russell, Bertrand.** The Philosophy of William James. The Nation 7 (3 Sept 1910): 793-794. Reprinted in The Living Age (Boston) o.s. 267 (1 Oct 1901): 52-55. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell,* vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 286-289.

James is at his best when dealing with facts, but in the rarified air of metaphysics his mind fails to find full scope. His pragmatism is a philosophy for those who love battle more than victory. He urges us to accept any faith we find to be congenial. IKS

Notes

See also Russell, "William James" in his *A History of Western Philosophy* (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 811-818.

874 **Russell, John E.** The Humanist Theory of Value. Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 547-549.

Russell replies to Oliver Quick's "The Humanist Theory of Value: A Criticism" {869}. In "my anti-pragmatist days (now happily passed) I was vexed by the same difficulties." What would be left of the idea of God if all that "connotes value for our human lives" were subtracted? JRS

Notes

See Quick's reply, "The Humanist Theory of Value" {991}.

875 **Ruttman, W. J.** Die Hauptpunkte der James'shen Psychologie. Die Deutsche Schule 14 (1910): 751-757.

James is not a psychologist in a narrow sense. His work has a strong literary flavor. The main aspects of James's psychology are surveyed with an emphasis on the self. IKS

876 **Salter, William M.** Schopenhauer's Contact With Pragmatism. Phil Rev 19.2 (March 1910): 137-153.

877 **Schiller, F. C. S.** Absolutism *In Extremis*? Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 533-540.

Schiller comments on F. H. Bradley's "On Appearance, Error and Contradiction," Mind 19.2 (April 1910): 153-185 [*Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 245-273]. Bradley has confessed the irrationality of the Absolute. Logic must acknowledge particulars and selves. His philosophy deals with the "mere verbal forms of judgment" and not the judgments of actual thinking. JRS

878 Schiller, F. C. S. The Present Phase of 'Idealist' Philosophy. Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 30-45.

Bradley's sense of "intellectual satisfaction" is sheer verbalism and false abstraction. It is based on the false psychology which portrays given objects of knowledge as originally distinct and separate. The unity of the Real may explain truth, but what is able to explain falsity? How can this Unity exclude personality? JRS

Summaries

George T. Colman, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 565.

879 Schiller, F. C. S. *Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism.* 3rd revised ed., with a new subtitle and two more appendixes. London: Swan, Sonnenschein and Co.; New York: Macmillan, 1910. Reprinted, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

Philosophy must ultimately deal with the practical needs of life, like any other area of human knowledge. Chap. 2 analyses scientific agnosticism (Spencer's "Unknowable") and epistemological agnosticism (Kant's "things-in-themselves") into a reliance on skepticism. Chapters 3 and 4 reveal skepticism's pessimistic result: the resignation that we cannot resolve the irrationalities of life. Optimism based on the sure evolutionary progress of intelligence fails to recognize the instability of nature, however. What is needed to defeat pessimism is a rejection of those impossibly high standards of truth separating us from reality. Chap. 5 offers the humanist's theory of truth: a truth is essentially a superior value used for the manipulation of human experience. When certitude and correspondence are abandoned, the fact that the probabilities of life permit successful action cannot be pessimistically denied. Humanism can accept the realities of imperfection, becoming, and time. The method of philosophy should start with the Self, the judge of what satisfies life. Chap. 6 explains that Naturalism wrongly elevates scientific interpretations, and Abstractionism artificially places limited rational concepts first; both fail to understand the whole of experience. A humanistic reconciliation only asks of philosophy that it render plausible hypotheses, resting on the rest of our current knowledge, to answer the deepest questions. Like any knowledge, philosophy must adapt and grow to meet the tests of experience.

Chapters 7 and 8 discuss evolution's metaphysical implications. Its use of the notion of potentiality enables it to reveal the teleological nature of the universe, though we may not be able to learn its goals. In the social realm, evolutionary progress demands the harmonious development of both the individual and society, in increasing complexity and interde-pendence. The evolutionary chain of being goes back, in order of decreasing individuality, through the forms of life and then chemical compounds, arriving at elemental atoms. Forward progress aims at perfected individuals in the Christian heaven. Chap. 9 argues that space and time should not be considered as infinite, and that matter is a manifestation of the Divine force, used to guide our progress. Monotheism and pantheism are rejected on logical and emotional grounds in chap. 10, in favor of a finite, immanent, and personal God in the process of striving to bring evil into harmony. Since "omnipotence becomes impotence in the absence of resistance," this limited God has a real role to play as designer and director of a spiritual and pluralistic system. Chap. 11 defends personal immortality through reincarnation. Each life is another opportunity for God to alter our egos, and though we do not remember much of our past lives, spiritual progress shapes our personality. In conclusion, pessimism is defeated by an act of practical will: a faith in a philosophy of optimism.

The first appendix applies the concept of "will" as the prototype of causation to the problem of determinism. Both necessity and freedom are signs of an imperfect will. The second appendix, "Choice" is a reprint of {712}, and the third appendix, "Science and Religion," is a reprint of {599}. JRS

Reviews

Edward D. Fawcett, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 405-413. How does Schiller's theory of truth differ from Mill's or Bain's empiricism? Humanism is just "good" anthropomorphism, squaring with James's view that pragmatism is but an *attitude*. Pluralism makes strange the notion of a single divine God; what of James's idea of divine hierarchies? JRS

Walter B. Pitkin, J Phil 8.11 (25 May 1911): 299-302. Schiller's anthropomorphic and intellectualist conclusions about "all things" abandons the pragmatic principle that limits meanings to their cognitive situation. JRS

Thomas Whittaker, Hibbert Journal 9.3 (April 1911): 677-680. Schiller's arguments don't seem "pragmatic" but instead appeal to the intellect. There is no adequate reason to reject infinite space and time, or an infinite regress of determined causes. A finite God cannot assure security against chance. JRS

Lionel Dauriac, Rev Phil 72.5 (Nov 1911): 541-546; J. M., Rev de Phil 18.6 (1 June 1911): 639-641; Ralph B. Perry, Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 112-113; Sydney Waterlow, Int J Ethics 22.1 (Oct 1911): 107-111.

Notes

This work was previously *Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution by a Troglodyte*, 1st ed., 1891; 2nd ed., 1894. See "A Correction" to Waterlow's review, Int J Ethics 22.4 (July 1912): 501.

880 Schiller, F. C. S., and T. Percy Nunn. Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception? *Proc Arist Soc* 10 (1910): 191-231.

Schiller's contribution is part 2 of this discussion, on pp. 218-231. Schiller critiques Nunn's realistic affirmation, distinguishing between the claim of independence which an experience makes, and the validity of that claim, which is pragmatically tested. JRS

881 Shelton, H. S. On Evolutionary Empiricism. Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 46-62.

Summaries

George T. Colman, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 564.

882 Switalski, Wladimir. *Der Wahrheitsbegriffs des Pragmatismus nach William James*. Braunsberg: Heynes Buchdruckerei, 1910.

For the question "What is truth?" pragmatists substitute "What are the grounds for the validity of my judgment?" Answers should be sought in Christian philosophy and the Aristotelian tradition, which objectively interprets the knowledge of truth. IKS

Notes

Also published in the *Abhandlung im Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen* des Lyceum Hosianum zu Braunsberg für das Jahr 1910, Wintersemester 1910/11.

883 Talbert, Ernest Lynn. *The Dualism of Fact and Idea in Its Social Implications*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1910. Philosophic Studies, No. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

Talbert describes functional logic and examines dualism's consequences for society. The systems of Hegel and Marx, and the subsequent economic "opportunism," receive criticism. He examines logical method as applied to trade, the consumer, social strata, and progressive democracy. "Democracy, then, as a logical method, signifies the continued use of a constructive hypothetical procedure in the solution of social problems." (p. 52) JRS

884 Tarozzi, Guiseppe. William James. Nuova Antologia (1 Nov 1910): 65-76.

885 Thorndike, Edward L. William James. Journal of Educational Psychology 1.8 (Sept 1910): 473-474.

886 Tsanoff, Radoslav A. Professor Boodin on the Nature of Truth. Phil Rev 19.6 (Nov 1910): 632-638.

Tsanoff comments on Boodin's "The Nature of Truth" {758}. Boodin is trapped by the dilemma of his epistemology: either the systematic metaphysics will omit the non-cognitive traits of experience, or the "will-to-think" will result in an irrational metaphysics. JRS

Notes

See Boodin, "The Nature of Truth: A Reply" {915}.

887 Vailati, Giovanni and Calderoni, Mario. L'arbitrario nel funzionamento della vita psichica. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 6.2 (March-April 1910): 166-183; 6.3 (May-June 1910): 234-248; 6.4 (Sept-Oct 1910): 385-416. Reprinted in *Il pragmatismo* {1471}, pp. 87-239. *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 189-314.

888 Varisco, Bernardino. Cognizioni e convenzioni. Riv Filo 2 (1910): 366-374.

889 Walker, Leslie J. *Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism.* London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910.

A brief summation of Scholastic doctrine and syllogistic refutation of adversaries is "no longer sufficient for present-day needs." (p. vii) The Introduction presents the three competing systems. Pragmatism borrows its notion of verification by experiment from science, and has French and German exponents. Scholastic Realism is the most complete form of realism. Part One tackles "The Psychological Analysis of Cognition," and treats pragmatism on pp. 124-206. Pragmatism denies an absolute distinction between subject and object but cannot explain how they can arise out of pure experience. Pragmatism's method of postulation can never achieve universality nor be completely verified, and ignores the givenness of facts and self-evident axioms. Dewey's claim that knowledge involves remembrance is false, and Schiller's treatment of axioms is too limited. Pragmatism succeeds in explaining the origin of belief only by ending up in Apriorism or Aristotelianism. Some concepts have no instrumental function. James's "felt relations" are not psychologically real, and "radical empiricism" is actually a metaphysical theory. Pragmatism uses genetic psychology, but this application of evolution to cognition results in an exaggerated and one-sided view, subordinating the intellect to the will.

In Part Two, "The Metaphysical Conditions of Knowledge," the "Philosophy of Pure Experience" is examined on pp. 295-346. James's doctrine of the connections between "selves" tends toward monism. Avenarius and Rey also offer theories of reality as experience. If humans "make" reality, or if the universe is "pan-psychic," the origin of knowledge is mysterious. A pragmatism based on personal idealism is unstable; it is driven to either Kantian skepticism or to the pure experience philosophy. In Part Three, "The Epistemological Value of Cognition," pragmatism's relation to physical science and its theory of truth are discussed. Truth as utility violates common sense, presupposes truth as correspondence, leads to skeptical subjectivism, and yields contradictory truths. Social agreement cannot be ultimate, and the criterion of "the maximal combination of satisfactions" is most ambiguous and lacks objectivity. Realism preserves the valuable portions of Absolutism and Pragmatism, without undermining common sense, leading to skepticism, or failing to explain the data of human experience. JRS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 8.9 (27 April 1911): 248-249. The lack of self-criticism, and the ignorance of pragmatism's interpretation of sensation and thought, makes Walker's criticisms ineffective. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 565-570. Pragmatism as a movement should not be held responsible for "the scattered utterances of any of its exponents" or a critic's sceptical inferences. It is Scholasticism which has failed to offer a theory of knowledge. Schiller replies to the charges that pragmatism involves skepticism and subjectivism, and argues that realism's correspondence theory cannot discover truths or prevent errors. JRS

Henry W. Wright, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 651-657. Walker's realism fails to give an adequate account of error, which involves inconsistency with organized experience. His reliance on human testimony to traditional belief runs contrary to the process of scientific progress. Philosophy can advance only by taking the "standpoint of experience" and conceiving knowledge and truth in terms of function and value. JRS

George H. Langley, Hibbert Journal 9.1 (Oct 1910): 223-226.

Notes

M.A. thesis, University of London, 1909.

890 Warren, G. O. A Philosophical Aspect of Science. Monist 20.2 (April 1910): 217-230.

Science aims to control experience using abstractions. JRS

Notes

See Carus's comments, "The Rock of Ages," Monist 20.2 (April 1910): 231-241 [*Truth on Trial* {672}, pp. 65-77].

891 Waterhouse, Eric S. *Modern Theories of Religion.* London: Charles H. Kelly, 1910.

Part One, chap. 8, is titled "Pragmatism as a Religious Philosophy: Professor James and Dr. Schiller," pp. 266-288. Pragmatism must develop a religious philosophy, since the God of religious experience cannot be ignored, and the complete valuation of experience is in religious consciousness. On pp. 314-329, Waterhouse examines James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}. JRS

Reviews

G. Galloway, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 429-430.

892 Waterhouse, Eric S. The Present Position in Religious Philosophy. London Quarterly Review 114.1 (July 1910): 24-38.

A review of the "journey from Transcendentalism on the one hand, to Empiricism and Pragmatism on the other." By the pragmatic method, even theism and monism can claim superiority. JRS

893 Waterhouse, Eric S. Professor William James. London Quarterly Review 114.2 (Oct 1910): 317-320.

894 Watson, John. Some Remarks on Radical Empiricism. Queen's Quarterly 18 (1910): 111-119.

James condemns pale abstractions, but conceptions grasp real essences, beyond the merely transient and picturable. James gives us a false dilemma between dualism or pantheism; absolute idealism instead holds that "God is present in every part of the universe...but...He is not present as fully in the radium as in the highest specimen of humanity." Radical empiricism cannot explain the "ordinary world," the "fundamental presuppositions of religious consciousness," or the problem of evil. James offers a "modern Manicheeism," the most hopeless of all creeds. JRS

1911

895 Aliotta, Antonio. Intuizionismo, prammatismo, ed intellettualismo come aspetti unilaterali ed astratti d'una verità superiore. In *Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia,* Bologna, Italy, 6-11 April 1911 (Bolongna: Biblioteca di Filosofia e di Pedagogia, 1911. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 173-179, with discussion following on pp. 180-181.

896 Amendola, Giovanni. La novità del pragmatismo. L'Anima 1.2 (Feb 1911): 56-59.

897 Amendola, Giovanni. *La volontà è bene.* Rome: Libreria romana editrice, 1911.

898 Angell, James R. William James. Psych Rev 18.1 (Jan 1911): 78-82. Reprinted in *William James Remembered,* ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 131-138.

The Principles of Psychology (1890) appeared at the right time and completely changed psychology. James introduced habit as the basic principle of mental organization, revolutionized views of emotion, gave instinct a place in the forefront of human psychology, demanded recognition of the vague and fugitive in consciousness, and, more so than other English writers, used materials from the pathological side of human life. His account of space perception still remains valuable. His support of psychical research in the face of severe criticism should teach us "honest independence." His greatest contribution lies not in his doctrines but in his spirit. IKS

899 Anon. Accidentalism. Article in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1910-1911), vol. 1, p. 114.

In metaphysics, the term is synonymous with Tychism, used by C. S. Peirce "for those theories which make chance an objective factor in the process of the Universe." JRS

900 Anon. Bergson in English. Nation 92.26 (29 June 1911): 648-649.

Reviews Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1911) and *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell (1911). The reviewer draws comparisons between James and Bergson. JRS

901 Anon. James, William. Article in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1910-1911), vol. 15, p. 144.

902 Arréat, Lucien. On the Abuses of the Notion of the Unconscious. Translated by Lydia G. Robinson. Monist 21.2 (April 1911): 267-277.

The dangers of moral materialism and anarchism inherent in James's pragmatism result from the elevation of instinctive experience over social intelligence. (p. 276) JRS

903 Baldwin, Bird T. William James' Contributions to Education. Journal of Educational Psychology 2.7 (Sept 1911): 369-382.

James is primarily responsible for the present-day empirical and experimental treatment of education. IKS

904 Baldwin, James M. Psychology and Philosophy. In *The American Yearbook for 1910*, new series, vol. 1 (New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1911), pp. 671-675. Excerpts, including the portion on pragmatism, are reprinted in Appendix C, "Aspects of Contemporary Thought," to his *Thought and Things*, vol. 3, Part 1: *Genetic Epistemology* {905}, pp. 272-280.

905 Baldwin, James M. *Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meanings of Thought or Genetic Logic.* Vol. 3: *Interest and Art, being Real Logic. I. Genetic Epistemology.* London: George Allen and Co.; New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Reviews

Willard C. Gore, Psych Bull 11.3 (15 March 1914): 110-112; Edward L. Schaub, Phil Rev 22.3 (May 1913): 314-320; Guy A. Tawney, J Phil 10.23 (6 Nov 1913): 637-641.

906 Benn, A. W. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Evolution. Mind 20.2 (April 1911): 243-247.

Schiller, in *Riddles of the Sphinx* {879}, incorrectly attributes to Aristotle the position that evolution can take place by "insensible gradations." JRS

907 Bergson, Henri. Vérité et réalité: Introduction. To *Le Pragmatisme*, translation of William James, *Pragmatism* {438} by E. Le Brun (Paris: Flammarion, 1911), pp. i-xvi. Reprinted as "Sur le pragmatisme de William James: Vérité et

réalité," in *La Pensée et le mouvant* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1934), and translated by M. L. Andison as "On the Pragmatism of William James: Truth and Reality" in *The Creative Mind* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 248-260. It was also reprinted with the revised title in *Oeuvres*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), pp. 1440-1450.

If we understand James, we will change our conception of the universe. The world will no longer seem like a play. In the world, scenes do not follow each other in order, things do not fit, and there are no finally decisive events. The world is fluid. James's conception of truth is suited to his conception of the world. IKS

908 Berman, Iakov Aleksandrovich. Sushchnost' Pragmatizma: Novyia Techeniia v Naukie o Myshlenii. Moscow: Zlavotsviet, 1911.

909 Berthelot, René. *Un Romantisme utilitaire: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste.* Vol. 1. *Le Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincaré.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911.

One can distinguish three senses of "pragmatism": (1) a certain attitude of mind, (2) a conception of truth, and (3) a view of the world. The second sense is the focus of this book, since it is the "newest" and the sense that William James prefers. Berthelot's thesis is that pragmatism is born out of German Romanticism and English Utilitarianism, and he considers Nietzsche's and Poincaré's pragmatisms as "limiting cases" (Nietzsche's excesses, Poincaré's defects). Of the former, he argues that there are two internal contradictions concerning objective truth and knowledge, and science and determinism. Chap. 7 is a discussion of Nietzsche's moral pragmatism. Of Poincaré's position, Berthelot believes that it is so "fragmentary and mitigated" that one hesitates to label it pragmatism, and here the author is concerned with Poincaré's substitution of "convenience" for "truth." LF

Reviews

A. W. Moore, Phil Rev 21.6 (Nov 1912): 707-709. Too many "general historical analogies" and omissions (for example, Dewey is mentioned but once) prevent any significant account of pragmatism. Worse, he indicts pragmatism for confounding psychological and logical necessity, without grasping pragmatism's theory. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 250-253. Berthelot has a vague understanding of pragmatism and seeks "traces and anticipations of it everywhere." Nietzsche takes the usefulness of a belief to be only grounds for judging it *false*, and thus he remains an intellectualist. Poincaré refuses to apply pragmatism beyond the mathematical sciences. JRS

François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 22 (1911): 198-199; Richard Smith, Int J Ethics 23.1 (Oct 1912): 103-104.

Notes

This book was initially published as a three-part article, "Sur le Pragmatisme de Nietzsche" {512}. See Lalande, "Philosophy in France in 1911" {1082} for a critique of this work. See also vol. 2 {1145} and vol. 3 {1661}.

910 Blundell, Alice. *Idealism, Possible and Impossible.* London: Ouseley, 1911.

Notes

See Tsanoff, "Rejoinder," Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 1911): 63-66.

916 Boodin, J. E. *Truth and Reality: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Chap. 1, "Philosophic Tolerance," pp. 3-14, is reprinted from {517}. Chap. 2, "Mind as Instinct," pp. 15-42, is reprinted from {308}. Chap. 3, "The Categories of Intelligence," pp. 43-64; chap. 4 "The Truth Process," pp. 67-85; chap. 5, "The Morphology of Truth," pp. 86-103; and chap. 6, "The Content of Truth," pp. 104-122, were written for this book. Chap. 7, "The Postulates of Truth," pp. 123-145, is reprinted from {758}. Chap. 8, "The Postulates of Truth Continued," pp. 146-163, is reprinted from {915}. Chap. 9, "From Protagorus to William James," pp. 165-185, is reprinted from {913}. Chap. 10, "What Pragmatism Is and Is Not," pp. 186-199, is reprinted from {628}. Chap. 11, "Meaning and Validity," pp. 200-213, is reprinted from {518}. Chap. 12, "Truth and Agreement," pp. 214-229, is reprinted from {627}. Chap. 13, "Human Nature and Truth," pp. 230-249, was written for this book. Chap. 14, "Pragmatic Realism," pp. 251-268, is reprinted from {759}. Chap. 15, "The Object and Its Contexts," pp. 269-290, is reprinted from {760}. Chap. 16, "Metaphysics–The Overlapping Problems," pp. 291-306, was written for this book. Chap. 17, "The Reality of Religious Ideals," pp. 307-326, is reprinted from {45}. JRS

Reviews

Ellen Bliss Talbot, Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 468-471. Boodin's pragmatism is "very moderate and conciliatory" but takes postulates to be both "absolutely necessary" and "hypotheses to be verified." JRS

Charles B. Vibbert, J Phil 12.2 (21 Jan 1915): 48-53. Boodin attempts to preserve James's pragmatism from "the unwarranted developments of the instrumentalists and the humanists." JRS

C. D. Broad, Mind 21.3 (July 1912): 449-451; André Lalande, Rev Phil 77.2 (Feb 1914): 194-196.

917 Bosanquet, Bernard. *Logic, Or the Morphology of Knowledge.* 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911.

The first edition was published in 1888. The second edition's expansions include chap. 9 of vol. 2, "Truth and Coherence," which discusses pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 21.6 (Nov 1912): 716.

Notes

See George Sabine, "Professor Bosanquet's *Logic* and the Concrete Universal" {1120}.

918 Boutroux, Émile. *William James.* Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1911. 2nd ed., 1912. The second edition was translated by Archibald and Barbara Henderson as *William James* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).

As J. R. Tuttle notes in his review, this "book contains practically no criticism but aims to give us a picture of the man and a brief characterization of what he tried to do." (p. 88) Although Boutroux devotes most of the text to a discussion of James's philosophy, it is really chap. 3, "Pragmatism," that is of interest. Here we find an explanation

of James's theory of truth and a short discussion of meaning, which mentions the influence of Renouvier and Pillon. The question of the possibility of truth in psychological and religious experiences is then raised, followed by a discussion of science, and scientific versus religious experience. Several objections to James's theory of truth are discussed, followed by an account of James's relation to Bergson, intellectual knowledge, and reality and experience. "For James it is exactly the degree of complexity and of richness of experience which measures the degree of its authenticity. Experience absolutely immediate and intuitive would be total experience." (p. 78) Chap. 4 surveys James's *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} and *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, and Boutroux concludes that "to say, with William James, *Im Anfang war die Tat*, is not to signify, 'In the Beginning was the Deed', to the exclusion of the reason. While admitting this formula, nothing prevents our maintaining the great principle of Descartes who also professed the free creation of the truth: 'We should not conceive any preference or priority between the understanding of God and His will'." (pp. 125-126) The book was well received, though the translation of the second edition was not. Nearly all the reviewers agree that Boutroux's work is a well-written and interesting, albeit cursory, account of James's philosophy. LF

Reviews

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 563-566. Neither Hoernlé nor Kallen (below) can agree with Boutroux's claim that "the essential idea of [James's] metaphysics was 'the identification of reality with largest, completest, profoundest, and directest experience'." Hoernle suggests that "the two poles of James's 'Radical Empiricism' were pragmatism on the one side and a certain Mysticism on the other." (p. 565) LF

Horace M. Kallen, J Phil 8.21 (12 Oct 1911): 583-584. A certain shift of emphasis leaves James unrendered. Contrary to Boutroux's account, James neither sought science's destruction, nor placed mysticism at the heart of his metaphysics. JRS

Dickinson S. Miller, Nation 94.15 (11 April 1912): 362-363. Boutroux's treatment is too light, and one would do better to read James. IKS

Robert M. Ogden, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 658-662. James roused the American mind from the "lethargy of its German rationalism." Boutroux "convincingly" outlines James's thought and shows how it bridges the gap between mind and matter. IKS

Maurice Serol, Rev de Phil 20 (1912): 94-97.

Reviews of the translation

Bertrand Russell, Cambridge Review 34 (5 Dec 1912): 176 [*Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 306]; J. R. Tuttle, Phil Rev 22.1 (Jan 1913): 88-90.

919 Bradley, F. H. Faith. Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 165-171. Reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 19-27.

Faith is not practical. In a note (p. 166) Bradley says that "Pragmatism, as I understand it, is merely a one-sided perversion of the more complete view. Its essence consists in the attempt to subordinate every aspect of mind to what it calls practice, the meaning of practice not having been first ascertained." JRS

920 Bradley, F. H. On Some Aspects of Truth. Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 305-341. The main portion, pp. 305-337, is reprinted in *Essays on Truth and Reality*

{1244}, pp. 310-352. The remainder, a discussion of James's *The Meaning of Truth* {672}, is reprinted with "slight alterations" in *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244}, pp. 142-149.

It is not clear in what sense James is a relativist. What does James mean by "humanity"? James's view that where there is truth there is a temporal process connecting idea and object is also criticized. IKS

Summaries

Katherine Everett, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 687-688.

921 Busch, Karl August. William James. Zeitschrift für Religionsphilosophie 4 (1911): 300-303.

For the Kantian, James was an "enfant terrible." He was an individualist and a poet. Busch had visited James in Cambridge late in James's life. IKS

922 Busch, Karl August. *William James als Religionsphilosophie.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911.

Busch discusses the psychological religious philosophy of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, the relation between pragmatism and religion, and James's pluralism in connection with God and meliorism. This exposition is followed by an evaluation. IKS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 283. This "well-meaning" book was written by one who demands "absolute" values and who is "quite sure he has the absolutely true religion." It is time that foreigners, such as James, should be credited with the ability to appreciate and supersede Kant. JRS

James B. Pratt, Psych Bull 9.12 (15 Dec 1912): 482-483.

923 Calderoni, Mario. Intorno il pragmatismo di G. Vailati. L'Anima 1.3 (March 1911): 88-93. Reprinted in *Scritti di Mario Calderoni* {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 347-358.

Calderoni replies to Amendola's "La novità del pragmatismo" {896}. Calderoni was a veteran of many skirmishes over the meaning of pragmatism, dating back to his celebrated exchange with Giuseppe Prezzolini during 1904 and 1905 in the pages of *Leonardo.* Amendola is accused of treating pragmatism far too superficially, seeing it as nothing other than the old inductive method in disguise. Calderoni addresses the positivist tendencies in pragmatism, and distances the genuine variety from the excesses of the "will to believe" variety. Once again, Calderoni takes the opportunity to argue that pragmatism means the pragmatism of Peirce's pragmatic maxim. EPC

924 Carus, Paul. Professor Mach and His Work. Monist 21.1 (Jan 1911): 19-42.

Mach prepared the way for the pragmatic movement, but he did not go to James's extremes. (p. 41) JRS

925 Carus, Paul. *Truth on Trial.* Chicago: Open Court, 1911.

The subtitle is "An Exposition of the Nature of Truth, Preceded by a Critique of Pragmatism and an Appreciation of Its Leader." The chapters are mostly reprinted articles

from the *Monist*, as follows: "A Prologue on Truth," pp. 1-3; "Pragmatism" {526}, pp. 4-45; "The Philosophy of Personal Equation" {638}, pp. 46-64; "The Rock of Ages," pp. 65-77, from Monist 20.2 (April 1910): 231-241; "The Nature of Truth" {776}, pp. 78-109; "Conclusion," pp. 110-112; "An Appendix on Pragmatism" which consists of "A German Critic of Pragmatism," pp. 113-126 (see {606}), and "Critics of Pragmatism Rebuked" {773}, pp. 126-131. The book is dedicated "To the memory of William James, who with the best intentions put truth on trial, and by his very errors advanced the cause of truth." The "Conclusion" expresses dismay at pragmatism's efforts to replace the "old truth" with "a more elastic kind of truth which can change with the fashions and makes it possible that we need no longer trouble about inconsistencies; for what is true to one need no longer be true to others." JRS

Reviews

J. Waterlow, Mind 20.4 (Oct 1911): 438.

926 Chiappelli, Alessandro. Il pluralismo moderno e il monismo. Riv Filo 3.2 (April 1911): 223-236.

927 Chiocchetti, Emilio. Saggio di esposizione sintetica del pragmatismo religiosi di W. James e di F. C. S. Schiller. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 3.1 (Feb 1911): 24-33; 3.2 (April 1911): 212-231.

928 Cockerell, T. D. A. Reality and Truth. Popular Science Monthly 78.4 (April 1911): 371-376.

Pragmatism, if socially oriented, is in accord with democracy. Excessive pragmatism forgets human limitations and the wisdom embodied in custom. JRS

929 Colvin, Stephen S. *The Learning Process*. New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Reviews

Elijah Jordan, Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 612-614

930 Cooley, William Forbes. Confessions of an Indeterminist. Int J Ethics 21.2 (Jan 1911): 199-215.

Genuine evolution and individuality requires indeterminism. Schiller's defence of libertarianism involves a conception of perfection "indistinguishable from the void." JRS

931 Croiset, Alfred. Le Pragmatisme et les sophistes grecs. Athena 8 (July 1911): 188-194.

932 Dauriac, Lionel. Positivisme et pragmatisme, criticisme et pragmatisme. Rev Phil 72.6 (Dec 1911): 584-605.

Summaries

F. R. Prout, Phil Rev 21.2 (March 1912): 266.

933 Dauriac, Lionel. Le Pragmatisme et le réalisme du sens commun. Rev Phil 72.4 (Oct 1911): 337-367.

Pragmatism is rooted in the Scotch philosophy of common sense and in positivism. Part One discusses the pragmatism of common sense, and the identification of pragmatism with empiricism. Part Two discusses pragmatism and realism; Part Three, Thomas Reid's realism; Part Four, Reid's doctrine of perception, and in Part Five, pragmatism and empiricism (Reid and James) are compared. Dauriac concludes that pragmatism may date back as far as the mind itself, that pragmatism and realism mutually imply each other, and that pragmatism should be distinguished from traditional rationalism and traditional empiricism. LF

Summaries

Katherine Everett, Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 119-120.

934 De Gaultier, Jules. Scientisme et pragmatisme. Rev Phil 36.6 (June 1911): 661-689.

935 Derr, E. Z. *The Uncaused Being and the Criterion of Truth.* Boston: Sherman, French and Co., 1911.

Derr criticizes James's religious pragmatism in the course of defending an uncaused monotheistic God. JRS

Reviews

"κ," Monist 23.2 (April 1913): 319-320.

936 Dewey, John. Brief Studies in Realism. J Phil 8.15 (20 July 1911): 393-400; 8.20 (28 Sept 1911): 546-554. Reprinted with revisions in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 250-280. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 92-107. *MW* 6: 103-122.

Part one, "Naïve Realism vs. Presentative Realism," argues that presentative realism's thesis that every perception is a knowing removes the "real" object from a relationship with the knower. This removal is the idealist's opportunity to find (1) purely mental states, and (2) evidence for a transcendent knower. Naïve realism treats objects *and* perceptions as natural events, and can explain knowledge in terms of natural processes. Perceptions are the only evidence for the objects inferred in knowing, and the only means to test such inferences. Part two, "Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relationship," points out that presentative realism must hold that "knowledge of every form and kind must be treated as a case of a presentation to a knower." This "ego-centric predicament" creates "epistemology" and provides the common premise for the realist/idealist debate. That debate is analogous to a debate on whether food only exists in relation to eating, or eating only exists in relation to food. This debate starts only on the agreed assumption that the organism and its environment can only stand in one relation to each other (analogously, that the knower and the known can only stand in one relation with each other). The naïve realist rejects this assumption, finding other relations in which the "self" is an "agent-patient, doer, sufferer, and enjoyer" of things. JRS

Summaries

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 10.2 (Jan 1912): 482; Elijah Jordan, Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 120-121.

Notes

See E. B. McGilvary's comments in {1096} and {1097}.

937 Dewey, John. Environment and Organism. Article in *A Cyclopedia of Education*, ed. Paul Monroe (New York: Macmillan, 1911-1913), vol. 2, pp. 486-487. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 437-440.

As correlative terms of the medium of life–"a self-conserving, expanding activity"–they interact and develop together. The more highly evolved organisms have correspondingly more heterogeneous and complex environments. JRS

Notes

Dewey also wrote entries on 117 other terms for this dictionary, from "Abstraction" to "Values, Educational." They give succinct overviews and definitions for many aspects and key concepts of his philosophy. See especially "Epistemology," vol. 2, p. 491 [*MW* 7: 440-443], and "Pragmatism," vol. 5, pp. 22-24 [*MW* 7: 326-330].

938 Dewey, John. Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life. Hibbert Journal 9.4 (July 1911): 765-778. Reprinted as "Maurice Maeterlinck," in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 31-44. *MW* 6: 123-135.

939 Dewey, John. The Problem of Truth. Old Penn, The Weekly Review of the University of Pennsylvania 9 (11 Feb 1911): 522-528; 9 (18 Feb 1911): 556-563; 9 (4 March 1911): 620-625. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 12-68.

Part one is titled "Why is Truth a Problem?" To the layman, truths are socially dominant principles that regulate conduct and provide for common understanding. Individual states of mind are but capacities "judged from the standpoint of definite social use and results." Without connection to society, a person's experiences are neither true nor false. The attempt to artificially distinguish the thing from its social relations and traits abandons common sense: "socially determined qualities are an inextricable part of any object." When custom itself becomes doubtful, philosophy has historically sought some "final and eternal measure of truth" beyond experience. Science has instead developed improving methods of inquiry, with the expectation that truths will also improve.

Part two is titled "Truth and Consequences." The consistency theory of truth cannot guarantee material truth, and the correspondence theory makes verification impossible. Their endless debate is conducted on the basis on a common assumption: "a statement by its nature implies an assertion of its own truth." Statements, according to pragmatism, have any *intellectual* quality (as opposed to a prejudicial, dogmatic, or stimulative quality), only if there is a doubt of its truth and ongoing inquiry trying to verify it. The realists can explain "correspondence" only using established *facts*; when an intellectual *proposition* is made, one has reason to infer it, and one believes that further inquiry would probably verify it. For example, a proposition about the past actually has its meaning in taking something past "in its bearings upon the future consequences which making the proposition help us to reach." (p. 40, italics deleted) Only the pragmatist can offer a meaning to the phrase, "truth presents things as they really are," and an answer to the question, "What *is* intellectual representation?" Common sense is perplexed on hearing that the truth of a proposition is a mysterious static property.

Part three is titled "Objective Truths." The only serious question for pragmatism is how intellectual truths can become social facts, as both transcendentalism and science have, so far, offered truths unrelated to social needs. The answering hypothesis is that science will redirect society's interests to "fostering and subjecting novelty." A progressive society is freed from customary limited purposes, finding ever-widening ends

"that evoke interest and endeavor." The objectivity of science lies in its ability to create "interpretations of things that make these things effectively function in liberation of human purpose and efficiency of human effort." JRS

940 Dewey, John. Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding. J Phil 8.3 (3 Feb 1911): 77-79. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 143-145.

Dewey answers Spaulding's "Realism: A Reply to Professor Dewey and an Exposition" {1007}. The criticisms made of realism were not made from the genetic standpoint, but from the formal issue of whether questions of existence can be answered by the analysis of propositions. JRS

Notes

See Spaulding's reply, "A Reply to Professor Dewey's Rejoinder" {1008}.

941 Dewey, John and Edward G. Spaulding. Joint Discussion with Articles of Agreement and Disagreement. J Phil 8.21 (12 Oct 1911): 574-597. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 146-152.

Dewey states that "the process of inquiry and discovery which terminates in a proposition is necessary to the existence of the subject-matter or subsistent of the proposition" and that this process does not alter the fact that "the subsistent is the existent to which it refers, modified; that this particular sort of modification is just what is denoted by proposition, assertion, knowledge." The act of assertion produces "a more desirable form of the existent referred to." Spaulding asserts, and Dewey denies, that some types of propositions are independent of inquiry (for example, Dewey rejects Spaulding's example of numbers being logically prior to counting). Dewey claims that logical entities and the process of inquiry are the same thing. JRS

942 Dijk, Isaak Van. *Het Pragmatisme van William James.* Groningen: P. Noordhoff, 1911.

943 Dolson, Grace N. The Philosophy of Bergson. II. Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 1911): 46-58.

Bergson sympathizes with the pragmatic account of knowledge and, with the pragmatists, attacks rationalism. Unlike pragmatism, epistemology *follows* from his metaphysics. His philosophy suffers from independent difficulties relating intelligence and instinct, time and space, and matter and perception. JRS

944 Dumville, Benjamin. The Standpoint of Psychology. *Proc Arist Soc* 11 (1911): 191-231.

Dumville rejects James's thesis that behavior occurs for the sake of some future goal. (p. 70-71) On pp. 72-74, Dumville accuses Dewey's "The Psychological Standpoint" (1886) of confusing the psychological with the philosophical standpoint on experience. JRS

945 Enriques, Federigo. La Philosophie de Giovanni Vailati. Revista di Scienza 9 (1911).

946 Fawcett, Edward D. A Note on Pragmatism. Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 399-401.

Pragmatism cannot claim any originality for its attacks on idealism. JRS

947 Flournoy, Théodore. *La Philosophie de William James.* Saint-Blaise: Foyer Solidariste, 1911. Translated by Edwin B. Holt and William James, Jr. as *The Philosophy of William James*, (New York: Henry Holt; London: Constable, 1917. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969).

James's artistic temperament and early environment created his "sense of the poignant reality and of human suffering." This caused in turn his rejection of religious and scientific monism. Chapters expound James's "Pragmatism," "Radical Empiricism," "Pluralism," "Tychism," "Meliorism and Moralism," "Theism," and "The Will to Believe." A "Summary and Conclusion" distinguishes the popular philosopher from the professional philosopher. James "will remain one of the great prophets of moral and intellectual liberty in the history of thought." The appendix is a reprint of his review of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, pp. 217-254. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 279. Flournoy has drawn "a living and well-proportioned picture," although greater emphasis is placed on the moral and religious side of James's thought, to the expense of his psychological doctrines. JRS

Edwin B. Holt, Psych Bull 9.7 (15 July 1912): 276-279; Horace M. Kallen, Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 610-611; Arthur Mitchell, J Phil 9.19 (12 Sept 1912): 527-529; M. S., Rev de Phil 21.2 (1 Aug 1912): 204-205.

Reviews of the translation

J. R. Kantor, Int J Ethics 29.1 (Oct 1918): 120-121; Alfred Sidgwick, Mind 26.4 (Oct 1917): 487-488; William K. Wright, Phil Rev 26.6 (Nov 1917): 671-672.

Notes

Pp. 68-99 of the translation are reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 219-233.

948 Fouillée, Alfred. *La Pensée et les nouvelles écoles anti-intellectualiste.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911. 2nd ed., 1911. 4th ed., 1919. 5th ed., 1927.

Fouillée announces his intention to "determine the nature, origin, and practical and theoretical value of thought"; as well as to provide critiques of the anti-intellectualist schools: the intuitionalists, pragmatists, and skeptics. Books 1 and 2, on the "Will to Consciousness" and the "Origin of thought and Ideas," are primarily constructive; and according to de Laguna's review, "add no notable addition to the author's system." The critical portion of the work, Book 3, consists of five chapters, including "La Néo-sophistique pragmatiste." In this chapter Fouillée distinguishes between psychological pragmatism, epistemological pragmatism, and moral and religious pragmatism. There are nearly as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists. It is impossible to rigorously define this position, which is a curious amalgam of the work of Heraclitus, Protagoras, Hobbes, Kant, Mill, and Spencer. In all its forms, however, it denies the mind the "power of true objective knowledge..." Pragmatists are creators of truth, and pragmatism "reduces science to a utilitarian knowledge, with a view to our practical needs." The final chapter, "Intuitionalism," focuses on Bergson and his claim that concepts are discrete and relative. Fouillée concludes that "intellectual voluntarism is the condition of action and morality, as it is the condition of knowledge." (p. 412) LF

Extended reviews

André Lalande, "Le 'voluntarisme intellectualiste' de M. Fouillée" {1083}.

Reviews

Theodore De Laguna, J Phil 9.18 (29 Aug 1912): 498-500. Fouillée claims priority over Nietzsche, James, and Bergson, and faults them for departing from the true path cleared by his "will to consciousness" philosophy. Like most French discussions of pragmatism, it falsely attributes claims to pragmatism. JRS

Walter Goodnow Everett, Phil Rev 24.1 (Jan 1915): 72-81. Fouillée finds that pragmatism eventually admits what all logicians profess: ideas become true when they bring us into logical relations with other experiences. JRS

J. Henry, Revue Néo-Scolastique 18.4 (Nov 1911): 601-603; François Pillon, L'Année Philosophique 22 (1911): 209-210.

Notes

"La Néo-sophistique pragmatiste" was also published in Rev Phil 71.4 (April 1911): 337-366. A summary of Fouillée's philosophy is Alma Thorne Penney, "The Intellectual Voluntarism of Alfred Fouillée," in *Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton*, ed. George Holland Sabine (New York: Macmillan, 1917), pp. 95-111.

949 Gates, Errett. Pragmatic Elements in Modernism. American Journal of Theology 15.1 (Jan 1911): 43-56.

Catholic Modernists (especially Tyrrell, Le Roy, and Loisy) have "instinctively" appealed to pragmatic principles, along with an eclectic selection from other philosophies. This pragmatic aspect involves their alliance with Blondel's school, the Philosophy of Action, and pre-dates Pragmatism itself. Specifically, they claim that experience alone is the source and test of knowledge–especially theological and historical knowledge–and that this test is one of "practical consequences" or "successful working." JRS

Summaries

Corrinne Stephenson, Phil Rev 20.6 (Nov 1911): 676-677.

950 Gaultier, Paul. *La Penseé contemporaine: Les Grands problèmes*. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie., 1911.

Neither a survey nor a critique exclusively, this work is a study of some of the principal problems of the day *vis-à-vis* some of the most notable texts. Authors include William James, Le Roy, Lalande, Bergson, Boutroux, Fouillée, Chide, Blondel, and Schiller. Of special interest is chap. 10, "The End of Monism," which centers on a discussion of James's philosophy of experience. "The Americans are a practical people," according to Gaultier. "So as to escape skepticism, the destructive energy that engenders idealism, [and] the fact that it denies the reality of the external world, they invented pragmatism." (p. 291) This is followed by a description of James's theory of truth and Schiller's view of reality. Chap. 12 is a discussion of James's *Pragmatism* {438}, including some remarks on Blondel's *L'Action* (1893). For the pragmatist, "truth and a part of reality are 'what is better to believe'...[and] science, like art and morality, exists only in the act of humanity." (p. 267) The author takes exception to each of these points, arguing for the objectivity of reality and for truth as a correspondence between mind and reality. (p. 305-6) "Truth is no more constructed wholly by the human mind than it pre-exists in facts. It is intelligence taking possession of things." "...in the beginning was the action, the action of a good God who ceaselessly impels the uni-

verse and our collaboration, with the goal of a perfection most complete and elevated. In Him alone...do utility and truth, that is to say, reality and goodness, coincide." (p. 311) LF

951 Goldstein, Julius. *Wandlungen in der Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911.

James, Bergson, and Eucken are the forces of progress bringing the downfall of rationalism. JRS

Reviews

Sydney Waterlow, Int J Ethics 22.3 (April 1912): 358-360.

952 Granger, Frank. The Contribution of Pragmatism to the History of Philosophy. In *Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia,* Bologna, Italy, 6-11 April 1911 (Bologna: Biblioteca di Filosofia e di Pedagogia, 1911. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 311-314.

James's principle is that "human experience is founded upon the intuition of the real." (p. 312, italics deleted) This principle forestalls any attempt to use categories as they are found by introspection for the sole definition of the real. Idealism does not violate this principle, and benefits from the pragmatist's addition of "action" to the basic categories. JRS

953 Hodgson, Shadworth. Some Cardinal Points in Knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 5 (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 31-87.

Pragmatism wrongly identifies any cognition of an object with a complete knowledge of that object. In holding that complete knowledge is impossible, pragmatism fallaciously concludes that we have no knowledge at all. (p. 51) "Thinking aims not at satisfaction but at truth." Verification can only find truths, using ultimate data of experience. JRS

954 Huizinga, Arnold van C. P. *The American Philosophy Pragmatism: Critically Considered in Relation to Present-Day Theology.* Boston: Sherman, French, 1911.

If truth is but a form of value in experience, subjectivism and irrationalism follow. "There are no standards, no norms, no creeds anymore." This modern Americanism drifts on "the evolutionary currents." Dewey's pragmatism follows the collapse of the representative view of knowledge, just as Fichte's "supreme ego" answered Kant. Pragmatism fails to account for the changeless order in nature. Absolute truth arrives in experience, and has nothing to do with origins. In pragmatism, God is brought to human judgment, and "bowels and brains have exchanged functions." JRS

Reviews

"κ," Monist 23.1 (Jan 1913): 159; I. Woodbridge Riley, J Phil 9.9 (25 April 1912): 248-249.

955 Hyde, Winifred. *Zur Erkenntnislehre des Pragmatismus.* Jena: Frommansche, 1911.

956 Jacks, Lawrence Pearsall. William James and His Message. Contemporary Review 99.1 (Jan 1911): 20-33.

James's philosophy is a stimulating influence because it is a call to undertake a "daring and risky expedition into the unknown." For James, words were "pointers" into a "concrete whole of experience," while for his critics, words were to be taken at face value. IKS

957 James, William. *Memories and Studies.* Edited, with a prefatory note, by Henry James. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911. Translated into French by H. Marty, with a preface by Émile Boutroux {1243}, as *Aux étudiants* (Paris: Payot, 1914).

A collection of memorial addresses, essays and occasional pieces compiled by his son Henry James in execution of the intent which James formed before his death. "Louis Agassiz," pp. 3-16, was first published in 1897. Agassiz trained most of the American naturalists of James's generation, seeking out promising students. He valued facts only, was an enemy of all abstractionism, and favored the concrete method of instruction, demanding that students go out and learn the facts for themselves. And James himself, while unable to escape abstractionism, learned from Agassiz the value of living in the "light of the world's concrete fullness." "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord," pp. 19-34, is a reprint of {121}. "Robert Gould Shaw," pp. 37-61, was first published in 1897. Civil War hero Robert Gould Shaw and the regiment of black soldiers under his command suffered defeat on Morris Island. Yet through this union of a "blue-eyed child of fortune" and "dark outcasts," in a nation standing on the "horrible self-contradiction" of slavery, truth became possible at last. "Francis Boott," pp. 65-72, was first published in 1904. The composer Francis Boott was a private man, honest, sturdy, and faithful. Having outlived three generations, he remained unchanged and can serve as a standard for measuring the changes which took place around him. "Thomas Davidson: A Knight-Errant of the Intellectual Life," pp. 75-104, was first published in May 1905. Thomas Davidson was an intense individualist, describable only by contradictory adjectives, with a great capacity for friendship, an easy man to quarrel with, and holding intellectual treasures of the rarest. James first met him at meetings of a philosophical club in Cambridge at which Davidson defended Aristotle. James believed Davidson should become professor of Greek at Harvard, but Davidson made this impossible by savagely attacking the Greek department. While Davidson came to dislike the academic life, and once attacked James for the "ignoble academicism" of his character, he remained essentially a teacher. He founded the Fellowship of the New Life and established a summer school of philosophy in the Adirondack Mountains.

"Herbert Spencer's Autobiography," pp. 107-142, is a reprint of {175}. "Frederick Myers' Service to Psychology," pp. 145-170, is a reprint of {64}. "Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher," pp. 173-206, is a reprint of {670}. "On Some Mental Effects of the Earthquake," pp. 209-226, was first published in 1906. James describes his experiences during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. During the event he felt no fear and saw it as a person. He was impressed by the speed with which order was restored and the "universal equanimity." "The Energies of Men," pp. 229-264, is a reprint of {437}. "The Moral Equivalent of War," pp. 267-296, is a reprint of {819}. "Remarks at the Peace Banquet," pp. 299-306, is a reprint of {179}. "The Social Value of the

College-Bred," pp. 309-328, is a reprint of {557}. The next three essays are brought together in chap. 14, "The University and the Individual." "The Ph. D. Octopus," pp. 329-347, is a reprint of {122}; "The True Harvard," pp. 348-355, is a reprint of {123}; and "Stanford's Ideal Destiny," pp. 356-367, is a reprint of {332}. "A Pluralistic Mystic," pp. 371-411, is a reprint of {820}. IKS

Reviews

Anon, The Athenaeum no. 4389 (9 Dec 1911): 726-727. A "garden of rare flowers, fragrant with the personality of a great philosopher." IKS

Howard V. Knox, Mind 21.3 (July 1912): 453-455. Knox indicates a number of important points. As always, James is a delightful reading. IKS

Dickinson S. Miller, Nation 94.15 (11 April 1912): 362-363. These essays mark James as among the best American essayists. IKS

Bertrand Russell, Cambridge Review 33 (16 Nov 1911): 118 [*Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 291]. James's maxim that a worthy pursuit will make a man's face shine does little for chimney sweeps. The essay on Spencer is amusing, those on war, delightful. IKS

958 James, William. *Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning to an Introduction to Philosophy.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911. Translated into French by Roger Picard as *Introduction á la philosophie* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1914). Reprinted as *The Works of William James: Some Problems of Philosophy*, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

Philosophy is facing much criticism because when compared with the sciences it makes no progress. But philosophy is the residue of unanswered questions: as soon as questions receive definite answers, they split off from their philosophical parent and become separate specialties. In some ways, science has made less progress than philosophy. The ancients would find many familiar conceptions in modern science, but the whole of critical philosophy would seem strange and difficult to understand. Philosophy is accused of being dogmatic. This charge is historically valid, but since when thinking about things in general any method can be used, there is no reason why philosophy should remain dogmatic. In fact, it has become less dogmatic. It is also accused of substituting abstractions for real life. The charge is true, but the manners of philosophy can change and it can get as close to life as "realistic novelists." In the older and better sense of the term, philosophy, to use Herbert Spencer's words, is simply the search for completely unified knowledge. It is also thought of as metaphysics, with problems distinct from those of the sciences. Metaphysics deals with many obscure questions, most of them real and not arising from the misuse of words.

Two types of mind have dominated the history of metaphysics: the rationalist and the empiricist. The rationalist's thought goes from wholes to parts, while the empiricist begins with particulars and proceed to wholes. The problem of being is central for metaphysics: why there is something rather than nothing. The problem has no solution, and rationalistic efforts to deduce being are failures. All philosophers must beg the question and begin with something given. The given is first perceived and then, conceived. The intellectual life consists of the substitution of concepts for percepts. Rationalists view concepts as independent of and superior to experience, while em-

piricists insist that concepts must always stand related to perceptual particulars. The pragmatic rule is important: the meaning of a concept is found either in the sensible particulars which it designates, or in the particular difference in experience which its being true will make. Concepts originate because they are useful. By their means we can seek what is absent, make predictions, and influence the course of experience. They also have a theoretical use: we come to understand our percepts better, to know many truths about them, and explain them.

Since concepts are discrete and static, relations between them are unchanging. These relations are studied in the mathematical sciences. To explain perceptual facts means to correlate the percepts with concepts and assume that the intuitively found relations holding between concepts also hold between percepts. A conceptual structure is thereby substituted for the perceptual flux. Conceptual structures by their simplicity can give rise to feeling of sublimity and power, to new interests and motivations. Intellectualists, overcome by such feelings, come to think of the conceptual realm as something superior to the perceptual. But concepts also have their defects: they provide only an abstract map and falsify reality by their discreteness. They make the flux impossible to understand. The deficiencies of concepts have given rise to claims that activity and causation are incomprehensible, that knowledge, motion, and change are impossible, that perceived resemblances are illusions, that no knowledge of direction is possible until the process has been completed, that relations are not real, and that even the relation of subject to predicate is unintelligible and self-contradictory.

In our time Bradley and Bergson have faced these dialectical difficulties and proposed general solutions. For Bradley, the perceptual order possesses a felt wholeness which is destroyed by concepts. But as an intellectualist who cannot admit mere feeling into philosophy, Bradley refuses to admit both the wholeness of the perceptual and the discreteness of the conceptual into philosophy, and cannot delimit the scope of each and show how one supplements the other. He then has no choice but to construct an absolute in which, in some incomprehensible way, the two stand together. He should have followed Bergson, who uses concepts when they help and drops them when they hinder. Concepts do not reveal the deepest levels of reality, which are found in our perceptual experience and show us continuity, substance, activity, causality, and freedom. This conclusion establishes the empiricist point of view, making conceptual systems distinct but inferior orders of reality. Conceptual systems are changeless and ideal objects always remain the same. We must accept the logical realism of Plato that concepts are singulars, which is an eccentric position for an empiricist. Concepts and percepts are made of the same kind of stuff, melt into each other, and are always handled together.

Rationalism favors monism and empiricism favors pluralism. Looked at pragmatically, the world is in some respects a unity and in others a multiplicity; the extent of each is something to be ascertained. Monists claim that the unity of things confers special dignity and grounds rationality. Presently, monism exists as absolute idealism and often claims the support of mystical insight. It is a sublime view, able to confer religious stability and peace. However, monism cannot account for finite consciousnesses, creates the problem of evil, contradicts the character of reality as experienced, and fosters fatalism. Pluralism is free from such difficulties. It takes experience at face value; the world is unfinished and full of possibilities. Pluralism is melioristic. It is more scientific and agrees better with the "moral and dramatic expressiveness of life."

The problem of novelty arises at this point. In respect of the physical world, it serves us very well to believe that experienced novelty is only a remixing of eternal elements. But with respect to human lives the case is different. It is of no use to talk about the remixing of ancient elements when the full individuality of a person has never been and will never come again. Perceptually, novelty comes discontinuously in "buds and drops." Conceptually this seems impossible, presenting the ancient problem of the "continuum and the infinite," found in arguments against motion developed by Zeno the Eleatic and Kant. Charles Renouvier, to escape the paradoxes of infinity, asserted discontinuous change to became a radical pluralist. Renouvier made mistakes, but his defense of pluralism freed James from monism. It is no difficulty to speak of an infinity of "standing" things. Thus, in numbering the stars it is possible to think of the process as endless or as coming to an end. The difficulties of infinity arise when we consider "growing" things. What is continuous is infinitely divisible and the end of a process cannot be reached by the addition of units. The only solution is to think of change perceptually or empirically, as involving the addition of discrete units.

Recent mathematics has developed a "new infinite" which is used by Bertrand Russell to dissolve Zeno's paradoxes. Russell argues that the longer path of Achilles consists of an infinity of points as does the shorter path of the tortoise. The two paths can then be correlated point for point and Achilles in the same amount of time can traverse the longer path and the tortoise, the shorter. But Russell is in error because he turns it into a problem of dealing retrospectively with a standing infinite. The real problem concerns the formation of paths which requires the traversing of a continuum containing an infinite number of points by occupying each of the points in succession. The new infinite thus does not block the way of the empiricist view that change involves discrete additions. But if reality changes by finite steps, it remains to be determined whether these additions contain genuine novelty.

The monistic denial of novelty is based on the claim that a cause already contains the effect. The scholastic principle that a cause must be adequate to its effect was developed by rationalists into the view that cause and effect are different names for the same being. In Descartes and especially Leibniz, the perceptual view is replaced by the conceptual. Leibniz's pre-established harmony establishes God as the sole and instantaneous cause of everything, thus making novelty impossible. Hume rejected the common view of causality as the exercise of power because he could find no experience of connection. He could have been a pluralist, but he was half-hearted like most empiricists of the past. For him events are disconnected, yet no genuine novelty is possible. Kant remedy for Hume failed because he accepted Hume's premise that events are totally discontinuous. However, causality's meaning must lie in our perceptual experience, in our own activity when we strive to bring about results against resistance. IKS

Reviews

A. D. Lindsay, Hibbert Journal 10.2 (Jan 1912): 489-492. This is perhaps the most interesting of James's works. James sometimes describes philosophy as the residue of questions not yet capable of scientific treatment, but he holds that philosophy co-ordinates the sciences and that it treats the general and leaves the particular to science. IKS

Dickinson S. Miller, "The Pragmatic System," Nation 93.11 (14 Sept 1911): 240-241. The work centers around three problems: the relation of thought to things, the problem of the one and the many, and the problem of novelty. James rebels against control and his treatment of these problems can be reduced to this rebellion. IKS

W. P. Montague, J Phil 9.1 (4 Jan 1912): 22-25. It is disappointing that this book breaks off just at the beginning of the treatment of certain metaphysical problems. IKS

George H. Sabine, Int J Ethics 22.2 (Jan 1912): 217-221. The theory of conception is the root of James's thought. A great philosopher can teach even by errors. James is mistaken is opposing conception to perception so sharply. He resembles Kant, and his solution of this difficulty is as artificial as Kant's. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 20.4 (Oct 1911): 571-573. James has been writing introductions to philosophy since *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). Had it been completed, it would still have given us only a fragment of James's vision. It teaches philosophy to be "profound without pedantry." The treatment of the problem of being is novel, and so are the chapters on percept and concept. IKS

Anon, Athenaeum no. 4365 (24 June 1911): 709-710; Anon, "Some Works on Philosophy," Contemporary Review 192.2 (Aug 1912): 290-295.

Reviews of the French translation

M. S., Rev de Phil 25 (1914): 431-435. Radical evolutionism and a defiance of reason marks James's other works. The present one appears to be the beginning of a return to the "philosophia perennis" of Aristotle and St. Thomas. IKS

Lional Dauriac, Rev Phil 79.6 (June 1915): 557-561.

959 Jastrow, Joseph. An American Academician. Educational Review 41.1 (Jan 1911): 27-33.

Jastrow offers some reminiscences of James. IKS

960 Johnson, Francis Howe. *God in Evolution: A Pragmatic Study of Theology.* London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911.

Reviews

M. M. Pattison Muir, Hibbert Journal 10.2 (Jan 1912): 509-511.

961 Jordan, David Starr. *The Stability of Truth.* New York: Henry Holt, 1911.

The test of truth is its "livableness." What is needed is not representation, but "accuracy as prompting fruitful attack or exploitation." Science exemplifies the method of trusting knowledge. JRS

Reviews

H. A. Overstreet, Int J Ethics 23.1 (Oct 1912): 92-95. A noteworthy application of pragmatism to science and conduct. It is interesting how this eminent scientist settles the mechanist-vitalist dispute. JRS

962 Jourdain, Eleanor Frances. Pragmatism and a Theory of Knowledge. In her *On the Theory of the Infinite on Modern Thought* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), pp. 31-55.

Reviews

Harold C. Brown, J Phil 8.18 (31 Aug 1911): 500-502; Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 437.

963 Kallen, Horace M. Pragmatism and Its "Principles." J Phil 8.23 (9 Nov 1911): 617-636.

Kallen comments on H. Heath Bawden's *The Principles of Pragmatism* {752}. Bawden's "Chicago School" pragmatism is a "Hegelianism of the extreme left," which possesses a "functional absolute" and presents a "museum of fallacies." The authentic pragmatism is that of James; Kallen explains its principles at length. He then distinguishes and describes four other offshoot varieties of pragmatism: Schiller's humanism, Dewey's and Bawden's instrumentalism, "epiphenomenal" pragmatism, and the "New Realism." JRS

964 Lalande, André. L'Idée de vérité d'après William James et ses adversaires. Rev Phil 71.1 (Jan 1911): 1-26.

The realist posits a world external to the individual, of which true knowledge is an accurate copy, and false knowledge is an inaccurate representation. For the idealist, all knowledge is arrived at *a priori*. In answer to the question, "What is the reality to which true propositions correspond?" and "In what does that accord consist?" the pragmatist replies that they do not transcend the ideas, but are of the same nature as it. (p. 5) The idea and the action form a whole experience. Truth is the expedient in our way of thinking and behaving. Pratt objects: if truth consists in actual verification, how are past events true or false? Pragmatism answers that there are historical works and there is a consensus. With regard to the charge of solipsism, Lalande point out that James explicitly rejects it; he *can* be a solipsist, but no more or less than an anti-pragmatist. (p. 13) Lalande concludes by arguing for pragmatism as a common sense philosophy, and against the charges of anarchy and relativism (there is a consensus of opinion which grounds science). LF

Summaries

Corrinne Stephenson, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 465.

965 Lane, Albert C. The Trilemma of Determinism. Western Journal of Education 4 (April 1911): 161-168.

On p. 168 Lane reprints a letter of William James's, which emphasizes the unalterability of past events. JRS

966 Levi, Adolfo. La filosofia dell'esperienza: La filosofia dell'intuizione indifferenziata (Bergson e James). Rivista di Psicologia 7.1 (Jan-Feb 1911): 47-75. Reprinted in *La filosofia dell'experienza*, vol. 2 (Bologna: Stabilimento Poligrafico Emiliano, 1911).

967 Lovejoy, Arthur, O. William James as Philosopher. Int J Ethics 21.2 (Jan 1911): 125-153. Reprinted with "some omissions and additions" in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 79-112. *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 153-164.

Contrary to common belief, James had more logical scrupulosity than most and followed his analyses wherever they led. James was devoted to individuality and had a sense for the flow of time. We should not infer from the simplicity of his style the simplicity of his thought. It is complex and delicately balanced. IKS

968 Lowie, Robert H. A Forgotten Pragmatist: Ludwig Feuerbach. J Phil 8.5 (2 March 1911): 128-129.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in 1910.

969 MacDonald, Loren Benjamin. *Life in the Making: An Approach to Religion through the Method of Modern Pragmatism.* Boston: Sherman, French and Co., 1911.

Pragmatism tests all truth and reality in relation to the natural experience of active life. Reason's value lies in its instrumentality for such life, but it is limited; the resulting agnosticism should be "full of hope and joyful expectancy." In religion, such agnosticism is a confession that unlimited possibilities of experience await. The mystical revelation, for example, will radically alter one's viewpoint on life. Religion is a respect for our moral and spiritual possibilities. History recounts such religious progress and its rewards, which supplies the only justification for keeping to this road that pragmatism can offer. Religion requires the surrender of individuality and materialism. Science need not be an obstacle. How can pragmatism supply that basic religious trust in the essential goodness of the world? This trust's value for strengthened life is permanent. Even though dogmatic blind faith demands certainty, people can confidently act on hypothesis alone, and scientific method confirms this ability. Lofty ideals of social change do not confront pessimistically conceived "hard realities" but only older ideals, congealed into tradition. The optimist's confidence in goodness harnesses the most powerful force available: mental suggestion. Consciousness is not the sum of life; optimism will access life's hidden potentials for display in human experience. Pragmatism cannot endorse any particular creed about God, since God is manifested in diverse ways for human experience, but creeds (like the faith in immortality) are justified to the extent that they create value for this life. A pragmatic unified church would covenant only on "the simple faith in the latent and undeveloped capacities of the human soul." JRS

Reviews

"κ," Monist 23.3 (July 1913): 479. The contents of this book are more like sermons, written in a "tone of prophetic ecstasy," than expositions. JRS

970 McDougall, William. In Memory of William James. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 15.1 (March 1911): 11-29.

James was a leader of the Society, but had the Society never existed, he would have still done much for psychical research. His aim was to reconcile science and religion on empirical grounds, which is identical with the aim of the Society. James's psychical research provided data for the attack on mechanical materialism. IKS

Notes

This issue of the *Proceedings* includes memorial remarks by H. Arthur Smith, "Commemorative Address: William James and Frank Podmore," pp. 1-4.

971 McGilvary, Evander B. Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning. J Phil 8.19 (14 Sept 1911): 511-525.

A comparison of James and Woodbridge on their relational theories of consciousness. JRS

972 McGilvary, Evander B. The Fringe of William James's Psychology as the Basis of Logic. Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 137-164.

The doctrine of the "fringe" can serve as the basis of a wider logic than James himself developed. This wider logic centers around the "non-pragmatistic correspondence between ideas and realities." IKS

973 McGilvary, Evander B. Professor Dewey's "Action of Consciousness." J Phil 8.17 (17 Aug 1911): 458-460. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 314-316.

McGilvary comments on Dewey's "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" {535} JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "A Reply to Professor McGilvary's Questions" {1045}.

974 Mead, G. H. Review of B. M. Anderson, Jr., *Social Value: A Study in Economic Theory*. Psych Bull 8 (1911): 432-436.

975 Mead, G. H. Review of Warner Fite, *Individualism: Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations*. Psych Bull 8 (1911): 323-328.

976 Minot, Charles Sedgwick. The Method of Science. Science n.s. 33.4 (27 Jan 1911): 119-131.

Science is "a vast series of approximations...closer to the absolute truth" and while this understanding of science is "the pragmatic attitude of mind...its new name has not rendered it a novelty." JRS

Summaries

Anon, "Pragmatism in Science," Scientific American 104 (18 March 1911): 287.

977 Moore, A. W. Reply to Professor Pratt. J Phil 8.15 (20 July 1911): 403-407.

Moore responds to Pratt's "Peter's Toothache Once More" {989}. Pragmatists find the meaning of ideas in their "origin, intent, and nature" but their critics cannot, so "each party seems to the other to be constantly begging the question." On Pratt's view, if anyone should have the "mental image" of "Peter Doe's eyes are green," and if, "entirely apart from the origin and intent of this image, there happened to be somewhere, anywhere, in the universe, even beyond the experience 'of any of us humans,' a being with green eyes called by his co-beings 'Peter Doe,' we should have a judgment...and the judgment would be true." Pratt would say that a judgment has the intent to correspond to its object, but what does this mean? Pratt has no way to ever "know" these "facts" which he so easily claims to exist. JRS

978 Muir, M. M. Pattison. Can Theology Become Scientific? Hibbert Journal 9.3 (April 1911): 470-476.

The early Church was pragmatic: theology was an instrument to co-ordinate religious facts. Today, the Church lacks this scientific attitude, risking "unproductive intellectualism." Theology should again place truth "inside human experience." JRS

979 Muirhead, John H. Review of Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution.* Hibbert Journal 9.4 (July 1911): 895-907.

Muirhead discusses Bergson's relationships with pragmatism and neo-Kantianism. JRS

980 Muirhead, John H. William James as Philosopher. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 15.1 (March 1911): 30-37.

James wanted to see everything in human terms and was part of a general humanistic movement. James's attack on impersonal idealism kept him from developing his thought in its natural direction. On the subjects of truth, the relation of concepts to reality, and pluralism, he should have moved towards idealism. IKS

981 Müller-Freienfels, Richard. Studien zum Pragmatismus. Annalen der Naturphilosophie 10.6 (1911): 210-241.

982 Noël, Léon. William James. Revue Néo-Scolastique 18.1 (Feb 1911): 28-57. Reprinted, Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1911.

A critical synopsis of James's life and work, "le *boy* americain." Although highly critical of his metaphysics, Noël finds James's work personal and original. Of pragmatism, Noël says that it "seems unable to find a basis for action. It lacks a point of support. And from this point of view, it is not pragmatic, it fails to meet its own criterion." (p. 25) LF

983 Palante, Georges. Le Débat sur l'intelligence. Mercure de France 92 (Aug 1911): 823-829.

James's *Pragmatism* {438} is reviewed together with other books on the value of reason. Pragmatism finds intellectual truth too threatening and leaves the comfort and security of moral truth in its place. It seeks social utility. James tries to preserve intellectual truth, but ends up confounding everything with everything else. IKS

984 Papini, Giovanni. Le verità per la verità. L'Anima 1.1 (Jan 1911). Reprinted in *Sul pragmatismo* {1202}. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 119-130.

Papini takes his reader through far too many sources, given his space. It is something of a contradiction in his character that he is at once a journalist working in the format of a short article in a periodic review, yet in possession of a mind that at every turn wants to be encyclopedic. As a result, the depth and quality of his more philosophical writings tend to suffer, as is the case here. The essay proves to say less about truth than the title seems to promise. EPC

985 Patten, Simon N. Pragmatism and Social Science. J Phil 8.24 (23 Nov 1911): 653-660. Reprinted in *Essays in Economic Theory*, ed. Rexford Guy Tugwell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), pp. 259-264.

986 Peattie, Elia W. The Outskirts of Thought. Open Court 25.12 (Dec 1911): 708-719.

987 Pérès, Jean. Pragmatisme et esthétique. Rev Phil 72.3 (Sept 1911): 278-284.

Pragmatic experience is not that of the phenomenalists; it is rather a lived experience which would allow for a continuity–from the point of view of duration–outside the fusion of the self and non-self, and would constitute a reflection on thought rather than thought itself. (p. 279) This position is in perfect harmony with art. The literary genre is most consonant with pragmatic psychologism. Ultimately, Pérès argues, art is an "illustration of pragmatic psychology." (p. 283) LF

Summaries

Alma R. Thorne, Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 130.

988 Perry, Ralph B. The Philosophy of William James. Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 1911): 1-29. Reprinted with the incorporation of Perry's "William James" {866}, in Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies* {1116}, pp. 349-378.

A "rude sketch" of James's philosophy. James's thought is a system, it is "one philosophy," although James died before he could make its structure explicit. His thought was "a study of man." IKS

989 Pratt, James B. Peter's Toothache Once More. J Phil 8.15 (20 July 1911): 400-403.

Why does a hypothetical case about a toothache cause pragmatists to retort, "How do you *know* he has a toothache?" Do the pragmatists mean to deny the existence of other minds? JRS

Notes

See A. W. Moore, "Reply to Professor Pratt" {977}.

990 Pratt, James B. The Religious Philosophy of William James. Hibbert Journal 10.1 (Oct 1911): 225-234.

James was hospitable to all sincerely held beliefs. He is accused of believing what he wanted to, but he rejected monism, in spite of its attractiveness, because it is inconsistent with the actual pluralistic universe. James was a "believer" rather than a "skeptic," although he never worked out a theology. Included is a long quotation from James's letter to James H. Leuba on religion. IKS

991 Quick, Oliver C. The Humanist Theory of Value. Mind 20.2 (April 1911): 256-257.

Quick replies to John E. Russell's "The Humanist Theory of Value" {874}. Granted, reality cannot be conceived apart from values, but the reverse is also true, foiling the pragmatic attempt to subsume reality under value. No definite meaning to the "satisfactions" of truth has been given. JRS

Notes

See Russell's reply, "Truth as Value and the Value of Truth," Mind 20.4 (Oct 1911): 538-539.

992 Rey, Abel. Le Congrès international de philosophie de 1911. Rev Phil 72.1 (July 1911): 1-22.

993 Riley, I. Woodbridge. Continental Critics of Pragmatism. I. French Critics. J Phil 8.9 (27 April 1911): 225-232.

The French understanding of pragmatism was well prepared for by the anti-positivism of Boutroux and Poincaré. However, French thought does not recognize pragmatism's aversion to Kantianism. Riley describes reactions to pragmatism by Bourdeau, Blondel, Rey, Chaumeix, Bergson, and Le Roy, and outlines the "acute classification" of pragmatism in all its varieties and international species offered by Hébert's *Le Pragmatisme* {549}. JRS

994 Riley, I. Woodbridge. Continental Critics of Pragmatism. II. Italian Critics. J Phil 8.11 (25 May 1911): 289-294.

Riley describes the views on pragmatism in Cesca, *La filosofia dell' azione* {417}, Aliotta, "Il pragmatismo anglo-americaine" {619}, and Chiappelli, "Les Tendences vives de la philosophie contemporaine" {784}. JRS

995 Royce, Josiah. James as a Philosopher. Science n.s. 34.2 (14 July 1911): 33-45. Reprinted as "William James and the Philosophy of Life," in *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life* {996}, pp. 3-45.

When James died many asked Royce to write about him, but this is his only public statement. With Edwards and Emerson, James is a representative American philosopher. His work is related to three major movements: evolution, the new psychology, and the social transformation of America. IKS

Notes

The Phi Beta Kappa oration before the Harvard chapter, 29 June 1911. It first appeared in The Boston Evening Transcript (29 June 1911): 13, and was also published in the Harvard Graduates' Magazine 20 (Sept 1911): 1-18.

996 Royce, Josiah. *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life.* New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Essay 1, "William James and the Philosophy of Life," pp. 3-45, is reprinted from {995}. Essay 4, "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion," pp. 187-254, is reprinted from {709}. JRS

Reviews

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 563-566. Royce presents the less familiar sides of James's teachings: the religious and ethical. Among American ideals are "efficiency" and "playing the game." James expresses these and purifies them by insisting on high ideals. IKS

Horace M. Kallen, J Phil 9.20 (26 Sept 1912): 548-558. James's thought is gradually transmuted into Royce's own philosophy of life. Absolutism "loves pragmatism, and with cannibalistic intensity" but what is swallowed up is only absolutism's version, in which truth and existence are identified, consciousness is private, time is unreal, and knowledge "by acquaintance" is confused with knowledge "about." JRS

Dickinson S. Miller, Nation 94.15 (11 April 1912): 362-363. Royce interprets James as a representative American, but it is easy to exaggerate James's Americanism. IKS

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 478-479; Ezra B. Crooks, Int J Ethics 22.3 (April 1912): 354-358; G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 10.3 (April 1912): 704.

997 Santayana, George. The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy. University of California Chronicle 13 (Oct 1911): 357-380. Reprinted in *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), pp. 186-215. The Triton edition, *The Works of George Santayana* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936-1937), vol. 7, pp. 127-150. *The Development of American Philosophy* {2786}, pp. 179-89.

Raised in the genteel tradition, James cast off most of it. James viewed the spirit of the world as a "romantic adventurer." The world is a "gradual improvisation." IKS

998 Santayana, George. Russell's Philosophical Essays. II. The Critique of Pragmatism. J Phil 8.5 (2 March 1911): 113-124. Reprinted in *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), pp. 124-138. The Triton edition, *The Works of George Santayana* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936-1937), vol. 7, pp. 102-113.

Santayana comments on Bertrand Russell's "Pragmatism" {710}. The characteristically American themes of pragmatism provoke Russell to "more wit than sympathy." A "general picture of pragmatism" cannot be expected from Russell's "exact and spare way of philosophizing" since that would instead require "a delicate blending of historical perspectives and some faith in blundering, kindly, brave human nature." Russell has highlighted two difficulties: pragmatism's psychological viewpoint, and whether pragmatism attempts to account for all types of knowledge. Schiller probably holds that "human thought constitutes the only structure of the universe" but no other pragmatist agrees. Dewey is not interested in the (undoubted) independent existence of objects from ideas of them, but as a philosopher, his goal is to "fix the logic and system of our own knowledge." James likewise is only concerned with our ideas. Solipsism is avoided when pragmatism dissolves consciousness into interacting experiences. Some facts cannot be reduced to their pragmatic meaning, in order that they can be used to test other beliefs. The pragmatic test apparently is only applicable to doubtful hypotheses, not established theories. Russell's theory of truth, involving objective relations between objective terms, curiously also holds that truth depends on minds, and allows perception to be infallible. JRS

999 Sauvage, George M. Intellectualism and Pragmatism. Catholic University Bulletin 17.3 (March 1911): 199-213; 18.2 (Feb 1912): 97-129.

Part one, "The Theory of Knowledge," accuses pragmatism and absolutism of separating intuitions from concepts, forgetting their proper synthesis in Scholastic Realism. Pragmatism sets aside the representative role for concepts, replacing it with a practical role, and conceives experience nominalistically. The theories of knowledge of James, Dewey, and Bergson are briefly recounted. In part two, "The Problem of Knowledge," Sauvage explains how moderate realism has a solution, unlike absolutism, which conceives knowledge *a priori*, and unlike pragmatism, which explains knowledge by its production. We must accept knowledge "as a fact, that is, as it manifests itself to our mind in its entirety and in its primary and spontaneous presentation." Such acceptance tells us that perception is transcendental, which condemns radical empiricism. The inadequacy of concepts to reality that pragmatism stresses, is not denied by scholasticism. A concept must be first oriented to its object so that it may be useful. "Pure" experience is impossible; concepts allow us to intuit objects. Despite reality's flux, permanent forms remain. JRS

1000 Schiller, F. C. S. Error. *Proc Arist Soc* 11 (1911): 144-165.

A theory of truth must explain error. Philosophy typically defines error by assuming truth; this is as helpful as declaring that "the cure of poverty is the acquisition of property." Error should not be metaphysically located but logically analyzed as a cognitive relation, which arises when an assertion's consequences refute its claim to truth. For Absolute idealism, "either there is no Error or all is Error." Truth and error are values with degrees, and can only exist in a world with purposes. In a note on p. 165, Schiller relates that Vaihinger "himself so nearly agrees with us that he almost called his own position *critical pragmatism*." See Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob* {1017}. JRS

Reviews

C. D. Broad, Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 260-264.

Notes

Also read at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy at Bologna, April 8, 1911, and published in *Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia,* Bologna, Italy, 6-11 April 1911 (Bolongna: Biblioteca di Filosofia e di Pedagogia, 1911. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 140-153, with discussion following on pp. 154-159. The Italian translation of that version was published as "L'errore," Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 3.2 (April 1911): 293-306. A brief account of the discussion of that reading is given in D. L. Murray, "The Bologna Congress," Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 453-455.

1001 Schiller, F. C. S. The Humanism of Protagorus. Mind 20.2 (April 1911): 181-196.

Schiller replies to C. M. Gillespie's "The *Truth* of Protagorus" {806}. JRS

1002 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatism. Article in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1911), vol. 22, pp. 246-248. Reprinted in the 12th, 13th, and 14th editions.

1003 Schinz, Albert. La Portée philosophique de l'oeuvre de William James. Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue Suisse 4th series 62 (1911): 519-539.

For James, truth is important, but life is more important. He began with a study of nature, then turned to psychology, then to philosophy. Against spiritualists, he held that body acts on mind, but against materialists, he held that men have spontaneity. IKS

1004 Sheldon, W. H. Ideals of Philosophic Thought. Phil Rev 20.3 (May 1911): 280-290.

All philosophies belong to one of two opposed camps, divided on whether relations are internal (idealists), or external (realists, pragmatists), to their terms. JRS

1005 Slattery, Charles Lewis. The Debt of the Church to William James. Outlook 98 (22 July 1911): 643-646.

James had the spirit of Christ. While outside the church, he still rendered it great services. None who has read James on habit can approve of "wild oats," since laws are needed to build character. His studies in religion revealed the influence of the "Unseen God," while his pragmatism required that the church be judged not by dogmas but by fruits. James's thought has been reproduced in thousands of sermons. IKS

1006 Snellman, J. W. The 'Meaning' and 'Test' of Truth. Mind 20.2 (April 1911): 235-242.

Snellman defends pragmatism against Bertrand Russell's criticisms in "Pragmatism" {710}. Russell's formal *definition* of truth cannot distinguish truth from error. Despite his acceptance of the pragmatic *test* of truth, if truth is purely relational, it cannot be known pragmatically. Pragmatic meaning and definitional meaning are incompatible if taken in Russell's sense. Pragmatists are concerned with, say, distinguishing butter from magarine, and rightly think that defining what we mean by "butter" is irrelevant if it is disassociated from how we test the thing which claims to be butter. Science's reliance on "facts" does not give them any "ultimate" status. JRS

1007 Spaulding, Edward G. Realism: A Reply to Professor Dewey and an Exposition. J Phil 8.3 (3 Feb 1911): 63-77. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 483-500.

Spaulding replies to Dewey's "The Short-Cut to Realism Examined" {796}. Logical principles, which do not change, have priority over genetic explanations. There are empirical grounds for holding that knowledge is a matter of external relations. Dewey confuses judgments and propositions: "judgments are psychological entities, propositions are subsistents." Judgments can be errors about propositions, and knowledge of the external world can grow. Why can't the relation of the knowing process to its object itself be a subject for study? Dewey himself undertakes just such a study in his theory of knowledge: how can he know his own account of knowledge? Any genetic account presupposes that knowing does not modify the thing known. JRS

1008 Spaulding, Edward G. A Reply to Professor Dewey's Rejoinder. J Phil 8.21 (12 Oct 1911): 566-574. Reprinted in *MW* 6: 501-511.

Spaulding replies to Dewey's "Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding" {940}. Observational evidence "establishes a presumption in favor of the validity of the 'external theory'." Dewey recognizes "*fewer types* of experimentation and observation and fact than the realist recognizes." While other philosophies can absorb any empirical results with further argument, only the realists insist that "ordinary empirical methods" can settle whether knowledge alters its object. Why has no one designed an empirical test, acceptable to all? JRS

Notes

See Dewey and Spaulding's "Joint Discussion" {941}.

1009 Stewart, J. McKellar. *A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Reviews

Richard Smith, Int J Ethics 23.2 (Jan 1913): 211-216. Stewart rightly emphasizes the unpragmatic nature of Bergson's philosophy. JRS

1010 Stratton, George M. *Psychology of the Religious Life.* London: George Allen and Co., 1911. Reprinted, London: Allen and Unwin, 1978.

1011 Tarozzi, Giuseppe. Il pensiero di William James e il tempo nostro. Introduction to *Compendio dei principii di psicologia di William James*, ed. Guiseppi Tarozzi (Milan, Societa Editrice Libraria, 1911.

1012 Taylor, Alfred E. Review of Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory.* Int J Ethics 22.1 (Oct 1911): 101-107.

A review of the authorized translation of *Matière et mémoire*, 2nd ed., by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1911). Bergson and Bradley are "in complete accord," making the pragmatists' approval of Bergson surprising. JRS

1013 Teisen, Niels C. G. *William James' Laere om Retten til at Tro.* Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag, 1911.

1014 Turner, William. Pragmatism. Article in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1911), vol. 12, pp. 333-338.

1015 Turner, William. Pragmatism–What Does It Mean? Catholic World 94 (Nov 1911): 178-189.

Like Protestantism, pragmatism repudiates the unity of reality and universal principles, reducing all knowledge to personal interpretation. Its confident look to the future will be disappointed, since the dangers of democracy must be controlled by "healthy institutionalism" and "aristocratic leisure." JRS

1016 Underhill, Evelyn. *Mysticism.* London: Methuen, 1911.

This work contains several references to William James. JRS

1017 Vaihinger, Hans. *Die Philosophie des Als Ob. System der Theoretischen, Praktischen und Religiosen Fiktionen der Menschheit.* Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1911. 2nd ed., 1913. 6th ed., Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1920. Popular edition, ed. Raymund Schmidt (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923). 10th ed., 1927. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1986. The 6th edition was translated by C. K. Ogden as *The Philosophy of As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924. 2nd ed., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).

Extended reviews

Paul Carus, "The Philosophy of the As If" {1035}.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 21.1 (Jan 1912): 93-104. The rise of pragmatism aided this work's eventual publication, which was delayed for 35 years by fear of the "dominant dogmatisms of his colleagues." Schiller lists fourteen doctrines of Vaihinger's "ultra-pragmatism." Vaihinger's attacks on "uncritical" pragmatism were aimed at "certain theologians of his acquaintance." The heavy Kantian debt permits him to retain the un-pragmatic distinction between the theoretical (the true) and the practical (the fictional), and causes his denial of the unity of the good with the true and real. The many psychological difficulties involved in "fictions" are examined and corrected by Schiller. JRS

Horace M. Kallen, Phil Rev 22.2 (March 1913): 200-208.

Reviews of the translation

James Gutmann, J Phil 23.3 (4 Feb 1926): 77-80.

1018 Vailati, Giovanni. *Scritti: 1863-1909.* Three volumes. I. *Scritti di filosofia.* II. *Scritti di scienza.* III. *Scritti di scienza umane.* Ed. Mario Calderoni, U. Ricci, and G. Vacca. Florence: Succ. B. Seeber; Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911. Reprinted, Sala Bolognese: A. Forni, 1987.

Vailati's papers were collected after his death in 1909. *Scritti* offers a complete inventory of Vailati's writings and original bibliographical information. The "Preface" is largely the work of his longtime student and fellow Peircean, Mario Calderoni. EPC

Reviews

Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 437-438.

1019 Walker, Leslie J. L'Evolutionisme dans la theorie de la connaissance et de la vérité. Rev de Phil 19 (Sept-Oct 1911).

1020 Wundt, Wilhelm Max. *Probleme der Völkerpsychologie.* Leipzig: Ernst Wiegandt, 1911. 2nd ed., Stuttgart: Kroner, 1921.

Wundt surveys the impact of pragmatism on the German theologians Ernst Troeltsch and Georg Wobbermin. Wundt is critical of the resulting individualistic tendencies in the study of religion. Much better are the methods of social psychology. IKS

Notes

See Georg Wobbermin's response in his second introduction with {500}.

1912

1021 Aliotta, Antonio. *La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza.* Palermo: Optima, 1912. Reprinted, Naples: Libreria scientifica editrice, 1970. Translated by Agnes McCaskill as *The Idealist Reaction Against Science* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1914).

Croce's idealism was a dominant fixture in the Italian cultural landscape since the publication of his *Estetica.* The one-time pragmatist Giuseppe Prezzolini was by now firmly entrenched in the Crocean camp. Aliotta explores the consequences of this renewal of idealism for science. EPC

The author describes the translation as a new edition: "I have subjected the whole of it to a process of revision with a view to improving it and adapting it to the British public." The second section of Part 1 examines recent forms of anti-intellectualism, including the French philosophers Boutroux, Bergson, Le Roy, and Duhem; the American pragmatists James, Dewey, and Schiller; and the American and German "philosophers of value": Royce, Münsterberg, Windelband, and Rickert. JRS

Reviews

Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 536-546. Aliotta rightly argues that Bradley is an intuitionist mystic, despite pragmatism's claim that he is an intellectualist. JRS

Reviews of the translation

A. C. Armstrong, J Phil 13.19 (14 Sept 1916): 525-528; C. D. Broad, Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 107-112; Joshua C. Gregory, Phil Rev 25.1 (Jan 1916): 68-75.

Notes

See Schiller's comments on Taylor's review, "Mysticism v. Intellectualism" {1218}.

1022 Anon. William James. Phil Rev 21.2 (March 1912): 192-196.
A minute of the American Philosophical Association marking James's death. JRS

1023 Berkeley, Hastings. The Kernel of Pragmatism. Mind 21.1 (Jan 1912): 84-88.
It is futile to argue with pragmatists. They simply do not see a certain quality which their opponents claim is essential. James admitted in theory a difference between the truth of a belief and its working, but claimed that this difference has never been discerned. Anti-pragmatists, like Bertrand Russell, fail to understand pragmatism. IKS

1024 Bierbower, A. Pragmatism in Education. Journal of Education 76.16 (24 Oct 1912): 423-424.

1025 Bode, Boyd H. The Concept of Immediacy. J Phil 9.6 (14 March 1912): 141-149.
Objective idealism relies on immediate sensations, only to deny their reality in experience. If immediacy in experience is relative, functionalism results, in which "meanings are interpreted as the 'presence-in-absence' of their objects." Royce would be a functionalist, save for his insistence that the datum and its meaning are distinct. JRS

1026 Bode, Boyd H. Consciousness and Its Object. J Phil 9.19 (12 Sept 1912): 505-513.
McGilvary's defense of representationalism commits the "external observer" fallacy. If "we imagine ourselves comparing the original experience with the verifying experience from a standpoint external to both" then verification is no mystery. However, only a consciousness internally giving meaning to both experiences can perform any comparison. JRS

Reviews
Elijah Jordan, Phil Rev 22.2 (March 1913): 234.

1027 Bode, Boyd H. Review of Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution.* Amer J Psych 23.2 (April 1912): 333-335.
A review of the authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell (1911) of Henri Bergson's *L'Evolution Creatrice* (1907). Bergson's "objective" treatment of duration can dispel the "air of subjectivism and paradox" hanging around pragmatism. JRS

1028 Boodin, J. E. Do Things Exist? J Phil 9.1 (4 Jan 1912): 5-14. Reprinted with revisions in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 62-73.

1029 Boodin, J. E. The Identity of the Ideals. Int J Ethics 23.1 (Oct 1912): 29-50. Reprinted with revisions in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 307-325.

1030 Boodin, J. E. Knowing Selves. Psych Rev 19.2 (March 1912): 124-146. Reprinted with revisions and additions as "Knowing Minds" and "Knowing Minds (Continued)" in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 164-190, 191-204.

1031 Bourdeau, Jean. *La Philosophie affective: Nouveaux courants et nouveaux problemes dans la philosophie contemporaine.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1912.

A survey of trends in contemporary philosophy. Of interest is chap. 4, "Pragmatism v. Intellectualism," including the psychology and philosophy of James as well as a section on pluralism; chap. 5, on the anti-intellectualism of Ribot; and chap. 6, on the intellectualist writings of Fouillée. There is also a short discussion of Schinz, who is at once sympathetic and critical of pragmatism, on pp. 60ff. LF

1032 Burkamp, Wilhelm. Biologische bedeutung des Erkennens und Pragmatismus. Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie 36.4 (1912): 477-514.

Biology asserts that organisms' functions aim at teleological ends. The pragmatist recognizes only those categories or criteria which have practical purpose. James is a religiously utilitarian pragmatist. Other pragmatisms are variations, like Dewey's scientific instrumentalism. Pragmatism exalts utilitarian criteria, but their truth lies in an agreement with intellectual criteria. It thus contradicts the intellectual criteria of truth, and also the natural perception of truth and biological teleology. It brings anarchy, not freedom. JRS

Summaries

Emmanuel R. Engel, Phil Rev 22.4 (July 1913): 453-454.

1033 Carus, Paul. The Anti-Intellectual Movement of To-day. Monist 22.3 (July 1912): 397-404.

1034 Carus, Paul. The Philosophy of Relativity: In the Light of the Philosophy of Science. Monist 22.4 (Oct 1912): 540-579.

1035 Carus, Paul. The Philosophy of the As If. Open Court 26.9 (Sept 1912): 561-564.

Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob* {1017} is "a decided improvement" on current pragmatism. JRS

1036 Carus, Paul. Professor Henri Bergson. Open Court 26.9 (Sept 1912): 572-574.

1037 Celi, G. La psicologia religiosa di William James. La Civiltà Cattolica anno 63, 3.5 (11 Sept 1912): 654-665.

1038 Celi, G. William James e l'opera sua psicologica. La Civiltà Cattolica anno 63, 2 (18 May 1912): 401-413.

1039 Ceulemans, J. B. The Metaphysics of Pragmatism. American Catholic Quarterly Review 37.2 (April 1912): 310-321.

An examination of James's *Some Problems of Philosophy* {958}. Human testimony and religious faith both involve absolute certainty, not pragmatic belief. Pluralism denies real causes, abandons reason and leaves the universe with "no whence, no whither." JRS

1040 Chipman, W. Pragmatism and Politics. American Political Science Review Supplement 6 (Feb 1912): 189-197.

1041 Cooley, William Forbes. *The Principles of Science.* New York: Henry Holt, 1912.

The instrumental understanding of science is a needed corrective to the purely theoretical notion of science. (p. 19) JRS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 10.22 (23 Oct 1913): 613-614.

1042 De Ruggiero, Guido. *La filosofia contemporanea.* Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1912. 2nd ed., 1920. 5th ed., 1947. The 2nd ed. was translated by A. Howard Hannay and R. G. Collingwood as *Modern Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1921).

The book treats German, French, Anglo-American, and Italian philosophies. The pragmatisms of James, Dewey, and Schiller are surveyed, and De Ruggiero indicates some Hegelian influence on pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

J. L. McIntyre, Mind 22.2 (April 1913): 307-308.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Ralph B. Perry, J Phil 18.10 (12 May 1921): 275-278.

1043 Dewey, John. In Response to Professor McGilvary. J Phil 9.20 (26 Sept 1912): 544-548. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 113-117. *MW* 7: 79-84.

Dewey replies to McGilvary's "Professor Dewey's 'Awareness'" {1095} and "Realism and the Ego-Centric Predicament" {1097}. JRS

1044 Dewey, John. Perception and Organic Action. J Phil 9.24 (21 Nov 1912): 645-668. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 202-232. *MW* 7: 3-30.

Philosophies, like Bergson's, which explain perception and science in terms of organic action yet seek "true knowledge" using philosophical intuition, erect a dualism of theoretical (real) and practical (fictional) knowledge. This dualism causes Bergson's theory of perception to alternate between taking organisms to be passive potentialities or active selectors. Perception is not "ready-made and complete," but formed during the process of organic readjustment, as one function of the sensori-motor circuit. JRS

1045 Dewey, John. A Reply to Professor McGilvary's Questions. J Phil 9.1 (4 Jan 1912): 19-21. Reprinted in *MW* 4: 143-145.

Dewey replies to McGilvary's "Professor Dewey's 'Action of Consciousness'" {973}. Consciousness is "a characteristic quality of one kind of behavior," and knowledge can accordingly be studied in its "generating conditions and consequences." JRS

1046 Dewey, John. Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism. Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 69-81. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 64-78.

Dewey replies to Royce's "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Previous Discussion" {709}. Royce's otherwise sympathetic criticism succeeds only by attributing to the pragmatist a dubiously "private" notion of experience. If it is indeed so "individual," any notion of the Absolute would be so as well. The instrumentalist takes beliefs, judgments, etc., to be organic functions and adaptations to a natural world. Royce evidently identifies truth with existence, but "instrumentalism never pretended to encroach on the idealistic privilege of creating natural existences by formulating truths about them." While "the vast majority of natural happenings go by without being reflected upon," when the specific need for thought develops, the process of testing hypotheses relies on the "continuities and sociable relationships" of life. Isaac Newton's ideas did not perish with him, thanks to these relationships. On Royce's notion of the Absolute, there is no way to understand why they did not perish.

Royce also tries to force on the instrumentalist the "good old rationalistic device of rigid alternatives." The trust we place in others' judgments is neither whimsical nor based on the assumption of their pre-existent truth, but founded practically on the "general verificational background" in the "social medium of life." Only Royce is trapped by his dilemma into skepticism or sheer opinion. The analogy of business credit can be applied to intelligence: monetary *and* truth value lies in the potentialities of what now exists. JRS

1047 Dewey, John. Review of G. Stanley Hall, *Founders of Modern Psychology*. New York Times Review of Books (25 Aug 1912): 457-458. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 137-141.

1048 Dewey, John. Review of Hugh Elliot, *Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson*. Phil Rev 21.6 (Nov 1912): 705-707. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 135-136.

1049 Dewey, John. What Are States of Mind? Paper delivered at the New York Philosophical Club on 21 November 1912. *MW* 7: 31-43.

A state of mind is an emotional disposition exhibited in behavior by a living organism in a mal-adjusted situation. JRS

Notes

Dewey revisits the topic of mind and behavior in his lectures "The Psychology of Social Behavior," given at Union College in Schenectady, New York, in February and March, 1914. A summary by John Lewis March of these lectures is preserved in the Union Alumni Monthly 3 (1914): 309-326 [*MW* 7: 390-408].

1050 Drake, Durant. What Kind of Realism? J Phil 9.6 (14 March 1912): 149-154. Reprinted in *MW* 10: 431-438.

Dewey and other realists cannot easily solve the problem of perception by simply declaring that both perceptions and their objects are natural events. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's comments, "Duality and Dualism" {1418}.

1051 Dufumier, Henri. Les Tendences de la logique contemporaine. Rev Phil 74.4 (Oct 1912): 366-372.

Pp. 366-372 comments on Schiller's *Formal Logic* {1121}. JRS

1052 Dunlap, Knight. The Case Against Introspection. Psych Rev 19.5 (Sept 1912): 404-413.

Dunlap criticizes James and others for their use of introspection. JRS

1053 Dunlap, Knight. The Nature of Perceived Relations. Psych Rev 19.6 (Nov 1912): 415-446.

James, following Thomas Brown, offers a theory of perceived relations, with the improvement of the "disappearing 'transitive state'." JRS

1054 Durkheim, Émile. *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1912. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain as *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1915.

In the "Conclusion" Durkheim agrees with James that the function of religion is not to express beliefs about a reality, but to confer experiences of strength, joy, peace, serenity, or enthusiasm. These are used by society to transform human beings into forces of collective action. JRS

1055 Eastman, Max. Mr. Schiller's Logic. J Phil 9.17 (15 Aug 1912): 463-468.

Eastman comments on Schiller's *Formal Logic* {1121}. Schiller's attacks on logic are just as intellectualistic, academic, and worthless. Formal logic is at bottom the ideal of consistency, and so long as Schiller focuses solely on it, he cannot approach Dewey's exemplification of the value theory of knowledge. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "The Problem of Formal Logic" {1123}.

1056 Editor. The Pragmatic Test of Christianity. Biblical World 39 (April 1912): 221-224.

1057 Eggenschwyler, W. Nietzsche und der Pragmatismus. Arch Gesch Phil n.s. 25.4 (July 1912): 447-455.

Berthelot's *Un Romantisme utilitaire* {909} wrongly classifies Nietzsche as a pragmatist. Granted, both he and James fought rationalism, elevated instincts, and questioned truth's usefulness. However, James's epistemology was one of moral conviction, while Nietzsche separated knowledge and ethics in order to glorify spiritual abandonment. JRS

Summaries

E. T. Paine, Phil Rev 22.1 (Jan 1913): 94.

1058 Eggenschwyler, W. War Nietzsche Pragmatist? Arch Gesch Phil n.s. 19.1 (1 Oct 1912): 35-47.

1059 Enriques, Federigo. *Scienza e razionalismo.* Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1912. Reprinted, 1990.

Reviews

Philip E. B. Jourdain, Mind 22.3 (July 1913): 436-438.

1060 Eucken, Rudolf. *Erkennen und Leben.* Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1912. Translated by W. Tudor Jones as *Knowledge and Life* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1913).

1061 Ewald, Oscar. Philosophy in Germany in 1912. Translated by William A. Hammond. Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 499-526.

Ewald describes Keyserling's "approximation" to pragmatism in his *Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Nature* (1911), and criticizes Schiller's essay "Error" {1000} and Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob* {1017}. Ewald laments on the failure of transcendentalism, pragmatism, and intuitionalism to properly harmonize Being and Thought. JRS

1062 Ferrari, Giulio Cesare. Le emozione e la vite del subcosciente. Rivista di Psicologia 8 (1912): 97-118.

1063 Ferriere, Ad. Deux philosophes de l'expérience: William James et Théodore Flournoy. Coenobium 5 (May 1912): 1-13.

Both James and Flournoy fought against the cancer of materialistic monism. It is appropriate that Flournoy should author his tribute to James, *La Philosophie de William James* {947}. IKS

1064 Flaccus, Louis W. Moral Experience. Phil Rev 21.2 (March 1912): 174-188.

Pragmatism is a variety of "auto-teleology," regarding "moral experience as a self-revelational process." It thus suffers from an ambiguous notion of "meaning." JRS

1065 Foltz, Stewart P. Automatism. Monist 22.1 (Jan 1912): 91-123.

Foltz rejects James's theory of chance. (p. 107) JRS

1066 Grzybowski, W. I. *Pragmatyzm Drzisiejszy.* Warsaw: Wende et Cie., 1912.

Notes

The German title is *Der heutige Pragmatismus–Versuch einer Charakteristik.*

1067 Hall, G. Stanley. Why Kant is Passing. Amer J Psych 23.3 (July 1912): 370-426.

Kantianism is a "curious relic of bygone days." Pragmatism brings the "eternal verities" of religion closer to science, but has nothing to teach science itself. Science has from its beginnings been "through and through pragmatic" (p. 425), although it would be injured if it became aware of its pragmatism. The most advanced pragmatism is "only a dilution of scientific principles with speculative and religious tinctures," and even as a pedagogy, it falls short of science's "greater efficiency." JRS

1068 Halpern, J. Philosophiegeschichtliche Arbeit in Polen: von Anfang 1910 bis Mitte 1911. Arch Gesch Phil n.s. 25.3 (April 1912): 332-344.

Halpern describes William James's influence on Polish philosophy. JRS

1069 Henry, J. Pragmatisme anglo-américaine et philosophie nouvelle. Revue Néo-Scolastique 19.2 (May 1912): 264-272.

James and Schiller's pragmatism is quite different from Bergsonism and Le Roy's "new philosophy." Pragmatism begins with epistemological problems and is compatible with various kinds of metaphysics. The new philosophy begins with the metaphysical view of radical evolutionism. IKS

1070 Hocking, William Ernest. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912.

Reviews

Anon, Open Court 27.8 (Aug 1913): 511-512; William Adams Brown, J Phil 10.9 (24 April 1913): 242-251; Jay William Hudson, Phil Rev 22.5 (Sept 1913): 546-550.

1071 Holt, Edwin B., *et al.* *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1912.

Walter Marvin, "The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology," pp. 45-95, categorizes pragmatism as an epistemological theory lacking any relevance to metaphysics. Ralph B. Perry, "A Realistic Theory of Independence," pp. 99-151, claims that Dewey mistakenly attributes to realism the acceptance of the "ego-centric predicament," and refuses to agree that things are independent of both knowledge *and* experience. E. G. Spaulding, "A Defense of Analysis," pp. 155-247, contrasts realism's use of analysis as "discovery" with the pragmatic use of analysis as "construction." Walter B. Pitkin, "Some Realistic Implications of Biology," pp. 377-467, accuses the life sciences of fostering anti-realistic psychologies. The leader of this movement is Dewey, whose *The Study of Ethics* (1894) was "the first formal analysis of conduct ever attempted." For Dewey, knowledge is "wholly pure subject," and a percept is not an entity in relation to the eye, but the relating of two entities. The inability to perceive slight changes in light intensity disproves Dewey's theory of perception. Organic wholes can be unaffected by their parts, and vice versa, falsifying the Neo-Hegelian and pragmatic claim that organic reactions involve the "total situation." While Dewey "broke the magic spell of introspectionism and epistemology," he deems irrelevant the materials on which cognition acts. JRS

1072 Horne, Herman H. Pragmatism and Freedom. In his *Free Will and Human Responsibility* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 155-171.

A critical discussion of James, Schiller, Bergson, and Thorndike on freedom. The pragmatist's confusion of desired truths with eternal truth renders it "useless in finding and defining the truth." JRS

Reviews

Henry W. Wright, Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 481.

1073 Jacoby, Günther. Der Amerikanische Pragmatismus und die Philosophie des Als-Ob. Z Phil Ph Krit 147 (1912): 172-184.

Pragmatism is often represented as an American philosophy of dollars. It is actually a philosophy of life and creativity. Vaihinger's philosophy is more deeply grounded than pragmatism. The pragmatic conception of truth is obtained from general considerations, but Vaihinger's is from a detailed investigation of science. IKS

1074 Jacoby, Günther. German Pragmatism. J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 356-357.

An abstract of a paper. The biological reaction against Hegelianism forty years ago produced the German pragmatism of Mach, Jerusalem, Simmel, Avenarius, Ostwald, and Vaihinger. Presently, Germany is undergoing a counter-reaction back to idealism. JRS

Notes

See *Günther Jacoby (1881-1969): zu Werk und Wirkung* (Greifswald: Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universitat, 1993).

1075 Jacoby, Günther. Henri Bergson, Pragmatism and Schopenhauer. Monist 22.4 (Oct 1912): 593-611.

For Bergson and Schopenhauer, philosophy begins where pragmatism ceases. JRS

1076 Jacoby, Günther. William James' Angriff auf das deutsche Geisteswesen. Die Grenzboten jahr 71 1.3 (17 Jan 1912): 109-115.

1077 Jacoby, Günther. William James und das deutsche Geistesleben. Die Grenzboten jahr 71 1.5 (31 Jan 1912): 212-220.

1078 James, William. *Essays in Radical Empiricism.* Edited and with a preface by Ralph B. Perry. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912. Reprinted as *The Works of William James*: *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, ed. Frederick Burkhardt. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

This posthumously published collection follows a plan formulated by James. There is reason to believe that James decided not to publish the collection because he saw serious deficiencies in his formulation of radical empiricism.

"Does 'Consciousness' Exist," pp. 1-38, is a reprint of {174}. "A World of Pure Experience," pp. 39-91, is a reprint of {180}. "The Thing and Its Relations," pp. 92-122, is a reprint of {250}. "How Two Minds Can Know One Thing," pp. 123-136, is a reprint of {244}. "The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience," pp. 137-154, is a reprint of {249}. "The Experience of Activity," pp. 155-189, is a reprint of {243}. "The Essence of Humanism," pp. 190-205, is a reprint of {242}. "La Notion de conscience," pp. 206-233, is a reprint of {248}. "Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?" pp. 234-240, is a reprint of {247}. "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'," pp. 241-243, is a reprint of {330}. "Humanism and Truth Once More," pp. 244-265, is a reprint of {245}.

"Absolutism and Empiricism," pp. 266-280, was published in 1884. He contrasts absolutism, represented by John Scott Haldane, a British scientist, and the empiricism of common sense. For the former, the world is an absolute, in which the parts exist in and are known only through the whole, so that by logic alone we can move from a part to all the others. Empiricism recognizes the simply given, brute fact, which remains opaque to reason. Empiricists hold that both views are only hypotheses, and like all other philosophical views are based on personal dislikes. If absolutists admitted this, fruitful discussion would become possible. IKS

Extended reviews

Wendell T. Bush {1158}.

Reviews

Anon, "William James and Empiricism," Athenaeum 4421 (20 July 1912): 57. No momentous contributions to philosophy are to be found. IKS

Anon, North American Review 196.11 (Nov 1912): 716-717. James proposes a revolutionary method for philosophy, that of looking at primary facts. IKS

B. H. Bode, Phil Rev 21.6 (Nov 1912): 704-705. This book should help distinguish James's pragmatism from that of others. IKS

H. Wildon Carr, Hibbert Journal 11.2 (Jan 1913): 451-453. Was it necessary for the editors to present this as a treatise? It is actually a collection of polemical articles. IKS

E. D., Rev de Phil 22.2 (1 Feb 1913): 193-195. A summary of the contents with emphasis on the claim that for radical empiricism relations too are part of experience. IKS

John Dewey, New York Times Review of Books (June 9 1912): 357 [*MW* 7: 142-148]. James's surprising philosophical accomplishments resulted from a remarkable literary style and the "ready and eager" imagination of the times. The "radical" nature of his empiricism lies in its discovery of relations and universals in immediate experience, permitting experience to be "self-sustaining," and the world to be "a much more loosely jointed thing." JRS

Günther Jacoby, Kant-Studien 18.4 (1913): 508-510. James dislikes systems and enters more deeply into the human spirit than most. IKS

"κ," Monist 23.2 (April 1913): 318. James was not a systematic thinker; "his interests were too varied to be satisfied with one interpretation of life." JRS

Bertrand Russell, Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 571-575 [*Pure Experience*, pp. 214-218. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 300-304]. Radical empiricism is by now "indubitable," except for the term "experience" which James uses without adequate analysis. James's attempt to identify the mental with the physical through the notion of pure experience is "profoundly original." However, James should have just shown that there is no "mental," no act which is distinct from its object. IKS

1079 Jastrow, Joseph. The Legacy of William James. Dial 52.1 (1 Jan 1912): 12-14.

A review of Royce's *William James and Other Essays* {996}, James's *Some Problems of Philosophy* {958}, and *Memories and Studies* {957}. James could be fair even to those he disliked. "The humanist persists in the philosopher." IKS

1080 Kallen, Horace M. The Essence of Tragedy. Int J Ethics 22.2 (Jan 1912): 179-202.

A pragmatic theory of tragedy finds it in the human battle of goodness against goodness, truth against truth. JRS

1081 Keller, Adolf. William James. Wissen und Leben 5 (15 June 1912): 370-391.

James exemplifies the empirical method in its purest form. His thought is like a pyramid. Concrete fact forms the pyramid's base, and the pyramid's point reaches up to the heights of metaphysics. He is a representative of a country which is not tied down by tradition. IKS

1082 Lalande, André. Philosophy in France in 1911. Translated by Elijah Jordan. Phil Rev 21.3 (May 1912): 279-302.

Lalande describes Fouillées *La Pensée et les nouvelles écoles anti-intellectualistes* {948} and Berthelot's *Un Romantisme utilitaire* {909}. JRS

1083 Lalande, André. Le "Voluntarisme intellectualiste." Rev Phil 74.1 (July 1912): 1-21.

Lalande's examination of Fouillée, *La Pensée et les nouvelles écoles anti-intellectualistes* {948}, focuses on three points: the critique of the pragmatists, the critique of intuitionism, and the theory of the "will to be consciousness." Pragmatism is attacked because it allows everyone the right to create his own truth; there is no universal test. Epistemically, there is a similar problem, for there are useful errors in life, and there are truths that are of no use, such as that of human mortality. In addition to defending the pragmatists, Lalande draws on the work of Bergson, and criticizes Fouillée's "monism," subjective immediacy, and starting point. LF

Summaries

F. R. Prout, Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 489-490.

1084 Lee, Vernon [pseud. for Violet Paget]. *Vital Lies: Studies of some Varieties of Recent Obscurantism.* London and New York: J. Lane, 1912.

This polemical work against the "will to believe" is dedicated to Giovanni Papini, who "explained the incompatibility between 'willing to believe' and 'making one's ideas clear'." The introduction to Part One, "Theoretical Obscurantism," explains that only the "virus" of James's "will to believe" doctrine is under attack. "It is only when we have done with the Pragmatism of James and Schiller that we can duly value and put to use the Pragmatism of Peirce." Chap. 1, "The Two Pragmatisms," pp. 7-49, is a reprint of {835}. Chap. 2, "What Is Truth," pp. 50-90, is a reprint of {1085}. Chap. 3, "The Truths of Mysticism," shows "what sort of ideas are considered 'better to believe' and recommended to our 'will to believe'." Chap. 4, "Fruits for Life," shows "that obscurantism turns to profit not the truth of ideas, but their power of determining action." Part Two, "Applied Obscurantism," surveys George Tyrrell's Modernism, the "anthropological apologetics" of Ernest Crawley, and Georges Sorel's syndicalism. Part Three culminates the work with the exposition of the author's own version of humanism. JRS

Reviews

Anon, Current Opinion 54 (April 1913): 313-314; Anon, Nation 96.17 (24 April 1913): 414-415; M. E. Robinson, Hibbert Journal 11.3 (April 1913): 702-704; Sidney Waterlow, Int J Ethics 24.1 (Oct 1913): 110-113.

1085 Lee, Vernon [pseud. for Violet Paget]. What Is Truth? (A Criticism of Pragmatism). Yale Review n.s. 1.4 (July 1912): 600-619. Reprinted as "What Is Truth?" in in *Vital Lies* {1084}, vol. 1, pp. 50-90.

A dialogue in which the anti-pragmatist at last realizes that it is in religious experience that the "cash value" of truth must be sought. IKS

1086 Lemaire, J. Les Bases de la cosmologie. In *Annales de L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie*, vol. 1 (Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain, 1912).

Reviews

Joseph Louis Perrier, J Phil 10.1 (2 Jan 1913): 24-26; Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 593.

1087 Leuba, James H. *A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future.* New York: Macmillan, 1912.

In James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, James examined mystical states to find evidence for the "transcendent hypothesis." James held that the presence of "reconciliation" and union pointed to the superhuman but he had no warrant for such a claim. His efforts are a "fiasco." IKS

1088 Lewis, C. I. Implication and the Algebra of Logic. Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 522-531. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 351-359.

1089 Lewis, C. I. Professor Santayana and Idealism. University of California Chronicle 14.8 (1912): 192-211. Reprinted as "Naturalism and Idealism" in *Collected Papers*, pp. 20-34.

1090 Lovejoy, Arthur O. "Present Philosophical Tendencies" I. The Critique of Naturalism. J Phil 9.23 (7 Nov 1912): 627-640.

Lovejoy discusses Ralph B. Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies* {1116}. The appendix on James omits the fact that James first argued in *A Pluralistic Universe* that since conceptualized reality contains contradictions, it cannot be inferred that reality itself is contradictory. Perry only describes James's later view in *Some Problems of Philosophy*. Perry does not sufficiently insist on James's "radical temporalism." JRS

1091 Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy. Phil Rev 21.1 (Jan 1912): 11-31; 21.3 (May 1912): 322-343; 21.5 (Sept 1912): 527-545.

Part 1, "Renouvier and Recent Temporalism," announces a critical examination of the effort to disprove intellectualism by appeal to the reality of time in experience. James belongs to the progression from Renouvier to Bergson, transitioning from a respect for theoretical grounds to outright anti-intellectualism. Part 2 is "Temporalism and Anti-Intellectualism: Bergson." In part 3, "Time and Continuity: Pillon, James," James's search for a solution to the "paradox of the continuum" is analyzed. James at first confused "interpenetration" with "continuity" but concluded that thought falsely portrays the discrete perceptual flux as a continuum. Thus James repudiated Bergson and returned to his neo-criticism origins. JRS

1092 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. The Causal Relation Between Mind and Body. J Phil 9.18 (29 Aug 1912): 477-490.

1093 Masci, Filippo. Intellettualismo e pragmatismo. In *Atti della R. Acc. di scienze morale e politica*, vol. 41 (Naples, 1912), part 1, pp. 1-68.

1094 McClure, M. T. A Point of Difference Between American and English Realism. J Phil 9.25 (5 Dec 1912): 684-687.

American Realism, following James, holds that consciousness is derivative relation between things, allowing it to inquire into the conditions of its origins. JRS

1095 McGilvary, Evander B. Professor Dewey's "Awareness." J Phil 9.11 (23 May 1912): 301-302. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 452-453.

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "In Response to Professor McGilvary" {1043}.

1096 McGilvary, Evander B. Professor Dewey's "Brief Studies in Realism." J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 344-349. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 107-112.

McGilvary responds to Dewey's "Brief Studies in Realism" {936}. American realists also reject substantive "minds," viewing consciousness as a relation between things. JRS

1097 McGilvary, Evander B. Realism and the Ego-Centric Predicament. Phil Rev 21.3 (May 1912): 351-356. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 445-451.

McGilvary comments on R. B. Perry's "The Ego-Centric Predicament," J Phil 7.1 (6 Jan 1910): 5-14, and Dewey's "Brief Studies in Realism" {936}. JRS

1098 Macintosh, Douglas C. Representational Pragmatism. Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 167-181.

Intellectualism identifies truths with reality, but "truth" qualifies judgments. Idealism wavers between the coherence and correspondence notions of truth, but both lead to agnosticism. Russell's intellectualism likewise has no real criterion of truth. "Extreme" pragmatism identifies truth with its verification. "Representational" pragmatism compromises by defining truth as a "representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment." (p. 177, italics deleted) JRS

Summaries

Mark E. Penny, Phil Rev 21.5 (July 1912): 618.

1099 Mead, G. H. The Mechanism of Social Consciousness. J Phil 9.15 (18 July 1912): 401-406. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 134-141.

The social object is the gestures leading to a social act when sensed by another form, arousing in that form the imagery of the answering gesture and its consequences. The "self" is one's own response to one's own social stimulation. JRS

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 355.

1100 Merz, John Theodore. *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1912. Reprinted, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1976.

Merz mentions pragmatism and William James in connection with wider movements of thought in vol. 4, p. 93, 253, 349, 414, 613, and 722. JRS

1101 Meyerson, Émile. *Identité et réalité.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1912. Translated by Kate Loewenberg as *Identity and Reality* (New York: Dover, 1962).

Meyerson, who offers "the most powerful critique of positivism" that Costello (below) has ever encountered, and whom Lalande praises highly, comes to the following conclusions: "it is not true that the sole end of science is action nor that it is solely governed by the desire for economy in this action. Science also wishes to make us understand nature." (p. 384) "Law, such as science really understands it, is an ideal construction, an image transformed by our understanding of the ordering of nature; it cannot, therefore, directly express reality or be truly adequate to it. It did not exist before we had formulated it, and it will no longer exist when we shall have merged it in a wider law." (pp. 412-413) Le Roy and Boutroux are both influential figures. LF

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, J Phil 22.23 (5 Nov 1925): 637-643.

1102 Moore, A. W. Bergson and Pragmatism. Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 397-414.

Bergson's evolutionism is most congenial to pragmatism, while his versions of instrumentalism and anti-intellectualism widely diverge from pragmatism. His reliance on intuitions results in a "shy transcendentalism." JRS

1103 Moore, A. W. Professor De Laguna on "The Chicago School." Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 627-629.

Moore replies to De Laguna's review of his *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}. JRS

1104 Moore, A. W. Thought and Its Function. Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 233-237.

Moore replies to D. L. Murray's review of his *Pragmatism and Its Critics* {860}. JRS

1105 Moore, Edward Caldwell. *An Outline of the History of Christian Thought Since Kant.* London: Duckworth, 1912.

Pp. 238-241 deal with James. Modern religious thought begins with Kant's view that "religion is a fact of the inner life" and James's religious psychology continues this. It suggests that lower religions are to be understood in terms of the higher religions, and not the reverse. IKS

1106 Morgan, F. Grover. Pragmatism and Religion: A Note. Journal of Religious Psychology 5.4 (Oct 1912): 429-434.

1107 Muir, M. M. Pattison. The Vain Appeal of Dogma to Science. Hibbert J 10.4 (July 1912): 824-834.

Muir gives a fuller development of the fundamental difference between authoritarian theology, the preference for abstract thinking over perceptual realities, and pragmatic theory. JRS

Notes

See O. C. Quick's response, "Dogma, Science, and Pragmatism" {1117}.

1108 Müller, Ernst. Henri Bergson. Arch Syst Phil n.s. 8.2 (15 May 1912): 185-194.

Bergson's philosophy contains several pragmatic themes. JRS

Reviews

H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 22.2 (March 1913): 236.

1109 Murray, D. L. *Pragmatism.* London: Constable and Co.; New York: Dodge, 1912. 2nd ed., London: Constable and Co., 1925.

F. C. S. Schiller's "Preface," pp. vii-x, declares that James's *Pragmatism* {438}, while a work of genius, is too untechnical for professional philosophers and no longer "covers the whole ground." IKS

Chap. 1, "The Genesis of Pragmatism," explains that pragmatism is a continuation, not replacement, of philosophical thought. It solves the problem of knowledge with the "New Psychology" of volitional belief, and dissolves skepticism by replacing formal logic's "juggling with empty forms of words" with a practical understanding of thought. The other chapters are "The New Psychology," "Will in Cognition," "The Dilemmas of Dogmatism," "The Problem of Truth and Error," "The Failure of Formal Logic," "The Bankruptcy of Intellectualism," and "Thought and Life." JRS

Reviews

Howard V. Knox, Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 560-563; John Pickett Turner, J Phil 11.1 (1 Jan 1914): 24-26.

Notes

See Schiller's comments on Turner's review, "Letter from Dr. Schiller," J Phil 11.7 (26 March 1914): 194-195.

1110 Nève, Paul. *Le Pragmatisme et la philosophie de Bergson.* In *Annales de L'Institute Supérieur de Philosophie*, vol. 1 (Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain, 1912), pp. 173-210. Published separately, Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1912.

Reviews

Joseph Louis Perrier, J Phil 10.1 (2 Jan 1913): 24-26. American readers will be suspicious of Nève's view that Bergson's philosophy is the purest and most durable form of pragmatism. JRS

Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 593.

1111 O'Keefe, D. Pragmatism. Irish Ecclesiastical Record 4th series 31.6 (June 1912): 561-569; 32.1 (July 1912): 31-40; 32.3 (Sept 1912): 268-277; 32.4 (Oct 1912): 354-361.

O'Keefe surveys the pragmatism of James, the "most logical and clear-sighted advocate." Pragmatism promises emancipation from "the formal logical schools," but without a definite pragmatic theory of values, it lacks an understandable formulation. Inspired by the "multiplication" of useful scientific hypotheses, pragmatism rejects absolute truth for a "thinly veiled scepticism." Part two, "The Representative Theory of Truth," explains that pragmatism's psychology advances beyond thought as "crude imagery," offering a "modified nominalism" in which concepts are instruments. James does not understand that Thomism rejects the representation theory also, as it finds knowledge in universals,

not particulars. Part three, "Evolution and Truth," accuses pragmatism of alternating between a reduction of truth to what meets individual needs, and a restriction of truth to what has proven socially valuable over time. Part four, "The Absolutist Theory of Truth," argues that pragmatism, while rightly rejecting Absolute idealism, practically achieves the same skeptical result. While "our intellectual life is inextricably interwoven with our volitional life," the intellect cannot be reduced to volition, and all knowledge "rests in the immediate certainty and absolute validity of certain judgments." JRS

1112 Oltramare, Hugo. *Essai sur la prière d'après la pensée philosophique de William James.* Geneva: H. Robert, 1912.

A discussion, faithful to James's spirit and method, of the problem of evil in relation to James's radical empiricism, pragmatism, and his "théorie anatomo-physiologique." IKS

1113 Papini, Giovanni. *24 Cervelli.* Ancona: Pucini, 1912. 4th rev. ed., Milan: St. ed. Lombardo, 1918. 6th rev. ed., Florence: Vallechi, 1924.

Several sections discuss pragmatism, including "F. C. S. Schiller," pp. 125-132, and "Giovanni Vailati," pp. 263-282. JRS

1114 Parker, Charles P. Plato and Pragmatism. In *Harvard Essays on Classical Subjects*, ed. Herbert Weir Smyth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), pp. 175-206.

James refers us to the flux of sensations while Plato points to the world of essence. But perhaps both reach the same "mystical region" where "rational thinking" fails. IKS

1115 Parker, Willis Allen. *Pluralism and Irrationalism in the Philosophy of William James.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1912.

1116 Perry, Ralph B. Pragmatism. Part 4 of *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), pp. 195-268. 2nd ed., 1919. Reprinted, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

Pragmatism is primarily a theory of knowledge based on a bio-centric viewpoint. An idea's meaning is the plan of action leading to the thing meant. Truth is an adjective of ideas; truth does not reside in Platonic essences or absolute reality. An idea is true when it successfully fulfills its function. There are five modes of verification: by perception, consistency, operation, sentiment, and general utility. Pragmatism is "reactionary and dangerous" when it gives sentiment and utility equal priority to perception and consistency. James favors a realistic pragmatism; Schiller's is subjective. Epistemologically, pragmatism is naturalistic, but when a pragmatist declares that the environment is a "precipitate of knowledge itself," activity must paradoxically produce the conditions of action. This logically leads to absolutism; pragmatism should instead follow James's realistic route. The appendix, "The Philosophy of William James," is a reprint of {988}. JRS

Extended reviews

Arthur O. Lovejoy {1090}; F. C. S. Schiller {1220}.

Reviews

Evander B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 462-468; George H. Sabine, Int J Ethics 24.1 (Oct 1913): 89-94.

1117 Quick, Oliver C. Dogma, Science, and Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 11.1 (Oct 1912): 195-196.

Quick responds to Muir's "The Vain Appeal of Dogma to Science" {1107}. Speaking also as a pragmatist, it seems that while the postulated existence of an atom is of little significance to the scientist, the religious person's postulation of God is a matter on which depends "his whole aim and conduct in life." Religion therefore must be verifiable in *all* experience, not just some "specific psychological phenomenon," as James assumes. Theology accordingly must claim an eternal spiritual truth. JRS

1118 Robet, Henri. La Signification et la valeur du pragmatisme. Rev Phil 74.6 (Dec 1912): 568-601.

Reviews

E. T. Paine, Phil Rev 22.3 (May 1913): 342-343.

1119 Royce, Josiah. Prinzipien der Logik. In *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, vol. 1: *Logik*, ed. Arnold Ruge (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1912), pp. 61-136. The original English text, "The Principles of Logic" is in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 1: *Logic*, translated by B. Ethel Meyer (London and New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 67-135. Reprinted in *Royce's Logical Essays*, ed. Daniel S. Robinson (Dubuque: William C. Brown, 1951), pp. 310-378. Published as *The Principles of Logic* (New York: Wisdom Library, 1961).

Reviews of the translation

Willard C. Gore, Psych Bull 11.3 (15 March 1914): 108-110; Karl Schmidt, Phil Rev 26.1 (Jan 1917): 70-87.

1120 Sabine, George H. Professor Bosanquet's Logic and the Concrete Universal. Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 546-565.

An extended discussion of Bosanquet's *Logic* {917}. The difficulties with the coherence theory of truth are illustrated by comparing it with pragmatism. Pragmatism goes beyond the search for mere contradictions toward an ideal system, discovering thought only in the search for solutions to specific problems. It is idealism which cannot account for experience's continuity, for it elevates one phase of experience and discredits another, unable to give meaning to temporal reality. JRS

Notes

See Bosanquet's reply, "The Relation of Coherence to Immediacy and Specific Purpose" {1409}.

1121 Schiller, F. C. S. *Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem*. London: Macmillan, 1912. 2nd ed., 1931.

Extended reviews

Max Eastman {1055}.

Reviews

John Dewey, "A Trenchant Attack on Logic," Independent 73 (25 July 1912): 203-205 [*MW* 7: 131-134]. No doctrine or distinction of traditional logic "escapes Schiller's

demolishing hand," guided by the principle that no mode of thought has meaning beyond the context of actual human purposes in real situations. JRS

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 22.1 (Jan 1913): 102-111. Philosophers today agree that "Formal Logic as a science of true thinking is a failure," but also that it still has a "propaedeutic value," which is untouched by Schiller's attacks. Schiller expends his efforts only on formal logic, not on the specific kind of logic used by the idealists. Surely logic must abstract to some degree, and science must perform genuine thinking to maintain "stable systems of established truths." Pragmatism has "lived in an atmosphere of perpetual polemics," but to regain its impetus, it must establish a reconstruction of logic. JRS

Bertrand Russell, The Nation 11 (18 May 1912): 258-259 [*Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 6: *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 296-297]. Schiller only attacks Aristotelian logic (justifiably), not the recent work since Boole. His helpful emphasis on "the uncertainty of all our beliefs" must be kept separate from his contentment with a "a theory of truth which does not demand that a true belief shall in any way correspond with fact." See Schiller's letter of reply to Russell, *Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913*, pp. 383-385. JRS

W. E. Tanner, Hibbert Journal 11.4 (July 1913): 912-916. Logic is not really as grotesque as Schiller portrays. Its forms are "practically useful and theoretically valid." JRS

G. D., Rev de Phil 21.1 (1 July 1912): 95-97; J. B. Payne, Int J Ethics 23.3 (April 1913): 368-370; Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Phil Rev 21.5 (Sept 1912): 602-604.

Notes

Schiller and A. Wolf debate the merits of this work in "The Value of Logic" {1286}. See also Schiller's response to Hoernlé's review, "Formalism in Logic" {1217}, and his response to Tanner's review, "The Social Value of Logic Teaching" {1221}.

1122 Schiller, F. C. S. Logic Versus Life. Independent 73.8 (22 Aug 1912): 375-378.

1123 Schiller, F. C. S. The Problems of Formal Logic. J Phil 9.25 (5 Dec 1912): 687-691.

Schiller replies to Max Eastman's "Mr. Schiller's Logic" {1055}. JRS

Notes

See Eastman, "Rejoinder to Mr. Schiller," 9.25 (5 Dec 1912): 692-693. See also Schiller's review of E. E. Constance Jones's *A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1911), Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 246-250.

1124 Schiller, F. C. S. Relevance. Mind 21.2 (April 1912): 153-166.

The term "relevance" connotes subjectivity, selection, honesty, and disputableness. Only relevant truths are ever meaningfully asserted. Philosophers seeking the "absolutely" true with formal logic always categorize individuality as unreal, but their metaphysical "absolutes" are nevertheless highly selective. JRS

Summaries

Mark E. Penney, Phil Rev 21.5 (July 1912): 618.

1125 Schiller, F. C. S. The 'Working' of 'Truths'. Mind 21.4 (Oct 1912): 532-535.

Schiller replies to Susan L. Stebbing's "Pragmatism and the Dictum 'All Truths Work'" {1129}. Pragmatism offers no absolute, infallible test for truth; criteria of working are *valuable*, not "valid." JRS

Notes

See Stebbing's reply, "The 'Working' of 'Truths'," Mind 22.2 (April 1913): 250-253, and Schiller's rejoinder, "The 'Working' of Truths and Their 'Criterion'," Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 532-538. See also Alfred Sidgwick's comments on this Schiller-Stebbing exchange, "Truth and Working," Mind 23.1 (Jan 1914): 99-101.

1126 Sellars, Roy Wood. Is There a Cognitive Relation? J Phil 9.9 (25 April 1912): 225-232. Portions are reprinted in *Principles of Emergent Realism*, ed. W. Preston Warren (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1970), pp. 75-84.

James's psychological interests causes a confusion: while a thing is considered to be real when it affects us, it cannot be inferred that the essential meaning of reality lies in its relation to ourselves. JRS

1127 Serol, Maurice. La Fin de l'homme selon William James. Rev de Phil 21.5 (1 Nov 1912): 564-574.

The study of James shows that empiricism is too limited to provide answers about the ultimate destiny of man. James cannot find redemptive truths and ends by contradicting experience. IKS

1128 Seth, James. Present Tendencies in English Philosophy. In his *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1912), pp. 358-367.

1129 Stebbing, L. Susan. Pragmatism and the Dictum "All Truths Work." Mind 21.3 (July 1912): 471-472.

Schiller's denial that "All that works is true" robs pragmatism of a criterion of truth and error. He also contradicts James and his own statements elsewhere. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's response, "The 'Working' of 'Truths'" {1125}.

1130 Stewart, Herbert L. Pragmatism. Chap. 5 of *Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology* (London: Edward Arnold; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).

Reviews

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 22.4 (July 1913): 434-437. Stewart disagrees with pragmatism's contention that truth is not a purely intellectual ideal, but believes that it can correct some errors of idealism. Stewart wrongly assumes that a rejection of intellectual intuitions implies a grounding of truth on feeling and will alone. JRS

John Pickett Turner, J Phil 11.5 (26 Feb 1914): 134-137.

1131 Thilly, Frank. The Relation of Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception. Phil Rev 21.4 (July 1912): 415-432.

1132 Townsend, James G. Bergson and Religion. Monist 22.3 (July 1912): 392-397.

The common man could catch James's religious vision of a personal god, but he will not find "plan or purpose" in Bergson's universe. JRS

1133 Troeltsch, Ernst. Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion: To the Memory of William James. Harvard Theological Review 5.4 (Oct 1912): 401-422. The German text is in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 364-385.

James's is the first "thorough-going" American contribution to the philosophy of religion. James presents his views as a working hypothesis, while European thinkers see in theirs a demand of reason. The European tradition is Platonic, while James turns religious philosophy into psychology. James draws our attention to the concrete but we should not forget that the abstract is the sphere of philosophy. IKS

1134 Ubbink, J. G. *Het Pragmatisme van William James vooral in zijne Beteekenis voor de Theologie.* Arnhem: A. Tamminga, 1912.

1135 Watson, John. *The Interpretation of Religious Experince.* Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1912.

Lecture two of the second volume seeks to refute "Radical Empiricism." JRS

Reviews

George T. Ladd, Phil Rev 22.5 (Sept 1913): 539-546.

1136 Windelband, Wilhelm. Prinzipien der Logik. In *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, vol. 1: *Logik*, ed. Arnold Ruge (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1912), pp. 1-60. Translated as "The Principles of Logic" in *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 1: *Logic*, translated by B. Ethel Meyer (London and New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 1-66.

Reviews of the translation

Willard C. Gore, Psych Bull 11.3 (15 March 1914): 108-110; Karl Schmidt, Phil Rev 26.1 (Jan 1917): 70-87.

1137 Witter, Charles Edgar. *Pragmatic Elements in Kant's Philosophy.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1912. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915.

1138 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Evolution. Phil Rev 21.2 (March 1912): 137-151.

Intelligence is more than the instrument of truth; it allows the discovery of "its implied possibilities." JRS

1139 Wright, Henry W. The Interpretation of Reality. J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 356.

An abstract of a paper. Naturalism and intellectualism cannot interpret genuine evolution, which requires a philosophy founded on the activity of the creative will. JRS

1140 Adams, George P. Mind as Form and as Activity. Phil Rev 22.3 (May 1913): 265-283.

1141 Alexander, Samuel. Collective Willing and Truth. Mind 22.1 (Jan 1913): 14-47; 22.2 (April 1913): 161-189.

The practical will aims not at true but good propositions. (p. 163) Truth is one thing and its discovery is another. (p. 171) Pragmatism declares that success, as verified in sense experience, *is* truth. (p. 183) Pragmatism's doctrine of pure experience elevates sensations over ideas, but either sensations are already full of ideas, or sensations cannot serve to verify ideas. Are ideas merely substitutes for percepts, constituents of reality, or both? The last option is the correct answer, but pragmatism denies it. Pragmatism cannot be accused of supporting or requiring a solipsistic theory of truth, since it has no theory of truth at all. JRS

Summaries

Nann Clark Barr, Phil Rev 22.4 (July 1913): 451-452.

1142 Angell, James R. Behavior as a Category of Psychology. Psych Rev 20.4 (July 1913): 255-270.

1143 Baldwin, James Mark. French and American Ideals. Sociological Review 6.2 (April 1913). Reprinted in *Between Two Wars* {1848}, vol. 2, pp. 3-31.

James's formulation of pragmatism is "ideally suited to express the American national genius." It is "a philosophy of achievement, action, results, success, moral purpose." However, the other types of American philosophy must match pragmatism's "restlessness, urgency, vigorous self-assertion" with the "poise and serenity of highly-balanced reflective thought." JRS

1144 Balfour, G. W. Telepathy and Metaphysics. Hibbert Journal 11.3 (April 1913): 544-562.

1145 Berthelot, René. *Un Romantisme utilitaire: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste.* Vol. 2. *Le Pragmatisme chez Bergson.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913.

In this second study of the pragmatist movement, Berthelot focuses on the work of Bergson. Part One traces the influences of his pragmatism to Ravaisson, Schelling, Guyau, Spencer and Berkeley. The conclusion of the first part is an account of Bergson's "real duration." Part Two is an analysis of these sources, with discussions of Bergson's logic, physics, biology, and psychology. Chap. 1 describes the pragmatic elements of *Les Données immédiates* (1889) and *Matière et mémoire* (1896). Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the pragmatism of *L'Evolution créatrice* (1907), and chap. 4 is a comparison of the pragmatisms of Bergson, Poincaré, and Nietzsche. LF

Reviews

E. D., Rev de Phil 20.2 (1 Feb 1912): 202-204; Lionel Dauriac, Rev Phil 77.6 (June 1914): 624-631; Arthur Robinson, Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 124-125.

Notes

See vol. 1 {909} and vol. 3 {1661}.

1146 Bloch, Werner. *Der Pragmatismus von James und Schiller: nebst Exkursen über Weltanschauung und über die Hypothese.* Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1913. A different version was published as *Der Pragmatismus von James und Schiller nebst Exkursen über Weltanschauung und über die Hypothese* (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1913). A version also was in Z Phil Ph Krit 152 (1913): 1-41, 145-214.

Pragmatism is not a philosophy but a world-view. It is not well grounded, and one can prove its falsity. Bloch concentrates on the pragmatic theories of meaning and truth. IKS

Reviews

Howard V. Knox, Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 625-626. This work does not merit serious notice, due to his meager acquaintance with pragmatism, and an "almost comical self-confidence which accompanies his ignorance." JRS

1147 Bode, B. H. The Definition of Consciousness. J Phil 10.9 (24 April 1913): 232-239.

1148 Bode, B. H. The Method of Introspection. J Phil 10.4 (13 Feb 1913): 85-91.

1149 Bode, B. H. The Paradoxes of Pragmatism. Monist 23.1 (Jan 1913): 112-122.

Paradoxes arise as pragmatism is interpreted by other philosophies, which appeal to the unknowable in their accounts of truth. Pragmatism's immediate empiricism instead connects the origin of belief with its verification. The problem of past truths is solved when the organism's relation to the environment is not conceived as mechanical. JRS

Notes

An abstract from an earlier reading of this paper is in J Phil 9.13 (20 June 1912): 355-356.

1150 Boisse, Louis. Le Pragmatisme pédagogique. Revue Pédagogique n.s. 62 (15 May 1913): 401-428.

An exposition and criticism of James's philosophy of education as presented in *Talks to Teachers* {32}. Boisse disagrees with James's view that knowledge of psychology is neither necessary nor sufficient for good education and with his tendency to ignore the theoretical power. Boisse does agree with James's emphasis on activity in education. IKS

1151 Boodin, J. E. The Existence of Social Minds. American Journal of Sociology 19.1 (July 1913): 1-47.

1152 Boodin, J. E. Individual and Social Minds. J Phil 10.7 (27 March 1913): 169-180. Reprinted with revisions in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 191-204.

1153 Boodin, J. E. Pragmatic Realism–The Five Attributes. Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 509-525. Reprinted with revisions as "Retrospect–The Five Attributes" in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 385-404.

Summaries

C. M. Hobart, Phil Rev 23.3 (May 1914): 384.

1154 Boodin, J. E. The Reinstatement of Teleology. Harvard Theological Review 6.1 (Jan 1913): 76-99. Reprinted with revisions as "Teleological Idealism" in *A Realistic Universe* {1352}, pp. 360-384.

1155 Bornhausen, Karl. James der Philosoph des Heutigen Amerika. Die Christliche Welt 6 (6 Feb 1913): 122-130.

A brief introduction to the German translation of Royce's "William James and the Philosophy of Life" {995}. IKS

1156 Bridel, P. Des fictions dans la science et dans la vie humaine. Revue de Theologie et de Philosophy n.s. 1.1 (Jan 1913): 12-33.

1157 Brugmans, Henri Johan Frans Willem. *James: Een Samenvatting en Beoordeeling.* Groningen: M. de Waal, 1913.

1158 Bush, Wendell T. The Empiricism of James. J Phil 10.20 (25 Sept 1913): 533-541.

Since James, philosophers have come to respect their power of observation. Yet, in the *Essays in Radical Empiricism* {1078}, James does not yet speak the "language of empiricism." Terms such as "flux," "pure experience," and James's attachment to the "supernatural," tend to compromise it in empiricist eyes. IKS

1159 Caldwell, William. *Pragmatism and Idealism.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1913.

The "Introduction" summarizes the pragmatisms of James, Dewey and Schiller. "The Pragmatist Movement" surveys pragmatism's international character. France and Italy have been receptive and sponsor versions of pragmatism, but Germany opposes it, despite earlier pragmatic thinkers. Many British idealists have admitted pragmatic doctrines. "Some Fundamental Characteristics" include its dissatisfaction with scientific and philosophical rationalism, its "broad humanism," a trust in "instinctive" beliefs, and its affiliation with various other liberal tendencies. "Pragmatism and Human Activity" explains the breakdown of the theoretical/practical distinction. Unless pragmatism can justify our conception of "person" as possessing "higher reason and truth," it will remain a crude form of utilitarianism. The appendix to chap. 4 is some extracts from "Philosophy and the Activity-Experience" {5}. Chap. 5, "Critical," lists "pragmatic" philosophers throughout history. Pragmatism is unsystematic and confusing. It lacks a theory of reality, a criterion of "consequences," and an account of the relation of the individual's activity to reality. It has several difficulties with truth, logic, and knowledge, and is a near failure in ethics.

Chap. 6, "Pragmatism as Humanism," explains that its progress goes towards idealism and a "normative" view of ethics. "Pragmatism as Americanism" consists of the American interest in action, free creative effort, man-made truth, reliance on experience, democratic politics, and tolerance. "Pragmatism and Anglo-Hegelian Rationalism" critiques Bosanquet from a pragmatic perspective. Chap. 9 is titled "Pragmatism and Idealism in the Philosophy of Bergson," followed by "Concluding Remarks." Pragmatism fights for the "sovereignty of the spirit" and signifies that "humanity is again awakening to a creative and a self-determinative view of itself, of its experience, and of its powers." JRS

Reviews

H. Wildon Carr, Mind 23.2 (April 1914): 268-271. Caldwell's treatment of pragmatism as just a philosophical tendency "is to empty pragmatism of all philosophical meaning." By finding "coherence" at the heart of pragmatism's theory of truth, the real objective of pragmatism's fight with realists and idealists has been lost. Bergson's actual contribution to pragmatism is his doctrine of real free creativity. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Hibbert Journal 12.3 (April 1914): 704-706. Caldwell's metaphysical standpoint ignores pragmatism's psychological and logical aspects. Pragmatism has spread, not because of its conformity with the American temper, but despite it; for example, German philosophers are most distressed at the very notion that America produced this movement of thought. JRS

John Watson, Queen's Quarterly 21 (1914): 465-472. The dispute between Bradley and pragmatists turns on the meanings given to "practice" and to truth "in the long run." Despite Caldwell's claims, Bradley has not made a single concession to pragmatism. JRS

Anon, "Pragmatism and Its Affiliations," Spectator 111.26 (27 Dec 1913): 1122-1123; Bernard Muscio, Int J Ethics 24.3 (April 1914): 357-362; William J. Newlin, J Phil 11.14 (2 July 1914): 385-387; Henry W. Wright, Phil Rev 23.3 (May 1914): 348-352.

1160 Carr, H. Wildon. *The Problem of Truth.* London and Edinburgh: T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1913.

Reviews

C. D. Broad, Int J Ethics 24.1 (Oct 1913): 104-107. Carr gives a "fairminded" account of pragmatism, but it is no surprise that "he cannot make that tissue of confusions consistent with itself and with what we know ourselves to mean by truth." JRS

1161 Carus, Paul. Truth *vs.* Illusion. Open Court 27.6 (June 1913): 330-333.

1162 Celi, G. La santità secondo W. James. La Civiltà Cattolica anno 64 1.3 (23 Jan 1913): 257-274.

1163 Celi, G. William James e il pragmatismo. La Civiltà Cattolica anno 64 2.2 (11 April 1913): 155-164.

1164 Crooks, Ezra B. Is It Must or Ought? Int J Ethics 23.3 (April 1913): 323-339.

1165 Crooks, Ezra B. Professor James and the Psychology of Religion. Monist 23.1 (Jan 1913): 122-130.

James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} gave rise to the field of psychology of religion. James's method was "sympathetic interpretation" and an "imaginative entering" into religious experience. We find illuminated the "oddities" of our consciousness. Fascinated by this, we tend to forget that these oddities are only a small part of our life. IKS

1166 Dewey, John. *Interest and Effort in Education.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 151-198.

1167 Dewey, John. Introduction. To *A Contribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1913), pp. ix-xii. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 201-204.

1168 Dewey, John. The Problem of Values. J Phil 10.10 (8 May 1913): 268-269. Reprinted in *MW* 7: 44-46.

1169 Durkheim, Émile. *Pragmatisme et sociologie.* Lectures given at the Sorbonne during the academic year 1913-1914, from 9 December 1913 to 12 May 1914. Edited with a preface by Armand Cuvillier (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955). Translated by J. C. Whitehouse as *Pragmatism and Sociology*, edited and introduced by John B. Allcock (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983). An English translation of Cuvillier's preface is included on pp. xi-xxii.

The preface, introduction, and bibliography for the translation offer exceptionally detailed information on the interaction of pragmatism with French philosophy and sociology. The chapter titles are "The Origins of Pragmatism," "The Pragmatist Movement," "Truth and human knowledge," "Criticism of dogmatism," "The criticism of conceptual thought," "The secondary aspects of thought," "Thought and reality," "Knowledge as an instrument of action," and "The pragmatist theory of truth." Durkheim attacks pragmatism on the grounds that it lacks a criterion of satisfaction and hence a criterion of truth. Such a criterion must be based on an adequate *sociology* of knowledge, which for Durkheim is a sociology of morals. Pragmatism instead defines truth "psychologically and subjectively," which ignores the moral obligations, necessity, and impersonality necessarily involved in truth. JRS

Notes

See Marcel Mauss's remarks on these lectures in his "In memoriam: l'oeuvre inédit de Durkheim et des collaborateurs," Année Sociologique n.s. 1 (1925): 7-29. See also Hans Joas, "Durkheim and Pragmatism," translated by Jeremy Gaines, in *Pragmatism and Social Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 55-78.

1170 Eucken, Rudolf. Knowledge and Life. Phil Rev 22.1 (Jan 1913): 1-16.

A sketch of Eucken's *Erkennen und Leben* {1060}. The pragmatic and biological branches of recent empiricism are examined. Pragmatism cannot do justice to the transforming and ennobling effects of knowledge on mankind. JRS

1171 Ferrari, G. M. L'umanesimo filosofico. Riv Filo 5.5 (Nov-Dec 1913): 548-566.

1172 Foerster, Norman. Open Minds: A Text from William James. Dial 54.9 (1 May 1913): 364-367.

This is the age of open-mindedness, which however is not always good. There is the democratic open mind which espouses everything; the snobbish one, which emphasizes the novel; and the aristocratic one, which sifts things in accordance with standards. Probably, James meant the third kind, but pragmatism itself tends to be democratic. IKS

1173 Fouillée, Alfred. *Esquisse d'une interprétation du monde.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913.

This posthumous work of Fouillée's, compiled by his former pupil Émile Boirac, is an exposition of nearly all his ideas, and those of his contemporaries. After critiquing various interpretations of the world, he describes a possible reunion of all contemporary positions. In opposition to pragmatic voluntarism and the philosophies of intuition, Fouillée defends intellectualistic voluntarism. Of special interest is Fouillée's critique of pragmatism in section 3 of the introduction. "Without a doubt, first philosophy does not have, like positive science, the resource of experimental verification; but that is not to say that the choice of philosophical ideas should be uniquely regulated by our needs or desires." (p. xli) LF

Reviews

William Ernest Hocking, Phil Rev 23.4 (July 1914): 451-453.

1174 Fullerton, George Stuart. "Everybody's World" and the Will to Believe. J Phil 10.16 (31 July 1913): 438-441.

1175 Gillouin, René. William James. In *Essais de Critique: Litteraire et philosophique* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1913), pp. 231-288.

The author begins with the following: "William James is not a philosopher of the first order. Coming late to philosophy, and not by way of philosophy but by way of psychology and medicine, he brings a point of view altogether practical of which we will show the originality and theoretic interest; but it is a view that also has, on the other hand, if I may say so, a kind of preliminary scorn for technique." (p. 238) A good part of the chapter is about James and religious experience, though toward the end (pp. 265ff) Gillouin discusses pragmatism (better named Humanism or Anthropocentrism) directly. It is a view that understands man "in nature as an empire in an empire." (p. 275) "No longer is there *a* reality, no longer is there *a* truth...each individual has his truth, which is the original combination of his temperament and the objects of the spiritual or sensible order with which he is in relation." (p. 279) Gillouin argues that "to say that utility is the principle or the criterion of scientific truth" is to commit a grave error. (p. 23ff) The essay concludes with a discussion of James and Bergson. LF

1176 Guyau, Augustin. *La Philosophie et la sociologie d'Alfred Fouillée.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913.

This thorough account of Fouillée's philosophy–"Idées-Forces" and its application to sociology–is based on conversations with Fouillée himself, and a précis he wrote for the author, his grandson. "The philosophy of Fouillée is essentially...a philosophy of experience...[and his goal] is a philosophy that is at once speculative and experimental...reconciling all facts and all ideas." (pp. 11-12) Chap. 1 describes this method in detail. Also of interest is chap. 9, "The Epistemology of Fouillée," which includes a discussion of how Fouillée both precedes and succeeds pragmatism. LF

Reviews

Edmund H. Hollands, Int J Ethics 24.3 (April 1914): 362-364; Alma Rose Thorne, Phil Rev 23.1 (Jan 1914): 100-101; James Ward, Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 617-618.

1177 Harberts, William. *William James' Religionsphilosophie, Begrundet auf Personlicher Erfahrung.* Erlangen: E. Th. Jacob, 1913.

For James, religious experience is supersensible, personal, and mystical. Harberts surveys James's views on God, the sick-soul, faith, conversion, saintliness, and prayer. IKS

1178 Huneker, James G. A Philosophy for Philistines. In *The Pathos of Distance* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), pp. 347-366.

Huneker claims that pragmatism has been influenced by Nietzsche, it is "old-fashioned utilitarianism with a dollar mark," and it is "a thin doctoral thesis." It revives the Jesuitical maxim that the end justifies the means. In the second section James's *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} is reviewed. James is trying to exorcise monism, his "haunting devil." He has written a "large, lucid, friendly book," which attempts to "humanize rationalism." IKS

1179 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Zur Wieterentwicklung des Pragmatismus. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 51-52 (20 Dec 1913).

1180 Kallen, Horace M. Art, Philosophy, and Life. Int J Ethics 24.1 (Oct 1913): 37-54.

Art is either instrumental craft, or a "spontaneous, free, and irresponsible" fine art. Since the crafts ultimately serve that which has no further purpose, all art is ultimately fine art, and life has no extrinsic value. Philosophy is an art, defining the nature and value of the universe. Idealism mistakenly identifies reality with value, but pragmatism distinguishes them when it relates knowledge to happiness. The philosopher of art should inquire into "the degree in which it serves and extends all life's potencies, with the harmonious actualities it prepares, and renders enduring, stable, happy." JRS

1181 Kallen, Horace M. Radical Empiricism and the Philosophic Tradition. Phil Rev 22.2 (March 1913): 151-164. Reprinted "in slightly different form" in *William James and Henri Bergson* {1260}, pp. 1-30.

Philosophy has long sought the ideals of world unity, spiritual divinity, immortality, and freedom, at the price of ignoring the human mind and the experiential flux. James's democratic empiricism is instead based on these previously ignored realities, preferring truth to logic, and life to system. Speculation has been worshipfully hypostatized by philosophy and science, and by government and religion. Pragmatism avoids such bias, finding a neutral standpoint prior to all systems. JRS

1182 Kilpatrick, William Heard. Dewey's Doctrine of Interest. In *Proceedings and Addresses of the North Carolina Teacher's Assembly*, 26-29 November 1913, pp. 129-131.

1183 Knox, Howard V. William James and His Philosophy. Mind 22.2 (April 1913): 231-242. Reprinted in *The Evolution of Truth* {2113} pp. 95-114.

James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) shows how for the psychologist the abstract distinction between philosophy and psychology breaks down. James's later work only expands and enforces the "underlying philosophy" of the *Principles*. IKS

1184 Ladd, George Trumbull. Rationalism and Empiricism. Mind 22.1 (Jan 1913): 1-13.

Pragmatism selectively emphasizes one aspect of reason and tries to use it to deprecate rationalism. Rationalists would have all truth tested by induction from facts. The substantial features of pragmatism have been seen "over and over again" in the history of philosophy. It will fail to "work toward the establishment of a new form of systematic philosophy." JRS

1185 Lalande, André. Pragmatisme. Bulletin de la Societé Française de Philosophie 13 (June 1913): 201-205.

Notes

An article in the *Vocabulaire Philosophique*, fasc. 16. This small philosophical dictionary was regularly published as part of the *Bulletin*.

1186 Legrand, Georges. "L'Expérience religieuse" et la philosophie de William James. Revue Néo-Scolastique 20.1 (Feb 1913): 69-87.

The subconscious is central to James's study of religion, but it leads him to the error of identifying the experiences of a religious mystic and a drug user. He estimates the worth of religion pragmatically and ignores rational proofs, which is again an error. James's work is valuable for removing materialistic prejudices, but it must be viewed with reservations. IKS

1187 Leighton, Joseph A., Walter T. Marvin, Malcolm Taylor, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge. The Moral Aspect of Pragmatism. In *The Church Congress Journal*, Papers and Addresses of the Thirty-First Church Congress of the Protestant Episcopal Church (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1913), pp. 174-205.

The four papers, each having the common title (Leighton, pp. 174-184; Marvin, pp. 184-193; Taylor, pp. 194-200; Woodbridge, pp. 200-205) approvingly explain that pragmatism, even though it is incompatible with absolute standards of truth or goodness, stands for optimism, growth, and scientific intelligence. Discussion follows: Frederic C. Morehouse (pp. 205-207), George C. Foley (pp. 207-209), and Albert S. Thomas (pp. 209-210). JRS

1188 Lewis, C. I. The Calculus of Strict Implication. Mind 23.2 (April 1913): 240-247.

1189 Lewis, C. I. Interesting Theorems in Symbolic Logic. J Phil 10.9 (24 April 1913): 232-239.

1190 Lewis, C. I. Realism and Subjectivism. J Phil 10.2 (16 Jan 1913): 43-49. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 35-41.

The realists' arguments have not touched the basis of objective idealism, which does not assert that all reality is *known*, but only that it is *knowable*. The problem of knowledge is one of meaning: meaning always reaches beyond present experience. It is realism's problem, on its *assumption* of an independent reality, to determine the degree of difference between a known object and the object itself. Knowing is acting, but the realism *also*

assumes that the real is not altered by becoming known. Furthermore, realism takes it that all logical relations are already independently there too. "Such a happy conjunction of miracles reminds one of Leibniz's preestablished harmony." *Realism* is trapped in dogmatic subjectivism, unable to prove any of its assumptions, but confident that its arguments defeating the provability of its opponents' views thereby proves that realism is valid. The choice between dogmatic idealism and realism turns on pragmatic or temperamental preferences. JRS

1191 Lloyd, Alfred H. Conformity, Consistency, and Truth: A Sociological Study. J Phil 10.11 (22 May 1913): 281-296.

1192 Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism. Int J Ethics 23.3 (April 1913): 253-275; 23.4 (July 1913): 419-443.

1193 Marvin, Walter T. *A First Book in Metaphysics.* New York: Macmillan, 1913.

Reviews

C. D. Broad, Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 580-582. James's views on consciousness, presented in the chapter on "Psychology," are stated too dogmatically to assist beginning students with this "paradoxical" theory. JRS

1194 Mead, G. H. The Social Self. J Phil 10.14 (3 July 1913): 374-380. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 142-149.

The self is always an object in experience, and our awareness of our conduct is made possible by the relation between the conscious and self-conscious selves. Ethics studies the reconstruction taking place when a new social object develops before the new self develops. JRS

Notes

An abstract of this paper is in J Phil 10.12 (5 June 1913): 324-325.

1195 Moore, A. W. The Aviary Theory of Truth and Error. J Phil 10.20 (25 Sept 1913): 542-546

If "truth and error are respectively belief in what is real and unreal," and belief is "the attitude we take toward any proposition that *appears* to be true or real," as Montague holds, then objects of belief must either all be truth, or all be error. This use of the term "appears" is an instance of what Bode calls the "fallacy of the innocent bystander," where these definitions of truth and belief involve the standpoint of an omniscient observer. Both realism and idealism use this standpoint, and both metaphysically convert it into ontological absolutism (of either substance or ideas). The cure lies in not partitioning belief into a contentless "subjective" act and an actionless "objective" content. JRS

Notes

An abstract of an earlier version of this essay, entitled "Objectivity and Truth and Error," is in J Phil 10.12 (5 June 1913): 323-324.

1196 Moore, Jared S. The Religious Significance of the Philosophy of William James. Sewanee Review 21.1 (Jan 1913): 41-58.

James's thought passed from the problems of the body, to the problems of the mind, and then to the "deeper problems of the soul." James is favorable to religion, but the consequences of his pragmatism are not. IKS

1197 Mukerji, N. C. Martineau on the Object and Mode of Moral Judgment. Int J Ethics 24.1 (Oct 1913): 54-69.

Dewey's ethical theory begs the question by taking for granted that "a creature of blind impulses can...judge moral consequences." JRS

1198 Muller, Tobias Ballot. *De Kennisleer van het Anglo-Amerikaansch Pragmatisme.* The Hague: H. P. de Swart et Zoon, 1913.

Reviews

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 23.2 (April 1914): 271-273. A new prophet of pragmatism has written the most "comprehensive and systematic survey of the whole movement." JRS

1199 Müller-Freienfels, Richard. Nietzsche und der Pragmatismus. Arch Gesch Phil n.s. 19.3 (1 April 1913): 339-358.

1200 Muscio, Bernard. Degrees of Reality. Phil Rev 22.6 (Nov 1913): 583-605.

Idealists in the end turn to the principle, "Reality must satisfy our deepest needs." It thus appears, despite idealism's protest, that "pragmatism has discovered the essence of metaphysical argument." (p. 593) JRS

1201 Palhoriès, F. Le Pragmatisme en morale. Revue Néo-Scolastique 20.3 (Aug 1913): 339-365.

This article is a study of the theoretical and practical consequences that pragmatist philosophy has had on the conception of moral philosophy. Pragmatism is at once a method (of solving problems empirically), and a theory (that discovers the foundation of truth and by what signs we can recognize it). To begin his exposé, Palhoriès focuses on James. Morality, according to the pragmatists, is a human creation: it is the result of multiple experiences. Things considered in themselves are neither moral nor amoral, as they are neither true nor false; they become moral, like they become true. Nevertheless, morality is not arbitrary. There is a discussion of morality in the work of Peirce, Schiller, Dewey, Calderoni, Bellonci, Levi (and the 1904 International Congress of Philosophy in Geneva), Valli (and the Congress in Bologne), and Lévy-Brühl's work *La Morale et la science de moeurs*. The author concludes that to judge the value of an action by its consequences is to establish, as a rule of conduct, the most unstable, capricious, and flexible criterion possible. This is so, because ultimately no two individuals will ever experience the results of their contact with reality in the same way. LF

1202 Papini, Giovanni. *Sul pragmatisto: saggi e ricerche.* Milan: Libreria editrice Milanese, 1913. 2nd ed., titled *Pragmatismo: (1903-1911)* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1920). 3rd ed., 1927. Reprinted in *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2. The 1st ed. is reprinted in *Opere: Dal "Leonardo" al Futurismo*, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 3-130.

This book, dedicated to Giovanni Vailati, is a collection of Papini's articles on pragmatism which had originally appeared in *Leonardo* and in other reviews of the period from 1903-1911. Papini's plan for the book's publication in late 1906 with the French publisher Félix Alcan fell through and Papini put the project aside. When it finally did appear, Papini was no longer a pragmatist and thus he looked upon the book as an historical statement. Papini engages a wide range of topics from the critical assessment of modern philosophy to more specific treatment of theoretical issues in pragmatism such as the one and the many, and the will to believe. EPC

The essays compiled in the books are as follows; page numbers refer to the 2nd ed. "Avvertimento," pp. 5-11; "Morte e ressurezione della filosofia," pp. 13-33 {131}; "Unico e diverso," pp. 35-59 {265}; "Dall'uomo a dio," pp. 61-73 {350}; "Introduzione al pragmatismo," pp. 75-89 {468}; "Pragmatismo messo in ordine," pp. 91-97 {269}; "Non bisogna esser monisti," pp. 99-117 {469}; "Volontà e conoscenza," pp. 119-123 {268}; "Agire senze sentire e sentire senza agire," pp. 125-141 {264}; "La volontà di credere," pp. 143-153 {352}; "Il pragmatismo e i partiti politici," pp. 155-160 {267}; "La verità per la verità," pp. 161-175 {984}.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 626-628; Feliciu Vexler, J Phil 11.15 (16 July 1914): 415-418.

1203 Papini, Giovanni. *L'uomo finito.* Florence: Libreria della Voce, 1913. Reprinted in *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 135-385. *Opere: Dal "Leonardo" al Futurismo*, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 131-209.

Papini's autobiographical statement provides valuable insight into his early intellectual development. In some ways, it reads like Papini's version of *The Apology of Socrates,* a role he himself would have accepted as an accurate characterization of his activities during these years. There are references to pragmatism and the attraction that it had held for him during the *Leonardo* days. Yet there is so much more to Papini's intellectual journey than just its pragmatism. From his tortured childhood during which he projected his own commentary on the Bible, to his spiritual wanderings prior to the Great War, Papini proves to be his own best psycho-biographer. A total picture of the man, tormented soul and all, emerges from these pages in vivid detail. Reading this book, it is much more understandable why he chose James's "will to believe" as a philosophical locus, and also why he could never remain in that place for very long. Reading between the lines, his post-War conversion to Catholicism also emerges as somewhat inevitable. This work is a fascinating portrait of a thinker who still had much to contribute to the 20th-century development of Italian intellectual culture. EPC

1204 Parodi, Dominique. Le Problème religieux dans la pensée contemporaine. Rev Meta 21.4 (July 1913): 511-525.

1205 Patterson, Herbert Parsons. *An Extension of the "Pure Experience" Philosophy of William James.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1913.

1206 Paulhan, Frederic. Qu'est-ce que la vérité? Rev Phil 76 (1913): 225-250; 76 (1913): 380-393.

1207 Perry, Ralph B. Realism and Pragmatism. Mind 22.4 (Oct 1913): 544-548.

Perry replies to Schiller's "Review of Ralph B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*" {1220}. Perry states that empirical observations support realism. James's "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" {174} establishes his realism, while Schiller's claims that ontology is conditioned by epistemology, and that metaphysics must be ethical, are evidence of Schiller's subjectivism. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Prof. Perry's Realism" {1284}.

1208 Pratt, James B. The Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 10.4 (13 Feb 1913): 91-95.

Contains a report of Dewey's remarks concerning scientific and philosophical progress. (p. 93) JRS

1209 Reverdin, Henri. *La Notion d'expérience d'après William James.* Geneva and Bâle: Georg et Cie., 1913.

In this work the author focuses on the notion of experience in order to find the meaning of James's philosophy. Reverdin surveys nearly all of James's writings, holding that far from presenting one definition, description or theory of experience, he had numerous, diverse, and irreconcilable points of view. There is also an extended discussion of James's interest in possibility. The work divides into five chapters: Empiricism, Internal experience, External Experience and the Sciences, Radical Empiricism, and Religious Experience. There is no detailed discussion of pragmatism, though see Knox's review and Warbeke's review for remarks on Reverdin's James and pragmatism. LF

Reviews

Horace M. Kallen, Phil Rev 23.3 (May 1914): 357-359. Reverdin lists the several concepts of experience adopted by James at various times. However, he finds in this a contradiction, whereas it should be viewed as a development. IKS

Howard V. Knox, Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 604-608. A carefully done book, but Reverdin fails, as he admits, to catch the central thread. It is pragmatism which unifies James's thought; the insistence on a functional rather that a structural approach to every problem. Reverdin fails to perceive the radical transformation of empiricism which James effects. IKS

Henri L. Mieville, Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie n.s. 1 (1913): 378-384. An exposition of the work with an emphasis on the vagueness of James's terms. IKS

Lionel Dauriac, L'Année Philosophique 24 (1913): 216-218; Frederic Paulhan, Rev Phil 77.5 (May 1914): 534-536; John M. Warbeke, J Phil 12.19 (16 Sept 1915): 525-529.

1210 Robet, Henri. L'École de Chicago et l'instrumentalisme. Rev Méta 21.4 (July 1913): 537-575.

1211 Robet, Henri. La Valeur du pragmatisme. Rev Phil 75.2 (Feb 1913): 156-183.

1212 Royce, Josiah. *The Problem of Christianity.* New York: Macmillan, 1913. Reprinted, with an introduction by John E. Smith, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Reviews

William Adams Brown, J Phil 11.22 (22 Oct 1914): 608-614; L. P. Jacks, Hibbert Journal 12.1 (Oct 1913): 215-220.

1213 Royce, Josiah. Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism. Popular Science Monthly 83.10 (Oct 1913): 394-411.

Pragmatism's foundation in the psychology of the thinking process raises three problems, concerning how hypotheses are invented, how ideas are made sufficiently clear for testing, and what happens when an idea is tested. Pragmatism has not taken sufficient interest in the logic of deductive processes: the scientist's to deduce the consequences of theories, to confirm or refute hypotheses, and to express belief in terms of objective probabilities. Peirce, and then Poincaré, pointed out that a set of principles of mathematical science can generate an indefinite number of deductive inferences. Modern logic has ignored this aspect of reasoning, instead studying only the syllogism. JRS

1214 Ruckmich, Christian A. The Use of the Term *Function* in English Textbooks of Psychology. Amer J Psych 24.1 (Jan 1913): 99-123.

Notes

See also K. M. Dallenbach, "The History and Derivation of the Word 'Function' as a Systematic Term in Psychology," Amer J Psych 26.4 (Oct 1915): 473-484.

1215 Russell, John Edward. *A First Course in Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt, 1913.

Reviews

Albert Balz, J Phil 12.8 (15 April 1915): 222-223.

1216 Scheler, Max. *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik.* Part One is in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, edited by Edmund Husserl, vol. 1 (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1913). Part Two is in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, edited by Edmund Husserl, vol. 2 (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1916). Published as one volume, with a preface, Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1916. 2nd ed., 1921. 3rd ed., 1927. Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk as *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

Pragmatism reduces the "a priori" to "traditional compulsions of combinations of ideas which become fixated during historical development and which preserved themselves because their purposefulness determined actions toward the 'useful'." (p. 78) Scheler makes several sharp criticisms of the pragmatic treatment of ethics. JRS

Notes

See John H. Nota, *Max Scheler: The Man and His Work*, translated from the Dutch *Max Scheler: De man en zijn werk* by Theodore Plantinga and John H. Nota (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983).

1217 Schiller, F. C. S. Formalism in Logic. Mind 22.2 (April 1913): 243-249.

Schiller responds to R. F. A. Hoernlé's review of Schiller's *Formal Logic* {1121}. Hoernlé gave an exceptionally fair treatment, considering that "not 1 per cent of the critics of pragmatism showed the faintest glimmering of an apprehension of either our motives, our reasons, or our aims." The unconscious preoccupation with formal logic prevents understanding, regardless of what professional philosophers may state otherwise. Since meaning is a matter of psychological fact, formal logic is meaningless. JRS

1218 Schiller, F. C. S. Mysticism *V.* Intellectualism. Mind 22.1 (Jan 1913): 87-89.

Schiller comments on A. E. Taylor's review of Aliotta, *La reazione idealistica contro la scienza* {1021}. Save for Bradley's "loyalty to rationalism," his philosophy would become completely voluntarist. It is this rationalistic failure to move closer to pragmatism which leaves him in his embarrassing posture of pointing to both mysticism and scepticism. JRS

1219 Schiller, F. C. S. The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Quarterly Review 218.1 (Jan 1913): 148-167. Reprinted with revisions as "Nietzsche" in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 106-128.

An examination of Nietzsche in the context of reviewing the *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* (1909-1911), Henri Lichtenberger's *The Gospel of Superman* (1910), H. Vaihinger's *Die 'Philosophie' des Als Ob* {1017}, and Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche's *The Young Nietzsche* (1912). JRS

1220 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Ralph B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*. Mind 22.2 (April 1913): 280-284.

Perry's book {1116} misses the biological psychology at the heart of James's pragmatism, causing him to give metaphysical readings to methodological principles. Preoccupied with the realist/idealist debate, he distorts James into a "new" realist. This realism misuses the "ego-centric predicament," assuming that the failure of idealism's arguments is a proof of realism. The third alternative, the correlation of mind and object, organism and environment, makes that debate meaningless. JRS

Notes

See Perry's reply, "Realism and Pragmatism" {1207}.

1221 Schiller, F. C. S. The Social Value of Logic Teaching. Hibbert Journal 12.1 (Oct 1913): 192-193.

Schiller responds to W. E. Tanner's review of *Formal Logic* {1121}. JRS

Notes

See Tanner's rejoinder, Hibbert Journal 12.2 (Jan 1914): 426-427.

1222 Schultze, Martin. *Das Problem der Wahrheitserkenntnis bei William James und Henri Bergson*. Erlangen: Junge und Sohn, 1913.

The emphasis is on Bergson. Some ten pages are given to an exposition of James's views and another ten to a criticism of the pragmatic and positivistic conception of truth. IKS

1223 Seillière, Ernest. La Morale de W. James et les elements de l'activité mystique. Revue Germanique 9 (Jan-Feb 1913): 1-35.

James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} advocates salvation through faith alone. He holds that mystical experiences lead to peace and believes in mind-cure. He thus fails to understand the importance of works. Moral progress is the result not of mystical but of practical experience. IKS

1224 Serol, M. La Valuer religieuse du pragmatisme de William James. Rev de Phil 23.6 (1 Dec 1913): 507-540.

If we apply the pragmatic test to James's own pragmatism, its value for religion is slight. It gives us a faith far short of certainty, which is too fragile a basis for an intense and vigorous religious life. IKS

1225 Singer, Edgar A. Jr. Man and Fellow-Man. J Phil 10.6 (13 March 1913): 141-148.

Does Dewey's instrumentalism argue that mind is essentially social? If so, where is his disagreement with idealism? JRS

1226 Stebbing, L. Susan. The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. *Proc Arist Soc* 13 (1913): 224-256.

Neither Bergson, Le Roy, Wilbois, nor Poincaré agree with pragmatism's theory of truth. JRS

Reviews

Walter B. Pitkin, J Phil 11.11 (21 May 1914): 298-304.

1227 Thilly, Frank. Romanticism and Rationalism. Phil Rev 22.2 (March 1913): 107-132.

James's pragmatism is a species of romanticism. JRS

1228 Thomas, George Brown. *The Religious Aspect of Pragmatism.* Dissertation, Boston University, 1913.

1229 Ubbink, J. G. *De Pragmatistische Philosophie van William James en haar begrip van Waarheid.* Arnhem: A. Tamminga, 1913.

1230 Vorbrodt, Gustav. W. James' Philosophie. Z Phil Ph Krit 151 (1913): 1-27.

Vorbrodt surveys several main points of James's thought, with reference to the work of Günther Jacoby, Théodore Flournoy, and Émile Boutroux. IKS

1231 Walling, William English. *The Larger Aspects of Socialism.* New York: Macmillan, 1913.

Reviews

Robert Rives La Monte, New Review 1 (1913): 661-664.

Notes

See Walling's reply to La Monte's review, "Pragmatism and Socialism," New Review 1 (1913): 718-719; Walter Lippman's reply, ibid. pp. 907-909; and La Monte's rejoinder, ibid. pp. 909-910. See also a survey of other reviews by Anon, "Can Socialism Be Identified with Pragmatism?" Current Opinion 61.1 (Jan 1914): 45.

1232 Witwicki, Wladyslaw. William James Jako Psychology. Przeglad Filosoficnzy 16 (1913): 21-63.

1233 Wright, Henry W. Practical Success as the Criterion of Truth. Phil Rev 22.6 (Nov 1913): 606-622.

A philosophy must satisfy three tests: "be consistent with the facts of experience as these are systematically recorded in the different sciences, useful as an instrument of adjustment in the economic and social spheres, and harmonizing in its emotional effects." JRS

Notes

An abstract of an earlier reading of this paper, then titled "Voluntarism and the Criterion of Truth," is in J Phil 10.12 (5 June 1913): 323.

1234 Wright, William K. The Genesis of the Categories. J Phil 10.24 (20 Nov 1913): 645-657.

Wright offers a psychological and sociological explanation of the categories, including "truth," from a pragmatic standpoint. JRS

1914

1235 Albeggiani, F. Il prammatismo di W. James. Riv Filo 6.2 (March-April 1914): 200-219.

1236 Assaglioli, R. Mario Calderoni. Il Marzocco 51 (20 Dec 1914).

Mario Calderoni died in 1914. This is one of the many memorial articles which appeared to mark the passing of this significant cultural writer. EPC

1237 Bode, Boyd H. The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin. Phil Rev 23.4 (July 1914): 389-409.

1238 Bode, Boyd H. Psychology as a Science of Behavior. Psych Rev 21.1 (Jan 1914): 46-61.

1239 Bode, Boyd H. Review of Oswald Külpe, *Die Realisierung*. Amer J Psych 25.1 (Jan 1914): 136-138.

Notes

A review of *Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1912).

1240 Boisse, Louis. Le Pragmatisme et la vie religieuse. La Grande Revue 85 (25 May 1914): 302-322.

Pragmatism is a vile spirit, invented to diminish the value of philosophy. It is now being applied to religion, politics, aesthetics, and education. IKS

1241 Bonucci, Allesandro. M. Calderoni. Rivista italiana di sociologica 18 (1914): 1-3, 5-6.

1242 Boodin, J. E. Cognition and Social Interpretation. American Journal of Sociology 20.2 (Sept 1914): 181-219.

Notes

An earlier version, "Knowledge and Social Interpretation," is abstracted in J Phil 11.13 (18 June 1914): 340.

1243 Boutroux, Émile. Preface. To the French translation by H. Marty of William James, *Memories and Studies* {957} as *Aux étudiants* (Paris: Payot, 1914; 2nd ed., 1920).

James's thought is a living force. This can be shown by his doctrine of the subliminal consciousness and by his tolerance. IKS

1244 Bradley, F. H. *Essays on Truth and Reality.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914.

A collection of previously published articles and some additional new essays. In a new essay, "On Professor James's 'Radical Empiricism'," pp. 149-158, Bradley states that James identifies reality with experience, but leaves unclear the status of past and possible experience. James seems to hold both that experience is a continuous flux with no terms or relations *and* that terms and relations are given in experience. IKS

Reviews

Theodore De Laguna, J Phil 12.11 (24 June 1915): 358-361. Bradley convicts James of inconsistency and ignorance of neo-Hegelianism. Dewey is "gingerly handled," due to a "deep respect." JRS

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 23.5 (Sept 1914): 550-557. It is easy to see why pragmatists have targeted Bradley. His rejection of thought's ability to constitute reality naturally raises the question of why nevertheless "thought must eternally and vainly endeavor to do so." JRS

H. Wildon Carr, Hibbert Journal 12.3 (April 1914): 697-702; J. S. Mackenzie, Int J Ethics 24.4 (July 1914): 453-455.

Notes

See Schiller, "The New Developments of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy" {1338}.

1245 Brown, Harold C. Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 11.3 (29 Jan 1914): 57-67.

Brown's report contains Dewey's remarks as a participant in a joint discussion with members of the American Psychological Association of "The Standpoint and Method of Psychology." Dewey says that philosophers should challenge the psychologists' notions of a distinct psychical world and the privacy of the consciousness. Such notions are just

remnants of older philosophical systems. Behaviorism is promising; of greatest importance is the elimination of the abstract term "consciousness." JRS

Notes

Another report of Dewey's remarks, written by M. E. Haggerty, is on p. 88-89 of "Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association," J Phil 11.4 (12 Feb 1914): 85-109.

1246 Bruce, H. Addington. The Soul's Winning Fight with Science. American Magazine 77.3 (March 1914): 21-26.

James has "helped bring the soul of man back into fashion." JRS

1247 Dewey, John. Nature and Reason in Law. Int J Ethics 25.4 (Oct 1914): 25-32. Reprinted in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 790-797. *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 166-172. *MW* 7: 56-63.

Summaries

A. J. Thomas, Phil Rev 24.1 (Jan 1915): 116.

1248 Dewey, John. Psychological Doctrine and Philosophical Teaching. J Phil 11.19 (10 Sept 1914): 505-511. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 439-445. *MW* 7: 47-55.

Summaries

C. Cecil Church, Phil Rev 24.1 (Jan 1915): 120-121.

Notes

An abstract of this paper is in J Phil 11.3 (29 Jan 1914): 64-65, and also in J Phil 11.4 (12 Feb 1914): 88-89.

1249 Driscoll, John Thomas. Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea. American Catholic Quarterly Review 39.3 (July 1914): 457-468. Reprinted in chap. 2 of *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea* {1316}.

Pragmatism insists on mental activity, and has three postulates: all knowledge has its source and material in mental sensations, experience is an evolving process, and theories are instruments of adaptation. Truth becomes relative to the person, and changes over time and place. Pragmatism is skeptical, subjective, and in ethics, holds that the ends justify the means. Experience for Dewey is not knowledge, but his theory of knowledge admits that the stimuli to action already have meaning. Dewey's logical theory is a functional version of Spencer's psychology. It must admit that not all conscious experience is not purposive action, which is a doctrine of Scholasticism. Pragmatism cannot explain, though it constantly assumes, the unity of consciousness, personal identity, and reflection. JRS

1250 Fite, Warner. Pragmatism and Science. Phil Rev 23.4 (July 1914): 410-429.

Unlike Kant, pragmatism relates reason and desire. The logic of pragmatism declares that Copernican theory, and the law of cause and effect, were not discoveries of fact, but inventions. Pragmatism requires a logic of human needs. Science would not find pragmatism useful; it prides itself on its freedom from anthropomorphic explanations and its impractical love for its subject. Is free motion rectilinear because we walk better in a

straight line? Just as Kant's "blind reverence" for Newtonian physics distorted his philosophy, pragmatism is distorted by its reverence for evolutionary biology. JRS

Notes

See Fite, "Pragmatism and Truth" {1251} for the list of commentators.

1251 Fite, Warner. Pragmatism and Truth. Phil Rev 23.5 (Sept 1914): 506-524.

Fite discusses Kant's, and then Poincaré's, difficulties with "the hard facts of science." Pragmatism has also avoided this dilemma: either truth is solely determined by our needs (but how can truth be distinguished from fiction?) or truth is completely independent of our needs (but how can it be true for us?). Fite then embarks on a study of the logic of personal relations, on the basis of the principle that "knowledge of our fellows is a higher grade of knowledge." This logic sheds light on the question, "How can truth satisfy human needs and yet have an independent value?" JRS

Notes

See J. F. Dashiell, "Humanism and Science" {1308}, and A. W. Moore, "Pragmatism, Science and Truth" {1329}.

1252 Galloway, George. *The Philosophy of Religion.* Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1914.

Contains references emphasizing James's pragmatism and the tests of truth. IKS

1253 Geyer, Denton Loring. *The Pragmatic Theory of Truth as Developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey.* Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1914.

1254 Goldstein, Julius. Introduction. To the German translation by Julius Goldstein of James's *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} as *Das pluralistische Universum* (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner, 1914).

This work introduces James's metaphysics into Germany, which thus far has known only his psychology and theory of knowledge. James is a radical empiricist who nevertheless appreciates man's higher spiritual life. The central problem is between monism and pluralism. IKS

1255 Griffin, Edward H. Some Presentday Problems of Philosophy. In *The Johns Hopkins Circular, Three Studies in Current Philosophical Questions* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1914).

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, Phil Rev 24.1 (Jan 1915): 102-105. Griffin's criticisms of pragmatism amount to "an attack on a straw man." JRS

1256 Hedges, M. H. The Physician as Hero: William James. Forum 52 (Dec 1914): 875-881.

James is one of the "illustrious physicians" and most deserving of the title of hero. James sought "balm for the souls of men." James answered the questions of the day with a "materialistic mysticism" and a "scientific religion." IKS

1257 Hill, J. Arthur. Changing Religion. Hibbert Journal 12.2 (Jan 1914): 356-373.

Notes

See John W. Graham's response, Hibbert Journal 12.4 (July 1914): 893-895, and Hill's reply, Hibbert Journal 13.1 (Oct 1914): 206-207.

1258 Holt, Henry. *On the Cosmic Relations.* Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1914. 2nd ed., *The Cosmic Relations and Immortality*, 1919.

Contains many references to James's participation in the American Society for Psychical Research, and to his observations and theories on psychic phenomena. JRS

1259 Kallen, Horace M. James, Bergson, and Traditional Metaphysics. Mind 23.2 (April 1914): 207-239. Reprinted "in slightly different form" as "The Revelations of Intuition and the Discoveries of Pragmatism," in *William James and Henri Bergson* {1260}, pp. 103-178.

Traditional metaphysics builds systems, considers experience to reveal appearances only, and holds that ultimate reality conserves human values. Bergson sides with the tradition, while James's radical empiricism breaks off completely. However, there are aspects in which James could owe a debt to Bergson. IKS

1260 Kallen, Horace M. *William James and Henri Bergson: A Study in Contrasting Theories of Life.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1914. Reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1980.

Chap. 1, "Radical Empiricism and the Philosophical Tradition," pp. 1-30, is a reprint of {1181}. Chap. 4, "The Revelations of Intuition and the Discoveries of Pragmatism," pp. 103-178, is a reprint of {1259}. James breaks with the philosophical tradition while Bergson remains within it. James describes experience, while Bergson "interprets and transmutes." Kallen places special emphasis on the contrast between Bergsonian intuition and the pragmatic method. Metaphysical differences lead the two to divergent conceptions of God, freedom, and immortality. IKS

Reviews

H. Wildon Carr, Mind 24.2 (April 1915): 269. Kallen relies on "a travesty of Bergson," whose philosophical vision does not make him a "system builder." JRS

Arthur O. Lovejoy, Nation 100.14 (8 April 1915): 388-390. Kallen identifies James's thought with radical empiricism, for which, he claims, all the data of experience are equals. But this would show that pragmatism is false, since, for Kallen, pragmatism is the view that all thinking is biased by the desires of the thinker. IKS

A. W. Moore, Int J Ethics 25.4 (July 1915): 554-556. The author concludes that "all have sinned and come short of the glory of the God of things as they are" although James's radical empiricism at least takes the world at "face value." JRS

George Peckham, J Phil 12.15 (22 July 1915): 416-417; Ellen Bliss Talbot, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 666-668.

Notes

See Bergson, "An Extract from a Letter written by Henri Bergson to Horace M. Kallen" {1299}.

1261 Knox, Howard V. *The Philosophy of William James.* London: Archibald Constable, 1914.

Knox summarizes in James's own words the central portion of James's thought. James broke down the barriers between metaphysics and psychology and discovered a new territory. James restored to us our world by showing that consciousness is a "means of action and adaptation." Theories derive their meaning from their applicability to the world and this leads to the "decisive step": viewing truth as "successful application." IKS

Reviews

J. A. Stewart, Hibbert Journal 13.3 (April 1915): 677-681. Besides Darwinism, James was also influenced by mysticism. Knox's exposition of theory and practice makes it evident that pragmatism is "but plain common sense," as English-speaking peoples "will not tolerate the Absolute." JRS

William McDougall, Mind 24.3 (July 1915): 423-424.

1262 Ladd, George Trumbull. *What Can I Know? An Inquiry into Truth, Its Nature, the Means of Its Attainment, and Its Relation to the Practical Life.* New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.

Reviews

A. C. Armstrong, Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 217-218.

1263 Lewis, C. I. Bergson and Contemporary Thought. University of California Chronicle 16.2 (1914): 181-197. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 42-54.

1264 Lewis, C. I. The Matrix Algebra for Implications. J Phil 11.22 (18 Oct 1914): 589-600.

1265 Lewis, C. I. Review of A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica.* J Phil 11.18 (27 Aug 1914): 497-502.

1266 Macmillan, M. T. The Pragmatic Test. Harper's Weekly 61 (18 April 1914): 10-12.

Reminiscences by a woman who in her late thirties read James's *Principles of Psychology* and decided to enter college so that she could teach the subject. It contains letters from James to her. IKS

1267 Massis, Henri. William James, ou le manager et l'idéal. L'Opinion 7 (23 May 1914): 655-656.

Pragmatism turns philosophy away from its true purpose, which is the contemplation of intelligible being. James gives us a rough version of what in Bergson we find in a more cultured form. IKS

1268 Moore, A. W. Isolated Knowledge. J Phil 11.15 (16 July 1914): 393-408.

It has been forgotten that knowing is a part of living. Instead, knowing is usually defined as "an act of a being whose sole or essential nature is to know," instantly making the recognition of error impossible. Bertrand Russell says that immediate knowing is an external relation between things and minds. Attributing certainty to *mental* sense-data, and

then arguing that sense-data exist in the relation between a *physical* sense-organ and a *physical thing*, leaves Russell with a strange metaphysics. His division between "immediate" and "mediate" knowing requires the bridging judgment, for example, "this patch of red." But this type of judgment for Russell's theory must be both absolutely certain *and* liable to error. Coherence cannot be a criterion of particular truths if correspondence is the "meaning" of truth. JRS

1269 Papini, Giovanni. M. Calderoni. Rivista di Psicologia 10 (1914): 5-6; 10 (1914): 440-445. Reprinted as "Mario Calderoni" in *Il pragmatismo* {1471}, pp. 5-16. *Tutte le opere* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 675- 681.

In spite of deep philosophical differences, Papini provides a thoughtful and sympathetic picture of Mario Calderoni in this memorial essay. The project of cultural agitation always seemed to matter more to Papini than did sectarian loyalties. In Calderoni, he found a philosopher who would concern himself with the problems of the public and the issues of the day every bit as much as with more specialized philosophical issues. In this regard, Papini found Calderoni to be something of a kindred spirit. EPC

Notes

A slightly different version was published as "Mario Calderoni (1879-1914)," Il Resto del Carlino 30 (24 Dec 1914). It is reprinted in *Opere: Dal "Leonardo" al Futurismo*, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 675-681.

1270 Paulhan, Frederic. Les Conditions générales de la connaissance. Rev Phil 77.6 (June 1914): 581-610.

A theory of knowledge is necessary for every philosophy (to pass over it is to admit it into discussion), and it is dominated by an opposition of subject and object. It is this opposition that Paulhan examines. It does not yet seem to have been established how subject and object are opposed. One problem is how knowledge is known. The subject is known only as an object, and the object is known only subjectively. (p. 598) Knowledge is an assimilation, though always incomplete and imperfect, involving the subjectivization of object and the objectification of subject. (pp. 599, 609) LF

Summaries

F. H. Knight, Phil Rev 23.5 (Sept 1914): 581-582.

1271 Rogers, Arthur K. *The Religious Conception of the World: An Essay in Constructive Philosophy*. New York and London: Macmillan, 1914.

1272 Rogers, Reginald A. P. The Simple-Complex, with Remarks on Some of Mr. Bergson's Ideas. Hermathena 40 (1914): 99-114.

James "deliberately confounds 'value' and 'fact'." His theory of freedom is one of pure novelty. It reminds one of the story in which a butler puts ice down his master's neck, explaining that "he felt that he must just for once break the routine of thirteen decorous years, and do something entirely new." (p. 109) JRS

1273 Roustan, Desiré. La Morale de Rauh. Rev Méta 22.3 (May 1914): 293-333.

Roustan compares Frédéric Rauh's and Dewey's moral theories. JRS

1274 Roustan, Desiré. La Science comme instrument vital. Rev Méta 22.5 (Sept 1914): 612-643.

Summaries

Gertrude Q. Baker, Phil Rev 25.1 (Jan 1916): 90-91.

1275 Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. Monist 12.4 (July 1914): 780-803. Section one, "Reason and Intuition," was also published as part of chap. 1, "Current Tendencies," in *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin; Chicago: Open Court, 1914), pp. 20-26. The entire essay, with revisions, is in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1918), pp. 1-32. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 8: *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914-1919* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 30-49.

Bergson holds that intuition is a superior kind of knowledge to practical intelligence. With Nietzsche and pragmatism, he excessively infuses the universe with progress. JRS

1276 Russell, Bertrand. On the Nature of Acquaintance. Monist 24.1 (Jan 1914): 1-16; 24.2 (April 1914): 161-187; 24.3 (July 1914): 435-453. Reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950*, ed. Robert Charles Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 127-174. *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*, vol. 7 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 5-44.

Notes

Additional references to James and pragmatism are made in other portions of the *Theory of Knowledge*.

1277 Russell, Bertrand. *Scientific Method in Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914. Reprinted with revisions as "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" in *Mysticism and Logic* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1918), pp. 97-124. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 8: *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914-1919* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 55-73.

James rightly abjures the attempt to describe the whole universe. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 24.3 (July 1915): 399-404.

1278 Russell, Francis C. In Memoriam Charles S. Peirce. Monist 24.3 (July 1914): 469-472.

1279 Schiller, F. C. S. Aristotle's Refutation of 'Aristotelian' Logic. Mind 23.1 (Jan 1914): 1-18.

Notes

See H. W. B. Joseph's response, "Correspondence," Mind 23.2 (April 1914): 319, and Schiller's reply, ibid. pp. 319-320. See also G. R. T. Ross, "Aristotle and Abstract Truth–

A Reply to Mr. Schiller," Mind 23.3 (July 1914): 396-401, and Schiller's reply, "Prof. Ross on Aristotle's Self-Refutation," Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 558-564.

1280 Schiller, F. C. S. Dr. Mercier and Formal Logic. Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 568-569.

Schiller responds to H. S. Shelton's "Dr. Mercier and the Logicians," Mind 23.3 (July 1914): 402-404, and to C. A. Mercier's reply to Shelton, "Dr. Mercier and the Logicians," Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 564-567. See also Shelton's comments on these three articles, "The Opponents of Formal Logic," Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 75-78. Schiller rejoins this continuing debate on logic with his "The Argument *A Fortiori*" {1393}. JRS

1281 Schiller, F. C. S. Eugenics and Politics. Hibbert Journal 12.2 (Jan 1914): 241-259.

Notes

See comments by John L. Heaton, R. M. MacIver, and E. H. Bethell, Hibbert Journal 12.3 (April 1914): 668-674.

1282 Schiller, F. C. S. The Logic of Science. Science Progress 8 (Jan 1914): 398-407.

1283 Schiller, F. C. S. Philosophy, Science, and Psychical Research. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 27.1 (July 1914): 191-220. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 320-351.

1284 Schiller, F. C. S. Prof. Perry's Realism. Mind 23.3 (July 1914): 386-395.

Schiller replies to Perry's "Realism and Pragmatism" {1207}. Why does Perry obsessively assume that realism and idealism are exhaustive alternatives? What is the value of either theory? How could the thesis that the subject and object are correlated be taken for an idealism? Where is a definition of reality's "independence"? When will Perry appreciate that the "psychic continuum" is the nucleus of James's system? JRS

Notes

See Perry's reply, "Dr. Schiller on William James and on Realism" {1330}.

1285 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Luigi Valli, *Il valore supremo*. Mind 23.4 (Oct 1914): 628.

Notes

Il valore supremo (Geneva: A. F. Formiggini, 1913).

1286 Schiller, F. C. S., and Abraham Wolf. The Value of Logic. *Proc Arist Soc* 14 (1914): 181-241.

Wolf's contribution, pp. 181-217, seeks to refute Schiller's arguments in *Formal Logic* {1121}. Schiller's response is pp. 217-241. JRS

Reviews

Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 13.6 (16 March 1916): 159-165. Wolf's discussion shows "considerably more animus than relevancy." JRS

1287 Shaw, Charles Gregory. Emerson the Nihilist. Int J Ethics 25.1 (Oct 1914): 68-86.

Emerson's nihilistic egoism celebrates anarchy, nominalism, immoralism, and irreligion. Emerson's "open universe" presaged the pragmatists, though they lack Emerson's courage to face irrationalism and immoralism. Like Emerson, James used Swedenborgian mysticism to escape this world. They both found it easy to "play with men's prayers or the varieties of their religious experiences." JRS

Summaries

A. J. Thomas, Phil Rev 24.1 (Jan 1915): 125-126.

1288 Stebbing, L. Susan. *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1914.

The subtitle is "With Especial Reference to the Notion of Truth in the Development of French Philosophy from Maine de Biran to Professor Bergson." Written from the "intellectualist standpoint," it offers a comparison of the Bergsonian Intuitionist and the pragmatist. Stebbing argues that the two are opposed in "their methods and conclusions, and...in no sense can the French voluntarists be classified as Pragmatists." Both fail to give an adequate account of truth; the pragmatist because "he identifies truth with one of its consequences, the Bergsonian Intuitionist because he identifies truth with reality." (pp. v-vi) The author objects to the attempt to solve metaphysical problems non-intellectually. Philosophers discussed include Boutroux, Le Roy, Poincaré, Peirce, Blondel, Renouvier, Fouillée, and Séailles. LF

Reviews

Una Bernard Sait, J Phil 13.8 (13 April 1916): 219-221. Stebbing misunderstands Bergson, neglects Dewey, and "criticizes theories with which she is so unsympathetic that she can not obtain more than a superficial understanding of their meaning." LF

Alma Rosa Thorne, Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 220-221.

Notes

M.A. thesis, University of London, 1912.

1289 Study, Eduard. *Die realistische Weltansicht und die Lehre vom Raume.* Brunswick: F. Vieweg und Sohn, 1914.

Carus's review gives translated quotations concerning pragmatism on pp. 312-315. James "speaks of slander," but "the cause of pragmatism's ill luck lies in pragmatism itself, in its principle, and in the jelly-like consistency of its jelly-fish philosophy which dissolves under close scrutiny." The dark side of humanity should be recalled: "Is there any horrible deed which could not be and has not been proven to be 'pragmatically successful'?" Life contains "uncomfortable and even quite dreadful truths." JRS

Reviews

Paul Carus, "Eduard Study's Realistic World-Conception," Monist 24.2 (April 1914): 309-315.

1290 Suryanarayanan, S. S. William James and His Philosophy. East and West 13 (1914): 1094-1101.

James combated the divorce of philosophy from life. His work's value lies not in its results but in its pragmatic method, a "newer and clearer way of solving old problems." IKS

1291 Thilly, Frank. Pragmatism. Section 72 of *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1914), pp. 566-577. 2nd ed., with revisions by Ledger Wood, 1951. 3rd ed., with revisions by Ledger Wood, 1957.

Notes

For the 3rd edition, this section was considerably revised and expanded to become no. 84, pp. 634-654.

1292 Vogt, P. B. From John Stuart Mill to William James. Catholic University Bulletin 20 (Feb 1914): 139-165.

James moves in "Mill's orbit," for both subordinate logic to psychology, abandon absolute truth in favor of relative truth, and limit knowledge to sense experience. But whereas Mill interprets everything in terms of association, James has "teleological evolution." Both hold that "reality is intrinsically subjective," but for Mill this is a truth, while for James it is only a hypothesis. Future experience could lead us to a realism. Pragmatic ideas were in the air and it is difficult to establish direct lines of influence. IKS

Summaries

Nann Clark Barr, Phil Rev 23.3 (May 1914): 378.

1293 Wiener, Norbert. Relativism. J Phil 11.22 (18 Oct 1914): 561-577.

It is not true that objects of experience "would be exactly what they are now if they were in isolation." Experience must be completely coherent at every instant, and over time, but it cannot be concluded that there is one absolute self-sufficient experience. Thus all knowledge is relative, and while pragmatism agrees, its criterion of truth is problematic. JRS

Summaries

C. Cecil Church, Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 229.

1294 Wilde, Norman. The Pragmatism of Pascal. Phil Rev 23.5 (Sept 1914): 540-549.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 11.13 (18 June 1914): 338.

1295 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Faith and Pragmatism. Chronicle 14 (1914): 319-323.

Notes

See also Woodbridge's *The Purpose of History: Reflections on Bergson, Dewey, and Santayana* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916).

1915

1296 Aveling, F. Some Theories of Knowledge. *Proc Arist Soc* 15 (1915): 306-331.

Idealism fails to account for the contingent and transient; pragmatism fails with respect to the necessary and universal. Scholastic realism, using knowledge by intuition, balances all aspects of experience. JRS

1297 Bagley, William Chandler. Educational Theory and Democracy; Dewey's Individualism; Democracy and Abstract Thinking; Democracy and Discipline; The Peril in Dewey's Teachings. School and Home Education 35 (1915): 4-5.

Notes

See Dewey's and John T. McManis's replies, "Democracy and Individualism," with editorial comment by Bagley, ibid., 35-40; McManis's response, "Democracy and Individualism–Again," ibid., pp. 72-74; Bagley's editorial comment, ibid., pp. 74-75; and Bagley's rejoinder, "'Democracy and Education'; The Baneful Effects of Systematic Study; A Former Criticism Reiterated; Can all Dualisms be Reconciled?" School and Home Education 36 (1916): 5.

1298 Baldwin, James Mark. *Genetic Theory of Reality: Being The Outcome of Genetic Logic as Issuing in the Aesthetic Theory of Reality called Pancalism.* London and New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 639-646; Wilbur M. Urban, J Phil 13.13 (22 June 1916): 356-362.

1299 Bergson, Henri. An Extract from a Letter written by Henri Bergson to Horace M. Kallen. J Phil 12.22 (28 Oct 1915): 615-616. Reprinted in *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 1191-1194.

A favorable discussion of Kallen's *William James and Henri Bergson* {1260}. IKS

1300 Boodin, J. E. American Education and Democracy. Educational Review 50.2 (Oct 1915): 225-245.

1301 Boodin, J. E. The Function of Religion. Biblical World 46 (Aug 1915): 67-76.

1302 Boodin, J. E. Social Immortality. Int J Ethics 25.2 (Jan 1915): 196-212.

1303 Boodin, J. E. Value and Social Interpretation. American Journal of Sociology 21.1 (July 1915): 65-103.

1304 Bourne, Randolph S. John Dewey's Philosophy. New Republic 2 (1915): 154-156.

1305 Boutroux, Émile. *Certitude et vérité.* London: Oxford University Press, 1915

Boutroux takes up a discussion of the putative equivalence of "certainty" and "truth." After a short discussion of the difference between conviction and truth, Boutroux suggests that certainty and truth cannot have the same meaning. Nor, he argues, could the two be separated, any more than they could be reduced to one another.

Pragmatism, however, provides a third alternative: feeling as the "common principle" of certainty and truth. Yet because pragmatism invariably leads to either vagueness or a vicious circle, the author undertakes to reinterpret the notion of feeling. "Will and intellect, by themselves, would be incapable of acting on one another. But each acts on feeling, and are influenced by it; it is through feeling, therefore, that they communicate. All certitude...consequently, partakes of truth, and all truth...partakes of certitude." (p. 20) Boutroux concludes with remarks on science, feeling, and toleration. LF

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 25.1 (Jan 1916): 110-112. Schiller laments the absence of any discussion of Descartes, notes the defects of the German theories that Boutroux discusses (Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), and defends the claim that to describe the pragmatist solution as introducing a third term mediating between intellect and will does it "somewhat less than justice." He concludes cordially agreeing "with M. Boutroux that tolerance is a most precious attitude of mind to cultivate in the pursuit both of the good and of the true." LF

1306 Brown, George A. Education for What? School and Home Education 35 (1915): 5-7.

1307 Bunge, C. O. El Pragmatismo. Nosotros 19.1 (July 1915): 16-20.

1308 Dashiell, John Frederick. Humanism and Science. J Phil 12.7 (1 April 1915): 177-189.

Dashiell comments on Warner Fite's "Pragmatism and Science" {1250} and "Pragmatism and Truth" {1251}. Fite assumes that nature's independence is mechanically aloof; pragmatism is accordingly seen as reducing science to the "arbitrary creation of the personal subject." But no pragmatist accepts a mechanistic science, or treats reality as a human invention. Fite's own epistemological dualism prevents his understanding of pragmatism's logical analysis of knowledge. Science endeavors to locate and measure the centers of natural action for better human control. JRS

Summaries

Marion D. Crane, Phil Rev 24.4 (July 1915): 468.

1309 Dewey, John. The Existence of the World as a Problem. Phil Rev 24.4 (July 1915): 357-370. Reprinted in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 281-302. *MW* 8: 83-97.

It is impossible to meaningfully doubt the external world, as for example Bertrand Russell attempts in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), without assuming some externally real entity or process. Russell's examples give an adequate enough meaning to "private" perspectives, but only by using objective, public settings. Psychologists understand that knowledge of sensations is the product of physiological and experimental observation, and have realized that original experience is not made up the "highly discriminated particulars" that Russell describes. What is doubtful is "not the common-sense *world*," but "*common sense* as a complex of beliefs about specific things and relations in the world." JRS

Reviews

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 14.1 (Oct 1915): 184.

1310 Dewey, John. *German Philosophy and Politics.* New York: Henry Holt, 1915. 2nd ed., with a new forward and introduction (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942). Reprinted in *MW* 8: 135-203.

Kant's rigid separation of science and morality is the primary philosophical contribution to the shaping of Germany's culture. Its scientific achievements are not guided by any moral supervision, and its moral rigidity is not responsive to actual consequences. JRS

Reviews

George Santayana, "German Philosophy and Politics," J Phil 12.24 (25 Nov 1915): 645-649; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 25.2 (April 1916): 250-255; Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 24.5 (Sept 1915): 540-545; James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 26.1 (Oct 1915): 131-133.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Anon, American Sociological Review 8 (1943): 246; H. L. Ansbacher, Psychological Abstracts 17 (1943): 268; Jim Cork, Enquiry 1 (Nov 1943): 21-24; Leo Strauss, Social Research 10 (1943): 505-507.

Notes

See W. E. Hocking, "Political Philosophy in Germany" {1319}. See also Dewey's review of George Santayana's *Egotism in German Philosophy*, "The Tragedy of the Human Soul," New Republic 9 (9 Dec 1916): 155-156 [*MW* 10: 305-309], and R. B. Perry's review, J Phil 14.23 (8 Nov 1917): 637-640.

1311 Dewey, John. The Logic of Judgments of Practise. J Phil 12.19 (16 Sept 1915): 505-523; 12.20 (30 Sept 1915): 533-543. Reprinted as "The Logic of Judgments of Practice" in *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}, pp. 335-442. Part one is reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 567-585. *MW* 8: 14-82.

Practical judgments have these traits: (1) an incomplete situation is involved, (2) the judgment is a factor in completing the situation, (3) the judgment will assist bringing about a better completion, (4) the judgment is about both the goal and the means or given facts available to its attainment (condemning the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism), (5) the given facts are a hypothetical selection of the most completely relevant data, (6) the judgment's truth or falsity is constituted by the verification–has the envisioned goal, the way the situation was to be completed, been attained? The likely hypothesis that all judgments are practical is a type of pragmatism, which is free from any "voluntaristic psychology...emotional satisfactions or the play of desires".

The judgment of value is a species of practical judgment, which is a cognitive act distinct from, but possibly involving, the experience of good or bad. Any objective qualities of a thing are not themselves values, but data for a practical valuation; recent debate on the "objectivity of values" assumes a false psychology of private mental states. Things get values in the course of reflection on practical problems; values are not embodied in some prior standard, leading back to a *summum bonum.* Aristotle rightly sees that deliberation can only be about means with respect to an assumed end. The alternative destroys real moral uncertainty and only the morally ignorant or corrupted could fail to act morally. It is hopeless to discover a standard of value in moral reflection using either *a priori* intuitionism or hedonistic abstractionism. The logic of practical value is a new alternative, similar to empiricism's replacement of the regulative model with the hypothetical formula.

Most sense perceptions are forms, "terms of inferences," of practical judgments; lacking such meaning, an experience would be only a stimulus to action. An optical image physically exists and is explainable with reference to other physical conditions. It is not itself a known object, but a term in knowledge. It is usually assumed that the "real" object of knowledge in perception is the object that caused the perception. However, since the latter object is often not also perceived (for example, a mother hearing her baby's cry), then this assumption creates the epistemological problem of why reality "transcends" experience. Sensations are not elements of perception, but the most finely discriminated perceptions, distinguished scientifically for logical purposes. Locke confused this process by taking sensations to be "historical or psychological primitives–as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks upon inference and as means of knowing." The mind-body problem, the division between scientific and sense-data propositions, and the "egocentric predicament," are the results of this confusion.

All purely logical terms and propositions are propositions of inquiry, and thus are propositions of practice. Logical traits are traits of things, transformed for inferences. An inference is "a brute empirically observable event" of human action, which brings into existence with it other distinct, unique traits: signs, terms, meanings, notions, etc. These can be manipulated in inquiry in ways that physical objects cannot. The sciences are the various types of controlled inquiry; "true" theoretical objects are "those which best fulfil the demands of secure and fertile inferences." Theoretical and practical knowledge are only distinguished to the degree of sophistication of experimental thinking involved. JRS

Summaries of part one

Yuen R. Chao, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 684-685.

Notes

See Schiller, "Are All Judgments 'Practical'?" {1336}.

1312 Dewey, John. The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry. J Phil 12.11 (24 June 1915): 337-345. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 309-317. *MW* 8: 3-13.

Dewey replies to Ralph Stayner Lillie's "The Philosophy of Biology: Vitalism *versus* Mechanism," Science n.s. 40 (1914): 840-846 [*MW* 8: 449-459]. The "nature of metaphysical inquiry" is an issue raised by those who would distinguish scientific inquiry from metaphysical speculation into "ultimate" origins and processes. However, there is no "first" state of things (considering that evolution has renounced competition with theology's creationism). The better view is to give metaphysics the task of inquiring into the "irreducible traits found in any and every subject of scientific inquiry," such as diversity, interaction, specificality, and change. Mathematical quantity and order are equally valuable traits, but cannot replace the rest. Physical determinism fallaciously attempts to explain a course of events using only a statement of the historical facts. Since explanation inquires into relationships between the thing to be explained and some wider field of events, an explanation of "the whole" is impossible. A thing with the a "potentiality of X" means that present changes of that thing will, if it is exposed to certain conditions not now present, take on a form of X. Hence the early earth did have the potentiality of life and mind; this is not to say that the earth was then "biocentric or vitalistic or psychic." Evolution is not explainable; it is one of the irreducible traits of existence. JRS

Summaries

Marion D. Crane, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 680-681.

1313 Dewey, John and Evelyn Dewey. *Schools of Tomorrow.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1915. Reprinted in *MW* 8: 205-404.

In this manifesto of the advancing progressive education movement the Deweys broadly portray the interrelationships of the psychological, social, and pedagogical principles underlying democratic education. JRS

Reviews

Thomas Percival Beyer, Dial 59 (1915): 109-111; Robert H. Hutchinson, New Review 4 (April 1916): 128-129; Ernest Carroll Moore, Survey 34 (1916): 438.

1314 Dodd, L. W. This Then is Life. Unpopular Review 4.1 (July-Sept 1915): 120-126.

1315 Drake, Durant. Practical Versus Literal Truth. J Phil 12.9 (29 April 1915): 236-243.

Practical insights of wisdom, phrased in ambiguous language, provide an important service. But such moral or religious dictums should not be mistaken for theoretical truths, and pragmatism is best understood as dealing only with the former. JRS

Summaries

Marion D. Crane, Phil. Rev 24.4 (July 1915): 465.

1316 Driscoll, John Thomas. *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.

Chap. 1 situates pragmatism in a historical context. It has arisen as a consequence of evolutionary psychology, reversing Hegel's principle that the Absolute is the evolution of the Idea into the principle that the idea evolves in the human mind. It has two branches: Royce's absolute idealism, and the phenomenal idealism of James, Schiller, Bergson, and Dewey. Hegel's system failed because it has no place for potential energy, but only kinetic motion. Pragmatism similarly cannot find a place for latent knowledge, and thus declares that *all* ideas must be plans of action. Chap. 2 is largely a reprint of {1249}. Chapters 3 and 4 examine Royce's absolute pragmatism in *The World and the Individual* (1900-01) and *The Problem of Christianity* {1212}. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss Schiller's personal idealism and ethical voluntarism. Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 describe Bergson's theory of "creative evolution." Chap. 12 contrasts pragmatism and scholasticism. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 25.2 (April 1916): 274-275. Driscoll has "no very clear idea of what the pragmatist movement is about and how it developed out of the problems of modern philosophy." JRS

1317 Haas, John A. W. *Trends of Thought and Christian Truth.* Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1915.

Pragmatic themes are discussed in Part One, chap. 6, "The Biological Supposition" and chap. 7, "The Psychological Solution." Haas compares pragmatism with "Christian truth" in Part Two, chap. 4, "The Pragmatic Program" and chap. 5, "The Results of Pragmatism." JRS

Reviews

William Forbes Cooley, J Phil 13.23 (9 Nov 1916): 641-642.

1318 Hedges, M. H. Seeking the Shade of William James. Forum 53 (April 1915): 441-448.

After reading James's *The Will to Believe* (1897), Hedges began a "romantic quest" for the spirit of James. He did not find it at Harvard and Harvard professors denied James three times. James's spirit lives in his books, which shows him a "fellow-loving democrat" who believed in the "sovereignty of the mediocre man," and a "materialistic mystic" who saw "God in dirt." IKS

1319 Hocking, William Ernest. Political Philosophy in Germany. New Republic 4 (2 Oct 1915): 234-236. Reprinted, J Phil 12.21 (14 Oct 1915): 584-586.

Hocking comments on Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics* {1310}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, New Republic 4 (2 Oct 1915): 236, also published in J Phil 12.21 (14 Oct 1915): 587-588 [*MW* 8:418-420].

1320 Höffding, Harald. *Modern Philosophers and Lectures on Bergson.* Translated by Alfred C. Mason. London: Macmillan, 1915.

Lectures delivered in the autumn of 1902. James approaches religion from epistemological, ethical, and psychological points of view, but the last is predominant. Since James recognizes the variety of religious consciousnesses, a major problem for him is their classification. James correctly distinguishes personal from institutional religion. He takes too lightly the problem of historical continuity. IKS

Reviews

George Peckham, J Phil 14.5 (1 March 1917): 135-137; Alma Rose Thorne, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 670-671.

1321 Holt, Edwin B. Response and Cognition. J Phil 12.12 (8 July 1915): 365-373. Reprinted in *Pure Experience*, pp. 234-261.

Holt criticizes James's views on the relation between feeling and will in "The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience" {249}. JRS

1322 Ladd, George Trumbull. *What Should I Believe? An Inquiry into the Nature, Grounds, and Value of the Faiths of Science, Society, Morals, and Religion.* London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.

Reviews

Ellen Bliss Talbot, J Phil 13.19 (14 Sept 1916): 528-529. In the chapter "The So-Called 'Will to Believe'" Ladd gives limited credence to the role of the will in carrying out the duty to believe what is reasonable. However, Ladd fails to show that the will actually plays any role at all. The chapter on "Rights and Obligations of Belief" sets down three criteria of reasonableness: evidential fact or sound inference from fact, the satisfaction of our highest aspirations, and the service to practical life. JRS

1323 Lalande, André. Philosophy in France, 1913-1914. Translated by Alma R. Thorne. Phil Rev 24.3 (May 1915): 245-269.

1324 Leuba, James H. William James and Immortality. J Phil 12.15 (22 July 1915): 409-416.

In psychical research, James was critical and never committed himself to spiritism. He had no desire for personal survival, having early discarded the notion of a soul. He surmised that death does not end everything and we become parts of a "superhuman consciousness." His *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} sought evidence of this. IKS

1325 Lewis, C. I. A Too Brief Set of Postulates for the Algebra of Logic. J Phil 12.19 (16 Sept 1915): 523-525.

1326 Macintosh, Douglas C. *The Problem of Knowledge.* New York: Macmillan; London: Allen and Unwin, 1915.

Macintosh classifies as "psychological idealists" James, Dewey, Mead, A. W. Moore, and H. H. Bawden (pp. 116-120). Some "Antecedents of the New Realism" include James, Dewey, and J. E. Boodin (pp. 222-229). Pp. 266-275 describe James's role in the origin of American Neo-Realism and Dewey's involvment in functional and behavioristic psychology. Pp. 355-361 discuss James's evolutionary theory of the *a priori.* Royce's absolute pragmatism and Boodin's pragmatic realism are critiqued as "intellectualism" (pp. 384-390, 395-396). Macintosh comprehensively enumerates pragmatic-minded philosophers in "Current Pragmatism," pp. 407-437. There are five types: essential pragmatism, semi-pragmatism, quasi-pragmatism, pseudo-pragmatism, and hyper-pragmatism. Essential pragmatism asserts that the test of truth is its practical consequences. Semi-pragmatists (including C. S. Peirce, J. M. Baldwin, J. E. Boodin, Royce, and W. E. Hocking) only supplementing intellectualism with pragmatic doctrines. Quasi-pragmatists treat concepts and hypotheses as practical substitutes for truth (Mach, Poincaré, Le Roy, Vaihinger, Bergson). Pseudo-pragmatism takes any and all satisfactory beliefs to be true; while no pragmatist actually holds this doctrine (despite its opponents' statements to that effect) some have occasionally implied it–James himself being the worst offender, with Schiller close behind. Even the Chicago school of Dewey, Bawden, and Moore have not clearly separated their position from it. Hyper-pragmatism states that truth consists of nothing other than its working, identifying truth with its function. This position is taken by James, Schiller, Dewey, Moore, Bawden, and J. E. Russell. Macintosh explains hyper-pragmatism's faults and how it arose. Even essential pragmatism faces several problems: avoiding "crass utilitarianism," preventing "ultra-individualism," and recognizing the value of strictly theoretical interests and methods. Macintosh outlines his own "representational pragmatism," or "critical logical monism," on pp. 438-458. JRS

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, "Professor Macintosh's Pragmatic Empiricism," J Phil 13.12 (8 June 1916): 309-318; G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 18.3 (April 1920): 600-601; John Laird, Mind 25.2 (April 1916): 255-260; E. B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 25.4 (July 1916): 623-628.

1327 Mead, G. H. Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution. . Phil 12 (1915): 141-155. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 150-170.

1328 Mead, G. H. The Psychological Bases of Internationalism. Survey 3: (1915): 604-607.

1329 Moore, A. W. Pragmatism, Science and Truth. Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 631-638.

Moore responds to Warner Fite's "Pragmatism and Science" {1250} and "Pragmatism and Truth" {1251}. Fite's assertion that pragmatism is only interested in satisfactions of the "bread and butter" variety is astounding. His own account of knowledge requires the involvement of the knower, despite his insistence on the independence of reality. JRS

1330 Perry, Ralph B. Dr. Schiller on William James and on Realism. Mind 24.2 (April 1915): 240-249.

Perry replies to Schiller's "Prof. Perry's Realism" {1284}. Schiller thinks that objects must be knowable in order to exist, but there is no evidence for this position. Schiller's "inadequate and slovenly versions of James" underestimate the permanent centrality of "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" {174} and conflate Bergsonian themes with James's independent views. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Realism, Pragmatism, and William James" {1339}.

1331 Perry, Ralph B. Philosophy. In *The American Yearbook, 1914* (New York: D. Appleton, 1915), pp. 677-679.

1332 Quick, Oliver C. *Moral Philosophy and the Incarnation.* London: S. P. C. K., 1915.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 25.1 (Jan 1916): 124-126. Quick cannot accept pragmatism's approach to religion because of its inability to "give him the absolute assurance he craves," but he is demanding more than any theory could provide. JRS

1333 Rashdall, Hastings. *Is Conscience an Emotion? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories.* London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915.

The third lecture defends the objectivity of moral judgments against James's "emotionalist" denial of the validity of duty. JRS

Reviews

W. R. Matthews, Hibbert Journal 13.4 (July 1915): 926-927.

1334 Reisner, Edward Hartman. *Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency.* New York: The Science Press, 1915.

Reviews

J. R. Kantor, Int J Ethics 26.3 (April 1916): 441. Reisner gives "a fair statement of the Pragmatic attitude toward religion." JRS

1335 Riley, Isaac Woodbridge. Pragmatism. In *American Thought: From Puritanism to Pragmatism and Beyond* (New York: Henry Holt, 1915. Rpt., New York: Peter Smith, 1941), pp. 279-340.

The "primitive" pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce is "a logical method teaching us how to make our ideas clear." It was subsequently expanded by Dewey and James. Dewey's instrumentalism is genetic, social, and empirical. It denies the correspondence theory of

truth but sacrifices emotions: the "sanctions of sentiment." Dewey has not dealt with the problems of flux and purpose. James represents a psychological approach to pragmatism, reducing knowledge to "felt needs, to the emotional thrill." He is charged with hedonism and solipsism, but "neither charge is wholly warranted." James wrongly identifies the meaning of "it is true because it is useful" with "it is useful because it is true." Riley then traces the sources of pragmatism and describes complaints made by some foreign critics of pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 12.26 (23 Dec 1915): 715-718. Riley rightly distinguishes the quite disparate pragmatisms of James and Dewey. JRS

Hartley Burr Alexander, Phil Rev 24.4 (July 1915): 450-453; Howard C. Warren, Psych Bull 13.1 (15 Jan 1916): 34-36.

1336 Schiller, F. C. S. Are All Judgments "Practical"? J Phil 12.25 (9 Dec 1915): 682-687.

Schiller comments on Dewey's "The Logic of Judgments of Practise" {1311}. Schiller argues that since every judgment is a preferential selection from an indefinitely large class of possibly relevant judgments, every judgment is practical. JRS

1337 Schiller, F. C. S. The Indetermination of Meanings. Mind 24.4 (Oct 1915): 539-540.

Schiller comments on H. V. Knox's review of Alfred Sidgwick's *Elementary Logic*, Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 98-103, and on Sidgwick's reply to Knox, "Elementary Logic," Mind 24.3 (July 1915): 397-398. JRS

Notes

See Sidgwick's reply to Schiller, "The Indetermination of Meanings" {1398}.

1338 Schiller, F. C. S. The New Developments of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy. Mind 24.3 (July 1915): 345-366.

Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality* {1244} have fulfilled James's prediction that Bradley would come to reject the synthesizing function of mind. Religion is to be an entirely practical affair, albeit one of "mere emotional satisfactoriness." He confesses that all truths are working ideas, which require testing. His analysis of dreams is similar to Schiller's own, but Bradley will not see that dreams cannot confirm the Absolute. The many agreements with pragmatism still clash with Bradley's Absolute, which now is obviously "metaphysical overbelief" lacking any practical function. JRS

1339 Schiller, F. C. S. Realism, Pragmatism, and William James. Mind 25.4 (Oct 1915): 516-524.

Schiller replies to Perry's "Dr. Schiller on William James and on Realism" {1330}. JRS

1340 Schiller, F. C. S., E. E. Constance Jones, Bernard Bosanquet. Symposium–The Import of Propositions. *Proc Arist Soc* 15 (1915): 353-427.

Schiller's contributions to this symposium are on pp. 384-397 and 419-427. JRS

1341 Sheldon, W. H. The Vice of Modern Philosophy. J Phil 12.1 (7 Jan 1915): 5-16.

Knowledge and practical affairs are distinct. Within knowledge, the special sciences require a contemplative synthesis in a philosophical "plan of the universe as a whole." Most systems, including pragmatism, have lost sight of this fundamental need. JRS

Summaries

Suh Hu, Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 233.

1342 Tilgher, Adriano. *Teoria del pragmatismo transcendentale: dottrina della conoscenza e della volonta.* Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1915.

1343 Törnudd, Allan. Types of Pragmatist Theory of Truth. J Phil 12.18 (2 Sept 1915): 491-500.

Pragmatism results from an instrumental view of concepts: all processes of judgment contain elements of action. Differing types of pragmatism arise from the range of relevant satisfactions that a belief may have. The first type recognizes only some specific satisfaction as relevant to a given belief. The second type recognizes *any* satisfaction; it thus conflicts with logical criteria of coherence, universality, etc. A third type identifies a satisfaction with the meaning of a belief. A fourth type denies that true beliefs have any theoretical value in themselves, placing all value in practical usefulness. This last version, perhaps "the most lasting part of the pragmatist theory of truth," approaches irrationalism, since falsehoods can sometimes have greater value than truths. However, a "policy of 'pious fraud' toward our neighbors" is impractical, and so is giving up the search for more truths. JRS

Summaries

Delton T. Howard, Phil Rev 24.6 (Nov 1915): 683-684.

1344 Tuckwell, James Henry. *Religion and Reality: A Study in the Philosophy of Mysticism.* London: Metheun and Co., 1915.

Reviews

Kenneth Dunbar, Hibbert Journal 14.4 (July 1916): 841-843. Tuckwell is "most convincing" in his rejection of James's view that "there is no essential principle involved in all the varieties of religious experience." James used empirical psychology, whereas Tuckwell argues that religion's essence is discoverable only through *a priori* methods. JRS

G. A. Johnston, Int J Ethics 26.3 (April 1916): 434-435.

1345 Waibel, Edwin P. B. *Der Pragmatismus in der Geschichte der Philosophie.* Bonn: H. Luwig, 1915.

1346 Waibel, Edwin P. B. Studien zum Pragmatismus. Arch Syst Phil n.s. 21.1 (15 Feb 1915): 1-43; 21.2 (15 May 1915): 113-126. Reprinted in *Der Pragmatismus in der Geschichte der Philosophie* {1345}.

Part one is titled "Die pragmatische Methode," and part two is titled "Die pragmatische Wahrheitslehre." JRS

Summaries of part two

Delton T. Howard, Phil Rev 25.1 (Jan 1916): 89-90.

1347 Walter, Johnston Estep. *Subject and Object.* West Newton, Penn.: Johnston and Penney, 1915.

James's scientific psychology and the "stream of consciousness" theory of mind are convicted on the grounds that they are contaminated with metaphysics, and cannot account for memory, personal identity, or corporeal permanence. (pp. 22-41) The "pragmatic idealists" position on the "making of truth" is critiqued on pp. 160-184. JRS

1348 Wright, Henry W. Principles of Voluntarism. Phil Rev 24.3 (May 1915): 297-313.

Notes

Abstracted in J Phil 12.4 (18 Feb 1915): 104-105, and Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 196.

1349 Wright, William K. The Evolution of Values from Instincts. Phil Rev 24.2 (March 1915): 165-183.

1916

1350 Bode, Boyd H. Ernst Mach and the New Empiricism. J Phil 13.11 (25 May 1916): 281-290.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 13.14 (6 July 1916): 383-384.

1351 Bois, E. Pragmatismo. Bilychnis 5.11-12 (Nov-Dec 1916): 332-340.

1352 Boodin, J. E. *A Realistic Universe: An Introduction to Metaphysics.* New York: Macmillan, 1916. 2nd ed., with a new introduction, 1931.

The introduction is "The Meaning of Metaphysics," pp. xiii-xxii. Chap. 1, "Perspective. The Divine Five-Fold Truth," pp. 3-12, is a reprint of {912}. Chap. 2, "Being–Matter and the Absolute," pp. 15-32, and chap. 3, "Pragmatic Energism," pp. 33-61, were written for this book. Chap. 4, "Do Things Exist?" pp. 62-73, is a reprint of {1028}. Chap. 5, "Knowing Things," pp. 74-91, is a reprint of {914}. Chap. 6, "Knowing Things (Continued)," pp. 92-112, was written for this book. Chap. 7, "The Concept of Consciousness," pp. 115-133, and chap. 8, "The Concept of Consciousness (Continued)," pp. 134-150, were written for this book. Chap. 9, "Knowing Minds," pp. 164-190, and chap. 10, "Knowing Minds (Continued)," pp. 191-204, are revisions from {1030}. Chap. 11, "Individual and Social Minds," pp. 191-204, is a reprint of {1152}. The next four chapters were composed for this book: chap. 12, "Psychological and Geometric Space," pp. 207-224; chap. 13, "The Nature of Real Space," pp. 225-247; chap. 14, "The Nature of Time," pp. 251-282; and chap. 15, "Time and the Problematic," pp. 283-303. Chap. 16, "The Identity of the Ideals," pp. 307-325, is a reprint of {1029}. Chap. 17, "Form and the Ought," pp. 326-359, is a reprint of {402}. Chap. 18, "Teleological Idealism," pp. 360-384, is a reprint of {1154}. Chap. 19, "Retrospect–The Five Attributes," pp. 385-404, is a revision of {1153}. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 28.3 (July 1919): 362-365. Boodin trusts that the laws of thought are also the laws of things. He selects five scientific categories as irreducible, but

"tastes differ in metaphysics as in love" and the sciences' diverse purposes will continually engender incompatible concepts. Many "dark corners" of Boodin's "realistic universe" have not been "illumined by the sunlight of a thoroughgoing pragmatism." JRS

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 18.1 (Oct 1919): 171-172; M. T. McClure, J Phil 14.25 (6 Dec 1917): 693-695; Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Phil Rev 26.6 (Nov 1917): 660-665; E. C. Wilm, Int J Ethics 30.4 (July 1920): 464-467.

Reviews of 2nd edition

Clifford Barrett, J Phil 30.15 (20 July 1933): 417-419; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 305.

1353 Chadwick, Harold King. A Suggested Metaphysics to Fit a Functional Psychology. J Phil 13.14 (6 July 1916): 365-371.

Chadwick attempts to "develop coherently the metaphysical hints gleaned from Professor Dewey's various works." Instrumentalism requires a reality (with which experience must be continuously co-extensive) of interacting elements in kinetic motion, and none of them can exist independently from, or remain unchanged by, the entire whole of reality. Consciousness is "the quality of hesitation in direction present for all reals in their higher functioning within the experiencing series." JRS

1354 Cohen, Morris R. Charles S. Peirce and a Tentative Bibliography of His Published Writings. J Phil 13.26 (21 Dec 1916): 726-737.

1355 Connor, Walter Thomas. *Pragmatism and Theology.* Dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1916.

1356 Davis, Tenney L. Theory as Truth: A Study of the Logical Status of Scientific Theory. J Phil 13.9 (27 April 1916): 236-247.

C. S. Peirce's contributions to the logic of induction are mentioned. JRS

1357 Delle Piane, Arístides L. *La Filosofía y su Enseñanza.* Montevideo: 1916.

1358 Dewey, John. *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1916. Reprinted as *MW* 9.

Life's strivings require renewals; education is the renewal of social life, using communication to create the common possession of shared experience. The student receives a controlled environment in the school, designed to create "a common understanding of the means and ends of action." Immaturity is a positive ability to grow, to develop dispositions of adaptation. Democracy is marked by shared interests and the continuous readjustments necessitated by new means of social relations, and education should have these traits as its ideals. Ideals are not external to the means of achieving them, but exist only for the sake of the activity involved. Education therefore exists for the sake of the possibilities of activity, and not for some fixed remote end.

In chapters 10-14 Dewey describes his functional account of experience and thought, applying them to the problem of structuring the educational process. Chapters 15-21 consider the curriculum roles of play and work, geography and history, science, educational

values, labor and leisure, intellectual and practical studies, and physical and social studies. Chapters 22-26 present Dewey's philosophical positions on dualism and individualism, vocational labor, the philosophy of education, theories of knowledge, and theories of morality. JRS

Reviews

James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 25.5 (Sept 1916): 735-741. Education texts are frequently dull, but Dewey's "grasp of philosophical principles and his power of suggestive and penetrating criticism" make this text an exception. Pragmatism is not the only philosophy of democracy or scientific method. Dewey's own analysis of democracy exhibits the necessity to transcend a naturalistic view of mind, as intelligence and education must consist of the acquisition and use of universal meanings. Intelligence is more than a means to practical ends. Its real purpose lies in the contemplation of the spiritual. JRS

Anon, Elementary School Journal 17 (1917): 13-17; Thomas Percival Beyer, Dial 61 (1916): 101-103; Irving King, American Journal of Sociology 22.5 (March 1917): 674-676; Walter Lippman, New Republic 7 (1916): 231; Frank A. Manny, Survey 36 (1916): 541-542; A. W. Moore, Int J Ethics 26.4 (July 1916): 547-550; Ernest C. Moore, J Phil 14.14 (5 July 1917): 384-389; Norman Wilde, Educational Review 59.2 (Feb 1920): 168-171; Ella Flagg Young, Journal of Education 84 (1916): 5-6; Carl Zigrosser, Modern School 3 (1917): 103-105.

Notes

See H. H. Horne's *The Democratic Philosophy of Education* {2236}.

1359 Dewey, John. *Essays in Experimental Logic.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916. Reprinted, New York: Dover, 1953.

The "Prefatory Note," pp. v-vi [*MW* 10: 319] states that "the essays in their psychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now termed a behavioristic psychology, though some of them antedate the use of that term as a descriptive epithet." The "Introduction," pp. 1-74 [*MW* 10: 320-365] clarifies the meaning of "experience" as it used in these essays, and shows how inquiry and judgment operates within experience. Reflective experience always has a prior experience of a different character (aesthetic, social, active, affectional, etc.). Philosophers, focusing on only reflection, attribute the traits of reflective experience to *all* experiences, rendering all experience into knowledge. The ordinary use of "experience" is an indispensable way to indicate "an actual focusing of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining apparency." The philosophical use of "experience" is these essays is "an invitation [to the philosopher] to note that at the very time in which he is thinking, his thinking is set in a continuum which is not a object of thought." (p. 325n) When non-reflective experience contains conflicting factors in a tensional situation, reflection arises; it proceeds by explorations of data gathering and hypothesizing, and terminates in an overt action. This termination produces knowledge, though there are other senses of "knowledge."

Idealism has contributed valuable analyses of thought and knowledge, but idealistic logic has labored under the assumption that "immediate plural data" and "unifying rationalizing meanings" are automatically distinct in experience. Empirical logics accepted this division too, and like idealism, denied any temporal status to knowledge. Identifying known objects with reality, non-reflective experience was denigrated as subjective mental error, and logic became the requirement that "we shall think things as they are themselves, not make them into objects constructed by thinking." Instrumentalism is idealistic insofar

as it holds that objects of knowledge, in precisely that capacity, are constructed by intelligence. It is realistic since intelligence is itself defined in terms of natural events of experience, and produces physical alterations. These existences will not themselves become known, but provide the problem and test for reflection. Realism faces the dilemma of either admitting that the results of analysis are error, or assert that reality is composed of mutually independent simples. Instrumentalism instead asserts that the "results of abstraction and analysis are perfectly real; but they are real, like everything else, *where* they are real: that is to say, in some *particular* coexistence in the situation where they originate and operate." (p. 343) The philosopher who ignores the context of reflection, transferring a thing's properties to things in other modes of behavior, is the one in danger of using analysis to falsify experience. Things are naturally capable of suggesting other things; systematized suggestions for purposes of investigation are meanings, capable of implying other meanings. Terms further refine the more useful meanings of things, but can by hypostatized into independent objects. Naive realism prevents such an "affront to the common-sense world of action, appreciation, and affection."

Despite Hume and Kant, the term "experience" retains its original objective, experimental significance which arose with modern science's rejection of occult essences in favor of observable results. The accusations of "subjectivism" made on instrumentalism is "a depressing revelation" of the consequences of basing logic solely on known objects irrespective of the human processes of knowledge acquisition. "Is not the marked aversion on the part of some philosophers to any reference to psychology a Freudian symptom?" Philosophy has a historical affinity with dualism, separating ideals from nature, and reserving contemplation for the practically irrelevant and parasitic luxury class of society. A philosophy which asserts the continuity of ideal and natural existences would be able to possess "a social calling and responsibility."

"The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter," pp. 75-102, "The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking," pp. 103-135, "Data and Meanings," pp. 136-156, and "The Objects of Thought," pp. 157-182, are revised versions of Dewey's contributions to *Studies in Logical Theory* {118}. "Some Stages of Logical Thought," pp. 183-219, is a revision of {51}. "The Logical Character of Ideas," pp. 220-229, is a revision of {537}. "The Control of Ideas by Facts," pp. 230-249, is a revision of {421}. "Brief Studies in Realism," pp. 250-280, is a revised version of {936}. "The Existence of the World as a Problem," pp. 281-302, is a reprint of {1309}. "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," pp. 303-329, is a revised version of {539}. "An Added Note as to the Practical" is appended on pp. 330-334 [*MW* 10: 366-369]. "The Logic of Judgments of Practice," pp. 335-442, is a reprint of {1311}. JRS

Extended reviews

Bertrand Russell {1549}.

Reviews

Harold C. Brown, J Phil 14.9 (26 April 1917): 246-248. Dewey's use of the term "experience" will "still be a stumbling block to some." The advancement of behavioristic psychology will illuminate his viewpoint, which "stands or falls" with its theory of sensations. JRS

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Phil Rev 26.4 (July 1917): 421-430. Dewey's instrumental logic is best understood if seen in relation to his earlier idealistic phase. Idealism mediated the intellectual passage from "supernatural theology" to "an unprejudiced inquiry into the actual structure or our universe as revealed in all forms of our experience." But the

realities of time, evil and creative activity, the influence of evolutionary biology, and the zeal of moral, social, and educational interests brought Dewey to a behavioristic psychology oriented to "human progress and well-being." Dewey's logic is thus the exposition of the conditions and products of thinking. But what might be the "positive content," or the problems solved, by this logic? He does not "touch the traditional body of logical doctrine" and "has needlessly cast himself in the rôle of the lonely voice crying in the wilderness." The attitudes of religion, morality, art, science, and philosophy are neither biological nor experimental. Knowledge is worthy for its own sake; one of the best ways of living "consists precisely in emancipation from the service of life." Paradoxically, pragmatists "talk most about the efficacy of thinking" but they "have made the smallest positive contributions to either logic or to any other recognized branch of philosophy." JRS

Alfred Sidgwick, Mind 26.2 (April 1917): 217-222. Dewey's disagreements with other philosophical systems try to "do all possible justice to them" and are expressed with reserve. He sees philosophical errors as "survivals from a time when they were of real service." JRS

Morris R. Cohen, New Republic 8 (2 Sept 1916): 118-119 [reprinted in his *Preface to Logic* (New York: Henry Holt, 1944), pp. 196-202]; George R. Geiger, Philosophy of Science 22 (1955): 168-169; Willard C. Gore, "Memory, Concept, Judgment, Logic (Theory)," Psych Bull 13.9 (15 Sept 1916): 355-358; Horace M. Kallen, Dial 62 (1917): 136-137; Max C. Otto, School Review 24 (1916): 775-776.

Notes

See also Dewey's address, "Logical Objects," to the Columbia University Philosophy Club, 9 March 1916, preserved in *MW* 10: 89-97.

1360 Dewey, John. The Pragmatism of Peirce. J Phil 13.26 (21 Dec 1916): 709-715. Reprinted in *Chance, Love, and Logic* {1734}, pp. 301-308. *MW* 10: 71-78.

Peirce's pragmatism was only concerned with the meaning of terms, emphasizing their applicability to future general forms of conduct. This commitment to the reality of universals contrasts with James's emphasis on the particularity of phenomenal experience. For Peirce, the meaning of science's hypothesis of the independently real lies in science's pursuit of universally accepted results of inquiry. Peirce is "more of a pragmatist than James": he is "less of a nominalist" and makes "a high estimate of logic." While both are realists, Peirce more clearly states that the very conception of reality is something "to be determined in terms of consequences." Epistemology would benefit from this refusal to "define the 'real' as something given prior to reflective inquiry." JRS

1361 Dewey, John. Spencer and Bergson. Rev Méta 70 (1965): 327-330. Reprinted in *MW* 10: 67-70.

This essay, not published during Dewey's life, has been dated to 1916-17 [see "Textual Commentary," *MW* 10: 459]. JRS

1362 Dewey, John. Voluntarism in the Roycean Philosophy. Phil Rev 25.3 (May 1916): 245-254. Reprinted in *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Cornell: Philosophical Review, 1916), pp. 17-26. *MW* 10: 79-88.

Reviews

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 15.1 (Oct 1916): 156-157.

1363 Drake, Durant. May Belief Outstrip Evidence? Int J Ethics 26.3 (April 1916): 414-419.

1364 Drake, Durant. *Problems of Religion: An Introductory Survey.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916.

Chap. 21 discusses "Pragmatic Arguments," pp. 332-350. JRS

1365 Flannery, M. Jay. Pragmatism and Truth. Monist 26.1 (Jan 1916): 132-134.

Carus's *Truth on Trial* {925} displays many failures to correctly represent pragmatism's theory of truth. JRS

Notes

See Carus's reply, Monist 26.1 (Jan 1916): 134-137.

1366 Geiger, Joseph Roy. *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1916. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919.

The pragmatic doctrines of reality, knowledge, and truth must, following Dewey, deny any meaning to religious objects beyond the specific, concrete, and empirical situation. Only there can religious realities exist, as socially experienced meanings and values, and as such, are not problematic. Rational religion is "an attitude of faith, a moral venturesomeness, a working hypothesis" which is used to create values to solve living problems. This scientific control of religious beliefs requires a psychological analysis of judgment and character, and an analysis of social and economic institutions. Our conception of God must be adequate to the new democratic community, by becoming the idealized embodiment of the meanings and values of social life. Worship must similarly abandon "moral dualism" and instead enlarge the individual's sense of interdependence to reveal "a higher and better self, a contact which expands his interests, reinforces his purposes, and sustains his energies." JRS

Reviews

H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 29.3 (May 1920): 295-296. Since we may seek religion for a contemplative understanding of the world, in addition to a program for reforming the world, metaphysics "will not be conjured away." JRS

Anon, Int J Ethics 30.3 (April 1920): 341.

1367 Gentile, Giovanni. *Teoria generale della spirito come atto puro.* Pisa: E. Spoerri, 1916. 2nd ed., 1918. 4th ed., Bari: G. Laterza e Figli, 1920. 6th ed., Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1944. 7th ed., Florence: Le Lettre, 1987. Translated by H. Wildon Carr as *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (London: Macmillan, 1922).

1368 Hackett, F. William James as Highbrow. New Republic 8 (23 Sept 1916): 184-186.

Quotations from James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) are used to show that highbrows are cold and unemotional. James himself was a "superior" man who still remained human. IKS

1369 Henry, T. S. A Comparison of Two Recent Contributions to the Philosophy of Education. School and Home Education 36 (1916): 14-17.

Notes

See also Henry, "The Problem Method in Teaching," School and Home Education 36 (1916): 162-168.

1370 Howard, Delton Thomas. *John Dewey's Logical Theory.* Dissertation, Cornell University, 1916. Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 11. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1919.

Reviews

Evander B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 28.4 (July 1919): 424-426; Wesley Raymond Wells, J Phil 16.25 (4 Dec 1919): 698.

1371 Howison, G. H. Josiah Royce: The Significance of His Work in Philosophy. Phil Rev 25.3 (May 1916): 231-244. Reprinted in *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Cornell: Philosophical Review, 1916), pp. 3-16.

Reviews

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 15.1 (Oct 1916): 156.

1372 Jastrow, Joseph. Charles S. Peirce as a Teacher. J Phil 13.26 (21 Dec 1916): 723-726.

1373 Jourdain, Philip E. B. The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll. Monist 26.1 (Jan 1916): 24-62. Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll* (London: George Allen and Unwin; Chicago: Open Court, 1918).

Jourdain offers witty "fragments" of R*ss*ll's philosophy, allegedly derived from that of Bertrand Russell, on a wide variety of philosophical topics, including "The Pragmatist Theory of Truth," pp. 25-26 [*The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll*, pp. 32-33]. JRS

1374 Kallen, Horace M. Philosophic Formalism and Scientific Imagination. J Phil 13.22 (26 Oct 1916): 597-607.

1375 Ladd-Franklin, Christine. Charles S. Peirce at the Johns Hopkins. J Phil 13.26 (21 Dec 1916): 715-722.

Peirce was the "brooding type" of teacher, seemingly "bringing fresh truth by divination out of some inexhaustible well." Four letters from Peirce are included. JRS

1376 Laski, H. J. The Sovereignty of the State. J Phil 13.4 (17 Feb 1916): 85-97.

1377 Lewis, C. I. Types of Order and the System Σ. Phil Rev 25.3 (May 1916): 407-419. Reprinted in *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Cornell: Philosophical Review, 1916). *Collected Papers*, pp. 360-370.

1378 Loewenberg, Jacob. Interpretation as a Self-Representative Process. Phil Rev 25.3 (May 1916): 420-423. Reprinted in *Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Cornell: Philosophical Review, 1916), pp. 192-195.

1379 McComas, H. C. Extravagances in the Motor Theories of Consciousness. Psych Rev 23.5 (Sept 1916): 397-406.

An exaggerated emphasis on the role of motor control for consciousness is found in the psychologies of Dewey, Münsterberg, Judd, and Watson. This emphasis is due to a captivation with the physiological continuities of the nervous system, but experiments demonstrate the far greater importance of the sensory organs. JRS

1380 Merrington, Ernest Northcroft. *The Problem of Personality.* London: Macmillan, 1916.

Merrington examines theories of personality and the self by recent philosophers, including James and Schiller. JRS

Reviews

Alfred Fawkes, Int J Ethics 27.3 (April 1917): 405-406.

1381 Paulhan, Frederic. La Valeur humaine de la vérité. Rev Phil 81.1 (Jan 1916): 24-61.

Happiness and Truth are perhaps the most prominent aims of human activity, though it seems that one is only attainable by conquering the other. The subject of this article is the human value of truth, its place in our lives, and its role in our conduct. Its role is actually quite restricted, more so than the pragmatists believe. Knowledge is a means to action, and like all means, it tends to become an end. Human action aims at remedying some discordance. When it fails, man creates a fictitious world corresponding to the real one, though different in essential ways. Error and illusion are thus necessary for life; they are crutches, their use supports man's weaknesses. In many ways, man is essentially just a grown child. LF

Summaries

Raymond P. Hawes, Phil Rev 25.4 (July 1916): 631-632.

1382 Perrier, Joseph Louis. The Permanent Contributions of the Pragmatists. J Phil 13.10 (11 May 1916): 267-273.

Pragmatism does not, strictly speaking, exist. Great differences and incompatibilities separate the philosophies of all "pragmatists." Peirce, James, and Schiller each perceived the divergence of his tenets from those of the others. Dewey has never referred to himself as a pragmatist, and it is highly debatable whether Bergson is in much agreement with any of the rest. That aspect of pragmatism which James emphasized, the consideration of practical results for the evaluation of truth, is bound to fade from interest due to the recognition of the indisputable scientific value of "pure, disinterested speculation." Pragmatism's enduring themes are the "temporal character of reality," and the "human element in the building up of reality." JRS

1383 Perry, Ralph B. The Truth Problem. J Phil 13.19 (14 Sept 1916): 505-515; 13.21 (12 Oct 1916): 561-573.

Of the four valid senses of "truth," the logical, ontological, existential, and psychological, pragmatism treats truth in its psychological sense: the creative action of cognition is a volitional situation. JRS

Summaries

Charles H. Wright, Phil Rev 26.2 (March 1917): 250-251.

1384 Piccoli, Raffaello. Benedetto Croce's Aesthetics. Monist 26.2 (April 1916): 161-181.

1385 Pokrovskii, Iosif Alekseevich. *"Pragmatizm" i "Reliativizm" v Pravosudii.* Petrograd: V. i I. Lipnik, 1916.

1386 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. The Vedantic Approach to Reality. Monist 26.2 (April 1916): 200-231.

1387 Rogers, Arthur K. Belief and the Criterion of Truth. J Phil 13.14 (20 July 1916): 393-410.

Summaries

William E. Bingham, Phil Rev 26.2 (March 1917): 251-252

1388 Rogers, Arthur K. A Statement of Epistemological Dualism. J Phil 13.7 (30 March 1916): 169-181.

Summaries

Delton T. Howard, Phil Rev 25.5 (Sept 1916): 757.

1389 Royce, Josiah. Mind. Article in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 8, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), pp. 649-657. Reprinted in *Royce's Logical Essays*, ed. Daniel S. Robinson (Dubuque: William C. Brown, 1951), pp. 146-178. *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 735-762.

1390 Royce, Josiah and Fergus Kernan. C. S. Peirce: Peirce as a Philosopher. J Phil 13.26 (21 Dec 1916): 701-709.

While preferring to call himself a logician, Peirce also deserves the title of "scientific philosopher." An original evolutionist, he sought an evolutionary explanation of the laws of nature, inspired by his experience with the scientific control of measurement error. Peirce insisted that empirical evidence favored this evolutionary account. His other principal ideas were his "insurance theory" of induction, the objectivity and evolution of chance, and the teleological and idealistic tendencies in his metaphysics. The conclusion is a description of the Harvard collection of Peirce's unpublished manuscripts. JRS

1391 Sabin, Ethel E. James's Later View of Consciousness and the Pragmatic View: A Contrast. J Phil 13.14 (6 July 1916): 382-383.

A pragmatism which realizes that stability is relative to purpose would have saved James from errors in his conception of knowledge. IKS

Notes

An abstract of a paper presented at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Washington University, April 21 and 22, 1916.

1392 Sabin, Ethel E. *William James and Pragmatism.* Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1916. Material used for "Some Difficulties in James's Formulation of Pragmatism" {1498}. This article and remaining material from the dissertation was published as *William James and Pragmatism* {1499}.

1393 Schiller, F. C. S. The Argument *A Fortiori.* Mind 25.4 (Oct 1916): 513-517.

Schiller re-enters a debate over validity and meaning between Charles Mercier and W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, after his previous contribution, "Dr. Mercier and Formal Logic" {1280}. JRS

Notes

The debate continues with Alfred Sidgwick, "The *A Fortiori* Argument," Mind 25.4 (Oct 1916): 518-521; W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, "Universals and *A Fortiori* Reasoning," Mind 26.2 (April 1917): 205-215; Charles A. Mercier, "The Argument *A Fortiori*," Mind 26.3 (July 1917): 340-350; and H. S. Shelton, "The Necessity of a Universal in Reasoning," Mind 26.3 (July 1917): 351-356. F. C. S. Schiller again contributes to the fray with "Formalism and the *A Fortiori*" {1445}.

1394 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Charles F. D'Arcy, *God and Freedom in Human Experience.* Mind 25.4 (Oct 1916): 533-537.

Notes

God and Freedom in Human Experience (London: Edward Arnold, 1915).

1395 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, *Contribution to the Study of the Psychology of Mrs. Piper's Trance Phenomena.* Mind 25.3 (July 1916): 405-407.

Notes

The reviewed work was published as Part 71 of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, December 1915.

1396 Schroeder, Theodore. Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism. Monist 26.1 (Jan 1916): 86-112.

Schroeder develops a "psycho-analytical" study arguing that James was blind to aspects of his problem and explaining by reference to James's personality why he was blind. IKS

1397 Sellars, Roy Wood. *Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge.* Chicago and New York: Rand McNally, 1916.

Reviews

George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 26.1 (Jan 1917): 87-91; Henry W. Wright, J Phil 14.8 (12 April 1917): 218-221.

1398 Sidgwick, Alfred. The Indetermination of Meanings. Mind 25.1 (Jan 1916): 101-102.

Sidgwick responds to Schiller's "The Indetermination of Meanings" {1337}. JRS

1399 Wiener, Norbert. Mr. Lewis and Implication. J Phil 13.24 (23 Nov 1916): 656-662.

Wiener defends Russell's theory of types against Lewis's review of *Principia Mathematica* {1265}. JRS

1400 Wright, Henry W. *Faith Justified By Progress.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916.

Reviews

Warner Fite, Phil Rev 26.4 (July 1917): 434-437. Wright offers "a purely humanistic, or in its broader sense, a pragmatic Christianity." JRS

Edward S. Ames, Int J Ethics 30.2 (Jan 1920): 222-224.

1401 Wright, Henry W. The Object of Perception *versus* the Object of Thought. J Phil 13.16 (3 Aug 1916): 437-441.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 13.14 (6 July 1916): 383.

1917

1402 Adlerblum, Nima Hirschensohn. A Reinterpretation of Jewish Philosophy. J Phil 14.7 (29 March 1917): 181-189.

For Judaism, as in pragmatism, ethics involves "the effect of action on personal character" and unites the action and the intention. (p. 187) Both are based on "evolution, progress, change, adaptation" and "grasps life in its flowing dynamic aspect." Jehuda Halevi's conception of religion is similar to James's, and a contemporary Jewish philosopher, Ahad Ha'am, proposes a form of pragmatism in several essays written from 1891 to 1893. JRS

1403 Ames, Edward S. No title. J Phil 14.15 (19 July 1917): 407-408.

Of a theistic God, pragmatists have said little. God "symbolizes existent reality especially in its social, ideal aspects." JRS

Notes

An abstract of a paper read at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at the University of Michigan, April 6 and 7, 1917.

1404 Anon. John E. Russell. J Phil 14.7 (29 March 1917): 195-196.

A memorial written upon the occasion of Russell's death. It notes that he once was "among the keenest and most dangerous critics that pragmatism ever had to face." Interestingly, later on, Russell "announced his own partial conversion to the doctrine." JRS

1405 Bakewell, Charles M. Introduction. To William James, *Selected Papers on Philosophy*, ed. Charles M. Bakewell (New York: E. P. Dutton; London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1917), pp. v-x. Reprinted in *Modern English Essays*, vol. 5, ed. E. Rhys (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1922).

James wrote in a popular style because he interpreted life. He disliked philosophical schools and became uneasy as pragmatism emerged as a school. His radical empiricism teaches that mind is never a passive spectator. IKS

1406 Boas, George. *An Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth.* Dissertation, University of California, 1917. Published in *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 187-290.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 31.3 (July 1922): 362-363.

1407 Bode, Boyd H. Experience and the Physical World. J Phil 14.15 (19 July 1917): 407.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in April 1917.

1408 Bonucci, Allesandro. *Mario Calderoni.* Scansano, 1917.

1409 Bosanquet, Bernard. The Relation of Coherency to Immediacy and Specific Purpose. Phil Rev 26.3 (May 1917): 259-273.

Bosanquet replies to G. H. Sabine's "Professor Bosanquet's Logic and the Concrete Universal" {1120}. Against pragmatism, any subjective need must be kept separate from the logical interest of purely scientific curiosity. Pragmatism accuses idealism of seeking "the relation of thought as such to reality as such" but any post-Kantian idealist would abhor the very notion. JRS

1410 Bourne, Randolph Silliman. Conscience and Intelligence in War. Dial 63.5 (13 Sept 1917): 193-195. Reprinted in *The History of Literary Radical and Other Papers* (New York: S. A. Russell, 1956), pp. 197-204.

Bourne criticizes Dewey's "Conscience and Compulsion," New Republic 11 (14 July 1917): 297-298 [*MW* 10: 260-264]. JRS

1411 Bourne, Randolph Silliman. Twilight of Idols. Seven Arts 2.6 (Oct 1917): 688-702. Reprinted in *Untimely Papers*, ed. James Oppenheim (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919) and *The History of Literary Radical and Other Papers* (New York: S. A. Russell, 1956), pp. 241-259.

Dewey's articles on the war suggest "the inadequacy of his pragmatism as a philosophy of life in this emergency." JRS

1412 Brown, George A. Knowledge and Duty. School and Home Education 36 (1917): 278-279.

1413 Bush, Wendell T. Constructive Intelligence. J Phil 14.19 (13 Sept 1917): 505-520.

Bush comments on *Creative Intelligence* {1420}. As philosophy moves away from idealism and its "neo-Platonism," instrumentalism will likely be "an aspect of really empirical naturalism." It suffers from a polemical emphasis on novelty, to the diminishment of the value of past experience. Its attitude is due to its role as an organon for present times, in a setting of social psychology and ethics. JRS

1414 Coffey, Peter. *Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction to General Metaphysics*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1917. Reprinted, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958.

Coffey offers a neo-Scholastic treatise on epistemology. In vol. 2, section 170 is "Outline of Pragmatism and Humanism," pp. 353-357; section 171 is "General Arguments Against Pragmatism, pp. 357-359; and section 172 is "The Pragmatist Criterion Examined. Special Argument Outlined," pp. 359-366. Pragmatism has simply "misstated and displaced" the real problem of "the nature of that peculiar and *sui generis* relation called the knowledge- or truth-relation." JRS

Reviews

Roy Wood Sellars, J Phil 15.20 (26 Sept 1918): 557-558.

1415 Davis, Tenney L. The Contrast Between Scientific Theory and the Demands of the Pragmatic Prescription. J Phil 14.4 (15 Feb 1917): 93-102.

1416 Dewey, John. The Concept of the Neutral in Recent Epistemology. J Phil 14.6 (15 March 1917): 161-163. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 228-230. *MW* 10: 49-52.

Neither the logical nor ontological senses of "neutral" are presently used with clarity. James's theory of pure experience ambiguously treats experience as either a "stuff" antecedent to any reflection (such that only newborns possess it), or an immediately had experience innocent of any mental or physical distinction (any experience qualifies). JRS

1417 Dewey, John. *Concerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson.* J Phil 14.9 (26 April 1917): 237-245. Reprinted in *MW* 10: 98-108.

Dewey replies to Daniel Robinson's "An Alleged New Discovery in Logic" {1441}. Robinson uses older authorities to misinterpret Dewey's position, and wrongly supposes that "deliberation is merely judging about what a ready-made agent is to do in abstraction from–or to the neglect of–judgment of subject-matter existing independently of the agent." Robinson can too easily distinguish categorical from hypothetical judgments because the case under consideration (consulting a physician) is conventionally habitual. Instead, we must focus on situations of experimental inquiry and moral perplexity. JRS

1418 Dewey, John. Duality and Dualism. J Phil 14.18 (30 Aug 1917): 491-493. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 117-119. *MW* 10: 64-66.

Dewey comments on Durant Drake's "What Kind of Realism?" {1050} and "A Cul-De-Sac For Realism," J Phil 14.14 (5 July 1917): 365-373 [*MW* 10: 439-449]. The multitude of diverse events in perception indicates empirical pluralism, not Drake's simplistic

epistemological dualism. Drake assumes that the organic sensation "*is* intrinsically *representative* of its extra-organic cause" and an instance of knowledge. However, an experience becomes cognitive only when it is used as indicative of another event. JRS

1419 Dewey, John. The Need for Social Psychology. Psych Rev 24.4 (July 1917): 266-277. Reprinted as "Social Psychology and Social Progress" in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 709-720. *MW* 10: 53-63.

James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) awoke the dawning of a true social psychology, which does not set up an "absurd" antithesis of an individual vs. social psychology. Statistical and behavioral psychology properly emphasize the social nature of learned behavior, while "folk" and "introspectionist" psychologies retain outdated categories. Social psychology will confirm that "mind" is "the working of certain beliefs and desires" as "functions of associated behavior, varying with the structure and operation of social groups." This conception of intelligence can be used to restore balance between the advanced methods of controlling nature and the weak methods of social control. JRS

1420 Dewey, John, *et al.* *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude.* New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917. Reprinted, New York: Octagon Books, 1970. Dewey's contribution is reprinted in *Philosophy of JD I*, pp. 58-97, and *MW* 10: 3-48. Mead's contribution is in *Selected Writings*, pp. 171-211.

The "Prefatory Note" states that the essays agree on "the ideas of the genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of that future so far as it can come within human control, and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed mind." (p. iii) The essays are as follows: John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," pp. 3-69; A. W. Moore, "Reformation in Logic," pp. 70-117; Harold C. Brown "Intelligence and Mathematics," pp. 118-175; G. H. Mead, "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker," pp. 176-227; Boyd H. Bode, "Consciousness and Psychology," pp. 228-281; Henry Waldgrave Stuart, "The Phases of Economic Interest," pp. 282-353; James H. Tufts, "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards," pp. 354-408; Horace M. Kallen, "Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and Religion," pp. 409-467.

Dewey's "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" finds that philosophy conservatively clings to old problems and academic traditions, which are no longer genuine due to scientific and social progress. Its conception of experience emphasizes knowledge, subjectivity, the past, the particular, and absence of inference. A biological conception instead emphasizes life's struggle to control its environment, the "doings and sufferings" of the organism, and the focus on the possibilities of future adaptation. Experience is pluralistic and relational: discontinuities *and* active bonds, organic instincts *and* the formation of new habits, are some of its principal traits. Both traditional empiricism and idealism are felled by the fact that "thought is an intrinsic feature of experience." Both are fixated by epistemology, the "problem" of knowledge, which is created by the assumption that the "knower" is separated from "the real world" to be "known." A naturalistic analysis of illusions dispels the epistemologist's argument for the subjectivity of erroneous perceptions, by showing that the physical events acting as data for knowing should not be treated as if they were themselves the act of knowing. Critics often clamor for pragmatism's theory of Reality, but no such theory is possible or valuable; like science, philosophy

should consider everything real, as "a subject-matter of description and inquiry." Pragmatism has been mistaken for religious apologetics or an exaltation of sheer bodily action; it does stand for the "deliberate control of policies by the method of intelligence."

Mead's "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker" attributes modern scientific advancement to the scientist's ability to countenance events which contradict current theories. The ancients' mathematical, astronomical, and medical achievements were limited by the lack of this ability. The powerlessness of the individual's observations to modify theoretical concepts was codified as Plato's theory of knowledge and Aristotle's logical method. The modern development of experimental science was marked by the emergence of a psychological perspective that "placed the objective world in the experience of the individual," permitted contradictions in experience to point to a reconstructed object of knowledge, and located this reconstruction in the natural processes of reality. The positivist mistakenly assumes that an event violating an older law is identical to the event instantiating a newly discovered law, the neo-realist assumes that the object is the same within as without the mind, and the "sense-data" philosophy has analyzed experience into sensations for which no scientist would ever have any use. Scientific problems are conflicts between individual experiences and some laws, leaving the other unaffected laws to ground in the real world the formulation of the problem and the search for a solution. Scientific progress and error must be understood using a social standpoint of consciousness, where the "individual in his experiences is continually creating a world which becomes real through his discovery." JRS

Extended reviews

Wendell Bush {1413}; Delton Howard {1480}.

Reviews

Ralph B. Perry, Int J Ethics 28.1 (Oct 1917): 115-123. Stuart, Tufts, and Kallen write on the philosophy of value, but Kallen lacks the others' "characteristic instrumentalist touch." JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 26.4 (Oct 1917): 466-474. This book is a sign that American philosophy will seize the opportunity to reject traditional debates and reform its academic role. The essays share leading ideas because "pragmatism is naturally so coherent a philosophy that whoever has grasped its meaning and method is bound to apply it in the same way." JRS

Anon, "How Pragmatism Looks Today," Current Opinion 62.4 (April 1917): 269-270; Katherine E. Gilbert, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 200-208; Max C. Otto, Dial 62 (1917): 348-352.

Notes

A portion of Moore's essay, pp. 101-117, was read at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Washington University, April 21 and 22, 1916. An abstract of this reading, "Neo-Realistic Logic and Science," is in J Phil 13.14 (6 July 1916): 384.

1421 Drake, Durant. Dr. Dewey's Duality and Dualism. J Phil 14.24 (22 Nov 1917): 660-663. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 119-122.

Drake replies to Dewey's "Duality and Dualism" {1418}. Dewey's article "furnishes another depressing bit of evidence that even the ablest philosophers sometimes can not grasp the simplest distinctions of those who hold views alien to their own." Dewey mistakenly identifies epistemological dualism with ontological dualism. JRS

1422 Durant, Will. *Philosophy and the Social Problem.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1917. New York: Macmillan, 1917.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 28.4 (Oct 1919): 480-483. This work is the first to apply pragmatism to social and political problems. Durant's proposal to organize professors into a society to research and publish "the real facts" about political issues forgets the realities of inevitable corruption or legal suppression. JRS

Charles A. Ellwood, Psych Bull 14.11 (Nov 1917): 396; Henry W. Wright, Phil Rev 27.3 (May 1918): 324-325; William K. Wright, J Phil 15.5 (28 Feb 1918): 137-138.

1423 Eastman, Max. The Will to Live. J Phil 14.4 (15 Feb 1917): 102-107.

Eastman comments on Dewey's "The Existence of the World as a Problem" {1309}. Dewey's dismissal of Russell's questioning of the external world is applicable to any metaphysical issue, but such playfully serious adventures like metaphysics are still "a very strenuous form of life." JRS

1424 Fite, Warner. The Pragmatic Attitude. Nation 105.4 (26 July 1917): 88-91.

1425 Geyer, Denton L. The Relation of Truth to Tests. J Phil 14.23 (8 Nov 1917): 626-633.

Pragmatism confuses the criterion of truth with its definition, and cannot answer how many tests are sufficient nor who should do the testing. Unless a test is infallible, it cannot be used to define the truth. Accidental discoveries can be truths. No pragmatist has ever asked the reader to experimentally verify pragmatism. Peirce's definition of truth as ultimate opinion, since it is independent of the criterion of truth as scientific verification, does not suffer from the problems of other pragmatic systems. However, why must experiment be the only test of truth? JRS

Summaries

Ernest Bridges, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1918): 431.

1426 Geyer, Denton L. The Wavering Aim of Education in Dewey's Educational Philosophy. Education 37 (1917): 484-491

1427 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Phil Rev 26.3 (May 1917): 297-314.

1428 Kallen, Horace M. William James. Dial 63.4 (30 Aug 1917): 141-143.

Unlike most American philosophy, James's is not derivative, but arises from a direct vision of man and his destiny. He interpreted the life of pioneers who insisted that men are not born good, "they *make* good." James gives us a "metaphysical democracy" in which ideas too must make good. IKS

1429 Lewis, C. I. The Issues Concerning Material Implication. J Phil 14.13 (21 June 1917): 350-356.

1430 Lindsay, James. *A Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism.* Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1917.

1431 Lloyd, Alfred H. Pragmatism and Metaphysics. J Phil 14.18 (30 Aug 1917): 477-483.

Pragmatism's monistic denial of metaphysical dualism is the most recent phase of the historical pattern of philosophical systems. Any monistic philosophy resolves an older dualism only by giving rise to a new expression of dualism on a higher level. Pragmatism makes dualisms functionally real in all experience; it "so nearly identifies experience with reality as to render a metaphysics gratuitous if not unseemly." Its call for "free and constant interchange, between the values of life and its machinery" signals that mankind is "at last deliberately entering upon adventures in the world of reality...enjoying the creative life of reality thus set free in his own life." JRS

1432 Lloyd, Alfred H. Psychophysical Parallelism: A Psychological Episode in History. J Phil 14.21 (11 Oct 1917): 561-570.

1433 Mackenzie, J. S. *Elements of Constructive Philosophy.* London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1917

Reviews

M. W. Robieson, Int J Ethics 28.4 (July 1918): 558-562.

1434 Manny, Frank A. John Dewey. Seven Arts 2.2 (June 1917): 214-228.

1435 Marvin, Walter T. *The History of European Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1917.

In the concluding chapter Marvin contrasts "Intellectualism and Pragmatism," pp. 402-409. JRS

Reviews

Ellen Bliss Talbot, Phil Rev 27.1 (Jan 1918): 87-91.

1436 Mead, G. H. Josiah Royce–A Personal Impression. Int J Ethics 27.2 (Jan 1917): 168-170.

1437 Mitchell, Arthur. What Is Formal Logic About? Mind 26.4 (Oct 1917): 428-447.

Notes

See F. C. S. Schiller's response, "What Formal Logic Is About" {1506}.

1438 Moore, A. W. Pragmatism and Immortality. J Phil 14.15 (19 July 1917): 406-407.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at the University of Michigan, 6 and 7 April 1917.

1439 Perry, Ralph B. Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments. J Phil 14.7 (29 March 1917): 169-181. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 586-598. *MW* 10: 361-374.

Perry comments on Dewey's "The Logic of Judgments of Practice" {1311}, and W. M. Urban's "Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment," J Phil 13.25 (7 Dec 1916): 673-687. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "The Objects of Valuation" {1476}.

1440 Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth. *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy.* Oxford: Clarendon, 1917.

There are numerous references and criticisms of James's views on a finite god, determinism, the unfinished world and contingency, pluralism, and meliorism. JRS

Reviews

Ernest Albee, Phil Rev 26.6 (Nov 1917): 649-659; Bernard Bosanquet, Mind 26.4 (Oct 1917): 474-481; R. Latta, Hibbert Journal 16.1 (Oct 1917): 153-160.

1441 Robinson, Daniel Sommer. An Alleged New Discovery in Logic. J Phil 14.9 (26 April 1917): 225-237. Reprinted in *MW* 10: 415-430.

Robinson critiques Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Concerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson" {1417}, and F. C. S. Schiller, "Mr. Bradley, Bain, and Pragmatism" {1446}.

1442 Sabine, George Holland, ed. *Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton.* New York: Macmillan, 1917.

Essays discussing pragmatism include G. Watts Cunningham, "Coherence as Organization," pp. 133-150; Edmund H. Hollands, "Some Comments on Instrumentalism," pp. 214-228; Elijah Jordan, "Idea and Action," pp. 245-265; Edward L. Schaub, "Functional Interpretations of Religion: A Critique," pp. 328-356; Ellen Bliss Talbot, "Pragmatism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth," pp. 229-244; and Henry W. Wright, "Is the Dualism of Mind and Matter Final?" pp. 184-201. JRS

Reviews

Warner Fite, Phil Rev 27.1 (Jan 1918): 76-82; W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 15.19 (12 Sept 1918): 528-529.

1443 Scales, Albert Louis. *William James and John Dewey: An Interpretative and Critical Study.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1917.

1444 Schiller, F. C. S. Aristotle and the Practical Syllogism. J Phil 14.24 (22 Nov 1917): 645-653.

A comparison of Dewey's and Aristotle's doctrines of the practical syllogism. JRS

1445 Schiller, F. C. S. Formalism and the *A Fortiori*. Mind 26.4 (Oct 1917): 458-465.

Schiller replies to W. A. Pickard-Cambridge's "Universals and *A Fortiori* Reasoning," Mind 26.2 (April 1917): 205-215. JRS

1446 Schiller, F. C. S. Mr. Bradley, Bain, and Pragmatism. J Phil 14.17 (16 Aug 1917): 449-457.

Schiller responds to D. S. Robinson's "An Alleged New Discovery in Logic" {1441}. Bain was concerned with the psychological of belief, not the logical judgment of truth and error. Bradley's criticisms of Bain are based on a reading of Bain that "is not even consistent nonsense," and hence fail to be also applicable to pragmatism. JRS

1447 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Edward Douglas Fawcett, *The World as Imagination*. Mind 26.3 (July 1917): 357-361.

Notes

See Fawcett's reply, "Some Observations Touching the Cosmic Imagining and 'Reason'," Mind 27.2 (April 1918): 152-164.

1448 Schiller, F. C. S. Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof. In *Studies in the History and Method of Science*, ed. Charles Joseph Singer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917. Rpt., London: William Dawson and Sons, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 235-289.

Syllogistic reasoning assumes that terms have stable and known meanings, and that absolute truths exist. Science alters meanings and creates terms to make new judgments in the course of inquiry, and does not start from absolute principles or facts, but some definite lack of knowledge. Possible theories to explain selected facts outrun the human mind; an "impossible exhaustion of the alternatives" would be needed to prove one theory absolutely true. The pragmatic analysis of knowledge describes the method to test available hypotheses, but it does not imply that "whatever works is true." "The more extensively, conveniently, and economically a hypothesis works, the more value has it, i.e. the more likely it is to be called 'true', and to be supposed true absolutely: the more continuously and successfully the test of working has been applied to a doctrine, the greater confidence and affection with which it is regarded, and the greater the presumption that it will continue to approve itself as true." All statements of fact ultimately involve value-judgments, and it is "a superstition that 'facts' are plain, straightforward, and easy to discover." Logic must admit the reality of unpredictable novelties, which are able to help overthrow old truths. Logic must also admit that the taking of risks is essential to the progress of knowledge. JRS

1449 Schneider, Herbert W. The Theory of Values. J Phil 14.6 (15 March 1917): 141-154.

Pragmatism has brought together ethics and psychology in relation to the problem of values, providing an alternative to the absolutism defended by Münsterberg and the structural psychology of Urban. The value situation consists of a valuable object for an organism's activity aimed at some purpose. Thus values must be judged empirically and situationally, and while classifications of types of value are possible, no single value could claim absolute priority. JRS

Notes

See W. M. Urban's response, "The Values of Pragmatic Theory: A Reply to Herbert W. Schneider" {1456}.

1450 Sellars, Roy Wood. *The Essentials of Logic.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1917.

Reviews

William Forbes Cooley, J Phil 15.2 (17 Jan 1918): 51-54.

1451 Sellars, Roy Wood. The Status of Epistemology. J Phil 14.25 (6 Dec 1917): 673-680.

Pragmatists rightly describe how knowledge is achieved in practical purposes, but they stop short of also recognizing that "the individual possesses the distinction between his consciousness and a realm which controls it." Critical realism, unlike pragmatism, does not make the situation absolute: "May not the whole objective situation *as experienced* be within the field of the individual's experience (his consciousness) and be a function of the doing and suffering of the individual–to use Professor Dewey's phrase–in dynamic relation to his environment?" Dewey must be more naturalistic and he should forget his assumption that epistemology implies ontological dualism. Only by clinging to "his blanket terms, experience and objective situation" does Dewey appear to avoid the problems of his naive realism. JRS

1452 Sinclair, May. *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions.* New York and London: Macmillan, 1917.

Chap. 5 is "Pragmatism and Humanism," pp. 127-150. In the last resort pragmatists attack monism by appealing to the "utter indifference" of the "man in the street" to metaphysical issues, but James and Schiller themselves put forward monistic visions. The relative and contradictory pluralities to which the pragmatist points are but signs of a higher metaphysical unity, and this absolute unity only seems excessively "abstract" only if one is absolutely sure that pluralities are absolutely real. Pragmatists argue that monism compels God to be evil, but it is *their* view that evil is real, not monism's. By preserving God's goodness, pragmatists also seek the universe's final unity. Their emphasis on conduct has robbed them of any basis for ethics. Pragmatism's quest "is not for Ultimate Reality, but for steam-engines and motor cars and synthetic chemistry." JRS

Reviews

George P. Adams, Phil Rev 27.3 (May 1918): 322-324; Delton T. Howard, J Phil 15.9 (25 April 1918): 247-249; M. W. Robieson, Int J Ethics 28.4 (July 1918): 563-567; Dorothy Wrinch, Monist 29.4 (Oct 1919): 636-638.

1453 Slosson, Edwin Emery. A British Pragmatist: The Philosophy and Personality of F. C. S. Schiller. Independent 89.7 (12 Feb 1917): 265-268. Revised and expanded as "F. C. S. Schiller" in *Six Major Prophets* (Boston: Little Brown, 1917), pp. 190-233.

1454 Slosson, Edwin Emery. John Dewey: Teacher of Teachers. Independent 89.13 (26 March 1917): 541-544. Revised and expanded as "John Dewey" in *Six Major Prophets* (Boston: Little Brown, 1917), pp. 234-275.

1455 Urban, Wilbur M. Ontological Problems of Value. J Phil 14.12 (7 June 1917): 309-327.

1456 Urban, Wilbur M. The Pragmatic Theory of Value: A Reply to Herbert W. Schneider. J Phil 14.26 (20 Dec 1917): 701-706.

Urban replies to Schneider's "The Theory of Values" {1449}. Pragmatism would ask for impossibilities: that existent things alone are values, and that ends are not values at all. Trapped within the "magic circle" of the "specific situation," the pragmatist reaches the "fundamental incoherence" of making existence a value and value an existent. JRS

Notes

See Schneider, "The Values of Pragmatic Theory: A Rejoinder to Professor Urban," J Phil 14.26 (20 Dec 1917): 706-714. Also see Wendell Bush, "Value and Causality" {1470}.

1457 Wells, Wesley Raymond. Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion. J Phil 14.24 (22 Nov 1917): 653-660. Reprinted as chap. 2, "The Pragmatic Fallacy and the Fallacy of False Attribution," in *The Biological Foundations of Belief* (Boston: Richard C. Badger, 1921), pp. 27-41.

The "pragmatic fallacy" identifies the truth and the value of religious beliefs. The "false attribution" fallacy attributes to an experience some divine source in cases where a psychological explanation suffices. James's writings display both fallacies. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's response, "Truth and Survival Value" {1505}, and E. S. Brightman's comments, "Some Remarks on "Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion" {1469}. Wells accuses George A. Barrow of committing the "pragmatic fallacy" in a review of Barrow, *The Validity of Religious Experience*, J Phil 15.11 (23 May 1918): 301-304.

1458 Wenley, Robert Mark. *The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris.* New York: Macmillan, 1917.

Wenley qoutes Dewey's comments on Morris and his influence on pp. 313-321. JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 212-213 [*MW* 11: 336-337]; James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 28.2 (Jan 1918): 280-281.

Notes

Dewey's comments are reprinted as "George Sylvester Morris: An Estimate," *MW* 10: 109-115.

1918

1459 Ackerman, Phyllis. Some Aspects of Pragmatism and Hegel. J Phil 15.13 (20 June 1918): 337-356.

For the pragmatists, the subject-object relation of knowledge exists only within an interrelated and organic whole situation. Pragmatism, by stressing continuity, must admit the existence of "some background of fixed determinate structure" and thus must be deterministic. Hegel has anticipated all these aspects of pragmatism; there is no barrier to pragmatism's dissolution into Hegelianism. Pragmatism can prevent modern idealism from "floating off into the supernaturalism with which pragmatism charges it." JRS

Notes

See Q. L. Shepherd's response, "Pragmatism and the Irrelevant" {1555}.

1460 Ayres, C. E. The Epistemological Significance of Social Epistemology. J Phil 15.2 (17 Jan 1918): 35-44.

1461 Ayres, C. E. The New Era of Fruitfulness in Ethical Thinking. Int J Ethics 28.3 (April 1918): 373-392.

Chicago pragmatism, from Dewey's 1891 *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, inaugurated the idea that moral theory is the instrumental analysis of conduct. JRS

1462 Bawden, H. Heath. The Presuppositions of a Behaviorist Psychology. Psych Rev 25.3 (May 1918): 171-190.

1463 Bode, Boyd H. Consciousness as Behavior. J Phil 15.17 (15 Aug 1918): 449-453.

Bode replies to Henry Rutgers Marshall's "Behavior" {1488}. JRS

Summaries

I. Chasman, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 222.

Notes

See Marshall's reply in a letter to the editor, J Phil 15.20 (26 Sept 1918): 559-560.

1464 Bode, Boyd H. Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method. J Phil 15.26 (19 Dec 1918): 701-710.

Summaries

I. Chasman, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 222-223.

1465 Bode, Boyd H. Why Do Philosophical Problems Persist? J Phil 15.7 (28 March 1918): 169-177.

1466 Boodin, J. E. Education and Society. School and Society 8.16 (Oct 1918): 451-461.

1467 Boodin, J. E. Education for Democracy. School and Society 7.25 (22 June 1918): 724-731.

1468 Boodin, J. E. Social Systems. American Journal of Sociology 23.6 (May 1918): 705-734.

1469 Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. Some Remarks on "Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion." J Phil 15.3 (31 Jan 1917): 71-76.

Brightman comments on W. R. Wells, {1457}. JRS

Notes

See Wells' reply, "On Religious Values: A Rejoinder" {1519}.

1470 Bush, Wendell T. Value and Causality. J Phil 15.4 (14 Feb 1918): 85-96. Reprinted in *MW* 10: 375-387.

Bush comments on W. M. Urban's "The Pragmatic Theory of Value: A Reply to Herbert W. Schneider" {1456} and Schneider's reply. JRS

Summaries

Edgar De Laski, Phil Rev 27.3 (May 1918): 337; Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

1471 Calderoni, Mario and Giovanni Vailati. *Il pragmatismo.* Edited by Giovanni Papini. Lanciano: R. Carabba, 1918.

Papini gathered their joint work and prefaced it with "Mario Calderoni (1879-1914)," pp. 5-16, a reprint of {1269}. A bibliography of Calderoni's work is on pp. 17-18. "Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del pragmatismo," pp. 19-49, is a reprint of {737}. "Il pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente," pp. 51-85, is a reprint of {738}. "L'arbitrario nel funzionamento della vita psichica," pp. 87-239, is a reprint of {887}. EPC

1472 Capek, Karl. *Pragmatismus, cili, Filosofie Praktickeho Zivota.* Prague: F. Topic, 1918. 2nd rev. ed., 1925.

1473 Costello, Harry T. Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians. J Phil 15.3 (31 Jan 1918): 57-64.

A mere statement of future fact, with action delayed, is more about the analysis and comparison of past experiences than behavior, and a mere guess about the future is not a scientific hypothesis. Instrumentalism omits any social aspect to thought, and ignores the role of systematizing scientific principles. JRS

1474 Dewey, John. Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind. J Phil 15.2 (17 Jan 1918): 29-35. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 446-452. *MW* 11: 10-17.

A. E. Taylor's *The Problem of Conduct* (1901) applies an introspectionist psychology to the examination of one's ethical motives, yielding "an extreme ethical subjectivism." An emotion is only judged by considering "the circumstances which evoke it and the consequences which flow from it." Behavioristic psychology rightly sees that there are no definite and complete feelings or states of mind, but only instinctive reactive attitudes which receive classification as the various emotions when considered in relation to the situation and consequences. JRS

Summaries

Edgar De Laski, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1918): 431.

1475 Dewey, John. The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy. *Studies in the History of Ideas* by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 88-115. Reprinted in *MW* 11: 18-40.

Reviews

Anon, Dial 65 (1918): 218-219; Joseph A. Leighton, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 213-216; A. W. Moore, Int J Ethics 30.2 (Jan 1920): 226-228; H. A. Overstreet, J Phil 16.4 (13 Feb 1919): 108-110; Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 28.1 (Jan 1919): 99-102.

1476 Dewey, John. The Objects of Valuation. J Phil 15.10 (9 May 1918): 253-258. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 599-604. *MW* 11: 3-9.

Dewey responds to "Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments" {1439}, and W. T. Bush's "Value and Causality" {1470}. JRS

Summaries

Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

1477 Fawcett, Edward D. "Activity"–A Vital Problem. Mind 27.1 (Jan 1918): 92-93.

1478 Gilbert, Katherine E. The Mind and Its Discipline. Phil Rev 27.4 (July 1918): 413-427.

1479 Hocking, William Ernest. *Human Nature and Its Remaking.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1918.

Reviews

A. W. Moore, Int J Ethics 29.2 (Jan 1919): 230-232.

1480 Howard, Delton T. The Pragmatic Method. J Phil 15.6 (14 March 1918): 149-157.

Howard comments on Dewey's "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy," in *Creative Intelligence* {1420}. Dewey attacks a species of idealism rarely seen anymore; recent critical idealism also dismisses any "ego-centric" epistemology. There is no reason to limit philosophy to biological methods that are inadequate to the complexities of mental life. Idealistic speculation also deals with human problems. JRS

1481 Kallen, John J. Amateur Psychologizing of Expert Psychologists: An Analysis of Two Experts in the Light of Materialism. Radical Review 2 (1918): 134-141.

Kallen comments on Dewey's "What America Will Fight For," New Republic 12 (18 Aug 1917): 68-69 [*MW* 10: 271-275; also reprinted as "America and War" in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 561-565]. JRS

1482 Kortsen, Kort K. William James' Filosofi Saerlig med Hensyn til hans Opfatelse af det Religiose. Teologisk Tidsskrift 3rd series 9 (1918): 177-209.

1483 Lewis, C. I. German Idealism and Its War Critics. University of California Chronicle 20.1 (1918): 1-15. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 55-65.

Lewis discusses several works about German philosophy and the Great War, including Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics* {1310}. JRS

1484 Lewis, C. I. *A Survey of Symbolic Logic.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918.

Reviews

Henry M. Sheffer, American Mathematical Monthly 27 (July-Sept 1920): 309-311; Norbert Wiener, J Phil 17.3 (29 Jan 1920): 78-79.

1485 Lindsay, James. Rationalism and Voluntarism. Monist 28.3 (July 1918): 432-455.

1486 Lodge, Rupert Clendon. The Division of Judgments. J Phil 15.20 (26 Sept 1918): 541-550.

Notes

An abstract of this paper is in J Phil 15.19 (12 Sept 1918): 527-528.

1487 McClure, M. T. Pragmatism and Democracy. J Phil 15.18 (29 Aug 1918): 481-488.

1488 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. Behavior. J Phil 15.10 (9 May 1918): 259-261.

Marshall comments on B. H. Bode's "Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence* {1420}. JRS

Notes

See B. H. Bode's reply, "Consciousness as Behavior" {1463}.

1489 Mead, G. H. The Psychology of Punitive Justice. American Journal of Sociology 23 (1918): 577-602. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 212-239.

1490 Mead, G. H. Review of Thorstein Veblen, *The Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation.* Journal of Political Economy 26 (1918): 752-762.

1491 Mead, G. H. Social Work, Standards of Living, and the War. Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work 45 (1918): 637-644.

1492 Montague, William P. The Antimony and Its Implications for Logical Theory. In *Studies in the History of Ideas* by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 223-248. Reprinted in *The Ways of Things* {2776}, pp. 203-229.

Reviews

Joseph A. Leighton, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 213-216; H. A. Overstreet, J Phil 16.4 (13 Feb 1919): 108-110; Alfred E. Taylor, Mind 28.1 (Jan 1919): 99-102.

1493 Moore, A. W. The Opportunity of Philosophy. Phil Rev 27.2 (March 1918): 117-133.

1494 Perry, Ralph B. *The Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the Philosophical Background of the World War.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.

Chapters 20-23 deal with aspects of pragmatism: "The Revolt Against Reason," "The Pragmatic Justification of Faith," "Pluralism and the Finite God," and "The Gospel of Action and Movement." JRS

Reviews

Hartley Burr Alexander, J Phil 16.13 (19 June 1919): 352-356; Alfred H. Lloyd, Int J Ethics 29.4 (July 1919): 498-501.

1495 Renauld, J. L'Oeuvre inachevée de Mario Calderoni. Rev Méta 25.2 (March-April 1918): 207-231.

Following Calderoni's premature death in 1914 at the age of 36, his friends compiled his papers, and the present work is a survey of the ideas that most interested him. Included is a discussion of Calderoni and Vailati; the influence of Berkeley's work on Calderoni; the role of arbitrariness, conjecture, and science; concepts, assertions, and judgments; voluntary action; and the moral life. LF

1496 Rieber, Charles H. Footnotes to Formal Logic. In *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 3, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 1-177.

Pragmatism sees only the secondary practical function of thought; idealism sees that its fundamental function it to be true–to be "self-consistent." Experimental logic may find the cause of our judgments in our purposes; it cannot give the criteria of true purpose. The presupposition of the truth of the thought-system which must be used at the moment of judgment is conveniently ignored when the pragmatist seeks new ideas consistent with the old. JRS

Reviews

Alfred Sidgwick, Mind 28.1 (Jan 1919): 87-92. Sidgwick indicates his agreement with pragmatist critiques of formal logic in the process of defending them against Rieber's accusations. JRS

1497 Rogers, Arthur K. Pragmatism vs. Dualism. Phil Rev 27.1 (Jan 1918): 21-38.

Pragmatism's definitions may well provide for its internal self-consistency, but critics must test those definitions' ability to properly interpret the facts. The dualist is interested in the experienced situation of contemplating the object of a completed judgment. The pragmatist cannot object to the traditional label of "knowing" applied to such a situation; the problems of epistemology center here. Dualism easily accounts for thinking of absent things, while Dewey must paradoxically discover the absent thing in experience after all. His inability to consistently describe a not-knowing experience should be expected, but he expects his readers to always recognize its nature. To take experience as the ultimate category, is to prejudge the question against the dualist from the start, and to strip all meaning from the term (this explains why critics charitably find pragmatism to be subjectivism instead). Only in a realistic setting can the pragmatism avoid subjectivism, reverting to an extreme behaviorism with its assumed field of known objects, and abandoning its thesis that objects are created out of "experience." JRS

Notes

See his criticism of Dewey (pp. 157-160) in "The Problem of Error" in *Essays in Critical Realism*, by Durant Drake *et al.* (London: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 117-160.

1498 Sabin, Ethel E. Some Difficulties in James's Formulation of Pragmatism. J Phil 15.12 (6 June 1918): 309-322. Reprinted as chap. 1 of *William James and Pragmatism* {1499}, pp. 1-15.

Pragmatism has advanced beyond James, who never did escape dualism. He confused truth and reality, and in the guise of radical empiricism, returned to sensationalism. IKS

1499 Sabin, Ethel E. *William James and Pragmatism.* Lancaster, Penn.: The New Era Printing Co., 1918.

Chap. 1, pp. 1-15, is a reprint of "Some Difficulties in James's Formulation of Pragmatism" {1498}. The other chapter, "The Question of Truth," pp. 16-29, contains further material from her dissertation {1392}. JRS

1500 Salter, William M. *Nietzsche, The Thinker: A Study.* New York: Henry Holt, 1918.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 28.1 (Jan 1919): 107-108. James's brother-in-law declares that Nietzsche's theory of truth is connected with pragmatism, but fails to pursue it further. JRS

1501 Santayana, George. Philosophical Opinion in America. Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 8 (London: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 299-309. Reprinted as "Later Speculations" in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. Rpt., New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 139-164.

Pragmatism, like all philosophies, assumes the reality of comprehensive truth, of which all truth claims are a portion. As a psychological empiricism, it concludes that thought is nothing but the elements used in thinking, and can thus only deal with the relation between a sign and the thing signified. However, when it also asks "what existential relations surround an idea when it is called true which are absent when it is called false" pragmatism is mired in an unsolvable problem. Empiricism once relied on the past; now it looks only to the future. These "small scandals" should not be allowed to detract from pragmatism's accepting spirit of "happy watchfulness and insecurity." JRS

Reviews

Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 16.4 (13 Feb 1919): 104-107.

1502 Schiller, F. C. S. Cassandra's Apologia. Mind 27.1 (Jan 1918): 86-91. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 194-202.

1503 Schiller, F. C. S. Formalism and the *A Fortiori.* Mind 27.2 (April 1918): 198-202.

Schiller comments on Charles A. Mercier's "The Argument *A Fortiori*," Mind 26.3 (July 1917): 340-350, and on H. S. Shelton's "The Necessity for a Universal in Reasoning," Mind 26.3 (July 1917): 351-356. JRS

Notes

Shelton responds with "Logic and Formalism" {1509}, and Schiller answers with "Logic and Formalism" {1552}. See Shelton, "The Syllogism and Other Logical Forms," Mind 28.2 (April 1919): 180-202, and Alfred Sidgwick's review of Rieber's *Footnotes to Formal Logic* {1496}. Also see Schiller's review of J. Welton's *Groundwork of Logic* (London: W. B. Clive, University Tutorial Press, 1917), Mind 27.4 (Oct 1918): 499-501.

1504 Schiller, F. C. S. Omnipotence. *Proc Arist Soc* 18 (1918): 247-270.

Reviews

A. E. Heath, Int J Ethics 29.3 (April 1919): 384-389.

1505 Schiller, F. C. S. Truth and Survival Value. J Phil 15.19 (12 Sept 1918): 505-515.

Schiller defends the assimilation of truth and value against Wesley Wells's "Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion" {1457}. JRS

Summaries

Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

Notes

See Wells's reply, "The Biological Foundations of Belief" {1561}.

1506 Schiller, F. C. S. What Formal Logic Is About. Mind 27.4 (Oct 1918): 422-431.

Schiller formulates objections to Arthur Mitchell's "What is Formal Logic About?" {1437}. JRS

1507 Schroeder, Theodore Albert. A Psychological View of the Pragmatic Issue. Monist 28.2 (April 1918): 273-281.

A synthetic view of the debate over whether "it is true because it works" or "it works because it is true" enables one to see how each, the inductive and deductive aspects, are necessary to knowledge. JRS

1508 Scott, William Henry. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Phil Rev 27.1 (Jan 1918): 1-20.

James's explanation of self-consciousness has no reasonable psychological basis. JRS

1509 Shelton, H. S. Logic and Formalism. Mind 27.4 (Oct 1918): 464-471.

Shelton comments on Schiller's "Formalism and the *A Fortiori*" {1503}. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Logic and Formalism" {1552}.

1510 Simmel, Georg. *Der Konflikt der Modernen Kultur.* Munich and Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1918. 2nd ed., 1921. 3rd ed., 1926. Reprinted in *Das individuelle Gesetz: Philosophische Exkurse*, ed. Michael Landmann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 148-173. The 2nd ed. was translated by K. Peter Etzkorn as "The Conflict in Modern Culture" in *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), pp. 11-26.

American pragmatism is the "most superficial and limited" manifestation of the modern infatuation with individual creativity and novelty. Its denial of even the independence of truth from human life relies on an elevation of Life to the status of absolute being. Pragmatism's rejection of mechanics and subjugation of ideas abandons classicism. JRS

1511 Simon, Paul. *Der Pragmatismus in der Modernen Franzoesischen Philosophie.* Dissertation, Freiburg University, 1918. Munster: W. Druk der Westfalischen vereinsdruckerei, 1918. Reprinted, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1920.

1512 Singer, Edgar A. Jr. The Empiricism of William James. In *University of Pennsylvania: University Lectures Delivered by Members of the Faculty in the Free Public Lectures Course*, vol. 5 (1918), pp. 325-345. Reprinted, minus some omissions, as "Pragmatism" in *Modern Thinkers and Present Problems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1923. London: George G. Harrap and Co., 1925), pp. 213-246.

An interpretation of James's "The Will to Believe" (1897), by one who heard it read while a student at Harvard and found it a shock to his "laboratory mind." Pragmatism tries to show that the "moral and religious aspects" of the world are "things to work and fight for" and not merely to find. But Singer himself would prefer in this struggle to rely on science. IKS

Reviews of *Modern Thinkers and Present Problems*

Houston Peterson, J Phil 21.12 (5 June 1924): 331-333.

1513 Slattery, Charles Lewis. William James. In his *Certain American Faces: Sketches from Life* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1918).

Slattery offers anecdotes about James, current among James's students. IKS

1514 Sonneberg, Walter. A Biologist's Religion. Monist 28.4 (Oct 1918): 567-585.

1515 Spaulding, Edward G. *The New Rationalism*. New York: Henry Holt, 1918.

Pragmatism assumes that all things causally affect one another. (p. 10) Chap. 10 discusses "The Epistemological Problem" by comparing the positions of pragmatism, phenomenalism, idealism, and realism; pp. 109-111 describes "The Pragmatic Tendency." Chap. 33, "Pragmatism," explains that pragmatism abhors substance, follows evolution, and enfolds sensationalism, emotionalism, immediatism, and mysticism into its anti-intellectualism. Since for pragmatism all truth and goodness is relative, the very basis by which truth can be distinguished from the false is abandoned; pragmatism itself cannot claim to be the true theory. The existence of error requires more than just some adaptive, causal relationship between cognition and the thing known. Pragmatism's evolutionary viewpoint realistically assumes absolute truth. JRS

1516 Swenson, David F. Sixteen Logical Aphorisms. J Phil 15.19 (12 Sept 1918): 515-518.

The errors of epistemology reduce to the "confusion of the instrumentalities of thought with the objects of thought." Schiller's explanation of the laws of thought end in paradox. JRS

1517 Troilo, E. W. James. In *Figure e studi di storia della filosofia* (Rome: l'Universelle, 1918), pp. 33-39.

1518 Wells, Wesley Raymond. The Fallacy in Mr. H. G. Wells's "New Religion." Monist 28.4 (Oct 1918): 604-608.

1519 Wells, Wesley Raymond. On Religious Values: A Rejoinder. J Phil 15.18 (29 Aug 1918): 488-499. Reprinted as chap. 3, "A Classification of Religious Values," in *The Biological Foundations of Belief* (Boston: Richard C. Badger, 1921), pp. 42-67.

Wells replies to Edgar Brightman's "Some Remarks on 'Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion'" {1469}, and to Jared S. Moore's "The Validity of Religious Belief," J Phil 15.4 (13 Feb 1918): 76-78. JRS

1520 Wright, Henry W. Bode's Conception of Consciousness. J Phil 15.19 (12 Sept 1918): 526.

Notes

Abstract of a paper read at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Northwestern University, March 29 and 30, 1918.

1919

1521 Baudouin, Charles. William James' "Talks to Teachers on Psychology." La Feuille (Geneva) 5, 12, and 26 Sept 1919; 3 Oct 1919. Reprinted in *Contemporary Studies*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924).

A general sketch of James's psychology with emphasis on educational applications. James stresses the importance of action and the education of the will. IKS

1522 Bawden, Henry Heath. Psychology and Scientific Method. J Phil 16.22 (23 Oct 1919): 603-609.

1523 Boardman, Rufus Norman. *The Significance of Meaning in Pragmatism and Neo-Realism.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1919.

1524 Brown, Harold C. The Definition of Logic. J Phil 16.20 (25 Sept 1919): 533-541.

1525 Bushnell, J. C. The Logic of the Sciences. Monist 29.4 (Oct 1919): 481-508.

Bushnell defends Dewey's instrumentalism and applies it to a sytematic organization of the sciences. JRS

1526 Casagrande, Mario. Scoula, società e democrazia. Societa 5 (Dec 1919): 662-673.

1527 Cohen, Morris R. William James. New Republic 20 (1 Oct 1919): 255-257. A revised version is reprinted in the *Cambridge History of American Literature* (1921).

James's humanistic thought has little in common with the supposed American practicality. He was dominated by a "religious vision of life," which from the very beginning was united with an empiricism. Sometimes James falls into the intellectualistic trap of recognizing only extremes: we must either believe or not believe and no room is left for suspension of judgment, for acting without belief, and the like. IKS

1528 Dewey, John. *Lectures in China, 1919-1920.* Edited and translated from the Chinese, with an introduction, by Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-chen Ou. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973.

This volume includes a series of sixteen lectures on "Social and Political Philosophy," a series of sixteen lectures on "A Philosophy of Education," and two appendixes: Dewey's leaflet entitled "An Open Letter to the Chinese People," and an annotated table of contents of translations of ten other series of lectures by Dewey in China. JRS

1529 Dewey, John. Philosophy and Democracy. University of California Chronicle 21 (Jan 1919): 39-54. Reprinted in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 841-855. *MW* 11: 41-53.

Summaries

Katherine E. Gilbert, Phil Rev 28.5 (Sept 1919): 538.

1530 Edman, Irwin. The New Puritanism. Columbia University Quarterly 21.1 (Jan 1919): 38-50.

A pragmatist finds not one duty, like Puritanism, but enough duties to "keep him solemn, busy, and unbending all the days of the week." While purposive thinking may ignore irrelevant emotional delights in the pursuit of total perfection for all, only the aesthetic attitude can give us a taste of perfection now, lest the postponement of heaven causes us to completely forget it. JRS

1531 Flournoy, Théodore. *Métaphysique et psychologie.* 2nd ed. Geneva, Kundig, Paris: Fischbacher, 1919.

This 2nd ed. of the 1890 text is a re-issue without revision, with a preface by Harold Höffding. Flournoy attacks the principle of psychological parallelism as a metaphysical conclusion, arguing that it is no more than a scientific expression of the intimate union between body and mind. (p. 2) The aim of the work, he holds, is to show that "our science" is not metaphysics, and should not become so. (pp. 118f). LF

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 29.1 (Jan 1920): 112-113. Flournoy anticipated "both the subsequent criticism of the principle of psychological parallelism and the discovery of the Pragmatic Method [as he]...insists that the principle should be taken methodologically, as merely a postulate of mechanical experiment," and that this "of course is the way to treat *all* ideas according to the pragmatists." Schiller also notes that Flournoy anticipated the doctrine of evolution and James's *Will to Believe* (1897). LF

1532 Follett, Mary Parker. Community Is a Process. J Phil 16.26 (18 Dec 1919): 715-717.

Notes

An abstract of a paper.

1533 Gronau, Gotthard. Der Pragmatismus von James und Schiller. In *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart: ein Einfuhrung in die philosophischen Hauptstromungen unserer Zeit* (Langensalza: Wendt und Klauwell, 1919), pp. 59-81.

Germans are a nation of poets and thinkers, while Americans are a practical people for whom money is God. James's philosophy is American. It will be quickly forgotten, especially in Germany, a land in which idealism has found a home. IKS

1534 Gutmann, James. Imagination as a Factor Toward Truth. J Phil 16.3 (30 Jan 1919): 57-71.

1535 Haydon, Albert Eustace. The Theological Trend of Pragmatism. American Journal of Theology 23.4 (Oct 1919): 401-416.

Haydon discusses the "Finite God" of James and Schiller, the "God-Idea" of the functionalist psychologists, E. S. Ames and Irving King, and the "devotion to human service" of Dewey and other instrumentalists. Will the pragmatists participate in the modern effort of constructive religious thought? JRS

Reviews

Glenn R. Morrow, Phil Rev 29.1 (Jan 1920): 109-110.

1536 Howard, Delton T. The Descriptive Method in Philosophy. Phil Rev 28.4 (July 1919): 379-390.

Dewey's pragmatism takes active experience as immediate and fundamental, but he refuses to metaphysically justifying this seemingly arbitrary definition of experience. His method of describing thought and behavior looks empirical, but the "facts" he finds are simply created at second hand by the categories that he has taken over from biology. Why can't knowledge instead be studied directly, from the standpoint of the knower? JRS

1537 Howard, Delton T. The Logical Approach to Functionalism. J Phil 16.17 (14 Aug 1919): 463-464.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in April 1919.

1538 Kantor, J. R. Instrumental Transformism and the Unrealities of Realism. J Phil 16.17 (14 Aug 1919): 449-461.

Both idealists and new realists deny that instrumentalism offers a logic or any "solidity" to the world, but the essence of its logic is the transformative inquiry into the real active processes of the world. JRS

Notes

Kantor's 1917 dissertation at The University of Chicago was titled *The Functional Nature of the Philosophical Categories.*

1539 Lalande, André. Philosophy in France, 1918. Translated by Katherine E. Gilbert. Phil Rev 28.5 (Sept 1919): 443-465.

Lalande argues that neither Edmund Goblot nor Gaston Milhaud can be properly classified as pragmatists. JRS

1540 Leroux, Emmanuel. Le Développement de la pensée philosophique aux États-Unis. Revue de synthese historique 29 (1919): 125-149.

Leroux examines Jonathan Edwards, Deism, Emerson, Royce, and James. (pp. 142-147) JRS

1541 Lindsay, James. The Greatest Problem in Value. Monist 29.1 (Jan 1919): 64-95.

The pragmatic idea that objective truth is made by us is "absurd and untenable." JRS

1542 Lloyd, Alfred H. The Function of Philosophy in Reconstruction. J Phil 16.19 (11 Sept 1919): 505-518.

1543 Lloyd, Alfred H. Luther and Machiavelli; Kant and Frederick. J Phil 16.9 (24 April 1919): 225-236.

Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics* {1310} gives a superficial interpretation of Luther's and Kant's contributions to German culture. JRS

1544 Mead, G. H. A Translation of Wundt's *Folk Psychology*. American Journal of Theology 23 (1919): 533-536.

1545 Owen, Roberts Bishop. Teleology and Pragmatism: A Note. J Phil 16.18 (28 Aug 1919): 87.

Owen comments on John Warbeke, "A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism" {1559}. JRS

Notes

See Warbeke's reply, "Instrumentalism and Teleology" {1558}.

1546 Randall, John H. Jr. Instrumentalism and Mythology. J Phil 16.12 (5 June 1919): 309-324.

Philosophy, as simply more respectable mythology, provides "a pleasant habitation while storms rage in the rude realms of existence." To change a way of life, we must first "recreate the universe" so that its "inevitable ideals" can inspire revolutionary devotion. As happiness lies in the struggle for control to achieve ideals, pragmatism does not disclaim utopias. When inevitable obstacles come, we must control ourselves. JRS

1547 Royce, Josiah. *Lectures on Modern Idealism*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919.

These posthumously published lectures were delivered at the John Hopkins University in 1906 with the title "Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism." Most American pragmatists "could be viewed as the outcome" of post-Kantian idealism. (p. 2) Idealists "were, one and all, in a very genuine sense what people now call pragmatists" due to a common emphasis on "the relation of truth to action, to practice, to will." (p. 85, 86) Pragmatism is one expression of a widespread modified Kantianism in the form of "empirical idealism," in which knowledge depends on our idealized reactions to phenomena for some finite need. But pragmatism cannot rest with the assertion that all truths are finite and relative, since "the finite is as such self-contradictory, dialectical, burdened with irra-

tionality" and must find "fulfillment in an Absolute Life which is also an absolute truth." (p. 258) JRS

Reviews

Warner Fite, J Phil 18.18 (1 Sept 1921): 497-499; E. L. Hinman, Int J Ethics 31.2 (Jan 1921): 229-231.

1548 Russell, Bertrand. On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 2 (1919): 1-43. Material used for *The Analysis of Mind* {1640}. Reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950*, edited by Robert Charles Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956). *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 8: *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914-1919* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 278-306.

James rightly separates imagining a thing and believing its existence. His principle that if an object remains uncontradicted, then it is believed to be real, only accounts for simple aspects of belief. (p. 35) The correspondence theory of truth cannot be objected to on theoretical grounds if it is incompatible with the possibility of knowledge. JRS

1549 Russell, Bertrand. Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic." J Phil 16.1 (2 Jan 1919): 5-26. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 231-252. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 8: *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914-1919* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 134-154.

Russell comments on {1359}. Philosophical misunderstandings arise from interest in different problems and employment of different meanings. Dewey's work is not on logic, but psychology, and interprets "data" as psychological entities, whereas Russell means the scientifically observed events acting as premises in scientific reasoning. "Pure psychology" explains the origins of belief; Russell sets this inquiry aside. "Mixed psychology and logic" explains how we logically organize our beliefs. Russell here uses the term "epistemologically primitive" to designate those beliefs not inferred, and says that they are not also psychologically primitive. "Pure logic" seeks deductive systems with purely logical primitives; such primitives are not relevant to scientific inquiry. Scientific observations differ from ordinary perceptions by possessing less vagueness and more inferential value.

The instrumentalist account of knowledge has its attractions, but its problems include assuming that beliefs in causal laws are true, ignoring skepticism, and forbidding contemplation and escape from the self. Dewey's "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem" relies on a misinterpretation of "data" and a misunderstanding of Russell's problem and scientific methodology: starting only from those data which cannot be doubted, can the belief in the external world be inferred? No "external" world was begged, as Dewey alleges; the differences between the world of data and the common-sense world are the absence of physical things, things existing before or after being observed, and other persons aside from their "outward show." Dewey rightly notes the empirical nature of events of inference, but Russell is concerned with their validity. JRS

Summaries

I. Chasman, Phil Rev 28.2 (March 1919): 223; G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 17.3 (April 1919): 532.

1550 Sabin, Ethel E. Pragmatic Teleology. J Phil 16.18 (28 Aug 1919): 488-493.

Sabin comments on Warbeke's "A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism" {1559}. Many of Warbeke's charges apply to James's humanism, but Dewey's instrumentalism must be opposed to this humanism. IKS

Notes

See Warbeke's reply, "Instrumentalism and Teleology" {1558}.

1551 Schiller, F. C. S. Doctrinal Functions. J Phil 16.2 (16 Jan 1919): 44-46.

1552 Schiller, F. C. S. Logic and Formalism. Mind 28.2 (April 1919): 213-216.

Schiller responds to H. S. Shelton's "Logic and Formalism" {1509}. JRS

1553 Schiller, F. C. S. Methodological Teleology. J Phil 16.20 (25 Sept 1919): 548-553.

Schiller responds to Warbeke's "A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism" {1559}. Warbeke has presupposed an "an unpragmatic logic and an unpragmatic metaphysic." JRS

Notes

See Warbeke's reply, "Instrumentalism and Teleology" {1558}.

1554 Schiller, F. C. S., Hastings Rashdall, J. H. Muirhead, C. F. D'Arcy. Can Individual Minds Be Included in the Mind of God? *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 2 (1919): 109-158.

Schiller's contribution to this symposium is section three, pp. 135-147. JRS

Reviews

G. Dawes Hicks, Hibbert Journal 18.1 (Oct 1919): 169-170.

1555 Shepherd, Q. L. Pragmatism and the Irrelevant. J Phil 16.3 (30 Jan 1919): 72-74.

Shepherd responds to Phyllis Ackerman's "Some Aspects of Pragmatism and Hegel" {1459}. While both systems find an organic relationship between consciousness and its objects, Hegelianism asks us to "go beyond knowledge to explain knowledge." JRS

1556 Stearns, Harold. *Liberalism in America.* New York: Boni and Liveright, 1919.

Stearns disagrees with Dewey's "Conscience and Compulsion" New Republic 11 (14 July 1917): 297-298 [*MW* 10: 260-264] on pp. 12n-13n. Chap. 8 describes the "Débâcle of Pragmatism," pp. 173-191. JRS

1557 Turner, John Evan. *An Examination of William James's Philosophy: A Critical Essay for the General Reader.* Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1919.

James's philosophy tends to "lower the life of the spirit," although he was a noble person. James's wide sympathies led him to adopt each new movement and as a result his pragmatism, pluralism, empiricism, and philosophy of religion, cannot be reconciled with each other. James's genius was to stimulate thought and show that philosophy is not "aloof" from everyday concerns. IKS

Reviews

Horace L. Friess, J Phil 17.19 (9 Sept 1920): 522-526. James would probably admit inconsistencies, but philosophy for James would seek "a fresh perception every day." Turner's coherence theory is less satisfactory than James's pragmatic theory of truth. James found relations in experience, but Turner assumes that relations are the work of thought, thus unfairly denying any sense to James's pluralism and radical empiricism. JRS

1558 Warbeke, John M. Instrumentalism and Teleology. J Phil 16.26 (18 Dec 1919): 701-713.

Warbeke replies to Roberts Owen's "Teleology and Pragmatism: A Note" {1545}, Ethel Sabin's "Pragmatic Teleology" {1550}, and F. C. S. Schiller's "Methodological Teleology" {1553}. JRS

1559 Warbeke, John M. A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism. J Phil 16.8 (10 April 1919): 207-215.

James's pragmatism, by subordinating knowledge to an ethical ideal, is like medieval doctrine in which everything was subordinated by salvation. IKS

Notes

See Schiller's response, "Methodological Teleology" {1553}. See also comments by Roberts B. Owen, "Teleology and Pragmatism: A Note" {1545}, and by Ethel E. Sabin, "Pragmatic Teleology" {1550}.

1560 Wells, Wesley Raymond. Behaviorism and the Definition of Words. Monist 29.1 (Jan 1919): 133-140.

Peirce's "valuable terminology" of interpretants, icons, indices, and symbols can be applied to the "behavioristic situation" as E. B. Holt understands it. The behaving organism is the interpretant, and through habit formation words can substitute for other stimuli. Dewey's views on language are similar. JRS

1561 Wells, Wesley Raymond. The Biological Foundations of Belief. J Phil 16.10 (8 May 1919): 259-271. Reprinted as "Truth and Survival Value," in *The Biological Foundations of Belief* (Boston: Richard C. Badger, 1921), pp. 68-92.

Wells replies to Schiller's "Truth and Survival Value" {1505}. JRS

Reviews of *The Biological Foundations of Belief*

L. B. Hoisington, Amer J Psych 33.1 (Jan 1922): 152-153; C. F. Taeusch, Int J Ethics 31.4 (July 1921): 452-453.

1562 Wilson, Roland K. Humanism: An Experiment in Religion. Hibbert Journal 18.1 (Oct 1919): 27-35.

1563 Znaniecki, Florian. *Cultural Reality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919.

Znaniecki declares that he is "inclined to consider himself almost as a pragmatist," and offers a "new culturistic philosophy." JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 28.4 (Oct 1919): 488-489.

1564 Alexander, Hartley Burr. Philosophy in Deliquescence. J Phil 17.23 (4 Nov 1920): 617-622.

1565 Boodin, J. E. The Unit of Civilization. Int J Ethics 30.2 (Jan 1920): 142-159.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 16.17 (14 Aug 1919): 470-471.

1566 Buermeyer, Laurence. Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought. J Phil 17.25 (2 Dec 1920): 673-681. Reprinted in *MW* 13: 482-491.

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "An Analysis of Reflective Thought" {1665}.

1567 Chiapelli, Allesandro. *La crisi del pensiero moderno.* Naples: "Il Solco," 1920.

1568 Cohen, Morris R.. On American Philosophy. III. John Dewey and the Chicago School. New Republic 22 (17 March 1920): 82-86.

Notes

See G. A. Tawney and E. L. Talbert's response, "Democracy and Morals" {1704}. See also Mortimer J. Adler, "The Chicago School," Harper's Magazine 183 (Sept 1941): 377-388.

1569 Costello, Harry T. Professor Dewey's "Judgments of Practise." J Phil 17.17 (12 Aug 1920): 449-455.

Costello comments on Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359}. Dewey confusingly fails to distinguish between a person's situation and what a person *believes* to be his situation, and between judgments in causal relationships and those lacking any causal relationship. Often a desire for a judgment to be true has nothing to do with any desire to verify its truth. Verification involves "analysis and comparison and recognition, and is not a mere plunging back into a non-intellectual immediacy or activity." On Dewey's theory, if a cook makes a cake using the judgment "this recipe will make a good-tasting cake," then that judgment caused the resulting cake to taste good, and without that judgment that cake would not taste good. JRS

1570 Cresson, André. *L'Invérifiable: Les Problèmes de la métaphysique.* Paris: E. Chiron, 1920.

According to Cresson, the answers to ethical questions rest, at least in part, on the answers to metaphysical questions. Over the centuries, metaphysics has seen great change: it was once considered to be of a scientific order, capable of a demonstrable solution, and one of the first and most important sciences. Since the end of the 18th century, however, the expansion of science has succeeded in killing off skepticism, but has breeded a new kind of philosopher who is at once non-sceptical and non-metaphysical. He admits (only) the results that science demonstrates and verifies. Metaphysics was thus no longer considered a science, but rather "extra-scientific," and the answers to its questions deemed "unknowable." (p. 8) Recently there has been a revival

of metaphysics, and so we ask again: can we hope to definitively solve metaphysical questions, or must we, with the positivists, acknowledge the existence of an unknowable? Cresson argues (chapters 1-4) that it is equally false to say that the problems of metaphysics are unknowable as it is to say that we can possess a "proved solution." In short, every metaphysical doctrine is and always will be inevitably unverifiable. There are thus three defensible positions that one may hold: positivism, probabilism, and pragmatism. The discussion of pragmatism, which includes both James and Pascal, runs from pp. 270-305, and Cresson concludes with the following statement. He who says "I have metaphysical beliefs that support and console me, and I shall hold on to them since none other is verifiable" places himself in a philosophically inexpungable position. He who does not possess any comforting beliefs, and does not know the art of pleasant belying, cannot in the least be touched by the pragmatist's argument. (p. 305) LF

1571 Cubberly, Ellwood P. The Contribution of John Dewey. In *The History of Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), pp. 780-783.

1572 Dewey, John. *Reconstruction in Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920. London: University of London Press, 1921. Reprinted in *MW* 12: 77-204.

This work of philosophical anthropology provides an account of how philosophy arises from cultural norms and practices yet subsequently reflects back upon and reshapes them. The first five chapters trace the progression from early Greek thought to the age of modern science. Philosophy arose from wonder, from ideals and poetic images at odds with mundane practices needed for survival. Institutionalized as stories, and later as norms, the invention of logic elevated these dreams and ideals to the status of "ultimate realities": absolute, fixed, and timeless bearers of the True and the Good. With the advent of modern science, however, the conception of nature changed. Western Europe began to utilize knowledge, not merely venerate it; the true and the good were now measured in terms of social progress, and progress requires cooperation and an openness to innovation. A new individualism emerged, yet the lure of the absolute has not been abandoned, but only transformed: rationalism and empiricism still reflect the dichotomy between mathematical physics and individual sensations. "Reality" is either a system of inviolable laws and relations or locked away in the "external world" beyond a veil of perceptions.

The final three chapters suggest how scientific methodology might not only help free philosophy from its self-imposed shackles, but may even reunite the ideals and practices for the first time in twenty four centuries. Unlike many philosophers, working scientists accept change and uncertainty as ineluctable traits of nature. They realize that ideals are hypotheses–methods, rather than goals–and they accept that "mundane" practices are integral to the procurement of truth and good. Indeed, "truth" itself is not a static property of being, but an "active, dynamic function," that which "guides us truly" (p. 170) The "good," similarly, is not a final goal, but an "ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining" where "growth itself is the only moral 'end'." (p. 181) The scientific spirit must therefore guide reconstruction in logical, moral, and social thought. FXR

Reviews

George P. Adams, Phil Rev 30.5 (Sept 1921): 519-523. This "monumental achievement" sketches the intellectual and social roots of the growing rift between the triumphs of science and the "checked and distorted" life of imagination, art, religion, and philosophy. FXR

Harry T. Costello, "A Teacher of Teachers," Yale Rev 12.2 (Jan 1923): 407-410. Rousing and readable, this book "leaves the reader eager to get up and do something," but with no specific program, one does not know quite what to do. FXR

Ralph B. Perry, Dial 70 (1921): 454-457. Dewey's new philosophy does not hold up well under close and intense scrutiny. For example, we are never sure whether his "nature" is physical nature, or whether his "intelligence" is in the organism or its environment. Similar vagueness plagues his work on epistemology, logic, and ethics. FXR

H. H. Williams, Monist 31.2 (April 1921): 297-304. Dewey contradicts himself by saying that the "ultimate is action" while also endorsing a "continuity" that resists all action. He also fails to see that thinking is about truth, not about problems. FXR

Horace M. Kallen, "Philosophical Reconstruction," Freeman 3.6 (20 April 1921): 140-141; Victor S. Yarros, Open Court 37 (1923): 596-604.

Notes

See W. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, The Protagonist of Democracy" {1650}. *Reconstruction in Philosophy* was first presented as a course of lectures given at the Imperial University of Japan at Tokyo in February and March of 1919. The syllabus for these lectures, "Dewey's Lectures in Japan," was published in J Phil 16.13 (19 June 1919): 357-364 [*MW* 11: 341-349]. This work's reprinting (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948) was accompanied by Dewey's "Introduction: Reconstruction as Seen Twenty-five Years Later," pp. v-xli [*MW* 12: 256-277].

1573 Dewey, John and Alice Chipman Dewey. *Letters from China and Japan.* Evelyn Dewey, ed. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920.

1574 Gamertsfelder, Walter Sylvester. *Thought, Existence, and Reality as Viewed by F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet.* Dissertation, Ohio State, 1920.

Pragmatism is discussed on pp. 73-75. JRS

1575 Gass, Sherlock Bronson. From the Common-Sense Level. J Phil 17.1 (1 Jan 1920): 5-11.

We all saw great things in pragmatism a dozen years ago, but "now James is dead, and Pragmatism is a memory, and M. Bergson and Mr. Schiller and Mr. Dewey." Such anti-intellectualism ignored the real needs of human nature, desires, and values. JRS

1576 Heller, Bernard. *Judaism and Pragmatism.* Hebrew Union College Rabbinic thesis, 1920.

1577 Hobbs, Ewart William. *Two Conceptions of Individuality. An Examination into the Theories of Josiah Royce and William James.* Dissertation, George Washington University, 1920.

1578 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920.

Instrumentalism demands the use of scientific method in philosophy, resulting in "intelligent philanthropy." (p. 38-42) It denies the legitimacy of thought as an end in itself. Peirce's speculations on the laws of nature as "habits" are mentioned on p. 181. James's theories of truth and mind are critically discussed on pp. 214-217 and pp. 274-281. JRS

Reviews

A. W. Moore, Int J Ethics 31.4 (July 1921): 441-443.

Notes

See Max Otto, "Pragmatism and the Concept of Wholeness" {1733}.

1579 James, William. *Collected Essays and Reviews.* Edited with a preface by Ralph B. Perry. New York: Russell and Russell, 1920.

Extended reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, "William James" {1647}.

Reviews

C. F. Taeusch, Int J Ethics 31.3 (April 1921): 346-347.

1580 James, William. *The Letters of William James.* Henry James, ed. 2 vols. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press; London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. A limited illustrated edition was published, Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920. A one volume edition with corrections and an appendix was published, Boston: Little, Brown, 1926.

The *Letters* contains a biographical Introduction and Notes by his son, who selected William James's letters with an emphasis on personal correspondence. Corrections were made in the 1926 edition, and an appendix with two previously unpublished letters was added. IKS

Extended reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, "William James" {1647}.

Reviews

Anon, "William James as an Inspiration to His Family and Friends," Current Opinion 70 (March 1921): 366-368. James's *Letters* show his "love for his family and friends." IKS

John Erskine, "William James, Lover of Life," Outlook 129 (2 Nov 1921): 355-356. James's letters in "literary art" are inferior to those of Emerson and others, but they reveal the man. James was first of all an artist delighting in the "quality of life." IKS

L. P. Jacks, "William James and His Letters," Atlantic Monthly 128 (Aug 1921): 197-203. James's philosophy expresses his personality. He was unique and his power consisted in seeing the "queerness" in things. The letters introduce his pragmatism, his ethics, and his religion. James made philosophy interesting for everybody; his work led to a greater interest in philosophy. IKS

M. Jourdain, Int J Ethics 31.4 (July 1921): 445-446. James never completed his philosophy and this "informal biography" does not complete it. It reveals a "most individual and living personality." IKS

Howard V. Knox, "The Letters of William James," Hibbert Journal 19.4 (July 1921): 645-653 [*The Evolution of Truth* {2113} pp. 137-149]. James's "deep interest in human individuality" and his "intellectual tolerance" is displayed in these letters. JRS

P. Littell, "Books and Things," New Republic 25 (29 Dec 1920): 154-146. These letters reveal the many interests which James's growing absorption in philosophy pushed into the background. Contains reminiscences by a former student. IKS

John Macy, "William James, Man of Letters," in *The Critical Game* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922), pp. 175-189. James's thought is marked by balance. "To the over-credulous he preached caution; to the over-sceptical, faith." IKS

Edward L. Thorndike, Science n.s. 53 (18 Feb 1921): 165-167. James is one of the great Americans. The letters show that James became interested in philosophy early and that most of his writing was due to outside pressures. IKS

James H. Tufts, J Phil 18.14 (7 July 1921): 381-387. James's letters correct many misconceptions, particularly that by "practical" James understood something very narrow, that it excluded "imagination, science, friendship, and religion." The bulk of the review reports remarks allegedly made by various people when trying to understand James's personality. IKS

Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Yale Review n.s. 11.1 (Oct 1921): 182-187. These letters do greater justice to a portrait of James the father and philosopher than to questions of his character, background, and career as a psychologist. JRS

1581 Katuin, Gerald A. The Ideality of Values. J Phil 17.14 (1 July 1920): 381-386.

Summaries

Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

1582 Kiefl, Franz Xavier. Pragmatismus und Ethische Bewegung. In *Christentum und Padagogik: eine Antwort auf Foersters gleichnamige Schrift* (Regensburg: G. F. Manz, 1920).

1583 Kremer, René. Réalism et pragmatisme. Chap. 3 of *Le néo-réalisme* (Louvain: Institut de Philosophie, 1920).

Reviews

Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 18.4 (17 Feb 1921): 105-107.

1584 Lamprecht, Sterling Power. Ends and Means in Ethical Theory. J Phil 17.19 (9 Sept 1920): 505-513.

Pragmatism emphasizes means at the expense of ends. The futurity of purposes indefinitely postpones accomplishment, but a system of ethics must recognize some good in itself. As every means is an end, and every end a means, intrinsic goods cannot be separated in fact, but only in theory, from instrumental goods. In this scientific age, control has become an end in itself, producing tools of war too dangerous to allow us to ignore the question of the "proper goals of human behavior." We must also consider whether the intrinsic goodness of the means is sufficient to permit the pursuit of the end. Just as the absence of intrinsic goods repelled John Stuart Mill from the "cold and forbidding" morality of Benthamism, philosophy must see how pragmatism forgets that "Life gains its meaning and its value only because through its course men can achieve a multitude of goods which not only lead on to further consequences, but are in themselves a joy and a delight." JRS

1585 Lewis, C. I. Strict Implication–an Emendation. J Phil 17.11 (20 May 1920): 300-302.

1586 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pragmatism as Interactionism. J Phil 17.22 (21 Oct 1920): 589-596; 17.23 (4 Nov 1920): 622-632. Reprinted with "some omissions and additions" in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 191-218.

Bode and Dewey frame an "instrumental" conception of intelligence as ultimately a feature of "things" rather than of "minds." This precludes creative human invention, including the ability to represent the past and project the future. If pragmatism truly wants to conceive of intelligence as the creative redirection of resources, then it must embrace an "interactive" dualism of minds and external objects. FXR

Notes

See Bode's reply, "Intelligence and Behavior" {1613}.

1587 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pragmatism versus the Pragmatist. In *Essays in Critical Realism*, by Durant Drake *et al.* (London: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 35-81. Reprinted in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 133-190. *MW* 13: 443-481.

In erroneously following James's radical empiricism, Dewey espouses a pragmatism that denies any existence or reality beyond the content of immediate perception. Not only is this subjectivistic and idealistic, but it also precludes any knowledge of past events. The true pragmatist is a critical realist who acknowledges an ineliminable psychical component wherein the external world is "present as absent" to us. Pragmatic realism differs from traditional realism, however, in holding that mind is active and dynamic instead of passive and receptive. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's response, "Realism Without Monism or Dualism" {1669}.

1588 Maurice-Denis, Noele. La Pensée française et l'empirisme américain. La Revue Universelle 3 (1 Nov 1920): 362-366.

The war has aided in bringing American thought to France in two ways. It has allowed for the establishment of frequent and facile communication. On the psychological side, it has resulted in a serious simplification of thoughts and desires. When everything is collapsing, one is led to the primordial, and to clear, easy, practical, and simple ideas–the very ideas sought after by American thinkers (though not necessarily true ideas). LF

1589 Moore, A. W. Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism. J Phil 17.19 (9 Sept 1920): 514-519.

Only consciousness of a reflective, logical, and inferential character is instrumental to behavior. Critics usually instead assume that knowing is co-extensive with consciousness. As for values, most values are of a non-instrumental nature, in order that some values may be instruments for their attainment. Instrumentalism does not look to the older "naturalistic" biology, but "a transfigured and glorified biology, loaded with all the conscious and social values" which naturalism omits. Critics suppose that reflection must be "tied to the

past" and isolated from the world of values. When reflective thought resolves value conflicts and permits control, new values are created in the process. JRS

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 17.12 (3 June 1920): 318-319.

1590 Palmer, George H. William James. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 29 (Sept 1920): 29-34. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 27-35.

Reminiscences by a faculty colleague. James always sided with the underdog. His praise of Peirce sprang as much from "pity as from admiration." He rarely spoke at faculty meetings. He attended Palmer's seminar on Hegel and wrote "On Some Hegelisms" (1882) to wash his hands of the whole thing. IKS

1591 Picard, Maurice. The Psychological Basis of Values. J Phil 17.1 (1 Jan 1920): 11-20.

Picard comments on Dewey, "The Objects of Valuation" {1476}, Wendell T. Bush, "Value and Causality" {1470}, and W. M. Urban, "Value and Existence," J Phil 13.17 (17 Aug 1916): 449-465. JRS

Summaries

Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

1592 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*. London: Macmillan, 1920.

Radhakrishnan applies a Hegelian system to critique Leibniz, James Ward, Henri Bergson, pragmatism, pluralism, F. C. S. Schiller, Rudolf Eucken, Bertrand Russell, and personal idealism. He concludes with an examination of the close relationship between absolute idealism and the philosophy of the Upanishads. JRS

Reviews

E. L. Hinman, Phil Rev 29.6 (Nov 1920): 582-586; John E. Turner, J Phil 18.5 (3 March 1921): 129-138.

1593 Rickert, Heinrich. *Die Philosophie des Lebens*. Tübingen: Verlag von Mohr, 1920. 2nd ed., 1922.

1594 Robinson, Daniel Sommer. Reality as a Transient Now. J Phil 17.24 (18 Nov 1920): 645-654.

The "transient now" is espoused by H. B. Alexander, Whitehead, Bergson, Dewey, and James. It is a revived form of Humean subjectivism, and suffers from its absurdities. JRS

1595 Rogers, Arthur K. Some Recent Theories of Consciousness. Mind 29.3 (July 1920): 294-312.

James denied the reality of consciousness, but this denial does not preclude the existence of knowing as a relation between things. Neo-realists are driven to a dualistic interpretation, and any behavioristic account of knowledge, such as the pragmatists', ignores the distinction between having an idea in mind and acting on that idea. JRS

1596 Sabin, Ethel E. Giving up the Ghost. J Phil 17.26 (16 Dec 1920): 701-708.

James led the way towards the scientific understanding of consciousness as a natural interaction between organism and environment. JRS

1597 Sageret, Jules. *La Vague mystique.* Paris: F. Flammarion, 1920.

Chap. 6 discusses "Le Pragmatisme," pp. 107-158. Chap. 7 is "La Philosophie de M. E. Boutroux," pp. 159-168. JRS

1598 Salomon, Michel. William James. In his *Portraits et Paysages* (Paris: Perrin et Cie., 1920), pp. 51-76.

A survey of James's work, including such topics as religion and psychology, his use of introspection, anti-intellectualism, his taste for the ineffable and inexpressible, the self, pluralism, reality and empiricism. James will be remembered as poetic and humoristic. LF

1599 Santayana, George. William James. In *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. Rpt., New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 64-96. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 89-105.

An appreciation of James's thought and character. His excursions into philosophy were like "raids." For him, philosophy had a "Polish constitution," where nothing could pass if one vote was against it. His best known works are "somewhat incidental" and his "best achievement" is *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). IKS

Extended reviews

Dickinson S. Miller {1635}.

1600 Schiller, F. C. S. The Place of Metaphysics. J Phil 17.17 (12 Aug 1920): 455-462.

Schiller replies to John Warbeke's "A Theory of Knowledge Which Foregoes Metaphysics. In Reply to Dr. Schiller" {1610}. JRS

1601 Schiller, F. C. S. Science and Life. Hibbert Journal 19.1 (Oct 1920): 101-111.

Science, like religion and philosophy before it, will also fail to capture and control Life. The reward for unleashing the atom's powers may not be riches, but instead total destruction. JRS

1602 Schiller, F. C. S. Scientific Method in Psychical Research. Psychic Research Quarterly 1.1 (July 1920): 4-16.

1603 Schiller, F. C. S. Truth, Value and Biology. J Phil 17.2 (15 Jan 1920): 36-44.

Schiller responds to Wells's "The Biological Foundations of Belief" {1561}. JRS

Summaries

Henry T. Moore, "Values," Psych Bull 17.8 (Aug 1920): 260-263.

1604 Schiller, F. C. S., Bertrand Russell, H. H. Joachim. The Meaning of 'Meaning'. Mind 29.4 (Oct 1920): 385-414. Russell's contribution, pp. 398-404, is reprinted in *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 9: *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter, 1919-1926* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 88-93.

Part one is by Schiller, pp. 385-414. Meaning cannot be either an inherent property of objects or a static relation between objects, but "an *activity* or *attitude* taken up towards objects by a subject." This voluntaristic understanding of meaning finds it to be universally present, important, and personal. Meanings cannot be fixed in abstraction from their particular uses. Therefore, mental images or sensations cannot compose beliefs, and meanings cannot depend on expressions. To attribute meaning and to attribute value are practically the same thing.

Russell rebuts Schiller's arguments against the derivation of meaning from images, and questions Schiller's claim to know entities which cannot be made into objects of contemplation. Russell concludes with his definition of the meaning of signs. Joachim argues, on pp. 404-414, that on Russell's theory of meaning it is impossible to think at all. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's comments on this symposium in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" {1645}.

1605 Smith, Norman Kemp. The Present Situation in Philosophy. Phil Rev 29.1 (Jan 1920): 1-26.

1606 Swabey, W. Curtis. On Realism. Monist 30.3 (July 1920): 446-459.

Realism exposes the fallacious relativism of pragmatism's theory of truth. It can prove that pragmatism must always presuppose a definite ontology and a realistic epistemology. JRS

1607 Swenson, David F. The Logical Implicates of the Community. J Phil 17.10 (6 May 1920): 253-260.

1608 Vaz Ferreira, Carlos. *Lógica viva.* Montevideo: Talleres gráficos, 1920.

1609 Wahl, Jean. *Les Philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1920. Translated by Fred Rothwell as *The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America* (London: Open Court, 1925).

Wahl's thorough survey of the various pluralisms that have developed in England and America is divided into five books: "Monism in England and America"; "The Formation of Pluralism," which includes discussions of Ménard, Renouvier and Peirce; "William James," which comprises the real focus of the work; "From Personal Idealism to Neo-Realism," which includes discussions of Schiller and (briefly) Dewey; and the last book, in which Wahl takes up the "essential contradictions" of James's position, and summarizes various recent pluralistic theories. This work contains a detailed bibliography, and two appendices on the various definitions and the etymology of "pluralism" respectively. Also of interest is pp. 90-100, a chapter entitled "Pragmatism and Pluralism," and pp. 235-238 on pragmatic realism. LF

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 18.26 (22 Dec 1921): 717-720. Other philosophers are treated solely as anticipators or followers of James's pluralism. Wahl's exposition of James's views is "thorough and accurate" even where he inserts his own objections. JRS

Reviews of the translation

G. T. W. Patrick, Amer J Psych 38.3 (July 1927): 468; F. C. S. Schiller, "American Pragmatism," Spectator 135.13 (26 Sept 1925): 494, 497.

1610 Warbeke, John M. A Theory of Knowledge which Foregoes Metaphysics. In Reply to Dr. Schiller. J Phil 17.5 (26 Feb 1920): 120-125.

Warbeke replies to Schiller's "Methodological Teleology" {1600}. JRS

1611 Wright, Henry W. Rational Self-Interest and the Social Adjustment. Int J Ethics 30.4 (July 1920): 394-403.

1921

1612 Bode, Boyd H. *Fundamentals of Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1921.

1613 Bode, Boyd H. Intelligence and Behavior. J Phil 18.1 (6 Jan 1921): 10-17.

Bode comments on Lovejoy's "Pragmatism as Interactionism" {1586}. JRS

Notes

See Lovejoy's response, "Pragmatism and the New Materialism" {1681}.

1614 Boodin, J. E. Cosmic Evolution. *Proc Arist Soc* 21 (1921): 91-121. Reprinted as chap. 1, "Introductory Survey–Cosmic Evolution" in *Cosmic Evolution* {1799}, pp. 17-46.

1615 Boodin, J. E. The Laws of Social Participation. American Journal of Sociology 27.1 (July 1921): 22-53.

Notes

An abstract of an earlier version of this essay, entitled "Group Participation as the Sociological Principle par Excellance," is at J Phil 17.12 (3 June 1920): 325-326.

1616 Boodin, J. E. Pragmatism. J Phil 18.5 (3 March 1921): 125-127.

An abstract of a paper read at the Oxford Congress of Philosophy, Oxford University, September 24-27, 1920. Pragmatism diverted American philosophy's attention from Germany to England and France. Its definite contributions include a focus on the meaning of propositions, a better psychology of thinking, an attention to scientific method, a search for a test of truth, and an emphasis on the creativity of thought. JRS

1617 Boodin, J. E. The Religion of Mother Earth. Hibbert Journal 19.4 (July 1921): 690-701. Reprinted with revisions as "Finale–Cosmic Religion," chap. 9 of *Cosmic Evolution* {1799}, pp. 456-472.

1618 Boodin, J. E. Sensation, Imagination, and Consciousness. Psych Rev 28.6 (Nov 1921): 425-452. Reprinted with additions as chap. 4, "Sensation, Imagination, and Mind" in *Cosmic Evolution* {1799}, pp. 135-169.

1619 Bosanquet, Bernard. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy.* London: Macmillan, 1921.

William James's "quite extraordinary fantasies" about idealism as "intellectualism" has no "jot or tittle of resemblance to the personalities or conceptions about which he was writing." (p. 102-103) JRS

Notes

See Schiller's "An Idealist *In Extremis*" {1698}.

1620 Brett, George Sidney. *A History of Psychology.* 3 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921.

Vol. 3, *Modern Psychology,* includes discussions of James and Dewey. JRS

1621 Burtt, Edwin A. Present-Day Tendencies in Ethical Theory. Int J Ethics 31.4 (July 1921): 432-438.

1622 Bush, Wendell T. Philosophy in France. J Phil 18.3 (3 Feb 1921): 68-78.

1623 Crawford, John Forsyth. Pragmatism. Article in *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics,* ed. Shailer Mathews and Gerald Birney Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 344.

1624 Dewey, John. Classicism as an Evangel. J Phil 18.24 (24 Nov 1921): 664-666. Reprinted in *MW* 13: 286-288.

1625 Dewey, John. First Introduction. To Scudder Klyce, *Universe* (Winchester, Mass.: S. Klyce, 1921), pp. iii-v. Reprinted in *MW* 13: 412-419.

Klyce wisely observes that even the simplest meaning implies other meanings, which in turn imply other meanings to an indefinite extent. So-called "infinity" words such as "all," "nothing," and "being" are useful in indicating this ineffable indefiniteness. Infinity words are "transcendental, noumenal, a priori, they have emotional, esthetic, or mystical impact but no definite meaning." Positivists err by ignoring this impact; absolutists err by trying to infuse such words with definite meaning. FXR

1626 Hamilton, Clarence H. Idealistic and Pragmatic Interpretations of Religion. Journal of Religion 1.6 (Nov 1921): 616-625.

Dewey's views on religion raise four issues. There are circumstances in which "the problem of a relation to the whole of things" becomes urgent. The idea of God may be independent of traditional idealisms. It is not necessary to always interpret religion "in terms of contemplation, resignation, mystic estheticism." Dewey's faith in the power of intelligence implies "a cosmic ethical tendency." JRS

1627 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. A Plea for a Phenomenology of Meaning. *Proc Arist Soc* 21 (1921): 71-89.

Hoernlé comments on Schiller's and Peirce's theories of meaning. JRS

1628 Jung, Carl G. The Type Problem in Modern Philosophy. Chap. 8 of *Psychologische Typen* (Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1921). Reprinted with slight revisions in volume 6 of his *Gessamelte Werke* (Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1960). Translated by H. Godwin Baynes as *Psychological Types* (London: Kegan Paul; New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923). Revised edition by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 300-321.

Jung discusses James's distinction between tender- and tough-mindedness. James's *Pragmatism* {438} is concerned with intellectual qualities. His categories are too broad and, without much difficulty, one could show that some of them belong to the opposite type as well. IKS

Notes

The Hull edition includes a translation of a 1913 lecture, "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types," pp. 499-509, which also discusses James.

Reviews of the translation

J. R. Kantor, J Phil 20.23 (8 Nov 1923): 636-640.

1629 Kallen, Horace M. America and the Life of Reason. II. J Phil 18.21 (13 Oct 1921): 568-575.

Kallen discusses Santayana's views on James offered in *Character and Opinion in the United States* {1599}. JRS

1630 Kerby-Miller, Sinclair. *The Early Development of Dewey's Logical Theory.* M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1921.

1631 Lewis, C. I. The Structure of Logic and Its Relation to Other Systems. J Phil 18.19 (15 Sept 1921): 505-516. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 371-382.

1632 Maritain, Jacques. La Philosophie américaine et les continuateurs de James. La Revue Universelle 7 (1 Oct 1921): 48-69. Parts reprinted as "William James and His Impetuous Philosophy," in Living Age 311 (12 Nov 1921): 392-396. It was also incorporated into *Reflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924).

James's reputation is greater than the value of his work. He is worth less than the American neo-realists who, at least, do not try to transform all philosophic values through the magic of pragmatism. His pluralism is vague, an emotional idea with little intellectual content, designed to restore the faith of simple souls. IKS

1633 Mead, G. H. Individualism. Article in *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, ed. Shailer Mathews and Gerald Birney Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 222.

Notes

Mead also wrote articles for "Idea," pp. 215-216, "Ideal," p. 216, "Infinity," p. 223, and "Law of Nature, Natural Law," pp. 254-255.

1634 Mecklin, John M. The Philosopher as Social Interpreter. Int J Ethics 31.4 (July 1921): 408-417.

1635 Miller, Dickinson S. Mr. Santayana and William James. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 29 (21 March 1921): 348-364.

Miller reviews Santayana's *Character and Opinion in the United States* {1599}. Miller offers some reminiscences of James and Santayana, but primarily attempts to contrast the two philosophies. Santayana writes about James too patronizingly. IKS

Notes

See Santayana's reply, "Professor Miller and Mr. Santayana" {1642}.

1636 Morgan, William J. "Some Pragmatic Defenses of Religious Beliefs." A Criticism. Open Court 35.10 (Oct 1921): 584-589.

1637 Prall, David W. A Study in the Theory of Value. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 3, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 179-290.

Prall defines value in terms of interest, apart from judgment. Chap. 4, "The Pragmatic Theory of Valuation as Expounded by Dewey," pp. 215-226, argues that the pragmatic theory of value mistakenly identifies the validity of value with the subject's knowledge of value, and paradoxically requires a judgment to create its own subject-matter. JRS

1638 Randall, John H. Jr. Théodore Flournoy. J Phil 18.4 (17 Feb 1921): 110-112.

A notice upon Flournoy's death in 1920, describing his close relationship with William James and pragmatism. JRS

1639 Riley, I. Woodbridge. La Philosophie française en amérique. Rev Phil 91 (1921): 75-107; 91 (1921): 234-271.

Riley studies Bergson's reception in America. In the first part, W. B. Pitkin's "James and Bergson: Or, Who Is Against Intellect?" {867} and H. M. Kallen's *William James and Henri Bergson* {1260} are discussed at some length. In *A Pluralistic Universe* {675} James first announced that a great philosopher had appeared in France. IKS

1640 Russell, Bertrand. *The Analysis of Mind.* London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1921.

James is quoted several times. James's rejection of consciousness is discussed with approval on pp. 22-24, although Russell places only sensations into the "neutral stuff" category, and further on he defends the thesis that the object of perception is inferentially and externally related to the experiences in us. JRS

Extended reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, "Mr. Russell's Psychology" {1699}.

1641 Santayana, George. On My Friendly Critics. J Phil 18.26 (22 Dec 1921): 701-713.

Santayana replies to James's criticism that he separates values from existences, and distances the "practical intellect" from his own naturalistic standpoint. JRS

1642 Santayana, George. Professor Miller and Mr. Santayana. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 30 (Sept 1921): 32-36.

Santayana replies to D. S. Miller's "Mr. Santayana and William James" {1635}. JRS

1643 Schaub, Edward L. The Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 18.16 (4 Aug 1921): 433-441.

Schaub reports on four theses offered by Boyd H. Bode during a discussion of pragmatism and the psychical. JRS

1644 Schiller, F. C. S. Hypothesis. In *Studies in the History and Methods of Science*, ed. Charles Joseph Singer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Rpt., London: William Dawson and Sons, 1955), vol. 2, pp. 414-446.

1645 Schiller, F. C. S. The Meaning of 'Meaning'. Mind 30.2 (April 1921): 185-190.

Schiller debates the issues raised in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" {1604}. JRS

Notes

See C. A. Strong's response, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," Mind 30.3 (July 1921): 313-316; Schiller's reply, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," Mind 30.4 (Oct 1921): 444-447; Strong's reply, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," Mind 31.1 (Jan 1922): 69-70; Schiller's reply, "The Meaning of 'Self'," Mind 31.2 (April 1922): 185-188; and Strong's "Rejoinder," Mind 31.4 (Oct 1922): 486.

1646 Schiller, F. C. S. On Arguing in a Circle. *Proc Arist Soc* 21 (1921): 211-234.

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, J Phil 19.15 (20 July 1922): 414-418.

1647 Schiller, F. C. S. William James. Quarterly Review 236.1 (July 1921): 24-41. Reprinted as "The Letters of William James" in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 74-92. In *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 139-152.

An appreciation of James's personality, in a review of *Letters* {1580} and *Collected Essays* {1579}. Schiller contrasts James with the conventional philosophy professor. Why did not some millionaire free James from the drudgery of the Ph.D. factory? IKS

1648 Schneider, Herbert W. Instrumental Instrumentalism. J Phil 18.5 (3 March 1921): 113-117.

Instrumentalism holds that *good* judgments are instrumental towards the attainment of goals. Not all values are instrumental, and there is no criterion of good goals. JRS

1649 Schneider, Herbert W. John Dewey and His Influence. New Era 2 (1921): 136-140.

1650 Sheldon, W. H. Professor Dewey, The Protagonist of Democracy. J Phil 18.12 (9 June 1921): 309-320.

Sheldon reviews Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* {1572}. Dewey's "gospel of democracy" relies on a distorted, narrow view of science, tries to merely justify the political system of today, not change it, and denies that anything other than growth is a moral end. Dewey's version of democratic impartiality given to all goods, high and low, means a direction against progress: a preference for the "lower, material needs, the judgment of the masses, the standards of the unskilled," and a stimulus toward "extreme radicalism." Progress is desirable *if* accompanied by increasing stability. JRS

Notes

See G. A. Tawney and E. L. Talbert's response, "Democracy and Morals" {1704}.

1651 Shoemaker, Robert V. A Truce of Philosophies. Open Court 35.1 (Jan 1921): 54-59.

On pragmatic criteria, the past requires materialism, the present needs idealism, and the future points to pantheism. JRS

1652 Sorel, Georges. *De l'Utilité du pragmatisme.* Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1921. 2nd ed., 1928.

This work is a defense of pragmatism, and in particular of its way of pursing truth, as "one of the essential elements of modern thought." (p. 4) Pragmatism, Sorel holds, must be taught pragmatically, rather than by way of treatise or dogma: "it is to familiarize oneself with ways of governing the mind." (p. 6) Sorel's aim is to discuss the current philosophical problems pragmatically to show the answers it affords, and the profits that modern thinking can reap from it. There are six chapters: "From Kant to William James," which includes discussions of truth, and objections to pragmatism concerning subjectivity, along with James's response; "On the Origin of Truth"; "Observations on Greek Science"; "Experience in Modern Physics"; "Critique of 'Creative Evolution'"; and "Renan and the Theology of Saint-Sulpice." LF

Notes

See Richard Humphrey, *Georges Sorel: Prophet without Honor* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), especially chap. 5, "Pragmatism and a Pluralist World," pp. 117-142.

1653 Spirito, Ugo. *Il Pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea: saggio critico con appendice bibliografica.* Florence: Vallecchi, 1921.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 30.3 (July 1921): 362-363.

1654 Taeusch, C. F. The Fate of Pragmatism. J Phil 18.16 (4 Aug 1921): 433-441.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in March 1921.

1655 Titchener, Edward B. Functional Psychology and the Psychology of the Act. I. Amer J Psych 32.4 (Oct 1921): 519-542.

1656 Unna, Sarah. A Conception of Philosophy. J Phil 18.2 (20 Jan 1921): 29-41.

1657 Watson, Arthur Clinton. James, William. Article in *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, ed. Shailer Mathews and Gerald Birney Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 232.

1658 Wobbermin, Georg. *Das Wesen der Religion.* Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1921. 2nd ed., 1925. Translated by Theophil Menzel and Daniel S. Robinson as *The Nature of Religion* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1933).

1922

1659 Aliotta, Antonio. *Relativismo e idealismo.* Naples: Perrella, 1922.

1660 Barron, Joseph T. Professor Dewey and Truth. Catholic World 116 (Nov 1922): 212-221.

Pragmatism's creed is "action for action's sake and change at all hazards." It cannot evade the charge of inconsistency. JRS

Notes

See his "Contributions of the New Scholasticism to Modern Philosophy in the Field of Epitemology," in *Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1926) pp. 43-49.

1661 Berthelot, René. *Un Romantisme utilitaire: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste.* Vol. 3. *Le Pragmatisme religieux chez William James et chez les catholiques modernistes.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922.

The first part concerns the definition and origins of James's pragmatism, mentioning Swedenborg, Carlyle, and Renouvier, and Fouillée. Chap. 2 describes the different senses of "pragmatism" in James. Chap. 3 is an account of James's religious pragmaism. In chapters 4 and 5, Berthelot critiques the positions outlined in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Of interest in the second part is chapters 4 and 7 on Tyrrell, and §5 of chap. 4 on Le Roy. The conclusion includes a section on the "general characteristics of the pragmatist movement" where Berthelot reiterates his view that pragmatism is "a mélange... of Romantic and Utilitarian ideas." The final section is on the conflict between the "Cartesian Spirit and the Romantic Spirit in Modern Philosophy." LF

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 32.1 (Jan 1923): 108.

Notes

See also vol. 1 {909} and vol. 2 {1145}.

1662 Bode, Boyd H. Critical Realism. J Phil 19.3 (2 Feb 1922): 68-78.

1663 Bradley, F. H. *The Principles of Logic.* 2nd revised ed., with additional notes and terminal essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922.

The first edition was published in 1883; the 2nd edition's supplementary material includes comments and an essay on pragmatism. In vol. 1, p. 39, note 19 states that "the unjust neglect of Bain by Pragmatists" has "cost them dear." In vol. 2, p. 516, note 1, Bradley denies that James was an early influence on him, and rejects Schiller's claims to that effect. Pp. 517-518, note 13, clarifies his conceptions of "practical" and "ideal" activity. On p. 578, note 35 denies, in rebuttal to Schiller's assertion, that Bradley claimed to anticipate Sidgwick's position on the ambiguity of middle terms. Terminal essay 12, "On Theoretical and Practical Activity," pp. 713-728, argues that all theoretical activity is also practical, but denies that the essence of judgment is to refer to the future. Bradley enumerates the extent of his agreement, and his disagreement, with pragmatic tenets expressed in *Creative Intelligence* {1420}. JRS

1664 Conger, George P. The Implicit Duality of Thinking. J Phil 19.9 (27 April 1922): 225-238.

1665 Dewey, John. An Analysis of Reflective Thought. J Phil 19.2 (19 Jan 1922): 29-38. Reprinted in *MW* 13: 61-71.

Dewey replies to Buermeyer's "Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought" {1566}. Beurmeyer suggests that the phases of inquiry, whereby hypotheses are formed and tested to resolve problems, cannot be dissolved into separate steps. From a psychological standpoint, this is true, for the phases can appear in different orders, or even fuse in a single unified experience. From the logical standpoint, it is vital to distinguish the inductive and deductive functions of inquiry. Traditional logic regards induction as the inference from particulars to generals, deduction as the reverse inference, and holds that all meanings are determined in advance. Instrumentalism views induction as the selection of facts to frame a successful hypothesis which results in a new cognitive meaning, and deduction as the discernment of inferences among previously formed reflective meanings. FXR

1666 Dewey, John. Le Développement du pragmatisme américain. Rev Méta 29.4 (Oct-Dec 1922): 411-430. Reprinted as "The Development of American Pragmatism" in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), pp. 353-377. *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 13-35. *Philosophy of JD I*, pp. 41-57. *LW* 2: 3-21.

This essay is a rare attempt by Dewey to compose an overview of American pragmatism for a European audience. In devising the pragmatic method, Peirce had the modest aim of establishing a link between cognitive meaning and purposive action, by restricting the significance of a word to its conceivable bearing on the conduct of life. He also envisioned a universal meaning applicable to human conduct in all situations. James both expanded the pragmatic method, embracing a theory of truth as well as meaning, and restricted it, by stressing particular consequences at the expense of universal law. He repudiated the traditional quest for fixed principles or sense-certainties:

at best these are tools or data whose "cash-value" is attained by the consequences they produce. Since human reason can control the future, nature is open and to some degree plastic. Nonetheless, James stressed consequences so heavily that at times he underestimates the hard work necessary to achieve them.

Unlike Peirce, James was a humanist rather than a logician. Dewey's instrumentalism thus hopes to renew Peirce's effort to establish "universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic" by examining the function of thought in "the experimental determination of future consequences." (p. 14) To this end, instrumentalism draws on two key predecessors: 1) a biological orientation towards means and ends, based on organism-environment adjustments instead of introspective states of consciousness, and 2) a neo-Hegelian grasp of the close connection between thought and reality. Unlike neo-Hegelianism, which claims that thought constitutes reality, instrumentalism claims that thought is integral to human efforts to reconstitute natural things that are not themselves comprised of thought. FXR

Reviews

Theodore De Laguna, J Phil 20.21 (11 Oct 1923): 582-586.

1667 Dewey, John. *Human Nature and Conduct.* New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922. Reprinted with a new Foreword [*MW* 14: 228-230], New York: Modern Library, 1930. *MW* 14.

Subtitled "An Introduction to Social Psychology," this book is both a philosophical treatise on human nature and a contribution to social and educational theory. It argues that an account of human behavior requires the examination of three prominent traits: habit, impulse, and intelligence. Unlike other animals, humans are born with few instincts necessary for survival. While energetic by nature, an infant's movements are ineffectual. Habit is learned behavior that channels this energy to satisfy basic needs. Because many of these needs are imposed by the world, habit is no mere social contrivance; yet the "social" is an ineliminable feature of the development of character, which denotes the infusion of encultured patterns of response. The habitual is a sign of rest or security. When routine is blocked or ineffectual, stress and conflict arise, producing defensive impulses. The infant learns to channel these impulses into socially accepted responses, forming new habits.

Engrained rules for action ultimately become moral laws. Virtue and vice are habituated patterns of response, not free rational choices. When such patterns are too restrictive, innovation is stifled. Intelligence gets confined to seeking ordained responses, and habits become stultified, inflexible, and ineffective against unexpected problems. Intelligence is liberated when innovation, ingenuity, and creativity are part of a habituated pattern. Habit is then not merely a way of acting, but also a way of thinking, and of evaluating and acting on possibilities. Deliberation is the intelligent analysis of possible means and ends. Choice is the direction of energies into channels identified by deliberation. As the product of multiple influences, deliberate choice is neither fixated on the purely rational contemplation of ideal laws, nor enslaved by a single trait such as the pursuit of pleasure. Freedom, similarly, is not the release from habit, but the ability to maximize intelligence in the successful redirection of habit. FXR

Reviews

C. E. Ayres, J Phil 19.17 (17 Aug 1922): 469-475. Dewey's behavioristic work in metaphysics and educational theory is here extended to social psychology. It is only a preliminary statement, not a fully developed system. FXR

G. C. Field, Mind 32.1 (Jan 1923): 79-86. Although it is obvious that social factors have some effect on the individual's character development, Dewey breeds confusion by blurring the distinction between "self" and "environment." FXR

Horace M. Kallen, New Republic 30 (24 May 1922): 379-382. Dewey's book is a "devastating dissolution" of the "ineffables" of traditional moral philosophy. By placing human nature in a natural and cultural setting, he links morality to social efficacy. FXR

Harry T. Costello, "A Teacher of Teachers," Yale Review n.s. 12.2 (Jan 1923): 407-410; Victor S. Yarros, Open Court 36 (1922): 586-593.

Notes

See James Seth, "Pragmatist and Idealistic Ethics" {1741}, and George Adams, "Activity and Objects in Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*" {1709}.

1668 Dewey, John. Knowledge and Speech Reaction. J Phil 19.21 (12 Oct 1922): 561-570. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 453-462. *MW* 13: 29-39.

1669 Dewey, John. Realism Without Monism or Dualism. J Phil 19.12 (8 June 1922): 309-317; 19.13 (22 June 1922): 351-361. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 123-141. *MW* 13: 40-60.

Dewey replies to Lovejoy's "Pragmatism versus the Pragmatist" {1587}. In holding that the *meaning* of any judgment concerns only the "past as such," Lovejoy forgets that any verification of a past fact requires a present hypothesis testable in the future. An "object" is therefore a "past event in its connection with present and future effects and consequences." In other words, an object is not an "'external something' to which the judgment corresponds, but the terminal stage of the inquiry itself." (p. 45) Lovejoy also accuses pragmatism of focusing only on the "immediate." To be sure, experience as it is directly had is *immediate*, but knowledge is always *mediated* by the reflection and inference required to frame and test hypotheses. Such mediation also carries over into, and thus affects the quality of, the restored immediate experience.

Arthur K. Rogers has suggested that pragmatism restricts itself to "the advance of knowledge in the concrete," whereas his own critical realism probes the deeper question of how the mind confronts "the true nature of the world." (p. 58) Actually, the problem is the same for both sides, but Rogers misses the crucial fact that any attempt to say what the world *is* requires cognizance of *how* "knowledge is secured and furthered." Pragmatism is neither a monistic or direct realism, where objects are immediately known just as they are, nor a dualistic or critical realism, where objects are indirectly represented by minds. Instead, pragmatism's realism is *pluralistic*: depending on the inquiry at hand, a given real can stand for an indefinite number of other reals. FXR

1670 Dewey, John. Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thought. *MW* 13: 349-395.

This syllabus was written and distributed for use by his class in "Philosophy 191-192" at Columbia University, 1922-23. Dewey's course syllabi are often blunt and candid, two qualities sometimes lacking in his more "refined" publications. This syllabus is especially noteworthy for anticipating ideas developed in later books. To counter the narrow subjectivism of British empiricism, "experience" must be reconstructed broadly as the "unity or totality" from which objects and subjects may be distinguished for specific purposes. As

such, experience is no less that "the wide universe as manifesting in the careers and fortunes of human beings." (p. 351) But doesn't this definition embrace virtually everything, making it philosophically useless? This objection would have merit if experience is taken as a "kind of universal homogenous stuff." But our use of "experience" is methodological: practices that achieve successful consequences become entrenched meanings. "Means-consequences" is thus the basic intellectual category underlying the distinction of subjects and objects in the vast historical sweep of diverse cultural experiences. (p. 360)

Previous philosophies latched onto a part of this full sense of experience and elevated it to the status of the "really real." Primitive experience rewarded social order as the basis of all order, with "nature outside as wild and irregular." The Greeks reversed this, seeking an objective norm or order in nature not found in fractious political life. Modern philosophy began with an incongruous mixture of the Christian soul and scientific efficient causation. Thoughts and perceptions were regarded as purely subjective, though causally related to external reality. But the realization that thought has limited control over perception, combined with the holdover belief that knowledge is the immediate grasp of the "really real," generated the modern problem of knowledge and the futile realistic and idealistic attempts to solve it. The restoration of experience to its full integrity requires supplementing the physical model with a functional sense that "gets us behind the ordinary distinction of organism and environment." (p. 377) Hence, while it is permissible to speak of physical or existential factors that bring about consequences, we must also recognize the primacy of the moving function that brings hypotheses (means-meanings) into ends, and a sense of "reference" that is logical rather than physical. FXR

1671 Dewey, John. Valuation and Experimental Knowledge. Phil Rev 31.4 (July 1922): 325-351. Reprinted in *MW* 13: 3-28.

1672 Hansen, Valdemar. William James og hans Breve. Nordisk Tidskrift for Vetenskap, Konst Och Industri 45 (1922): 176-184.

1673 Hook, Sidney. A Philosophical Dialogue. Open Court 36.10 (Oct 1922): 621-626.

"Pragmaticus" defends against "Universalus" (a neo-realist) the thesis that philosophy must serve social thought. JRS

1674 Hume, James Gibson. Evolution and Personality. In *Philosophical Essays Presented to John Watson* (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Press, 1922. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 298-330.

Evolutionary naturalism at every turn "runs into bankruptcy and failure." James overthrows naturalism, approaching a constructive idealism. (p. 329) Christianity's teachings, explaining human personality, passes James's "practical test." JRS

1675 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Meine Wege und Ziele. In *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, ed. R. Schmidt, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1922), pp. 53-98.

1676 Kallen, Horace M. La Méthode de l'intuition et la méthode pragmatiste. Rev Méta 29.1 (Jan-March 1922): 35-62.

For Bergson, ultimate reality is apprehended directly. The knower and the known are identified, and conceptual knowledge deals with illusion, not reality. Bergson remains close to traditional philosophy. James wanted to make philosophy scientific, and viewed conceptual knowledge instrumentally, as a means of leading to contact with objects. IKS

1677 Kanovitch, Abraham. Bergson and William James. In *The Will To Beauty* (New York: Gold Rose Printing Co., 1922. Rpt., New York: Henry Bee, 1923), pp. 117-121.

James is a mediocrity who "popularizes and cheapens" in his "obnoxious conversational style." Pragmatism gives permission to "believe in any ideal," but no person having emotion needs permission, since we are "helpless against the human emotions." IKS

1678 Leroux, Emmanuel. *Le Pragmatisme américain et anglais: Étude historique et critique.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922.

The first part surveys the formation and development of pragmatism, focusing on Peirce, James and Dewey. The second part, "The Value of Pragmatism," takes up two problems with pragmatism: the pragmatic criterion of verification, and the pragmatic definition of truth. Leroux argues that this criterion is not new, but a "new name for an old way of thinking," and that pragmatism's originality is to be found primarily in its "penetrating psychology." On the second problem, Leroux argues that all definitions of truth must transcend experience. LF

Notes

Leroux also published a *Bibliographie méthodique du pragmatisme, américaine, anglais et italien* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922. Rpt., New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), which is an extended bibliography on the writings of nearly all the pragmatists (American, English, Italian, French, and German) and their followers, critical discussions of pragmatism, and writings on the forerunners to pragmatism (in various languages). This bibliography was combined with *Le Pragmatisme américain et anglais* to form the one-volume *Le Pragmatisme américaine et anglais: Étude historique et critique, suivie d'une bibliographie méthodique* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923).

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 21.7 (27 March 1924): 184-191. Though Schneider believes that the author has "produced by far the most scholarly work on Pragmatism which has yet appeared," he critiques both of Leroux's conclusions. LF

Howard V. Knox, Mind 33 (1924): 198-202; William K. Wright, Phil Rev 33 (1924): 607-612.

1679 Lewis, C. I. La Logique de la méthode mathématique. Rev Méta 29.4 (Oct-Dec 1922): 455-474.

1680 Lewis, C. I. Review of John Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability.* Phil Rev 31.2 (March 1922): 180-186.

1681 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pragmatism and the New Materialism. J Phil 19.1 (5 Jan 1922): 5-15. Reprinted in *The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 219-235.

Lovejoy answers B. H. Bode's "Intelligence and Behavior" {1613}. Pragmatism's alliance with behaviorism and neo-realism contradicts its view that intelligence involves plans of action, as plans represent a future state not yet part of the material world. Bode's replies are irrelevant; his conclusion is a confession of psychophysical dualism. JRS

Notes

See L. K. Frank's comments, "The Locus of Experience," J Phil 20.12 (7 June 1923): 327-329, and G. A. Tawney's "A Metaphysician's *Petitio*" {1703}.

1682 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Time, Meaning, and Transcendence. J Phil 19.19 (14 Sept 1922): 505-515; 19.20 (28 Sept 1922): 533-541. Part one is reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 142-152. *MW* 15: 349-370.

Lovejoy replies to Dewey's "Realism Without Monism or Dualism" {1669}. Dewey's use of the word "object" trades on an unconscious pun that fails to distinguish a future "objective of inquiry" from the past "real object" that is the causal source of both inquiry and its "objectives." FXR

1683 MacEachran, John M. Some Present-Day Tendencies in Philosophy. In *Philosophical Essays Presented to John Watson* (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Press, 1922. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 275-297.

1684 McGilvary, Evander B. James, Bergson, and Determinism, *University of California Publications*, Modern Philology Section, vol. 11: *The Charles Mills Gayley Anniversary Papers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922), pp. 23-30.

Both James and Bergson denounce determinism, but in relation to the other, each is a determinist. For James, indeterminism is the doctrine that out of many possibilities only a few are selected by chance to be actualized. For Bergson, things could not have been otherwise, but there is indeterminism, since the relation between antecedent and consequent cannot be expressed by a law. Both agree that the future is not completely calculable. IKS

1685 McNutt, Walter S. *Is the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge Compatible with Serious Religious Faith?* Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1922.

1686 Mead, G. H. A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Signal. J Phil 19.6 (16 March 1922): 157-163. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 240-247.

Objects in immediate experience exist where organisms affect the environment, and some, including "images," exist only for specific individuals. The self arises as an individual "becomes a social object in experience to himself." The symbol acquires universal meaning when the individual assumes the attitude of the "generalized other" as does the group. Signification has two aspects: a reference to a thing, and a reference to a response (denotation/name and connotation/concept). Consciousness as "awareness" is the result in experience of "that inner conversation in which objects as stimuli are both separated from and related to their responses." Mind "lies in a field of conduct between a specific individual and the environment" where the individual can make use of symbolic gestures. JRS

Summaries

T. R. Garth, Psych Bull 19.7 (July 1922): 380.

1687 Moore, A. W. Some Logical Aspects of Critical Realism. J Phil 19.22 (26 Oct 1922): 589-596.

1688 More, Paul Elmer. Religion and Social Discontent. *In Christianity and Problems of Today* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), pp. 75-106. Reprinted in *On Being Human* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), pp. 117-143.

Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* {1572} naively proclaims that religion was devised to maintain the status of the higher classes. The naturalist's notion of progress is really a mask for "greed and animal rapacity." JRS

1689 Munro, Thomas. The Verification of Standards of Value. J Phil 19.11 (25 May 1922): 294-301.

1690 Nichols, Herbert. The Cosmology of William James. J Phil 19.25 (7 Dec 1922): 673-683.

James's "vision of the universe" was clouded by his rationalism. While he wanted to be an empiricist, he could not escape the rationalism which permeated his time. IKS

1691 Patrick, G. T. W. The Emergent Theory of Mind. J Phil 19.26 (21 Dec 1922): 701-708.

1692 Picard, Maurice. Value and Worth. J Phil 19.18 (31 Aug 1922): 477-489.

Notes

See David W. Prall, "In Defense of a *Worthless* Theory of Value" {1735}.

1693 Pratt, James B. *Matter and Spirit: A Study of Mind and Body in their Relation to the Spiritual Life.* New York: Macmillan, 1922.

Reviews

David F. Swenson, J Phil 21.12 (5 June 1924): 326-331. Pragmatism is revealed to be an ineffective attempt to deny any mind-body problem. JRS

1694 Rasmussen, Carl. Some Reactions to Dewey's Philosophy. Personalist 3.3 (July 1922): 171-182.

1695 Reymond, Arnold. Le Pragmatisme religieux. Revue de théologie et de philosophie 10 (1922).

1696 Rogers, Arthur K. Pragmatism. Chap. 7 of *English and American Philosophy Since 1800* (New York: Macmillan, 1922. Rpt., New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970), pp. 359-410.

James's insights cannot be combined into a system. Rogers makes brief critical comments about pragmatism as a method, the will to believe, James's demand for an open universe, and James's conception of knowledge. IKS

Reviews

Albert Balz, J Phil 20.3 (1 Feb 1923): 76-79.

1697 Russell, Bertrand. Dr. Schiller's Analysis of *The Analysis of Mind.* J Phil 19.24 (23 Nov 1922): 645-651. Reprinted in *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 9: *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter 1919-1926* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983), pp. 39-44.

Russell replies to F. C. S. Schiller's "Mr. Russell's Psychology" {1699}. Russell's battle cry is indeed "back to the eighteenth century." It is the heart's inspirations, leading to the "will to believe," which bring atrocities, war, and starvation. Our self-perceptions are usually faulty, necessitating external observers; at any rate, beyond correlations of bodily movements and images, no "activity" of which Schiller speaks can be recognized. Many philosophers committed the "psychologist's fallacy" before James's time, but since then, too many like Schiller are mired in the opposite fallacy, absurdly supposing that "if a savage, a baby, or a monkey has an experience which he or it does not discriminate into related parts, then the experience in question does not consist of related parts." An obsession with "growth and progress" will prevent a genuine science of psychology. It surprising to see Schiller defend the soul, despite James's influential repudiation. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "Analysis and Self-Analysis" {1739}.

1698 Schiller, F. C. S. An Idealist *In Extremis.* Mind 31.2 (April 1922): 144-153.

Schiller comments on Bosanquet's *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* {1619}. Bosanquet condemns any philosophical consort with the reality of time or change, but he relies on the fallacious ontological argument. The finite mind has every right to respond to the Absolute's denial of finite realities with a denial of the Absolute. How can an unchanging reality have any relation to changing elements? The solution is to admit the reality of changing "accidents" and reject "substance." JRS

1699 Schiller, F. C. S. Mr. Russell's Psychology. J Phil 19.11 (25 May 1922): 281-292. Reprinted in *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 9: *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter, 1919-1926* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983), pp. 488-497.

A review of Bertrand Russell's *The Analysis of Mind* {1640}. Schiller agrees with Russell's negative evaluation of behaviorism, but deplores Russell's Humean methodology of "abstract analysis in search of the 'simple' and elemental, conducted from the standpoint of an extraneous observer." JRS

Notes

See Russell's reply, "Dr. Schiller's Analysis of *The Analysis of Mind*" {1697}.

1700 Schiller, F. C. S. Novelty. *Proc Arist Soc* 22 (1922): 1-22. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 214-234.

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, J Phil 20.22 (25 Oct 1923): 613-614.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 18.24 (24 Nov 1921): 671-672.

1701 Schiller, F. C. S., R. G. Collingwood, A. E. Taylor. Are History and Science Different Kinds of Knowledge? Mind 31.4 (Oct 1922): 443-466.

Schiller's contribution to this symposium is part three, pp. 459-446. Science aims at prediction and control, with the help of history's ability to relate the past to the present. "The ultimate aim of both, however, is to minister to our need of controlling a reality that kills us if we don't." JRS

1702 Smith, Thomas Vernor. Dewey's Theory of Value. Monist 32.3 (July 1922): 339-354.

Resting on an analysis of experience into valuable means and invaluable ends, Dewey's ethics is concerned with the reconstruction of values within experience. To judge value is to create value; to the idealist and realist this doctrine is a corruptive subjectivism. Dewey avoids this charge by rejecting its basis: the false notion that there exists some value standard independent of the work of reflective intelligence. Unlike Bradley's inability to find value (or reality) in experience, Dewey finds it everywhere. Like Bradley's Absolute, Dewey's "immediate situation" enjoys the relief from thought in emotional satisfaction. His theory's greatest problem is whether *all* experience is suffused with judgment, or, more likely, one always experiences more than what one is thinking about. JRS

1703 Tawney, G. A. A Metaphysician's *Petitio*. J Phil 19.15 (20 July 1922): 407-414.

Tawney comments on Lovejoy's "Pragmatism and the New Materialism" {1681}. JRS

1704 Tawney, Guy A., and E. L. Talbert. Democracy and Morals. J Phil 19.6 (16 March 1922): 141-146.

Tawney and Talbert respond to Morris Cohen's "On American Philosophy. III. John Dewey and the Chicago School" {1568}, and to W. H. Sheldon's "Professor Dewey, The Protagonist of Democracy" {1650}. JRS

1705 Wahl, Jean. William James d'après sa correspondence. Rev Phil 93.5-6 (May-June 1922): 381-416; 94.3-4 (Sept-Oct 1922): 298-347. Reprinted in *Vers le concret: Études d'histoire de la philosophie contemporaine* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932).

A biographical study based on *The Letters of William James* {1580}. IKS

Reviews of *Vers le concret*

Charles W. Morris, J Phil 30.26 (21 Dec 1933): 714-716.

1706 Wells, Wesley Raymond. The Fallacy of Exclusive Scientific Methodology. Monist 32.3 (July 1922): 471-480.

1707 Yarros, Victor S. Social Ideals and Human Nature. Open Court 36 (1922): 586-593.

1708 Abbagnano, Nicola. *Le sorgenti irrazionale del pensiero.* Genova: Francesco Perrella, 1923.

Abbagnano traces the history of the correspondence theory of truth and gives an exposition and criticism of nine current theories, including a chapter on pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

Morris R. Cohen, J Phil 21.20 (25 Sept 1924): 554-556. Abbagnano's treatment of pragmatism is "essentially unsympathetic." JRS

1709 Adams, George P. Activity and Objects in Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct.* J Phil 20.22 (25 Oct 1923): 596-603.

The "naturalistic" ethics of *Human Nature and Conduct* {1667} proposes that scientific methods should be used to solve all moral problems. However, two different notions of the relationship between activities and the environment are operating. Does the meaning of an act depend entirely on some objective situation, or, as the logic of Dewey's ethics seems to demand, does the meaning of the objective situation entirely depend on the organism's act? The significance of an act cannot lie entirely within the activity itself, as even Dewey must admit. The enveloping world consists of objectively valuable situations and structures, and the pursuit of control presupposes ethical knowledge: the contemplative acceptance of their fixed and universal nature. JRS

1710 Adams, George P. The Nature and Habitat of Mind. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 4, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 47-73.

1711 Ayres, Clarence Edwin. John Dewey: Naturalist. New Republic 34 (1923): 158-160.

1712 Bush, Wendell T. The Background of Instrumentalism. J Phil 20.26 (20 Dec 1923): 701-714.

The parts of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* {1359} concerning the history of philosophy expose the pathology of the disease called epistemology. Reconstruction is thus the calling of philosophy to its real task, the improvement of our social and political life, and the following of the Socratic maxim, "wisdom is virtue." The *Essays* might better have been titled, "Problems Connected with the Organon of Progressive Inquiry." JRS

1713 Case, Mary Sophia. The Aim of Philosophy. J Phil 20.11 (24 May 1923): 300.

Case responds to John Dewey's "Tradition, Metaphysics, and Morals" {1721}. JRS

1714 Columbia Associates in Philosophy. *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923.

The authors acknowledge their debt to Dewey's *How We Think* {792} and summarize his analysis of the act of thought in the "Introduction–What Reflective Thinking Means." The other chapters are "Diagnosis: Ancient Egypt and the Massachusetts General Hospital–Observation; Classification; Definition," "The Development of Hypothesis in Astronomy," "The Methods of Experimental Science: The Discovery of Causal Relations

in Biology," "Deductive Elaboration and the Relation of Implication in Mathematics," "The Function of Explanation in Physics," "Evolution as a Principle of Explanation," "How Reflective Thought Deals with the Past, as Illustrated by the Criticism of the Pentateuch," "Reflective Thought in the Field of Values," "Measurements for Use in Social Decisions," "Reflective Thinking in Law," "Reflective Thought in the Realm of Ethics," and "Summary." JRS

Reviews

Marten ten Hoor, J Phil 21.9 (24 April 1924): 236-241; Florence B. Woolsey, Amer J Psych 37.2 (April 1926): 301-302.

1715 Conger, George P. A Critique of Some Idealistic Evaluations of Values. J Phil 20.11 (24 May 1923): 290-299.

1716 Delattre, Floris. William James Bergsonian. Revue Anglo-Americaine 1 (Oct 1923): 1-24, 1 (Dec 1923): 35-144. Reprinted, Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1924.

James and Bergson were participants in the modern revolt against rationalism. They rejected scientific determinism, insisted on the primacy of consciousness, and tried to make psychology an empirical science. Later, they became brothers pursuing the same path. In Bergson, James found a firm foundation for his personal convictions. IKS

Notes

Some correspondence from Bergson to Delattre has been published. See "Lettre à Floris Delattre: 23 ou 24 août 1923," Revue Anglo-Américaine 13.5 (June 1936): 392-393 [*Ecrits et Paroles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 3, pp. 560-561; *Mélanges* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 1417-1418].

1717 Dewey, John. Ethics and International Relations. Foreign Affairs 1 (15 March 1923): 85-95. Reprinted in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 804-814. *MW* 15: 53-64.

1718 Dewey, John. Individuality in Education. General Science Quarterly 7 (March 1923): 157-166. Reprinted in *MW* 15: 170-179.

1719 Dewey, John. Review of George Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. New Republic 35 (8 Aug 1923): 294-296. Reprinted in *MW* 15: 219-222.

1720 Dewey, John. Social Purposes in Education. General Science Quarterly 7 (Jan 1923): 79-91. Reprinted in *MW* 15: 158-169.

1721 Dewey, John. Tradition, Metaphysics, and Morals. J Phil 20.7 (29 March 1923): 187-192. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 331-336. *MW* 15: 14-19.

Dewey replies to D. S. Robinson's "The Chief Types of Motivation to Philosophical Reflection," J Phil 20.2 (17 Jan 1923): 29-41 [*MW* 15: 323-337]. Robinson says that pragmatism converts philosophy into sociological and moral discourse, while discounting its "traditional" problems. But his own claim that "knowledge for its own sake" is the

only worthy motive proves that knowledge cannot be severed from values. Besides, such "problems" are recent psychological and epistemological puzzles of the last two centuries. By removing these puzzles, we may recover the profound issues of philosophy. FXR

Notes

See Mary Sophia Case's response to Dewey, "The Aim of Philosophy" {1713}.

1722 Dewey, John. Values, Liking, and Thought. J Phil 20.23 (8 Nov 1923): 617-622. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 615-620. *MW* 15: 20-26.

Dewey responds to Prall's "In Defense of a *Worthless* Theory of Value" {1735}. JRS

1723 Ellis, Havelock. *The Dance of Life.* New York: The Book League of America, 1923.

In the chapter "The Art of Religion," Ellis finds that the pragmatist's efforts to reconcile science and religion "come to grief because he has not realized that the walls of the spiritual world can only be scaled with much expenditure of treasure, not without blood and sweat, that we cannot glide luxuriously to Heaven in his motor-car." (p. 221) JRS

1724 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. *His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith of Our Fathers and the Work of Our Mothers.* New York: Century, 1923. Reprinted, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion, 1976.

Notes

See also Gilman, *Women and Economics* (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1898); *The Man-Made World; or, Our Androcentric Culture* (New York: Charlton, 1911); *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935).

1725 Lamprecht, Stirling P. A Note on Professor Dewey's Theory of Knowledge. J Phil 20.18 (30 Aug 1923): 488-494. Reprinted in *MW* 15: 371-377.

Lamprecht responds to Dewey's "Realism Without Monism or Dualism" {1669}. Dewey restricts knowledge to knowing-processes directed at the future. He should widen this to include both what is known and knowing-processes which look to the past. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Some Comments on Philosophical Discussion" {1756}.

1726 Leighton, Joseph A. The Field of Philosophy. 2nd ed., New York: D. Appleton, 1923.

This edition adds material on James and Dewey to the first (1920) edition. JRS

Reviews

Brand Blanshard, J Phil 21.13 (19 June 1924): 361-362.

1727 Lewis, C. I. Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World. J Phil 20.6 (15 March 1923): 141-151. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 383-393.

Any conceivable world is a system of mutually consistent facts, but not every system is a world. The real world is "*always merely one of many which must be viewed as equally possible.*" Any possible world must contain mutually independent parts, though all facts of a world must be determined by other facts of it. This pluralism is logically preferable to a monism which identifies the necessary with the actual. JRS

1728 Lewis, C. I. A Pragmatic Conception of the *A Priori*. J Phil 20.7 (29 March 1923): 169-177. Reprinted in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 286-294. *Collected Papers*, pp. 231-239.

The *a priori* is a contingent stipulation which does not prescribe experience. The laws of logic are accordingly just formal, legislative, and pragmatic: choice among possible logics rests on "conformity to human bent and intellectual convenience." Science uses the *a priori* for defining classifications, devising categorical tests, and giving criteria for the real. Experience cannot prove any *a priori* law false, but if experience is not satisfactorily explainable, a law or category may be altered or abandoned. The *a priori* can be maintained despite any experience, while the *a posteriori* might be proven false. Pragmatism recognizes an *a priori* which is "malleable to our purpose and responsive to our need" and a factual, independent, and unalterable element to experience. JRS

Notes

For a report on a reading of this paper see "The Twenty-Second Meeting of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 20.3 (1 Feb 1923): 68-76.

1729 Lewis, C. I. Review of D. Nys, *La Notion d'espace*. J Phil 20.10 (10 May 1923): 277-278.

1730 Lewkowitz, Albert. Religiose Erfahrung: Wundt, James, Otto, Scholz. Monatsschrift fur Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 67 (April-June 1923): 81-110.

If Wundt studies religion by investigating groups, James tries to base religious psychology upon the experiences of individuals. James does not study primitive tribes, but the experiences of religious geniuses. IKS

1731 Mead, G. H. Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences. Int J Ethics 33.3 (April 1923): 229-247. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 248-266.

Mechanistic science, dealing with relations between past facts, is compatible with the teleological moral world, which deals with future ends. Science can assist with problems of ends as well as means, by insisting that we consider all the factors involved in conduct, such as institutions, and social habits and customs. JRS

1732 Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards. C. S. Peirce. Section 6 of Appendix D in *The Meaning of Meaning* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923), pp. 279-290. 2nd ed., 1926; 3rd ed., 1930; 8th ed., 1946.

Reviews

John Dewey, New Republic 39 (11 June 1924): 77-78 [*MW* 15: 223-225].

1733 Otto, Max C. Pragmatism and the Concept of Wholeness. J Phil 20.12 (7 June 1923): 309-311.

Otto comments on R. F. A. Hoernlé's *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics* {1578}. JRS

1734 Peirce, C. S. *Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays by the Late Charles S. Peirce, the Founder of Pragmatism.* Morris R. Cohen, ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1923. Reprinted, New York: George Braziller, 1956.

Part One contains "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878), "The Doctrine of Chances" (1878), "The Probability of Induction" (1878), "The Order of Nature" (1878), and "Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis" (1878). Part Two contains "The Architecture of Theories" (1891), "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (1892), "The Law of Mind" (1892), "Man's Glassy Essence" (1892), and "Evolutionary Love" (1893). There is also an introduction by Cohen (pp. vii-xxxiii), a proem consisting of the first two pages of Peirce's 1868 essay "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," a reprint of Dewey's "The Pragmatism of Peirce" on pp. 301-308 {1360}, and a bibliography of Peirce's published writings. LF

Reviews

John Dewey, New Republic 40 (25 June 1924): 69-71 [*MW* 15: 226-228]. This collection is "the performance of a needed work of piety," and Cohen's introduction is "a valuable contribution to the history of American intellectual life." JRS

C. I. Lewis, J Phil 21.3 (31 Jan 1924): 71-74. Only "patient study" can discover the important yet complex relations between his original ideas. Philosophy "has moved beyond Peirce in the very directions in which he departed from his contemporaries." JRS

1735 Prall, David W. In Defense of a *Worthless* Theory of Value. J Phil 20.5 (1 March 1923): 128-137. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 605-614. *MW* 15: 338-348.

Prall comments on Picard's "Value and Worth" {1692} and Dewey's "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge" {1671}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's response, "Values, Liking, and Thought" {1723}.

1736 Prall, David W. The Present Status of the Theory of Value. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 4, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 77-103.

Prall criticizes Dewey's theory of value for its "confusions" on pp. 80-88. JRS

1737 Robertson, John MacKinnon. *Explorations.* London: Watts, 1923.

"Professor James's Plea for Theism" (first published in 1898) is reprinted on pp. 176-211. It attacks James's *The Will to Believe* (1897) from the stance of atheistical rationalism. James's arguments could be used by non-Christians against Christianity. "Professor James on Religious Experience" (published shortly after 1902), pp. 212-236, argues that James encourages "commonplace conceit" by emphasizing the spiritual meaning of the Bible. Robertson reminds his audience that "existentially" the Bible is nonsense. IKS

1738 Rossi, Mario. Il pragmatismo italiano. Rivista la psicologia 19.1 (1923): 8-23.

Rossi surveys the variety within Italian pragmatism. The influence of F. C. S. Schiller, William James and Charles S. Peirce is discussed. The article distinguishes between the voluntaristic and logical strains of Italian pragmatism. EPC

1739 Schiller, F. C. S. Analysis and Self-Analysis. J Phil 20.9 (26 April 1923): 234-242.

Schiller replies to Bertrand Russell's "Dr. Schiller's Analysis of *The Analysis of Mind*" {1697}. JRS

1740 Schiller, F. C. S., C. E. M. Joad, C. A. Richardson. Is Neo-Idealism Reducible to Solipsism? *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 3 (1923): 129-147.

Schiller's contribution to the discussion is part three, pp. 142-147. Every metaphysics must surmount solipsism. Schiller himself proposed an "escape route" in *Humanism* {139}, pp. 263-267. Arguments showing that pragmatism cannot escape solipsism fail on several accounts. JRS

1741 Seth, James. Pragmatist and Idealistic Ethics. Phil Rev 32.2 (March 1923): 182-197.

Although Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* {1572} and *Human Nature and Conduct* {1667} claim to radically overthrow the philosophical tradition, his "bark is much worse than his bite." He does not deny the need for standards and ideals, but asks only that "they be concrete and relative, not abstract and absolute." Indeed, by and large Dewey insists on "loyalty to the established order in so far as it is well-founded and the condition of further progress." FXR

Notes

See B. M. Laing, "Pragmatist and Idealistic Ethics. A Reply," Phil Rev 32.5 (Sept 1923): 526-530, and Seth's rejoinder, ibid. pp. 530-531.

1742 Weinberg, Albert. A Critique of Pragmatist Ethics. J Phil 20.21 (11 Oct 1923): 561-566.

1743 Yarros, Victor S. What Are the Problems of Philosophy?–Taking Stock. Open Court 37 (1923): 596-604.

1924

1744 Aliotta, Antonio. *Il problema di dio e il nuovo pluralismo.* Citta di Castello: "Il Solco," 1924.

James is discussed in several sections. JRS

1745 Anschutz, R. The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 2.3 (Sept 1924): 174-182.

Dewey identifies philosophy with a pragmatic social science, regarding ethics as "knowledge whose purpose and justification is control." Dewey distinguishes satisfactory experiences from those which really justify thought, but the search for right "facts" of the situation presupposes that we already can know their meaning. Non-reflectional experiences may occur, but no real thinking ever arises from them. Since only meanings can be incomplete, an incomplete situation must be already composed of definite meanings (lest innumerable "truths" complete innumerably indefinite meanings). But these meanings

suffice for a practical judgment of knowable consequences, prior to any action taken. Finally, Dewey's logic, by emphasizing the uniqueness of all situations, makes his wider social philosophy impossible: social science requires judgments on classes of common situations and meanings. JRS

1746 Bergson, Henri. Préface. To *William James: Extraits de sa correspondance*, ed. Floris Delattre and Maurice Le Breton {1751}, pp. 7-12. Reprinted in *Ecrits et Paroles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 3, pp. 583-586, and in *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 1470-1474.

James's great originality lies in accepting the variety of the world. IKS

1747 Blake, Ralph Mason. A Criticism of Scepticism and Relativism. J Phil 21.10 (8 May 1924): 253-272.

1748 Bremond, Henri. L'Américanisme de W. James. Revue de France 4.21 (1 Nov 1924): 181-188.

James was a Yankee to the bone, both as a philosopher and as a man. He loved his country, but did not overlook its faults. He lacked the restraint of a European. IKS

1749 Calderoni, Mario. *Scritti di Mario Calderoni.* 2 vols. Odoardo Campa, ed. Florence: Societa anon. editrice "La Voce," 1924.

The essays embrace the wide range of Calderoni's interests, from articles on pragmatism and law to matters of economic policy. Papini's "Preface" describes Calderoni as a student of both Plato and Mill, and as a theorist working in the traditions of Mosca in politics, Pareto in economics, and Vailati in philosophical methodology. Also included is a complete bibliography of Calderoni's works (vol. 2, pp. 359-365). EPC

Volume one contains 18 essays. "Vediamo gli oggetti diritti o capovolti?" pp. 1-10, was published in July 1899. "Métaphysique et positivisme," pp. 11-32, was published in 1901. "I postulati della scienza positiva ed il diritto penale," pp. 33-168, is a reprint of {62}. "Nazionalismo antiprotezionista?" pp. 169-176, was published in January 1904. "Aristocrazie e democrazie (Colloquio con Gaetano Mosca)," pp. 177-184, was published in January 1904. "Imperialismo e militarismo secondo uno scrittore democratico," pp. 185-192, was published in January 1904. "Nazionalismo borghese e protezionista," pp. 193-204, was published in February 1904. "Du role de l'evidence en morale," pp. 205-206, is a reprint of {224}. "De l'utilité "marginale" dans les questions éthiques," pp. 207-208, is a reprint of {225}. "Le varietà del pragmatismo," pp. 209-222, is a reprint of {161}. "La questione degli scioperi ferroviari," pp. 223-230, was published in December 1904. "La necessità del capitale," pp. 231-238. "Variazioni sul pragmatismo," pp. 239-258, is a reprint of {228}. "Il senso dei non sensi," pp. 259-266, is a reprint of {226}. "Intorno alla distinzione fra atti volontari ed involuntari," pp. 267-274, is a reprint of {227}. "La filosofia e il diritto," pp. 275-284, was published in 1905. "Disarmonie economiche e disarmonie morali. (Saggio di un'estensione della teoria ricardiana della rendita)," pp. 285-344, was published in 1906. "L'imperativo categorico," pp. 345-353, was published in 1906.

Volume two contains twelve essays and Calderoni's bibliography. "La previsione nella teoria della conoscenza," pp. 1-24, is a reprint of {413}. "La volontarietà degli atti e la sua importanza sociale," pp. 25-56, was published in 1907. "Forme e criteri di responsabilità," pp. 57-98, was published in 1908. "Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del pragmatismo," pp. 99-124, is a reprint of {737}. "Una difficoltà del metodo pragmatista," pp. 125-132, is a reprint of {635}. "Il pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente," pp. 133-160, is a reprint of {738}. "Giovanni Vailati," pp. 161-180, is a reprint of {636}. "La filosofia dei valori," pp. 181-188, was first published in January 1910. "L'arbitrario nel funzionamento della vita psichica," pp. 189-314, is a reprint of {887}. "Le teorie psicologiche di J. Pikler e la sua teoria del 'subconsciente'," pp. 315-340, was published in 1910. "Il filosofo di fronte alla vita morale," pp. 341-346, was published in March 1911. "Intorno il pragmatismo di G. Vailati," pp. 347-358, is a reprint of {923}. JRS

1750 Chassell, Laura M. and Clara Frances Chassell. A Restatement of Important Educational Conceptions of Dewey in the Terminology of Thorndike. Journal of Educational Method 3 (1924): 286-298.

1751 Delattre, Floris and Maurice Le Breton, eds. *William James: Extraits de sa correspondance.* Paris: Payot, 1924.

A translation of selected letters, with a biographical introduction and notes, and Henri Bergson's "Préface" {1746}. IKS

1752 Dennes, William R. The Method of Metaphysics. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 5, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 51-77.

1753 Dewey, John. Kant After 200 Years. New Republic 38 (30 April 1924): 254-265. Reprinted as "Immanuel Kant" in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 63-68. *MW* 15: 8-13.

To his credit, Kant shattered both rationalism and empiricism by showing why reason must be rooted in concrete existence and why thought must supplement mere sensation. Unfortunately, he was so absorbed in abstract philosophical concepts that one wonders whether he "ever looked a fact of life or nature directly in the face." In particular, the separation he imposed between science and morality caused science to become "barren in morals" and caused morality to become increasingly ineffective in a technological society. FXR

1754 Dewey, John. Logical Method and Law. Phil Rev 33.6 (Nov 1924): 560-572. Reprinted in Cornell Law Quarterly 10 (Dec 1924): 17-27. *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 126-140. *MW* 15: 65-77.

1755 Dewey, John. Science, Belief, and the Public. New Republic 38 (2 April 1924): 143-145. Reprinted in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 2, pp. 459-464. *MW* 15: 47-52.

1756 Dewey, John. Some Comments on Philosophical Discussion. J Phil 21.8 (10 April 1924): 197-209. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 153-165. *MW* 15: 27-41.

Dewey replies to Lovejoy's "Time, Meaning, and Transcendence" {1682}, and Lamprecht's "A Note on Professor Dewey's Theory of Knowledge" {1725}. Contrary to the assessments of Lovejoy and Lamprecht, instrumentalism does not deny cognitive reference to past events. *Logically*, however, the content of a past event involves its future involvements. As such, knowledge about the past "for its own sake" is legitimate so long as we realize that this requires the isolation of a meaning to be ascertained in inquiry. FXR

1757 d'Hautefeuille, François. *Le Privilège de l'intelligence.* Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1924.

Reviews

Anon, J Phil 21.5 (28 Feb 1924): 139-140.

1758 Di Laghi, Giuseppina. Il pensiero pedagogico di Giovanni Dewey. In *Una scuola elementare di New York: documenti didattici della scuola Horace Mann* (Florence: Società anon. editrice "La Voce," 1924).

This introduction, to a book on educational practice, is devoted to the educational philosophy of John Dewey. EPC

1759 Eldridge, Seba. Controversies Over the Possibilities of Intelligence and Education in Social Life. The Views of Dewey and His School. In *Political Action: A Naturalistic Interpretation of the Labor Movement in Relation to the State* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1924), pp. 351-368.

1760 Frank, Lawrence K. The Development of Science. J Phil 21.1 (3 Jan 1924): 5-25.

1761 Frasier, George W., and Winfield D. Armentrout. *An Introduction to Education.* Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1924. 2nd ed., 1927. 3rd ed., 1933.

There are numerous references to Dewey. See especially the sections on "Some Educational Problems in the Light of Dewey's Philosophy" and "Criticisms of Dewey's Philosophy," pp. 40-49, 50-54. JRS

1762 Hammond, Albert L. Anti-Intellectualism in Present Philosophy. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1924.

Chapters 3-6 of Book One discuss "The Emphasis upon the Practical" made by Dewey, Schiller, James, and Royce. Chapters 16 and 17 of Book Two are "The Artificiality of Thought: The Pragmatist Doctrine of Contradiction," and "The Artificiality of Thought: Pragmatic Provisionalism." JRS

1763 Inge, William R. Philosophy and Religion. In *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements*, First Series, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924), pp. 189-211.

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 22.1 (1 Jan 1925): 20-26.

1764 James, William. *Études et réflexions d'un psychiste.* Translated by E. Durandeaud. Paris: Payot, 1924.

A translation of twelve articles by James on psychical research. René Sudre's introduction surveys James's psychical research activities. IKS

1765 Joad, C. E. M. Pragmatism. Chap. 4 of *Introduction to Modern Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 66-86.

Joad divides pragmatism into three tenets–a psychological denial of atomism, a logical criterion of truth, and a metaphysical exploration of how knowledge creates reality–and considers several objections to each. Pragmatism would require that all beliefs are necessarily true. JRS

Reviews

Edwin A. Burtt, J Phil 21.24 (20 Nov 1924): 669-670.

1766 Kallen, Horace M. *Culture and Democracy in the United States.* New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924.

1767 Kandel, Isaac Leon, ed. *Twenty-Five Years of American Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1924.

Several essays mention James and Dewey. See especially Daniel B. Leary's "Development of Educational Psychology," pp. 91-114, and William A. Maddox's "Development of Method," pp. 141-176. JRS

1768 Kantorovitch, Haim. A Revolutionary Interpretation of Philosophy. Modern Quarterly 2.1 (1924): 22-31.

Kantorovitch discusses Dewey and Marx. JRS

1769 Kennedy, W. B. Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law. Marquette Law Review 9 (1924): 63-77.

1770 Lamprecht, Sterling. An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalist Logic. Mind 33.4 (Oct 1924): 415-427.

Dewey's logic should be understood in light of his debt to neo-Hegelianism, and especially to T. H. Green's criticism of sensationalistic empiricism and emphasis on the creative work of reflective thought. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's response, "Instrumentalism and Idealism" {1838}.

1771 Leuba, James H. The Immediate Apprehension of God According to William James and William E. Hocking. J Phil 21.26 (18 Dec 1924): 701-712.

In James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, facts are sought to support pluralism and religious faith. This leads him to regard as immediately given what in fact is not. The repose, safety, and harmony claimed for mystical states are only interpretations of a neutral experience. James is mistaken about mysticism because he opposes the immediate to the conceptual. IKS

1772 Lovejoy, Arthur O. Pastness and Transcendence. J Phil 21.22 (23 Oct 1924): 601-611.

Lovejoy replies to Dewey's "Some Comments on Philosophical Discussion" {1756}. JRS

1773 McDougall, William. Can Sociology and Social Psychology Dispense with Instincts? American Journal of Sociology 29.6 (May 1924): 657-670.

Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* {1667} would "condemn us to found our social psychology on vague generalities." JRS

Notes

See L. L. Bernard's "Discussion" of this article, American Journal of Sociology 29.6 (May 1924): pp. 670-673.

1774 Mead, G. H. Review of E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science.* Journal of Religion 4 (1924): 324-327.

1775 Nash, J. V. The Ethics of John Dewey. Open Court 38 (1924): 527-538.

1776 Neumann, Henry. *Education for Moral Growth.* New York: D. Appleton, 1924.

Reviews

Max C. Otto, "Ethical Culture and Pragmatism," American Review 2.6 (Nov-Dec 1924): 666-675.

Notes

See Henry Neumann's reply to Otto's review, "Two Letters on Ethical Culture and Pragmatism," American Review 3 (1925): 252-253, and Otto's rejoinder, ibid., pp. 253-254.

1777 Otto, Max Carl. *Things and Ideals: Essays in Functional Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt, 1924.

Reviews

Guy A. Tawney, J Phil 22.20 (24 Sept 1925): 553-556; C. O. Weber, Amer J Psych 37.4 (Oct 1926): 606-607.

Notes

See Ray H. Dotterer's "Science as Symbol and as Description" {1863}.

1778 Prall, David W. Value and Thought-Process. J Phil 21.5 (28 Feb 1924): 117-125. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 621-629. *LW* 2: 393-402.

Prall replies to Dewey's "Values, Liking, and Thought" {1722}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "The Meaning of Value" {1811}.

1779 Ratner, Joseph. George Santayana: A Philosopher of Piety. Monist 34.2 (April 1924): 236-259.

Pragmatism "fared only a little better at his hands" than the detested Absolute idealism. JRS

1780 Rossi, Mario M. Pragmatismo ed etica kantiana. Rivista di psicologia 4 (1924): 145-152.

1781 Ruediger, W. C. Monism and Consciousness. J Phil 21.13 (19 June 1924): 347-352.

1782 Russell, Bertrand. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Dial 77 (Oct 1924): 271-290. Reprinted as chap. 5 of *Sceptical Essays* (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: W. W. Norton, 1928), pp. 54-79. *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), pp. 227-249. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 9: *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter 1919-1926* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983), pp. 451-466.

William James "may be regarded as almost the founder of both realism and pragmatism" and was "the greatest influence in the overthrow of German idealism." Russell finds three "strands in his nature": a slight materialist bias from physiology, a mystical and religious bias from his family, and a quest for the "democratic sentiment." Of all the pragmatists and realists, only Dewey agreed with *both* of James's goals: to turn religion into scientific hypothesis, and to eliminate "consciousness" to overcome dualism. Pragmatism is skeptical, rightly emphasizing the changeable nature of human truths (though facts do exist beyond the human realm). Pragmatism also rightly saw that the relation between beliefs and facts "does not have the schematic simplicity which logic assumes." Our beliefs have a degree of truth, depending on their approximation to the ideal of Fact. JRS

1783 Scheler, Max. Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens. In *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1924), pp. 1-146. Slightly changed and expanded as part of his *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1926), pp. 1-229. The 2nd ed. of *Die Wissensformen*, ed. Maria Scheler, was vol. 8 of *Gesammelte Werke* (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1960), with *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens* at pp. 1-190. The 2nd ed. of *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens* was translated by Manfred S. Frings as *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, edited and with an introduction by Kenneth W. Stikkers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

Technology did not precede science, as pragmatism claims. (pp. 130-131) Pragmatism's allegiance to "technological scientism" and perpetual "becoming" constitutes its appeal to the proletariat's political aspirations. (pp. 166-169) JRS

1784 Schiller, F. C. S. Humanism. Article in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924-1927), vol. 6, pp. 830-831.

1785 Schiller, F. C. S. The Infinite Whole. Mind 33.2 (April 1924): 182-183.

Schiller critiques J. W. Scott's "Our Knowledge of the Infinite," Mind 33.1 (Jan 1924): 72-77. JRS

1786 Schiller, F. C. S. Our Natural Relativity. Personalist 5.4 (Oct 1924): 233-237. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 159-163.

1787 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatism. Article in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924-1927), vol. 10, pp. 147-150.

1788 Schiller, F. C. S. *Problems of Belief.* London: Hodder and Stoughton; New York: G. H. Doran, 1924.

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 22.10 (7 May 1925): 272-278. Schiller has given a "compact and eloquent development of his favorite theme": the inseparable bond between logic and psychology. Humanism is an "ontological romanticism." Unlike Dewey, Schiller has failed to develop a logic of experimental inquiry. JRS

1789 Schiller, F. C. S. Psychology and Logic. In *Psychology and the Sciences*, ed. William Brown (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1924), pp. 53-70.

1790 Schiller, F. C. S. *Tantalus, or the Future of Man.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1924.

1791 Schiller, F. C. S. Value. Article in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924-1927), vol. 12, pp. 584-589.

1792 Schiller, F. C. S. Why Humanism? In *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements*, First Series, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924), pp. 385-410.

The sciences have long been delimited to exclude human nature and its interests. The intellectualist belief that logic and psychology are irrelevant to each other (though both deal with human cognition) is one serious consequence. Humanism protests this divorce on the grounds that if thus separated, neither science can render human intelligence understandable, and produces the inconclusive battle between Rationalism and Empiricism. Humanism properly reconstructs scientific method, and accounts for error as well as truth. The metaphysical implications of humanism include nature's plasticity to the human activity of knowing, pluralism, and individualism. JRS

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 22.1 (1 Jan 1925): 20-26.

1793 Sidgwick, Alfred. Truth and Purpose. Mind 33.3 (July 1924): 385-397.

1794 Tissi, Silvio. *James.* Milan: Athena, 1924.

1795 Unknown. *Pragmatismos e Houmanismos: Anaptyxis kai kritike Theorion henos Megalou Rheumatos tes Synchonou Philosophias.* Athens: 1924.

1925

1796 Anon. Interview with Mussolini. London Observer (22 Nov 1925).

Notes

An extract from this interview on Mussolini's appreciation for James is reprinted in J Phil 23.6 (18 May 1926): 168. See another interview with Mussolini by André Révesz, London Sunday Times (11 April 1926). See also H. M. Kallen's "Fascism: For the Italians" {1920}, and R. B. Perry, *Thought and Character of William James* {2444}, pp. 575-578.

1797 Bixler, Julius Seelye. Mysticism and the Philosophy of William James. Int J Ethics 36.1 (Oct 1925): 71-85. Incorporated into his *Religion in the Philosophy of William James* {1850}.

Mysticism naturally supplements James's thought. James was torn between a life of action and risk and a desire for assurance and peace. Mysticism offers a practical reconciliation. It broadens James's pragmatism by expanding the range of experience, and adds a social element to James's ethics. IKS

1798 Bixler, Julius Seelye. William James and Immortality. Journal of Religion 5.4 (July 1925): 378-396. Material incorporated into his *Religion in the Philosophy of William James* {1850}.

Bixler studies James's views on immortality in his published letters. IKS

1799 Boodin, J. E. *Cosmic Evolution.* New York: Macmillan, 1925.

Boodin tells his readers in the "Preface" (p. 7-11) that Cosmic Idealism is "an attempt at a synthesis of the various aspects of reality as creatively revealed in human experience. Such a synthesis must...[be] an evaluation of them into a hierarchical system, which shall show their relative claims." Chap. 1, "Introductory Survey–Cosmic Evolution," is a reprint of {1614}. The rest of the chapters are: "Evolution as Cosmic Adaptation," "Evolution as Cosmic Interaction," "Sensation, Imagination, and Mind" (a revised version of {1618}), "The Minded Organism and the Cosmos," "Theories of Relativity," "Reality and Space-Time Perspectives," "Relativity and the Law of the Whole," and "Finale–Cosmic Religion" (a revised version of {1617}). JRS

Reviews

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, J Phil 24.6 (17 March 1927): 160-163. Boodin's interpretation of evolution is original in two significant respects: evolution is subordinated to the universe's non-changing structure, and lower levels evolve, not by chance, but by interaction and adaptation to co-existing higher levels. God, as "supermind," is the highest level of the universe. Boodin's abilities "should have earned him wider recognition than has actually fallen to his lot." JRS

A. K. Stout, Mind 36.4 (Oct 1927): 496-499. Boodin is "suggestive and stimulating," but his failure to define key terms and his use of "vague and ambiguous" conceptions leaves the reader with unconvincing "pointless metaphor" and "verbiage." JRS

G. T. W. Patrick, Amer J Psych 38.2 (April 1927): 296-297; E. C. Wilm, Phil Rev 40.2 (March 1931): 198-203.

Notes

See Boodin's reply to Stout's review, "*Cosmic Evolution*," Mind 37.3 (July 1928): 349-352.

1800 Bower, William Clayton. *The Curriculum of Religious Education.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

The curriculum is "enriched and controlled experience" and knowledge is an instrument for its attainment. Representative chapters are "The Nature of Experience," "The Origin and Function of Knowledge," "The Principle of Continuity," "Method as Widening Experience," "Religious Education Through Social Participation," and "The Principle of Adaptation." JRS

1801 Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. *Religious Values.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1925.

Chap. 6 questions the ability of Dewey's instrumentalism to interpret religious experience. JRS

Reviews

Radoslav A. Tsanoff, J Phil 23.16 (5 Aug 1926): 442-443.

1802 Bush, Wendell T. William James and Panpsychism. In *Studies in the History of Ideas*, by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925. Rpt., New York: AMS Press, 1970), pp. 378-396.

James advocated panpsychism, in addition to naturalistic empiricism, but his statements are "scattered, tentative and metaphorical." IKS

1803 Calkins, Mary Whiton. The Revolt of the Pragmatists. Section A of Chap. 11, "Twentieth Century Philosophy" in *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 5th rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 398-405.

Reviews

George P. Conger, J Phil 23.7 (1 April 1926): 193-194.

Notes

Chap. 11 was added for the fifth edition. The first edition was published in 1907.

1804 Clarke, Mary Evelyn. Valuing and Quality of Value. J Phil 22.3 (29 Jan 1925): 57-75.

1805 Cohen, Morris R. The Insurgence Against Reason. J Phil 22.5 (26 Feb 1925): 113-126; J Phil 22.7 (26 March 1925): 180-189. Incorporated into his *Reason and Nature* {2164}.

1806 Cohen, Morris R. The Intellectual Love of God. Menorah Journal 11 (1925): 332-341.

1807 Crooks, Ezra B. The Pragmatic Absolute. Monist 35.3 (July 1925): 405-419.

We pragmatically need an absolute standard of truth to attain any truth, and an absolute God to empower faith and righteousness and to justify fatalism. JRS

1808 Cugini, Umberto. *L'empirismo radicale di W. James.* Genova: Societa Anonima Editrice Francesco Perrella, 1925. Also published in Logos: Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia 8 (1925): 1-56.

1809 Dewey, John. *Experience and Nature.* Chicago: Open Court, 1925. Revised edition, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1929. *LW* 1.

Experience and Nature is Dewey's principal work of metaphysics, and his most comprehensive defense of empirical naturalism. Its chapters progress from generality to specificity, from the broad traits of existence and experience to the phenomena of meaning, mind, and morals. Chap. 1 rejects the narrow and subjective sense of "experience" inherited from empiricism. Instead, experience *is* nature itself in its multitude of human involvements. Experience is "double-barrelled," encompassing a depth of *what* is experienced and a breadth of *how* experience is stretched by inference. The "thing" and "thought," and the "subject" and "object," are "single-barrelled." They are products discriminated from the "unanalyzed totality" of primary experience, for some specific purpose in inquiry. To forget this is to commit "*the* philosophic fallacy" of converting "eventual functions into antecedent existences." (p. 34)

Chap. 2 decries the historic tendency to identify Being with the ideal, permanent, and changeless. Change and stability, peril and security, are ineliminable features of the encountered world. Idealism identifies reality with perfection of thought, while realism isolates the foibles of cognition from the real external world. Empirical naturalism regards uncertainty and restored security as linked phases of problem-solving inquiry. The dynamics of inquiry are explored further in chap. 3. Experience in its primal integrity is immediate. It possesses an aesthetic "temporal quality": a sense of connectedness and finality that is *had* or *felt*, not known. Discrete objects and their relations, on the other hand, are discriminations of reflective experience that introduce "temporal orders" and causal interactions. We should distinguish "ends" as immediate finalities from "ends" as objectives of inquiry.

Chapters four and five examine the creation of meaning in the circuit of primary and reflective experience. A meaning is not a mental phantasm capable somehow of "corresponding" to an external object, but an achievement of inquiry which returns to primary experience as an instrument–a *means* to procure future ends. Language is thus the "tool of tools," making other tools possible. Communication as shared experience is "the greatest of human goods." (p. 157) The next three chapters focus on the self, body, and mind. Chap. 6 approaches these issues from the "breadth" of experience. Here, a "self" is not an autonomous being endowed with "mind," but a function that emerges in complex organic and social involvements. Individual thought arises to provide plans and ideas for the resolution of problematic situations. The intractable mind-body problem is solved by articulating the intellectual and physical phases of inquiry.

Chap. 7 addresses the same matters from the physical "depth" of experience. While nature is a plenum of connections and continuities, we can discern "plateaus" of organization: physical interactions, described by mechanical laws; life, endowed with immediate qualitative feeling; communicative participation, in which feelings "make sense" that can be grasped cognitively and shared meaningfully. Chap. 8 analyses the "plateau" of consciousness and mind. Consciousness extends from non-cognitive qualitative immediacy to attentive awareness; from a remote "fringe" of feelings and minute perceptual adjustments to the "bright focus" on matters of urgent attention. Background and foreground interpenetrate each other: the selection of focal objects depends on noncognitive adjustments, but these in turn are habituations forged from a vast background of meanings secured from previous inquiries. This "whole system of meanings" as "embedded in the workings of organic life" is mind, in its full and authentic sense. Mind extends far beyond consciousness. "Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive." (p. 230)

The final two chapters address the aesthetic and normative character of experience. Contrary to the traditional separation of science and art, scientific method transforms aesthetic immediacy into reflective objects, and both are "full of enjoyed meanings." Similarly, the exclusion of value from metaphysics ignores the "ineluctable traits of natural existence": immediacy and relation, peril and stability, and obstruction and resolution. These are the very stuff of value, but to merely detect and record such traits is only a starting point, a "ground map of the province of criticism, establishing base lines to be employed in more intricate triangulations." (p. 309) Philosophy is "this critical operation and function become aware of itself and its implications, pursued deliberately and systematically." (p. 302) FXR

Extended reviews

George Santayana {1836}.

Reviews

H. Wildon Carr, Phil Rev 35.1 (Jan 1926): 64-68. In his philosophy of both nature and language, Dewey hangs between idealism and realism without obvious support from either. Instead of explaining how mind and language confront the world, he merely provides a weak genetic account of their formation. FXR

Joseph Jastrow, "A Calendar of Philosophy," Forum 76.1 (July 1926): 316. "It would be a pleasant task" to select from this book "a helpful epigram, an inspirational sentence, an illuminating summary or illustration for every day of the thinking year." JRS

John Laird, Mind 34.4 (Oct 1925): 476-482. At times "experience" merely seems to denote "consciousness," while at other times it seems to include everything. Equally odd is Dewey's definition of "mind" and "body" as the "active" and "conserved" phases of experience. FXR

Ralph B. Perry, "An Omnibus Philosophy," Saturday Review of Literature 1.49 (4 July 1925): 874-875. Despite a certain eloquence, this book is "promiscuous." It embraces a welter of "realities" with no sense of "sympathetic unity or transforming insight." FXR

Roy Wood Sellars, Journal of Religion 6.1 (Jan 1926): 89-91. Although Dewey moves toward a truly naturalistic (critical) realism, he backslides by failing to locate his various "ideas," "feelings," and qualities" *in* the perceiving organism. He still dodges epistemological problems by cloaking himself in the "fog of 'experience'." FXR

George P. Adams, Int J Ethics 36.2 (Jan 1926): 201-205; Anon, Amer J Psych 38.3 (July 1927): 468; C. E. Ayres, New Republic 42 (29 March 1925): 129-131; Joseph K.

Hart, Inquiry 1 (Dec 1925): 57-59; C. E. M. Joad, Nation and Athenaeum 37 (1925): 682, 684; C. R. Morris, Hibbert Journal 24.2 (Jan 1926): 370-373; C. F. Salmond, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 3.3 (Sept 1925): 230-231; Hugh W. Sanford, Sewanee Review 33.4 (Oct 1925): 496-499; F. C. S. Schiller, "American Pragmatism," Spectator 135.13 (26 Sept 1925): 494, 497; Robert Mark Wenley, Anglican Theological Review 8 (1925-26): 277-278.

Reviews of revised edition

Herbert H. Farmer, Journal of Theological Studies 31 (1929): 82-86; C. E. M. Joad, Nation and Athenaeum 45 (1929): 832, 834; E. M. Whetnall, Mind 38 (1929): 527-528.

Notes

A brief synopsis of three Paul Carus lectures that later formed chapters 2-4 is given, with a report of some discussion on them, in "The Twenty-Second Meeting of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 20.3 (1 Feb 1923): 68-76. Selections from chap. 9, "Experience, Nature and Art," were revised for publication as "Experience and Nature and Art" {1810}.

1810 Dewey, John. Experience and Nature and Art. Journal of the Barnes Foundation 1.3 (Oct 1925): 4-10. Reprinted as "Experience, Nature and Art" in *Art and Education* (Merion, Penn.: Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), pp. 3-12.

A brief adaptation of material from chap. 9, "Experience, Nature and Art" of *Experience and Nature* {1809}. JRS

Notes

See also Dewey's "Dedication Address" of the Barnes Foundation, Journal of the Barnes Foundation 1.1 (May 1925): 3-6 [*LW* 2: 382-385].

1811 Dewey, John. The Meaning of Value. J Phil 22.5 (26 Feb 1925): 126-133. Reprinted in *LW* 2: 69-77.

Dewey replies to Prall's "Value and Thought-Process" {1778}. Because a value is not a self-sustaining essence or property, we must ask "how values come to be, i.e., how things come to possess the quality of value." Mere "liking" is not a sufficient condition of value. Liking must be directed by thought: the meaningful recognition of objective facts and consequences beyond what is immediately present. FXR

1812 Dewey, John. The Naturalistic Theory of Perception by the Senses. J Phil 22.22 (24 Oct 1925): 596-605. Reprinted as "A Naturalistic Account of Perception" in *The Philosophy of John Dewey* {1969}, pp. 123-135. As "A Naturalistic Theory of Sense Perception," in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 188-201. As "A Naturalistic Theory of Sense-Perception," in *LW* 2: 44-54.

The philosophical analysis of "sense organs" and its scientific counterpart in neural research can tell us about the *means* of perception, but not about its *nature*. Although sense organs affect perceived qualities, perception does not. A naturalistic theory finds no particular "problem" of perception, though the forms of perception (for example, direct spatio-temporal perception versus memory perception) are as straightforward and open to examination as any other scientific phenomena. This position differs sharply from epistemology, which accords "sense-data" a privileged position. It then must worry whether "reality" resides in percepts or concepts, in the simple or the complex. FXR

1813 Dewey, John. The "Socratic" Dialogues of Plato. In *Studies in the History of Ideas*, by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), vol. 2, pp. 1-23. Reprinted in *LW* 2: 124-140.

Reviews

George P. Adams, J Phil 23.11 (27 May 1926): 300-303; F. C. S. Schiller, "American Pragmatism," Spectator 135.13 (26 Sept 1925): 494, 497.

1814 Dewey, John. Value, Objective Reference and Criticism. Phil Rev 34.4 (July 1925): 313-332. Reprinted in *LW* 2: 78-97.

Positivism holds that a value is merely the expression of an emotion. However, even a child's cry of "goody-goody" is the direction of an emotion towards something of perceived value. Hence value is not a bare feeling, but a need related to something that will satisfy it. Since the need itself is an inchoate immediacy, it must be grasped cognitively to be related to other events. In its full sense, value is determined in the relation of an *idea* or expressed *interest* in an object which fulfills or frustrates it. FXR

1815 Drake, Durant. *Mind and Its Place in Nature*. New York: Macmillan, 1925.

Reviews

Adelbert Ford, Amer J Psych 38.2 (April 1927): 298-299; Douglas C. Macintosh, J Phil 24.5 (3 March 1925): 129-136.

1816 Durant, Will. *Contemporary American Philosophers: Santayana, James and Dewey*. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius, 1925. Reprinted in *The Story of Philosophy* {1864}, pp. 530-575.

1817 Farley, J. H. Kant's Philosophy of Religion. Monist 35.2 (April 1925): 259-279.

1818 Fauville, A. La Place de James dans l'évolution de la psychologie contemporaine. Revue Néo-Scolastique 26.8 (1925).

1819 Fite, Warner. The Pragmatic Attitude. In *Moral Philosophy: The Critical View of Life* (New York: Dial Press, 1925. Rpt., Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972), pp. 103-118.

Reviews

Laurence Buermeyer, J Phil 23.13 (24 June 1926): 351-361. Fite's treatment of Dewey is "radically unjust." He falsely accuses him with a "narrow utilitarianism." JRS

1820 Geiger, Joseph R. Concerning the "Good Man" and the Moral Standard. J Phil 22.23 (5 Nov 1925): 634-637.

1821 Gordon, George Angier. My Education and Religion: An Autobiography. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925. Pp. 195-200 is reprinted as "A

Profoundly Religious Man" in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 43-49.

Gordon reflects on William James's character and his influence on Gordon's thought. Four letters from James to Gordon, in which James comments on Gordon's books, are on pp. 198-200. JRS

1822 Grünewald, Max. *Simmels Philosophie mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Beziehungen zum Pragmatismus*. Dissertation, Breslau, Germany, 1925.

1823 Halbert, Anna Evelyna. *The Problem of Self-Activity in Modern Educational Theory, with Special Reference to Rousseau, Harris, Dewey, and Montessori*. Dissertation, New York University, 1925.

1824 Hall, Robert Sprague. The "I": An Egoistic, Perhaps Egotistic Divagation. Open Court 39 (Feb 1925): 72-85.

James is frequently quoted to show that psychologists should look "beneath consciousness" for the "real thinker." IKS

1825 Hammond, Albert L. Some Alleged Incapacities of the Intellect. Phil Rev 34.6 (Nov 1925): 557-559.

1826 Harris, Marjorie S. Comte and James. Phil Rev 34.2 (March 1925): 154-164.

Comte shows deeper insight than James. Both agree that only the phenomenal is known, but for Comte, it is a world of law behind which stands an orderly reality. Both interpret thought instrumentally, but Comte realizes that thought should not always be "confined by practical consequences" and has some "commerce with reality." IKS

1827 James, William. *The Philosophy of William James, Selected from His Chief Works*. Edited with an introduction by Horace M. Kallen. New York: Modern Library, 1925.

Kallen's "Introduction: The Meaning of William James for 'Us Moderns'," pp. 1-55, states that James recognized the limits of philosophy. Because of this, after James, philosophy will continue to fail, but it will enjoy moments of "genuine efficacy and transforming power." James recognized a plurality of individuals and the spontaneity of things. Truth is an instrument in our "struggle to live." IKS

Extended reviews

John Dewey {1862}.

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 23.24 (25 Nov 1926): 670-671. Kallen finds a more "catholic" James than is usual. However, we lose a sense of development when his various views are placed side by side. IKS

1828 Lewis, C. I. Review of C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*. Phil Rev 34.4 (July 1925): 406-411.

1829 McClure, Matthew Thompson. *An Introduction to the Logic of Reflection.* New York: Henry Holt, 1925.

Reviews

Donald S. Mackay, J Phil 23.17 (19 Aug 1926): 470-474. Pragmatism's intent to "show thinking at work" has "invaded" logic textbooks. McClure's analysis of logic relies on Dewey's distinction between data and meanings, but it is often unclear. JRS

1830 Macintosh, Douglas Clyde. *The Reasonableness of Christianity.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

Reviews

William K. Wright, J Phil 23.16 (5 Aug 1926): 439-442. Macintosh effects a "happy compromise between intellectualism and pragmatism...[and] combines it with his monistic version of critical realism." JRS

1831 McNutt, Walter Scott. Instrumentalism at Its Best. Education 46 (1925): 149-153.

1832 Masson, Charles. La Personnalité religieuese de William James. Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie n.s. 13 (1925): 126-139.

Masson studies the religious side of James's personality, based on *William James: Extraits de sa correspondence* {1751}. IKS

1833 Mead, G. H. The Genesis of the Self and Social Control. Int J Ethics 35.3 (April 1925): 251-277. Reprinted in *The Philosophy of the Present* {2244}, pp. 176-195. *Selected Writings*, pp. 267-293.

1834 Montague, William Pepperell. *The Ways of Knowing; or, the Methods of Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925. Reprinted, New York: Humanities Press; London: Allen and Unwin, 1978.

Montague examines six theories of logic, including chap. 5, "The Method of Pragmatism," pp. 131-172. Montague then considers "alliances" between pragmatism and the other theories on pp. 211-224 and 230-231. JRS

Reviews

Jacob Loewenberg, "Philosophical Federalism," J Phil 23.20 (30 Sept 1926): 533-545.

Notes

See Donald A. Piatt, "Mr. Montague on the Relativity of Truth" {1998}.

1835 Piatt, Donald Ayres. *Mind and Nature.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1925.

1836 Santayana, George. Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics. J Phil 22.25 (3 Dec 1925): 673-688. Reprinted in *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays, and Reviews*, ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 213-240. *The Philosophy of John Dewey* {2720}, pp. 243-261. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 343-358. *LW* 3: 367-384.

Santayana comments on Dewey's *Experience and Nature* {1809}. Although Dewey crusades tirelessly against the recurrent tendency to project human ideals and ambitions into the constitution of the universe, his own metaphysics prominently features immediacy, quality, opportunity, and other blatantly human traits. As nature is woven into a panorama relative to human discourse, the foreground of experience dominates Dewey's naturalism. But nature itself has "no foreground or background, no here, no now, no moral cathedra..." (p. 372) FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Half-Hearted Naturalism" {1905}.

1837 Schaub, Edward L. The Legacy of Kant. Monist 35.2 (April 1925): 161-182.

1838 Schiller, F. C. S. Instrumentalism and Idealism. Mind 34.1 (Jan 1925): 75-79.

Schiller responds to Lamprecht's "An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalist Logic" {1770}. Lamprecht forgets that any intellectual influence on Dewey from Green could well have been negative, instead of positive, and assumes that the coincidence of criticisms on empiricism constitutes proof of borrowing. The enormous difference in philosophical spirit between instrumentalism and idealism precludes any assimilation of one into the other. JRS

1839 Schiller, F. C. S. The Origin of Bradley's Scepticism. Mind 34.2 (April 1925): 217-223.

Bradley's theory of judgment posits the Absolute as the real subject of all judgments, in order to secure their complete truth from the standpoint of the Absolute, and therefore "compels *us* to despair of truth." Bradley refuses to "recognize the actual procedures of our thought on the ground that they are 'psychological': hence the great primary need of relevance is ignored, and selection is grudgingly given an untenable position which sees in the purposive selection underlying every successful reasoning nothing but a source of error." (p. 223) Bradley hides this difficulty by confusing judgments with propositions; "without this juggle Bradley's scepticism has no case." JRS

Notes

See John Anderson's response, "Propositions and Judgments," Mind 35.2 (April 1926): 237-241; Schiller's reply, "Judgments *versus* Propositions," Mind 35.3 (July 1926): 337-343; Anderson, "The Truth of Propositions," Mind 35.4 (Oct 1926): 466-472; and Schiller, "The Two Logics" {1943}.

1840 Schiller, F. C. S., J. A. Smith, A. D. Lindsay. The Economic Doctrine of the Concept. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 5 (1925): 103-134.

Schiller's contribution to this symposium is on pp. 123-128. JRS

Notes

See a report of the discussion surrounding this paper in Marie Collins Swabey, "The Oxford Philosophical Meeting," J Phil 22.24 (19 Nov 1925): 654-667.

1841 Sheen, Fulton J. *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy.* London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925.

Notes

See also his "Contemporary Philosophies of Religion" in the *Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1927) pp. 66-79.

1842 Tillich, Paul. Religionsphilosophie. In *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, ed. Max Dessoir (Berlin: Ullstein, 1925), vol. 2, pp. 765-835. Translated as "The Philosophy of Religion," by James Luther Adams, Konrad Raiser and Charles W. Fox, in *What is Religion?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 27-121.

1843 Wieman, Henry. Religion in Dewey's *Experience and Nature*. Journal of Religion 5.5 (Sept 1925): 519-542.

There is a use of mysticism which fits Dewey's account of meaningless experiences. These experiences have a maximum richness of content/emotion and a minimum of signification. Such experiences "serve as transitional stages toward the development of new meanings." Radical originality is made possible and new religious meanings are born. JRS

1844 Yarros, Victor S. Empiricism and Philosophic Method: Professor Dewey's Views. Open Court 39 (1925): 586-592

1845 Yarros, Victor S. Metaphysics, Psychology, and Philosophy: Professor Dewey's Views. Open Court 39 (1925): 669-675

1846 Yarros, Victor S. The Province and Issues of Philosophy: Professor Dewey's Views. Open Court 39 (1925): 755-766

1926

1847 Ames, Van Meter. The Function of Aesthetic Experience. J Phil 23.22 (28 Oct 1926): 603-609.

1848 Baldwin, James Mark. *Between Two Wars (1861-1921).* Boston: The Stratford Co., 1926.

Baldwin recounts his interactions with James and comments on his psychological, psychical, and philosophical views in the first volume. The second volume contains "Selected Letters from William James," pp. 204-222, and two letters from Peirce on pp. 272-274. JRS

Reviews

I. Woodbridge Riley, J Phil 24.10 (12 May 1927): 275-278.

1849 Beach, Joseph Warren. Unripe Fruits. Yale Review n.s. 26.1 (Oct 1926): 134-147. Pp. 143-147 was reprinted as "Incoherence in the Philosopher: Mr. John Dewey" in *The Outlook for American Prose* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. Rpt., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 41-52.

1850 Bixler, Julius Seelye. *Religion in the Philosophy of William James.* Boston: Marshall Jones, 1926. Reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1979.

The conflict in James is not primarily between religion and science but between two religious interests. There are both active and passive modes, desires for a world of risk and for a world of peace. Bixler quotes extensively from James's unpublished letters to Thomas Davidson and Mrs. William H. Prince. IKS

Reviews

Dickinson S. Miller, J Phil 24.8 (14 April 1927): 203-210. James had remarkable powers of analysis, yet his *Pragmatism* {438} suffers from an inadequate analysis of terms. Miller repeats his criticism of the will to believe, first expressed in his "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" {39}. IKS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 36.4 (Oct 1927): 509-511. Bixler makes out his case that the conflict in James's religious philosophy was between two aspects of his religious nature. Religion is vital to James's pragmatism. The will to believe is not a "desparate dodge," but a major contribution to epistemology. It reveals more about science than religion. IKS

James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 37.1 (Oct 1927): 107-108.

Notes

See Schiller's response to Miller's review, "William James and the Will to Believe" {1945}.

1851 Blake, Ralph Mason. The Paradox of Temporal Process. J Phil 23.24 (25 Nov 1926): 645-654.

Blake explores the reasons why James and Whitehead felt that the long-standing problem of motion has not been solved. JRS

1852 Braham, Ernest G. *Personality and Immortality in Post-Kantian Thought.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926.

At first James was a dualist and distinguished the psychical from the physical. Later, as a radical empiricist, he came to hold that the self is "turned out" of pure experience. In *Human Immortality* {11}, he rests belief in immortality on feeling and offers no constructive theory. IKS

1853 Chiocchetti, Emilio. *Il pragmatismo.* Milan: Edizione Athena, 1926

1854 Clapp, Elsie Ripley. John Dewey's Influence on Education. New Era 7 (July 1926): 124-126.

Notes

See also her "Learning and Indoctrinating," Progressive Education 9 (1932): 269-272; "Schools Socially Functioning," Progressive Education 15 (1938): 89-90; and *Community Schools in Action* (New York: Viking, 1939).

1855 Dewey, John. Affective Thought in Logic and Painting. Journal of the Barnes Foundation 2.2 (April 1926): 3-9. Reprinted in *Art and Education* (Merion, Penn.: Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), pp. 63-72. Reprinted as "Affective Thought," in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 117-125. *LW* 2: 104-110.

The pervasive dualism of body and mind has fostered the separation of volition and reason. Recent advances in biology and physiology, however, indicate that will and thought, the affective and the intellectual, are reciprocally dependent partners. Desire marks a disruption of equilibrium between an organism and its environment; reasoning draws on habituated experiences to discover suitable *means* for resolving the conflict. The integration of the affective and the intellectual also closes the perceived gap between art and science. Both embody the basic relationship "of life and its surroundings." Successful art coordinates light, line, and form to fulfill the expectations of habit while evoking imaginative new connections. Successful science equally draws on creativity and ingenuity in "re-creating the world." FXR

Reviews of *Art and Education*

William G. Whitford, Elementary School Journal 30 (1930): 550-551.

Reviews of *Art and Education*, 2nd ed. (1947)

Helmut Kohn, J Phil 44.20 (25 Sept 1947): 558-559.

Notes

See Allen Tate, "The Aesthetic Emotion as Useful" {2270}.

1856 Dewey, John. The Changing Intellectual Climate. New Republic 45 (17 Feb 1926): 360-361. Reprinted in *LW* 2: 221-225.

A review of A. N. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* (1925). JRS

Notes

Dewey further considers this book in "Art in Education–and Education in Art," New Republic 46 (24 Feb 1926): 11-13 [*LW* 2: 111-115].

1857 Dewey, John. The Ethics of Animal Experimentation. Atlantic Monthly 138.9 (Sept 1926): 343-346. Reprinted in Hygeia 9 (Feb 1931): 118-120. *LW* 2: 98-103.

1858 Dewey, John. Events and the Future. J Phil 23.10 (13 May 1926): 253-258. Reprinted in *Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace M. Kallen on his 70th Birthday*, ed. Sidney Ratner (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), pp. 184-191. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 337-342. *LW* 2: 62-68.

Dewey comments on C. D. Broad's *Scientific Thought* (1923). To be an *event*, an object must possess a unity or wholeness despite qualitative variation over a stretch of time; an event is a *becoming* in the sense that the past and future infuse the qualitative character of each present moment. By this criteria, however, Broad's "ultimate scientific object" is not an event, for he requires that each spatio-temporal "slice" be exactly like any other slice and like the whole itself. Such an object could have no duration, for something endures only in relation to that which changes; nor could it have "stages," for these too require qualitative change. Broad's ultimate objects are not events because they are not *histories*. FXR

1859 Dewey, John. The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality. Yale Law Review 35 (April 1926): 655-673. Reprinted as "Corporate Personality" in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 141-165. LW 2: 22-43.

1860 Dewey, John. Individuality and Experience. Journal of the Barnes Foundation 2.1 (Jan 1926): 1-6. Reprinted in *Art and Education* (Merion, Penn.: Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), pp. 175-183. *LW* 2: 55-61.

1861 Dewey, John. Substance, Power, and Quality in Locke. Phil Rev 35.1 (Jan 1926): 22-38. Reprinted in *Freedom and Experience: Essays Presented to Horace M. Kallen*, ed. Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), pp. 205-220. *LW* 2: 141-157.

Summaries

Anon, Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie 1.1 (Jan-March 1927): 122-123.

1862 Dewey, John. William James in Nineteen Twenty-Six. New Republic 47 (30 June 1926): 163-165. Reprinted as "William James. III." in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 117-122. *LW* 2: 158-162.

Dewey reviews H. M. Kallen's *The Philosophy of William James* {1827}. This fine book gives rise to reflections about James as an interpreter of American ideals. Did he express something permanent is the American spirit or only give voice to characteristics of his own time? There is a sharp contrast between James's pragmatism, which insisted that thought have meaning for human life, and the "current pragmatism" of a society dominated by businessmen. IKS

1863 Dotterer, Ray H. Science as Symbol and as Description. J Phil 23.12 (10 June 1926): 315-324.

Dotterer comments on M. C. Otto's *Things and Ideals* {1777}. JRS

1864 Durant, Will. *The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926. Reprinted, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961.

John Dewey supplied the "Foreword," p. v [*LW* 2: 387]. The chapters on Santayana, James, and Dewey (pp. 530-575) are reprinted from {1816}. JRS

Reviews

Michael Kenny, Thought 1.4 (March 1927): 724-731; Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 23.25 (9 Dec 1926): 685-692.

1865 Frank, Waldo (signed as Search-Light). The Man Who Made Us What We Are. New Yorker (22 May 1926): 15-16. Reprinted in *Time Exposures* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926), pp. 121-127.

John Dewey is "the most influential American alive." JRS

1866 Haldane, Viscount. *Human Experience: A Study of Its Structure.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1926.

Reviews

Max Otto, J Phil 24.3 (3 Feb 1927): 80-82. Haldane responds to Dewey's *Experience and Nature* {1809}, arguing that experience develops from knowledge, not the reverse. JRS

1867 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. Idealism and Evolutionary Naturalism. Monist 36.4 (Oct 1926): 561-576.

Dewey's instrumentalism, like many philosophies, has been dominated by the naturalistic, but not the evolutionary, aspects of Darwinism. (p. 561) Only idealism can claim to have explored the more fundamental issue, which naturalism takes for granted, whether nature is "really what we experience and judge it to be." JRS

1868 Hook, Sidney. The Metaphysics of *Leading Principles*. J Phil 23.7 (1 April 1926): 169-183.

1869 Lamprecht, Sterling P. The Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 23.11 (27 May 1926): 289-296.

Lamprecht reports several discussions involving pragmatism. JRS

1870 Leroux, Emmanuel. Le Plus humain des philosophes: William James, d'après sa correspondence. Rev Méta 33.2 (April-June 1926): 227-252.

A study of James's personality based on his letters in *William James* {1751}. IKS

1871 Lewis, C. I. The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 6, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 205-227. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 240-257.

Thought can be analyzed into the data of sense, the concept, and the act of interpreting the data using the concept. Pragmatism stresses the third component, while asserting against idealism that mind is individual, not ideal or generic. An examination of geometry, as an example of knowledge, reveals the importance of interpretation. The *a priori* nature of the meaning of some geometric concepts is the guarantee of mutual understanding, not the common possession of images or sensations. No immediate experience is knowledge; knowledge is based on the conceptual interpretation of an experience as significant of what is not present. Concepts imposed on experience are formulated to meets our needs as they arise. The debate between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems can only be settled on such pragmatic grounds, since motion is always relative to some empirically (but not pragmatically) *arbitrary* axis. Pragmatists have regrettably sometimes said that truth changes, that truths reduce to hypotheses, and that truth is dependent on "brute-fact" experience. Instead, old modes of interpretation are abandoned for newer, more successful ones; both eternally true (in their own terms) and cannot contradict each other. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 36.3 (July 1927): 377-379.

1872 Lewis, C. I. Review of Harold R. Smart, *The Philosophical Presuppositions of Mathematical Logic*. J Phil 23.8 (15 April 1926): 220-223.

1873 Mead, G. H. The Nature of Aesthetic Experience. Int J Ethics 36.4 (July 1926): 382-393. Reprinted in part in *The Philosophy of the Act* {2633}, pp. 454-459. *Selected Writings*, pp. 294-305.

1874 Morgan, C. Lloyd. Influence and Reference: A Biological Approach to Philosophical Problems. Monist 36.4 (Oct 1926): 535-560.

1875 Morgan, William J. *The Nature and Right of Religion.* Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1926.

Pragmatism's faults are discussed on pp. 76-78. JRS

1876 Muirhead, John H. The Real and the Ideal. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 8, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 3-22.

Dewey emphasizes the dependence of moral ideals on "concrete actualities and social condition" in a way which "would have astonished earlier pragmatists." Dewey's use of the notion of the "enduring and comprehending whole" faces the dilemma of either referring to actual ideals of finite minds, or to ideals that are impossible to realize for finite minds. JRS

1877 Mumford, Lewis. *The Golden Day: A Study in American Experience and Culture.* New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926.

Notes

See Dewey's response, "The Pragmatic Acquiescence" {1906}.

1878 Murphy, Arthur E. Ideas and Nature. *University of California Publications in Philosophy* vol. 8, no. 8 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 193-213.

Dewey and Whitehead point to a way to reconcile the natural and the ideal without reducing one to the other. Ideas "belong to reality and in knowledge and action man is in touch with his world." JRS

1879 Murray, David L. William James. In *Scenes and Silhouettes* (London: J. Cape, 1926. Rpt., Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 268-286.

James was never understood by philosophers because he always remained "just a plain, natural man, unsophisticated by learning." His life and thought offer no riddle and was determined to a large extent by his ancestry and his times. IKS

1880 Otto, Max C. Instrumentalism. Monist 36.4 (Oct 1926): 577-593.

Peirce and James independently published expositions of basic principles of pragmatism in January 1878. Peirce gave the pragmatic definition of meaning, and James argued that intelligence, through action, helps to make truth. In 1888 Dewey defended social democracy in an instrumentalist way, and his psychological theory followed, although it has remained distinct from behaviorism in three respects. Pragmatism is "the philosophy that strives to discover and to render pervasive and secure all that makes life meaningful and precious." JRS

1881 Otto, Max C. *Natural Laws and Human Hopes.* New York: Henry Holt, 1926. Reprinted, Denver: A. Swallow, 1953.

1900 Bode, Boyd H. *Modern Educational Theories.* New York: Macmillan, 1927.

1901 Bridgman, Percy Williams. *The Logic of Modern Physics.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. Reprinted, New York: Arno Press, 1980.

Reviews

A. C. Benjamin, J Phil 24.24 (24 Nov 1927): 663-665.

1902 Cimmaruta, Mathilde. La pedagogica de Giovanni Dewey. L'educazione nazionale 9 (July 1927): 446-457.

1903 Dewey, John. Anthropology and Ethics. In *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, ed. William Fielding Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), pp. 24-36. Reprinted in *LW* 3: 11-24.

1904 Dewey, John. An Empirical Account of Appearance. J Phil 24.17 (18 Aug 1927): 449-463. Reprinted as "Appearing and Appearance" in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 56-76. *LW* 3: 55-72.

Summaries

Anon, Journal of Philosophical Studies 2.4 (Oct 1927): 592-593.

1905 Dewey, John. Half-Hearted Naturalism. J Phil 24.3 (3 Feb 1927): 57-64. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 359-366. *LW* 3: 73-81.

Dewey replies to Thilly's "Contemporary American Philosophy" {1890}, and Santayana's "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," {1836}. Because it embraces a "foreground" of human involvements, Santayana dismisses pragmatic naturalism as "half-hearted." Instead he advocates a "whole-hearted" naturalism that despises foreground and kneels dumbly before the infinite. Santayana's philosophy is "broken-backed," for it places a gap between nature and human activity, which is rejected by common sense and science alike. Wherever we look, human affairs are continuous with nature. Experience is not a barrier, but a conduit to background: "it is the foreground *of* nature." FXR

1906 Dewey, John. The Pragmatic Acquiescence. New Republic 49.1 (5 Jan 1927): 186-189. Reprinted as "Philosophy and the Social Order" in *Characters and Events* {2024} vol. 2, pp. 435-442. *LW* 3: 145-151.

Dewey comments on Lewis Mumford, *The Golden* Day {1877}. JRS

Notes

See Mumford's reply, New Republic 49 (1927): 250-251.

1907 Dewey, John. *The Public and Its Problems.* New York: Henry Holt; London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1927. Reprinted with a new Introduction [*LW* 2: 375-381] Chicago: Gateway Press, 1946. *LW* 2: 235-372.

This seminal work of social philosophy explores the emergence of the "public" and champions a "Great Community" fostered by social intelligence. At the outset Dewey warns against mythologizing The State as either an inherent force or as a reflection of per-

manent human nature. Instead, needs produce actions with consequences that not only affect one's immediate circle but may have indirect affects on others, creating the need for the state: government and officials empowered to regulate public consequences.

The next two chapters similarly de-mystify and de-romanticize democracy. "Individual liberty" is neither a self-evident precept nor an inalienable right. The "individual" and "liberty" are both products of profound changes in science, religion, and economics. Born in rebellion, democracy is superior to other forms of government in which power and wealth are distributed by caprice or oppression. In America, the explosion of technology and communication has fostered confusion and complacency rather than enlightened participation; the public has shattered into myriad "publics" overwhelmed by and thus alienated from a political system dominated by bureaucracies and corporations. Despite lip service to the contrary, our society promotes conformity over true individuality.

It is not too late to reverse this downward spiral. The final two chapters sketch Dewey's vision of the "Great Community," erected and maintained by the method of social intelligence. He promotes no specific structures; these must be built by the participants themselves. Instead, we must first overcome the standard view of the inevitable conflict between the individual and society. In eradicating the autonomous individual, we learn that selves and communities are reciprocally connected. As a literal construct of social involvements, the individual learns to integrate direct and indirect consequences, personal needs with the needs of others. A community, commensurably, realizes that it can survive unexpected challenges only by encouraging openness, innovation, and a plurality of views. It must also learn how to educate and inform effectively to maximize social intelligence. FXR

Reviews

Anon, Monist 40.4 (Oct 1930): 640; L. L. Bernard, Social Forces 7 (1928): 155-156; Emory S. Bogardus, Sociology and Social Research 12 (1928): 385-386; W. E. Hocking, J Phil 26.12 (6 June 1929): 329-335; Robert Morss Lovett, New Republic 52 (24 Aug 1927): 22-23; Virgil Michel, New Scholasticism 2 (April 1928): 210-212; William Bennett Munro, Yale Review n.s. 17 (April 1928): 610-612; Henry Neumann, Survey 59 (1 Nov 1927): 162-163; Robert E. Park, American Journal of Sociology 34 (1928): 1192-1194; Stephen C. Pepper, Int J Ethics 38 (1928): 478-480; O. de Selincourt, Mind 37.3 (July 1928): 368-370; Thomas V. Smith, Phil Rev 38.2 (March 1929): 177-180.

1908 Dewey, John. The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar Sheffield Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 536-542. Reprinted in Phil Rev 36.1 (Jan 1927): 1-9. Reprinted as "Philosophy and Civilization," in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 3-12. *LW* 3: 3-10.

Philosophy, like science, is deeply influenced by history and culture. Every civilization is enveloped by a vast network of meanings in which "truths" are but a small subclass. Significant history evolves in human imagination and emotion. Science itself is "but a function of the imagination" that enriches "life with the significance of things" subject to experimentation and control. Some believe that the vast impersonal universe renders human experience insignificant. Such a comparison is illegitimate, however, because we measure the former solely by the latter. Philosophy distills and exaggerates the inevitable

clash between old and new, resistance and innovation. Under the pretense of what "always *has* been," it traditionally dictates what "*should* be." This inhibits genuine scientific imagination and a philosophy responsive to it. FXR

Summaries

Anon, Journal of Philosophical Studies 2.2 (April 1927): 270-271.

Notes

See Horace L. Friess's "The Sixth International Congress of Philosophy," J Phil 23.23 (11 Nov 1926): 617-638, for a report of the discussion of this paper.

1909 Elliott, William Y. Pragmatic Ethics, Positivistic Law, and the Constitutional State. Economica No. 19 (March 1927): 1-26.

1910 Hart, Joseph Kinmont. *Inside Experience: A Naturalistic Philosophy of Life and the Modern World.* London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927.

It contains Dewey's "Introductory Note," pp. xxi-xxvi [*LW* 5: 342-345]. Expressing an indebtedness to John Dewey, Hart offers a wide-ranging discussion of "some of the main categories of Dr. Dewey's *Experience and Nature*." Typical chapters include "Some Aspects of Reflective Experience," "The Nature of Society," "Mind and Matter," "Levels of Behavior," "What is Deliberation?" "What is Morality?" "The Intellectual Life," "Creation and Recreation," "What is Art?" and "The Individual." JRS

Reviews

Mary Kuypers, J Phil 26.15 (18 July 1929): 407-411. Hart often confuses terms which Dewey has carefully defined, exposing instrumentalism to "the very valid attacks which Mr. Dewey himself has had to deal with." JRS

J. J. Findlay, Journal of Philosophical Studies 3.1 (Jan 1928): 116-118; Virgil Michel, New Scholasticism 2.2 (April 1928): 179-180.

Notes

See Hart, "What Price System?" Survey 57 (1927): 552-556, 600.

1911 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. *Idealism as a Philosophy.* New York: George H. Doran, 1927.

Hoernlé discusses pragmatism in relation to F. H. Bradley on pp. 234-235. JRS

1912 Hook, Sidney. Categorical Analysis and Pragmatic-Realism. J Phil 24.7 (31 March 1927): 169-187.

Pragmatic realism defends the middle ground between Aristotle's objectivism and Kant's subjectivism. The mind is "a mode or consequence of behavior in a natural context of things and events; that those fundamental categories, like causality, unity, etc., which validly apply for all objects and qualities, characterize mind in its operations, too." As distinctions made in analysis, categories cannot be independently investigated; the universe cannot be the subject of a meaningful judgment. Potential meanings are sorted for their relevance to specific purposes of control. The most useful meanings emerge as categories, becoming axiomatic in their respective fields of experience. Such principles of explanation can be extended into other fields in the search for explanatory simplicity, and may be amended or discarded if they fail to resolve doubt or fall to defiant experiences. JRS

1913 Hook, Sidney. The Irrationality of *The Irrational.* J Phil 24.16 (4 Aug 1927): 421-437.

If any logic of "a priori" truths is used to *explain why* things are, then those elements of existence which cannot be deduced from these truths are labeled as "irrational," resulting in a "schismatic" ontology. This reasoning hides the fact that 1) the "a priori" truths are arbitrarily selected from the generic traits of existence, and 2) any set of "a priori" truths will leave behind non-deducible elements. Therefore, logic should be used to *describe what* things are, existence really contains no "irrational" elements, and existence is an intelligible plurality of things possessing individuality, uniqueness, and immediacy. Meaningful questions must have possible answers. The ultimate characteristics of existence give rise to problems and meaningful questions about problems, but they cannot be themselves the subjects of meaningful questions. Kantian antinomies reveal such limits to questioning. Chance is not real, and an intelligible account of time can be given. JRS

1914 Hook, Sidney. *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1927. Chicago: Open Court, 1927. Reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1977. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1996.

It contains Dewey's "Introductory Word," pp. 1-5 [*LW* 5: 338-341]. Pragmatism is more truly represented by the experimentalism of Peirce and Dewey than the personalism and nominalism of James and Schiller. While pragmatism eliminates traditional problems by dissolving their underlying assumptions, it does not reject metaphysics. Existence has discrete structures, though these are dynamic, open-ended, and empirically determined. At the heart of pragmatic metaphysics is a "theory of the instrument," for instruments impose meaning and order on brute existential "stuff." By liberating latent forms, instruments transform potentiality into actuality. Forms of greatest generality and widest applicability become *leading principles*–scientific laws and habituated social norms. *Categories* further delineate forms in terms of progressive "thickness," where greater richness of meaning restricts the scope of applicability. FXR

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 37.2 (April 1928): 242-243. Hook's dubious use of "metaphysics" and "pragmatism" confuses logic with metaphysics. He underestimates the pragmatic method's value, causing his mistaken notion that it needs a supplementary doctrine of ultimate reality. A truly pragmatic metaphysics will be provisional but progressive. JRS

Anon, Dial 85 (Oct 1928): 360; Scott Buchanan, J Phil 25.13 (21 June 1928): 356-359; J. J. Stocks, London Mercury 18 (Oct 1928): 666-669.

Notes

See Stephen Pepper, "The Order of Time" {2443}.

1915 Hook, Sidney. The Metaphysics of the Instrument. Monist 37.3 (July 1927): 335-356; 37.4 (Oct 1927): 601-619.

Hook restates themes of his *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism* {1914}. JRS

1916 Horne, Herman Harrell. *The Philosophy of Education: Being the Foundations of Education in the Related Natural and Mental Sciences.* Revised edition, with "special reference to the educational philosophy of John Dewey." New York: Macmillan, 1927.

1917 Hsiao, K. C. *Political Pluralism: A Study of Modern Political Theory.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., 1927.

Chap. 8 critiques James's radical empiricism from the Hegelian standpoint. JRS

Reviews

Paul W. Ward, J Phil 25.14 (5 July 1928): 383-387.

1918 Hull, Robert L. The New Realists and the American Social Revolution. Thought 2.2 (Sept 1927): 252-276.

1919 James, William. Reason and Faith. J Phil 24.8 (14 April 1927): 197-201. Reprinted in *Works ERM,* pp. 124-128.

Notes

This paper is a summary of his contribution to a discussion in San Francisco in 1906, which was prevented by the earthquake in that year from publication.

1920 Kallen, Horace M. Fascism: For the Italians. New Republic 49 (12 Jan 1927): 211-212.

Kallen asked Mussolini what of James he had read; Mussolini was visibly irritated and made no reply. IKS

Notes

See Kallen, "Mussolini, William James, and the Rationalists" {2628}.

1921 Knudson, Albert C. *The Philosophy of Personalism: A Study in the Metaphysics of Religion.* New York: Abingdon, 1927. Reprinted, New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969.

1922 Krikorian, Y. H. Mechanical Explanation: Its Meaning and Applicability. J Phil 24.1 (6 Jan 1927): 14-21.

1923 Lewis, C. I. Review of N. O. Losokij, *Handbuch der Logic.* J Phil 24.24 (24 Nov 1927): 665-667.

1924 Lloyd, Alfred H. Also the Emergence of Matter. J Phil 24.12 (9 June 1927): 309-332.

1925 Lombardo Radice, Giuseppe. L'impostazione del problema pedagogica in John Dewey. L'educazione nazionale 12 (June-July 1930): 281-287.

1926 Long, Wilbur Harry. *The Philosophy of Charles Renouvier and Its Influence on William James.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1927.

1927 MacMurray, J. The Function of Experiment in Knowledge. *Proc Arist Soc* 27 (1927): 193-212.

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, J Phil 25.10 (10 May 1928): 270-273.

1928 Mead, G. H. The Objective Reality of Perspectives. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 75-85. Reprinted in *The Philosophy of the Present* {2244}, pp. 161-175. *Selected Writings*, pp. 306-319.

The assault on dualism has been attempted by James, Bergson, neo-idealism, neo-realism, and pragmatism. Further progress may come from the "objectivity of perspectives," arising independently in behavioristic psychology and Whitehead's philosophy of relativism. The genetic development of human intelligence is the emergence of social experience through the organization of objective perspectives. JRS

1929 Miller, Dickinson S. Dr. Schiller and Analysis. J Phil 24.23 (10 Nov 1927): 617-624.

Miller replies to Schiller's "William James and the Will to Believe" {1945}. Schiller's indulgently loose "breezes of impalpable criticism" fail to touch "the joints of my argument." JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "William James and Empiricism" {2004}.

1930 Moore, A. W. Substance and Existence in Neo-Realism. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 278-284.

1931 Morris, Charles W. The Concept of the Symbol. J Phil 24.10 (12 May 1927): 253-262; 24.11 (26 May 1927): 281-291.

1932 Murphy, Arthur E. Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead. Phil Rev 36.2 (March 1927): 121-144.

"Objective relativism" holds that 1) objective natural facts are directly disclosed to us in reality, and yet 2) "remain ultimately and inescapably relative." This reverses the accepted view that *objects* are real and *events* "merely" mark their relations. Instead, events are substantive, as the union of relation and brute occurrence. Objects are "slices" or "characters" of events, and universals are meanings whose spatio-temporal locus is irrelevant. Whitehead acutely grasps this fundamental realignment as "prehensive events" and "eternal objects." So too does Dewey, in his recognition that "the same existential event is capable of an infinite number of meanings." Dewey's subjectivistic tendency to reduce the world to personal "experience" is rectified once we realize that "relativity" is not in the perceiver but in the world itself. FXR

1933 Piccoli, Raffaello. Contemporary Tendencies in Italian Philosophy. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Long-

mans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 649-655.

1934 Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. Facts and Propositions. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 7 (1927): 153-170. Reprinted in *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays*, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), pp. 138-155. *Philosophical Papers*, ed. D. H. Mellor (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 34-51.

Ramsey expresses his debt to Wittgenstein, save for Ramsey's pragmatism, which is derived from Bertrand Russell. "The essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects." JRS

Notes

See Nils-Eric Sahlin, *The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

1935 Reyburn, Hugh A. A Functional Theory of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Studies 2.3 (July 1927): 315-329; 2.4 (Oct 1927): 643-476.

1936 Rosenberger, Harry Emerson. *William James' Philosophy of Will.* Dissertation, New York University, 1927.

1937 Rossi Longhi, M. La pedagogica di Giovanni Dewey. L'educazione nazionale 9 (Oct 1927): 582-589.

1938 Russell, Bertrand. *An Outline of Philosophy.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927. Published as *Philosophy*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1927.

Russell discusses James's views on "Consciousness," pp. 218-225, and makes a few other references to pragmatists. JRS

1939 Schiller, F. C. S. Communication on Philosophy and International Relations. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 382-384.

1940 Schiller, F. C. S. Fact and Value. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, at Harvard University, 13-17 September 1926, ed. Edgar S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 296-300.

1941 Schiller, F. C. S. Reality, Fact and Meaning. In *Congrès des sociétés philosophiques américaine, anglaises, belge, italienne, et de la société française de philosophie* (Paris: Armond Colin, 1927).

Reviews

Theodore De Laguna, J Phil 23.22 (28 Oct 1926): 609-613.

1942 Schiller, F. C. S. Some Logical Aspects of Psychical Research. In *The Case For and Against Psychical Belief*, ed. Carl A. Murchinson (Worcester: Clark University, 1927), pp. 215-226.

1943 Schiller, F. C. S. The Two Logics. Mind 36.1 (Jan 1927): 64-68. Reprinted in the University of California *Alumni Circular*, May and June, 1931.

1944 Schiller, F. C. S. William James and the Making of Pragmatism. Personalist 8.2 (April 1927): 81-93. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 93-105.

Schiller offers his reminiscences about the founding of pragmatism and his contacts with James. According to a letter to Schiller from James's wife, James came to regret not adopting Schiller's suggestion to use the term "humanism." IKS

1945 Schiller, F. C. S. William James and the Will to Believe. J Phil 24.16 (4 Aug 1927): 437-440.

Schiller comments on D. S. Miller's review of Bixler's *Religion in the Philosophy of William James* {1850}. Schiller regretted that Miller had not "moved an inch" from his early position on James, and that Miller was still tied to the conception of a static truth. IKS

Notes

See Miller's reply, "Dr. Schiller and Analysis" {2004}.

1946 Schiller, F. C. S., A. C. Ewing, W. F. R. Hardie. The Problem of Meaning. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 7 (1927): 98-123.

Schiller's contribution to this symposium is part one, pp. 98-105. Ewing comments on Schiller's essay in his portion, pp. 106-113, as does Hardie, pp. 114-123. JRS

1947 Slochower, Harry. Die Philosophie in den Vereinigten Staaten unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gegenwart. In *Reichls Philosophischer Almanach* (1927), pp. 349-458.

1948 Stumpf, Carl. *William James, nach seinen briefen: Leben, Charakter, Lehre.* Kant-Studien 32.2-3 (1927): 205-241. Reprinted, Berlin: Rolf Heise, 1928.

1949 Trueblood, Charles K. The Education of William James. Dial 83 (Oct 1927): 301-314.

James's philosophy is an expression of his character. While we do not find logic in it, we find "discernment into humanity, the gifts of insight." Trueblood stresses James's relations with his father and Louis Agassiz. IKS

1950 Ward, James. The Present Trend of Philosophical Speculation. In *Essays in Philosophy*, ed. W. R. Sorley and G. F. Stout (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1927), pp. 162-181.

Notes

This essay was written in 1903 and given as a lecture in England and America.

1951 Widgery, Alban G. Pragmatist Humanism. Chap. 4 of his *Contemporary Thought of Great Britain* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 120-143.

1952 Ziegler, Leopold. Amerikanismus und Pragmatismus. In *Zwischen Mensch und Wirtschaft* (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl, 1927), pp. 271-302.

1928

1953 Baillie, John. The Interpretation of Religion. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.

James's contributions to the psychology of religion are reviewed on pp. 132-138. James's failure to face the real issue of religion's truth lies in his futile attempt to "find some standard by which it can be judged other than that by which it judges itself." JRS

1954 Baum, Maurice James. *A Comparative Study of the Philosophies of William James and John Dewey.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928.

1955 Beath, Paul Robert. John Dewey: Pragmatist. University of Illinois Daily Illini (26 Feb 1928): 1, 2.

Notes

See also Levi Robert Lind, "Dewey Pictured as Prophet and Reconstructivist," ibid.

1956 Beer, Thomas. Pragmatism: Story. Saturday Evening Post 200 (21 Jan 1928): 12-13.

1957 Bogoslovsky, Boris Basil. *The Technique of Controversy: Principles of Dynamic Logic.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., 1928.

1958 Cobb, Stanwood. *The New Leaven.* New York: John Day, 1928.

The subtitle is "Progressive Education and Its Effect upon the Child and Society." Pp. 12-14 describe Dewey's educational contributions. JRS

1959 Crissman, Paul. Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good. Monist 38.4 (Oct 1928): 592-619.

A thorough exposition is followed by a critique. Dewey shortsightedly discards tradition and individual creativity. His tenet that the meaning of the good lies in the present contradicts his tenet that no object comes complete with its full import. Another contra-

diction is found between the statements that all moral goods are on the same level and that some goods are supreme and consummatory. JRS

1960 DeLargy, Percy Lee. *Empirical Method in Science and Philosophy.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928.

1961 Dennes, William R. Practice as the Test of Truth. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 10, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 89-116.

Dewey's "empiricist" theory of truth makes it impossible to specify what judgment is being verified by experience. C. I. Lewis argues that conceptual systems can be compared only on pragmatic grounds. However, the better course is to distrust any judgments lacking in empirical testability, and to instead seek other verifiable judgments. Knowledge is the direct apprehension of "the essence of processes in nature." The pragmatic criterion of simple convenience is not a practical, but aesthetic, preference. Since no theory of truth can be "proven," the authority of intuition is able to guarantee the correct definition of truth. JRS

Reviews

Charles W. Morris, J Phil 26.13 (20 June 1929): 356-360.

1962 Dewey, John. Body and Mind. Mental Hygiene 12 (Jan 1928): 1-17. Also published in Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 4 (Jan 1928): 3-19. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 299-317. *LW* 3: 25-40.

The separation of body and mind in Western thought has consequently resulted in the "disastrous" alternatives of either regarding the human being as a mere physical mechanism or isolating the soul from the natural universe. To overcome this we must conceive of body-mind as a "unity of action" within which body presents itself as the "instrument of behavior" and mind as "the function, fruit, and consummation" of such behavior. Because it denotes the source of purposive, intelligently directed behavior, body extends beyond the physiological processes within the individual organism to include an entire social environment. FXR

1963 Dewey, John. A Critique of American Civilization. Chap. 12 of *Recent Gains in American Civilization*, ed. Kirby Page (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), pp. 253-276. Reprinted in *LW* 3: 133-144.

Notes

A shorter version first appeared in World Tomorrow 11 (Oct 1928): 391-395.

1964 Dewey, John. Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind. New Republic 53 (11 Jan 1928): 210-212. Reprinted as "Oliver Wendell Holmes" in *Characters and Events* {2024}, vol. 1, pp. 100-106. In *Mr. Justice Holmes*, ed. Felix Frankfurter (New York: Coward-McCann, 1931), pp. 33-45. *LW* 3: 177-183.

Reviews of *Mr. Justice Holmes*

Norman Wilde, Int J Ethics 42 (1932): 215-217.

1965 Dewey, John. Meaning and Existence. J Phil 25.13 (21 June 1928): 345-353. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 475-483. *LW* 3: 82-91.

Dewey replies to Hall's "Some Meanings of Meaning in Dewey's *Experience and Nature*" {1974}. In one sense Hall is correct, since even the bare mention of "events without meaning" imparts meaning, "if only the meaning of being without meaning." But we must not convert a "predicament of discourse into a trait of existence," hence we must allow a level of meaningless natural events that acquire meaning. There are also prelinguistic qualities and feelings that guide behavior in subtle ways. Though not themselves meanings, these are prerequisites to meaning, or the "stuff" of meaning.

Hall believes that meaning is inherent in primitive qualities, when in fact it only emerges when a quality *refers* to something beyond itself. A crack in the night becomes meaningful when the sailor *refers* it to a blown sail in order to decide what to *do* about it. It is not that a partial meaning refers to a whole, but that one thing is a sign of another. A so-called "immanent" meaning is the product of successful use. FXR

1966 Dewey, John. Philosophies of Freedom. In *Freedom and the Modern World*, ed. Horace M. Kallen (New York: Coward-McCann, 1928), pp. 236-271. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 271-298. *LW* 3: 92-114.

Although "freedom" is now enmeshed in social and political ideology, at its core is the moral issue of the dignity of choice. Human action is continuous with the selection and rejection found throughout nature. "Choice" is the capacity for selection among conflicting preferences. Will is thus not "free" is the sense of choice unmotivated by habits or desires, and philosophies that preach unfettered "liberty" inevitably favor the privileged and empowered. A truly free society, to the contrary, promotes the intelligent consideration of consequences that enhance both the power and range of action. FXR

Reviews

H. G. Townsend, J Phil 26.16 (1 Aug 1929): 444-446.

1967 Dewey, John. Philosophy. In *Whither Mankind: a Panorama of Modern Civilization*, ed. Charles Austin Beard (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928): 313-331. Reprinted in *LW* 3: 115-132.

1968 Dewey, John. Philosophy as Fine Art. New Republic 53 (15 Feb 1928): 352-354. Reprinted in *LW* 3: 287-294.

Dewey reviews George Santayana's *The Realm of Essence* (1927). JRS

1969 Dewey, John. *The Philosophy of John Dewey*. Ed. Joseph Ratner. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928.

Ratner's "Preface," pp. v-vii, promises that these chosen excerpts from Dewey's books and articles are carefully arranged so that "Mr. Dewey's philosophy stands systematically revealed" to the lay reader. FXR

Reviews

Anon, Monist 40.2 (April 1930): 324; Joseph K. Hart, Survey 61 (1929): 454-455; Eugene Mark Kayden, Sewanee Review 38.1 (Jan 1930): 120-123; Mary Kuypers, J Phil 26.15 (18 July 1929): 407-411; Virgil Michel, New Scholasticism 2.4 (Oct 1928): 387-388; Donald A. Piatt, Phil Rev 40 (1931): 276-281; Eliseo Vivas, Nation 127 (31 Oct 1928): 457-458.

1970 Dewey, John. Social as a Category. Monist 38.2 (April 1928): 161-177. Reprinted as "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea," in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 77-92. *LW* 3: 41-54.

All existences are involved in associated or conjoint behavior. The more fully we know such relations, the better we understand any thing or event. Hence the metaphysical quest for ultimate "reality" amounts to determining "the widest and fullest range of associated activity." While nature exhibits a continuity of relations from the simple to the complex, this progression exhibits itself in phases we identify as physical, organic, mental, and social. Of these, the social is the "philosophically inclusive category," for it "is the richest, fullest and most delicately subtle of any mode actually experienced." The most vital philosophical insight is realizing that we must start with the "widest and most complex" associations instead of atomic simples, data, or essences. To assert that analysis proceeds from the social is not to claim that other phases cannot otherwise exist, but only that the social is crucial to grasping their "full force and import." Science, even in describing physical and organic conditions of society, is itself a social phenomenon. FXR

Notes

The discussion of this paper, along with summaries of other papers involving pragmatism, is reported in "The Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 25.4 (16 Feb 1928): 96-108.

1971 Edman, Irwin. From Experience to Nature. J Phil 25.4 (16 Feb 1928): 85-96.

1972 Edman, Irwin. Religion and the Philosophical Imagination. J Phil 25.25 (6 Dec 1928): 673-685.

1973 Elliot, William Yandell. *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism, and the Constitutional State.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 2nd ed., with a new preface and three new appendixes, New York: H. Fertig, 1968.

Reviews

W. B. Mahan, J Phil 26.5 (28 Feb 1929): 134-139. Elliot presents the strange spectacle of a social scientist trying to condemn pragmatism, a philosophy focused on consequences, on the grounds that it has bad consequences. Elliot has no understanding of Dewey's emphasis on the social importance of intelligence. JRS

1974 Hall, Everett Wesley. Some Meanings of Meaning in Dewey's *Experience and Nature.* J Phil 25.7 (29 March 1928): 169-181. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 463-475. *LW* 3: 401-414.

Experience and Nature {1809} flourishes with meanings of "meaning," from rudimentary denotative pointing and "felt" immediacy, to complex social action. Dewey tries to avoid idealism by positing meaningless natural existences to which meaning is added. But to even point at something is to tacitly acknowledge a meaningful background against which this thing stands out. To call something a "bare" existence ascribes some nature to it. There is "no realm of existence from which all meaning can be excluded." FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Meaning and Existence" {1965}.

1975 Hall, Royal G. The Significance of John Dewey for Religious Interpretation. Open Court 42.6 (June 1928): 331-340.

1976 Han, Yü-Shan. Some Tendencies of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. J Phil 25.19 (13 Sept 1928): 505-513.

1977 Handschy, Harriet Wild. The Educational Theories of Cardinal Newman and John Dewey. Education 49 (1928): 129-137.

1978 Humphreys, John Wesley. *The Educational Philosophy of William James*. Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1928.

1979 Kaul, Vishwanath. *Anti-Pragmatism*. Gwalior, India: C. I., 1928.

Kaul summarizes the lectures of James's *Pragmatism* {438}. Pragmatism abandons philosophical inquiry "as a hopeless task," because of the presence of "human motives." It tells us to "take the cash in hand and waive the rest" and is "utilitarianism gone mad." IKS

1980 Klyce, Scudder. *Dewey's Suppressed Psychology: A Psychological Study of John Dewey, being Correspondence between John Dewey and Scudder Klyce*. Winchester, Mass.: S. Klyce, 1928.

This privately mimeographed text, since it includes only one letter from Dewey on pp. 232-233 (Dewey did not give Klyce permission to publish any of his letters, though Klyce paraphrases portions of many) and 32 of Klyce's letters, reveals far more about Klyce's own personality than Dewey's. The appendixes include reprints of eight of Klyce's reviews of various books, a circular summarizing reviews and personal letters commenting on Klyce's *Sins of Science*, and a reprint of an article on mathematics. JRS

1981 Knox, Howard V. *The Will to Be Free*. London: Constable and Co., 1928.

A lengthy and detailed defense of free-will based on James's will to believe doctrine. Determinism denies that freedom is intelligible, but fails to prove that the will cannot be an effective agent. The voluntarist's "will" is precisely intelligence in action. JRS

1982 Le Breton, Maurice. *La Personnalité de William James*. Dissertation, University of Bourdeaux, 1928. Bordeaux: Imprimerie de l'Université, 1928. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1929.

Le Breton surveys major aspects of James's thought, and emphasizes influences that shaped James's personality, such as his family, other philosophers, and his Cambridge surroundings. IKS

Reviews

Joseph Peterson, Amer J Psych 44.4 (Oct 1932): 830-831.

1983 Lewis, C. I. Review of A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 2nd. ed. American Mathematical Monthly 35 (April 1928): 200-205. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 394-399.

1984 Mackay, Donald S. Esthetic and Experimental Truth. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 10, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 63-86.

Reviews

Charles W. Morris, J Phil 26.13 (20 June 1929): 356-360.

1985 Michel, Virgil George. Some Thoughts on Professor Dewey. New Scholasticism 2.4 (Oct 1928): 327-341.

Dewey's thought "never leaves one lukewarm." Critics enjoy hunting for verbal inconsistencies in Dewey's writings, but they ought to give an author's words consistent meanings. Dewey's view that the full meaning of a statement lies only within its context certainly applies to his own work. Dewey now has a broader sympathy for the "perennial problems of philosophy." There is some agreement between Scholasticism and Dewey on the issue of cognition. JRS

1986 Miller, Dickinson S. A Bird's-Eye View. J Phil 25.14 (5 July 1928): 378-383.

Miller replies to Schiller's "William James and Empiricism" {2004}. Miller provides his own version of events surrounding the publication of his "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" {39}, to correct Schiller's version in "William James and the Making of Pragmatism" {1944}. Schiller does not care for the attentive use of terms and reasonings or the efforts to understand others' ideas; such "chaos" has caused "the low grade of development of philosophy as a science." JRS

Notes

See Schiller's reply, "The End of a Great Legend" {2062}.

1987 Morgan, William Joseph. *La Psychologie de la religion dans l'amérique d'aujourd'hui.* Paris: Jouve et Cie., 1928.

A chapter gives an exposition of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}. JRS

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 41.2 (April 1931): 318.

1988 Morris, Charles W. Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing. Monist 38.4 (Oct 1928): 494-510.

Mind, thought, knowledge, and truth are functions within experience, and not in the reflective processes guiding successful behavior, as "primitive" pragmatism contends. Montague's *The Ways of Knowing* {1834} fails to defend dualism; his reliance on an impossible revelatory experience giving knowledge of an object beyond experience explains error, but not knowledge. Epistemology must not assume that objects' qualities as experienced remain unchanged when objects are not experienced. By declaring that experience is not fundamentally subjective but just existent, the pragmatist transcends epistemology, and can instead analyze the reflective process of the creation of knowledge. Dewey's reduction of knowledge to successful behavior should be avoided. JRS

Notes

See Paul Schilpp's response, "The Subjectivism of the Neo-Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge" {2142}.

1989 Morris, Charles W. The Prediction Theory of Truth. Monist 38.3 (July 1928): 386-401.

Morris describes a version of pragmatism "which is not embarrassed by the realistic criticisms directed against the looser formulations" of James and Dewey. A prediction is "a claim made by symbols as to what would be found in a certain specific area of experience" and a prediction is "true" if the predicted experience is obtained as predicted. Truth is relative to the meanings of symbols and the observers of experiences, it has nothing to do with the internal consistency relations between symbols, and it is independent of the belief that a verifying experience will be obtained for a prediction. Judgments of practice are predictions, but not the only type of predictions. JRS

Notes

An earlier reading of this paper is summarized in "The Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 24.11 (26 May 1927): 298.

1990 Muirhead, John Henry. Peirce's Place in American Philosophy. Phil Rev 37.5 (Sept 1928): 460-481. Reprinted as "Charles Peirce" in *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-American Philosophy* {2184}, pp. 324-346.

1991 Naumberg, Margaret. A Challenge to John Dewey. Survey 60 (1928): 598-600.

1992 Otto, Max C. Instrumentalism. In *Philosophy Today*, ed. Edward L. Schaub (Chicago: Open Court, 1928. Rpt., Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 37-53.

1993 Pepper, Stephen C. Truth by Continuity. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 43-59.

Even Dewey has retained essences and does not take time completely seriously in his metaphysics, since his appeal to similarities implies subsistent entities. (pp. 46-49) His "denotative method" is a recent expression of the "scientists' unbounded faith in the powers of pure description." Pragmatism confuses truth with verifications. JRS

Reviews

Charles W. Morris, J Phil 26.13 (20 June 1929): 356-360.

1994 Perry, Charles M. A New Herakleiteanism. J Phil 25.9 (26 April 1928): 225-233.

Perry critiques James's radical empiricism on pp. 226-227. JRS

1995 Perry, Charner M. Language and Thought. Monist 38.2 (April 1928): 211-230.

Perry comments on Dewey's "Knowledge and Speech Reaction" {1668} and Mead's "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Signal" {1686}. JRS

1996 Perry, Charner M. Some Difficulties in Current Value Theory. J Phil 25.11 (24 May 1928): 281-287.

Views of Warner Fite, John Dewey, and R. B. Perry are compared and critiqued. JRS

Notes

An earlier reading of this paper is summarized in "The Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 24.11 (26 May 1927): 296.

1997 Piatt, Donald A. Immediate Experience. J Phil 25.18 (30 Aug 1928): 477-492.

In their zeal to defend "immediate" experience from the accepted view that knowledge is ubiquitous, many pragmatists have isolated such experience from all meaning and inference. But even the most primitive feelings, though beneath the threshold of meaning, are subject to psycho-physical direction and expectation. Aesthetic and consummatory objects, though immediate in their respective enjoyments and uses, are nonetheless charged with meanings that include acquaintance, familiarity, and recognition. FXR

Notes

An earlier reading of this paper is summarized in "The Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association," J Phil 24.11 (26 May 1927): 294.

1998 Piatt, Donald A. Mr. Montague on the Relativity of Truth. J Phil 25.12 (7 June 1928): 323-326.

Piatt defends pragmatism against W. P. Montague's interpretation in *The Ways of Knowing* {1834}. JRS

1999 Roe, Chungil Yhan. *The True Function of Education in Social Adjustment.* Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1928.

The subtitle reads "A Comparative Estimate and Criticism of the Educational Teachings of Confucius and the Philosophy of John Dewey with a View to Evolving a Project for a System of National Education Which Will Meet the Needs of Korea." JRS

2000 Rusk, Robert R. *The Philosophical Bases of Education.* London: University of London Press, 1928.

Reviews

T. C., Studies: Irish Quarterly Review 17.3 (Sept 1928): 501-502.

2001 Russell, Bertrand. Can Men Be Rational? Chap. 4 of *Sceptical Essays* (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: W. W. Norton, 1928), pp. 45-53.

Rationality is "the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief." The pragmatists' irrationalism, in denying objective fact, is inconsistent with the common-sense of real life. JRS

2002 Sarkar, Benoy Kumar. *The Political Philosophies Since 1905.* Madras, India: B. G. Paul, 1928

2003 Schiller, F. C. S. The Infinite Regress of Proof. Mind 37.3 (July 1928): 353-354.

2004 Schiller, F. C. S. William James and Empiricism. J Phil 25.6 (15 March 1928): 155-162.

Schiller replies to Dickinson Miller's "Dr. Schiller and Analysis" {1929}. JRS

Notes

See Miller's reply, "A Bird's-Eye View" {1986}.

2005 Schinz, Albert. Le Pragmatisme religieux: À propos de la "Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard." Rev Phil 106.9 (Sept 1928): 280-309.

Schinz agrees with many commentators that the *Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard* (*The Curate of Savoy's Profession of Faith*) is the keystone of the philosophical work of Rousseau. The religion of Rousseau–one that is logically connected to the rest of this thought–guarantees man's happiness on earth; and it is, from beginning to end, of a pragmatic character. (p. 304) Rousseau did not himself come to distinguish between rational pragmatic religion and mystical religion because (1) of the complexity of moral questions, (2) mystical religion can act as an ornament of every religion, and (3) mystical exaltation on the subject of consciousness is in perfect accord with Rousseau's poetic disposition. (p. 309) LF

2006 Spaulding, Edward G. *What Am I?* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.

Reviews

D. Maurice Allan, J Phil 26.4 (14 Feb 1929): 106-109. Spaulding effectively argues that pragmatism and other "appearance vs. reality" theories are doomed to fail because any attempt to discredit knowledge must itself be based on knowledge. JRS

2007 Townsend, H. G. The Pragmatism of Peirce and Hegel. Phil Rev 37.4 (July 1928): 297-303.

Some have associated Peirce with Hegel, while others have declared that Peirce and Hegel have completely divergent logical theories. Both treat implication as central to logic, find complete continuity between thought and action, and assert that thought requires the supposition of an ideal system. However, Peirce tends toward voluntarism. This voluntarism heavily influenced Josiah Royce, but the later pragmatists have carried voluntarism to extremes unacceptable to Royce. JRS

1929

2008 Adams, George P. Truths of Existence and of Meaning. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 35-61.

Reviews

R. I. Aaron, Mind 39.3 (July 1930): 376-379; Charles W. Morris, J Phil 27.8 (10 April 1930): 210-215; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 208-210.

2009 Ames, Edward Scribner. *Religion.* New York: Henry Holt, 1929.
James is discussed on pp. 29-33. JRS
Reviews
Anon, Monist 41.1 (Jan 1931): 159; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 26 (1929): 607-612.

2010 Arndt, Ruth Spence. *John Dewey's Philosophy of Education.* Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, 1929.

2011 Axtelle, George E. A Personal Appreciation of John Dewey. Hawaii Educational Review 18 (1929): 33-34, 41-43, 45-46.

2012 Bertalan, Biro. *A Tudatalatti Vilag: William James Lelektanaban.* Szeged: 1929.

2013 Bisbee, Eleanor. *Instrumentalism in Plato's Philosophy.* Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1929.

2014 Bode, B. H. John Dewey. Educational Research Bulletin 8 (1929): 342-343.

2015 Boodin, J. E. Cosmology in Plato's Thought. Mind 38.4 (Oct 1929): 489-505; 39.1 (Jan 1930): 61-78.

2016 Boodin, J. E. God. Hibbert Journal 27.4 (July 1929): 577-594.

2017 Boring, Edwin G. *A History of Experimental Psychology.* New York: Century, 1929. Revised ed., 1950.
Chap. 21 is "American Psychology: Its Pioneers." Chap. 22 is "American Functional Psychology." JRS

2018 Buchanan, Scott. John Dewey. Nation 129 (1929): 458-459.

2019 Bush, Wendell T. Memories and Faith. J Phil 24.19 (12 Sept 1929): 505-519.
Bush's tale of his philosophical education and interests is laced with observations on James, Dewey, and pragmatism. JRS

2020 Carpenter, Frederick Ives. Points of Comparison Between Emerson and William James. New England Quarterly 2 (July 1929): 458-474.
Notes
See also his "William James and Emerson" {2674}.

2021 Clarke, Mary Evelyn. *A Study in the Logic of Value.* London: University of London Press, 1929.

Reviews

William K. Wright, J Phil 27.18 (28 Aug 1930): 495-497. Dewey's "neutral" theory of value is found by Clarke to be "ambiguous and inconsistent" because it presupposes values that are independent of the situations in which they are recognized. JRS

2022 Coss, John, ed. *Essays in Honor of John Dewey on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929. Mead's "The Nature of the Past" is reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 345-354.

The following essays deal extensively with pragmatism. Edwin Burtt, "Two Basic Issues in the Problem of Meaning and of Truth," pp. 66-79. Dewey denies the realistic notion that the interests and experiences of the observer can be ignored in observation. He also rejects James's claim that truth is personal satisfaction. For Dewey, "scientific method is the method of all right thinking" that can resolve conflicting opinions.

William Forbes Cooley, "A Pragmatic Approach to Being," pp. 99-117. Although the quest for intrinsic being is as vital today as it was in antiquity, the quantitative techniques of physics and mathematics have failed to discover it. What remains is a qualitative approach whose ground is the "inner life," which is "human nature in its essential generic endowment" without which neither objects nor their relations could be identified. The fundamental properties of this nature are impulsiveness, typicality, modifiability, and appreciativeness.

Sidney Hook, "A Pragmatic Critique of the Historico-Genetic Method," pp. 156-174. The genetic method insists that any knowledge of what is must consider how it has come to be. Its classic form is inconsistent, however, for it 1) forgets that any historical account must proceed from current values and interests and 2) reduces all events to mechanical causation. It is thus inferior to the pragmatic method, which 1) acknowledges the interests of both observers and the observed and 2) supplements cause and effect with the study of how means procure ends.

G. H. Mead, "The Nature of the Past," pp. 235-242. Time is "the passage of one present into another, where alone is reality." Human experience perceives this as "an overlapping of one specious present by another." (p. 235) Each experienced present has both continuity with previous experiences and novelty–a stamp of uniqueness and a reminder that the future is hypothetical.

Herbert W. Schneider, "Radical Empiricism and Religion," pp. 336-353. Religious experience cannot be characterized as a unique spiritual or psychological phenomenon. To the contrary, James was right to claim that "religious objects" are "specific techniques or social patterns" that provide outlets for expression, imagination, and socialization. Religion is an art that adapts itself to the needs of its participants. FXR

Reviews

J. Milnor Dorey, Progressive Education 7 (1930): 93-97; R. F. A. Hoernlé, Personalist 12.2 (April 1931): 138-140; William McAndrew, School and Society 32 (1930): 474; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 301; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 39.4 (Oct 1930): 484-488; James H. Tufts, "John Dewey asks Philosophy [to] Follow Science," Chicago Daily Tribune (14 Dec 1929): 14.

2023 Dennes, William R. Truth and Perception. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 6 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 141-166.

Reviews

R. I. Aaron, Mind 39.3 (July 1930): 376-379; Charles W. Morris, J Phil 27.8 (10 April 1930): 210-215; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 208-210.

2024 Dewey, John. *Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy.* 2 volumes. Edited with a Preface by Joseph Ratner. New York: Henry Holt, 1929.

A collection of 104 previously published articles. JRS

Reviews

C. E. Ayres, "Philosophy and Genius," Int J Ethics 40.2 (Jan 1930): 263-271; Laurence Buermeyer, Symposium 1.1 (Jan 1930): 128-132; John M. Gaus, American Political Science Review 24.2 (May 1930): 487-489; Ralph B. Perry, Saturday Review of Literature (26 Oct 1929): 128-132; John Herman Randall, Jr., New York Evening Post (14 July 1929): M9; James H. Tufts, "John Dewey asks Philosophy [to] Follow Science," Daily Tribune (Chicago) (14 Dec 1929): 14.

2025 Dewey, John. An Organic Universe: The Philosophy of Alfred N. Whitehead. New York Sun (26 Oct 1929). Reprinted in *LW* 5: 375-381.

A review of Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan; Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1929). Whitehead unfortunately trades the old dualism of mind and matter for a new one of eternal objects and concrete actualities, with God a *deus ex machina* bringing them together. Despite a laudable effort to see the "togetherness" of things, it is regrettable that he reconstructs classical rationalism instead of empirically exploring how thought functions in the actual world. FXR

2026 Dewey, John. Philosophy. In *Research in the Social Sciences*, ed. Wilson Gee (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 241-265. Reprinted in *LW* 5: 161-177.

2027 Dewey, John. *The Quest for Certainty.* New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1930. Reprinted as *LW* 4.

Notorious for its concerted attack on the intellectualist tradition, this book is also hailed as an accessible and literary account of Dewey's fundamental claim that knowledge and action are inseparable. The first four chapters explore the "imaginary escape" promised by magic, ritual, and the supernatural from the relentless perils of primitive life. Practical arts, though necessary, deal with mutable and uncertain things. Such things in Greek thought were deemed to be deficiencies of Being; this distinction is mirrored in Aristotle's logic and teleological naturalism. The Christian dualisms of body/soul and practical/ideal augmented the philosophical quest for certainty and immutable knowledge. Though the advent of modern science began to challenge this quest, the pioneering efforts of Descartes, Newton, and the empiricists exacerbated the rift by raising the objective relations of quantitative matter above the subjective qualities of practical experience.

To their credit, the Greeks avoided both the "problem of knowledge" and the separation of facts and values by seeing nature as an aesthetic unity. The five middle chapters advance the thesis that a whole-hearted experimentalism blocks the epistemological problem. Qualities are neither objects of knowledge nor subjective illusions. Instead, qualities like "cold," "red," and "pain" are data or signs employed in resolving encountered

problems. Ideas do not mirror absolute verities; they utilize data to project a possible outcome and the means of achieving it. As such, *knowing* is inextricably bound up with *doing*. This combines a realism of objective natural existences with an "experimental idealism" which insists that "an object is the outcome of directed experimental operations instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing." (p. 137) And given that any assertion of "being" requires acknowledgment of the method of its attainment, refining the method of intelligent inquiry becomes a "supreme value." (p. 160)

Beyond the epistemological problem, the integrity of knowing and doing addresses nothing less than the "deepest problems of modern life"–the growing rift between runaway technology and enervated moral institutions. Chap. 10 argues that neither contemporary empiricism nor rationalism can deliver a robust sense of value. Empiricism reduces value to mere preferences or emotive expressions, while rationalism accords value a status so lofty as to be unattainable in this world. In actuality, values are neither mere preferences nor distant beacons, but concrete "enjoyments which are the consequences of intelligent action." (p. 207) Our very survival depends upon scientific institutions accepting their moral obligations and moral institutions becoming more forward-looking, flexible, and scientific. In the final chapter, Dewey admits that his radical reconstruction of thought and action is nothing short of a new Copernican revolution. Copernicus dethroned the Ptolemaic geocentric universe by applying human analysis and interpretation to overcome the apparent motion of celestial bodies. Kant generalized this with the philosophical conclusion that all meaningful assertions about the world involve human cognitive faculties. The new Copernican revolution, however, is one of *objectivity*; though it seems paradoxical, the more we press into the vast reaches of the unknown, the more we require conjoint human effort that experimentally "looks to security amid change instead of certainty in attachment to the fixed." (p. 245) FXR

Extended reviews

C. I. Lewis {2119}.

Reviews

Julius S. Bixler, Harvard Theological Review 23 (July 1930): 213-233. James's "will to believe" is superior to Dewey's rejection of the Absolute. Dewey fails to see that the hope and encouragement offered by a guiding absolute can be a constructive force in the betterment of humankind. FXR

Max C. Otto, Phil Rev 40.1 (Jan 1931): 79-89. Despite his "stupendous destruction" of the philosophical tradition, Dewey should abandon the illusion that philosophy is still the "liaison officer" between science and culture. Instead, the philosopher should be a "joint venturer" with all who seek knowledge. FXR

Ralph B. Perry, "Knowledge and Action," Saturday Review of Literature 6.22 (21 Dec 1929) 585. This surpasses previous books in its "lucidity and persuasiveness." Despite an admirable practical ethics, however, Dewey's theoretical ethics remains unsatisfactory. FXR

H. H. Price, Journal of Philosophical Studies 5.3 (July 1930): 448-451. Dewey's operationalism does not successfully challenge the empiricist theory of sense perception. His notion that whatever is real is "had" suggests a Bradleyan idealism whereby all existence is sentient. FXR

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 39.3 (July 1930): 372-375. Dewey masterfully debunks the entire intellectualist tradition. His effort may backfire, for there is "probably a hundred years of profitable employment for academic industry in Prof. Dewey's book." FXR

Ewart Edmund Turner, Christian Century 47 (30 Jan 1930) 48-49. While Dewey's attack upon formal religion is unfortunate, his "robust gospel of work and experiment" is praiseworthy. FXR

Anon, Monist 40.3 (July 1930): 483; C. E. Ayres, Int J Ethics 40.3 (April 1930): 425-433; George Boas, Symposium 1.2 (April 1930): 263-268; Boyd H. Bode, Journal of Higher Education 1 (March 1930): 179-180; Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Religious Education 25 (Jan 1930): 76-79; Kenneth Burke, New Republic 64 (3 Sept 1930): 77-79; Irwin Edman, Forum 83 (March 1930): xiv, xvi, xviii; Frank N. Freeman, Religious Education 25 (Jan 1930): 76-79; Henry Hazlitt, Nation 130.4 (22 Jan 1930): 100-101; C. E. M. Joad, London Spectator Literary Supplement 144 (12 April 1930): 619; Horace M. Kallen, New World Monthly 1 (Jan-Feb 1930): 69-73; J. H. Muirhead, Hibbert Journal 29.1 (Oct 1930): 174-181; Thomas V. Smith, Mental Hygiene 14 (April 1930): 472-475; Thomas V. Smith, Religious Education 25 (Jan 1930): 71-73; James Haydon Tufts, "John Dewey asks Philosophy [to] Follow Science," Chicago Daily Tribune (14 Dec 1929): 14; Howard Y. Williams, World Tomorrow 13 (Feb 1930): 89-90; Victor S. Yarros, Open Court 44 (Aug 1930): 499-501.

Notes

See Anderson, "On a Fragment from Dewey" {2077}, and G. Watts Cunningham, "On the Second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy" {2224}.

2028 Dewey, John. *The Sources of a Science of Education.* New York: Horace Liveright, 1929. Reprinted in *LW* 5: 1-39.

Reviews

Henry Hazlitt, Nation 130 (1930): 100-101; Herman Harrell Horne, Journal of Educational Sociology 3 (1930): 438-439; James H. Tufts, "John Dewey asks Philosophy [to] Follow Science," Chicago Daily Tribune (14 Dec 1929): 14.

2029 Dewey, John. The Sphere of Application of the Excluded Middle. J Phil 26.26 (19 Dec 1929): 701-705. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 503-507. *LW* 5: 197-202.

The logical laws of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle are wholly universal propositions. As hypothetical, however, they have no existential application without the support of particular, empirically grounded statements. We must not hypostasize logical relations into independent existences. Natural things *conflict*, but they do not contradict. FXR

Notes

See Nagel's reply, "Can Logic be Divorced from Ontology?" {2051}.

2030 Edman, Irwin. John Dewey, American. In *Adam, the Baby and the Man from Mars* (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), pp. 68-79.

2031 Finney, Ross L. *A Sociological Philosophy of Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1928.

2032 Han, Yu-Shan. *The Meaning of Experience in the Thought of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Boston University, 1929

2033 Hart, Joseph Kinmont. Principles of Character Development in the Philosophy of John Dewey. Religious Education 24 (1929): 113-116.

Notes

See also his "Judging Our Progressive Schools," New Republic 70 (1930): 354-355.

2034 Hartshorne, Charles. Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce. Monist 39.4 (Oct 1929): 521-534.

Synechism is the central concept in Peirce's philosophical inquiries into description, science, generality, possibility, experience, explanation, contingency, and the universe. Continuity is "the most scientific result which metaphysics has yet attained." JRS

2035 Hocking, William Ernest. *Types of Philosophy.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929.

Hocking discusses eight principal schools of philosophy, including pragmatism. JRS

Reviews

D. W. Gotshalk, J Phil 27.23 (6 Nov 1930): 614-615. The followers of Dewey will find that Hocking is far more interested in the pragmatism of Kant. JRS

2036 Jaccard, Benjamin E. *Étude sur quelques traits de la philosophie religieuse et sur la théorie de la sainteté de William James.* Belfort: Imprimerie Devillers S.A.R.L., 1929.

This study of James's religious philosophy consists of three parts. The first treats the notion of experience, radical empiricism, conscience, the human *I*, pluralism, and theism. The second is a study of James's theory of sainthood in *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, and in the third, Jaccard compares James's theory with the principal theories of Judaism and Christianity. Pp. 100f discuss the *I* and action. LF

2037 Kallen, Horace M. John Dewey, America's Foremost Thinker. Forward (English section) (20 Oct 1929): 1, 2.

2038 Kandel, Isaac L. The Influence of Dewey Abroad. School and Society 30 (1929): 700-704. Also published in Teachers College Record 31 (1929): 239-244.

2039 Lafferty, Theodore T. The Theory of Perspectives as an Interpretation of Functional Analysis. J Phil 26.13 (20 June 1929): 346-354.

Notes

A discussion of this paper is reported in {2059}.

2040 Langer, Susanne K. The Treadmill of Systematic Doubt. J Phil 26.14 (4 July 1929): 379-384.

2041 Lewis, C. I. *Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. Reprinted, New York: Dover, 1956.

Lewis terms his philosophy "conceptual pragmatism." Philosophy is the study of the *a priori*, revealing the categories used by mind to apply to given experience. Empirical knowledge is probable knowledge, made by the conceptual interpretation of the sensuously given. Interpretation treats a given as a sign of some set of possible experiences. Any conceivable experience can be interpreted by concepts. *A priori* truths are definitive, or explicative, of concepts. Common concepts (made possible by human nature and a common reality) makes community action, through speech, possible. The categories are the patterns of relationship that fit the given to produce effective anticipations and controls. Categories which fail to produce desired results can be abandoned for new ones, but by their nature they cannot be proven false. That which cannot fit the mind's patterns is classified as illusory. It cannot be meaningfully asserted that some experiences have no meaning or cannot be conceived. JRS

Extended reviews

Alice Ambrose {2152}.

Reviews

Charles A. Baylis, J Phil 27.12 (5 June 1930): 320-327. This work "will be deemed the most important contribution to epistemology in years." Lewis seems to rule out certain knowledge, and with that, rules out all knowledge. A more thorough treatment of the knowledge of the past could be desired. JRS

G. Watts Cunningham, Int J Ethics 40.4 (July 1930): 550-556. The thesis that the *a priori* can be maintained no matter what experience brings cannot be harmonized with the thesis that *a priori* concepts are susceptible to change. JRS

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 39.4 (Oct 1930): 505-507. This is "a valuable contribution to the systematic 'debunking'...of the intellectualist tradition in philosophy." His notion of finding "all the relevant data" and his denial of stability in experience is problematic. JRS

C. J. Ducasse, Symposium 1.2 (April 1930): 252-258; William Stetson Merrill, New Scholasticism 4.4 (Oct 1930): 393-396; Hugh Miller, Phil Rev 40.6 (Nov 1931): 573-579; Merrill F. Roff, Amer J Psych 44.4 (Oct 1932): 851-852; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 205-206.

Notes

See O. N. Hillman, "Professor Lewis' View of Our Knowledge of Objects" {2234}, and Arthur E. Murphy, "Mr. Lewis and the *A Priori*" {2247}.

2042 Loewenberg, Jacob. The Prepositional Nature of Truth. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 3-32.

Pragmatism's stress on the genetic origins of truth suppresses the other three necessary aspects to truth. JRS

Reviews

R. I. Aaron, Mind 39.3 (July 1930): 376-379; Charles W. Morris, J Phil 27.8 (10 April 1930): 210-215; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 208-210.

2043 McCadden, Helen M. John Dewey and Education. Commonweal 11 (1929): 113.

2044 Mead, G. H. Bishop Berkeley and His Message. J Phil 26.16 (1 Aug 1929): 421-430.

2045 Mead, G. H. National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness. Int J Ethics 39 (1929): 385-407. Pp. 392-407 are reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 355-370.

2046 Mead, G. H. A Pragmatic Theory of Truth. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 65-88. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 320-344.

Problems presuppose the non-problematic; a solution to a problem is true if it can harmonize with something whose validity is non-problematic. Thus there is no "Truth at large" since truth is relative to the problematic situation, and there are no final validities since problems can erupt anywhere. The subject of a judgment is the problematic situation, while the predicate is the reconstructed picture for the solution. This account relies on the distinction between problematic reflection and unreflective reality. Truth cannot transcend experience, and experience cannot contain any absolute order. JRS

Reviews

R. I. Aaron, Mind 39.3 (July 1930): 376-379; Charles W. Morris, J Phil 27.8 (10 April 1930): 210-215; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 208-210.

2047 Miller, Clyde R., ed. Some Popular Appraisals of John Dewey. Teachers College Record 31 (1929): 207-238.

2048 Morgan, Joy Elmer. John Dewey, the Humanist. Journal of the National Education Association 18 (1929): 286.

2049 Murphy, Arthur E. The Anti-Copernican Revolution. J Phil 26.11 (23 May 1929): 281-299.

2050 Murphy, Gardner. *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929. 2nd ed., 1930. 4th ed., 1938.

While an "ardent empiricist," James disliked experimentation. His thought involves a conflict between "neurological" explanations and a belief in a soul-like personality. Of major importance are James's theories of emotion, memory, and the origin of necessary truths. IKS

2051 Nagel, Ernest. Can Logic Be Divorced from Ontology? J Phil 26.26 (19 Dec 1929): 705-712. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 507-514. *LW* 5: 453-460.

Nagel responds to Dewey's "The Sphere of Application of the Excluded Middle" {2029}. Dewey's suggestion that logic can be divorced from ontology seems contrary to his own central thesis that formal relations emerge from, yet are continuous with, concrete human involvements with the world. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "The Applicability of Logic to Existence" {2092}.

2052 Naumberg, Margaret. The Crux of Progressive Education. New Republic 63 (1929): 145-146.

2053 O'Hara, James Henry. *The Limitations of the Educational Theory of John Dewey.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1929.

2054 Peirce, C. S. The Founding of Pragmatism. Hound and Horn 2 (April-June 1929): 282-285. This publication is from a manuscript (c. 1906) which was also published in *CP* 5.11-13.

Peirce remarks on the history of pragmatism from Socrates to Kant, the metaphysical club, Bain's definition of belief, and the use of "pragmatism" in Peirce's papers. There is a footnote about the entry "Pragmatism" in Baldwin's *Dictionary* {93}, and on the nature of philosophy and the method of pragmatism. LF

Notes

On the history of this ms., see the "Bibliography of the Works of Charles Sanders Peirce," *CP* 8, p. 299.

2055 Peirce, C. S. Guessing. Hound and Horn 2 (April-June 1929): 267-282. This publication is from a manuscript (c. 1907) which was also published in *CP* 7.36-48.

A discussion of guessing, knowledge, and science. Topics include collecting observations, our subsequent expectations, and hypotheses in general. Experiences contrary to our expectations rouse "us to consciousness." Peirce remarks on Darwinian theory, suggesting that "reason naturally thinks somewhat after nature's pattern." He then explains two experiments of his and Joseph Jastrow's on "the guessing instinct." LF

Notes

On the history of this ms., see the "Bibliography of the Works of Charles Sanders Peirce," *CP* 8, p. 300.

2056 Peirce, C. S. Training in Reasoning. Hound and Horn 2 (July-Sept 1929): 398-416.

This article on the "best means of improving o[ne's] reasoning powers," is an outline of Peirce's views of the three mental operations used in inquiry: observation, experimentation, and habituation. His discussion of observation includes observational discrimination, psychical discrimination, subconscious observation, clairvoyance, "observation of the relations of real object and parts of objects external to us," and self-observation. (p. 404) In observation, the most essential point is passivity, while in experimentation it is "strong work of the will," and requires some measure of contrivance. (p. 407) Habituation is the "power of readily taking habits and of readily throwing them off." (p. 409) Peirce explains the logical significance of a habit, generality and continuity, the three categories, and the operation of acquiring associations. He concludes by noting the three most common positive fallacies in retroduction, deduction, and induction. LF

Notes

This essay was from a manuscript that was also published as part of {18}. On the history of this ms., see the "Bibliography of the Works of Charles Sanders Peirce," *CP* 8, p. 288.

2057 Piper, Raymond F. and Paul W. Ward. *The Fields and Methods of Knowledge.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929.

Reviews

Richard Hope, J Phil 26.26 (19 Dec 1929): 714-716. The authors discuss logic from the standpoint of Dewey's analysis of reflective thought, while they reject James's "will to believe" doctrine. JRS

2058 Riley, Isaac Woodbridge. *Men and Morals: The Story of Ethics.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1929. Reprinted, New York: F. Ungar, 1960.

The ethics of pragmatism is utilitarian, marked by practicality, "democracy and dynamism." It emphasizes self-sufficiency. James's special contribution was the adjustment of "religious aspirations" to science. IKS

2059 Robinson, Daniel S. Report of the Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 26.10 (9 May 1929): 264-275.

Robinson describes several papers and discussions on pragmatism. JRS

2060 Salomaa, Jalmari Edvard. *Idealismus und Realismus in der englischen Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series B., vol. 19, No. 3, 1929.

Reviews

Richard Hope, J Phil 26.25 (5 Dec 1929): 695-699. Salomaa treats pragmatism as a "shortlived fad" of anthropomorphism. JRS

2061 Sayers, Ephraim Vern. Two of Dewey's Conceptions That Have Most Affected School Practice. Hawaii Educational Review 18 (1929): 35, 46-50.

2062 Schiller, F. C. S. The End of a Great Legend. J Phil 26.2 (17 Jan 1929): 43-46.

Schiller replies to Miller's "A Bird's-Eye View" {1986}. JRS

2063 Schiller, F. C. S. *Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge.* London: G. Bell and Sons, 1929. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930.

Schiller presents his "constructive" theory of logic as the counterpart to his previous "destructive" attacks on formal logic. Logic should consist of aids to actual reflective thinking and hence is a normative science of the evaluation of truth-claims. As thought requires meaning, the biological function, the verbal equivalence, the stability, the flexibility, the plasticity, the context, and the essentially personal nature of meaning must be recognized. Thought involves the selection of relevant factors of problems in the search for solutions. Given these considerations, the proper criteria of truth cannot be found in formal logic, since that logic only deals with the formal truth-claim made by every proposition, and hence is unable to distinguish the actual truth from error. Seven theories

of truth, each relying to some extent on formal logic, are accordingly condemned. The Humanist, or Voluntarist, theory of truth as the satisfaction of a purpose or need stands alone in its ability to be non-formal, to give an applicable test for real truth and error, and to be solely concerned with humanly attainable truths. Judgment must be appreciated in its biological/psychological realm, and not, as formal logic attempts, in some purely abstracted propositional realm. Inference, syllogistic reasoning, and the theory of proof must be adjusted to match the voluntarist theory of judgment and truth. The spirit of James's "will to believe" is retained in a modified "right to postulate" principle of inquiry. Valuable reasoning seeks not "proof" but practical discovery. The reconstruction of scientific method and the "casuistry" of knowing is offered. The conclusion describes metaphysical consequences of voluntaristic logic. JRS

Reviews

Eleanor Bisbee, J Phil 27.16 (31 July 1930): 439-444.

Notes

See F. A. Walsh, "The Humanistic Theory of Error" {2147}, and the symposium on *Logic for Use*, "The Nature and Validity of Formal Logic" {2200}.

2064 Schiller, F. C. S. Naturalism and Value, A Reply. Personalist 10.1 (Jan 1929): 13-15.

Schiller responds to Samuel Alexander's "Naturalism and Value," Personalist 9.4 (Oct 1928): 243-250. Naturalism misinterprets scientific method, as values are an "integral constituent of any world with which we can have dealings" and science involves valuation. JRS

Notes

See Alexander's reply, "Ingeminating Value," Personalist 10.2 (April 1929): 124-126, and Schiller's rejoinder, "Naturalism and Value," ibid. pp. 126-127.

2065 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatism, Humanism and Religion. In *Lectures in Philosophy, Scripps College Papers*, No. 1 (Claremont, Cal.: Scripps College, 1929), pp. 19-29. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 306-319.

2066 Schneider, Herbert W. John Dewey's Empiricism. The introduction to *A Bibliography of John Dewey*, by Milton Halsey Thomas and Herbert Wallace Schneider (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.

A genuine empiricism is related to the living problems of its age. Today, the work of the "James-Dewey leaven" has caused the "ingenious exposition of total systems" to retreat before a new philosophical wave of technical specialists engaged in inquiry and polemics. Philosophy as the "criticism of criticism" is not new, but for Dewey, such criticism is "clearly distinguished from and almost contraposed to reason and knowledge." The first step must be to discover why we believe what we do; a person's philosophy cannot be evaluated until we discover the motivation, meaning, and reasonableness it possesses for that person. Dewey is pushing philosophy towards the sciences of social behavior and institutions. JRS

2067 Shaw, Charles Gray. *Outline of Philosophy*. New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1929.

2068 Simons, H. Why William James 'Stood By' God. Open Court 43 (Feb 1929): 77-86.

James is a guide to the "scientific way of life," although given his background, we would associate him with the religious. For James, philosophy was "such a statement of the method and attitude of science as made it available for the fullness of living." IKS

2069 Sisson, Edward O. The Significance of John Dewey. Hawaii Educational Review 18 (1929): 29-32, 38-41.

2070 Smith, Thomas Vernor. *The Philosophic Way of Life.* Chicago: University of Chicago, 1929. 2nd ed., *The Philosophic Way of Life in America,* New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1943. Reprinted, Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1968.

Reviews

Una Bernard Sait, J Phil 27.14 (3 July 1930): 391-392.

2071 Smith, Thomas Vernor and William Kelley Wright, eds. *Essays in Philosophy.* Chicago and London: Open Court, 1929.

Essays concerning pragmatism are: Arthur K. Rogers, "Instrumentalism and Ideals," pp. 13-35; John Forsyth Crawford, "Meaning and Reality," pp. 83-96; Joseph Roy Geiger, "Prayer, Autosuggestion, and God," pp. 135-153; Van Meter Ames, "Aesthetic Experience," pp. 233-249; Charles W. Morris, "The Relation of Formal to Instrumental Logic," pp. 251-268. JRS

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 41.2 (April 1931): 308-309; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 39.2 (April 1930): 258-259.

2072 Spain, Charles L. Practical Aspects of John Dewey's Philosophy. Platoon School 3 (1929): 149

2073 Sprinkle, Henry Call. *Concerning the Philosophical Defensibility of a Limited Indeterminism: An Inquiry based on a Critical Study of the Indeterministic Theories of James, Renouvier, Boutroux, Eddington, Bergson, and Whitehead.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1929.

2074 Tzu, Lien Chao. *The Problem of Subjectivity and Objectivity in Moral Judgment as Treated in Pragmatism.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1929.

2075 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Promise of Pragmatism. J Phil 26.20 (26 Sept 1929): 541-552. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 215-229.

Pragmatism is "more a memory than a force," having taken a "comfortable and respected place among those intellectual enthusiasms which have a historical as distinct from a permanent or progressive interest." First gaining interest by its theory of meaning, it died from making perilous slogans about the nature of truth, wearing itself out in pointless debates. Pragmatism wisely recommended that an idea's meaning exists only in

certain contexts. Pragmatic analysis is needed in an age when scientific theories seem to strangely shift our ideas. "Pragmatism may never arrive at truth, but it can minimize confusion." JRS

2076 Adams, George P. and William P. Montague, eds. *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements.* Two volumes. New York: Macmillan, 1930. Reprinted, New York: Russell and Russell, 1962.

Three of the autobiographical essays are treated separately: John Boodin {2085}, John Dewey {2096}, and C. I. Lewis {2117}. Many of the essays briefly discuss or at least mention pragmatism. In vol. 1, pragmatists are mentioned by George H. Palmer (pp. 32, 33), A. C. Armstrong (pp. 121, 125), Harold C. Brown (pp. 171, 174ff, 185, 187-188, 190), Mary W. Calkins (pp. 199-200, 202n, 211), Morris R. Cohen (pp. 223, 237, 245-246), G. Watts Cunningham (pp. 259-260), C. J. Ducasse (p. 322), William E. Hocking (pp. 386, 388ff, 395), Theodore De Laguna (pp. 403, 406, 409, 412), and Joseph A. Leighton (pp. 425, 428, 429, 439). In vol. 2, pragmatists are mentioned by Jacob Loewenberg (pp. 69, 74, 80), Arthur O. Lovejoy (pp. 91, 100), Evander B. McGilvary (pp. 122, 131-132), William P. Montague (pp. 137-138, 140, 142), DeWitt H. Parker, (pp. 164, 165-166, 182), Ralph B. Perry (pp. 188-189, 198), James B. Pratt (pp. 214-215), Arthur K. Rogers (p. 230), George Santayana (pp. 250-251), Roy Wood Sellars (pp. 262, 265), and James H. Tufts (p. 338).

More substantial discussions of pragmatism are found in the following essays. George P. Adams (vol. 1, pp. 70-71) accuses pragmatism of stressing the stream of experience to the point of erecting experience into the very Absolute it was trying to reject. The alternative subjective interpretation of experience is preferable, but this needs a theory of the organism-environment relationship, which places pragmatism in a metaphysically realistic position. Durant Drake (vol. 1, pp. 280-283) finds the "will to believe" dangerous, as it can hardly replace the evidence of the truth, and can never "verify" the independent truth, but only what gives us personal satisfaction. Warner Fite (vol. 1, pp. 362-367, and *passim*) offers several observations on Dewey's conception of the social point of view and his related notion of experience. Charles A. Strong (vol. 2, pp. 316-318) explains his rejection of James's view of experience. Wilbur M. Urban (vol. 2, pp. 364-366) expresses a debt to James's melioristic understanding of metaphysical standpoints, but deplores pragmatism's separation of value from being and its neglect of fundamental metaphysical issues. JRS

Reviews

Axton Clark, New York Times Book Review (13 July 1930): 10; Harry T. Costello, J Phil 28.9 (23 April 1931): 244-249.

2077 Anderson, W. On a Fragment from Dewey. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 8.3 (Sept 1930): 168-175.

Dewey's Gifford Lectures (published as *The Quest for Certainty* {2027}) states that moral and spiritual leaders have proclaimed ideals lacking any relation with economic conditions, forgetting that means are necessary to ends. Why should we be discouraged from considering the ultimate purposes to life? Must not Dewey himself distinguish the means available from the goods to be pursued? Political philosophers have always applied their theories to life's needs. The "necessities of State" cannot be confused with "particular projects of reform." JRS

2078 Angell, James R. James Roland Angell. In *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, vol. 3, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, 1930. Rpt., New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), pp. 1-38.

Angell recounts his psychological education and subsequent research at the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago, with John Dewey, James H. Tufts, G. H. Mead, and A. W. Moore. Dewey's *Psychology* (1887) "instantly opened up a new world, which it seemed to me I had been waiting for, and for the first time I felt a deep and pervasive sense of the intellectual importance of the material I was facing." (p. 5) James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) also was a tremendous influence. "The dialectic of Dewey's thinking was utterly alien to the working of James's mind...the wealth of pertinent facts, the ingenious manipulation of data...and above all the irresistibly fascinating literary style swept me off my feet." (p. 22) These works, with Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896) brought him to "the conception of mind and body as functional poles in the life of the organism." Functional psychology investigates how mental activity contributes to adaptive organic activities, and hence is central to the philosophical fields of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. JRS

2079 Aubrey, Edwin Ewart. The Place of Definitions in Religious Experience. J Phil 27.21 (9 Oct 1930): 561-572.

2080 Babbitt, Irving. Experience and Dogma. Saturday Review 1 (Nov 1930): 287, 299.

2081 Ballantine, William Gay. *The Basis of Belief: Proof by Inductive Reasoning*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1930. Reprinted as *Logic of Science*, 1933.

2082 Bennett, Charles A. John Dewey and Industrial Education. Industrial Education Magazine 32 (1930): 146-147.

2083 Bixler, Julius S. Professor Dewey Discusses Religion. Harvard Theological Review 23.3 (July 1930): 213-233.

Bixler examines Dewey's theory of religion in *The Quest for Certainty* {2027}. JRS

2084 Bolton, Frederick E. William James. Progressive Education 7 (March 1930): 82-88.

James was among the first to apply psychology to education. He emphasized the importance of interest for educational progress. IKS

2085 Boodin, J. E. Nature and Reason. In *Contemporary American Philosophy* {2076}, vol. 1, pp. 135-166.

2086 Boodin, J. E. The Universe A Living Whole. Hibbert Journal 28.4 (July 1930): 583-600.

2087 Brightman, Edgar S. *The Problem of God.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1930.

Pp. 52-59 discuss Dewey's philosophy of religion. While the best statement of humanism, it "lacks both the intellectual vigor and content to supplant theism." JRS

2088 Browne, Samuel S. S. *A Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Reality.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930.

If a philosophy gives universals an eternally fixed and unchanging ontological status, it either cannot explain knowledge or cannot account for error. Hypothetically conceived laws can claim to be true of reality and be subject to verification. Only ideas in our experience can be true or false; hence the failure of the realist's claim that truths existed before life evolved. Truth lies in the idea's value for the solution of the problem which created the idea. While we accept as true ideas that cohere with the rest of our knowledge prior to testing them, such acceptance gives them no purely "theoretical" standing. Unless "facts" reside in that (rejected) order of timeless universals, the correspondence theory of truth is only a circular and tautological definition. Pragmatism is not subjective, despite Schiller's occasional lapses. The knower and the known are two "poles" or "aspects" of a situation. If pragmatism is interpreted to suggest that an unknowable reality provides the environment for the organism's knowledge, it becomes a phenomenalism similar to Kant's philosophy. Instead, pragmatism distinguishes the ontological status of reality from its epistemological status, holding that particulars can exist independently of knowing but universals cannot. Hence reality cannot be other than what it is known as, and even the unknown's reality can at least be conceived, since knowledge is always increasing. JRS

2089 Clark, Axton. John Dewey Honored. New York Times Book Review (30 March 1930): 17.

2090 Clugston, Herbert A. and Robert A. Davis. Is a Scientific Method Possible for Philosophical Research in Education? Educational Administration and Supervision 16 (1930): 293-299.

2091 Crissman, Paul. *The Moral Philosophy of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1930.

2092 Dewey, John. The Applicability of Logic to Existence. J Phil 27.8 (27 March 1930): 174-179. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 514-519. *LW* 5: 203-209.

Dewey replies to Nagel's "Can Logic Be Divorced From Ontology?" {2051}. Logic is linked to ontology: the ontological is the ground of the logical. Nonetheless, logical principles should not be directly applied to existences. The law of non-contradiction is an object of thought, not a directly manifest thing like a door that is open or shut. FXR

2093 Dewey, John. Conduct and Experience. In *Psychologies of Experience*, ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1930), pp. 409-422. Reprinted as "Conduct and Experiences in Psychology," in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 249-270. *LW* 5: 218-235.

Structuralism erred in assuming that behavior could be understood by direct physiological inspection. But in fact "no organism is so isolated that it can be understood apart from the environment in which it lives." (p. 220) For example, sense organs only function in an environment, and so-called "immediate" qualities are products of organism-environment interaction. This interaction, or "transaction," is the "primary fact" from which "organism" and "environment" are discriminated. Conversely, we also find that "no complete account of *what* is experienced can be given until we know *how* it is experienced." (p. 228) Behavior is the product of complex organism-environment adjustments, not mere stimulus and response. Behavior should be studied not as individual acts but as a connected series of activities in a "life-career." FXR

2094 Dewey, John. Construction and Criticism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930. Reprinted in *LW* 5: 125-146.

Discovery and innovation are crucial to the construction of a creative mind. Criticism–"judgment engaged in discriminating among values"–is the active ally of creativity. To boldly blaze new trails and candidly evaluate their worth is a mark of courage, whose opposite is passivity and submissiveness. The American pioneers "were inspired by the imperious need to create and produce." (p. 130) In our pre-packaged and conformist society, however, educators must redouble their efforts to impart the special "rhythm" of creativity and criticism. FXR

Reviews

Virgil Michel, New Scholasticism 6.1 (Jan 1932): 76-78; Philip Paul Wiener, Personalist 12.2 (April 1931): 141.

2095 Dewey, John. Credo. Forum 83 (March 1930): 176-182. Reprinted as "John Dewey" in *Living Philosophies* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), pp. 21-35. Reprinted as "What I Believe" in *LW* 5: 267-278.

The world encountered in primitive life was so uncontrollable that humans quite naturally placed their faith in the refuge of the supernatural. The refinement of scientific methods of experimentation and discovery, however, has engendered a new kind of faith where "experience itself is the ultimate authority." (p. 267) Though this "new morale of confidence, control, and security" has thus far progressed mainly in the industrial arts, it holds equal promise for social, educational, and even religious institutions. Religion, in particular, can remain vital if it promotes "faith in the possibilities of human experience." (p. 273) FXR

Reviews of *Living Philosophies*

Benjamin Ginzburg, New Republic 67 (1931): 292-293; Thomas V. Smith, Int J Ethics 43 (1932): 120-121.

2096 Dewey, John. From Absolutism to Experimentalism. In *Contemporary American Philosophy* {2076}, pp. 13-27. Reprinted in *Philosophy of JD I* pp. 1-12. *LW* 5: 147-160.

In this rare retrospective, Dewey recalls an early yearning for "a world and life" patterned after Thomas Huxley's physiology of the human organism. With the guidance of G. S. Morris, Hegel's synthesis of self and world, the divine and human, offered "an immense release, a liberation" from the provincial dualisms of New England culture. Despite having left a "permanent deposit" in his thought, Dewey "drifted" from Hegel's

artificial schematism toward pragmatism in the 1890s. Subsequently, four goals have become predominant: 1) the fusion of the social and psychological in education, 2) the extension of instrumental logic to heal the perilous rift between science and morality, 3) the purge of the "bad psychology" of sense data for the "life in action" of James's biological psychology, and 4) the extension of this biological approach to the development of distinctive social categories. FXR

Reviews

Harry T. Costello, J Phil 28.9 (23 April 1931): 244-249.

2097 Dewey, John. *Individualism, Old and New.* New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1930. London: Allen and Unwin, 1931. Portions are reprinted in chap. 33, "John Dewey," of *Social Reformers: Adam Smith to John Dewey*, ed. Donald O. Wagner (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 730-739.

A collection of eight articles published in *New Republic* from 24 April 1929 to 2 April 1930. Written at the onset of the Great Depression, this is perhaps the most contentious of the four books on political philosophy that Dewey published between 1927 and 1939. The first four chapters portray a deeply conflicted America that honors community, fair play, and equal opportunity while it tolerates a ruthless "survival of the fittest" economics. The world sees us as energetic yet superficial, mechanistic, and conformist. Pioneer individualism has given way to a "dominant corporateness." Mass production, fed by rampant consumerism, has replaced craftsmanship, thrift, and self-reliance. Without stable values and ideals, the individual is lost, restless, and confused.

Although the scientific revolution changed our dealings with nature, it has not yet helped us learn to live with one another. The "new individualism" sketched in the last four chapters heralds not just economic reform, but "a new psychological and moral type" dedicated to revitalizing society by the methods of science. Just as science utilizes a wide spectrum of ideas and information, so too must society enfranchise each sector of the public. Corporate America should temper the motive for profit with a sense of social responsibility. A "creative council" of business, labor, and government would regulate industry. But no general "system" is definable in advance: the genius of science lies in its ability to adapt its techniques to new problems as they arise. FXR

Reviews

Francis A. Ryan, Thought 6.1 (June 1931): 134-142. Instead of "glistening platitudes," Dewey ought to give details on his understanding of scientific method and its purpose, the individual's use of this method, "preferred" possibilities, and the desirability of a "new" individualism. To exclude any consideration of religion, the soul, or human destiny is to give up any hope of an adequate solution to human problems. JRS

John Chamberlain, New York Times Book Review (21 Dec 1930): 2; C. Hartley Grattan, New York World Book World (19 Oct 1930): 3; Henry Hazlitt, Nation 131 (22 Oct 1930): 446-447; Sidney Hook, Current History 33 (March 1931): 22-24; André Maurois, New York Herald Tribune Books (23 Nov 1930): 1, 6; John Herman Randall, Jr., World Unity 7 (Dec 1930): 193-201; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 41.1 (Jan 1932): 131-132.

2098 Dewey, John. In Reply to Some Criticisms. J Phil 27.11 (8 May 1930): 271-277. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 59-65. *LW* 5: 210-217. Dewey's reply to Lewis is reprinted in Lewis's *Collected Papers*, p. 86.

Dewey replies to the criticisms of Hocking's "Action and Certainty" {2106}, Lewis's "Pragmatism and Current Thought," {2118}, and Woodbridge's "Experience and Dialectic" {2151}. Existences "antecedent" to inquiry are in fact *data* for knowledge, and thus not themselves *objects* of knowledge. As "had" rather than "known," they define problems and help propose solutions. Objects of knowledge are thus redistributions of antecedent existences. Despite Woodbridge's fears, this is not "dialectic" for its own sake, but an effort to confront "dialectically supported" belief in "immutable existence" on its own terms. The overall goal is to liberate an empirical and naturalistic account of the world, not to foster a new dialectic.

Hocking's complaint that an evolved meaning-in-use prohibits knowledge of "ultimate" meaning makes sense only if we cling to the idea that "partial truths" must be contrasted to "final truth." This is overcome by seeing "meanings in development," where each verification marks the "whole truth of that part of the meaning." (p. 214) One may freely admit both necessary logical relations and empirically *a priori* meanings whose security is a warrant for new meanings. To foolishly combine these, however, invokes the "eternal verities" that promote dogmatism in thought and fanaticism in action. FXR

2099 Dewey, John. Philosophy and Education. In *Addresses Delivered at the Dedication of the New Campus and New Buildings of the University of California at Los Angeles, 27 and 28 March 1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), pp. 46-56. Reprinted with slight changes in *Higher Education Faces the Future*, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), pp. 273-283. *LW* 5: 289-298.

2100 Dewey, John. Qualitative Thought. Symposium 1.1 (Jan 1930): 5-32. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Civilization* {2170}, pp. 93-116. *LW* 5: 243-262.

In treating quality as either an inherent property of things or as a mere criterion of a class, traditional logic misses the vital sense in which a quality may permeate the entire life-career of an object. Native Americans are "stoic," for example, because they "lived, acted, endured stoically." The former merely states conclusions of thought; the latter captures the dynamic employment of thought in the development and reconstruction of conceptions. When regarded as something externally added to self-sufficient objects, the tendency is to exclude quality from the "real" world and relegate it to the subjective or the occult. This is rectified by realizing that quality is the pervasive or distinguishing characteristic of an "underlying unity" or *situation*: an *object* is an element abstracted from this "complex whole." Whereas objects are grasped cognitively, a situation is implicit, taken for granted, "felt" rather than "thought." Nonetheless, in all cases a situation pervades and thus controls "the selective determination and relation of objects in thought." (p. 246) A quality or situation itself may become a cognitive object of thought, but only within the framework of another situation. For example, a situation whose quality is "problematic" evokes the ideas and instruments that render the statement of the problem. Qualitative thought pervades everyday life; this fact resolves logical problems about predication and relation. Art, however, is the purest expression of the direction and control of an underlying situation, for here formal and material aspects clearly conform to the work as a qualitative whole. FXR

2101 Dewey, John. Social Change and Its Human Direction. Modern Quarterly 5 (Winter 1930): 422-425. Reprinted in *LW* 5: 363-368.

2102 Dewey, John. Trois facteurs indépendants en matière de morale. Translated by Charles Cestre. Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 30.4 (Oct-Dec 1930): 118-127. Translated by Jo Ann Boydston as "Three Independent Factors in Morals," Educational Theory 16 (July 1966): 198-209. The translation is reprinted in *LW* 5: 279-288.

Moral conflict is not usually a clear-cut choice between good and evil, but a "delicate distinction" among perceived conflicting goods. Moral virtue thus implies skill in deliberation and choice in the arbitration of three independent factors in moral conduct. Some believe morality lies in good as the fulfillment of proper desire, and for them, duty to right action is merely a means to achieving this good. Others insist that duty is the sole determinant of what is good. In fact, however, good and desire, right and duty, have independent yet equally legitimate origins. Basic human impulses and appetites, when tempered by foresight of consequences, produce judgments about their comparative worth. Greek philosophy extended this to an "organized plan of life" where good is the inclusive end or *telos* of all reasonable acts. Roman culture, fearing consequentialism, saw cosmic reason directly invested in *law*: hence, a morality of duty and harmony supplanted that of means-ends. This too is rooted in everyday social experience; humans naturally place demands upon one another. Acquiescence to such demands, if not coerced, requires acceptance of a socially sanctioned sense of obligation or duty.

It is "almost self-evident" that the pursuit of desires and the acceptance of duties are independent moral factors. Indeed, a duty is perceived as such only if it conflicts with a natural desire. The third discrete variable is praise and blame. These are "reflex imputations of virtue and vice," lacking both the rational calculation of good and the regard for law that determines duty. English legal and moral theory is indebted to the integral connection between praise and virtue, vice and blame. Despite their independence, these three factors are intertwined in everyday life. Instead of simple solutions wrought when one factor is declared supreme, moral philosophy must admit the complexity of deliberation when desires, laws, and opinions conflict. FXR

Notes

See "Textual Commentary," *LW* 5: 526-528, for an explanation of the circumstances surrounding this essay and its translations. Its initial publication was prefaced by Xavier Léon's introductory remarks (*Bulletin*, pp. 117-118), and followed by a discussion (*Bulletin*, pp. 127-133) whose participants include Léon, L. Robin, C. Bouglé, M. Mauss, E. Leroux, and J. Wahl, with paraphrases of Dewey's responses. The introduction and discussion were also translated by Jo Ann Boydston and published in Educational Theory 16 (July 1966): 198, 205-209 [*LW* 5: 496-503].

2103 Dewey, John. What Humanism Means to Me. Thinker 2 (June 1930): 9-12. Reprinted in *LW* 5: 263-266.

Notes

John Dewey was among the 34 signatories of "A Humanist Manifesto," New Humanist 6 (May-June 1933): 1-5.

2104 Duprat, Émile. Les Rapports de la connaissance et de l'action d'après John Dewey. Rev Méta 37.4 (Oct-Dec 1930): 535-553; 38.1 (Jan-March 1931): 107-123.

Dewey is an original thinker whose work merits study, despite its neglect due to James's prestige. In this two-part article, Duprat examines Dewey's instrumentalism, and the *rapport* between knowledge and action at the center of this philosophy. Topics include the opposition between theory and practice and its effect on our intellectual and social life; Greek philosophy and the religious tradition; scientific revolution; the discovery that mass varies with speed, and Dewey's interest in its logical and philosophical significance; the putative ubiquity of knowledge; and experimental knowledge. In the second part, Duprat continues his exposé of Dewey's ideas on knowledge and action. Knowledge, which was supposed to free us from error and illusion, plunges us anew into the darkness: doubt and ignorance replace immovable certitude. (p. 108) The author discusses Dewey's view of nature and knowledge, the divorce of the real and ideal, science as an instrument of action, and religion. He concludes that Dewey was unable to remain faithful to his method of strict empirical denotation, and that he did not succeed in integrating the idealism of action and naturalism. LF

2105 Evans, Valmai B. The Pragmatism of Giovanni Vailati. Int J Ethics 40.3 (April 1930): 416-424.

Evans examines the writings of Giovanni Vailati concerning William James. While Vailati's background in mathematics and logic drew him to Charles Peirce, he reviewed James's works as they appeared from the late 1890s until his death in 1909. Vailati saw the pragmatism of Peirce to be a kind of corrected positivism. In 1905, he wrote concurrent reviews of James's "The Essence of Humanism" and Peirce's "What Pragmatism Is." Evans' discussion of these reviews effectively brings Vailati's pragmatism into full relief. Vailati asserts that Peirce gave an ambiguous meaning to "practical consequences," leading to the disagreement between Jamesian and Peircean pragmatism. While Peirce equates these with the particular experiences which will be produced given certain circumstances, James interprets these in terms of the particular experiences that one desires. Vailati argues that pragmatism is not to be viewed as consistent with Protagoras but rather with Socrates' response to Protagoras. EPC

Notes

This article is a fine complement to C. P. Zanoni, "Development of Logical Pragmatism in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40.4 (Oct-Dec 1979): 603-619.

2106 Hocking, William Ernest. Action and Certainty. J Phil 27.10 (24 April 1930): 225-238. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, p. 19-32. *LW* 5: 461-476.

Instrumentalism's attempt to tie meaning exclusively to action has two pitfalls. Since operational meanings continually evolve, authentic or ultimate meaning is always postponed to the indefinite future. Furthermore, since use reveals only part of a thing's meaning, instrumental confirmation delivers only "half-truths." Constructive action requires a grasp of the *a priori*, the overall "frame of things." FXR

Notes

See Dewey, "In Reply to Some Criticisms" {2098}. See also a discussion of this paper in {2116}.

2107 Hook, Sidney. A Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy. J Phil 27.6 (13 March 1930): 141-160.

William James is the only pragmatist recognized by German philosophers. Refutations of pragmatism are many, but typically amount to a reminder that "man is born to something higher than to merely fill his stomach." Hook recounts an attempt to persuade one lecturer that his grasp of what pragmatists meant by "practical" was not correct. The lecturer's haughty response was "if they don't mean that, then they simply are not pragmatists." JRS

2108 Horton, Walter Marshall. *Theism and the Modern Mood.* New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1930.

2109 Huebsch, Arthur. *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey.* Dissertation, New York University, 1930.

The subtitle reads, "A Comparative Study and a Critical Estimate of Their Philosophies and Their Educational and Related Theories and Practices." JRS

2110 *John Dewey: The Man and His Philosophy.* Addresses delivered in New York in Celebration of his Seventieth Birthday. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1930. Moore's essay was also published in School and Society 31 (1930): 37-47, and as "John Dewey and His Educational Philosophy" in California Quarterly of Secondary Education 5 (1930): 113-126. Newlon's essay was first published in School and Society 30 (1929): 691-700 and Teacher's College Record 31 (1929): 224-238. Mead's essay was also published in Int J Ethics 40.2 (Jan 1930): 211-231, and reprinted in *The Development of American Philosophy* {2786}, pp. 319-329, and also in *Selected Writings*, pp. 371-391. Dewey's essay is reprinted in *LW* 5: 418-423.

The Harvard Graduate School of Education sought permission to publish these addresses from The National Committee for the Celebration of the Seventieth Birthday of John Dewey, chaired by William H. Kilpatrick, so that, in the words of Henry W. Holmes, "we might give tangible evidence of our respect for Professor Dewey's contribution to the philosophy of education." ("Foreward," p. v.) The organization and work of the Committee is explained by Henry R. Linville, "Inaugurating the Plan," pp. 1-2, and William H. Kilpatrick supplies the "Introduction," pp. 3-6.

Ernest Carroll Moore, "John Dewey's Contribution to Educational Theory," pp. 7-36. Dewey is "the most profound and understanding thinker on education the world has yet known." (p. 7) He shares Plato's vision of the lifelong achievement of *telos*, yet realizes that knowledge does not merely behold the world, but actively reshapes it. In schools inspired by Dewey children learn by doing–they propose, experiment, construct, and solicit the assistance of others.

Jesse H. Newlon, "John Dewey's Influence in the Schools," pp. 37-64. Isaac L. Kandel, "John Dewey's Influence on Education in Foreign Lands," pp. 65-74.

G. H. Mead, "The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey, in their American Setting," pp. 75-105. Even though American culture was forged in the active life of the community, for more than a century our colleges pursued the ideal of changeless order inherited from the class structure and religion of England. Royce's idealism struggled

to unite these disparate values in a "Blessed Community," where the practical organization of conflicting ends is an expression of the absolute self. James more directly grasped the link between problem-solving activity and both knowledge and conduct. Dewey's instrumentalist logic further unifies the biological and intellectual components. Because he embodies the implicit intelligence of the American community, "in the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America." (p. 105)

Herbert W. Schneider, "The Prospect for Empirical Philosophy," pp. 106-135. It is important to distinguish the "academic" and "public" aspects of Dewey's thought. The latter is the "real" Dewey: a champion of science who brings scientific practices to everyday life, not a staid "philosopher of science" bogged down in the "problem of the external world" or technical minutia. Dewey criticizes the world as it is encountered, without a pre-established theoretical framework constraining criticism in advance. For Dewey, philosophy is ultimately a matter of art, not of rigorous deduction.

James R. Angell gave "The Toastmaster's Words," pp. 136-139. Jane Adams, "John Dewey and Social Welfare," pp. 140-152. James Harvey Robinson, "John Dewey and Liberal Thought," pp. 153-172.

John Dewey, "In Response," pp. 173-181. Our greatest enemy is unconscious fear, which makes us shy away from life's challenges and take refuge in conformity of thought and the pursuit of possessions and idle distractions. Genuine happiness, to the contrary, is found in a "broadening of intellectual curiosity and sympathy in all the concerns of life." (p. 179) FXR

Reviews

Anon, Nature 126 (1930): 537-538; Bruce Bliven, Survey 64 (1930): 359; Edward T. Devine, Outlook 155 (1930): 227; Virgil Michel, New Scholasticism 6.1 (Jan 1932): 76-78; L. M. Pape, Int J Ethics 41 (1931): 276; H. H. Price, Philosophy 6.2 (April 1931): 264-265.

2111 Kallen, Horace M. *Indecency and the Seven Arts, and Other Adventures of a Pragmatist in Aesthetics.* New York: Horace Liveright, 1930.

2112 Kallen, Horace M. Religious Experience and Metaphysical Speculation: A Note. J Phil 27.25 (4 Dec 1930): 691-694.

2113 Knox, Howard V. *The Evolution of Truth and Other Essays.* London: Constable; New York: R. R. Smith, 1930.

A collection of previously published articles and reviews. "Green's Refutation of Empiricism" (1900); "Mr. Bradley's 'Absolute Criterion'" (1905); "Pragmatism: The Evolution of Truth" {680}; "What is Pragmatism? By J. B. Pratt. (A Review)" {705}; "The Philosophy of William James" {1183}; "Has Green Answered Locke?" (1914); "The Letters of William James," a review of {1580}; and "Is Determinism Rational?" JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 224-225.

2114 Laird, John. *Knowledge, Belief and Opinion.* New York and London: The Century Co., 1930.

Pp. 101-106 describe "Mr. Dewey's Account of Knowledge." James's theory of belief is discussed on pp. 151-156. JRS

2115 Lamprecht, Sterling P. The Philosophy of John Dewey. New World Monthly 1 (1930): 1-16.

2116 Larrabee, Harold A. The Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 27.3 (30 Jan 1930): 70-79.

Larrabee summarizes several papers on John Dewey and on pragmatism. JRS

2117 Lewis, C. I. Logic and Pragmatism. In *Contemporary American Philosophy* {2076}, pp. 31-51. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 3-19.

Lewis describes his defense of intensional logic and its large effect on his philosophical thought, due to his conviction that valid inference rests on the analysis of meaning. This in turn establishes a division between logically necessary propositions (those truths of intension as set down in a system of logic) and empirical truths. Pragmatic influences, mainly from Peirce, suggested that logic possesses no material truth but does give "definitive criteria of intelligent classification and interpretation" for dealing with "the empirical brute fact of the given" or "absolute datum." Philosophy analytically depicts the good, the right, the true, the valid, and the real, for the community of knowledge of the present historical period. Systems of categories for these notions come and go over time. JRS

2118 Lewis, C. I. Pragmatism and Current Thought. J Phil 27.10 (24 April 1930): 238-246. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 78-86. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 32-40. *LW* 5: 477-486.

The core of pragmatism is its pragmatic test of meaning, which implies a theory of knowledge. With modern science, pragmatism ties meaning and knowledge to abstract concepts and denies knowledge of immediate experience. Modern science holds that concepts are operations of testing, including only empirically verifiable relations. Dewey seems fearful of abstractions, as inadequate to full experience, but the conceptual knowledge of the structure of natural relations should not be viewed as a rival to the world of problems and needs. The pragmatic test portrays meaning as both connotative (as an abstract configuration of relations) and as denotative (as a way to transform the given for the immediate purpose of accomplishing a goal). JRS

Notes

See Dewey, "In Reply to Some Criticisms" {2098}. See also a discussion of this paper in {2116}.

2119 Lewis, C. I. Review of John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*. J Phil 27.1 (2 Jan 1930): 14-25. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 66-77. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 253-264.

Dewey's main thesis in {2027}, that knowing involves doing, is eminently praiseworthy. But those who seek a traditional ground for knowledge will not be satisfied with the answer that the sole criterion is *future* experience. To say that this means knowledge is "probable," moreover, begs the question, "what makes it probable?" To overcome this we must distinguish the *ground* of knowledge—knowledge accepted by the experimenter and used to reach a conclusion—from the *content* of knowledge found in the verified conclusion. The warrant of both knowledge and probability is manifest in the connection between *ground* and *content*. FXR

2120 Loewenberg, Jacob. The Question of Priority. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 37-69.

2121 Lovejoy, Arthur O. *The Revolt Against Dualism.* Chicago: Open Court, 1930. 2nd ed., 1960.

In chap. 2, "The First Phase of the Revolt and Its Outcome," James's questioning of the existence of "consciousness" and his "complete collapse into the dualism from which he set out to escape" is discussed on pp. 56-59. Dewey is discussed in chap. 3, "Objective Relativism," pp. 97-124, and elsewhere. Pragmatism is briefly mentioned in chap. 9, "The Nature of Knowing as a Natural Event," on p. 385 and 397. JRS

Reviews

H. Wildon Carr, Personalist 11.3 (July 1930): 206-207; W. P. Montague, "Professor Lovejoy's Carus Lectures," J Phil 15.11 (24 May 1928): 293-296.

Notes

See Arthur E. Murphy, "Mr. Lovejoy's Counter Revolution" {2186}.

2122 Mead, G. H. Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought. American Journal of Sociology 35 (1930): 693-706.

2123 Mead, G. H. Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics. In *Intelligent Philanthropy*, ed. Ellsworth Faris, Ferris Laune, and Arthur Todd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 133-148. Reprinted in *Selected Writings*, pp. 392-407.

2124 Meiklejohn, Alexander. Progressive Education in the Liberal College. In *Higher Education Faces the Future*, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), pp. 289-307.

2125 Morris, Charles W. A Reply to Professor Schilpp. Monist 40.2 (April 1930): 321-323.

Morris replies to Schilpp's "The Subjectivism of the Neo-Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge" {2142}. JRS

2126 Mumford, Lewis. A Modern Synthesis. Saturday Review (12 April 1930): 920-921.

Mumford responds to Charles Beard's "Toward Civilization," Saturday Review (5 April 1930): 894-895. JRS

Notes

See replies by James T. Farrell, "John Dewey's Philosophy" and Joseph Ratner, "More of the Same," Saturday Review (12 July 1930): 1194.

2127 Ortega y Gasset, José. *Qué es filosofía?* Vol. 5 of *Obras de Jose Ortega y Gasset*, 4th ed. (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1957). Translated by Mildred Adams as *What is Philosophy?* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960).

Pragmatism receives attention on pp. 44-45 and p. 64 of the translation. Pragmatism refuses to recognize problems which cannot be solved by its preferred methods. JRS

Notes

This collection of lectures given in 1928 and 1929 was first published in part in the Argentinian newspaper La Nación in 1930. See Adams' preface for publishing details. See also John T. Graham, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1994).

2128 Otto, Max C. Meditation on a Hill. Phil Rev 39.4 (July 1930): 329-350.

Philosophers too easily abandon the needs of common people, for the "bright halls of true being" above the dim daily world. Can philosophy meet the challenge to find meaning in life? If so, it will follow James, who made it "a *sense of direction* in the midst of life" and not "a *sense of having arrived* in a realm beyond life." He taught that our temperaments and struggles were where we touched reality. James and Dewey altered philosophy into a method for dealing with human problems. This view of philosophy will endure until people "stop seeking for meaning in human existence because their hearts no longer beat." JRS

Notes

See a discussion of this paper in {2116}.

2129 Pape, Leslie Manock. *The Naturalistic Ethics of John Dewey.* Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1930.

2130 Parodi, Dominique. *Du Positivisme à l'idealisme: Philosophies d'hier et d'aujourd'hui.* Paris: J. Vrin, 1930.

Chap. 2 is a reprint of "Le Pragmatisme d'après MM. W. James et Schiller" {579}, which describes this "new method of philosophy," fashionable in America and England. It summarizes James's *Pragmatism* {438} and Schiller's *Studies in Humanism* {490}, and recounts their views on pragmatism and humanism, truth, knowledge, and reality. Parodi argues that pragmatism's originality lies in the claim that truth-in-itself (or absolute Truth) does not exist. Truth, then, is of an arbitrary and voluntary character. The same problem is inherent in the pragmatist's theory of knowledge, that reality is "made" by humans. Chap. 3 is taken from his contribution to "La Signification du pragmatisme" {580}. It is an account of the exact signification of contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy, where the most careful formulations of pragmatism are to be found. Included is a further discussion of the problems with the pragmatists' theory of truth and reality. Many of the ideas of the French philosophy of action are to found in the pragmatist's writings, writings which are ultimately understood as a mere revival of empiricism. Parodi also discusses Le Roy's *Dogme et critique* in chap. 5, and devotes chap. 6 to the work of Boutroux. LF

2131 Pell, Orlie Anna Haggerty. *Value Theory and Criticism.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1930.

Pell discusses John Dewey, D. W. Prall, and R. B. Perry. JRS

2132 Pepper, Stephen C. Categories. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 13, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 73-98.

2133 Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. Truth and Probability. In *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays*, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), pp. 156-198. Reprinted in *Philosophical Papers*, ed. D. H. Mellor (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 52-94.

Notes

Ramsey mentions Peirce's notion of truth in "General Propositions and Causality," *The Foundations of Mathematics*, pp. 237-255 [*Philosophical Papers*, pp. 145-163]. See Nils-Eric Sahlin, *The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

2134 Ratner, Joseph. John Dewey's Theory of Judgment. J Phil 27.10 (8 May 1930): 253-264.

Dewey's theory of judgment is analogous to his theory of perception. Just as the only cognitive phase of perception is in the transformation from settled experience to a consummatory object, so too is the cognitive phase of judgment in the complex act of judging in inquiry. A proposition is a terminus of judgment, not, as realists suppose, a self-sustaining bearer of truth or falsity. Strictly speaking, we do not *know* a proposition, we *use* it: its value emerges in relation to other propositions in the settled background of experience Dewey calls "mind." FXR

Notes

See a discussion of this paper in {2116}.

2135 Reiser, Oliver L. *Humanistic Logic for the Mind in Action.* New York: Crowell, 1930.

Reviews

Sven Nilson, J Phil 28.12 (4 June 1931): 333-334; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 42.1 (Jan 1932): 156; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 12.2 (April 1931): 135.

2136 Sabine, George H. The Pragmatic Approach to Politics. American Political Science Review 24.4 (Nov 1930): 865-885.

2137 Schaub, Edward L. Francis Bacon and the Modern Spirit. Monist 40.3 (July 1930): 416-438.

Dewey's instrumentalism is likened to Bacon's dictum, "Knowledge is Power." JRS

2138 Schiller, F. C. S. Creation, Emergence, Novelty. Personalist 11.4 (Oct 1930): 239-247. Also published in *Proc Arist Soc* 31 (1931): 25-36. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392} pp. 203-213.

2139 Schiller, F. C. S. How "Propositions" Mean. J Phil 27.23 (6 Nov 1930): 632-635.

Schiller responds to W. E. Hocking's "Action and Certainty" {2106}. JRS

2140 Schiller, F. C. S. Psychology and Psychical Research. Monist 40.3 (July 1930): 439-452.

2141 Schilpp, Paul A. John Dewey, America's Typical Voice at the Philosophical Round-Table. In *Commemorative Essays, 1859-1929* (Stockton, Cal.: Privately published, 1930).

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 12.2 (April 1931): 140-141.

Notes

The subtitle of the *Commemorative Essays* is "In Celebration of the Seventieth Anniversary of the First Publication of Darwin's 'Origin of the Species' and of the 70th Birthday of Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, and John Dewey."

2142 Schilpp, Paul A. The Subjectivism of the Neo-Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge. Monist 40.2 (April 1930): 311-320.

Schilpp responds Morris, "Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing" {1988}. JRS

Notes

See Morris's reply {2125}.

2143 Singer, Edgar A. Jr. Philosophy of Experiment. Symposium 1.2 (April 1930): 149-167.

2144 Smith, Vivian T. An Educational Philosophy. Educational Administration and Supervision 16 (1930): 88-98.

2145 Stolberg, Benjamin. Degradation of American Psychology. Nation 131.16 (15 Oct 1930): 395-398.

Notes

See three letters to the editor in response, Nation 131.20 (12 Nov 1930): 525.

2146 Swabey, Marie C. *Logic and Nature.* New York: New York University Press, 1930.

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 41.3 (July 1931): 474. Swabey argues that the theory of the biologically instrumental nature of thought is self-refuting. JRS

2147 Walsh, Francis A. The Humanistic Theory of Error. New Scholasticism 4.4 (Oct 1930): 337-348.

Walsh evaluates Schiller's *Logic for Use* {2063}. JRS

Notes

See also Walsh, "Trends in American Thought," in the *Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1929) pp. 91-107.

2148 Ward, Leo Richard. *Philosophy of Value: An Essay in Constructive Criticism.* New York: Macmillan, 1930.

2149 Ward, Paul W. The Doctrine of the Situation and the Method of Social Science. Social Forces 9 (Oct 1930): 49-54.

2150 Wickham, Harvey. *The Unrealists: James, Bergson, Santayana, Einstein, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Alexander, and Whitehead.* New York: Dial Press, 1930. Reprinted, Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1971.

James comes under Wickham's fire in "Things Jimsian," pp. 29-67. Einstein's theory of relativity is implicit in James since it is only an attempt to abolish standards. James tries to "damn" the absolute. This is fine if "absolute" means your own idea of the incomprehensible. But if you mean the fact that there is an absolute, "your damn is apt to fall back upon your own head–with disastrous results to the noodle." IKS

Wickham lampoons John Dewey in "The Winnowing Fan," pp. 196-218. Dewey tries to explain everything, but loses everyone in the process: "Even his educational theories are expressed in lamentable language." If his philosophy was true, "there wouldn't be any universe." What Dewey calls the product of reflection *is* the originally given; he is "trying to make Reflection more primary than primary experience." When Dewey offers the absurd notion of experiences which are not anyone's, he has evidently forgotten the "one sensible tenet ever offered in Pragmatism's name–that there cannot be a difference...unless it makes a difference somewhere or somewhen to something or somebody." JRS

2151 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Experience and Dialectic. J Phil 27.11 (8 May 1930): 264-271. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 230-239. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 52-59. *LW* 5: 487-495.

Dewey's strong suit is an honest naturalism that identifies intelligence as a natural existence capable of both grasping and transforming nature. Unfortunately, this message is needlessly compromised by a "dialectic" insistent upon denying "an antecedent reality to which knowledge must conform." (p. 490) This flirtation with idealism embroils Dewey in an issue irrelevant to the control of objects whereby concrete knowledge is advanced. FXR

Notes

See Dewey, "In Reply to Some Criticisms" {2098}. See also a discussion of this essay in {2116}.

1931

2152 Ambrose, Alice. A Critical Discussion of *Mind and the World Order.* J Phil 28.14 (2 July 1931): 365-381.

C. I. Lewis's work {2041} relies on the dubious principle that propositions of logic are truths of intension. JRS

2153 Ames, Edward Scribner. Obituary of G. H. Mead. Monist 41.3 (July 1931): 471.

2154 Ames, Van Meter. G. H. Mead: An Appreciation. University of Chicago Magazine 23 (19 June 1931): 370-372.

2155 Anon. Education in Action: The Story of John Dewey. World Tomorrow 14 (1931): 106-109.

2156 Anon. Obituary of G. H. Mead. Phil Rev 40.4 (July 1931): 410.

2157 Barthel, Ernst. *Vorstellung und Denken: Eine Kritik des pragmatischen Verstandes.* Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1931.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 40.3 (July 1931): 399-400. This "apriorist" German metaphysician gives no sign that he has read any pragmatists. JRS

2158 Bittner, C. J. G. H. Mead's Social Concept of the Self. Sociology and Social Research 16 (Sept 1931): 6-22.

2159 Boas, George. Mr. Lewis's Theory of Meaning. J Phil 28.12 (4 June 1931): 314-325.

2160 Boodin, J. E. An Animistic Cosmology. In *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. Gilbert Ryle, held at Oxford, England, 16 September 1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 93-99.

2161 Boodin, J. E. God and the Cosmos. In *Religious Realism*, ed. Douglas C. Macintosh (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 479-491.

2162 Boodin, J. E. Interaction and Cosmic Structure. Philosophy 6.4 (Oct 1931): 422-432.

2163 Childs, John Lawrence. *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1931. New York and London: The Century Co., 1931. Reprinted, New York: Arno Press, 1971.

Reviews

Alice Keliher, Progressive Education 9 (1932): 67-69.

2164 Cohen, Morris R. *Reason and Nature.* New York: Harcourt Brace; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1931. 2nd ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953.

Reviews

John Dewey, "A Philosophy of Scientific Method," New Republic 66 (29 April 1931): 306-307 [*LW* 6: 299-303].

Notes

See Morris Cohen's response, "Reason, Nature, and Professor Dewey," New Republic 67 (17 June 1931): 126-127 [*LW* 6: 488-491], and Dewey's reply, ibid. p. 127 [*LW* 6: 304].

2165 De Hovre, Franz. Some Radical Social-Educators: John Dewey. In *Philosophy and Education*, translated by Edward B. Jordan (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1931), pp. 101-116.

2166 Della Volpe, Galvano. John Dewey. Article in *Enciclopedia Italiana* (1931), vol. 12, p. 713.

2167 De Ruggiero, Guido. Note sulla più recente filosofia europea e americana: John Dewey. La Critica 29 (20 Sept 1931): 341-357.

La Critica was the journal of Crocean idealism, founded by Croce in the first decade of the century. De Ruggiero was noted for his idealistic reading of the history of modern philosophy. This essay is his introduction to his translation of Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* {1572} as *Ricostruzione filosofica* (Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1931).

2168 Dewey, John. Context and Thought. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969.), pp. 203-224. Reprinted in *LW* 6: 3-21.

"The neglect of context is the greatest single disaster which philosophic thinking can incur." (p. 11) The analytic fallacy occurs when elements discriminated within a context are regarded as complete and self-sufficient. Its converse, the fallacy of unlimited extension, is the result of a single element, such as thought, torn from its context and elevated to the status of universal being. These fallacies are avoided by recognizing that context embraces both a background that is implicit yet obdurate, and a foreground of selective interest that denotes consciousness. Problems emerge from a background of beliefs and experiences that shape and direct the explicit determinations of thought. Although this mode of selection is subjective, it is not subjectivistic, for it establishes a "manner of action" rather than a body of private experiences.

Philosophy in its full sense is the "criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie culture." (p. 19) Philosophy may employ its critical power to generalize the results of the natural and social sciences. It must push beyond scientific contexts, however, to discover an underlying context that is "raw, crude, primitive, and yet pervasive and determining." This final inclusive context is "experience," whose expanding spheres radiate from the personal to the cultural to the ultimate revelation of "the structure of any and all experience." (p. 21) FXR

Reviews

Thomas V. Smith, Int J Ethics 42 (1932): 392.

2169 Dewey, John. George Herbert Mead as I Knew Him. University of Chicago Record n.s. 17 (July 1931): 173-177. Reprinted in *LW* 6: 22-28. The "greater part" of this address at Mead's funeral was published as "George Herbert Mead," in J Phil 28.12 (4 June 1931): 309-314.

2170 Dewey, John. *Philosophy and Civilization.* New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1931. London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.

Reprints with revisions of previously published articles, along with a new essay, "Science and Society," pp. 318-330 [*Philosophy of JD II*, pp. 388-396. *LW* 6: 53-63]. "Philosophy and Civilization," pp. 3-12 {1908}; "The Development of American Pragmatism," pp. 13-35 {1666}; "The Practical Character of Reality," pp. 36-55 {535}; "Appearing and Appearance," pp. 56-76 {1904}; "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea," pp.

77-92 {1970}; "Qualitative Thought," pp. 93-116 {2100}; "Affective Thought," pp. 117-125 {1855}; "Logical Method and Law," pp. 126-140 {1754}; "Corporate Personality," pp. 141-165 {1859}; "Nature and Reason in Law," pp. 166-172 {1247}; "Interpretation of the Savage Mind," pp. 173-187 {87}; "A Naturalistic Theory of Sense Perception," pp. 188-201 {1812}; "Perception and Organic Action," pp. 202-232 {1044}. "The Unit of Behavior," pp. 233-249, is a revised version of "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," published in 1896. The emendations for this article's reprinting are recorded in *EW* 5: clxxii-clxxiv. "Conduct and Experiences in Psychology," pp. 249-270 {2093}; "Philosophies of Freedom," pp. 271-298 {1966}; "Body and Mind," pp. 299-317 {1962}. JRS

Reviews

George P. Adams, Int J Ethics 44.2 (Jan 1933): 269-270; G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 41 (1932): 324; Sidney Hook, New Republic 68 (4 Nov 1931): 330-331; B. M. Laing, Philosophy (London) 8.3 (July 1933): 360-361; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.1 (Jan 1933): 157; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 41.2 (April 1932): 265; Thomas V. Smith, J Phil 29.15 (21 July 1932): 412-415.

2171 Finnegan, J. F. Remarks Concerning Certain Phases of the Moral Philosophy of John Dewey. In the *Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1931), pp. 125-134.

2172 Hook, Sidney. John Dewey and His Critics. New Republic 67 (June 1931): 73-74. Reprinted in *Pragmatism and American Culture*, ed. Gail Kennedy (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1950), pp. 92-94.

2173 Horne, Herman Harrell. *John Dewey's Philosophy, Especially* The Quest for Certainty. Boston: Boston University School of Religious Education and Social Service, 1931.

2174 Kagey, Rudolf. *The Growth of Mr. Bradley's Logic*. New York: New York University, 1931.

2175 Knight, Rex. Mr. Schiller *v.* Non-Pragmatist Logic. *Proc Arist Soc* 31 (1931): 87-102.

2176 Lafferty, Theodore T. The Dualism of Means and Value. J Phil 28.15 (16 July 1931): 393-406. Reprinted in *Studies in Philosophy*, Lehigh University (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania) Publication, vol. 6, no. 7, July 1932.

2177 Lynch, Jarmon Alvis. Two Ways of Misconstruing the Doctrine of Interest. Texas Outlook 15 (Aug 1931): 18-19.

2178 McCallister, W. J. Professor Dewey's Freedom Through Co-Operation. Chap. 28 of *The Growth of Freedom in Education: A Critical Interpretation of some Historical Views* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931), pp. 432-461.

2179 Macintosh, Douglas C. Experimental Realism in Religion. In *Religious Realism*, ed. Douglas C. Macintosh (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 307-409.

2180 Macintosh, Douglas C. *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought.* Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1931.

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 302.

2181 Marvin, Francis S. Science and Society. Nature (London) 129 (5 March 1931): 329-331.

2182 Mead, G. H. Dr. A. W. Moore's Philosophy. *The University Record* (Chicago) n.s. 17 (1931): 47-49.

2183 Meyer, Adolfe E. John Dewey and Modern Education, and Other Essays. New York: Avon Press, 1931.

2184 Muirhead, John H. *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-American Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1931.

The chapter on "Charles Peirce" is a reprint of {1990}. There are also numerous references to William James and John Dewey. JRS

Reviews

Sterling Lamprecht, J Phil 29.20 (29 Sept 1932): 552-554.

2185 Müller, Gustav. Charles Peirce. Arch Gesch Phil 40 (1931): 227-238.

2186 Murphy, Arthur E. Mr. Lovejoy's Counter-Revolution. J Phil 28.2 (15 Jan 1931): 29-42; 28.3 (29 Jan 1931): 57-71.

Murphy comments on A. O. Lovejoy's *The Revolt Against Dualism* {2121}. JRS

Notes

See Lovejoy's reply, "Dualisms Good and Bad," J Phil 29.13 (23 June 1932): 337-354; 29.14 (7 July 1932): 375-381, and Murphy's rejoinder, J Phil 30.13 (22 June 1933): 354-358.

2187 Murphy, Arthur E. Report of the California Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 28.6 (12 March 1931): 141-151.

Murphy reports on several papers and discussions concerning pragmatism. JRS

2188 Nagel, Ernest. Report of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 28.4 (12 Feb 1931): 85-98.

Nagel reports on several papers and discussions concerning pragmatism. JRS

2189 Newhall, Jannette Elthina. *The Influence of William James on Georg Wobbermin's Psychology and Philosophy of Religion.* Dissertation, Boston University, 1931.

2190 Norris, Orlando O. Some Postulates for an Instrumental Philosophy. Monist 41.3 (July 1931): 407-433.

2191 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 1: *Principles of Philosophy*. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains no works mentioned in this bibliography. JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, New Republic 68 (6 Jan 1932): 220-221 [*LW* 6: 273-277]. Peirce viewed philosophy as the critical awareness of the reciprocity of scientific methods and everyday experience. His fallibilism draws the mind to the "merging edges, the fluidity of all things" that defies the sharp cleavage of "exact knowledge," and instead seeks continuity and growth. His logical realism upholds the "objective reality of the general": the "reality of a way, an acquired and modified habit, disposition to behavior" antithetical to Aristotelianism, scholasticism, and many contemporary realists who appeal to Peirce. FXR

Sidney Hook, Symposium 3.2 (April 1932): 248-256. Peirce "is the most influential figure in the history of American philosophy." Peirce displays the characteristics of a great philosopher: discernment of consciousness, originality, generalizing power, subtlety, critical severity and sense of fact, systematic procedure, and perseverance and devotion to philosophy. JRS

H. T. Davis, Isis, 19 (1933): 217-220; J. H. Muirhead, Philosophy 7.2 (April 1932): 245-246; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.1 (Jan 1933): 154; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 13.2 (April 1932): 142-143; H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 41 (1932): 621-623.

2192 Perry, Ralph B. The Place of William James in the History of Empiricism. In *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. Gilbert Ryle, held at Oxford, England, 16 September 1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 480-486.

British empiricists held that experience is the only test of existence and that the essence of a thing is composed of the "content of sense-perception." James agreed, but held that this was not radical enough. James insisted that moral tests of truth be used where experiential ones are not available, and that experience itself supplies materials for filling in the gaps between seemingly discontinuous entities. IKS

2193 Pratt, James B. Socrates' Adventures in Wonderland: The Damning of Dualism. Chap. 1 of *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 1-140.

A dialogue between Socrates. Dr. Idealist, His daughter–Mrs. Sentimentalist, Assistant Professor Pragmatist, Assistant Professor Neorealist, His English cousin–Mr. New-Realist, Dr. Behaviorist, and Mr. Try-Everything-Once. Socrates announces that after to listening to all the arguments for the various monisms, he himself must be a dualist. JRS

Reviews

William K. Wright, J Phil 28.24 (19 Nov 1931): 668-670.

2194 Reeder, Paul A. *The Instrumental Theory of Judgment.* Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1931.

2195 Ritter, William E. Science and Philosophy. J Phil 28.1 (1 Jan 1931): 5-14.

2196 Rugg, Harold O. Culture and Education in America. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931.

Reviews

Hughes Mearns, Progressive Education 8 (1931): 411-414.

2197 Scalise, Victor F. William James and Preaching. Homiletic Review 102 (Aug 1931): 112-114.

2198 Schiller, F. C. S. Is the Distinction between Moral Rightness and Wrongness Ultimate? In *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. Gilbert Ryle, held at Oxford, England, 16 September 1930(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 319-323.

2199 Schiller, F. C. S. The Sacrifice of Barbara. Personalist 12.4 (Oct 1931): 233-243. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 47-57.

Notes

See A. Ushenko's response, "On the Meaning of a Proposition" {2208}.

2200 Schiller, F. C. S., A. C. Ewing, C. A. Mace, A. Rex Knight. The Nature and Validity of Formal Logic. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 10 (1931): 1-51.

This symposium is a discussion focused on Schiller's *Logic For Use* {2063}. Ewing, on pp. 1-10, sympathizes with Schiller's objections to formal logic, but protests that it still has much value. Schiller, on pp. 11-26, discusses Ewing's essay and Rex Knight's "Mr. Schiller *v.* Non-Pragmatist Logic" {2175}. Mace, on pp. 27-42, defends the necessity of formal logic for any practical reasoning. Knight, on pp. 43-51, responds to Schiller's contribution. JRS

Notes

See Schiller's comments on this symposium, "The Value of Formal Logic" {2263}.

2201 Shih, Hu. Hu Shi. In *Living Philosophies* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), pp. 235-263.

Hu Shi describes the large impact of Dewey's thought on his intellectual development. JRS

2202 Sidgwick, Henry. Outlines of the History of Ethics. 6th ed., enlarged with an additional chapter by Alban G. Widgery (London and New York: Macmillan, 1931).

Widgery describes Dewey's ethical theory on pp. 325-328. JRS

2203 Sisson, Edward O. A Preface to Logic. Monist 41.1 (Jan 1931): 117-139; 41.2 (April 1931): 228-252.

Sisson acknowledges a debt to James, Dewey, and Schiller for their influence on his work concerning the origins of "the universe of discourse" and its deep relevance to logic. JRS

2204 Slochower, Harry. John Dewey and Morris R. Cohen. Thinker 4 (Sept 1931): 33-41.

2205 Smith, Thomas V. The Social Philosophy of G. H. Mead. American Journal of Sociology 37.3 (Nov 1931): 368-385.

2206 Snedden, David. Directive Aims in Education. School and Society 34 (1931): 745-748.

2207 Tower, Carl Vernon. Neutralism and Radical Empiricism. J Phil 28.22 (22 Oct 1931): 589-600.

Tower gives an examination and criticism of the "analytic and pluralistic tendencies" in James's conception of neutral entities. IKS

2208 Ushenko, A. On the Meaning of a Proposition. J Phil 28.26 (17 Dec 1931): 715-716.

Ushenko replies to Schiller's "The Sacrifice of Barbara" {2199}. JRS

2209 Vidari, Giovanni. La pedagogica in europea ed in america. *Annuario dei diritti della scuola* (Rome, 1931).

2210 Watson, Genevieve Margaret. *The Educational Philosophy of Froebel and Dewey Compared and Evaluated.* Dissertation, New York University, 1931.

2211 Wieman, Henry Nelson. Religion in John Dewey's Philosophy. Journal of Religion 11.1 (Jan 1931): 1-19.

Dewey's instrumentalism is a call to recognize the evils inherent in the elevation of instruments (such as religious experiences) into ends in themselves (manifestations of God or presentations of a supreme value). Dewey's entire philosophy is "an exposition of a religious way of living" because it advocates "giving supreme devotion to the highest possibilities of value which the existing world can yield without knowing specifically what these possibilities are." A religious experience can be a value only if "the individual sees how the conditions and consequences of what he is doing are causally related to other enjoyments in such a way as to constitute a most inclusive system of mutual support and mutual enhancement." JRS

2212 Woodworth, Robert S. *Contemporary Schools of Psychology.* New York: Ronald Press, 1931. 2nd ed., 1949.

2213 Wright, Henry W. Community as the Key to Evolution. J Phil 28.4 (12 Feb 1931): 98-102.

Wright describes his attempts to combine the advantageous features of pragmatism and idealism: pragmatism's stress on the inventive powers of the individual and idealism's emphasis on the community of intelligence. JRS

1932

2214 Anon. Pragmatism. Truth 36 (Feb 1932): 23-24.

2215 Bakewell, Charles M. Continuity of the Idealist Tradition. In *Contemporary Idealism in America*, ed. Clifford Barrett (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 25-42.

Pragmatism does not conflict with idealism, unless pragmatism confuses the logical with the psychological and lapses into a "radical empiricism." (pp. 27-29) Dewey's instrumentalism has an "absolute" in his conception of an end in the "abundant and significant experience participated in by all." JRS

Reviews

Frank E. Morris, J Phil 30.7 (30 March 1933): 187-190.

2216 Baum, Maurice. The Attitude of William James toward Science. Monist 42.4 (Oct 1932): 585-604.

Critics have claimed that James's attitude towards science was inconsistent, but this is not true. James held that while science attains results, it can do so only in limited fields. Aspects of the universe escape its methods of verification. IKS

2217 Bentley, Arthur F. *Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics*. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1932.

The subject/object dualism in philosophy has compromised the search for firm foundations in mathematics. Both Brouwer's mathematical intuitionism and the realism that links symbols to "external reality" must be rejected. Instead, mathematical operations and our explanations of them should be tested by their *consistency*. The criteria of consistency, however, should be *postulational* rather than formal. Being neither *a priori*, necessary, nor even "true," such postulations mark "the most general form of linguistic control which we may establish in a given area of inquiry." (p. 22) FXR

2218 Bixler, Julius S. William James and Our Changing World. American Scholar 1.4 (Oct 1932): 392-400.

2219 Boodin, J. E. God and Cosmic Structure. In *Contemporary Idealism in America*, ed. Clifford Barrett (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 199-216. Reprinted in *The Development of American Philosophy* {2786}, pp. 500-509.

Reviews

Frank E. Morris, J Phil 30.7 (30 March 1933): 187-190.

2220 Bruce, William F. The Relation of Experimentalism to Democracy in Education. Education Administration and Supervision 18 (1932): 241-249.

2221 Campbell, Paul E. Fundamental Fallacies in Education. Homiletic and Pastoral Review 32 (1932): 1287-1295.

2222 Cary, C. P. John Dewey's Educational Ideas. Wisconsin Journal of Education 64 (1932): 333-334, 390-391.

2223 Commins, W. D. Some Early Holistic Psychologists. J Phil 29.8 (14 April 1932): 208-217.

James's and Dewey's contributions to psychological "holism" are described. JRS

2224 Cunningham, G. Watts. On the Second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy. Phil Rev 41.2 (March 1932): 107-129.

Cunningham comments on Dewey's *The Quest for Certainty* {2027}. JRS

Notes

See a discussion of the reading of this paper in the "Report of the California Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {2187}.

2225 Dewey, John. Human Nature. Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 531-537. Reprinted in *LW* 6: 29-39.

2226 Dewey, John. Politics and Culture. Modern Thinker 1 (May 1932): 168-174, 238. Reprinted in *LW* 6: 40-48.

2227 Dewey, John and James H. Tufts. *Ethics*. 2nd ed., revised. New York: Henry Holt, 1932. Reprinted as *LW* 7.

This major revision of {540} reflects advances in socio-cultural theory and the refinement of such key conceptions as reason, habit, individuality, and the good. The "unifying thread" in the central section written by Dewey is the recognition that moral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life. (p. 308) By nature we have blind impulses and desires whose indulgence provides satisfaction. Intelligence, however, offers foresight: immediate gratification yields to long-term goals involving plans and deliberation. Elevated above individual pursuits and lionized as the epitome of moral reason, such ends become "the Good." In actuality, however, "good" requires the successful arbitration of three often conflicting factors: 1) the *rights* that individuals possess for the fulfillment of their satisfactions, 2) accepted *obligations* that acknowledge the rights of others, and 3) social *approbation* and *condemnation*. Moral standards should be set by the intelligent criticism of prevailing habits and values. (p. 255) Although virtues are too numerous to list, virtue itself can be characterized as "qualities characteristic of interest" in a community, especially whole-heartedness, persistence, and impartiality. Although individual virtues come and go, these inherent interests are a permanent fact of human nature. FXR

Reviews

Eugene G. Bugg, Amer J Psych 46.4 (Oct 1934): 693-694; Bakewell Morrison, Thought 8.1 (June 1933): 140-143; DeWitt H. Parker, Phil Rev 43 (1934): 523-525; David Rynin, University of California Chronicle 35 (1933): 134-136; Frank Chapman Sharp, Int J Ethics 44.1 (Oct 1933): 155-160; A. S. Woodburne, Crozer Quarterly 10 (1933): 125.

Notes

Tuft's contribution is summarized by James Campbell in the *Selected Writings of James Hayden Tufts* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 417-419. See also a collection of Dewey's writings on morality drawn from other major works, *The Moral Writings of John Dewey*, edited with an introduction and notes by James Gouinlock (New York: Hafner Press, 1976).

2228 Ehlers, Hugo. *Die Wirlichkeitsphilosophie in ihrem Verhaltnis zum Pragmatismus.* Kropelin-Bad: Doberan, Alex Michaels, 1932.

A criticism of pragmatism, especially Schiller's, from the point of view of the "Wirlichkeitsphilosophie" of Heinrich Maier. If pragmatism elevates value above reality and even truth, Maier restores the primacy of reality. IKS

2229 Getman, Arthur K. The Influence of John Dewey in Education. Agricultural Education 5 (Dec 1932): 83-84, 96.

2230 Grattan, C. Hartley. *The Three Jameses: A Family of Minds. Henry James, Sr., William James, Henry James.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932.

A biographical work, with emphasis on James's personality. An epilogue assesses the intellectual contributions of James, his father, and his brother. IKS

Reviews

Henry Hazlitt, "A Family of Minds," Nation 135.19 (9 Nov 1932): 460-461. It is true that James is a "shallow optimist." But we must not overlook the "penetrating incidental insights," and his *Principles of Psychology* (1890), a work of genius. IKS

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 30.16 (3 Aug 1933): 435-441.

2231 Hall, Everett W. Continuity and Identity. Monist 42.4 (Oct 1932): 533-563.

Hall discusses Peirce's conception of "synechism" on pp. 544-545. JRS

2232 Hall, Everett W. Relevance and Scientific Method. J Phil 29.20 (29 Sept 1932): 533-543

2233 Hartshorne, Charles. Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics. J Phil 29.16 (4 Aug 1932): 421-431; 29.17 (18 Aug 1932): 457-469.

2234 Hillman, O. N. Professor Lewis' View of Our Knowledge of Objects. Monist 42.2 (April 1932): 303-312.

Hillman comments on Lewis's *Mind and the World-Order* {2041}. JRS

2235 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. The Revival of Idealism in the United States. In *Contemporary Idealism in America*, ed. Clifford Barrett (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 299-326.

The most vital recent movements in American philosophy—naturalism, realism, pragmatism, instrumentalism—were united in their opposition to absolute idealism, especially as elaborated in Royce's system. However, a revitalized idealism can be seen in the reconstructive efforts of Whitehead and Dewey. Dewey takes experience to be "ultimate," placing nature as a factor within it. His "empirical" method is "in spirit and principle, if not in the actual details of its execution, identical with the idealistic method." (p. 314) JRS

Reviews

Frank E. Morris, J Phil 30.7 (30 March 1933): 187-190.

2236 Horne, Herman Harrell. *The Democratic Philosophy of Education: Companion to Dewey's Democracy and Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1932

2237 Hullfish, Henry Gordon. Educational Confusion. Educational Research Bulletin 11 (1932): 85-90, 113-119.

2238 Kallen, Horace M. Reason as Fact and as Fetich. J Phil 29.21 (13 Oct 1932): 561-574; 29.22 (27 Oct 1932): 589-599

2239 Kling, Carlos. On the Instrumental Analysis of Thought. J Phil 29.10 (12 May 1932): 259-265.

Kling comments on Dewey's "An Analysis of Reflective Thought" {1665}. JRS

2240 Lafferty, Theodore T. Some Metaphysical Implications of the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge. J Phil 29.8 (14 April 1932): 197-207. Reprinted in his *Studies in Philosophy*, Lehigh University (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania) Publication, vol. 6, no. 7, July 1932.

Notes

Studies in Philosophy also contains a reprint of Lafferty's "The Dualism of Means and Value" {2176} and an Introduction by John Dewey, pp. i-ii [*LW* 6: 311-312]. Materials from these two articles, and from other articles, is used in his book, *Nature and Values: Pragmatic Essays in Metaphysics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1976). Dewey's introduction is reprinted in *Nature and Values*, pp. 277-279. See also Lafferty, "The Material World," J Phil 31 (1934): 505-513.

2241 Lewis, C. I. Alternative Systems of Logic. Monist 42.4 (Oct 1932): 481-507. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 400-419.

The grounds for choosing one logical system over another must be purely pragmatic. JRS

Notes

See A. Ushenko's response {2338}, and Y. L. Chin's response, "Note on Alternative Systems of Logic," Monist 44.1 (Jan 1934): 144-146.

2242 Lewis, C. I. and Cooper Harold Langford. *Symbolic Logic.* New York: The Century Co., 1932.

Reviews

Daniel J. Bronstein and Harry Tarter, Phil Rev 43.3 (May 1934): 305-309; Henry Bradford Smith, J Phil 30.11 (25 May 1933): 302-306; A. Ushenko, Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 309; John Wisdom, Mind 43.1 (Jan 1934): 99-109.

2243 Mackay, Donald S. Causality and Effectuality. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 15, no. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 129-144.

2244 Mead, G. H. *The Philosophy of the Present.* Ed. Arthur E. Murphy. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1932.

Murphy's "Introduction," pp. xi-xxxv, and Dewey's "Prefatory Remarks," pp. xxxvi-xl [*LW* 6: 307-310] orient the reader to Mead's lectures and to his traits of thought. The chapters are Mead's Paul Carus Lectures, read in December 1930. Chap. 1, "The Present as the Locus of Reality," pp. 1-31, defends the reality of emergent and truly novel events, and argues that "a reality which transcends the present must exhibit itself in the present." The past is as "hypothetical" as the future. Events occur under conditions of probable and relative determinability, as discovered by scientific method; yet these conditions do not determine the "full reality" of what emerges. Whitehead and Bergson tend to improperly abstract from temporal moments to define the present. A present is a situation referring to an emergent event whose earlier phases partially determine its later phases. Presents require a reinterpretation of the past, and the past is a construction whose reference is "to such an interpretation of the present in its conditioning passage as will enable intelligent conduct to proceed." (p. 29).

Chap. 2, "Emergence and Identity," pp. 32-46, explains that a life form maintains itself "through the mutual determination of the form and its environment" and thus the process of life "really confers characters upon the environment as it does upon the plant or animal." Reductive materialism falsely assumes that "it is possible to give an exhaustive account of any event which takes place in terms of the conditions of its occurrence." (p. 38) The theory of the relativity of space-time should not be metaphysically used to eliminate the reality of change; its significance lies in its elimination of the independence of space and time from events. Chap. 3, "The Social Nature of the Present," pp. 47-68, finds the "social" in the present mutual adjustment of the novel to prior conditions. Relativity proceeds from a demand for invariance, a constant speed for light, and the establishment of an object's perceptual characteristics as its reality. Relativity reverses the Newtonian reduction of perceptions to mere thoughts trying to conform to an assumed absolute reality of objects having an independent set of characters, and hence relativity supports a social understanding: "whatever emerges must be subject to the conditioning character of the present, and that it must be possible to state the emergent in terms of the conditioning past." (p. 64)

Chap. 4, "The Implications of the Self," pp. 68-90, defines knowledge as inferential reflection: "a process in conduct that so organizes the field of action that delayed and inhibited responses may take place." Knowledge's truth lies in its ability to construct those objects that will allow conduct to proceed. A "conscious" life form "can makes phases of its own life-processes parts of its environment" for the purpose of survival, and ideas are

perceptual symbols for habitual responses. The interpretation of experience from another's standpoint gives rise to the social self; relativity provides just that sort of organization of perspectives so that the fullest generality of communal experience is attained. Mind is the "realm of continual emergence" for life, culminating in sociality. The first three supplementary essays, "Empirical Realism," pp. 93-118, "The Physical Thing," pp. 119-139, and "Scientific Objects and Experience," pp. 140-160, were selected from preliminary drafts of the Carus Lectures. Essay four, "The Objective Reality of Perspectives," pp. 161-175, is a reprint of {1928}. The fifth essay, "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," pp. 176-195, is a reprint of {1833}. JRS

Reviews

H. T. Davis, Isis 20 (Nov 1933): 307-310; E. B. McGilvary, Int J Ethics 43.3 (April 1933): 345-349; Max C. Otto, Phil Rev 43.3 (May 1934): 314-315; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 42.3 (July 1933): 403-405; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 14.3 (July 1933): 217-218; Andrew Ushenko, Mind 43.2 (April 1934): 199-203; Gregory Vlastos, Queen's Quarterly 40 (1933): 473-477; Paul Weiss, New Republic 75 (26 Oct 1932): 302-303; Victor Yarros, Open Court 46 (Nov 1932): 787-791.

Notes

A discussion of the Paul Carus Lectures is in the "Report of the California Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {2187}. See also Alfred Tonness, "A Notation on the Problem of the Past–With Especial Reference to George Herbert Mead" {2273}.

2245 Morris, Charles W. Mind as Function. Chap. 6 of *Six Theories of Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1932. Rpt., Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 274-330.

Reviews

D. W. Gotshalk, J Phil 29.26 (22 Dec 1932): 717-719; Heinrich Meyer, Kant-Studien 38.1-2 (1933): 187-188; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 14.3 (July 1933): 215-217.

2246 Morris, Charles W. Truth, Action, and Verification. Monist 42.3 (July 1932): 321-329.

Instrumentalism should distinguish between judgments predicting events and judgments guiding behavior. A rigorous statement of pragmatism declares that judgments are responses to problematic situations which predict the results of actions; a judgment is true if the prediction is successful. JRS

2247 Murphy, Arthur E. Mr. Lewis and the *A Priori*. J Phil 29.7 (31 March 1932): 169-181.

Lewis's "dialectical" theory of truth in *Mind and the World-Order* {2041}, allowing mind to "legislate" to reality, is not consistent with the fact that every experience must objectively fall under some category, and that the mind has no alternative categories to choose from. The determination of meaning does not make truth relative to meaning: "to imagine that because we must know what we are talking about we are thereby absolved from the necessity of conforming to its nature, is a sheer *non sequitur*." JRS

2248 Papini, Giovanni. *Opere di Giovanni Papini.* 22 volumes. Florence: Vallecchi, 1932-1947.

2249 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 2: *Elements of Logic*. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains no works mentioned in this bibliography. JRS

Reviews

C. H., Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 315; W. V. Quine, Isis 19 (1933): 220-229; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 14.2 (April 1933): 140-141; H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 43 (1934): 209-212.

Extended reviews of vol. 1 and 2

Ernest Nagel {6 July 1933}.

Reviews of vols. 1 and 2

Morris R. Cohen, Ethics 43 (1933): 220-226; Rudolf Metz, Kant-Studien 38.1-2 (1933): 188-189; Heinrich Scholz, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 55 (4 March 1934): 392-395.

2250 Pepper, Stephen C. Middle-Sized Facts. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 3-28.

Dewey's "denotative method" fallaciously attributes to "middle-sized facts" a metaphysical ultimacy which they refuse to endure. Their contradictory truth claims—their demands to be "rationalized"—require adjudication. Even Dewey's system interprets away "dead stops and static objects," so he cannot claim that his method alone describes matters "as they really are" without interpreting them. JRS

2251 Perry, Ralph B. James, William. Article in *Dictionary of American Biography*, vol. 5, ed. Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), pp. 590-600.

2252 Perry, Ralph B. William James. American Scholar 1.4 (Oct 1932): 388-391.

2253 Raby, Sister Joseph Mary. *A Critical Study of the New Education.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1932.

Dewey's educational philosophy is extensively discussed and criticized in this polemical defense of Catholic educational principles. Insofar as progressive education does recognize the activity of the learner, as St. Thomas Aquinas stressed, it has some value. JRS

2254 Ramsdell, Edward Thomas. *Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemology of Borden P. Bowne.* Dissertation, Boston University, 1932.

Notes

Materials from this dissertation were used for "The Religious Pragmatism of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910)" {2388}, "Pragmatism and Rationalism in the Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne" {2447}, and "The Sources of Bowne's Pragmatism" {2448}. See Francis McConnell, *Borden Parker Bowne: His Life and His Philosophy* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1929), especially chap. 9, "Bowne and Pragmatism," pp. 149-162.

2255 Robinson, Daniel Sommer. *An Introduction to Living Philosophy.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1932.

Part Four discusses pragmatism. A section, pp. 246-249, is on "John Dewey's Instrumentalism." Dewey is also discussed on pp. 251-259, 283-297, and *passim.* JRS

Reviews

Theodore T. Lafferty, J Phil 30.8 (13 April 1933): 218-221.

2256 Robinson, James Harvey. John Dewey and His World. Harvard Teachers Record 2 (1932): 9-16.

2257 Savery, William. Chance and Cosmology. Phil Rev 41 (1932): 147-179.

2258 Schiller, F. C. S. Humanism. Philosophical Aspects. Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 542-543.

2259 Schiller, F. C. S. The Meaning of Biological History. Personalist 13.4 (Oct 1932): 268-280. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 249-261.

2260 Schiller, F. C. S. The Metaphysics of Change. Personalist 13.3 (July 1932): 178-190. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 235-248.

2261 Schiller, F. C. S. Must Philosophers Disagree? *College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Stockton, Cal.: College of the Pacific, 1932), pp. 94-105. Reprinted with revisions in *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 12 (1933): 118-130, and in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 3-14.

Notes

See the comments on Schiller's essay by the other two participants in the Aristotelian Society debate: C. A. Mace, pp. 131-137, and J. L. Stocks, pp. 138-149.

2262 Schiller, F. C. S. The Principles of Symbolic Logic. J Phil 19.20 (29 Sept 1932): 550-552.

2263 Schiller, F. C. S. The Value of Formal Logic. Mind 41.1 (Jan 1932): 53-71.

Schiller continues his discussion of formal logic, begun in "The Nature and Validity of Formal Logic" {2200}. JRS

Notes

See C. A. Mace's response, "Formalism," Mind 41.2 (April 1932): 208-211; Schiller, "Formalism Again," Mind 41.4 (Oct 1932): 481-482; Mace, "Formalism–A Rejoinder," 41.4 (Oct 1932): 483-484; and Schiller, "The Defence of Formalism," Mind 42.1 (Jan 1933): 130.

2264 Schiller, F. C. S., J. F. Wolfenden, John MacMurray. What is Philosophy? *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 11 (1932): 22-67

Schiller (pp. 42-47) and MacMurray (pp. 48-67) reply to Wolfenden (pp. 22-41). JRS

2265 Sears, Laurence. *Responsibility: Its Development Through Punishment and Reward.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.

Dewey's views are discussed in chap. 4, "Moral Judgments as Educational Instruments for Control," pp. 59-67, and also on pp. 152-159, 172-192. JRS

2266 Smith, Marshall P. *Criticism of Philosophical Method in Henri Bergson and John Dewey.* Honors Thesis, Harvard, 1932.

2267 Smith, Thomas V. G. H. Mead and the Philosophy of Philanthropy. Social Service Review 6 (March 1932): 37-54.

2268 Smith, Thomas V. The Religious Bearings of a Secular Mind: George Herbert Mead. Journal of Religion 12.2 (April 1932): 200-213.

2269 Swabey, Marie C. Is There Logical Force in Demonstration? J Phil 29.16 (4 Aug 1932): 431-439.

Swabey comments on Lewis's theory of the *a priori*. JRS

2270 Tate, Allen. The Aesthetic Emotion as Useful. This Quarter 5 (Dec 1932): 292-303. Reprinted in *LW* 6: 492-501.

Tate criticizes Dewey's *Affective Thought* {1855}. JRS

Notes

See Dewey's unpublished response, "What Is It All About?" *LW* 6: 330-334.

2271 Taylor, Henry Osborn. *Fact: The Romance of Mind.* New York: Macmillan, 1932.

Pp. 94-98 describe Dewey's view of philosophy's purpose and its relation to science. JRS

Reviews

Hugh Miller, J Phil 30.4 (16 Feb 1933): 110-111.

2272 Theodore, Samuel Joseph. *The Idea of God in Recent Pluralism, with Special Reference to John McTaggart, William James, and James Ward.* Dissertation, Yale, 1932.

2273 Tonness, Alfred. A Notation on the Problem of the Past–With Especial Reference to George Herbert Mead. J Phil 29.22 (27 Oct 1932): 599-606.

Tonness comments on Mead's *The Philosophy of the Present* {2244}. JRS

2274 Weiss, Paul. The Metaphysics and Logic of Classes. Monist 42.1 (Jan 1932): 112-154.

2275 Weiss, Paul. Peirce, Charles Sanders. Article in *Dictionary of American Biography*, vol. 14, ed. Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 398-403.

2276 Wen, Lien Chung. *The Conception of Culture with Special Reference to the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Ohio State, 1932.

1933

2277 Aldrich, Virgil C. Word-Portraiture. J Phil 30.3 (2 Feb 1933): 57-71.

2278 Anon. Apotheosis of Pragmatism. Saturday Review of Literature 10.1 (22 July 1933): 4

2279 Anon. Draft Code of "Humanism" as New Religion. Chicago Herald and Examiner (1 May 1933): 1.

2280 Bates, Ernest Sutherland. John Dewey: America's Philosophic Engineer. Modern Monthly 7 (1933): 387-396, 404.

2281 Baum, Maurice. The Development of James's Pragmatism Prior to 1879. J Phil 30.2 (19 Jan 1933): 43-51.

In *Pragmatism* {438} James asserts that Peirce's pragmatism lay unnoticed until 1898. But James had quoted Peirce's remarks in "Reflex Action and Theism" (1881) and "The Function of Cognition" (1885). Furthermore, in "Quelques considérations sur la méthode subjective" (1878), James himself had developed a similar method for establishing meanings. IKS

Notes

See Ralph B. Perry's comments {2323}.

2282 Blau, Théodore. *William James: Sa Théorie de la connaissance et la vérité.* Paris: Jouve et Cie., 1933.

This work focuses on James, and particularly on his theory of truth. Blau resolves to rely more on the pragmatic theory of knowledge than usual as a way of understanding James's position. (p. 1) Each chapter explores some pivotal aspect of knowledge: philosophy, science, and common sense (chap. 2), perception and conception (chap. 3), subject and object (chap. 4), and thought and action and thing and relations (chap. 5). Chap. 6, "The Idea of Truth," includes a discussion of objections, truth as a guide, truth as verification, and possible criteria of truth. Blau concludes that "Dewey arrived at the same conclusion as James, viz. that the problem of knowledge is neither its origin nor its value nor its fate...the philosophy of the future should envisage the intellect as an instrument intended for transforming the aspects of nature and life that hinder the social well-being...in a word, it will be a moral and political diagnostic and prognostic method." (p. 220) LF

2283 Bogholt, Carl. *John Dewey's Views of Philosophic Method in His Early Writings, 1882-1903.* Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1933.

2284 Breed, Frederick S. Progressive Education. School and Society 37 (1933): 544-548.

Notes

See William F. Bruce's response, "Comment upon Breed's Criticism of Dewey," School and Society 37 (1933): 812-814.

2285 Brotherston, Bruce W. The Empirical Method In Philosophy. J Phil 30.17 (17 Aug 1933): 449-458.

James had difficulty appreciating that radical empiricism could take the feeling of process to be truly physical, and not as mere bodily action. JRS

2286 Brotherston, Bruce W. Immediate Empiricism and Truth. J Phil 30.6 (16 March 1933): 141-149.

James came to realize that radical empiricism was his "fundamental contribution," grounding his pragmatic theory of truth. JRS

2287 Butler, James Donald. *The Criticism of the Philosophy of John Dewey from the Christian Point of View.* M.R.E. thesis, Biblical Seminary in New York, 1933.

2288 Conger, George P. Epitomization and Epistemology. Monist 43.1 (Jan 1933): 73-87.

2289 Conger, George P. *The Horizons of Thought: A Study in the Duality of Thinking.* Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1933.

2290 Coons, John Warren. *The Idea of Control in John Dewey's Philosophy.* Dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1933. Rochester, N.H.: Record Press, 1936.

2291 Cornesse, Marie. *L'Idée de dieu chez William James: Étude historique et critique.* Grenoble: Allier Père et Fils, 1933.

James's conception of God has a mystical basis. It is deficient, as no reason for God's existence is given, the metaphysical attributes of God are not understood, and it is anthropomorphic. Cornesse emphasizes the development of James's God from the early suppression of mystical tendencies to their later full flowering. IKS

2292 Cornesse, Marie. Le Rôle des images dans la pensée de William James. Grenoble: Allier Père et Fils, 1933.

James is a visualizer. Cornesse elaborately classifies James's images, revealing his personality. Their biographical and philosophical meanings are analyzed. IKS

2293 Dewey, John. The Adventure of Persuasion. New Republic 74 (19 April 1933): 285-286. Reprinted in *LW* 8: 355-359.

A review of Alfred North Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas* (1933). JRS

2294 Dewey, John. A God or The God? Christian Century 50 (8 Feb 1933): 193-196. Reprinted in *LW* 9: 213-222.

A review of Henry Wieman, Douglas Macintosh, and Max Carl Otto, *Is There a God?* (1932). It is inconsistent to attribute to God both absolute universality and the qualities of the "exclusive and jealous God of Israel." If the procurement of good requires an appeal to forces beyond us, how are these adequately explained by appeal to a "universal" God? It makes far more sense that "God" should designate "a collection of forces, unified only in their functional effect: the furtherance of goods in human life." (p. 221) FXR

Notes

See Henry Wieman and Douglas Macintosh's response, "Mr. Wieman and Mr. Macintosh 'Converse' with Mr. Dewey," Christian Century 50 (1 March 1933): 299-302; Dewey's rejoinder, "Dr. Dewey Replies," ibid. 50 (22 March 1933): 394-395 [*LW* 9: 223-228]; Charles C. Morrison, "Dewey and Wieman," ibid. 50 (5 April 1933): 448-449; Wieman, "Mr. Wieman Replies to Mr. Dewey," ibid. pp. 466-467; Macintosh's reply to Dewey, "Mr. Macintosh Restates His Position," ibid. 50 (19 April 1933): 531-533. See also Arthur B. Patten, "Open Letter to Prof. John Dewey," ibid. 50 (1933): 596-597. On these exchanges see Marvin C. Shaw, "Wieman's Misunderstanding of Dewey: The *Christian Century* Discussion," Zygon 22 (March 1987): 7-19.

2295 Dewey, John. *How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process.* 2nd ed., New York: Heath, 1933. Reprinted in *LW* 8: 105-352.

This "restatement" of Dewey's classic in educational theory {792} expands and clarifies the original text. The logical analysis of reflection receives the most extensive revision. Dewey replaces the "systematic inference" of deduction and induction with a more open and flexible approach to the question of how ideas are used to procure facts. FXR

Reviews

John Anderson, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 15 (1937): 224-230; Eugene G. Bugg, Amer J Psych 46.3 (July 1934): 528; Sidney Hook, "Dewey on Thought and Action," New Republic 78 (21 March 1934): 165; William McAndrew, School and Society 38 (1 July 1933): 24; Sven Nelson, Phil Rev 44 (1935): 75-76.

2296 Dewey, John. Logic. Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman, vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 590-603. Reprinted in *LW* 8: 3-12.

2297 Dewey, John. Outlawry of War. Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 508-510. Reprinted in *LW* 8: 13-18.

2298 Dewey, John. Why Have Progressive Schools? Current History 38 (July 1933): 411-448. Reprinted in *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 269-281. *LW* 9: 147-157.

2299 Dix, Lester Hancil, and Jesse Homer Newlon. John Dewey, Dean of Educational Theorists. School Executives Magazine 53 (1933): 99-101, 119

2300 Drake, Durant. *Invitation to Philosophy.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933.

Reviews

S. G. M., Monist 44.1 (Jan 1934): 153; Roy Wood Sellars, J Phil 30.24 (23 Nov 1933): 667-669.

2301 Ellis, Matt Locke. *John Dewey's Theory of Value.* Dissertation, Yale Uni-versity, 1933.

2302 Foerster, Norman. Education Leads the Way. American Review 1 (1933): 385-408.

2303 Gamertsfelder, Walter S. Current Skepticism of Metaphysics. Monist 43.1 (Jan 1933): 105-118.

2304 Girdler, John. Frill Mencken–De-Frill Dewey. Rotarian 42 (June 1933): 38-39.

2305 Harris, Pickens E. John Dewey: Pioneer in the Newer Discipline of the Child. Understanding the Child 3 (June 1933): 23-25, 31.

2306 Hartshorne, Charles. Four Principles of Method–With Applications. Monist 43.1 (Jan 1933): 40-72.

2307 Heidbreder, Edna. *Seven Psychologies.* New York: Century; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1933. Reprinted, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983.

See "The Psychology of William James," pp. 152-200, and "Functionalism and the University of Chicago," pp. 201-233. JRS

2308 Hook, Sidney. *Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation.* New York: John Day, 1933.

Reviews

Max Eastman, Herald Tribune (1933) [reprinted as "Higher Criticism of the Marxian Bible. I. If Marx had Studied Under Dewey" in his *Art and the Life of Action* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), pp. 122-128]. Hook's attempt to identify Marx's "dialectical materialism" with Dewey's "scientific pragmatism" is "as false and fantastic as it is historically improbable." Marx and Dewey both inherited from Hegel a belief in the unity

of theory and practice. Unlike Marx, who read his program-of-action into the objective movement of history itself, Dewey endorses possible modes-of-acting whereby directed ideas can achieve objective consequences. FXR

George H. Sabine, J Phil 30 (1933): 634-637.

2309 Kallen, Horace M. *Individualism: An American Way of Life.* New York: Liveright, 1933.

Reviews

Beryl Harold Levy, J Phil 30.23 (9 Nov 1933): 639-642; F. C. S. Schiller, 14.4 (Oct 1933): 302-303.

2310 Kilpatrick, William H., ed. *The Educational Frontier.* New York and London: Century Co., 1933.

John Dewey and John L. Childs authored chap. 2, "The Social-Economic Situation and Education," 32-72 [*LW* 8: 43-76], and chap. 9, "The Underlying Philosophy of Education," pp. 287-319 [*LW* 8: 77-103]. JRS

Reviews

Sidney Hook, New Republic 75 (24 May 1933): 49-50; A. Gordon Melvin, Progressive Education 10 (1933): 238-239; Mark Starr, American Teacher 18 (Feb 1934): 26-27.

2311 Korzybski, Alfred. *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics.* Lakeville, Conn.: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., 1933. 4th ed., 1958.

A "deeper and a new justification" for pragmatism is described on pp. 109-110. JRS

2312 Krakowski, E. Bergson et les philosophies de l'heroisme. Mercure Française 247 (1 Nov 1933): 513-528.

2313 Kunitz, Stanley J. John Dewey. In *Authors Today and Yesterday,* ed. Stanley Kunitz (New York: H. H. Wilson, 1933), pp. 195-197.

2314 Lewis, C. I. Note Concerning Many-Valued Logical Systems. J Phil 30.14 (6 July 1933): 364.

2315 Lyman, Eugene William. *The Meaning and Truth of Religion.* New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933.

The "will to believe" of James and Schiller is disapprovingly discussed on pp. 157-161. Dewey's naturalism is critiqued on pp. 175-192. Lyman finds the proper balance between value judgments and truth judgments in "pragmatic realism," pp. 193-194. JRS

Reviews

William K. Wright, J Phil 30.23 (9 Nov 1933): 631-634.

2316 McGilvary, Evander B. Perceptual and Memory Perspectives. J Phil 30.12 (8 June 1933): 309-330.

McGilvary contrasts his theory of beliefs about the past with the theories of Dewey and Mead. JRS

2317 Maire, Gilbert. *William James et le pragmatisme religieux.* Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1933.

The work of James—which defies intellectual analysis—is so much an expression of his life that it is necessary to unite them in one exposé. James's ideas are thus presented as episodes in his life, and his religious pragmatism is understood as a principal episode among them. (p. 8) Maire surveys the development of James's philosophy in eleven chapters. He discusses Hegel, James's intellectual origins, his life in Rio and Cambridge, his metaphysics, radical empiricism, and the pluralistic universe. Chap. 10 focuses on James and Bergson, Le Roy and Dewey, the publication of *Pragmatism* {438} and the reactions to it. The book includes a detailed bibliography and index. LF

Reviews

H. K., Studies: Irish Quarterly Review 23.3 (Sept 1934): 541-542. James's position is "merely a veiled pantheism." LF

2318 Major, D. R. Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, Humanism. In *Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1933), pp. 407-445.

2319 Nagel, Ernest. Charles Peirce's Guesses at the Riddle. J Phil 30.14 (6 July 1933): 365-386. Reprinted as parts 1-4 of "Charles Peirce's Guesses at the Riddle" in *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 58-83.

Nagel reviews the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1 {2191} and vol. 2 {2249}. Peirce's various characterizations of Firstness are difficult to reconcile with each other and with his logical pragmatism. Secondness is described by Peirce in regrettably anthropomorphic language, and he fails to give an analysis of the meaning of contingency. There are many obstacles to applying Peirce's categories to metaphysics, especially concerning the analogy of laws as habits. Peirce's obscure theory of signs is related to his views on the nature of meaning, the doctrine of fallibilism, logic and mathematics, and nominalism. His theory of the three forms of reasoning and of probability seems to ignore some material assumptions about the existence of limits to a rapidly converging series of variations, and the finite number of natural classes. JRS

Notes

See Paul Weiss's response, J Phil 31 (1934): 251, and Nagel's reply, J Phil 31 (1934): 252.

2320 Parkes, Henry Bamford. William James. Hound and Horn 7 (Oct-Dec 1933): 6-28.

2321 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 3: *Exact Logic*. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains no works mentioned in this bibliography. JRS

Reviews

C. J. Ducasse, Saturday Review of Literature 10 (16 Sept 1933): 123; W.V. Quine, Isis 22 (1934): 285-297; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 312; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 15.2 (April 1934): 174-177; John Wisdom, Philosophy 9.3 (July 1934): 379-380.

2322 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 4: *The Simplest Mathematics*. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," *CP* 4.530-572 {354}; and "Some Amazing Mazes," *CP* 4.585-642 {584} and "Some Amazing Mazes, A Second Curiosity," *CP* 4.643-646. JRS

Reviews

W. V. Quine, Isis 22 (1934): 551-553; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 16.1 (Jan 1935): 78-80.

Reviews of vols. 3-4

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 31.7 (29 March 1934): 188-190 [part 5 of "Charles Peirce's Guesses at the Riddle," *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 83-84]; H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 44 (1935): 85-87.

Reviews of vols. 1-4

R. B. Braithwaite, Mind 43.4 (Oct 1934): 487-511. Braithwaite focuses on Peirce's theory of signs and theory of probability and induction, and makes several sharp criticisms. Peirce's deficiencies lay in the areas of the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness, and the possession of critical severity and sense of fact. JRS

Cassius Jackson Keyser, "A Glance at Some of the Ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce," Scripta Mathematica 3 (Jan 1935): 11-37 [*Mathematics as a Cultural Clue and Other Essays* (New York: Scripta Mathematica, 1947), pp. 155-188]; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 312-313.

Notes

See Paul Weiss's comments on Ernest Nagel's review, J Phil 31.9 (26 April 1934): 251, and Nagel's reply to Weiss, ibid., p. 252.

2323 Perry, Ralph B. Letter to the Editor. J Phil 30.4 (16 Feb 1933): 112.

Perry comments on Baum's "The Development of James's Pragmatism Prior to 1879" {2281}. It is true that pragmatism can be found in James's early thought, but this does not mark the beginning of the pragmatic movement. IKS

2324 Prall, David W. A Case of the Pathetic Fallacy. J Phil 30.5 (2 March 1933): 113-119.

Prall responds to Marie Swabey's "Is There Logical Force in Demonstration?" {2269}. JRS

Notes

See Swabey's reply, "Logic as Language Habits versus Logic as Formal Truth" {2337}.

2325 Provine, Robert Calhoun. *The Voluntarism of William James: An Historical and Critical Study*. Dissertation, Brown University, 1933.

2326 Reisner, Edward H. What is Progressive Education? Teachers College Record 35 (1933): 192-201.

2327 Report of the Chicago Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 30.21 (12 Oct 1933): 574-580.

Reports on three papers, and subsequent discussion, concerning pragmatism. JRS

2328 Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 30.4 (16 Feb 1933): 102-108.

In a discussion of Locke, J. E. Boodin mentions (p. 106) that in a seminar William James offered Locke's philosophy as a prototype for the doctrine of truth as leading to and terminating in immediate experience. JRS

2329 **Schiller, F. C. S.** Data, Datives, and Ablatives. J Phil 30.18 (31 Aug 1933): 488-494. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 319-327.

2330 **Schiller, F. C. S.** The Development of Man. Personalist 14.1 (Jan 1933): 31-43. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 262-274.

2331 **Schiller, F. C. S.** Is Idealism Invariably Ambiguous? J Phil 30.24 (23 Nov 1933): 659-664. Reprinted as "Is Idealism Incurably Ambiguous?" in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 104-111.

Notes

See Clifford Barrett's response on p. 178 of "The Objectivity of Mind," J Phil 31.7 (29 March 1934): 169-178.

2332 **Schiller, F. C. S.** Man's Future on the Earth. Personalist 14.2 (April 1933): 119-129. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 275-286.

2333 **Schiller, F. C. S.** Man's Limitations or God's? Hibbert Journal 32.1 (Oct 1933): 41-55. Reprinted in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 287-305.

2334 **Schiller, F. C. S.** The Unity of the Universe. Mind 42.4 (Oct 1933): 501-503.

Notes

See Lewis Feuer, "On the Use of 'Universe'," Mind 43.3 (July 1934): 346-348, and Schiller's reply, "The Unity of the Universe Again," Mind 43.4 (Oct 1934): 469-471.

2335 **Smith, Thomas V.** Mead, George Herbert (1863-1931). Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman, vol. 10 (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 241-242.

2336 **Stimson, Rufus W.** Professional Sanctions from William James. Agricultural Education 5 (Jan 1933): 99-101.

James's work contained thousands of "sanctions" of use to a supervisor of vocational education in agriculture. A supervisor should look for a "variety of learning activities," good presentations of results, decisions made by the students, and the like. IKS

2337 **Swabey, Marie C.** Logic as Language Habits versus Logic as Formal Truth. J Phil 30.5 (2 March 1933): 119-128.

Swabey further examines C. I. Lewis's views on logic in this reply to D. W. Prall's "A Case of the Pathetic Fallacy" {2324}. JRS

2338 Ushenko, A. Note on Alternative Systems of Logic. Monist 43.2 (April 1933): 290-291.

Ushenko responds to C. I. Lewis's "Alternative Systems of Logic" {2241}. JRS

Notes

See Lewis, "Reply to Mr. Ushenko," Monist 43.2 (April 1933): 292-293; Ushenko, "An Addendum to the Note," ibid., p. 294; Lewis, "Reply to Mr. Ushenko's Addendum," ibid., pp. 295-296.

2339 Weiss, Paul. The Metaphysical and the Logical Individual. J Phil 30.11 (25 May 1933): 288-293.

2340 White, Carl Milton. *Meaning and Instrumentalism.* Dissertation, Cornell University, 1933.

2341 Williams, Donald C. The *A Priori* Argument for Subjectivism. Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 173-202.

The pragmatic tendency (exemplified in Schiller, but not Dewey) to attempt to defend subjectivism and refute realism using *a priori* tactics is reviewed and critiqued. JRS

2342 Williams, Donald C. The Innocence of the Given. J Phil 30.23 (9 Nov 1933): 617-628.

1934

2343 Aakesson, Elof. Begreppet 'Medvetande' i William James' Radikala Empirism. In *Gava och krav: skrifter tillagnade Manfred Bjorkquist pa hans femtioarsdag den 22 juni 1934* (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1934).

2344 Adams, Eugene Taylor. *The Epistemology of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1934.

2345 Akeley, Lewis E. The Problematic Situation. Its Symbolization and Meanings. J Phil 31.25 (6 Dec 1934): 673-681.

2346 Baker, Rannie Belle. *The Concept of a Limited God: A Study in the Philosophy of Personalism.* Washington, D.C.: Shenandoah Publishing House, 1934.

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 44.2 (Jan 1934): 317.

2347 Baum, Maurice. William James' Philosophy of Higher Education. School and Society 39 (10 Feb 1934): 161-166.

While James wrote no treatise on education, his various addresses add up to a "genuine philosophy of education." James stressed method rather than content, insisted that education should stimulate insight, and emphasized experimentation. IKS

2348 Baumgarten, Eduard. Die Pragmatische und Instrumentale Philosophie John Deweys. In *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, vol. 9 (1934), pp. 236-48.

2349 Bisbee, Eleanor. Knowledge by Fiat. J Phil 31.15 (19 July 1934): 400-408.

The willful *a priori* content of mind in Lewis's theory of knowledge must instead be either fundamentally *a posteriori* or an unaccountable mystery. JRS

Notes

Abstracted in J Phil 31.10 (10 May 1934): 271-272.

2350 Bixler, Julius S. The Patriot and the Pragmatist. Journal of Religion 14.3 (July 1934): 253-264.

The German National Socialist party has required philosophers to "build their theory of the new state on foundations laid by the American pragmatist, John Dewey." How could pragmatism be so misunderstood to become the "handmaiden" of Nazi patriotism? A correct grasp of James and Dewey erases the notion that pragmatism would subordinate philosophy to political desires. Pragmatism's psychological perspective does not leave us in complete relativism, but views people "universally...with purposeful minds." The world's "spiritual quality" is discovered when we "can live together harmoniously." JRS

2351 Boodin, J. E. Divine Laughter. Hibbert Journal 32.4 (July 1934): 572-584.

2352 Boodin, J. E. Functional Realism. Phil Rev 43.2 (March 1934): 147-178.

Functional realism asserts that perceived qualities and relations are "functions of objective nature and the percipient organism in perspective relation to one another." It harmonizes with recent science's tenet that "things exist only in fields, in mutuality with other things, and that they have properties only in their dynamic relations." This principle of cosmic "immanence" and "adjustment" rescues direct experience from the epistemologists. Like the "objective relativity" of physics, "organic relativity" finds that all properties are emergent, in the interaction of an organism's nervous system with the conditions of nature. The ideal aspects of experience are just as real as the sensory aspects. JRS

2353 Boodin, J. E. *God. A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Macmillan, 1934

Reviews

Clifford Barrett, J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 157-160; R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 45.2 (April 1936): 217-229; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 45.2 (July 1935): 312-313; James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 45.3 (April 1935): 466-468.

2354 Boodin, J. E. *Three Interpretations of the Universe.* New York: Macmillan, 1934.

Boodin studies three cosmological theories of evolution: preformation (from the beginning, the cosmos contains all forms and levels of existence), emergence (the temporal passage from lower to higher levels of existence without any formal guidance), and

Boodin's preferred view, creation (emergence of novel individuals takes place with the guidance of higher levels). JRS

Reviews

Clifford Barrett, J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 157-160; R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Mind 45.2 (April 1936): 217-229; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 45.2 (July 1935): 312-313; James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 45.3 (April 1935): 466-468.

2355 Commons, John Rogers. Hume and Peirce. Chap. 4 of *Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 140-157.

2356 Dewey, John. *Art as Experience.* New York: Minton, Balch and Co.; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1934. Reprinted as *LW* 10.

Highly praised as a masterpiece of aesthetics, it is anything but a typical essay on the "philosophy of art." Because the aesthetic captures experience in its fullest and most acute sense, Dewey calls it the ultimate "test" of any philosophy's ability to do justice to experience. This expansive role of art in the encountered world is evident from the outset. We must overcome the "museum attitude" that relegates art to elite connoisseurs, for art is equally manifest in the rushing fire engine, the spade of the gardener, and the grace of the athlete. Life is an "impulsive" flow of tension, emotion, desire, and material adjustment. In many experiences this flow is habitual or a means to an ancillary end. But when the interplay of flow and material itself becomes the focal point, we do not merely experience, we have an experience. Emotion, sensation, and materials forge an integral qualitative unity that expresses the fullness of being alive: "an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence." (p. 23)

The central chapters address the integration of matter and form that constitutes the aesthetic object. Form does not mold or shape inert matter. Instead it denotes both the subject-matter expressed and the materials organized in its expression. Nor is form a brute shaping force or a Platonic cosmic pattern. Form is elastic; it grows with each appreciative generation. In its full sense, then, form is an organization of forces that carries an experience to its integral fulfillment. (p. 142) And because these forces are natural rhythms progressing from simple physical reactions to highly complex human involvements, their reverberation in art is "a most perfect wedding" of matter and form. The concluding chapters fulfill the promise of aesthetic experience as the "test" of an ontology that forbids the dualisms of self and world, mind and object, concept and percept. Qualitative experience is prior to such distinctions, which are separated from it for some specific purpose. "Self" emerges in a world when the control of experience is at issue. "Mind" is the settled background of experience, while "consciousness" and "imagination" is the active foreground that continually adjusts self and world, old and new. "Perception" is charged with "conception"—though immediate, esthetic experience is imbued with meaning and inferential direction. For this reason, art is the "universal form of language" that "strikes below the barriers that separate human beings from one another." (p. 275) Art weds humans to nature and to each other. FXR

Reviews

Kenneth Burke, New Republic 78 (25 April 1934): 315-316. Dewey's new appreciation of art has tempered his staunch endorsement of technological progress, for now he sees the "grave cultural problems to which science has given rise." FXR

Irwin Edman, J Phil 31.10 (10 May 1934): 275-276. This book is an insightful account of Dewey's general theory of experience applied to "the varied enterprises and undergoings in life and civilization." FXR

David W. Prall, Phil Rev 44.4 (July 1935): 388-390. Although misguided critics will likely accuse him of subjectivism, Dewey has presented an "illuminating and thoroughly sound" case for reconceiving the "external world as esthetic presentation." FXR

Ernest Sutherland Bates, American Mercury 33 (Oct 1934): 253-255; I. Berlin, London Mercury 31 (Feb 1935): 387-388; Edwin T. Buehrer, Christian Century 51 (26 Sept 1934): 1211-1212; D. G. Cleage, New Era (London) 15 (Dec 1934): 256-257; Samuel L. Faison, Jr., Yale Review n.s. 24.1 (Sept 1934): 188-189; Robert J. Goldwater, Nation 138.25 (20 June 1934): 710-711; H. Gordon Hullfish, Educational Administration and Supervision 21 (March 1935): 235-236; John H. Randall, Jr., Social Frontier 2 (Jan 1936): 109-113; J. M. Lloyd Thomas, Hibbert Journal 33.3 (April 1935): 465-469.

2357 Dewey, John. *A Common Faith.* New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1934. Reprinted in *LW* 9: 1-58. Chap. 2 was also published as "The Liberation of Modern Religion," Yale Review 23 (June 1934): 751-770.

Dewey's principle work in the philosophy of religion emancipates the "religious" from "believers" insistent that religion must embrace the supernatural, and from "militant atheists" intent on discrediting all religious feeling. "Religion" must be distinguished from the religious. Religion is the adherence to specific beliefs and practices. The religious instead adhere to a form of experience–entwined with aesthetic, moral, scientific, and social experiences—that deepens "the sense of values which carry one through periods of darkness and despair." (p. 11) Religious experience expands to an "inclusiveness" of one's personal destiny and the fate of the universe.

Unfortunately, authentic spirituality is all too often subjugated to an outdated supernaturalistic metaphysics. Assailed by the compelling evidence of our natural origin in a natural universe advanced by astrophysics, biology, and anthropology, religions have clung to the crumbling sanctuary of scripture and authority. The full sense of religious discovery, however, takes us beyond individual truth claims to the *means* of procuring truth worthy of belief. Here honesty compels acceptance that "the one sure road of access to truth" is "observation, experiment, record, and controlled reflection." (p. 23) Though not about present realities, ideals are by no means chimerical or illusory. Ideals have the power to inspire us to action–even more so when we cannot rely upon a supernatural force to bring them to fruition. Indeed, "God" is an apt characterization of the actual and the ideal: the human procurement of greater and greater goods projected without mandated bounds or limitations. Religion has evolved from a preoccupation with original sin and the futility of human endeavors to the notion that natural and supernatural efforts are complementary. But even this dualism may now be overcome by a "humanistic religion," a "common faith" in the power of our conjoint and intelligent efforts to rehabilitate and transform our world. FXR

Reviews

Reinhold Niebuhr, "A Footnote on Religion," Nation 139.13 (26 Sept 1934): 358-359. Dewey's notion that the religious is an appreciation of the value of nature is closer to traditional religion than he supposes, for God is not an existence separate from nature but the background of such existence. FXR

Max C. Otto, Phil Rev 44 (1935): 496-497. Among all of Dewey's works, "there is none more incisive, more intellectually and emotionally mature, more alive with intense, if unsentimental, interest in man's destiny." FXR

F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 44.3 (July 1935): 397-399. Dewey defines God as "the mysterious totality of being the imagination calls the universe." But he makes no attempt to explicate such a totality, and his attempt to justify God by projective imagination seems oddly similar to the ontological argument of traditional theology. FXR

Andrew Banning, Christian Register 113 (1934): 787-789; A. E. Elder, Philosophy (London) 10.2 (April 1935): 235-236; Winfred E. Garrison, Christian Century 51 (10 Oct 1934): 1281; Frederick C. Grant, Anglican Theological Review 17 (1935): 44-45; Norbert Guterman, "John Dewey's Credo," New Republic 82 (20 Feb 1935): 53 [*LW* 9: 423-425]; Albert Eustace Haydon, Int J Ethics 45.3 (April 1935): 359-361; Henry Hazlitt, "But is It Religious?" Yale Review n.s. 24.1 (Sept 1934): 166-168; Corliss Lamont, New Masses 13 (2 Oct 1934): 38-39; William McAndrew, School and Society 41 (1935): 744-745; Walter Edwin Peck, Common Sense 3 (Nov 1934): 26; John H. Randall, Jr., Social Frontier 2 (1936): 109-113; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 45.2 (July 1935): 309; Robert Scoon, J Phil 31.21 (11 Oct 1934): 584-585; L. E. Sullivan, Thought 11.1 (June 1936): 147-153; G. A. T., Catholic World 140 (1934): 240.

Notes

See Dewey's response to Guterman's review, "Religions and the Religious," New Republic 82 (13 March 1935): 132. See also Henry Nelson Wieman, "John Dewey's Common Faith" {2403}.

2358 Dewey, John. *Education and the Social Order.* New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1934. Reprinted in *LW* 9: 175-185.

Reviews

Isadore Dubnau, High Points 16 (Oct 1934): 64-65.

2359 Dewey, John. Meaning, Assertion and Proposal. Philosophy of Science 1.2 (April 1934): 237-238. Reprinted in *LW* 9: 303-304.

Dewey comments on Rudolf Carnap's "On The Character of Philosophic Problems," Philosophy of Science 1.1 (Jan 1934): 5-19. JRS

Notes

See Carnap's response, "Meaning, Assertion and Proposal," Philosophy of Science 1.2 (April 1934): 359-360.

2360 Dewey, John. The Need for a Philosophy of Education. New Era in Home and School 15 (Nov 1934): 211-214. Reprinted in *Educational Adaptations in a Changing Society*, ed. E. G. Malherbe (Capetown and Johannesburg: Juta and Co., 1937), pp. 22-28. *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 288-299. *LW* 9: 194-204.

Notes

This paper was given at the South African Education Conference in July 1934. Two other papers Dewey gave at that time were later published in *Educational Adaptations in a Changing Society*: "What is Learning?" pp. 91-93 [*LW* 10:238-242] and "Growth in Activity," pp. 120-122 [*LW* 10: 243-246].

2361 Dewey, John. Philosophy. Article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 118-129. Reprinted in *LW* 8: 19-39.

2362 Dewey, John. Santayana's Orthodoxy. New Republic 78 (28 Feb 1934): 79-80. Reprinted in LW 9: 240-243.

A review of George Santayana's *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (1933). JRS

2363 Dewey, John. The Supreme Intellectual Obligation. Science Education 18 (Feb 1934): 1-4. Also published in Science n.s. 79 (16 March 1934): 240-243. Reprinted in *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 282-287. *LW* 9: 96-101.

2364 Dewey, John. Why I Am Not a Communist. Modern Monthly 9 (April 1934): 135-137. Reprinted in *The Meaning of Marx: A Symposium*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934), pp. 86-90. *LW* 9: 91-95.

2365 Dotterer, Ray H. The Operational Test of Meaninglessness. Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 231-237.

2366 Feldman, William Taft. *The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1934. Reprinted, New York: Greenwood, 1968.

Reviews

Robert J. Henle, Thought 10.3 (Dec 1935): 501-507; Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 31.21 (11 Oct 1934): 583-584; F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 44.2 (April 1935): 248-249.

Notes

This is a revision of his dissertation, *The Fundamental Motivation in the Philosophy of John Dewey*, The Johns Hopkins University, 1932. See Feldman's response to Schiller's review, Mind 44.4 (Oct 1935): 548-549, and Schiller's reply, Mind 45.1 (Jan 1936): 130.

2367 Fink, Joseph L. *A Critique of the Philosophy of Pragmatism in the Light of Scholastic Philosophy, with Special Reference to the Nature of Truth.* Dissertation, Niagara University, 1934.

2368 Fletcher, John Gould. Dewey's Latest Disciple. American Review 3 (1934): 392-393.

A review of Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization* (1934). JRS

2369 Freeman, Eugene. *The Categories of Charles Peirce.* Chicago and London: Open Court, 1934.

Reviews

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 31.10 (10 May 1934): 277-278. Freeman's attempt to show that Peirce's categories are objective but not universal or complete is "the first of a probably endless series of studies which will approach Peirce as a systematic speculative thinker."

It would be "a real loss to philosophy" to ignore Peirce as "the critic and clarifier of ideas." JRS

Charles Malik, Isis 23 (1935): 296-297; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 311.

2370 Fries, Horace S. *The Development of Dewey's Utilitarianism.* Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1934.

2371 Gambs, John S. Educator and Economist: An Essay Toward Mutual Understanding. Progressive Education 11 (1934): 32-37.

2372 Hall, Everett W. Time and Causality. Phil Rev 43.4 (July 1934): 333-350.

In Mead's account of time in *Philosophy of the Present* {2244}, the unreality of past and future undercuts his assumption that "there are different presents temporally related to one another." (p. 343) JRS

2373 Hartshorne, Charles. *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

2374 House, Floyd N. Measurement in Sociology. American Journal of Sociology 40.1 (July 1934): 1-11.

Notes

See Read Bain's response, "Measurement in Sociology," American Journal of Sociology 40.4 (Jan 1935): 481-488.

2375 Kallen, Horace M. Pragmatism. Article in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 307-311.

2376 Killeen, Mary Vincent. *Man in the New Humanism.* Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1934. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1934.

John Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, and several other humanists are critically contrasted with the "scholastic concept of man." JRS

2377 Lamont, Corliss. John Dewey Capitulates to "God." New Masses 12 (31 July 1934): 23-24.

2378 Lewis, C. I. Experience and Meaning. Phil Rev 43.2 (March 1934): 125-146. Reprinted in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 128-145. *Contemporary Philosophy*, James L. Jarrett and Sterling M. McMurrin, eds. (New York: Henry Holt, 1954), pp. 277-291. *Collected Papers*, pp. 258-276.

Lewis separates the logical positivist and pragmatist approaches to meaning. Logical positivism has joined empiricism with "methodological solipsism" to ground all possible

meaning and knowledge on sense data of first-person experience. This procedure is a reduction into absurdity since it is incompatible with the very possibility of empirical knowledge: it collapses knowledge into "the useless echo of data directly given to the mind at the present moment" and terminates meaning "in the immediate envisagement of what is meant." Objective idealism and pragmatism instead hold that the known object is definable in experience transcending the knowing experience of the subject. Objective idealism requires a deductive relation between the experience of the object's full reality and the cognizing experience, while pragmatism requires an inductive relation. For pragmatism, "the given experience of the moment of knowing is the basis of a probability-judgment concerning the experience (or experiences) which would verify, and in terms of which the real nature of the object is expressible." Thus knowing begins in experience with assertion, but ends in a different experience, the verification, in the future. Pragmatism rejects the old representational problems of knowledge as unreal, and also accounts for error and meaningful hypotheses about humanly unverifiable realities such as mind-independent reality or other selves (which logical positivism cannot do). JRS

Notes

An abstract of this paper is at J Phil 31.4 (15 Feb 1934): 100-101.

2379 Lewis, C. I. Paul Weiss on Alternative Logics. Phil Rev 43.1 (Jan 1934): 70-74.

2380 McClintock, James Alfred. *The Pragmatic Spirit in Modern English and American Theism.* Dissertation, Drew University, 1934.

2381 Mead, G. H. *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist.* Edited with an Introduction by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 162-163. These lectures, supplemented by excerpts from unpublished manuscripts, do not add anything essential to his social psychology as presented in his published articles. JRS

Van Meter Ames, Christian Century 52 (1 May 1935): 579-580; Bruce W. Brotherstone, Journal of Religion 15 (1935): 232-234; Harry T. Costello, Saturday Review of Literature 11 (9 Feb 1935): 481; W. Rex Crawford, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 179 (May 1935): 272-273; G. Davy *et al.*, L'Année Sociologique 3rd series 1 (1940-1948): 187-188; John Dewey, "The Work of George Mead," New Republic 87 (22 July 1936): 329-330 [*LW* 11:450-453]; Ellsworth Faris, American Journal of Sociology 51 (May 1936): 809-813; Sidney Hook, "A Philosophic Pathfinder," Nation 140 (13 Feb 1935): 195-196; J. R. Kantor, Int J Ethics 45 (April 1935): 459-461; Robert Liebendorfer, Today's Speech 8 (1960): 31-33; Eduard C. Lindeman, Survey 71 (1935): 280-281; Robert K. Merton, Isis 26 (Dec 1935): 189-191; Glenn R. Morrow, Phil Rev 44.6 (Nov 1935): 587-588; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 46.1 (Jan 1936): 155-156; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.1 (Jan 1936): 82-84; David Victoroff, L'Année Sociologique 3rd series 14 (1965): 234-235; Gregory Vlastos, Queen's Quarterly 42 (1935): 563-565; Wilson Wallis, Int J Ethics 45 (April 1935): 456-459; A. Stewart Woodburne, Crozer Quarterly 12 (April 1935): 203.

2382 Morris, Charles W. Pragmatism and Metaphysics. Phil Rev 43.6 (Nov 1934): 549-564. Reprinted in *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism* {2579} pp. 31-45.

Notes

An abstract is in "Report of the Chicago Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {2327}.

2383 Morris, Charles W. *Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Reviews

Harold H. Larrabee, J Phil 31.21 (11 Oct 1934): 585-586.

2384 Morris, Charles W. Some Aspects of Recent American Scientific Philosophy. Erkenntnis 5.2-3 (18 June 1935): 142-149.

Notes

A summary in German follows, ibid. pp. 149-151.

2385 Otto, Max Carl. Contemporary Thought Around the World: John Dewey. Christian Register 113 (11 Jan 1934): 19-21.

2386 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 5: *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism.* Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains the following works included elsewhere in this bibliography. For Peirce's contribution to the dictionary article "Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism," *CP* 5.1-4, see {93}. For Peirce's contribution to the dictionary article "Truth and Falsity (1) and (2) Error," *CP* 5.565-573, see {94}. For "What Pragmatism Is," *CP* 5.411-5.437, see {272}. For "Issues of Pragmaticism," *CP* 5.438-463, see {270}. For "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion," *CP* 5.610-614, see {353}. For "The Founding of Pragmatism," CP 5.11-13, see {2054}. JRS

Extended reviews

H. G. Townsend {2463}.

Reviews

John Dewey, New Republic 81 (30 Jan 1935): 338-339 [*LW* 11: 421-424]; Charles Malik, Isis 23 (1935): 477-483; Ernest Nagel, J Phil 31.21 (11 Oct 1934): 582-583 [part 6 of "Charles Peirce's Guesses at the Riddle," *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 85-86]; Mario M. Rossi, Logos 19 (1936): 152-157; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 45.1 (Jan 1935): 155; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 16.2 (April 1935): 169-173; Alfred Sidgwick, Mind 44.2 (April 1935): 223-230.

Reviews of vols. 3-5

Heinrich Scholz, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 57 (26 Jan 1936): 137-144.

Reviews of vols. 4-5

C. J. Ducasse, Saturday Review of Literature 11 (22 Sept 1934): 132; L. Susan Stebbing, Philosophy 11.1 (Jan 1936): 116-118.

2387 Pratt, James B. Logical Positivism and Professor Lewis. J Phil 31.26 (20 Dec 1934): 701-710.

Lewis rejects two positivistic tenets, as expressed by Carnap: that verifiability is essential to meaning, and that subjectivism is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of meaning. If Lewis explores further the question of how "the extraordinary coordination of our human experiences is possible" then he will come still nearer to representative realism. JRS

2388 Ramsdell, Edward T. The Religious Pragmatism of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910). Personalist 15.4 (Oct 1934): 305-314.

Bowne's pragmatic understanding of the activity of mind and the life of faith is visible in his work as early as 1879. JRS

2389 Rogers, Arthur K. The Ethics of Pragmatism. In *Ethics and Moral Tolerance* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 81-120.

Dewey's pragmatism treats intelligence as only a method of attaining goals, but what are the good goals? To attack finals ends is one thing, but Dewey seems to be unable to even critically justify any desirable human ends. Philosophy has traditionally involved "the personal quest for my own distinctive good" but Dewey considers individuals to only be "phases in a social process." Dewey's theory of knowledge permits a divorce between immediate natural goods, and reflective consequential goods. The problem is that for Dewey, only the latter are disputable or knowable. Ethics is about action in general, not situations, and explores the latent possibilities in human nature. JRS

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 45.1 (Jan 1935): 154; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 31.6 (15 March 1934): 165-166.

2390 Sarailieff, Ivan V. *Études sur le pragmatisme: Le Pragmatisme de William James*. Sofia: Imprimerie de la Cour, 1934.

Notes

This work is written in Bulgarian, though the title is in both Bulgarian and French.

2391 Schiller, F. C. S. The Evolution of Plato's Republic. Personalist 15.4 (Oct 1934): 327-340. Reprinted as "Plato's Republic" in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 155-167.

2392 Schiller, F. C. S. *Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*. London and New York: Macmillan, 1934.

A collection of lectures and previously published articles. Chap. 1, "*Must* Philosophers Disagree," is a reprint of {2261}. Chap. 2, "The Psychology of Examinations," pp. 15-31, is a 1927 lecture. Chap. 3, "Some Problems of Mass Education," pp. 32-38, is a 1930 address. Chap. 4 is a lecture entitled "Two Logics," pp. 39-46. Chap. 5, "The Sacrifice of Barbara," pp. 47-57, is a reprint of {2199}. Chap. 6, "William James," pp. 61-73, is a 1930 lecture and was also published as {2394}. Chap. 7, "The Letters of William James," pp. 74-92, is a reprint of {1647}. Chap. 8, "William James and the Making of Pragmatism," pp. 93-105, is a reprint of {1944}. Chap. 9, "Nietzsche," pp. 106-128, is a revised version of {1219}. Chap. 10, "Herbert Spencer as a Moralist," pp. 129-141, is a 1932 lecture. Chap. 11, "James Thomson: A Poet of Pessimism," pp. 142-155, is a 1933

lecture. Chap. 12, "Our Natural Relativity," pp. 159-163, is a reprint of {1786}. Chap. 13 "Theory and Practice," pp. 164-181, is a 1933 lecture. Chap. 14, "The Tribulations of Truth," pp. 182-193, is a reprint of {600}. Chap. 15, "Cassandra's Apologia," pp. 194-202, is a reprint of {1502}. Chap. 16, "Creation, Emergence, Novelty," pp. 203-213, is a reprint of {2138}. Chap. 17, "Novelty," pp. 214-234, is a reprint of {1700}. Chap. 18, "The Metaphysics of Change," pp. 235-248, is a reprint of {2260}. Chap. 19, "The Meaning of Biological History," pp. 249-261, is a reprint of {2259}. Chap. 20, "The Development of Man," pp. 262-274, is a reprint of {2330}. Chap. 21, "Man's Future on the Earth," pp. 275-286, is a reprint of {2332}. Chap. 22, "Man's Limitations or God's?" pp. 287-305, is a reprint of {2333}. Chap. 23, "Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion," pp. 306-319, is a reprint of {2065}. Chap. 24, "Philosophy, Science, and Psychical Research," pp. 320-351, is a reprint of {1283}. JRS

Reviews

Charles W. Morris, Personalist 16.4 (Oct 1935): 388-390; Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 31.26 (20 Dec 1934): 719-720.

Notes

See Schiller's reply to Morris's review, "Must Pragmatists Disagree?" {2527}.

2393 Schiller, F. C. S. Truthseekers and Soothsayers. Personalist 15.3 (July 1934): 209-218. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 48-56.

2394 Schiller, F. C. S. William James, The Maker of Pragmatism. In *College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 3, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Stockton, Cal.: College of the Pacific, 1934), pp. 101-109. Reprinted as "William James," in his *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}, pp. 61-73.

Schiller reminiscences about James and pragmatism. James broke down the separation of psychology from metaphysics, overthrew atomism, and introduced the continuum. He also developed pragmatism, removing the distinction between theory and practice. James interpreted American life in its universal aspects. Actual life is everywhere pragmatic. IKS

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 32.7 (28 March 1935): 191-192.

2395 Schiller, F. C. S., Julian S. Huxley, and E. W. MacBride. Science and Psychical Research. Nature 134 (22 Sept 1934): 458.

2396 Smith, Thomas Vernor. *Beyond Conscience.* New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1934.

2397 Somerville, John. The Strange Case of Modern Psychology. J Phil 31.21 (11 Oct 1934): 571-577.

The questions Locke refused to raise became central in James's psychology, for James wanted to correlate mind with body. James asks not "what can I know," but "how do I know." This is a major shift, although there are no signs that Locke's question has been answered. As James predicted, psychology has moved even further away from Locke. IKS

2398 Taylor, Thomas Whiting. The Aesthetic Approach to Theism. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1934.

2399 Townsend, Harvey Gates. *Philosophical Ideas in the United States.* New York: American Book Co., 1934. Reprinted, New York: Octagon Books, 1968.

James is discussed in chap. 9, "Psychological Empiricism and Spiritual Pluralism." Chap. 11, "Logical Realism: Chance," surveys Peirce's philosophy. Chap. 12, "Evolutionary Naturalism," discusses Dewey and Santayana. JRS

Reviews

Edward L. Schaub, Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 320; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 31.20 (27 Sept 1934): 556.

2400 Trageser, Gertrude A. *Criticism of John Dewey's "Quest for Certainty."* Dissertation, Fordham University, 1934.

2401 Tseng, Tso C. *Nationalism and Pragmatism in Modern Education with Special Application to Post-Revolutionary Chinese Thought.* Dissertation, University of Washington, 1934.

2402 Ushenko, A. Alternative Perspectives and the Invariant Space-Time. Mind 43.2 (April 1934): 199-203.

2403 Wieman, Henry Nelson. John Dewey's Common Faith. Christian Century 51 (14 Nov 1934): 1450-1452. Reprinted in *LW* 9: 426-434.

Notes

See Edwin E. Aubrey's response, "Is John Dewey a Theist?" Christian Century 51 (5 Dec 1934): 1550 [*LW* 9: 435-437]; Wieman's reply, "Is John Dewey a Theist?" ibid. pp. 1550-1551 [*LW* 9: 438-440]; Dewey's "Reply to Aubrey and Wieman in 'Is John Dewey a Theist?'" ibid. pp. 1551-1552 [*LW* 9: 294-295]; and Wieman's reply, ibid. pp. 1552-1553.

2404 Williams, Donald C. The Argument for Realism. Monist 44.2 (July 1934): 186-209.

Pragmatists have obscured the inductive case for realism by asserting that realism's superior utility actually *makes* it true, instead of properly claiming that such utility makes us *believe* it true. Pragmatism justifies metaphysical realism, and metaphysical realism justifies the pragmatic methodology. JRS

2405 Williams, Donald C. Truth, Error, and the Location of the Datum. J Phil 31.16 (2 Aug 1934): 428-438.

2406 Wu, Shu-Pan. *Implications of the Philosophy of Experimentalism for Higher Education, with Special Reference to Methods of Teaching.* Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1934.

2407 Baum, Maurice. William James and Psychical Research. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 30 (April-June 1935): 111-118.

Baum surveys James's writings in the field. James's interest in psychical research was serious, "cautious and scrupulous." IKS

2408 Bentley, Arthur F. *Behavior, Knowledge, Fact.* Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1935.

Dewey is correct in his assertion that the encountered world constitutes a primary matrix or "trans-action" from which organisms and environments are isolated by analysis and selective abstraction. (p. 76) This fundamental ground is social fact: these phenomena must be approached *functionally* as a general mode of social activity that underlies the specific determinations of physics and biology. Thus the mechanical causation of Watson's behaviorism must be replaced with a "behavioral space-time" whereby meaning is determined within the context of a social situation. FXR

Reviews

Frank Meyerson, Religious Education 31 (1936): 230; Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.6 (12 March 1936): 165-166; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.3 (July 1936): 328-329.

2409 Brotherstone, Bruce W. The Empirical Spirit. Monist 45.2 (July 1935): 186-198.

2410 Buckham, John W. God and the Ideal: Professor Dewey Reinterprets Religion. Journal of Religion 15.1 (Jan 1935): 1-9.

Dewey's novel emphasis on ideals is a "virtual surrender of pragmatism." Ideals may develop in nature, but this does not prove that they originate or belong exclusively to nature. We cannot say that because the plant is in the soil, the plant *is* soil, or say that because the soul is with the body, the soul *is* body. Only faith—the "will to believe"—and not merely imagination can give religion its vital quality. JRS

2411 Burke, Kenneth. *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose.* New York: New Republic, 1935. 2nd rev. ed., Los Altos, Cal.: Hermes Publications, 1954. 3rd rev. ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Dewey's theory of "occupational psychosis" is discussed in chap. 3, pp. 38-48. JRS

2412 Curti, Merle. *The Social Ideas of American Educators.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935.

Chap. 13 is "William James, Individualist," pp. 429-458. *The Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} idealized poverty, but James never experienced it and remained insensitive to the poor. His teachings on instinct and habit have conservative social implications. He interpreted social conflicts psychologically, but never grasped their deeper roots. IKS

Chap. 15 discusses "John Dewey," pp. 499-541. Dewey drifted from Hegelianism in his early career. Influenced by evolution and James's biological psychology, he found that "moral judgments are to be regarded as hypotheses for experimentation rather than as absolute principles." Dewey condemns the class character of American cultural values and exploitative commercialism. His advocacy of democratic collectivism is based on a faith in education—a morally socializing process emphasizing growth as an end in itself. JRS

2413 Dearborn, George Van Ness. William James's Scientific Integrity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 30 (July-Sept 1935): 262-264.

Dearborn praises Baum's article {2407}. How could James not be interested in psychical research, when survival is one of the most interesting questions of life? Dearborn served as James's assistant and was a friend for twenty-five years. IKS

2414 Demiashkevich, Michael. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education.* New York: American Book Co., 1935.

Pragmatism's influence on the New Education is recounted on pp. 107-117. Dewey's instrumentalism and its relation to progressive education is described on pp. 135-146. JRS

2415 Dennes, W. R. Time as Datum and as Construction. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 18, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California, 1935. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 83-117.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.9 (23 April 1936): 250-251.

2416 Dewey, John. Bergson on Instinct. New Republic 83 (26 June 1935): 200-201. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 428-431.

Dewey reviews Henri Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1935). According to Bergson, religion has only two sources. It is either a negative protest against intelligence that ferments individuality and social upheaval, or a positive instinct that grasps the *elan vital*, the "immediate ongoing of life." But Bergson seems to regard instinct as the ultimate solution to all problems, and one must wonder "whether an organ that by definition is susceptible of no control beyond itself is a safe guide." (p. 431) FXR

2417 Dewey, John. An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms. In *Studies in the History of Ideas*, vol. 3, edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), pp. 3-22. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 69-83.

With the ascendance of modern science, empiricism gained respectability for its insistence that knowledge of reality requires evidence, observation, and experimentation. Unfortunately, the preoccupation with sensations and ultimate "simplex" that plagued the successors of Locke rendered the natural world incomprehensible. Today, however, there is a "new empiricism." It insists that "facts" are determined by ideas or hypotheses experimentally directed to productive results, and that objective knowledge is a product of biological processes rather than introspective analysis. FXR

2418 Dewey, John. The Future of Liberalism. School and Society 41 (19 Jan 1935): 73-77. Also published in J Phil 32.11 (25 April 1935): 225-230. Reprinted as "The Future of Liberalism: II" in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 133-140. *LW* 11: 258-260.

Notes

See J. H. Randall Jr.'s "Liberalism as Faith in Intelligence" {2449}.

2419 Dewey, John. *Liberalism and Social Action.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 1-67.

Extended reviews

Frank H. Knight, "Pragmatism and Social Action" {2498}.

Reviews

Alfred M. Bingham, Common Sense 4 (Sept 1935): 28; Edwin Theophil Buehrer, Christian Century 52 (25 Sept 1935): 1210; Kenneth Burke, New Republic 86 (4 March 1936): 115-116; John Chamberlain, Current History 43 (Oct 1935): v-vi; Henry Hazlitt, New York Times Book Review (1 Sept 1935): 9; Horace M. Kallen, Saturday Review of Literature (14 Dec 1935): 7; Reinhold Niebuhr, Nation 141 (11 Sept 1935): 303-304; Melchior Palyi, American Journal of Sociology 44 (Nov 1938): 480-481; Walter L. Whittlesey, Survey Graphic 24 (Nov 1935): 555-556.

2420 Dewey, John. Mystical Naturalism and Religious Humanism. New Humanist 8 (April-May 1935): 74-75. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 84-85.

2421 Dewey, John. Peirce's Theory of Quality. J Phil 32.26 (19 Dec 1935): 701-708. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 86-94.

Dewey responds to Goudge's "The Views of Charles Peirce on the Given of Experience" {2426}. In Peirce's phenomenology, Firstness is a "pervading unity of quality" in experience, Secondness is an existential singular, and Thirdness is a "mediation or continuity." Goudge accuses Peirce of inconsistently describing Firstness as both immediate "qualities of feeling" and as logical possibilities or generals. Peirce himself makes it clear that the former describes Firstness per se, and the latter as it is applied to Secondness. In other words, Firstness itself is an ineffable quality that "totally and intimately pervades a phenomenon or experience." (p. 90) Each cognitively isolated singular, however, has its ground in the qualitative unity of primary experience. Firstness is thus potentiality and generality in its relation to Secondness. FXR

Notes

See Goudge's reply, "Further Reflections on Peirce's Doctrine of the Given" {2487}.

2422 Dykhuizen, George. Dewey's Philosophy and Theory of Education. Vermont Alumni Weekly (20 March 1935): 247-248, 254-255.

2423 Dykhuizen, George. Royce's Early Philosophy of Religion. Journal of Religion 15.3 (July 1935): 316-321.

2424 Ericksen, E. E. Dewey's Concept of the Individual Socially Evaluated. J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 152-153.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in December 1934.

2425 Fitch, Robert E. Growth as the Good–An Instrumental View. J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 153.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read in December 1934.

2426 Goudge, Thomas A. The Views of Charles Peirce on the Given of Experience. J Phil 32.20 (26 Sept 1935): 289-295.

Peirce describes Firstness as both immediate "qualities of feeling" and as logical possibilities or generals. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's response, "Peirce's Theory of Quality" {2421}.

2427 Haydon, Albert Eustace. Mr. Dewey on Religion and God. Journal of Religion 15.1 (Jan 1935): 22-25.

2428 Hook, Sidney. Experimental Naturalism. In *American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow*, ed. Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook (New York: Lee Furman, 1935. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 205-235.

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 33.4 (13 Feb 1936): 109-110; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.2 (April 1936): 202-204.

2429 Hook, Sidney. Our Philosophers. Current History 41.6 (March 1935): 698-704.

James remained a "sensitive European" who paid little attention to the social realm. He populated the world with "spooks" and adopted a "will to believe" that is incompatible with his own psychology. IKS

Peirce was the "philosophers' philosopher" whose experimental theory of meaning and knowledge had the greatest influence on American thought. Dewey has had few followers in academic philosophy, but his "experimental method" is echoed in Bridgeman's "operational method," which has found favor among scientists. Dewey "seems to erect a social philosophy on...scientific method," but underestimates the significance of class struggles, since classes "do not experiment to determine what the social consequences of their own non-existence will be." JRS

2430 Kennedy, Gail. The Pragmatic Naturalism of Chauncey Wright. In *Columbia Studies in the History of Ideas*, vol. 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), pp. 477-503.

2431 Locke, Alain. Values and Imperatives. In *American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow*, ed. Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook (New York: Lee Furman, 1935. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 313-333. Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Alain Locke*, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 34-50.

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 33.4 (13 Feb 1936): 109-110; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.2 (April): 202-204.

Notes

See Johnny Washington, *A Journey into the Philosophy of Alain Locke* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).

2432 MacDonald, Margaret. Charles Sanders Peirce on Language. Psyche 15 (1935): 108-128.

2433 Mead, G. H. The Philosophy of John Dewey. Int J Ethics 46.1 (Oct 1935): 64-81

Dewey's philosophy was initially neo-Hegelian. He retained its rejection of the older Scottish common-sense dualism, holding that "thought and its object lie within the same experience." Unlike idealistic systematizers (such as Royce), Dewey tried to solve American social problems, by applying a philosophy of morality and education. Linking intelligence with conduct, Dewey also formulated a logic of science for solving philosophical problems. Thinking uses universals, which are signs with social meaning in human experience, and these signs result from shared attentive abstraction from particulars. Nature has different characters in differing social perspectives. Dewey's view of reality is a pluralistic empiricism that recognizes possibilities and processes, but no final end. The responsibility for living must rest upon society, and society's success depends on its use of intelligence. JRS

2434 Meecham, H. G. The Pragmatic Note in the Gospels. London Quarterly Review 160.2 (April 1935): 201-208.

2435 Metz, Rudolf. Pragmatismus. In *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1935), vol. 2, chap. 2. Enlarged and revised for the English translation by Rudolf Metz and translated by Henry Sturt, T. E. Jessop and J. W. Harvey as *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 446-529. This chapter on "Pragmatism" was translated by Henry Sturt.

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 16.4 (Oct 1935): 398-399.

Reviews of the translation

Wilbur Long, Personalist 21.1 (Jan 1940): 79-81.

2436 Moore, Merritt H. Truth and the Interest Theory of Value. J Phil 32.20 (26 Sept 1935): 545-551.

2437 Morris, Charles W. Philosophy of Science and Science of Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 2.3 (July 1935): 271-286. Reprinted in *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism* {2579} pp. 7-21.

2438 Morris, Charles W. The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences within Scientific Empiricism. Erkenntnis 5.1 (31 March 1935): 6-14. Reprinted in *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism* {2579}, pp. 46-55.

Notes

A summary in German follows, Erkenntnis 5.1 (31 March 1935): 14-16.

2439 Muirhead, John H. *Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935.

The subtitle is "Letters Illustrating the Sources and the Development of His Philosophical Opinions." Letter XLII advises a friend to visit Harvard: "William James is certainly a spiritualist crank; but all he writes is suggestive." Letter CVIII asserts that social and historical progress is dependent on religious faith, and declares, "It is a thing Wm. James never seemed in the least to understand, and I could not see why." Several more references to pragmatism, James, and Dewey are found in other letters. JRS

2440 Ogden, C. K. Editorial. Psyche 15 (1935): 5-18.

2441 Otto, Max C. Mr. Dewey and Religion. New Humanist 8 (April 1935): 41-47.

2442 Peirce, C. S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 6: *Scientific Metaphysics.* Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935.

A collection of published and unpublished writings. It contains "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," *CP* 6.452-485 {583}, and portions of the lectures *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* {18}. JRS

Reviews

Karl Britton, Mind 46.3 (July 1935): 394-399; Lewis S. Feuer, Isis 26 (1936): 203-208; Ernest Nagel, J Phil 33.4 (13 Feb 1936): 107-109 [part 7 of "Charles Peirce's Guesses at the Riddle," *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 86-88]; Edward L. Schaub, Monist 46.1 (Jan 1936): 159; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.2 April 1936): 200-201; L. Susan Stebbing, Philosophy 12.2 (April 1937): 230-232.

Reviews of vols. 5-6

Henry S. Leonard, "The Pragmatism and Scientific Metaphysics of C. S. Peirce," Philosophy of Science 4.1 (Jan 1937): 109-121; H. G. Townsend, Phil Rev 45 (1936): 418-420.

Reviews of vols. 1-6

John Dewey, "C. S. Peirce," New Republic 89 (3 Feb 1937): 415-416 [*LW* 11: 479-484].

2443 Pepper, Stephen C. The Order of Time. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Berkeley: University of California, 1935. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 3-20.

Pragmatism, or "contextualism," should attempt to account for the order of time. Hook's *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism* {1914} avoids a correspondence theory of truth only by conceiving hypotheses as actively creating the conditions for its verification. On this notion, time is neither a sheer fiction nor a feature of a universal physical order. JRS

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.9 (23 April 1936): 250-251.

2444 Perry, Ralph B. *The Thought and Character of William James.* Two vols. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1935. Portions reprinted as *The Thought and Character of William James, Briefer Version* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948).

This standard biography of James consists largely of quotations from correspondence between James and family, friends, and intellectual peers, including many prominent philosophers, psychologists, and scientists. Material from James's unpublished manuscripts is also presented. IKS

Extended reviews

John Dewey {2548}; Horace M. Kallen {2565}; Dickinson S. Miller {2513}.

Reviews

Anon, "A Pragmatic Romantic: The Conflict in William James," Times Literary Supplement 35 (17 Oct 1936): 821-822. Perry lacked nothing but a pair of scissors. IKS

George S. Brett, "William James and American Ideals," University of Toronto Quarterly 6 (Jan 1937): 159-173. Perry has produced a "picture of American life." IKS

Kenneth Burke, "William James: Superlative Master of the Comparative," Science and Society 1 (1936): 122-125. James regarded the intellect as a "non-moral" power, while Peirce made logic a branch of ethics. As a result, James had to engraft moral exhortations onto his pragmatism. IKS

John Dewey, "The Jameses," New Republic 86 (12 Feb 1936): 24-25 [*LW* 11: 441-445]. James is fortunate in finding a biographer who permits him to speak for himself. Dewey offers reminiscences of James. IKS

C. Hartley Grattan, North American Review 241.1 (March 1936): 174-181. A history of the James family should form an important part of the history of American families. James was an "eupeptic for philosophers," "shallow," but a consolation to sick souls, and a contributor to "inspirational literature." He was a "great and noble human being." IKS

Valdemar Hansen, Theoria 4 (1938): 176-180. Perry's book is a rich work which deepens our understanding of James. IKS

Sidney Hook, "William James," Nation 141.24 (11 Dec 1935): 684, 686-687. James is more remarkable as an "intellectual force" than as a systematic thinker. The work is important because it reveals James's political and social views. IKS

Frank Jewett Mather Jr., "A Champion of Lost Causes," Saturday Review of Literature 13.5 (30 Nov 1935): 3-4, 14. James is interpreted in terms of his Irish background, relations with his father, and neurasthenia. James was an "outsider" trying to become an "insider." IKS

Edward S. Robinson, Yale Review n.s. 25.3 (March 1936): 616-620. James prepared the way for Freudian psychology and behaviorism. His repudiation of "logical nicety" reflects the "pandemonium of nineteenth century America." Perry has contributed to the history of American thought and the art of biography. IKS

Alfred Sidgwick, Mind 46.1 (Jan 1937): 67-74. James's pragmatism has no "special connexion" with the will to believe. It is concerned with reasoning in general rather than religious faith. IKS

R. P. Angier, "Perry's Thought and Character of William James," Psych Bull 33.8 (Oct 1936): 640-651; Émile Duprat, "Une Biographie psychologique de William James," Rev Méta 44.2 (April 1937): 457-471; Irwin Edman, J Phil 33.3 (30 Jan 1936): 81-82; James Bissett Pratt, New England Quarterly 9 (June 1936): 317-324; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.2 (April 1936): 200-201; James H. Tufts, Int J Ethics 48 (1938): 254-257.

Notes

See Perry's reply to Schiller's review, "Perry to Schiller," Personalist 17.4 (Oct 1936): 422, and Schiller, "Schiller's Reply to Perry," ibid. pp. 422-423.

2445 *Philosophy of Religion. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1935.

Three essays comment on pragmatism. Francis A. Walsh's "The Defeat of Philosophy in Religious Experience," pp. 1-12, calls James's "will to believe" philosophy "a weary failure." William P. O'Connor's "Types of American Naturalism in Religion," pp. 50-60, accuses Dewey's "revolutionary" naturalistic interpretation of religious experience of failing to account for the existence of goods in human experience. Agnes Teresa McAuliffe's "Some Modern Non-Intellectual Approaches to God," pp. 68-83, complains that James's theory of mysticism omits the first stage of mystical experience, the state of confused knowledge, and starts instead with the second stage, the affective state. His pseudo-mysticism, by placing feelings before intellect, is thus responsible for "the dethronement of reason and the extravagant visions of a disordered imagination." JRS

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 32.16 (1 Aug 1935): 444-445. In this collection of papers the failures of humanism, mysticism, and naturalism (including John Dewey's philosophy) to "square" with the "truth" of scholasticism "are rehearsed rather than examined." JRS

2446 Piatt, Donald A. That Will-O'-The-Wisp, The Innocent Inscrutable Given. J Phil 32.13 (20 June 1935): 337-350.

Notes

An abstract is in J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 153.

2447 Ramsdell, Edward T. Pragmatism and Rationalism in the Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne. Personalist 16.1 (Jan 1935): 23-35.

2448 Ramsdell, Edward T. The Sources of Bowne's Pragmatism. Personalist 16.2 (April 1935): 132-141.

2449 Randall, John H. Jr. *Liberalism as Faith in Intelligence.* J Phil 32.10 (9 May 1935): 253-264.

Randall responds to Dewey's "The Future of Liberalism" {2418}. JRS

2450 Ratner, Joseph. The Correspondence Theory of Truth. J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 141-152.

2451 Ratner, Joseph. Scientific Objects and Empirical Things. J Phil 32.15 (18 July 1935): 393-408.

2452 Ray, Binayendranath. *Consciousness in Neo-Realism.* London: Humphrey Milford, 1935. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.10 (7 May 1936): 275. James's role in American neo-realism is clearly portrayed. JRS

2453 Reeder, Edwin Hewitt. John Dewey and the Activist Movement. In *The Historical Approach to Methods of Teaching the Social Studies*, National Council for the Social Studies, Fifth Yearbook (Philadelphia: McKinley, 1935), pp. 38-49.

2454 Reid, John R. The Apotheosis of Intelligence. J Phil 32.14 (4 July 1935): 375-385.

If we can only discriminate among values by comparing their causes and consequences, how does such comparison occur—by further discrimination of *their* causes and consequences, and so on? Must we travel for the sake of traveling? Dewey's criticisms of epistemology's criteria of validity for knowledge have their place, but he produces unnecessary confusions by requiring the same criteria for knowledge *and* for value. Matters are further confused by identifying practical judgments of consequences with value judgments. How can a pragmatist find value in a gorgeous painting when it may have only socially negative consequences? If all intrinsic values, as such, cannot be compared, then no values can be compared at all. The "pragmatic heaven" bans "casual pleasures," being only a "purgatory" where "our virtues are put through the fire of practice." JRS

Notes

See Robert Rothman's response, "Value and Intelligence" {2523}.

2455 Richey, Homer. *Die Überwindung der Subjektivität in der Empirischen Philosophie Diltheys und Deweys.* Dissertation, Göttingen, Germany, 1935.

2456 Sanders, William Joseph. *The Evidence of the Hegelian Dialectic in the Educational Philosophy of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1935.

2457 Schiller, F. C. S. *Are* All Men Mortal? Mind 44.2 (April 1935): 204-210. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 328-337.

2458 Schiller, F. C. S. Burning Questions. Personalist 16.3 (July 1935): 199-215. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 3-17.

Reputed philosophical martyrs really suffered for their religious or political views. Still, several philosophical issues deserve to be "brightly burning," which no philosophy ought to be allowed to extinguish. Among them, the reality of Personality and the Self are central. The mistakes of Descartes, Hume, and Kant are corrected by the "continuum of experience," and the ownership of experience by the self, in James's psychology. JRS

2459 Schiller, F. C. S. Multi-Valued Logics–and Others. Mind 44.4 (Oct 1935): 467-483. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 298-318.

2460 Shaw, Charles Gray. *Logic in Theory and Practice.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935.

Reviews

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 32.20 (26 Sept 1935): 558. The third part is titled "Theory of Knowledge," in which "rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism come to blows and pragmatism gets the worst of it." JRS

2461 Shearer, E. A. Dewey's Aesthetic Theory. J Phil 32.23 (7 Nov 1935): 617-627; 32.24 (21 Nov 1935): 650-664. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 404-429.

Dewey's *Experience and Nature* {1809} offers a "means-end" analysis of aesthetic value, which makes all experiences aesthetic, and finds art only where beauty serves life. In *Art as Experience* {2356} a different analysis, the "instrumental-consummatory," provides an "important and brilliant account of the nature of art" by asking "what art does to life." The new artistic creation extends the "world of the higher imagination." As a part of a tradition from Aristotle, and including Hegel, Nietzsche, Croce, and Bergson, Dewey teaches that "art shapes fluid experience into form and helps us to realize it in its individual character." JRS

2462 Stebbing, L. Susan. Sounds, Shapes, and Words. *Proc Arist Soc* Supplement 14 (1935): 1-21.

Peirce's type/token distinction for words is critically discussed. JRS

Notes

See D. C. Williams, "Tokens, Types, Words and Terms" {2535}.

2463 Townsend, H. G. Some Sources and Early Meanings of Pragmatism as Reflected in Volume V of the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce. J Phil 32.7 (28 March 1935): 181-187.

Townsend examines the published and unpublished materials in {2386} for signs of Peirce's conception of pragmatism. JRS

Notes

An abstract of this paper is in J Phil 32.6 (14 March 1935): 155.

2464 Unknown. William James. S. Rosati. Nuova Antologia 378 (16 April 1935): 630-633.

2465 Van Dusen, Henry Pitney. The Faith of John Dewey. Religion in Life 4 (1935): 123-132

Notes

See Marion J. Bradshaw's "A Comment on Van Dusen's Dismissal of Dewey" {2605}.

2466 Ward, Leo Richard. *Values and Reality*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1935.

2467 Wieman, Henry Nelson. Dewey and Buckham on Religion. Journal of Religion 15.1 (Jan 1935): 10-21.

Wieman comments on John Buckham's "God and the Ideal: Professor Dewey Reinterprets Religion" {2410}. Buckham believes, *contra* Dewey, that the essence of religion is the emotional sense of the sacred. JRS

Notes

See Buckham's reply, "Religious Experience and Personality," Journal of Religion 15.3 (July 1935): 309-315.

2468 Abraham, Leo. What Is the Theory of Meaning About? Monist 46.2 (July 1936): 228-258.

2469 Aliotta, Antonio. *L'esperimento nella scienza, nella filosofia, e nella religione.* Naples: F. Perrelli, 1936.

2470 Anon. The John Dewey Society. Social Frontier 2 (1936): 1, 160.

2471 Axtelle, George E. *The Implications of the Philosophy of Experimentalism for Education.* Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1936.

2472 Baumgarten, Eduard. John Dewey. Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehung 5 (1936): 81-97, 407-30; 6 (1937): 177-200.

2473 Brewster, John M. A Behavioristic Account of the Logical Function of Universals. J Phil 33.19 (10 Sept 1936): 505-514; 33.20 (24 Sept 1936): 533-517.

2474 Burke, Kenneth. William James: Superlative Master of the Comparative. Science and Society (Cambridge, Mass.) 1 (1936): 122-125.

2475 Butterfield, Victor Lloyd. *The Ethical Theory of William James.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1936.

2476 Chevalier, Jacques. William James et Bergson. In *Harvard et la France: Recueil d'études* (Paris: Edité par les soins de la Revue d'Histoire Moderne, 1936), pp. 103-116.

A study of the relations between James and Bergson, arguing that their philosophies, starting from different starting points and methods, converge towards a common center. Henri Bergson's "Lettre à Jacques Chevalier: février 1936," follows on pp. 117-121. Bergson praises Chevalier's essay, which should have mentioned that Bergson knew James personally. Meeting James was one of Bergson's great joys, and he repeats anecdotes about their meetings. James is comparable to the great philosophers. He used introspection and made it a fruitful method. The center of his thought was his direct contact with spirit. IKS

Notes

Bergson's letter is reprinted in *Ecrits et Paroles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 3, pp. 617-620, and *Mélanges*, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 1542-1545.

2477 Dewey, John. Characteristics and Characters: Kinds and Classes. J Phil 33.10 (7 May 1936): 253-261. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 520-528. *LW* 11: 95-104.

It is important to distinguish *qualities* of actual existences from *attributes* which are hypothetical, abstract, and without direct existential import. "Characteristics" will henceforth designate the former, and "characters" the latter. Existences exhibiting conjoint characteristics establish a kind, while related characters form a class. FXR

2478 Dewey, John. General Propositions, Kinds, and Classes. J Phil 33.25 (3 Dec 1936): 673-680. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 537-544. *LW* 11: 118-126.

2479 Dewey, John. One Current Religious Problem. J Phil 33.12 (4 June 1936): 324-326. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 115-117.

2480 Dewey, John. Religion, Science, and Philosophy. Southern Review 2 (Summer 1936): 53-62. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 169-179. *LW* 11: 454-463.

Dewey reviews Bertrand Russell's *Religion and Science* (1935). Russell's cogent distinction between scientific attitude and scientific technology raises an issue that is "the most momentous the world faces at present." (p. 456) For, as Russell notes, relatively few have as yet embraced the tolerance, openness, and willingness to change that mark the true scientific spirit. On the other hand, technology's effects are pandemic, and this century has witnessed political movements all too eager to use this awesome force to enslave populations in a new yoke of authoritarianism. The threat to an open and democratic way of life is very real, and regrettably not lessened by Russell's tendency to view perception as "private," and value as mere expression of desire. FXR

2481 Dewey, John. What Are Universals? J Phil 33.11 (21 May 1936): 281-288. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 529-536. *LW* 11: 105-114.

A universal is a rule that formulates an operation to be performed. It does not describe, for such is the job of qualities that determine kinds. Peirce's "leading principles" are the key to "a valid logical theory of universals." (p. 107) These "guiding principles of the highest order of applicability" avoid nominalism because such "ways of action are characteristic of nature" and thus fully real. They also avoid the perils of Platonic realism: as operational guides rather than ultimate qualitative essences, the status of universals is not ontological but logical. FXR

2482 Eastwood, Dorothy Margaret. *The Revival of Pascal: A Study of His Relation to Modern French Thought.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.

In his *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90}, James developed a sympathetic secular approach to religion and mysticism. James helped prepare for the revival of Pascal by viewing asceticism sympathetically in removing the taint of morbidity and fanaticism. There is also a chapter on "Moral Pragmatism and Pascal's Wager." IKS

2483 Edwards, Anna and Katherine Mayhew. *The Dewey School: The Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, 1896-1903.* New York: Appleton, 1936. Reprinted, New York: Atherton, 1965.

This intriguing history of the Chicago "Laboratory School" of the late 1890s and early 1900s is replete with photographs, project notes, and actual case studies connecting Dewey's educational theory to actual practices and their results. Dewey wrote the Introduction [*LW* 11: 191-192], several statements in the text [*LW* 11: 193-201], and appendix 2, "The Theory of the Chicago Experiment" [*LW* 11: 202-216]. FXR

Reviews

Flora J. Cooke, Progressive Education 14 (1937): 216-219; H. G. Good, Educational Research Bulletin 16 (1937): 22-23; Howard Y. McClusky, Elementary School Journal 37 (1937): 711-712.

2484 Fitch, Robert E. The Two Methods of Ethics. J Phil 33.12 (4 June 1936): 318-324.

2485 Gerrity, Benignus. *The Relations Between the Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas.* Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1936. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1936.

Dewey's views on knowledge are contrasted with those of St. Aquinas on p. 116. JRS

2486 Gillis, Adolph and Roland Ketchum. John Dewey: Educator of Democracy. In *Our America* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1936), pp. 67-82.

2487 Goudge, Thomas A. Further Reflections on Peirce's Doctrine of the Given. J Phil 33.11 (21 May 21 1936): 289-295.

Goudge replies to Dewey's "Peirce's Theory of Quality" {2421}. JRS

2488 Groos, Karl. *Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage.* Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1936.

Groos includes chapters on Fechner, Hans Driesch, and William James. James treats immortality on a personal level. He rejects the idea of the soul as substance and accepts the hypothesis of a world-soul acting on us. IKS

2489 Hansen, Valdemar. *William James og det Religiose.* Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1936.

2490 Harding, T. Swann. Science versus Absolutism. Sewanee Review 44.4 (Oct-Dec 1936): 472-481.

2491 Herrick, C. Judson. Is Truth a Value? J Phil 33.7 (26 March 1936): 169-175.

2492 House, Floyd Nelson. *The Development of Sociology.* New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1936. Reprinted, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970.

James was the first American to hold the psychological view that humans have instincts. Instinct was made the basis of sociology by Wilfred Trotter in 1916 and was used by William McDougall. The idea of instinct gave rise to an individualistic social psychology in America. IKS

2493 Hughes, Percy. Current Philosophical Problems. J Phil 33.8 (9 April 1936): 212-217.

2494 Hughes, Percy. How Philosophers Should Analyze a Current Problem. J Phil 33.20 (24 Sept 1936): 548-551.

2495 Joad, C. E. M. *Guide to Philosophy.* New York: Random House, 1936.

Chap. 16 is "Developments and Applications of Hegelianism. I. The Problem of Truth and Error: Pragmatism." Pragmatism "has ministered to human complacency by assuring human beings that right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, reality and unreality, are not external facts" but are "the products of human consciousness and, therefore, amenable to human desires." (p. 464) JRS

2496 Jolivet, R. Le Pragmatisme. Rev Phil 36 (1936): 213-237.

2497 Kafka, Gustav. The Change in the Concepts of "World" and "Surrounding-World." Journal of General Psychology 14.2 (April 1936): 438-460.

2498 Knight, Frank H. Pragmatism and Social Action. Int J Ethics 46.1 (Jan 1936): 229-236. Reprinted in *Freedom and Reform* (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 35-44, and in *John Dewey: Critical Assessments*, ed. J. E. Tiles (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 236-243.

Dewey's *Liberalism and Social Action* {2419} oscillates between conceiving knowledge crudely as sheer power, or "mystically" as "shared experience." Dewey's liberalism is "catastrophically wrong" because power in the social realm is *anti-social.* JRS

2499 Kraushaar, Otto. Lotze's Influence on the Psychology of William James. Psych Rev 43.3 (May 1936): 235-257.

Lotze's influence on James is like "Socratic midwifery." Both stressed the dynamic and functional elements in mental life. James's doctrine of sense perception owed much to Lotze. His *Medizinische Psychologie* (1852) offered a theory of emotion like James's. IKS

2500 Kvitko, David Iur'evich. Pragmatïsm. In *Ochevki sovremeunoï anglo-amerikanskoï filosofii* (Moscow: 1936), pp. 53-116.

2501 Laird, John. The Pragmatists and Bergson. Chap. 5 of *Recent Philosophy* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1936), pp. 84-107.

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 34.7 (1 April 1937): 188-190.

2502 Lamont, Corliss. John Dewey, Marxism and the United Front. New Masses 18 (3 March 1936): 22-23.

2503 Lapan, Arthur. *The Significance of James' Essay.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1936. New York: Law Printing Co., 1936.

"Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" {174} shifts from "consciousness" to "experience," moving from the traditional separation of man from nature towards their reunion. IKS

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.26 (17 Dec 1936): 715.

2504 Le Boutillier, Cornelia. The Religious Philosophy of John Dewey. In *Religious Values in the Philosophy of Emergent Evolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), pp. 71-89.

2505 Lersch, Philipp. Grundsätzliches zur Lebensphilosophie. Blätter für deutsche Philosophie 9.4 (1936); 10.1 (1937); 10.2 (1937).

2506 Lewis, C. I. Emch's Calculus and Strict Implication. Journal of Symbolic Logic 1.3 (1936): 77-86.

2507 Lewis, C. I. Judgments of Value and Judgments of Fact. In *Collected Papers*, pp. 151-161.

Notes

A paper read to Harvard Philosophy Club in 1936.

2508 Lewis, C. I. Verification and the Types of Truth. In *Collected Papers*, pp. 277-293.

Notes

A paper read at Yale and Princeton in 1936-37.

2509 Lewis, Edwin Herbert. *What a Linguistic Contextualist Thinks of Philosophy*. Waukesha, Wisc.: Press of the Davis-Greene Corporation, 1936.

2510 Marhenke, Paul. The Constituents of Mind. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 19 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 171-208.

Consciousness does exist. James's theory in "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" {174} that the constituents of mind are objects is weak. When expanded into a theory of knowledge, the identification of the knower and the known results in difficulties concerning error. IKS

2511 Mead, G. H. *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Edited with an introduction by Merritt H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 33.14 (2 July 1936): 384-386. In these lectures Mead gives "a highly selective reconstruction, for present purposes and in the light of present problems" to illustrate the development of modern thought. JRS

Eugene G. Bugg, Amer J Psych 49 (July 1937): 509; John Cournos, New York Times Book Review (11 Oct 1936): 14; John Dewey, "The Work of George Mead," New Republic 87 (22 July 1936): 329-330 [*LW* 11:450-453]; N. F., American Literature 9 (1938): 275; Winfred Ernest Garrison, Christian Century 53 (9 Dec 1936): 1656-1657; C. A. Herbst, Thought 13.1 (March 1938): 147-149; Sidney Hook, Nation 143 (22 Aug 1936); L. M. Pape, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 187 (Sept 1936): 251-252; J. G. Randall, American Historical Review 42 (April 1937): 535-

537; Gertrude V. Rich, Saturday Review (8 Aug 1936): 14; F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 17.3 (July 1936): 327-328; Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Phil Rev 46.4 (July 1937): 433-436; A. Stewart Woodburne, Crozer Quarterly 13 (Oct 1936): 303-304.

Notes

See Harry E. Moore, "Five Theoretical Contributions" {2578}.

2512 Meiklejohn, Donald W. *The Relation Between Ethical and Intellectual Judgments in the Philosophy of John Dewey.* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1936.

2513 Miller, Dickinson S. James's Philosophical Development; Professor Perry's Biography. J Phil 33.12 (4 June 1936): 309-318.

Perry portrays an "indisputable" James in {2444}. James's commitment to the "fullness and richness and satisfaction of human life" led him to adopt theoretical positions not really required of it. His work was not analytical enough. Rather than asking whether freedom exists, he should have tried to find its meaning. IKS

2514 Miller, Randolf C. *Semi-Theism: The Quest for a Position Between Humanism and Theism.* Dissertation, Yale University, 1936.

2515 Morris, Charles W. The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. In *Actes du Huitième Congrès International de Philosophie*, held at Prague, Czechoslovakia, 2-7 September 1936 (Prague: 1936. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 130-138. Reprinted in *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism* {2579} pp. 22-30.

2516 Morris, Charles W. Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism. In *Proceedings of the First International Congress for the Unity of Science* (Paris: Hermann et Cie., 1936). Reprinted in *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism* {2579} pp. 56-71.

2517 Morrison, Charles Clayton. The New Modernism. Christian Century 53 (1936): 351-353.

2518 Müller, Gustav E. *Amerikanische Philosophie.* Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1936. 2nd ed., 1950.

The sections on pragmatism are "Charles Peirce," pp. 122-136, "Der Pragmatismus: William James und sein Ziet," pp. 182-209, and "John Dewey," pp. 209-217. The 2nd ed. has additions to Dewey's section on pp. 227-228. JRS

Reviews

F. C. S. Schiller, Personalist 18.3 (July 1937): 325-326.

2519 Parkes, Henry Bamford. John Dewey. Southern Review 2 (1936): 260-278. Reprinted in *The Pragmatic Test: Essays on the History of Ideas* (San Francisco: Colt Press, 1941. Rpt., Octagon Books, 1970), pp. 95-119.

Reviews

H. R. Cantine, Jr., Retort 1 (June 1942): 55-56; Joseph Ratner, New Leader 25 (22 Aug 1942): 3.

2520 Petty, Orville A. *Common Sense and God: A Critique of Naturalism.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

Petty's examination and critique of religious humanism and naturalism is for the most part directed at John Dewey's philosophy of religion. JRS

Reviews

Anon, Religious Education 31 (1936): 240.

2521 Ratner, Sidney. Evolution and the Rise of the Scientific Spirit in America. Philosophy of Science 3.1 (Jan 1936): 104-122.

2522 Rothman, Robert. *The Place of Knowledge in Valuation: A Comparative Study of John Dewey's Philosophy of Value.* Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1936.

2523 Rothman, Robert. Value and Intelligence. J Phil 33.7 (26 March 1936): 176-186.

Rothman defends Dewey against John Reid's essay "The Apotheosis of Intelligence" {2454}. JRS

2524 Schiller, F. C. S. Has Philosophy any Message for the World? Hibbert Journal 34.4 (July 1936): 592-601. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 81-92.

2525 Schiller, F. C. S. How Is "Exactness" Possible? In *Actes du Huitième Congrès International de Philosophie*, held at Prague, Czechoslovakia, 2-7 September 1936 (Prague: 1936. Rpt., Nendeln und Leichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 123-129. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 338-345.

Notes

Schiller also participated in discussions on other papers; see pp. 154-160, 197-200. On pp. 159-160 Schiller gives an epilogue to his paper.

2526 Schiller, F. C. S. Must Empiricism Be Limited? Mind 45.3 (July 1936): 297-309. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 32-47.

2527 Schiller, F. C. S. Must Pragmatists Disagree? Personalist 17.1 (Jan 1936): 56-63. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 57-64.

Schiller responds to Charles Morris's review of Schiller's *Must Philosophers Disagree?* {2392}. JRS

Notes

See Morris's reply, "Professor Schiller and Pragmatism," Personalist 17.3 (July 1936): 294-300, and Schiller's "Comments by F. C. S. Schiller," ibid. pp. 300-306.

2528 Schiller, F. C. S. The Ultra-Gothic Kant. Personalist 17.4 (Oct 1936): 384-396. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 112-123.

2529 Schneider, Herbert W. The Divorce of American Philosophy and Psychology since James. J Phil 33.25 (3 Dec 1936): 686-687.

Notes

An abstract of a paper read at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, at Harvard University, 28-30 December 1936.

2530 Shouse, James Blaine. John Dewey: Giovanni Gentile. Educational Forum 1 (1936): 74-80.

2531 Thalheimer, August. *Introduction to Dialectical Materialism: The Marxist World-View.* Translated by George Simpson and George Weltner. New York: Covici-Friede, 1936.

Reviews

Theodore B. Brameld, Marxist Quarterly 1.1 (Jan-March 1937): 144-148. The chapter on pragmatism gives absurd distortions of pragmatism's views. Dewey's social thought is close to Marx's in several respects. JRS

Notes

See George Simpson's discussion of Brameld's review, Marxist Quarterly 1.1 (Jan-March 1937): 148-150.

2532 Trask, Ida M. *The Development of William James's Philosophy.* Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1936.

2533 Viator, Britannicus. Representative Men: VI.–John Dewey. English Review 62 (June 1936): 644-646

2534 Wieman, Henry N. and Bernard E. Meland. *American Philosophies of Religion.* New York: Harper; Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1936.

Pp. 279-286 characterize Dewey's philosophy as "life in flux," looking only to the future. In seeing the present as merely a potential good, however, he neglects the existent reality that sustains all good. Dewey's religion of "social phenomena" abjures metaphysics, and thus fails to understand that a supernatural deity must be the ground of all that exists. FXR

2535 Williams, Donald C. Tokens, Types, Words, and Terms. J Phil 33.26 (17 Dec 1936): 701-707.

Williams comments on L. Susan Stebbing's article "Sounds, Shapes, and Words" {2462}. JRS

2536 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Problem of Consciousness Again. J Phil 33.21 (8 Oct 1936): 561-568. Reprinted in *Nature and Mind* {2598}, pp. 418-426.

2537 Baumgarten, Eduard. *Benjamin Franklin. Der Lehrmeister der amerikanischen Revolution.* Frankfort am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1937

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 34.13 (24 June 1937): 359-361. A careful and original biography is followed by an attempt to use Franklin to make American pragmatism intelligible to the German mind. Franklin would be "amused and astonished" by Baumgarten's interpretation of his "philosophy." JRS

Notes

This work is vol. 1 of his *Die geistigen Grunlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens.* See vol. 2, *Der Pragmatismus: R. W. Emerson, W. James, J. Dewey* {2601}.

2538 Baym, Max I. William James and Henry Adams. New England Quarterly 10.4 (Dec 1937): 717-742.

A study of Adams's marginalia to James's book, *Principles of Psychology* (1890). IKS

2539 Blondel, Maurice. *L'Action II.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1937.

This is a version of Blondel's controversial second doctoral dissertation, supervised by Boutroux, and defended and published in 1893 under the same title. The earlier version is referred to as *L'Action* (1893), the latter as *L'Action II.* Blondel considers the questions: does human life make sense, and does man have a destiny? The answers lie in our voluntary, but necessary, action. The relation between first and second editions is still a matter of some confusion. The second edition consists of two volumes: *L'Action I: Le Problème des causes secondes et le pur agir* (1936), and *L'Action II: L'Action humaine et les conditions de son aboutissement* (1937). LF

Notes

Based on notes Blondel took during his dissertation defense, Jean Wehrlé wrote "Une Soutenance de thèse," Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne 4th series 3 (May 1907).

2540 Bode, Boyd H. Education as Growth: Some Confusions. Progressive Education 14 (1937): 151-157.

Notes

See William H. Kilpatrick's reply, Progressive Education 14 (1937): 289.

2541 Boodin, J. E. Cosmic Implications of Normative Structure. In *Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie*, at Paris, France, 1937, ed. Raymond Bayer (Paris: Hermann et Cie, 1937), vol. 11, pp. 3-10.

2542 Boughton, J. S. The Sacramental Concept of Virtue. J Phil 34.24 (25 Nov 1937): 660-666.

2543 Buchler, Justus. The Pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce. Psyche 17 (1937): 92-131.

2544 Cooke, Harold P. Death of Dr. Schiller. Hibbert Journal 36.1 (Oct 1937): 112-113.

2545 Cooke, Harold P. "In the Beginning." Hibbert Journal 36.1 (Oct 1937): 105-112.

2546 Dewey, John. The Challenge of Democracy to Education. Progressive Education 14 (Feb 1937): 79-85. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 46-56. *LW* 11: 181-190.

2547 Dewey, John. Education and Social Change. Social Frontier 3 (May 1937): 235-238. Reprinted in *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 348-358. *LW* 11: 408-418.

Notes

See T. Russiano, "A Letter for John Dewey on 'Education and Social Change'" {2586}.

2548 Dewey, John. The Philosophy of William James. Southern Review 2 (Winter 1937): 447-461. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 379-395. *LW* 11: 464-478.

A review of *The Thought and Character of William James* {2444}. Dewey comments on the interplay between James's personality and thought. What James's critics decried as a disrespect for logic was an experience of James's greater "intellectual conscientiousness." He did not want to impose a system greater than what the facts warranted. IKS

2549 Dewey, John. F. C. S. Schiller: A Memorial. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 3 (Fall 1967): 52-54. Reprinted as "Tribute to F. C. S. Schiller" in *LW* 11: 155-157.

A memorial statement prepared on the occasion of Schiller's death in 1937. JRS

Notes

This memorial's first publication was in Allan Shields, "F. C. S. Schiller: An Unpublished Memorial by John Dewey," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 3 (Fall 1967): 51-54. See "Textual Commentary," *LW* 11: 622, explaining the circumstances of the writing of this memorial.

2550 Dewey, John. Whitehead's Philosophy. Phil Rev 46.3 (March 1937): 170-177. Reprinted in *LW* 11: 146-154.

Despite its remarkable contribution, Whitehead's philosophy ultimately seems to fall into traditional rationalism by holding that mathematical method has primacy over experimental observation. If, to the contrary, the genetic-functional method of inquiry was foremost, ontological absolutes such as "eternal objects" could be recast as hypothetical ideas that help resolve problematic situations. FXR

Notes

See Whitehead's "Remarks" on this essay, Phil Rev 46.2 (March 1937): 178-186. See also Dewey's contribution, "The Philosophy of Whitehead," to *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1941), pp. 643-661 [*LW* 14: 123-140].

2551 Dhami, Sadhu S. *The Philosophy of John Dewey: Its Bearing on India.* Dissertation, Boston University, 1937.

2552 Dommeyer, Frederick Charles. *Four Pragmatic Theories of Meaning.* Dissertation, Brown University, 1937.

Dommeyer discusses Dewey, Peirce, James, and C. I. Lewis. JRS

2553 Dykhuizen, George. The Early Pragmatism of Josiah Royce. Personalist 18.2 (April 1937): 126-133.

Notes

An abstract of this paper's earlier reading is in J Phil 31.25 (6 Dec 1934): 688-689.

2554 Edel, Abraham. Two Traditions in the Refutation of Egoism. J Phil 34.23 (11 Nov 1937): 617-628.

2555 Edman, Irwin. *Four Ways of Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt, 1937.

The four chapters are entitled "Philosophy as Logical Faith," "Philosophy as Social Criticism," "Philosophy as Mystical Insight," and "Philosophy as Nature Understood." JRS

2556 Erickson, Ralph W. *The Concept of Consciousness Since William James.* Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1937.

2557 Faris, Ellsworth. The Social Psychology of George Mead. American Journal of Sociology 43.3 (Nov 1937): 391-403.

2558 Fries, Horace S. The Method of Proving Ethical Realism. Phil Rev 46.5 (Sept 1937): 485-502.

2559 Goudge, Thomas Anderson. *The Theory of Knowledge in Charles S. Peirce.* Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1937.

2560 Hicks, G. Dawes. Obituary Notice: Prof. F. C. S. Schiller. Nature 140.11 (11 Sept 1937): 454-455.

2561 Hartshorne, Charles. *Beyond Humanism. Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature.* Chicago: Willett, Clark, and Co., 1937. Reprinted, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968.

See "Dewey's Philosophy of Religion," pp. 39-57, and "Mead and Alexander on Time," pp. 242-252. JRS

Reviews

John H. Randall, Jr., J Phil 34.25 (9 Dec 1937): 691-693.

2562 Hellpach, Willy. *Schöpferische Unvernuft? Rolle und Arenze des Irrationalen in der Wissenschaft.* Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1937.

Reviews

Gerhart Saenger, J Phil 35.16 (4 Aug 1938): 446-447. Hellpach argues that while every science has its purpose, its "pragma," Anglo-Saxon pragmatism distorts this

purpose into "pure utility." Hellpach contrasts pragmatism with the German idea of "pragma," which instead "regards everything from the point of view of the highest values, under the criterion of the welfare of the people and the state." JRS

2563 Hocking, William Ernest. *Thoughts on Death and Life.* New York: Harper, 1937.

Reviews

Robert Scoon, J Phil 24.24 (25 Nov 1937): 667-670.

2564 Jacobs, Norman. Physicalism and Sensation Sentences. J Phil 34.22 (28 Oct 1937): 602-611.

Both pragmatists, such as C. I. Lewis, and physicalists, such as Carnap, can fall into a naive use of language in their denotative method of verification. Such use of language creates the linguo-centric predicament—trying to use language to point to what is non-linguistic—which removes from Lewis's version of denotation any meaning and forces Carnap towards a rigorous behaviorism that denies the existence of sensations. The solution is to interpret sensation sentences on two distinct but parallel levels: the physicalist level for verification, and the intuitive level for denoting sensations. JRS

2565 Kallen, Horace M. Remarks on R. B. Perry's Portrait of William James. Phil Rev 46.1 (Jan 1937): 68-78. Reprinted in *William James Remembered*, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 237-251.

In *Thought and Character* {2444}, Perry's analysis of James into four personalities is a distortion, for James "was so essentially integrated a personality." He was bookish and did not prefer "achievement to contemplation." James did not hate exact thought; he only renounced certain logical techniques through "painstaking study." Kallen discusses the relation of James's philosophy to that of James's father and to Bergson. C. S. Peirce's originality was limited and his reputation was the result of James's interest. IKS

2566 Knudson, Albert C. *The Validity of Religious Experience.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1937.

Chap. 3, "Value and Truth," discusses the religious pragmatism of William James, Julius Kaftan, and Eric Waterhouse. Knudson then assesses the value of the pragmatic argument. Humanism has never inspired the high degree of moral devotion aroused by theism. Radical pragmatism would equate truth with utility but "falls into an all engulfing skepticism." Moderate pragmatism would find valuational processes at the heart of both science and religion, but fails to satisfactorily deal with problem of knowledge since it ignores the "faculties of knowledge and potentialities of thought in the spirit itself." JRS

2567 Lamont, Corliss. The Pragmatism of John Dewey. Marxist Quarterly 1 (1937): 298-300.

2568 Leander, Folke. *Humanism and Naturalism: A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt, and Paul Elmer More.* Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1937.

Reviews

John Herman Randall, Jr., J Phil 35.18 (1 Sept 1938): 490-491. Leander gives an exposition of Dewey's philosophy in the course of discussing Seillière, and surprisingly finds a "common cause" between them: a denial of a duality to human nature. JRS

2569 Leander, Folke. John Dewey and the Classical Tradition. American Review 9 (1937): 504-527.

2570 Lipps, Hans. Pragmatismus und Existenzphilosophie. 1937. Reprinted in *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1954). *Werke*, vol. 5, *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1977), pp. 38-54.

2571 Lodge, Rupert Clendon. *Philosophy of Education.* New York: Harper, 1937.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 34.18 (2 Sept 1937): 498-500. Lodge tries to distinguish realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic standpoints on the philosophy of education, but none of them are adequate philosophies. The student should avoid such misleading labels and instead seek the significant insights of each. JRS

2572 Lodge, Rupert Clendon. *The Questioning Mind.* New York: E. P. Dutton, 1937.

Reviews

Berenice Barnes Shepard, Amer J Psych 51.2 (April 1938): 444-445. This work "reflects upon various aspects of life from the viewpoints of realism, idealism, and pragmatism." It is "erudite, yet naive," and the "interpretation of realism is limited and materialistic; idealism is expounded with exalted emphasis; to pragmatism is assigned the preparation of palatable hash." JRS

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 35.6 (17 March 1938): 163-164.

Notes

See also Lodge, "The Comparative Method in Philosophy," in *Manitoba Essays*, ed. R. C. Lodge (Toronto: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 405-432.

2573 Long, Wilbur. Mr. Dewey's Faith Without Religion. Personalist 18.3 (July 1937): 239-253; 18.4 (Oct 1937): 369-388.

Dewey argues that supernatural religion is based on bad logic and a false attribution of value. However, if there is bad logic, it can be found in Dewey's own criticisms of religion. The "miracles" of supernaturalism are no more mysterious than the wonders to be found in Dewey's naturalism. Shall intelligence be democratic? Democracy is found in the unity of religious opinion through the ages. Why is Dewey entitled to have faith in the perfectibility of human nature, but any faith in humanity's "cosmic importance" is ruled out? As for the question of value, an optimistic humanism is "a contradiction in terms." Humanism embraces naturalism, but naturalism "destroys the meaning of life." JRS

2574 McWilliams, James Aloysius. Dewey's Esthetic Experience as a Substitute for Religion. Modern Schoolman 15 (Nov 1937): 9-13.

2575 Marett, R. R. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, 1864-1937. Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 23 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 538-550.

Let the historian note that during the dominance of German idealism at Oxford, a philosopher of German extraction stood alone to defend the empirical tradition of British thought. Marett includes two testimonials to Schiller's teaching and personality by a student and a friend, and summarizes his humanistic philosophy. JRS

2576 Melvin, Georgiana. The Social Philosophy Underlying Dewey's Theory of Art. In *Faculty Studies*, Mills College, No. 1 (Oakland, Cal.: The Eucalyptus Press, 1937), pp. 125-136. Reprinted in *John Dewey: Critical Assessments*, ed. J. E. Tiles (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), vol. 3, pp. 302-311.

2577 Montague, William P. The Story of American Realism. Philosophy 12.2 (April 1937): 140-161. Reprinted in *The Ways of Things* {2776}, pp. 230-261. *The Development of American Philosophy* {2786}, pp. 419-430. *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), pp. 419-448.

2578 Moore, Harry E. Five Theoretical Contributions. Social Forces 15 (May 1937): 570-575.

Moore discusses selected features of Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* {2511}. JRS

2579 Morris, Charles W. *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism*. Paris: Hermann et Cie., 1937. Reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1979.

Chap. 1, "Philosophy of Science and Science of Philosophy," pp. 7-21, is a reprint of {2437}. Chap. 2, "The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism," pp. 22-30, is a reprint of {2515}. Chap. 3, "Pragmatism and Metaphysics," pp. 31-45, is a reprint of {2382}. Chap. 4, "The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences within Scientific Empiricism," pp. 46-55, is a reprint of {2438}. Chap. 5, "Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism," pp. 56-71, is a reprint of {2516}. JRS

Reviews

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 35.5 (3 March 1938): 133-134.

2580 Morrison, Charles C. Thomism and the Re-Birth of Protestant Philosophy. Christendom 2 (1937): 110-125.

2581 Otto, Max. John Dewey's Philosophy. Social Frontier 3 (1937): 264-267.

2582 Otto, Max. Philosopher of a New Age. Social Frontier 3 (1937): 230-233.

2583 Pascual, Ricardo R. The Pragmatism of John Dewey. Philippine Social Science Review 9 (1937): 142-156.

2584 Ragusa, Thomas Joseph. *The Substance Theory of Mind and Contemporary Functionalism.* Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1937. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1937.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 35.9 (28 April 1938): 248-249. Ragusa finds that Dewey and Aquinas agree on the dynamic and creative nature of mind, the element of contingency in nature, the dependence of mind on both the organism and environment, and the difficulties of "the problem of knowledge." Ragusa's further treatment of Dewey gives his statements meanings which Dewey explicitly rejects, and identifies obviously partial aspects of his philosophy with its essence, in order to "discover" inconsistencies with other aspects. JRS

2585 Raymond, Mary E. Memories of William James. New England Quarterly 10.3 (Sept 1937): 419-429.

Reminiscences by one of James's students at Radcliffe College, including letters to her from James. IKS

2586 Russiano, Thomas B. A Letter for John Dewey on "Education and Social Change." Social Frontier 4 (1937): 34.

Russiano responds to Dewey's "Education and Social Change" {2547}. JRS

2587 Savery, William. Concatenism. J Phil 34.13 (24 June 1937): 337-354.

This plausible version of pluralism, which originated with Peirce and James and was developed by Bertrand Russell, holds that the universe is an overlapping chain of individual beings. JRS

2588 Schiller, F. C. S. How Far Does Science Need Determinism? In *Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie*, at Paris, France, 1937, ed. Raymond Bayer (Paris: Hermann et Cie, 1937), vol. 7, pp. 28-33. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 168-175.

2589 Schiller, F. C. S. Must Philosophy Be Dull? Personalist 18.1 (Jan 1937): 28-39. Reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718} pp. 93-103.

2590 Schiller, F. C. S. The Personalistic Implications of Humanism. Personalist 18.4 (Oct 1937): 352-368; 19.1 (Jan 1938): 16-31; 19.2 (April 1938): 164-178; 19.3 (July 1938): 241-254. Part one, "Humanisms and Humanism," is reprinted in *Our Human Truths* {2718}, pp. 65-80. Part two, "Logic: A Game, or an Agent of Value," is reprinted as "Humanistic Logic and Theory of Value" in *Our Human Truths*, pp. 283-297. Part three, "Ethics, Casuistry and Life," is reprinted in *Our Human Truths*, pp. 189-202. Part four, "The Relativity of Metaphysics," is reprinted in *Our Human Truths*, pp. 176-188.

2591 Schiller, F. C. S. Prophecy, Destiny and Population. Hibbert Journal 35.4 (July 1937): 510-520.

2592 Sellars, Roy Wood. Critical Realism and the Independence of the Object. J Phil 34.20 (30 Sept 1937): 541-550.

Sellars develops his critical realism by contrasting it with the pragmatisms of Dewey and C. I. Lewis. JRS

2592 Strong, Edward. Metaphors and Metaphysics. Int J Ethics 47.4 (July 1937): 461-471.

2593 Swabey, William Curtis. *Being and Being Known: An Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics.* New York: Dial Press, 1937.

Chap. 5, "The Relativism of Protagorus," relates modern pragmatism to ancient relativism and subjectivism. Chap. 6, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," briefly describes the versions of the pragmatic theory of meaning of Peirce and James, and the operationalism of Bridgman. Pragmatism only produces confusion: "it blinds us to our own meanings and encourages us to accept temporary and makeshift definitions as satisfactory analyses." (p. 73) Only the denotative method can find the essences of things, and knowledge itself cannot be defined without circularity, but understood through considering indubitable instances of knowledge. Chap. 7, "The Pragmatic Theory of Truth," distinguishes four kinds of "working" and argues that even the most reasonable version confuses truth with opinion. Swabey offers a "logical" correspondence theory of truth, in conjunction with a dualistic realism, and argues its advantages over pragmatic and coherence theories. JRS

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 35.1 (6 Jan 1938): 20-21.

2594 Threlkeld, Archie Lloyd. Dr. Dewey's Philosophy and the Curriculum. Curriculum Journal 8 (1937): 164-166.

2595 Tower, Carl V. Neutralism, Immediacy, and the "Irrational." J Phil 34.2 (21 Jan 1937): 29-47.

2596 Von Kempski, Jürgen. Der Pragmatismus. Deutsches Adelsblatt 55 (1937): 1502-1505; 55 (1937): 542-1544.

2597 Weinberg, Carlton Berenda. *Mach's Empirio-Pragmatism in Physical Science.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1937.

Reviews

Herbert Feigl, J Phil 35.9 (28 April 1938): 245-246.

Notes

Privately printed in 1937 and sold by The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

2598 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. *Nature and Mind: Selected Essays of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge.* Presented to Him on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday by Amherst College, The University of Minnesota, and Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. Reprinted, New York: Russell and Russell, 1965.

The reprinted essays which are elsewhere mentioned by this bibliography are: "The Field of Logic," pp. 56-78 {213}; "The Promise of Pragmatism," pp. 215-229 {2075}; "Experience and Dialectic," pp. 230-239 {2151}; "The Nature of Consciousness," pp. 307-315 {296}; "Of What Sort is Cognitive Experience," pp. 316-320 {297}; "The Problem of Consciousness Again," pp. 418-426 {2536}. The volume concludes with a bibliography of Woodbridge's publications. JRS

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 34.9 (29 April 1937): 243-245.

1938

2599 Acton, H. B. Man-Made Truth. Mind 47.2 (April 1938): 145-158.

While James's formulations of pragmatism were "met with pulverizing criticism," England should take notice of the new complex versions by Dewey and Mead. Acton accordingly expounds "the preliminaries of a theory of truth which might be called Pragmatism." The correspondence theory is rejected, the thesis that truth is a property of language is defended, and the function of statements in a social context is explored. JRS

2600 Adams, G. P., W. R. Dennes, J. Loewenberg, D. S. Mackay, P. Marhenke, S. C. Pepper, E. W. Strong. *Knowledge and Society: A Philosophical Approach to Modern Civilization.* New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1938.

This introduction to philosophy includes a chapter entitled "Philosophy and American Life," which gives accounts of "William James and Individualism," pp. 389-393, and "John Dewey and Individualism," pp. 400-404. JRS

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 35.17 (18 Aug 1938): 466-470.

2601 Baumgarten, Eduard. *Der Pragmatismus: R. W. Emerson, W. James, J. Dewey.* Frankfort am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1938.

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 35.25 (8 Dec 1938): 695-698. Baumgarten is "the most serious student of American thought Germany has produced and is one of the best informed writers on the subject in any language." Pragmatism is treated exclusively as the product of American culture; Peirce is thus excluded for he was a scientist. Emerson is unconventionally portrayed as a Nietzschean apostle of the will to power. James is competently described, while the exposition of Dewey "is the best I have read anywhere." JRS

Gerhard Lehmann, Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehung 8 (1938): 65-67; F. Rippe, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 60 (1939): 581-583; Rudolf Metz, Blätter für deutsche Philosophie 13 (1939): 226-229; Helmut Schelsky, Die Tatwelt (Berlin) 16 (1940): 27-30.

Notes

This work is vol. 2 of his *Die geistigen Grunlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens.* See vol. 1, *Benjamin Franklin. Der Lehrmeister der amerikanischen Revolution* {2537}.

2602 Bode, Boyd H. *Progressive Education at the Crossroads.* New York and Chicago: Newson and Co., 1938. Reprinted, 1971.

2603 Böhm, Franz. *Anti-Cartesianismus. Deutsche Philosophie im Widerstand.* Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1938.

Reviews

Vivian J. McGill, J Phil 35.16 (4 Aug 1938): 445-446. Böhm's German National Socialist pragmatic philosophy identifies the fruitfulness of knowledge with its truth, and "fruitfulness" is eagerly defined as what is useful to Germany. JRS

2604 Boodin, J. E. A Revolution in Metaphysics and in Science. Philosophy of Science 5.3 (July 1938): 267-276.

2605 Bradshaw, Marion John. A Comment on Van Dusen's Dismissal of Dewey. Review of Religion 3 (1938): 97-100.

Bradshaw responds to Van Dusen's "The Faith of John Dewey" {2465}. JRS

2606 Burkamp, Wilhelm. *Wirklichkeit und Sinn.* Vol. 2. *Das subjektive Recht des Sinns über die Wirklichkeit.* Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938.

Reviews

Vivian J. McGill, J Phil 36.8 (13 April 1939): 217-221. Burkamp's criticisms of pragmatism are directed at James, while he scarcely mentions Dewey. JRS

2607 Contri, S. A proposito di J. Dewey. Criterion (1938): i-ii.

2608 Crawford, Claude C. Functional Education in the Light of Dewey's Philosophy. School and Society 48 (1938): 381-385.

2609 Dewey, John. *Democracy and Education in the World of Today.* New York: Society for Ethical Culture, 1938. Reprinted in *Education Today* {2746}, pp. 359-370, and with revisions in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 34-45. *LW* 13: 294-303.

2610 Dewey, John. The Determination of Ultimate Values or Aims through Antecedent or A Priori Speculation or through Pragmatic and Empirical Inquiry. In *Thirty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, ed. Montrose Whipple (Bloomington: Public School Publishing Co., 1938), part 2, pp. 471-485. Reprinted in *LW* 13: 255-270.

2611 Dewey, John. *Experience and Education.* London and New York: Macmillan, 1938.

Despite the fact that Dewey has been both hailed and assailed as the father of "progressive" education, in this short book he rejects both the "traditional" approach that subordinates students' interests to a fixed and stultified curriculum, and the "new" alternative that declines to impose structure or guidelines on expressed desires. Proper education, to the contrary, is the channeling of desire and impulse to the development of intelligence capable of achieving constructive ends. Amid a world of upheaval and interactive change we discover continuities that, with proper preparation, help us learn

and adapt to future change. Most children are social by nature; in a beneficial educational environment it is not the will of the teacher or artificial uniformity but the adaptation of this energy that produces the best results. Controlled freedom of expression should be a means of education, not its intrinsic end. FXR

Reviews

George E. Axtelle, Social Frontier 4 (1938): 269; Ruth Byrns, Commonweal 27 (22 April 1938): 729-730; F. A. Cavenagh, Philosophy 14.4 (Oct 1939): 482-483; Frank N. Freeman, School Review 46 (1938): 786-789; Joseph K. Hart, Progressive Education 15 (1938): 572-573; Thomas M. Harvey, Thought 14.2 (June 1939): 318-322; Arthur Katuna, American Sociological Review 3.6 (Dec 1938): 917-919; Kurt F. Leidecker, International Education Review 7 (1938): 379-381; Eduard C. Lindeman, Survey Graphic 29 (April 1940): 257-258; A. J. W. Myers, Religious Education 34 (1939): 252.

2612 Dewey, John. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.* New York: Henry Holt, 1938. London: G. Allen, 1939. Reprinted as *LW* 12.

This work is Dewey's consummate argument that logic should be the broad pursuit of "inquiry into inquiry" instead of the narrow pre-occupation with purely formal symbols and techniques. Philosophers, he observes at the outset, have long disputed whether logical forms are "supreme realities" or mere "abstractions" from material reals. Instead of haggling over the superiority of matter and form, however, logic should embrace "a general theory of language in which form and matter are not separated." (p. 4) With no Archimedian starting point other than inquiry itself, logic becomes progressive, naturalistic, and social—the product of a matrix that is both biological and cultural. The fact of inclusion and exclusion endemic to biological process becomes, in logical analysis, the basic property of affirmation and negation.

From this framework chap. 6 introduces the "pattern of inquiry." Inquiry is the controlled transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is a unified whole. Specifically, 1) a non-cognitive awareness of a problem gives way to 2) a perceived need for inquiry that first 3) suggests possible causes and solutions, and is subsequently 4) framed by reason as a plan or hypothesis that must be 5) operationally confirmed by an experimental test that produces the anticipated resolution. Chapters 7-12 explore the crucial distinction between propositions and judgments. A proposition is a proposal, a plan or hypothesis for the resolution of a problem. A judgment is the settled outcome or consummation of a successful proposition. Failure to acknowledge the tentative and hypothetical nature of propositions is a chief cause of the stultification of non-instrumentalist logics. What in fact is evidential material and its potential requalification often becomes calcified as "subject" and "predicate." Inference and validity then mark only the formal manipulation of placeholders instead of discovered patterns of successful inquiry.

Later chapters articulate the "theory of propositions" that culminates the *Logic*. We first distinguish inference, in which predicated properties are signs of actual existences or kinds, from implication, in which the relation between the meaning of terms is paramount. From this, an entire taxonomy of propositions is derivable. Inference is carried by generic propositions whose scope of predication includes particular propositions, singular propositions, and relations of kinds. Implication is exhibited in two forms of universal propositions. The first form is the conceptual "ways of being" where predicates are indirectly related to concrete subject matters by a series of steps formally

rigorous yet at some point empirically *productive*. The second form comprises the logical and mathematical relations that may be free from "existential reference of even the most indirect, delayed, and ulterior kind." FXR

Extended reviews

E. B. McGilvary {2706}; G. Watts Cunningham {2675}; C. I. Lewis {2703}; Ernest Nagel {2712}.

Reviews

Clifford Barrett, New York Times Book Review (20 Nov 1938): 16; Karl Britton, Nature 144 (25 Nov 1939): 880-881; William Ray Dennes, Phil Rev 49.2 (March 1940): 259-261; Irwin Edman, New York Herald Tribune Books (11 Dec 1938): 5; Horace S. Fries, Common Sense 8 (Oct 1939): 26-27; William Gruen, Nation 147 (22 Oct 1938): 426-427; Felix Kaufmann, Social Research 7.2 (May 1940): 243-246; W. Kneale, Philosophy 14.3 (July 1939): 370-371; John Laird, Mind 48.4 (Oct 1939): 527-536; Lyle H. Lanier, Southern Review 5 (1939): 105-120; Eduard C. Lindeman, Survey Graphic 27 (Dec 1938): 615-616; Jerome Nathanson, "Dewey's Vivisection of the Logical Process," Philosophy of Science 6.1 (June 1939): 115-122; Philip B. Rice, Kenyon Review 2 (Winter 1940): 120-123; Eliseo Vivas, Saturday Review of Literature 19 (5 Nov 1938): 18; Paul Weiss, New Republic 97 (23 Nov 1938): 79-80; William H. Werkmeister, Ethics 50.1 (Oct 1939): 98-102.

Notes

See Thomas M. Wendell, "Dewey's Doctrine of the Situation" {2727} and A. Ushenko, "Inquiry and Discourse" {2790}.

2613 Dewey, John. The Relation of Science and Philosophy as the Basis of Education. School and Society 47 (9 April 1938): 470-473. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 164-168. *LW* 13: 281-285.

2614 Dewey, John. The Unity of Science as a Social Problem. In *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), no. 1, pp. 29-38. Reprinted in *LW* 13: 271-280.

Reviews

William Gruen, Nation 147 (17 Sept 1938): 275-276; Henry Margenau, Phil Rev 50 (1941): 433-434; Ernest Nagel, J Phil 35.25 (8 Dec 1938): 689-693.

2615 Dubs, Homer H. Recent Chinese Philosophy. J Phil 35.13 (23 June 1938): 345-355.

Hu Shi's pragmatic contribution (inspired by John Dewey) to the New Thought Movement has lost most of its influence. Hu Shi "failed to attract disciples, and today pragmatism is the smallest of the groups" which Dubs discusses. JRS

2616 Edman, Irwin. Former Teachers: John Dewey. In *Philosopher's Holiday* (New York: Viking Press, 1938), pp. 138-145.

2617 Ensley, Francis G. *The Naturalistic Interpretation of Religion by John Dewey*. Dissertation, Brown University, 1938.

2618 Flewelling, Ralph Tyler. F. C. S. Schiller: An Appreciation. Personalist 19.1 (Jan 1938): 5-11.

2619 Forsythe, Robert. Is John Dewey Honest? New Masses 26 (Jan 1938): 16.

2620 Gettys, Joseph Miller. *The Philosophy of Life Contained in the Fourth Gospel Compared with the Philosophies of Plato and Dewey.* Dissertation, New York University, 1938.

2621 Gillio-Tos, Maria Teresa Viretto. *Il pensiero di Giovanni Dewey.* Naples: Luigi Loffredo, 1938.

2622 Glicksman, Marjorie. A Note on the Philosophy of Heidegger. J Phil 35.4 (17 Feb 1938): 93-104.

Sein und Zeit gives an interpretation of knowing as subordinate to doing "which is strikingly reminiscent of Dewey." JRS

2623 Gordon, Kate. Imagination and Will. Journal of Psychology 5.2 (July 1938): 291-313.

2624 Henle, Robert J. Hutchins and Dewey Again. Modern Schoolman 15 (Jan 1938): 30-33; 15 (March 1938): 56-59.

2625 Hermes, Hans. *Semiotic: Eine Theorie der Zeichengestalten, als Grundlage fur Untersuchungen von Formalisterten Sprachen.* Leipzig: Hirzel, 1938. 2nd ed., Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1970.

2626 Hill, Walker Hawes. *Peirce and Dewey and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge.* Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1938.

2627 Hopkins, Louis J. Dr. Schiller as a Man and Friend. Personalist 19.1 (Jan 1938): 12-15.

2628 Kallen, Horace M. Mussolini, William James, and the Rationalists. Social Frontier 4 (May 1938): 253-256.

Kallen comments on the controversy between Sidney Hook and Brand Blanshard over the connection between rationalism and totalitarianism and between James and Mussolini. Mussolini mentioned James only for publicity. IKS

Notes

See Kallen, "Fascism: For the Italians" {1920}.

2629 Kohler, Wolfgang. *The Place of Value in a World of Facts.* New York: Liveright, 1938.

2630 Kraushaar, Otto. What James's Philosophical Orientation Owed to Lotze. Phil Rev 47.5 (Sept 1938): 517-526.

While there are many similarities, Lotze was not the primary influence on James. Both wanted to defend spiritual experience from "mechanistic principles." For both, philosophy arose out of deep intellectual need and was neither a science nor a game. Both mistrusted Hegel and "pan-logism." Kraushaar surveys James's reading of Lotze. IKS

2631 Lodge, Rupert C. Synthesis or Comparison? J Phil 35.16 (4 Aug 1938): 432-440.

A "comparative" philosopher persuades a realist, an idealist, a pragmatist, and a synthetic philosopher that no "neutral" logic exists to decide which philosophy has the best interpretation of experience, since each philosophy defends its own version of logic. JRS

2632 McKie, J. I. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937). Mind 47.1 (Jan 1938): 135-139.

2633 Mead, G. H. *The Philosophy of the Act.* Edited with an Introduction by Charles W. Morris, in collaboration with J. M. Brewster, A. M. Dunham, and D. L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

A collection of unpublished material, with an "Introduction" (pp. vii-lxxiii) and Henry C. A. Mead's "Biographical Notes" (pp. lxxv-lxxix). Part 1 is "General Analysis of Knowledge and the Act," Part 2 is "Perceptual and Manipulatory Phases of the Act," Part 3 is "Cosmology," Part 4 is "Value and the Act," and Part 5 is "Supplementary Essays." JRS

Extended reviews

Arthur E. Murphy {2711}.

Reviews

T. E. Jessop, Philosophy 14.1 (Jan 1939): 105-106. The general impression "is that Mead's philosophy was pragmatism made difficult." Mead paradoxically attempted to defend an objective naturalism using a subjectivist epistemology. JRS

John Laird, Mind 48.1 (Jan 1939): 82-88. Mead really does talk epistemology despite his claims to the contrary. He leaves the temporal process "a systematic muddle," and creates bewilderment with his theory of perspectives. JRS

Theodore Abel, Amer J Psych 52.1 (Jan 1939): 155-156; Rudolf Allers, New Scholasticism 13.3 (July 1939): 287-290; Anon, Times Literary Supplement (17 Sept 1938): 592; Robert Bierstedt, Saturday Review (2 July 1938): 16; Kenneth Burke, New Republic 97 (11 Jan 1939): 292-293; H. Gardeil, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 29 (Jan 1940): 129; Harold A. Larrabee, Phil Rev 48.4 (July 1938): 433-436; Wilbur Long, Personalist 21.1 (Jan 1940): 81-82; Robert K. Merton, Isis 31 (April 1940): 482-483; Paul A. Schilpp, Christian Century 55 (Aug 1938): 940; Samuel M. Strong, "A Note on George H. Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act*," American Journal of Sociology 45.1 (July 1939): 71-76; Eliseo Vivas, "The Philosophy of Control," Partisan Review 6 (Fall 1938): 113-117.

2634 Moore, John Morrison. *Theories of Religious Experience, with Special Reference to James, Otto, and Bergson.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1938. New York: Round Table Press, 1938.

The term "religious experience" is vague and has outlived its usefulness. What counts as religious experience will vary from culture to culture. IKS

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 36.13 (22 June 1939): 358.

2635 Morris, Charles W. Foundations of the Theory of Signs. *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), no. 2.

Reviews

Frederick Fitch, Phil Rev 49 (1940): 678-680; Ernest Nagel, J Phil 35.25 (8 Dec 1938): 689-693.

2636 Morris, Charles W. Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism. Phil Rev 47.2 (March 1938): 109-127.

The history of pragmatism reveals the evolution of three common tenets "from the metaphysical idealism of Peirce through the radical empiricism of James to the empirical naturalism of Dewey and Mead." Their focus on reflective intelligence led to 1) a renovated empiricism that recognizes the importance of signs, the objectivity of universality, and the bankruptcy of dualism, 2) an evolutionary cosmology permitting creative novelty, and 3) a theory of mind set in a context of interested, social action. Peirce defined truth in terms of "the long run" and hypostatized the categories of possibility, laws, and final causes, while Mead found truth in a situational context and integrated all categories into the concept of the act. Their similarities and differences are manifested in their respective analyses of signs. The convergence of logical empiricism with the pragmatic analysis of meaning instituted by Peirce (and not toward the excessively biological version of pragmatism) suggests that they belong to a common movement of scientific empiricism. JRS

2637 O'Connell, Geoffrey. *Naturalism in American Education.* New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1938.

Reviews

Kenneth D. Benne, J Phil 35.24 (24 Nov 1938): 670-671. His accounts of the naturalistic theories of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, and Thorndike are accurate and fair. JRS

Notes

This work was O'Connell's dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1936. Its initial publication was: Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1936.

2638 Ogden, C. K. Word Magic. Psyche 18 (1938): 119-126.

2639 Patty, William L. *A Study of Mechanism in Education.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1938.

2640 Perry, Ralph B. *In the Spirit of William James.* New Haven: Yale University Press; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1938.

Perry contrasts James and Royce, especially in their relations to American culture. Separate chapters deal with James's empiricist theory of knowledge, his metaphysics of experience, the right to believe, and James as a militant liberal. IKS

Reviews

A. C. Garnett, Int J Ethics 49 (1938): 115-116; Charles Hartshorne, Journal of Religion 19.3 (July 1939): 247-248; John Laird, Philosophy 14.2 (April 1939): 247; Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 35.18 (1 Sept 1938): 489-490, and New England Quarterly 12 (March 1939): 156-157; Rudolf Metz, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 59 (1938): 1843-1844.

2641 Race, Henrietta V. *The Psychology of Learning Through Experience.* Boston: Ginn and Co., 1938.

This work, for "students of education and for teachers in service in elementary schools," has the philosophy "of the pragmatic school, represented by John Dewey." JRS

2642 Reichenbach, Hans. *Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and Structure of Knowledge.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Reviews

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 35.10 (12 May 1938): 270-272. Reichenbach is sympathetic with the pragmatists, although "he is not sure whether he is one himself." JRS

2643 Russell, Bertrand. *Power: A New Social Analysis.* London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: W. W. Norton, 1938.

For pragmatism, "a belief is 'true' if its consequences are pleasant" which "gives to those in power a metaphysical omnipotence." Pragmatism's "attack on the common view of truth is an outcome of a love of power." (p. 257) JRS

2643 Santayana, George. *The Realm of Truth.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.

Reviews

Sterling P. Lamprecht, J Phil 35.8 (14 April 1938): 211-214.

2644 Savery, William. The Synoptic Theory of Truth: The Confluence of Diverse Theories. Phil Rev 47.4 (July 1938): 347-374.

Savery critiques pragmatism on pp. 353-359, but then expands upon it to establish "generalized pragmatism" as the synoptic theory of truth. JRS

Notes

An earlier reading of a portion of this essay is discussed in the "Report of the California Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {2187}.

2645 Thomas, Bonaventure. *Deweyism in the Light of Catholic Thought.* Dissertation, Niagara University, 1938.

2646 Thomas, Wendell Marshall. *A Democratic Philosophy.* New York: Correlated Enterprises, 1938.

Dewey is discussed on pp. 11-37, and *passim.* JRS

Reviews

Anon, J Phil 35 (1938): 586; Theodore Brameld, Ethics 49 (1938): 122; Joseph K. Hart, Social Frontier 4 (1938): 269.

2647 Tufts, James H. Forty Years of American Philosophy. Int J Ethics 48.3 (April 1938): 433-438.

2648 Vivas, Eliseo. A Note on the Emotion in Mr. Dewey's Theory of Art. Phil Rev 47.5 (Sept 1938): 527-531. Reprinted in *Creation and Discovery: Essays in Criticism and Aesthetics* (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), pp. 223-228. *John Dewey: Critical Assessments*, ed. J. E. Tiles (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), vol. 3, pp. 374-378.

Dewey often contradicts his sound judgment that the significant content of a work of art lies in emotion. JRS

Notes

See Vivas, "A Definition of the Esthetic Experience," J Phil 34 (1937): 628-634.

2649 Watts, Henry. Old Nick and the Jesuits. America 59 (9 July 1938): 330-331.

Because Machiavelli (not the Jesuits) invented the idea that "the end justifies the means," he was the "spiritual progenitor of all the Pragmatists." JRS

2650 Weiss, Paul. *Reality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Reviews

Arthur E. Murphy, J Phil 36.11 (25 May 1939): 299-302. Weiss's development of Peirce's theory of perceptual indication is especially useful. JRS

2651 White, Stephen Solomon. *A Comparison of the Philosophies of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey*. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1938. Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1940. Reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1979.

1939

2652 Anderson, Paul Russell and Max Harold Fisch, eds. *Philosophy in America: From the Puritans to James, with Representative Selections*. New York: Appleton-Century, 1939. Reprinted, New York: Octagon Books, 1969.

Fisch recounts pragmatism's rise in the "Introduction" to Part 4, "The Emergence of Contemporary Issues," on pp. 441-446. Fisch also introduces Peirce's thought (pp. 447-452), represented by his "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," and James's thought (pp. 519-526), represented by his "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" {13}. JRS

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 36.15 (20 July 1939): 414-415.

2653 Aubrey, Edwin Ewart. The Naturalistic Conception of Man. Journal of Religion 19.3 (July 1939): 189-200.

2654 Axtelle, George E. John Dewey and the Concept of Democracy. Educational Trends 7 (Nov-Dec 1939): 6-14.

2655 Ayres, Clarence E. Dewey: Master of the Commonplace. New Republic 97 (18 Jan 1939): 303-306. Reprinted with minor revisions as "Dewey and His 'Studies in Logical Theory'," in *Books that Changed Our Minds*, ed. Malcolm Cowley and Bernard Smith (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939. Rpt., Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 111-126.

Notes

See Sydney J. Harris's reply, "John Dewey's Liberalism," New Republic 98 (1939): 169. See also Cowley's introductory section in *Books that Changed Our Minds*, pp. 3-23, which explains how Dewey was selected.

2656 Beach, Walter Greenwood. John Dewey: Sociology and Social Education United. In *The Growth of Social Thought* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), pp. 200-206.

2657 Beard, Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. *America in Midpassage*, Vol. 3: *The Rise of American Civilization.* New York: Macmillan, 1939.

2658 Beck, Lewis White. The Synoptic Method. J Phil 36.13 (22 June 1939): 337-345.

Peirce's proof that any two objects have a property in common which they lack when considered apart can be extended to show that synopsis cannot be concerned only with wholes. Synopsis is thus "an unavoidable aspect of scientific method." JRS

2659 Bentley, Arthur F. Postulation for Behavioral Inquiry. J Phil 36.15 (20 July 1939): 405-413.

2660 Bixler, Julius Seelye. *Religion for Free Minds.* New York: Harper, 1939.

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 37.16 (1 Aug 1940): 445-447. Bixler has "drawn liberally" from James, Whitehead, and Hocking in his attempt to fuse the philosophies of biological process and moral idealism. JRS

2661 Blanshard, Brand. Pragmatism and Thought. In *The Nature of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 341-393.

Reviews

Theodore M. Greene, J Phil 37.25 (5 Dec 1940): 686-695.

2662 Boodin, J. E. Man in His World. In *Faculty Research Lectures* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1939).

2663 Boodin, J. E. *The Social Mind: Foundations of Social Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1939.

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider J Phil 37.7 (28 March 1940): 187-190. Boodin describes how "the interpenetration of minds in society may be regarded as a 'creative synthesis' which

emerges in the course of evolution." Boodin's conception of societies as "finite, intimate, and personal" is "a genuine solution" to the difficulties of Royce's problem of the individual in an infinite society governed by absolute spirit. JRS

Reviews

Moses J. Aronson, Journal of Social Philosophy 5.3 (April 1940): 274-277; Joseph A. Leighton, Phil. Rev 50.3 (May 1941): 332-334; A. D. Ritchie, Philosophy 16.2 (April 1941): 214-215.

Notes

See Boodin, *The Religion of Tomorrow* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) and *The Posthumous Papers of J. E. Boodin* (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 1957).

2664 Boyle, W. E. The Philosophical Background of John Dewey, Educator. Catholic Educational Review 37.6 (June 1939): 385-392.

2665 Breed, Frederick S. *Education and the New Realism.* New York: Macmillan, 1939.

2666 Britton, Karl. Introduction to the Metaphysics and Theology of C. S. Peirce. Ethics 49.4 (July 1939): 435-465.

2667 Brotherstone, Bruce W. "Firstness." J Phil 36.20 (28 Sept 1939): 533-543.

2668 Brownell, Baker (as reported by Thomas A. Leahy). John Dewey's Influence on American Life and Thought. Educational Trends 7 (Nov-Dec 1939): 26-29.

2669 Brubacher, John S. *Modern Philosophies of Education.* New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1939.

Reviews

Kenneth D. Benne, J Phil 37.2 (18 Jan 1940): 54-55.

2670 Buchler, Justus. *Charles Peirce's Empiricism.* Dissertation, Columbia University, 1939. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1939.

The three parts are titled "Critical Common-sensism," "Pragmatism," and "The Formal and the Empirical." JRS

Reviews

Thomas A. Goudge, J Phil 37.10 (9 May 1940): 274-276. Buchler rightly explains that Peirce's pragmatic maxim was intended to be a method of clarifying ideas, not a theory of truth. The Achilles heel of empiricism is its interpretation of logical and mathematical validity, and Peirce's empiricism is not an exception. Two suspicions are aroused concerning perceptual judgments: Peirce seems to use them as sources of intuitive knowledge, and presupposes such perceptual knowledge in his phenomenology. JRS

John Laird, Philosophy 15.2 (April 1940): 208-209; Margaret MacDonald, Mind 50.1 (Jan 1941): 81-83; Eliseo Vivas, Nation 151.20 (16 Nov 1940): 483-484; Paul Weiss, Phil Rev 49 (1940): 595; Albert Wohlsetter, Isis 32 (1949): 399-403.

2671 Buchler, Justus. Charles S. Peirce, Giant in American Philosophy. American Scholar 8.4 (Autumn 1939): 400-411.

Peirce revolted against the introspective method, revealing "the profound moral significance of the scientific method." His interest in mathematical logic led him to the study of language, and then on to his least understood contribution, pragmatism. James's version of pragmatism received wide attention, but for James "a general conclusion was more important than details by which it was arrived at" while Peirce took the reverse view, preferring exactitude. Any effort to reconcile all aspects of his system is blocked by the impossibility of pragmatically justifying the doctrines of Peirce's metaphysics. JRS

2672 Buchler, Justus. Peirce's Theory of Logic. J Phil 36.8 (13 April 1939): 197-215.

Reviews

Carl G. Hempel, Journal of Symbolic Logic 4 (1939): 102.

2673 Burtt, Edwin A. *Types of Religious Philosophy.* New York: Harper, 1939. 2nd rev. ed., 1951.

Pp. 399-408 discuss "Pragmatic Humanism," and pp. 410-415 discuss "William James." James was neither a modernist nor a humanist. He retained "supernaturalism" and was attracted to mysticism. His major contribution was the argument for faith. The section on James was dropped for the revised edition. IKS

Reviews

Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 36.15 (20 July 1939): 418-419; James H. Tufts, Phil Rev 48 (1939): 332-336.

2674 Carpenter, Frederic I. William James and Emerson. American Literature 11 (March 1939): 39-47.

A study of James's marginalia in Emerson's works, preserved in Harvard's Houghton Library. Emerson is part of James's and pragmatism's intellectual heritage. IKS

Notes

See also his "Points of Comparison Between Emerson and William James" {2020}.

2675 Cunningham, G. Watts. The New Logic and the Old. J Phil 36.21 (12 Oct 1939): 565-572. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 549-556.

A contribution to a symposium of reviews of Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* {2612}. Although there are some differences in terminology and intent, Dewey's emphasis upon the power of predication aligns his logic with idealism. FXR

2676 Dakin, Arthur Hazard. *Man the Measure: An Essay on Humanism as Religion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Reviews

Harold A. Larrabee, J Phil 37.8 (11 April 1940): 220-221.

2677 DeBoer, John J. The Influence of John Dewey on Education. Educational Trends 7 (Nov-Dec 1939): 15-19.

2678 Dewey, John. *Freedom and Culture.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939. Reprinted in *LW* 13: 63-187.

Dewey addresses the challenge to a democratic society posed by rampant industrial and technological change. We can no longer define "freedom" as the mere lack of external restraints and controls. Instead, freedom is expressed in the broad economic, aesthetic, and moral phenomena of a culture. "Private" enterprise, defined as the efforts of individuals or small groups, has given way to impersonal mass industrialization and mass media. Political reaction to this dramatic change, grounded in "natural rights" or the "necessity of history," results in the glorification, respectively, of capitalism and communism. Under the control of these restrictive views, science and technology foster mindless conformity. A scientific attitude of openness and initiative is the key to a truly democratic culture. This culture will prize the creation of an "ultimate intellectual consumer" who values "freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, [and] freedom of communication." (p. 135) A true "Jeffersonian democracy" embodies an informed and critical public dedicated to agencies that liberate human potential. FXR

Reviews

Ernest S. Bates, New York Herald Tribune Books (5 Nov 1939): 2; Robert Bierstedt, "John Dewey at Eighty," Saturday Review of Literature 21.5 (11 Nov 1939): 12-13; Boyd H. Bode, Journal of Higher Education 11 (April 1940): 226-229; Edwin T. Buehrer, Christian Century 57 (7 Feb 1940): 178-179; Ruth Byrns, Thought 15.2 (June 1940): 365-367; Norman Cousins, Current History 51 (Dec 1939): 6; Percy M. Dawson, Humanist Bulletin 2 (June 1940): 6; C. Hartley Grattan, New York Times Book Review (5 Nov 1939): 1, 27; William Gruen, Nation 149 (2 Dec 1939): 621-622; Albert Hofstadter, Philosophical Abstracts 1 (Spring 1940): 7-9; Charles E. Merriam, American Political Science Review 34 (April 1940): 339-342; F. R. Moulton, Scientific Monthly 51 (Sept 1940): 278-279; Robert Rothman, American Teacher 24 (Dec 1939): 25; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 688-690; Paul Weiss, New Republic 101 (6 Dec 1939): 206-207; Homer Woodbridge, "Preface to Democracy," Yale Review n.s. 29.2 (Dec 1939): 388-390.

2679 Dewey, John. I Believe. In *I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Certain Eminent Men and Women of Our Time*, ed. Clifton Fadiman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939), pp. 347-354. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 91-97.

2680 Dewey, John. *Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy.* Joseph Ratner, ed. New York: Modern Library, 1939.

Selections from Dewey's principal books and articles are organized by theme. Also included is Ratner's "Introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy," pp. 3-241, and his "Editor's Note," pp. 525-566, along with two new essays by Dewey: "The Economic Basis of a New Society," pp. 416-438 [*LW* 13: 309-322], and "The Unity of the Human Being," pp. 817-835 [*LW* 13: 323-337]. JRS

Reviews

Anon, Philosophic Abstracts 1 (Winter 1939): 8; C. E. Ayres, New Republic 99 (1939): 51-52; Joseph K. Hart, Survey Graphic 28 (1939): 453; Eric A. Havelock, "The Philo-

sophy of John Dewey," Canadian Forum 19 (1939): 121-123; G. V. Kennard, Modern Schoolman 20 (1943): 246-247; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 36.21 (21 Oct 1939): 585-586; Paul Weiss, New Republic 101 (1939): 206; William H. Werkmeister, Ethics 50.3 (April 1940): 375-376.

Notes

See Ratner's reply to Ayres's review, "Ratner vs. Ayres," New Republic 99 (1939): 255, and Ayres' rejoinder, ibid., p. 255.

2681 Dewey, John. Theory of Valuation. *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), no. 4. Reprinted in *LW* 13: 189-253.

Dewey offered this contribution to the *Foundations of the Unity of Science* series to distance his theory from the fashionable positivist view that value is merely the expression of an emotion. Even for an infant, cries, tears, and smiles are not themselves expressive. They are "constituents of a larger organic condition." In learning that emotional responses solicit beneficial responses from others, children incorporate them into social behavior. Desires and likings are, of course, just what they are; but they are also integrally bound to interests that require planning and foresight for their fulfillment. Such interests arise within the "life-activity of the person and group," and thus are inherently social. To be an authentic value, however, an interest or prizing must lend itself to the sort of comparison whereby some things are found to be better than others–a appraisal of prizings that affects future actions. Valuation may thus be defined as "a rule for determination of a future act to be performed." (p. 209) Maturity is the ability to distinguish immediate desires from what critical evaluation discloses as truly desirable. The close rational scrutiny that links desires to ends also undermines irresponsible "ends-justifies-means" thinking. Intelligence, foresight, and skill at achieving desirable goals–the cultivation of a scientific attitude–is the surest way to harmonize individual and social valuations. FXR

Reviews

D. Bidney, Phil Rev 50.4 (July 1941): 443-446; Abraham Edel, Philosophical Abstracts 1 (Spring 1940): 9; Frank Knight, American Journal of Sociology 45.6 (May 1940): 942-943; William M. Malisoff, Philosophy of Science 6.4 (Oct 1939): 490-491; Herbert Marcuse, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9 (1941): 144-148; Herbert W. Schneider, "A Note on Dewey's *Theory of Valuation*," J Phil 36.18 (31 Aug 1939): 490-495.

2682 Doescher, Waldemar Oswald. Dewey's Educational Philosophy and Its Implications for Christian Education. Christian Education 22 (1939): 377-389.

2683 *The Educational Frontier.* Progressive Education Booklet No. 13 (Columbus, Ohio: Progressive Education Association, 1939). Lindeman's essay is reprinted as "John Dewey as Educator" in School and Society 51 (1940): 33-37.

This booklet contains essays by John Lawrence Childs, "John Dewey and the Educational Frontier," pp. 5-12; Albert C. Barnes, "Art as Experience," pp. 13-25; Arthur E. Murphy, "John Dewey's Philosophy of Religion," pp. 26-41; Eduard C. Lindeman, "John Dewey and Social Action," pp. 42-57; and Ned H. Dearborn, "Democracy and Education," pp. 58-63. JRS

2684 Fay, Jay Wharton. *American Psychology Before William James.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1939.

Fay discusses John Dewey on pp. 163-167. JRS

Notes

A revised version of his dissertation, Rutgers University, 1935.

2685 Feibleman, James K. The Influence of Peirce on Dewey's Logic. J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 682.

Notes

An abstract of a paper that was later published in Education 66.1 (Sept 1945): 18-24.

2686 Feibleman, James K. Une Philosophie américaine: La Doctrine de Charles-S. Peirce. Rev Méta 46.3 (July 1939): 443-459. The English version was reprinted as "The Realism of Charles S. Peirce" in *The Revival of Realism: Critical Studies in Contemporary Philosophy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 31-45.

Peirce's work, like that of many American writers such as Poe, Melville, and Whitman, was not recognized until after his death. The popularity of *Chance, Love, and Logic* {1923} justifies a careful study of his philosophy. Parts 1-4 discuss Peirce's life, realism, theory of categories, and pragmatism, respectively. Part 5 compares James's and Peirce's pragmatism, and part 6 describes tychistic agapism, the community, and logic. Peirce has been misunderstood: he is neither a pragmatist like James, nor an instrumentalist like Dewey, nor a Marxist like Hook, nor a nominalist like the logical positivists. His metaphysics was most influenced by Duns Scotus. LF

2687 *Freedom and Education.* Progressive Education Booklet No. 12 (Columbus, Ohio: Progressive Education Association, 1939).

This booklet contains Horace M. Kallen's "Freedom and Education," pp. 5-15 [reprinted in *The Philosopher of the Common Man* {2781}, pp. 15-32]; Boyd H. Bode's "Dewey's Doctrine of the Learning Process," pp. 16-23; John Lovejoy Elliott's "Personality in Education," pp. 24-32; and William Heard Kilpatrick's "The Child and the Curriculum," pp. 33-36. JRS

2688 George, Samuel S. *The Influence of Pragmatism upon American Religion.* Dissertation, Temple University, 1939.

2689 Hahn, Lewis Edwin. *A Contextualistic Theory of Sense Perception.* Dissertation, University of California, 1939. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 22 (Berkeley: University of California, 1942. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969). Portions of chap. 6 was published as "Neutral, Indubitable Sense-Data as the Starting Point for Theories of Perception," J Phil 36.22 (26 Oct 1939): 589-600.

Notes

See also Hahn, "Psychological Data and Philosophical Theory of Perception," J Phil 39.11 (21 May 1942): 296-301.

2690 Hartshorne, Charles. A Critique of Peirce's Idea of God. J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 683-684.

Notes

An abstract of a paper which was later published in Phil Rev 50 (1941): 516-523.

2691 Hill, Walker H. Peirce and Pragmatism. J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 682-683.

Notes

An abstract of a paper; this paper was adapted to become "The Founder of Pragmatism," in *In Commemoration of William James, 1842-1942*, ed. Horace M. Kallen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Rpt., New York: AMS Press, 1967), pp. 223-234.

2692 Hook, Sidney. The Importance of John Dewey in Modern Thought. Modern Quarterly 11.4 (Fall 1939): 30-35.

Notes

See also Hook's "John Dewey at Eighty," New Leader 22 (28 Oct 1939): 5, and his "Salute to John Dewey!" Call 5 (4 Nov 1939): 4.

2693 Hook, Sidney. *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait.* New York: John Day, 1939. Reprinted, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971. Reprinted, with a foreword by Richard Rorty, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.

Hook surveys Dewey's philosophical work from numerous angles: starting with his theories of ideas, truth, and logic, through his studies on body, mind, behavior, and ends, to his visions of the good society, education, art, nature, and democracy. JRS

Reviews

Robert Bierstedt, "John Dewey at Eighty," Saturday Review of Literature 21.5 (11 Nov 1939): 12-13; Boyd H. Bode, Journal of Higher Education 11 (1940): 226-229; Ruth Byrns, Thought 15.2 (June 1940): 365-367; John L. Childs, New Leader 22 (16 Dec 1939): 2; Everett Wesley Hall, Phil Rev 50.1 (Jan 1941): 86-87; Philip B. Rice, Kenyon Review 2 (Winter 1940): 121-124; Herbert W. Schneider, J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 695; Eliseo Vivas, Nation 150.1 (6 Jan 1940): 22-23; Paul Weiss, New Republic 101 (6 Dec 1939): 206-207; Morton G. White, Partisan Review 7 (1939): 62-67.

2694 Howard, Delton T. John Dewey as a Philosopher. Educational Trends 7 (Nov-Dec 1939): 20-22

2695 Husik, Isaac. The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories. J Phil 36.16 (3 Aug 1939): 427-431.

In the course of arguing that Aristotle authored the *Categories*, Husik mentions that Peirce once expressed his agreement to Husik, though Peirce also told him that the last six chapters were not genuine. JRS

2696 *John Dewey and the Promise of America.* Progressive Education Booklet No. 14 (Columbus, Ohio: Progressive Education Association, 1939). Dewey's essay was reprinted in *The Philosophy of the Common Man* {2781}, pp. 220-228.

This booklet contains essays by William Heard Kilpatrick, "John Dewey in American Life," pp. 5-11; John Dewey, "Creative Democracy–The Task Before Us," pp. 12-17; Charles A. Beard, "America in Mid-Passage," pp. 18-25; Charles W. Morris, "General Education and the Unity of Science Movement," pp. 26-40. JRS

2697 Keyser, Cassius Jackson. Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839-1914. No. 12 of *Portraits of Famous Philosophers who were also Mathematicians, with Biographical Accounts* (New York: Scripta Mathematica, 1939).

2698 Kilpatrick, William Heard. John Dewey: Symbol of America at Its Best, Conscious of Its Deepest Yearnings. New Leader 22 (25 Nov 1939): 3, 7.

2699 Klubertanz, George Peter. The Man Whom Dewey Would Educate. Modern Schoolman 16 (1939): 60-64.

2700 Kraushaar, Otto. Lotze as a Factor in the Development of James's Radical Empiricism and Pluralism. Phil Rev 48.5 (Sept 1939): 455-471.

The dualism of thought and object adopted by James until around 1900 is defined in reference to Lotze. But his break toward radical empiricism owes little to Lotze. In marginal notes, James noted traces of pluralism in Lotze. However, since Lotze remained a monist, James's pluralism avoids the "ineptitudes" of monism with reference to Lotze. IKS

2701 Leander, Folke. *The Philosophy of John Dewey.* Göteborg, Sweden: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1939.

Reviews

Sidney Hook, Philosophy (London) 14 (1939): 481-482; John Laird, Philosophy 14.4 (Oct 1939): 481-482; Max C. Otto, Phil Rev 49 (1940): 262-264; Herbert Schneider, J Phil 36.21 (21 Oct 1939): 586-586.

Notes

See Leander's reply to Schneider's review, J Phil 37.15 (18 July 1940): 407-408

2702 Lepley, Ray. The Transposability of Fact and Values. J Phil 36.11 (25 May 1939): 290-299.

2703 Lewis, C. I. Meaning and Action. J Phil 36.21 (12 Oct 1939): 572-576. Reprinted in *Collected Papers*, pp. 87-91. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 556-560.

A contribution to a symposium of reviews of Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* {2612}. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the *Logic* is its insistence of the intrinsic connection between meaning and action, for this thoroughly undermines the passive "spectator" theory of knowledge. FXR

2704 Lynch, Jarmon Alvis. Dewey's Social Theory of the Stimulus Evaluated. Peabody Journal of Education 16 (1939): 324-329.

2705 McGill, Vivian J. Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy. Science and Society 3.3 (1939): 289-322.

2706 McGilvary, Evander B. Professor Dewey: Logician–Ontologician. J Phil 36.21 (12 Oct 1939): 561-565. Reprinted in *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 545-549.

A contribution to a symposium of reviews of Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* {2612}. Dewey has crafted an impressive logic thoroughly woven to his ontological experimentalism. Nonetheless, he continues to maintain a confused relation between achieved objectives of inquiry and antecedent existences. FXR

2707 McGilvary, Evander B. Relations in General and Universals in Particular. J Phil 36.1 (5 Jan 1939): 5-15; J Phil 36.2 (19 Jan 1939): 29-40.

McGilvary contrasts his theory of universals with Dewey's on pp. 37-39. JRS

2708 Mavit, Henry. *L'Intelligence créatrice.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1939

Reviews

Anon, Rev Méta Supplément 47.3 (July 1940): 334-335.

2709 Merrington, Ernest N. Conceptual Pragmatism. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 17.2 (Aug 1939): 97-107.

Merrington examines C. I. Lewis's *Mind and the World Order* {2041}. His epistemology is too individualistic, the voluntaristic basis for the *a priori* actually makes it *a posteriori*, and the approach to knowledge is subjectively empirical. "It is characteristic of pragmatism that it struggles to evade those principles of a rational faith which lie at the base of all knowledge and of the answering intelligibility of the world of objects." JRS

2710 Meyer, Adolphe E. *The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939.

2711 Murphy, Arthur E. Concerning Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act.* J Phil 36.4 (16 Feb 1939): 85-103.

The editors of this work {2633} wisely made such an inclusive selection of Mead's papers. The introduction, however, "is at least as puzzling as is the text." Many of Mead's important tenets must be taken in two different senses, depending on whether philosophical justification or empirical accuracy is desired. The confusions of this work originate in illicitly establishing the act as philosophically ultimate. This poor start, for example, affects his thesis that objects are relative to inquiry: its plausibility requires that statements about objects retain their ordinary realistic meaning as actually used *and* acquire an incompatible subjective content. Historians are not inquiring into their process of inquiry; they are inquiring into what actually happened in the past. Mead has offered no empirical confirmation of his theory that objects of inquiry possess no independent reality. No support for a "bio-social" interpretation of physics can be gained from relativity. JRS

2712 Nagel, Ernest. Some Leading Principles of Professor Dewey's Logical Theory. J Phil 36.21 (12 Oct 1939): 576-581. Reprinted as part one of "Reflections on Some Logical and Metaphysical Themes in Dewey's Philosophy" in *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 141-147. *Dewey and His Critics*, pp. 560-565.

A contribution to a symposium of reviews of Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* {2612}. Dewey's theory of generic and universal propositions seems similar to the more familiar distinction between "synthetic" and "analytic" propositions. He does not, however, adequately explain how universal relations can be "necessary" when their ground is operational and empirical, and in fact "the whole basis of his distinction between them and generic propositions remains obscure." FXR

Notes

See Patrick Suppes, "Nagel's Lectures on Dewey's Logic," in *Philosophy, Science, and Method*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), pp. 2-25.

2713 Newhall, Jannette E. Wobbermin and William James. In *Luther, Kant, Schleirmacher in ihrer Bedeutung fur en Protestantismus* (Berlin: Arthur Collignon, 1939). Also published in *Forschungen und Abhandlungen G. Wobbermin zum 70. Geburtstag dargebrachte* (1939), pp. 363-378.

A contribution to the celebration of Georg Wobbermin's 70th birthday. Wobbermin translated James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* {90} and was personally acquainted with James. Without tracing influences, Newhall holds that both begin with ego-psychology, use moral arguments to establish religion, and face the question of materialism. IKS

2714 Otto, Max C. The Social Philosophy of John Dewey. Journal of Social Philosophy 5 (1939): 42-60.

2715 Raup, R. Bruce. Dewey's *Logic* and Some Problems of Progressive Education. Progressive Education 16 (1939): 264-271.

2716 *Resources for Building America.* Progressive Education Booklet No. 15 (Columbus, Ohio: Progressive Education Association, 1939).

Contains Thomas V. Smith, "The Promise of American Politics," pp. 5-19; Walter N. Polakov, "Our Productive Potentialities," pp. 20-32; Irwin Edman, "The Resources of Art in American Life," pp. 33-40; Holgar Cahill, "American Resources in the Arts," pp. 41-57; Walter H. Hamilton, "Our Man-Made Natural Resources," ibid., pp. 58-63. JRS

2717 Sabine, George H. What Is a Political Theory? Journal of Politics 1.1 (Feb 1939): 1-16.

The pragmatic analysis of reflective thinking describes the essential elements of a political theory. Hegel's dialectic is perpetuated in Dewey's and Mead's pragmatism. JRS

2718 Schiller, F. C. S. *Our Human Truths.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

A posthumously published collection of journal articles, essays, and lectures. "Burning Questions," pp. 3-17, is a reprint of {2458}. "The Humanistic View of Life," pp. 18-31, is a 1935 lecture. "Must Empiricism be Limited?" pp. 32-47, is a reprint of {2526}. "Truth-Seekers and Sooth-Sayers," pp. 48-56, is a reprint of {2393}. "Must Pragmatists Disagree?" pp. 57-64, is a reprint of {2527}. "Humanisms and Humanism," pp. 65-80, is a reprint of part one of {2590}. "Has Philosophy any Message for the

World?" pp. 81-92, is a reprint of {2524}. "Must Philosophy Be Dull?" pp. 93-103, is a reprint of {2589}. "Is Idealism Incurably Ambiguous?" pp. 104-111, is a reprint of {2331}. "The Ultra-Gothic Kant," pp. 112-123, is a reprint of {2528}. "Goethe and the Faustian Way of Salvation," pp. 124-139, is a 1935 lecture. "Plato's Phaedo and the Ancient Hope of Immortality," pp. 140-154, is a 1934 lecture. "Plato's Republic," pp. 155-167, is a reprint of {2391}. "How Far Does Science Need Determinism?" pp. 168-175, is a reprint of {2588}. "The Relativity of Metaphysics," pp. 176-188, is a reprint of part four of {2590}. "Ethics, Casuistry, and Life," pp. 189-202, is a reprint of part three of {2590}. "Prophecy and Destiny," pp. 203-215, is a reprint of "Prophecy, Destiny and Population" in Hibbert Journal 35.4 (July 1937): 510-520. "The Crumbling British Empire," pp. 216-227, is reprinted from Current History 39 (Oct 1933): 25-31. "Can Democracy Survive?" pp. 228-245, is reprinted from The Twentieth Century and After 114 (Oct 1933): 385-397. "The Possibility of a United States of Europe," pp. 246-250, is reprinted from World Affairs Interpreter 4 (1933): 139-144. "Ant-Men or Super-Men?" pp. 251-268, is reprinted from The Twentieth Century and After 117 (Jan 1935): 89-101. "Fascisms and Dictatorships" is a 1934 lecture. "Humanistic Logic and Theory of Value," pp. 283-297, is a reprint of part two of {2590}. "Multi-Valued Logics–and Others," pp. 298-318, is a reprint of {2459}. "Data, Datives, and Ablatives," pp. 319-327, is a reprint of {2329}. "Are All Men Mortal?" pp. 328-337, is a reprint of {2457}. "How is 'Exactness' Possible?" pp. 338-345, is a reprint of {2525}. JRS

Reviews

Max C. Otto, J Phil 37.24 (21 Nov 1940): 657-668. Schiller's neglect of "the conventional niceties of professional scholarship" contributed to the "vital, dramatic, often exciting character of his thinking." His ever-prevailing emphasis on the personal element in experience was the "heart and soul" of his method, and often caused a myopic vision of philosophical issues. His writings will always be there to liberate and elevate. His reader will "look reality in the eye" and sense that "reality is made to be remade by those who have the faith, the insight, and the courage to meet the test." JRS

2719 Schilpp, Paul Arthur. John Dewey: American Citizen No. 1. Educational Trends 7 (Nov-Dec 1939): 23-25.

2720 Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. *The Philosophy of John Dewey*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939. 2nd ed., New York: Tudor, 1951. 3rd ed., LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989. Dewey's "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder" is reprinted in *LW* 14: 3-90. Whitehead's "John Dewey and His Influence," is reprinted in *Essays on Science and Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), pp. 120-121. Russell's "Dewey's New *Logic*," is reprinted in *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959*, ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), pp. 191-206. Randall's "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy" is reprinted in *Philosophy After Darwin*, ed. Beth J. Singer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 304-327.

This inaugural volume of The Library of Living Philosophers contains the "Biography of John Dewey," ed. Jane M. Dewey, pp. 3-45, seventeen essays, Dewey's reply, and a "Bibliography of the Writings of John Dewey."

2720 (cont.)

Joseph Ratner, "Dewey's Conception of Philosophy," pp. 49-73. At the heart of Dewey's philosophy is a "double movement" of method and vision: the sciences that rectify meaning, and the arts that enlarge these meanings in the world of lived experience. Dewey has not solved the ancient problem of mind and matter, which he has recast as the problem of theory and practice. If there is such a solution, however, it lies in discovering a fusion, a functional relationship, of method and vision. FXR

John Herman Randall, Jr., "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy," pp. 77-102. Although Dewey reveres the history of philosophy as a storehouse of the richness of the human imagination, he is more interested in making history than in writing about it. His purpose is to trace the continuity of human thought for the achievement of a more secure future. For Dewey, "philosophy is the intellectual instrument whereby a culture reconstructs itself." FXR

Donald Piatt, "Dewey's Logical Theory," pp. 105-134. Dewey's experimental logic underlies his metaphysics. Broadly naturalistic rather than narrowly empiricistic, it begins in a real world of use and involvements rather than one dispassionately known or judged. While such real havings are not sense-data or representations of external reality, they function as signs of other things. Inquiry advances as data incorporate meanings that are both in natural existences and in the ability of thought to form generals that link signs to consummatory objects of knowledge. FXR

Bertrand Russell, "Dewey's New *Logic*," pp. 137-156. Dewey's "unconscious metaphysic" is holistic: inquiry begins in a unique existential whole or situation. Although he admits an external world beyond situations, he says little about it. But just how large is a "situation?" Given Dewey's own rejection of any problem of the external world and his belief in the continuity of all things, it seems a situation must embrace the entire universe. His theory of knowledge rejects truth for the conversion of discrete elements into a "unified whole." But this is unsatisfactory, for a bricklayer "unifies" bricks into a house without "inquiring" into them. And unlike the standard view that reality is the ground of truth, Dewey's "warranted assertability" is both difficult to specify and based upon a sense of "success" that is relative, subjective, and ultimately postponed to the indefinite future. FXR

Hans Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science," pp. 159-192. Although Dewey's philosophy of science is admirably empirical, his identification of scientific "reals" with relations denies the reality of scientific objects. Because actual existences often differ from their appearances, it a fallacy to reduce their "reality" to their observed measurements or relations. Dewey compounds this error by granting full reality to dreams, illusions, and "tertiary qualities" such as love and fear. FXR

Arthur E. Murphy, "Dewey's Epistemology and Metaphysics," pp. 195-225. While Dewey's thesis that knowledge must be connected to inquiry is a significant philosophical advance, numerous inconsistencies impede its full development. For though his contextualism undermines the "epistemologies" that ignore the connection between thought and action, Dewey's inquiry is directed not to discovering the antecedent conditions of our existence, but only to the future modification of existences. As such, there is never *knowing* in Dewey's philosophy, but always a "more" to be known. FXR

Dominique Parodi, "Knowledge and Action in Dewey's Philosophy," pp. 229-242. Dewey's positivistic conception of science excludes mathematical science and its focus on necessary relationships. His theory of perception is so behavioristic that consciousness

becomes unintelligible, and his notion of voluntary action insufficiently appreciates the role of permanent unity. JRS

George Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," pp. 245-261. A reprint with minor revisions of {1836}. JRS

Gordon W. Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," pp. 265-290. Dewey advances an ingenious theory of the reciprocal development of society and the individual. A society is the product of social activities among individuals, yet individual character is molded and shaped by such interaction. Technology, however, has created a multitude of conflicting "publics," and each individual belongs to a number of these. But no mere multiplication of these diverse publics can achieve Dewey's "totally inclusive community," nor can mere participation in the segmented activities of a democratic state achieve unity for the individual. Despite Dewey's efforts, this problem is unsolved. Similarly, his metaphysics suggests an "objective relativism" that records the transformative role of human intelligence in a natural world. Instead of casting "experience" as the natural link between man and world, however, Dewey makes it the end of all knowing. This overindulgence of experience, as Santayana observes, collapses nature into sheer foreground or immediacy. FXR

Henry W. Stuart, "Dewey's Ethical Theory," pp. 293-333. Dewey believes that morality emerged from a "shrinking dread" of the "precarious" and "a yearning of the 'organism' for the security of restored equilibrium." (p. 329) To the contrary, true ethical reflection requires the rational control of conduct that mere "animal drive" could never have instituted. FXR

George R. Geiger, "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy," pp. 337-368. What is reflective thinking's role is finding the *right* experiments? How can reflective thinking both rely on democratic conditions of free inquiry and still defend democracy? Can Dewey's tentative liberalism operate during crises, or arouse loyalty? Are the values of reflective thinking the ultimate values? JRS

Stephen C. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics," pp. 371-389. Dewey's *Art as Experience* {2356} incongruously mixes a promising pragmatic esthetics embracing histories, relations, and qualitative unity, with an antiquated organistic idealism that reduces all elements of relation and imagination to "coherence." FXR

Edward L. Schaub, "Dewey's Interpretation of Religion," pp. 393-416. In narrowly defining religion as a preoccupation with the supernatural, Dewey ignores the deep richness and variety of actual religious practices, and the contribution religion has made to social reform and the "general cause of human enlightenment and refinement." He also underestimates the dependency of humanity and the terror of our mortality. To be complete, "human life must include worship as well as wonder and work." FXR

John L. Childs, "The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey," pp. 419-443. For Dewey, deliberate education is a moral enterprise, based on a biological understanding of human thought, socially operating in an uncertain environment. As a social institution in a democratic society, education respects the individual's intrinsic worth and uniqueness, and tries to produce the ability to intelligently judge values and conflict resolutions. JRS

William H. Kilpatrick, "Dewey's Influence on Education," pp. 447-473. Dewey's educational thought is portrayed against the wider backdrop of American and Western culture, that was "already largely disposed to consider favorably what he had to say." JRS

Alfred N. Whitehead, "John Dewey and His Influence," pp. 477-478. Dewey has "disclosed great ideas relevant to the functioning of the social system" of America. How-

ever, the "excellence of Dewey's work in the expressions of notions relevant to modern civilization increases the danger of sterilizing thought within the puny limitations of today." JRS

William Savery, "The Significance of Dewey's Philosophy," pp. 481-513. Dewey's instrumentalism is described in the context of Peirce and James. Savery's criticisms focus on (1) the meanings that Dewey attaches to key philosophical terms, (2) pragmatism's understanding of the process of verification, (3) Dewey's treatment of the external world, and (4) Dewey's version of naturalism. JRS

John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder," pp. 517-608. Despite some inconsistencies and shifts, "I have moved fairly steadily in one direction" since the turn of the century. The underlying problem of philosophy remains the relationship between scientific thought and the objects and values of ordinary experience. This has generated peculiar "epistemological" problems about the "ultimate reality" of, for example, perceptions versus scientific objects, or experiences versus things in themselves. With gratitude to the voices of support, these comments must be directed to dissenting views. Russell complains that little is told about the nature of things prior to our inquiry into them; in fact, because "telling" itself is derived from inquiry, the attempt to tell *anything* about such things is "inherently absurd." Reichenbach's charge that instrumentalism believes in the superior reality of relations is untrue, though it reveals a common bias toward the superiority of "concrete" objects. Murphy overlooks the fact that future consequences are integral to our understanding of the past and present conditions of experience. Santayana's charge that experience is "immediacy" or a mere "foreground" of nature occurs because he gives "experience" the narrow and subjective meaning of British empiricism. Allport is right in saying that an integration of individuals and segmented publics had not yet been achieved, though there is no inherent reason why personal fulfillment is incompatible with the pursuit of varied interests and involvements within the greater community. Stuart discovers a theory of moral development that only takes into account aversion to peril and blind impulse, when in fact this theory's lifeblood is in the transformation that occurs with communication and social intelligence. Schaub is entitled to his faith in the supernatural. *A Common Faith* {2357} merely tried to show that a full and enriched sense of religious experience need not be predicated upon such belief. FXR

Reviews

Sterling Lamprecht, J Phil 36.25 (5 Dec 1939): 691-695. This collection demonstrates a nearly uniform desire to promote clarity and understanding. Russell's essay, "an outstanding example of almost total misunderstanding and profitless faultfinding" is one exception: it "repeats some gratuitous gibes which he made years ago about America and then indulges in bizarre distortions of phrases wrested from context and thereby reduced to patent absurdity." Santayana's essay also misses the intent of Dewey's position, but at least it clearly expounds his own philosophy. With reference to the common question asked by many critics, whether Dewey denies the possibility of knowing things that existed prior to inquiry, Dewey states that he does not. Yet, he also confusingly says that "while one is engaged in knowing, the things to be known are still future." If Dewey gave a genetic analysis of his logical development, such confusions might be prevented. JRS

Robert Bierstedt, "John Dewey at Eighty," Saturday Review of Literature 21.5 (11 Nov 1939): 12-13; Ruth Byrns, Thought 15.2 (June 1940): 365-367; G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 49 (1940): 69-74; Charles Hartshorne, Christian Century 57 (1940): 313-

315; John Laird, Philosophy 15.2 (April 1940): 207-208; R. Miceli, Archivio di Filosofia (1939): 288-289; Philip B. Rice, Kenyon Review 2 (Winter 1940): 121-124; Howard Selsam, Science and Society 4 (1940): 120-125; Paul Weiss, New Republic 101 (6 Dec 1939): 206; William H. Werkmeister, Ethics 50.3 (April 1940): 353-359; Morton G. White, Partisan Review 7 (1939): 62-67.

2721 Schneider, Herbert W. Dewey's Eighth Decade. In *A Bibliography of John Dewey 1882-1939*, ed. Milton Halsey Thomas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. ix-xviii.

Reviews

John Laird, Philosophy 16.2 (April 1941): 218.

2722 Schneider, Herbert W. Moral Obligation. Ethics 50.1 (Oct 1939): 45-56.

2723 Schoenchen, Gustav G. *Eduard Burger and John Dewey.* Dissertation, New York University, 1939.

The subtitle is "A Comparative Study of Burger's Arbeitsschule and Contemporary American Activity Schools as Representative of Dewey's Educational Philosophy." JRS

Notes

See Schoenchen, "Eduard Burger and John Dewey," Journal of Experimental Education 8 (1939): 51-54.

2724 Smith, Martin J. *John Dewey and Moral Education.* Washington, D.C.: Guthrie Lithograph Co., 1939.

2725 Stallknecht, Newton P. In Defense of Ontology. J Phil 36.2 (19 Jan 1938): 40-48.

A critique of C. I. Lewis's rejection of ontology in favor of "realms of discourse." Since all purposive activity presupposes form and thinghood, possibility and actuality, an investigation of the reality of these factors can "rescue reality from the relativists." JRS

2726 Stone, Mark. John Dewey as Political Philosopher. New Republic 98 (1939): 281.

Notes

See Geiger's reply, "Dewey as Political Philosopher," New Republic 98 (1939): 380-381.

2727 Thomas, Wendell M. Dewey's Doctrine of the Situation. J Phil 36.21 (12 Oct 1939): 581-584.

2728 Vivas, Eliseo. John Dewey's Achievement. Partisan Review 6 (Spring 1939): 79-91.

2729 Warbeke, John M. Esthetic Form and Criteria in Croce and Dewey. J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 679.

Notes

An abstract of a paper.

2730 Barnes, Harry E., Howard Becker, and Francis B. Becker, eds. *Contemporary Social Theory.* New York and London: D. Appleton-Century, 1940.

2731 Barrett, William. John Dewey in His Eightieth Year. Southern Review 5 (1940): 700-710.

2732 Beck, Lewis White. The Psychophysical as a Pseudo-Problem. J Phil 37.21 (10 Oct 1940): 561-571.

2733 Benne, Kenneth D. The Human Individual: John Dewey. University Review (Kansas City) 7 (1940): 48-56.

2734 Briggs, Thomas H. *Pragmatism and Pedagogy.* New York: Macmillan, 1940.

2735 Brooks, Van Wyck. *New England: Indian Summer, 1865-1915.* New York: E. P. Dutton, 1940.

A history of literature with references to James. IKS

2736 Buchler, Justus. The Accidents of Peirce's System. J Phil 37.10 (9 May 1940): 264-269.

Buchler responds to Wiess's "The Essence of Peirce's System" {2793}. Why should any abstraction from Peirce's work be dreaded? His pragmatism is based on semiotic alone, and his semiotic is independent from his phenomenology. The categories do have metaphysical and methodological interpretations, but they are hardly "essential." The strain to conserve "his picturesque architectonic" does no honor to Peirce. The intelligent dissection of his concepts is preferable to "the esthetic contemplation of their dubious unity." JRS

2737 Buchler, Justus, ed. *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings.* London: Kegan Paul, 1940. Reprinted as *Philosophical Writings of Peirce* (New York: Dover, 1955).

Contains a Preface (pp. vii-viii) and Introduction (pp. ix-xvi) by Buchler and 28 selections from Peirce's writings in the *Collected Papers.* JRS

Reviews

Frederick Ives Carpenter, New England Quarterly 14 (Sept 1941): 601; John Laird, Philosophy 16.4 (Oct 1941): 434; Ernest Nagel, J Phil 38.7 (27 March 1941): 189-190.

Reviews of the reprinting

Gerard Deledalle, Études Philosophiques 13 (1958): 77-78; William S. Snyder, Philosophy 36 (1957): 81.

2738 Bush, Wendell T. Concerning the Concept of Pattern. J Phil 37.5 (29 Feb 1940): 113-134.

Bush comments on Dewey's concept of logic on pp. 132-133. JRS

2739 Chin Lee, Grace. *Social Individualism: A Systematic Treatment of the Metaphysics of George Herbert Mead.* Dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1940.

2740 Cohen, Morris R. Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropomorphic Naturalism. Phil Rev 49.2 (March 1940): 196-228. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 379-410.

Philosophers interested in ontological issues are apt to be confused and disappointed by Dewey's "anthropocentric naturalism." His perspective is essentially that of a moralist, and he subordinates metaphysics to morals in a way that is "harmful to both." He is so concerned with emphasizing the "naturalness" of humanity that he often takes the converse path of explaining natural events in terms of the categories of human experience. He thus ignores the fact that both logic and knowledge are grounded in the antecedent existence of the physical world. Dewey's "Emersonian optimism" blinds him to the "inevitability of human suffering, defeat, death, and destruction." FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Nature in Experience" {2747}.

2741 Conger, George Perigo. *The Ideologies of Religion.* New York: Round Table Press, 1940.

Conger discusses the religious philosophies of William James, E. S. Ames, John Dewey, and E. W. Lyman in chap. 10, "Pragmatism." With respect to science, pragmatism is not a cosmic philosophy, but a "cosmetic" philosophy. Pragmatism is also mentioned in the chapters on naturalism and humanism. JRS

2742 Creed, Isabel P. The Justification of the Habit of Induction. J Phil 37.4 (15 Feb 1940): 85-97.

Creed comments on Reichenbach's *Experience and Prediction* {2642}. JRS

Notes

See Reichenbach, "On the Justification of Induction," J Phil 37.4 (15 Feb 1940): 97-103.

2743 Croce, Benedetto. Intorno all'estetica del Dewey. La Critica 38 (20 Nov 1940): 348-353.

This is a superb discussion of Dewey from the foremost Italian thinker of the twentieth century. In many ways, both Croce and Dewey traveled through similar philosophical regions while on the road to expressing their own mature philosophies. Like Dewey, Croce served an apprenticeship in Hegel, and after studying and rejecting Marx, he developed his own idealist position based upon these early studies. Croce began with aesthetics in the articulation of his philosophy, whereas the same is not the case for Dewey. What is more, Croce and Dewey were both philosophers present in the world during their careers, treating philosophy less as a cloistered academic concern and more as a vital participant in the daily problems of the world. EPC

2744 Cunningham, William F. *The Pivotal Problems of Education.* New York: Macmillan, 1940.

The subtitle is "An Introduction to the Christian Philosophy of Education." Dewey's philosophy is described in the section "Pragmatic Naturalism," pp. 37-39. JRS

2745 D'Andrea, A. Introduzione al pragmatismo. La Nuove Italia 19 (Oct 1940).

2746 Dewey, John. *Education Today.* Joseph Ratner, ed. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

Ratner supplies the "Foreword," pp. v-xiv, to this collection of previously published articles. JRS

Reviews

Theodore Brameld, New Republic 103 (1940): 877; Lester Denonn, Philosophic Abstracts 1 (Winter 1940): 5-6; W. H. Lemmel, School Executive 60 (1941): 31; Ephraim V. Sayers, Educational Trends 9 (March-April 1941): 34-35; David Snedden, School and Society 53 (1941): 578.

2747 Dewey, John. Nature in Experience. Phil Rev 49.2 (March 1940): 244-258. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 193-207. *LW* 14: 141-154.

Dewey replies to Morris Cohen's "Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropocentric Naturalism" {2740}, and William H. Hocking's "Dewey's Concepts of Experience and Nature" {2758}. Criticisms from Cohen and Hocking illustrate the problem inherent in viewing experience from the one-sided perspectives of empiricism and idealism. The new conception of experience, to the contrary, incorporates the advantages of both in an expanded circle. On the one side, the analysis of nature in fact requires the scientific findings of physics and biology. On the other side, we must realize that experience itself possesses the instrumentalities that "lead to the methods and conclusions of the natural sciences." This circle is not vicious, for it is historical and existential rather than dialectical. It explains how experience gives rise to science, and reciprocally, how science expands and enriches experience. Cohen's charge of anthropocentrism arises from confusing what is actually a functional account of experience with a cause and effect cosmology of the physical universe. Unlike the latter, the former has an important and inescapable link to morality. Hocking's confusion arises from the same source, albeit the opposite direction. He overlooks a genuine pragmatic sense of reality, wherein knowledge exercises the function of control over other materials. Objective idealism results when this experience-dependent "object of knowledge" is recast as an autonomous and independent absolute real. FXR

2748 Dewey, John. Presenting Thomas Jefferson. Introduction to *The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Alfred O. Mendel (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.; London: Cassell and Co., 1940), pp. 1-30. Extracts reprinted as "Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Faith," Virginia Quarterly Review 16 (Winter 1940): 1-13. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 201-223.

Reviews

E. M. Kirkpatrick, American Political Science Review 34 (Dec 1940): 1248-1249.

2749 Dewey, John. Review of Douglas C. Macintosh, *Social Religion.* Review of Religion 4 (March 1940): 359-361. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 286-288.

2750 Dewey, John. Time and Individuality. In *Time and Its Mysteries*, Series 2, ed. D. W. Hering (New York: New York University Press, 1940), pp. 85-109. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 98-114.

Reviews of *Time and Its Mysteries*

Ernest Nagel, J Phil 39.1 (1 Jan 1942): 22-24 [*Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 147-149]; James A. McWilliams, Thought 16 (1941): 387-388.

2751 Dewey, John. The Vanishing Subject in the Philosophy of William James. J Phil 37.22 (24 Oct 1940): 589-599. Reprinted in *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 396-409. *LW* 14: 155-167.

In his *Principles of Psychology* (1890), James commits himself to epistemological dualism. But in his analysis of particular topics, the self tends to vanish and become a "subject," an organism interacting with its environment. Even the spiritual self, consisting of acts and emotions, is interpreted biologically. IKS

2752 Feibleman, James K. Peirce's Phaneroscopy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1.2 (Dec 1940): 208-216.

2753 Feibleman, James K. *Positive Democracy.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940.

Reviews

Sidney Hook, J Phil 37.20 (26 Sept 1940): 557-559.

2754 Gabriel, Ralph Henry. *The Course of American Democratic Thought: An Intellectual History Since 1815.* New York: Ronald Press, 1940.

Chap. 22 is "The Creative Individual–The Pragmatism of William James," pp. 280-289. He retreated from Royce's "sophisticated collectivism" to a "primitive individualism reminiscent of the American frontier." He personified the best of American nationalism. IKS

Chapters 25 and 26 portray progressivism and humanism, making many references to John Dewey. Chap. 29 outlines "The Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes," whose "humanism was a mixture of pragmatism and idealism." (p. 394) JRS

2755 Gehlen, Arnold. *Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt.* Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1940.

Notes

Klaus Oehler states that this work was "the first large-scale application of pragmatic principles in German thought...it was born from the spirit of pragmatism" in his "Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 17.1 (Winter 1981): 25-35.

2756 Goudge, Thomas A. Peirce's Treatment of Induction. Philosophy of Science 7.1 (Jan 1940): 56-68.

Peirce's most significant contribution to philosophy is his study of the logic of induction. Peirce analyzed induction into three types: "crude," "quantitative," and "qualitative." Induction presupposes representative, independent, and random sampling, which

can be accomplished even for an indefinitely large class if this class has some "order." Induction also requires the "predesignation" of samples, which for science means that problems are solved, not by the haphazard collection of "facts," but by the empirical testing of relevant hypotheses. Peirce rejects previous attempts to justify induction, and offers his own: induction is a "self-corrective process" that "is a method of reaching conclusions, which, if it be persisted in long enough, will assuredly correct any error concerning future experience into which it may temporarily lead us." Peirce points out that the necessity of assuming order in the universe is no assumption, but fact, since the existing universe cannot be conceived as pure chaos. Three criticisms must be made. First, inconceivability is not proof; second, Peirce underestimates the difficulties in getting representative samples from indefinitely large classes; third, waiting for "the long run" does not help the investigator estimate the probability of generalizations. JRS

Notes

An abstract of an earlier reading of this paper is in J Phil 35.25 (8 Dec 1938): 688-689.

2757 Hill, Walker H. Peirce's "Pragmatic" Method. Philosophy of Science 7.2 (April 1940): 168-181.

2758 Hocking, William Ernest. Dewey's Concepts of Experience and Nature. Phil Rev 49.2 (March 1940): 228-244. Reprinted in *LW* 14: 411-426.

The "doublebarrelledness" of "subjectmatters" and "transformative thought" in Dewey's conception of experience is a good cutting edge against the supposed ultimate reality of sense-data, essences, or physical objects. Due to his preoccupation with the immediate, however, he fails to see that the ultimate ground of both thought and thing is the totality of reality itself: what continental philosophers call "pure experience" or "*Existenz*." With sufficient courage, Dewey would confess to an objective idealism, wherein the formal relations of thought are embedded in a full, concrete reality—a dialectical progression that is the ground of all experience. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Nature in Experience" {2747}.

2759 Hook, Sidney. *Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy.* New York: John Day, 1940. Reprinted with a new introduction, New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Reviews

Jacques Barzun, Saturday Review (11 Jan 1941): 15; Albert R. Chandler, Phil Rev 51 (1942): 427-432; John L. Childs, New Leader 24 (11 Jan 1941): 5, 7; Irwin Edman, New Republic 103 (1940): 762-764; Ralph T. Flewelling, Personalist 23.3 (July 1942): 305-306; Vivian J. McGill, J Phil 38.9 (24 April 1941): 243-249; Glenn Negley, Ethics 52 (1942): 386-387; Reinhold Niebuhr, "Marx Reconsidered," Nation 151.16 (19 Oct 1940): 370-371.

2760 Kessler, Hubert. *Basic Factors in the Growth of Mind and Self: Analysis and Reconstruction of G. H. Mead's Theory.* Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1940.

2761 Knickerbocker, William S. John Dewey. Sewanee Review 48 (Jan-March 1940): 119-137.

2762 Knode, Jay C. The Influence of John Dewey in Higher Education. New Mexico Quarterly Review 10 (1940): 17-29.

2763 Kraushaar, Otto F. Lotze's Influence on the Pragmatism and Practical Philosophy of William James. Journal of the History of Ideas 1.4 (Oct 1940): 439-458.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate Lotze's influence on James. James studied Lotze in two waves: the first, lasting into the 1890s, and the second (much weaker), to James's death. Lotze held that things are what they are known as, knowledge is instrumental, and the practical reason is primary. In practical philosophy, Lotze interpreted mechanism in teleological terms and emphasized individuality. IKS

2764 Lamprecht, Sterling P. Empiricism and Natural Knowledge. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, vol. 16, n. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 71-94.

Reviews

John D. Goheen, J Phil 39.4 (12 Feb 1942): 109-110.

2765 Lee, Otis. Instrumentalism and Action. J Phil 37.3 (1 Feb 1940): 57-75.

Notes

An abstract of an earlier version of this paper, "Pragmatism and Action," is in J Phil 35.25 (8 Dec 1938): 688.

2766 Leslie, Elmer A. John Dewey. In *Vocations and Professions*, ed. Philip Henry Lotz (New York: Association Press, 1940), pp. 63-72.

2767 Long, Marcus. *The Morphology of Knowledge: A Study in the Logical Theories of Hermann Lotze, Bernard Bosanquet, and John Dewey.* Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1940.

2768 Lynch, Jarmon A. Concerning the Emphasis on Methods. J Phil 37.10 (9 May 1940): 269-273.

Lynch examines the "new absolute" of method and context embodied in Dewey's philosophy. JRS

2769 Lynch, Jarmon A. A Criticism of Dewey's Theory of the Stimulus. Phil Rev 49.3 (May 1940): 356-360.

2770 Macintosh, Douglas Clyde. *The Problem of Religious Knowledge.* New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1940.

Chap. 6, "Philosophical Antecedents of Humanism," is devoted to an exposition of Dewey's pragmatism and anti-theistic humanism. Dewey's rejection of theism commits

the fallacy of the excluded middle: our total dependence on natural agencies is not the only alternative to our complete dependence on God, since God's work may require our cooperative use of natural agencies. Dewey's behavioristic conception of knowledge is compatible with the introspective contemplation of the object of knowledge. Dewey infers the non-existence of something from the lack of experience of it. His distaste for epistemology drove him into "an ambiguous no-man's-land in which reality is experience not experienced for the most part by any subject." Dewey realizes the desperation inherent in the device of interpreting experience in terms of biology in order to escape realism and idealism. His "immediate empiricism" fallaciously infers the object's dependence on consciousness from the object's relatedness to consciousness.

Chap. 18, "Religious Pragmatism," discusses A. J. Balfour, his influence on William James, and James's religious epistemology. James's "will to believe" mistakes postulation for verification and remains dualistic and agnostic; religion is more a matter of intuition that arbitrary will. The pragmatic views on religion of F. C. S. Schiller, J. E. Boodin, A. K. Rogers, E. W. Lyman, E. A. Cook, Henri Bois, and Macintosh himself (who confesses that he was far more pragmatic years ago) are briefly examined. JRS

2771 Macintosh, Douglas C. Responsibility, Freedom, and Causality; Or, The Dilemma of Determinism or Indeterminism. J Phil 37.2 (18 Jan 1940): 42-51.

2772 McRae, Robert. Criticism and Fixed Species. J Phil 37.11 (23 May 1940): 297-302.

McRae rejects Dewey's theory of aesthetic criticism on pp. 298-299. JRS

2773 Massa, C. *La filosofia di J. Dewey.* Lecce: Tip. Edited Salentina, 1940.

2774 Mendoza de Montero, A. *Lineas fundamentales de la filosofia de John Dewey.* Buenos Aires: 1940.

2775 Miller, David L. Two Kinds of Certainty. Philosophy of Science 7.1 (Jan 1940): 26-35.

Morris's theory of semiosis adequately encompasses the syntactical and semantical dimensions of signs (emphasized by logical positivists) and the pragmatical dimension of signs (emphasized by pragmatists). Their reconciliation requires a distinction between logical and practical certainty. JRS

2776 Montague, William P. *The Ways of Things: A Philosophy of Knowledge, Nature, and Value.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940.

Chap. 2, "Knowledge and the Ways of Knowing: Material Logic" contains two sections on pragmatism, pp. 43-44 and 48-49. Pragmatism is justifiable "only in so far as it expresses the attitude of ethical utilitarianism." (p. 49) Chap. 4, "Nature and the Ways of Being: Metaphysics of the Macrocosm," orients philosophies: James is placed midway between positivism and idealism, while Dewey is placed midway between positivism and materialism. (p. 81) Four other essays included in this bibliography are reprinted here: "The Story of American Realism," pp. 140-161 {2577}; "The Antimony and Its Implications for Logical Theory," pp. 223-248 {1918}; "The True, the Good, and the Beautiful

Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint," pp. 550-559 {29 April 1909}; and Montague's intellectual biography, "Confessions of an Animistic Materialist," pp. 648-675, reprinted from *Contemporary American Philosophy* {1930}. JRS

2777 Murphy, Frances Harder. *The Place of Moral Responsibility in the Philosophies of Whitehead and Peirce.* Dissertation, Brown University, 1940.

2778 Nagel, Ernest. Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 7.1 (Jan 1940): 69-80. Reprinted in *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 89-100.

While Peirce was a foe of positivism and engaged in metaphysics, his contributions to logic center on his empirically-oriented pragmatic definition of meaning, his critical common-sensist rejection of Cartesian doubt, and his non-sceptical fallibilism. Unlike logical positivism's reliance on observation predicates and statements, Peirce's pragmatism locates the intellectual meaning of concepts in "the concrete habits or tendencies to action to which their acceptance leads." Knowledge is thus the product of communal inquiry, and does not involve either "the preposterous requirement that the outcome of one inquiry be incorrigible by further inquiry" or "the conception that science must be grounded upon an indubitable apprehension of simple elements...all pre-manufactured and neatly packaged." JRS

2779 Otto, Max Carl. *The Human Enterprise: An Attempt to Relate Philosophy to Daily Life.* New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1940.

Reviews

John Dewey, J Phil 37.11 (23 May 1940): 303-305 [*LW* 14: 289-292].

2780 Padellaro, Nazareno. John Dewey. In *Il lavoro produttivo nella carte della scuola* (Messina: G. D'Anna, 1940), pp. 119-133.

2781 Ratner, Sidney, ed. *The Philosopher of the Common Man: Essays in Honor of John Dewey to Celebrate His Eightieth Birthday.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. Nagel's "Dewey's Reconstruction of Logical Theory" is reprinted in *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 118-140. Randall's "The Religion of Shared Experience" is reprinted in *Philosophy After Darwin*, ed. Beth J. Singer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 241-267. Dewey's "Creative Democracy–The Task Before Us" is reprinted in *LW* 14: 224-230.

This volume contains essays by Sidney Ratner, "Foreword," pp. 7-11, Horace M. Kallen, "Freedom and Education," pp. 15-32, Arthur E. Murphy, "Dewey's Theory of the Nature and Function of Philosophy," pp. 33-55, Ernest Nagel, "Dewey's Reconstruction of Logical Theory," pp. 56-86, Albert C. Barnes, "Method in Aesthetics," pp. 87-105, John Herman Randall Jr., "The Religion of Shared Experience," pp. 106-145, Walton Hamilton, "A Deweyesque Mosaic," pp. 146-171, Edwin W. Pattison, "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law," pp. 172-204, Hu Shih, "The Political Philosophy of Instrumentalism," pp. 205-219, and John Dewey, "Creative Democracy–The Task Before Us," pp. 220-228.

Arthur E. Murphy, "Dewey's Theory of the Nature and Function of Philosophy." Dewey's concern for the "problems of men" over "philosophers problems" has been interpreted as a call for the abandonment of speculative and theoretical matters in lieu of the urgent issues of modern life. But Dewey himself never disparaged theory or contemplation, and his "reference to the problems of men is to their philosophical problems." What he opposes are speculations so "far and high" as to have lost all contact with ordinary experience, for in fact they may be about nothing at all. Dewey's insistence upon context is, above all, a plea that meanings useful within one discourse not be indiscriminately applied to others to which they do not belong. FXR

Ernest Nagel, "Dewey's Reconstruction of Logical Theory." Dewey's goal is to construct an experimental logic capable of healing the long-standing rift between rationalism and empiricism by making "both concepts and facts elements in and instruments of intelligently controlled action." As such, logic and its specific theorems must be connected to open and public problem-solving activities. This concrete connection between sense and thought has in fact become widely accepted in mathematics, physics, and biology. Regrettably, however, Dewey himself has contributed "next to nothing" to the powerful new techniques of symbolic logic, and many logicians do not believe a theory of inquiry is integral to its progress. FXR

John Herman Randall Jr., "The Religion of Shared Experience." Dewey's entire conception of religion is Christian, Protestant, and American, well-focused on the problems of his times. The "controlling conception" of Dewey's philosophy is "communication," thus finding religion in the highest value, the pursuit of shared experience. Denominations and creeds are in this sense anti-religious because they are anti-community. To fit into Dewey's philosophy, "religion" should be taken as an adverb, as description of public action, and not as an adjective. The one unifying faith which Dewey proffers is a faith in "forceful and passionate intelligence." JRS

John Dewey, "Creative Democracy–The Task Before Us." The blessings of America that were once the "natural, almost inevitable product of fortunate conditions" must now "be won by conscious and deliberate effort." To do this, democracy must become a personal way of individual life, governed by a working faith in the possibilities of directed intelligence. FXR

Reviews

James H. Tufts, J Phil 37.12 (6 June 1940): 332-334.

2782 Russell, Bertrand. Warranted Assertibility. In *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: W. W. Norton, 1940), pp. 318-326. Reprinted in *John Dewey: Critical Assessments*, ed. J. E. Tiles (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), vol. 4, pp. 106-111.

We engage in inquiry to replace a vague and complex assertion with one that is simple and clear. This yields knowledge of the truth or falsity of events that, when acted upon, may provide benefits. Dewey omits both knowledge and truth. For him, the one viable outcome of inquiry is successful action; this generates not truth, but only warranted assertability. FXR

Notes

See Dewey's reply, "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," J Phil 38.7 (27 March 1941): 169-186 [*Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 331-353. *LW* 14: 168-188]. See also Russell, "John Dewey" in *A History of Western*

Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 819-828, reprinted in *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959*, ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), pp. 259-274. Russell further comments on Dewey in "Science and Values," in *The Impact of Science on Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 44-64. "Science and Values" is reprinted in *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959*, pp. 635-646.

2783 Sanders, William Joseph. The Logical Unity of John Dewey's Educational Philosophy. Ethics 50.4 (July 1940): 424-440.

2784 Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. *The Philosophy of George Santayana.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1940. 2nd ed., 1951.

Santayana discusses James in his "A General Confession," pp. 14-17, and pragmatism in the section "Pragmatist Propaganda," pp. 533-542, of "Apologia Pro Mente Sua." JRS

Reviews

John Dewey, Mind 50.4 (Oct 1941): 374-385 [*LW* 14: 295-308].

2785 Schuetz, Alfred. William James's Concept of the Stream of Thought, Phenomenologically Considered. J Phil 27.25 (5 Dec 1940): 673-674.

Notes

An abstract of a paper.

2786 Sears, Laurence, and Walter G. Muelder. *The Development of American Philosophy: A Book of Readings.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940.

Part 6, "Pragmatism and Critical Empiricism," contains the editors' Introduction and Bibliography on pp. 311-318, and offers selected writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey, together with a reprint of Mead's "The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in their American Setting" in {2110}, and portions of A. O. Lovejoy's "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" {568}. JRS

2787 Sisson, Edward O. Relation in Reality and Symbolism. Philosophy of Science 7.3 (July 1940): 342-354.

2788 Thomas, Wendell M. Reflections on Dewey's Philosophy. Journal of Adult Education 12 (1940): 23-25.

2789 Ulich, Robert. *Fundamentals of Democratic Education.* New York: American Book Co., 1940.

Reviews

Eduard C. Lindeman, Progressive Education 17 (1940): 573-576

2790 Ushenko, Andrew. Inquiry and Discourse. J Phil 37.18 (29 Aug 1940): 484-491.

Ushenko critically examines Dewey's *Logic* {2612}. Dewey has completely misinterpreted the theory of general propositions in formal logic, as "all-sentences" do not have intensional meaning. JRS

2791 Warner, Winifred. On John Dewey's Religious Views. Philosophic Mind 1 (1940) 37-39.

2792 Warren, William P. The Limits of Instrumentalism, or John Dewey's Replies to His Critics. Furman Bulletin 22 (1940): 41-54.

2793 Weiss, Paul. The Essence of Peirce's System. J Phil 37.10 (9 May 1940): 253-264.

Any attempt to reduce Peirce to status of a "major figure" of symbolic logic, the science of signs, positivism, empiricism, nominalism, or pragmatism is "mischievous and misconceived." Peirce was a true philosopher, who embraced diverse and seemingly contradictory views in search of the "rich and complex" unifying truth. His theories of metaphysics, logic, and science, all based on the three categories, reveal the deeply systematic character of his philosophy. JRS

Notes

An abstract of this paper is in J Phil 36.25 (7 Dec 1939): 683. See Buchler's comments, "The Accidents of Peirce's System" {2736}.

2794 Young, Kimball. *Personality and Problems of Adjustment.* New York: F. S. Crofts, 1940.

Reviews

Laurence Sears, J Phil 38.1 (2 Jan 1941): 26-27. Young's naturalistic theory of the origin of the self is "essentially that of G. H. Mead." JRS

Author Index

This index and the subject index is for the entries and does not encompass the introduction. It includes authors, editors, and translators, except "Anon," "Editor," and "Unknown." Numbers represent entry numbers. Suffixed letters give additional information as follows: "a" – mentioned in the entry's annotation; "e" – edited the entry; "i" – wrote an introduction or preface for the entry; "n" – mentioned in the "Notes" to the entry; "r" – reviewed the entry; "s" – summarized the entry; "t" – translated the entry.

A., E., 35s
Aakesson, Elof, 2343
Aars, Kristian B. R., 617, 656
Aaron, R. I., 2008r, 2023r, 2042r, 2046r
Abauzit, Frank, 90t, 745
Abbagnano, Nicola, 1708
Abel, Theodore, 2633r
Abraham, Leo, 2468
Ackerman, Phyllis, 1459
Acton, Harry Burrows, 2599
Adams, Elizabeth Kemper, 299
Adams, Eugene Taylor, 2344
Adams, George Plimpton, 1140, 1452r, 1572r, 1709-10, 1809r, 1813r, 2008, 2076, 2085e, 2096e, 2117e, 2170r, 2600
Adams, James Luther, 1842t
Adams, Mildred, 2127t
Addams, Jane, 746, 2110
Adickes, Erich, 16r
Adler, Mortimer Jerome, 1568n
Adlerblum, Nima Hirschensohn, 1402
Ainslie, Douglas, 645t
Ainsworth, A. R., 139r
Akeley, Lewis Ellsworth, 2345
Albee, Ernest, 279r, 300r, 1440r
Albeggiani, F., 1235
Alberini, Coriolana, 1894
Albertini, C., 747
Alden, Henry M., 438r
Aldrich, L. M., 49r
Aldrich, Virgil Charles, 2277
Alexander, Hartley Burr, 147, 1335r
Alexander, Samuel, 618, 1141, 1494r, 1564
Aliotta, Antonio, 619, 895, 1021, 1659, 1744, 2469
Allan, Denison Maurice, 2006r
Allcock, John B., 1169e
Allers, Rudolf, 2633r
Allport, Gordon Willard, 2720r
Ambrose, Alice, 2152
Amendola, Giovanni, 502, 896-7
Ames, Edward Scribner, 1400r, 1403, 2009, 2153
Ames, Van Meter, 1847, 2071, 2154, 2381r
Anderson, John, 1839n, 2295r
Anderson, Paul Russell, 2652e
Anderson, W., 2077
Andison, Mabelle Louise C., 907t
Andrus, Grace Mead, 140s, 148, 156n, 176s. *See also* De Laguna, Grace Andrus.
Angell, James Roland, 1, 103, 149, 389, 438r, 898, 1142, 2078, 2110
Angier, Roswell Parker, 1895, 2444r
Anschutz, R., 1745
Archibald, Warren S., 750
Ardigo, Roberto, 151
Armentrout, Winfield Dockery, 1761, 1897
Armstrong, Andrew Campbell, 16r, 504-5, 535r, 541r, 656n, 658r, 1021r, 1262r, 2076
Arndt, Ruth Spence, 2010
Arniaz, Marc, 391
Arnold, Felix, 389s
Aronson, Moses J., 2663r
Arréat, Lucien, 902
Ashley, Myron Lucius, 118
Assaglioli, R., 1236
Aubrey, Edwin Ewart, 2079, 2403n, 2653

Austin, Herbert D., 383t, 384t
Aveling, Francis, 1296
Axtelle, George Edward, 2011, 2471, 2611r, 2654
Ayres, Clarence Edwin, 1460-1, 1667r, 1711, 1809r, 2024r, 2027r, 2655, 2680r

Babbit, Irving, 2080
Bagley, William Chandler, 795r, 1297
Baillie, James Black, 2, 41r, 300, 334r
Baillie, John, 1953
Bain, Read, 2374n
Baines-Griffiths, David, 90r
Baker, Gertrude Q., 1274s
Baker, Rannie Belle, 2346
Bakewell, Charles Montague, 152, 215-6, 276r(2), 438r, 506, 1405, 2215
Baldini, P., 507
Baldwin, Bird T., 903
Baldwin, James Mark, 3, 42n, 65, 88e, 93-4, 153, 301, 392-3, 459n, 508-9, 623, 643n, 904-5, 1143, 1298, 1848
Balfour, Arthur James, 60
Balfour, G. W., 1144
Ballantine, William Gay, 2081
Ballou, Robert Oleson, 11e, 64e, 670e, 676e
Balthasar, Nicholas, 510
Balz, Albert George Adam, 1215r, 1696r
Banning, Andrew, 2357r
Barbour, George Freeland, 394
Barker, Henry, 490r
Barnes, Albert Coombs, 2683, 2781
Barnes, Harry Elmer, 2730
Baron, E., 624, 672r
Barr, Nann Clark, 1141s, 1292s
Barrett, Clifford L., 1352r, 2215e, 2219e, 2219e, 2235e, 2331n, 2353r, 2354r, 2612r
Barrett, William, 2731
Barron, Joseph T., 1660
Barthel, Ernest, 2157
Barzun, Jacques, 778e, 2759r
Bates, Ernest Sutherland, 2280, 2356r, 2678r
Baudin, E., 625, 675e
Baudouin, Charles, 1521
Baum, Maurice James, 1954, 2216, 2281, 2347, 2407
Baumann, Julius, 104
Baumgarten, Eduard, 2348, 2472, 2537, 2601
Bawden, Henry Heath, 77, 152r, 154-7, 197r, 200r, 302-3, 511, 751-2, 1462, 1522
Baylis, Charles Augustus, 2041r
Baym, Max I., 2538
Baynes, Helton Godwin, 1628e
Beach, Joseph Warren, 1849
Beach, Walter Greenwood, 2656
Beals, Charles Elmer, 395
Beard, Charles Austin, 1967e, 2126a, 2657, 2696
Beard, Mary R., 2657
Beath, Paul Robert, 1955
Beaunis, Henri Étienne, 248
Beck, Lewis White, 2658, 2732
Becker, Francis Bennet, 2730
Becker, Howard, 2730
Beer, Thomas, 1956
Bellonci, Goffredo, 217, 224n
Benedict, W. R., 105
Benjamin, Abram Cornelius, 1901r
Benn, Alfred William, 417r, 906
Benne, Kenneth D., 2637r, 2669r, 2733
Bennett, Charles Alpheus, 2082
Bentley, Arthur Fisher, 2217, 2408, 2659
Bentley, I. Madison, 98r, 149r, 304, 310r
Bergson, Henri, 78, 218, 753, 907, 1299, 1716n, 1746
Berkeley, Hastings, 1023
Berkson, Isaac B., 1899
Berle, Adolf Augustus, 79, 106
Berlin, I., 2356r
Berman, Iakov Aleksandrovich, 908
Bernard, L. L., 1773n, 1907r
Bertalan, Biro, 2012
Bertaud, Alfred, 719r
Berthelot, René, 512, 580a, 909, 1145, 1661
Bertier, G., 625e, 675e
Besse, Clément, 396
Besse, Gertrude L., 263s

Bethell, E. H., 1281n
Beyer, Thomas Percival, 1313r, 1358r
Bidney, David, 2681r
Bieganski, Wladyslaw, 754
Bierbower, Austin, 1024
Bierstedt, Robert, 2633r, 2678r, 2693r, 2720r
Billia, Lorenzo-Michelangelo, 397
Bingham, Alfred M., 2419r
Bingham, William E., 1387r
Bisbee, Eleanor, 2013, 2063r, 2349
Bishop, William Samuel, 90r
Bittner, C. J., 2158
Bixler, Julius Seelye, 1797-8, 1850, 2027r, 2083, 2218, 2350, 2660
Björkman, Edwin, 398, 513, 755
Blake, Ralph Mason, 1747, 1851
Blanchard, D. H., 24
Blanché, A., 753r
Blanche, F. A., 399, 400, 626
Blanshard, Brand, 1726r, 2661
Blau, Théodore, 2282
Bliven, Bruce, 2110r
Bloch, Werner, 1146
Blondel, Maurice, 305-6, 2539
Blundell, Alice, 910
Boardman, Rufus Norman, 1523
Boas, George, 1406, 2027r, 2159
Bode, Boyd Henry, 39s, 158r, 219-21, 307, 361r, 366r, 379, 514, 719r, 752r, 756-7, 790r, 889r, 911, 1025-7, 1041r, 1078r, 1147-9, 1237-9, 1255r, 1286r, 1350, 1407, 1420, 1463-5, 1612-3, 1662, 1900, 2014, 2027r, 2540, 2602, 2678r, 2687, 2693r
Bogardus, Emory S., 1907r
Bogholt, Carl, 2283
Bogoslavsky, Boris Basil, 1957
Böhm, Franz, 2603
Boirac, Émile, 1173e
Bois, Elie-Joseph, 1351
Boisse, Louis, 1150, 1240
Bolton, Frederick E., 2084
Bonatelli, Francesco, 61
Bonucci, Allesandro, 1241, 1408
Boodin, John Elof, 45, 158, 308-9, 401-3, 515-8, 627-8, 758-60, 912-6, 1028-30, 1151-4, 1242, 1300-3, 1352, 1466-8, 1565, 1614-8, 1799, 2015-6, 2085-6, 2160-2, 2219, 2351-4, 2541, 2604, 2662-3
Booth, Meyrick, 658t
Boring, Edwin G., 2017
Bornhausen, Karl, 761, 1155
Borrell, Phillipe, 404
Bosanquet, Bernard, 107, 118r, 375, 533r, 917, 1340, 1409, 1440r, 1619, 2439
Boughton, J. S., 2542
Bouglé, Célestin, 580a
Bourdeau, Jean, 351, 405-8, 629, 1031
Bourne, Randolph S., 1304, 1410-11
Boutroux, Émile, 409, 519-20, 762-3, 918, 1243, 1305
Bovet, Pierre, 672r, 764-5
Bower, William Clayton, 1800
Bowman, Archibald A., 519r
Bowne, Borden Parker, 766
Boyce Gibson, William Ralph, 80, 542t, 630, 658n
Boydston, Jo Ann, 2102t
Boyle, W. E., 2664
Bradley, Francis Herbert, 81-2, 108, 159, 410, 521, 631, 767, 919-20, 1244, 1663
Bradshaw, Marion John, 2605
Braham, Ernest G., 1852
Braithwaite, Richard Bevan, 1934e, 2133e, 2322r
Brameld, Theodore B., 2531r, 2646r, 2746r
Breed, Frederick Stephen, 2284, 2665
Bremond, Henri, 1748
Brett, George Sidney, 1620, 2444r
Brewster, John Monroe, 2473, 2633e
Bridel, Phillipe, 1156
Bridges, Ernest, 1425s
Bridgman, Percy Williams, 1901
Briggs, Thomas H., 2734
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, 1469, 1519, 1801, 1890e, 1908e, 1928e, 1930e, 1933e, 1939e, 1940e, 1944e, 2027r, 2087

Britton, Karl, 2442r, 2612r, 2666
Broad, Charlie Dunbar, 916r, 1000r, 1021r, 1160r, 1193r
Bromse, Heinrich, 16r
Bronstein, Daniel J., 2242r
Brooks, Van Wyck, 2735
Brotherstone, Bruce Wallace, 2285-6, 2381r, 2409, 2667
Brown, Francis Theodore, 160
Brown, George A., 1306, 1412
Brown, George P., 25
Brown, Harold Chapman, 632, 790r, 962r, 1245, 1359r, 1420, 1524, 2076
Brown, William, 1789e
Brown, William Adams, 411, 1070r, 1212r
Browne, Samuel Stanhope Stryker, 2088
Brownell, Baker, 2668
Brubacher, John Seiler, 2669
Bruce, Grace, 241s, 316s
Bruce, H. Addington, 768, 1246
Bruce, William French, 2220, 2284n
Brugmans, Henri J. F. Willem, 1157
Brumas, E., 633
Brunetière, Ferdinand, 266
Brunschvicg, Léon, 4, 223, 580a
Buchanan, Scott, 1914r, 2018
Buchler, Justus, 1836e, 2543, 2670-2, 2736, 2737e
Buckham, John Wright, 634, 2410, 2467n
Buehrer, Edwin Theophil, 2356r, 2419r, 2678r
Buermeyer, Laurence, 1566, 1819r, 2024r
Bugg, Eugene G., 2227r, 2295r, 2511r
Bulliot, J., 248
Bunge, C. O., 1307
Burckhardt, Rudolf, 412
Burkamp, Wilhelm, 1032, 2606
Burke, John Butler, 522
Burke, Kenneth, 2027r, 2356r, 2411, 2419r, 2444r, 2474, 2633r
Burkhardt, Frederick, 675e, 958e
Burnet, John, 598r
Burtt, Edwin Arthur, 1621, 1765, 2022, 2673
Busch, Karl August, 921-2
Bush, Wendell T., 222, 229r, 468r, 1158, 1335r, 1413, 1470, 1501r, 1583r, 1622, 1712, 1802, 2019, 2738
Bushnell, J. C., 1525
Butler, James Donald, 2287
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 523
Butterfield, Victor Lloyd, 2475
Byrns, Ruth, 2611r, 2678r, 2693r, 2720r

C., J., 11r
C., T., 2000r
Cahill, Holgar, 2716
Caldecott, A., 769
Calderoni, Mario, 62, 90t, 151t, 161, 224-8, 413, 635-6, 737-8, 887, 923, 1018e, 1471, 1749
Caldwell, Morley Albert, 524
Caldwell, William, 5, 9n, 26, 46, 540r, 1159
Calkins, Mary Whiton, 154r, 310, 860r, 1803, 2076
Calò, Giovanni, 229, 311, 414
Campa, Odoardo, 217n, 770, 1749e
Campbell, James, 47r, 99e, 540n, 2227n
Campbell, Paul E., 2221
Cantecor, Georges, 525
Cantine, H. R., Jr., 2519r
Cantoni, Carlo, 252r
Capek, Karl, 1472
Carnap, Rudolf, 2359n
Carpenter, Frederick Ives, 2020, 2674, 2737r
Carr, H. Wildon, 78t, 637, 1078r, 1159r, 1160, 1244r, 1260r, 1367t, 1809r, 2121r
Carus, Paul, 83, 517n, 526, 555n, 606n, 638-9, 656, 706n, 733n, 759n, 771-5, 912n, 924-5, 1033-6, 1161, 1289r, 1365n
Cary, C. P., 2222
Casagrande, Mario, 1526
Case, Mary Sophia, 423s, 1713
Cassirer, Ernst, 776
Castro, Matilde, 415

Cattell, James McKeen, 416, 541
Cavenagh, F. A., 2611r
Caviglione, Carlo, 777
Celi, G., 1037-8, 1162-3
Cesca, Giovanni, 417
Cestre, Charles, 2102t
Ceulemans, J. B., 1039
Chadwick, Cabell Wright, 230
Chadwick, Harold King, 1353
Chamberlain, John, 2097r, 2419r
Chambliss, J. J., 794e
Chandler, Albert Richard, 527, 2759r
Chao, Yuen R., 1311s
Chapman, John Jay, 16r, 778
Charles, Paul, 779
Chasman, I., 1463s, 1464s, 1549s
Chassell, Clara Frances, 1750
Chassell, Laura M., 1750
Chaumeix, André, 780-1
Chelpanov, Georgii Ivanovich, 782
Chesterton, Gilbert Keith, 783
Chevalier, Jacques, 2476
Chiappelli, Alessandro, 640, 784-5, 926, 1567
Chide, Alphonse, 528
Childs, John Lawrence, 2163, 2310, 2683, 2693r, 2720, 2759r
Chin, Y. L., 2241n
Chin Lee, Grace, 2739
Chiocchetti, Emilio, 786-7, 927, 1853
Chipman, W., 1040
Christie, R., 231
Church, C. Cecil, 1248s, 1293s
Cimmaruta, Mathilde, 1902
Claparède, Edouard, 248
Clapp, Elsie Ripley, 809r, 1854
Clark, Axton, 2076r, 2089
Clarke, Helen M., 601s, 626s, 721s
Clarke, Mary Evelyn, 1804, 2021
Cleage, D. G., 2356r
Clipper, Lawrence J., 783e
Clopton, Robert W., 1528e
Clugston, Herbert A., 2090
Cobb, Stanwood, 1958
Cockerell, T. D. A., 90r, 788, 928
Coe, George Albert, 90r, 529
Coffey, Peter, 1414
Cohen, Morris Raphael, 789, 1354, 1359r, 1527, 1568, 1708r, 1734e, 1805-6, 2076, 2164, 2249r, 2740
Colapietro, Vincent, 161n
Colella, E. Paul, 161n
Collingwood, Robin George, 1042t, 1701
Colman, George T., 845s, 878s, 881s
Columbia Associates in Philosophy, 1714
Colvin, Stephen Sheldon, 238a, 312-3, 379, 418, 929
Commins, W. D., 2223
Commons, John Rogers, 2355
Conger, George Perrigo, 1664, 1715, 1803r, 2288-9, 2741
Connor, Walter Thomas, 1355
Contri, Sirro, 2607
Cook, Ezra Albert, 641
Cooke, Flora J., 2483r
Cooke, Harold P., 2544-5
Cooley, William Forbes, 930, 1041, 1317r, 1450r, 2022
Coons, John Warren, 2290
Cornesse, Marie, 2291-2
Corrance, H. C., 549r
Coss, John, 2022e
Costello, Harry Todd, 1101r, 1326r, 1473, 1569, 1572r, 1646r, 1667r, 1700r, 1927r, 2076r, 2096r, 2381r
Cournos, John, 2511r
Cousins, Norman, 2678r
Couturat, Louis, 447n
Cowley, Malcolm, 2655e
Cox, Ignatius W., 642
Crane, Marion D., 1308s, 1312s, 1315s
Crawford, Claude C., 2608
Crawford, John Forsyth, 1623, 2071
Crawford, W. Rex, 2381r
Creed, Isabel Payson, 2742
Creighton, James Edwin, 5s, 109, 162, 301r, 314, 344r, 347r, 392s, 530, 643-4, 793r, 996r, 1358r
Crespi, Angelo, 419
Cresson, André, 1570
Crissman, Paul, 1959, 2091
Cristiani, Léon, 531
Croce, Benedetto, 645, 2743
Croiset, Alfred, 931

Crooks, Ezra B., 996r, 1164-5, 1807
Crozier, John Beattie, 84
Cubberly, Ellwood P., 1571
Cugini, Umberto, 1808
Cunningham, Gustavus Watts, 354s, 410s, 423s, 700r, 1442, 2041r, 2076, 2170r, 2224, 2675, 2720r, 2744
Curti, Merle, 2412
Cuvillier, Armand, 1169e

D., E. [Émile Duprat?], 752r, 792r, 860r, 1078r, 1145r
D., G., 1121r
Dakin, Arthur Hazard, 2676
Dallenbach, K. M., 1214n
D'Andrea, A., 2745
D'Arcy, Charles F., 1554
Dashiell, John Frederick, 1308
Dauriac, Lionel, 672r, 860r, 879r, 932-3, 958r, 1145r, 1209r
David, Maxime, 672t
Davidson, Thomas, 11r
Davies, Arthur, 420
Davis, H. T., 2191rr, 2244r
Davis, Robert A., 2090
Davis, Tenney L., 1356, 1415
Davy, Georges, 2381r
Dawson, Percy M., 2678r
Dearborn, George Van Ness, 2413
Dearborn, Ned H., 2683
DeBoer, John J., 2677
De Bussy, Izaak Jan le Cosquino, 646
DeGarmo, Charles, 32r
De Gaultier, Jules, 934
De Hovre, Franz, 2165
Delacroix, Henri, 110, 656n
De Laguna, Grace Andrus, 647, 790. *See also* Andrus, Grace Mead.
De Laguna, Theodore, 163, 790, 860r, 948r, 1244r, 1666r, 1941r, 2076
DeLargy, Percy Lee, 1960
De Laski, Edgar, 1470s, 1474s
Delattre, Floris, 1716, 1746e, 1751
Delbos, Victor, 791
Deledalle, Gerard, 2737r
Della Volpe, Galvano, 2166
Delle Piane, Arístides L., 1357
Demiashkevich, Michael John, 2414
Dennes, William Ray, 1752, 1961, 2023, 2415, 2600, 2612r
Denonn, Lester Eugene, 2720e, 2746r, 2782n
De Roberty, Eugène, 532
Derr, E. Z., 935
De Ruggiero, Guido, 1042, 2167
De Sailly, Bernard. *See* Blondel, Maurice.
De Selincourt, O., 1907r
Dessoir, Max, 1842e
Dessoulavy, C., 232
De Tonquébec, J., 533
Devine, Edward T., 2110r
Dewey, Alice Chipman, 1573
Dewey, Evelyn, 1313, 1573e
Dewey, Jane M., 2720
Dewey, John, 1a, 6-10, 19a, 27-30, 32i, 47-51, 52n, 76a, 78a, 85-9, 111-8, 139r, 164-8, 233-8, 279r(2), 315-9, 339r, 360r, 421-3, 534-41, 648-53, 696r, 719r, 744a, 792-800, 936-41, 944a, 1043-9, 1078r, 1121r, 1166-8, 1208a, 1245a, 1247-8, 1297n, 1309-13, 1319n, 1358-62, 1410a, 1416-20, 1458r, 1458n, 1474-6, 1481a, 1528-9, 1556a, 1572-3, 1624-5, 1665-71, 1717-22, 1732r, 1734r, 1753-6, 1809-14, 1855-62, 1864a, 1895a, 1903-8, 1910a, 1914a, 1962-70, 1980a, 2024-9, 2092-2103, 2110, 2164r, 2164n, 2168-70, 2191r, 2225-7, 2240n, 2244a, 2270n, 2293-8, 2310, 2356-64, 2381r, 2386r, 2403n, 2416-21, 2442r, 2444r, 2477-81, 2483a, 2511r, 2546-50, 2609-14, 2678-81, 2696, 2720, 2746-51, 2779r, 2781, 2782n, 2784r
Dhami, Sadhu S., 2551
D'Hautefeuille, François, 1757
Dickenson, Goldsworthy Lowes, 239
Dijk, Isaak Van, 942
Di Laghi, Giuseppina, 1758
Dix, Lester Hancil, 2299
Doan, Frank Carlton, 654-5
Dodd, L. W., 1314

Dodson, George Rowland, 705r
Doescher, Waldemar Oswald, 2682
Dolson, Grace Neal, 251r, 252r, 629r, 943
Dommeyer, Frederick Charles, 2552
Dorey, J. Milnor, 2022r
Döring, August, 656
Dotterer, Ray H, 1863, 2365
Douthat, Robert William, 424
Drake, Durant, 1050, 1315, 1363-4, 1421, 1815, 2076, 2300
Driscoll, John Thomas, 1249, 1316
Dubnau, Isadore, 2358r
Dubs, Homer H., 2615
Ducasse, Curt John, 2041r, 2076, 2321r, 2386r
Dufumier, Henri, 1051
Dumville, Benjamin, 944
Dunbar, Kenneth, 1344r
Dunham, Albert Millard, 2633e
Dunlap, Knight, 1052-3
Duprat, Émile, 425, 2104, 2444r
Durandeaud, E., 1764t
Durant, Will (William James), 1422, 1816, 1864
Durkheim, Émile, 1054, 1169
Dürr, Ernst, 656
Dykeman, K. J., 47r
Dykhuizen, George, 2422-3, 2553

Eames, Elizabeth Ramsden, 592n
Eastman, Max, 792r, 1055, 1123n, 1423, 2308r
Eastwood, Dorothy Margaret, 2482
Edel, Abraham, 47r, 2554, 2681r
Edman, Irwin, 1530, 1971-2, 2027r, 2030, 2356r, 2444r, 2555, 2612r, 2616, 2716, 2759r
Edwards, A. S., 850s
Edwards, Anna, 2483
Eggenschwyler, W., 1057-8
Egner, Robert Edward, 2720e, 2782n
Ehlers, Hugo, 2228
Eisler, Rudolf, 96t, 139t, 490t, 426
Eldridge, Seba, 1759
Elkus, Savilla Alice, 590r
Elliot, John Lovejoy, 2687
Elliot, William Yandell, 1909, 1973
Ellis, Havelock, 1723
Ellis, Matt Locke, 2301
Ellwood, Charles Abram, 540r, 1422r
Elsenhans, Theodore, 656
Engel, Emmanuel R., 1032s
Enriques, Federigo, 675r, 802, 945, 1059
Ensley, Francis G., 2617
Ericksen, Ephriam Edward, 2424
Erickson, Ralph W., 2556
Erskine, John, 1580r
Eshleman, Cyrus H., 618n, 657
Etzkorn, K. Peter, 1510e
Eucken, Rudolf Christoph, 427, 542, 658-9, 1060, 1170
Evans, Valmai Burwood, 2105
Everett, Katherine, 920s, 933s. *See also* Gilbert, Katherine E.
Everett, Walter Goodnow, 543r, 948r
Ewald, Oscar, 656, 660, 803, 1061
Ewer, Bernard C., 142r, 661
Ewing, Alfred Cyril, 1946, 2200

Fadiman, Clifton, 2679e
Faison, Samuel L., Jr., 2356r
Falco, Gian. *See* Papini, Giovanni.
Farges, Albert, 428
Faris, Ellsworth, 2123e, 2381r, 2557
Farley, J. H., 320, 1817
Farmer, Herbert H., 1809r
Farrell, James T., 2126n
Fauville, A., 1818
Fawcett, Edward Douglas, 662, 879r, 946, 1447n, 1477
Fawkes, Alfred, 1380r
Fay, Jay Wharton, 2684
Feibleman, James Kern, 2685-6, 2752-3
Feigl, Herbert, 1728e, 2378e, 2597r
Feldman, William Taft, 2366
Ferrari, G. M., 1171
Ferrari, Giulio Cesare, 32t, 62r, 90t, 151t, 804, 1062
Ferriere, Ad., 1063
Feuer, Lewis, 2334n, 2442r
Field, G. C., 1667r
Findlay, Joseph John, 1910r
Fink, Joseph L., 2367
Finnegan, J. F., 2171

Finney, Ross L., 2031
Fisch, Max Harold, 275n, 2652
Fisher, G. M., 331t
Fitch, Frederick B., 2635r
Fitch, Robert E., 2425, 2484
Fite, Warner, 46r, 59s, 76s, 119, 120, 321, 700r, 1250-1, 1400r, 1424, 1442r, 1547r, 1819, 1889r, 2076
Flaccus, Louis W., 1064
Flannery, M. Jay, 1365
Fletcher, John Gould, 2368
Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, 2618, 2759r
Flournoy, Théodore, 90r, 947, 1531
Foerster, Norman, 1172, 2302
Fogel, Philip H., 757r
Foley, George C., 1187a
Follett, Mary Parker, 1532
Foltz, Stewart P., 1065
Ford, Adelbert, 1815r
Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth, 1219a
Forsyth, Thomas M., 805
Forsythe, Robert, 2619
Foster, George Burman, 429
Foster, H. H., 809r
Foston, Hubert, 663
Fouillée, Alfred, 543, 948, 1173
Fouret, 1231r
Fox, Charles W., 1842t
Frank, Lawrence K., 1760
Frank, Waldo, 1865
Frankfurter, Felix, 1964e
Frasier, George Willard, 1761
Freeman, Eugene, 2369
Freeman, Frank N., 2027r, 2611r
French, F. C., 169r, 655r
Fries, Horace Snyder, 2370, 2558, 2612r
Friess, Horace Leland, 1557r, 1908n
Frigessi, Delia, 132e, 134e, 136e, 275e, 349e, 359e
Frings, Manfred S., 1216t, 1783t
Fullerton, George Stuart, 322, 430, 1174
Funk, Roger L., 1216t
Furry, William Davis, 299r

Gaines, Jeremy, 1169n
Galdi, M., 544
Galloway, George, 169, 480r, 630r, 891r, 1252
Gambs, John S., 2371
Gamertsfelder, Walter Sylvester, 1574, 2303
Gardeil, H. D., 2633r
Gardener, H. N., 300r, 545
Gardner, P., 90r
Garnett, Arthur Campbell, 2640r
Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald Marie, 431, 664
Garrison, Winfred Ernest, 2357r, 2511r
Garth, T. R., 1686s
Gass, Sherlock Bronson, 1575
Gates, Everett, 949
Gaultier, Paul, 950
Gaus, John M., 2024r
Gee, Wilson, 2026e
Gehlin, Arnold, 2755
Geiger, George Raymond, 1359r, 2720, 2726n
Geiger, Joseph Roy, 1366, 1820, 2071
Gentile, Giovanni, 170, 1367
George, Samuel S., 2688
Gerrard, Thomas John, 323
Gerrity, Benignus (Joseph T.) 2485
Getman, Arthur K., 2229
Gettys, Joseph Miller, 2620
Geyer, Denton Loring, 1253, 1425-6
Gifford, Asa Russell, 546
Gilbert, Katherine Everett, 1420r, 1478, 1529s, 1539t. *See also* Everett, Katherine.
Gillespie, C. M., 806
Gillio-Tos, Maria Teresa Viretto, 2621
Gillis, Adolf, 2486
Gillouin, René, 1175
Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, 1724
Ginzburg, Benjamin, 2095r
Girdler, John, 2304
Glicksman, Marjorie, 2622
Goddard, Harold C., 807
Goheen, John David, 2764r
Goldenweiser, Alexander A., 1903a
Goldscheid, Rudolf, 656
Goldstein, Julius, 675t, 808, 951, 1254
Goldwater, Robert J., 2356r
Good, H. G., 2483r

Goodsell, Willystine, 809
Gordon, George Angier, 1821
Gordon, Kate, 541, 2623
Gore, Willard Clark, 118, 139r, 185n, 324, 905r, 1119r, 1136r, 1359r
Gotshalk, Dilman Walter, 2035r, 2245r
Goudge, Thomas Anderson, 2426, 2487, 2559, 2670r, 2756
Gouinlock, James, 540n, 2227n
Graham, John T., 2127n
Graham, John W., 1257n
Granger, Frank, 542r, 952
Grant, Frederick C., 2357r
Grattan, Clinton Hartley, 2097r, 2230, 2444r, 2678r
Greene, Theodore M., 2661r
Gregory, Joshua C., 1021r
Grelling, M., 656
Griffin, Edward H., 32r, 1255
Gronau, Gotthard, 1533
Groos, Karl, 810, 2488
Gruen, William, 2612r, 2614r, 2678r
Gruenberg, Benjamin, 811
Grünewald, Max, 1822
Gutmann, James, 1017r, 1534
Grzybowski, W. I., 1066
Gullace, Giovanni, 228n
Gutberlet, Constantin, 547
Guterman, Norbert, 2357r
Gutmann, James, 1017r, 1534
Guyau, Augustin, 1176

H., C., 2249r
Haas, John A. W.,1317
Hackett, F., 1368
Hadamard, Jacques, 580a
Haggerty, M. E., 1245n
Hahn, Lewis Edwin, 2689
Halbert, Anna Evelyna, 1823
Haldane, Viscount Richard Burdon, 1866
Halévy, Elie, 580a
Hall, Everett Wesley, 1974, 2231-2, 2372, 2693r
Hall, Granville Stanley, 1067
Hall, Robert Sprague, 1824
Hall, Royal G., 1975
Halpern, J., 1068
Hamilton, Clarence Herbert, 1626
Hamilton, Walter H., 2716, 2781
Hammond, Albert L., 1762, 1825
Hammond, William A., 660t, 803t, 1061t
Han, Yü-Shan, 1976, 2032
Handschy, Harriet Wild, 1977
Hannay, A. Howard, 1042t
Hansen, Valdemar, 1672, 2444r, 2489
Harberts, William, 1177
Hardie, W. F. R., 1946
Harding, Thomas Swann, 2490
Harris, Leonard, 2431e
Harris, Marjorie Silliman, 1826
Harris, Pickens E., 2305
Harris, Sidney J., 2655n
Hart, Joseph Kinmont, 1809r, 1910, 1969r, 2033, 2611r, 2646r, 2680r
Hartshorne, Charles, 2034, 2191e, 2233, 2249e, 2306, 2321e, 2322e, 2373, 2386e, 2442e, 2561, 2640r, 2690, 2720r
Harvey, J. W., 2435t
Harvey, Thomas M., 2611r
Hastings, James, 1389e, 1784e, 1787e, 1791e
Havelock, Eric Alfred, 2680r
Hawes, Raymond P., 1381s
Hawtrey, Ralph, 548
Haydon, Albert Eustace, 1535, 2357r, 2427
Haynes, Rowland, 696r
Hazlitt, Henry, 2027r, 2028r, 2097r, 2230r, 2357r, 2419r
Heath, A. E., 1504r
Heaton, John L., 1281n
Hébert, Marcel, 549
Hedges, M. H., 1256, 1318
Heidbreder, Edna, 2307
Heidel, William Arthur, 59s, 118
Heller, Bernard, 1576
Hellpach, Willy, 2562
Hempel, Carl Gustav, 2672r
Henderson, Archibald, 918t
Henderson, Barbara, 918t
Henderson, Ernest N., 689r
Henderson, Harold, 272n, 526n

Henle, Robert J., 2366r, 2624
Henry, J., 948r, 1069
Henry, T. S., 1369
Herbst, C. A., 2511r
Hermant, Paul, 665
Hermes, Hans, 2625
Herrick, Charles Judson, 240, 2491
Herrick, Clarence Luther, 171, 812
Hibben, John Grier, 75r, 90r, 337r, 550, 672r
Hicks, George Dawes, 936r, 996r, 1309r, 1326r, 1352r, 1362r, 1371r, 1549s, 1554s, 2560
Hill, J. Arthur, 1257
Hill, Walker Hawes, 2626, 2691, 2757
Hillman, Owen N., 2234
Hinman, Edgar Lenderson, 588r, 1547r, 1592r
Hinsdale, Burke Aaron, 30r, 32r
Hirshensohn, Nima, 519r. *See also* Adlerblum, Nima.
Hobart, C. M., 1153s
Hobbs, Ewart William, 1577
Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney, 172
Hobson, Benjamin Lewis, 16r
Hocking, William Ernest, 325, 1070, 1173r, 1319, 1479, 1907r, 2035, 2076, 2106, 2563, 2758
Hodder. Alfred, 16r, 32r
Hodge, C. W., 11r
Hodges, George, 432
Hodgson, Shadworth, 953
Hoeck, Louis G., 551
Hoernlé, Reinhold Friedrich Alfred, 241, 339r, 360r, 444, 458r, 658r, 918r, 996r, 1121r, 1198r, 1359r, 1427, 1578, 1627, 1799r, 1867, 1911, 2022r, 2235, 2353r, 2354r
Höffding, Harald, 326, 1320, 1531a
Hofstadter, Albert, 2678r
Hoisington, Louis Benjamin, 1561r
Hollands, Edmund Howard, 327, 434s, 830r, 834t, 1176r, 1442
Holmes, Henry W., 2100
Holt, Edwin Bissell, 484s, 796a, 947t, 947r, 1071, 1321
Holt, Henry, 1258
Holtzman, H., 519i
Hood, Helen Gardner, 321s, 368s, 450s
Hook, Sidney, 1673, 1868, 1912-5, 2022, 2097r, 2107, 2170r, 2172, 2191r, 2295r, 2308, 2310r, 2364e, 2381r, 2428-9, 2431e, 2444r, 2511r, 2692-3, 2701r, 2753r, 2759
Hope, Richard, 2057r, 2060r
Hopkins, Louis J., 2627
Horne, Herman Harrell, 552, 1072, 1916, 2028r, 2173, 2236
Horton, Walter Marshall, 2108
Hough, Williston Samuel, 542t
House, Floyd Nelson, 2374, 2492
Howard, Delton Thomas, 1343s, 1346s, 1370, 1388s, 1452r, 1480, 1536-7, 2694
Howison, George Holmes, 63, 1371
Hsiao, K. C., 1917
Hu, Suh, 1341s
Hubback, F. W., 675r
Hudson, Jay William, 33r, 813, 1070r
Huebsch, Arthur, 2109
Hughes, M. L. V., 910r
Hughes, Percy, 158r, 2493-4
Huizinga, Arnold van Couthen Piccardt, 666, 954
Hull, Richard Francis Carrington, 1628e
Hull, Robert L., 1918
Hullfish, Henry Gordon, 2237, 2356r
Hume, James Gibson, 667, 1674
Humphrey, Richard, 1652n
Humphreys, John Wesley, 1978
Huneker, James Gibbons, 503a, 1178
Husik, Isaac, 2695
Hutchinson, Robert H., 1313r
Huxley, Julian Sorell, 2395
Hyde, Winifred, 427r, 955

Inge, William Ralph, 433, 668, 1763
Itelson, 248n, 656

Jaccard, Benjamin E., 2036
Jacks, Lawrence Pearsall, 434, 956, 1212r, 1580r
Jacobs, Norman, 2564
Jacobson, Edmund, 814

Jacobsson, Malte, 815
Jacoby, Günther, 438r, 669, 1073-7, 1078r
Jakowenko, Boris, 656
James, Henry (son), 957e, 1580e
James, William, 11-13, 16n, 31-2, 64-5, 80r, 90, 93, 96r, 121-3, 139r, 173-80, 194a, 205a, 242-50, 328-32, 350a, 435-43, 548n, 549r, 553-8, 592n, 670-6, 733n, 816-21, 957-8, 965a, 1078, 1405, 1579-80, 1764, 1821a, 1827, 1850a, 1919, 2281a, 2444a, 2585a
James, William, Jr., 947e
Jankélévitch, S., 490t
Jannsens, Edgar, 90r
Jarrett, James Louis, 2378e
Jastrow, Joseph, 91, 959, 1079, 1372, 1809r
Jeannière, René, 690s, 822
Jerome, Thomas S., 596n
Jerusalem, Wilhelm, 33, 251-2, 438t, 559, 656, 669r, 823, 1179, 1675
Jessop, Thomas Edmund, 2435t, 2633r
Jevons, Frank Byron, 139r
Joachim, Harold Henry, 333, 714a, 1604
Joad, Cyril Edwin Mitchinson, 1740, 1765, 1809r(2), 2027r, 2495
Joas, Hans, 1169n
Johnson, Francis Howe, 960
Johnson, William Hallock, 369r, 560
Johnston, G. A., 1344r
Jolivet, Régîs, 2496
Jones, A. H., 528s
Jones, Adam Leroy, 223r
Jones, Emily Elizabeth Constance, 1340
Jones, Henry, 124, 334, 499r
Jones, William Tudor, 1060t
Jordan, David Starr, 961
Jordan, Edward Benedict, 2165t
Jordan, Elijah, 565s, 929s, 936s, 1026r, 1082t, 1442
Joseph, Horace William Brindley, 253
Jourdain, Eleanor Frances, 962
Jourdain, M., 1580r
Jourdain, Philip Edward Bertrand, 1059r, 1373
Judd, Charles Hubbard, 254, 438r, 677
Jung, Carl Gustav, 1628
Juvalta, Erminio, 62r

κ, 434r, 935r, 954r, 969r, 1078r
K., H., 2317r
Kafka, Gustav, 2497
Kaftan, Julius, 16r
Kagey, Rudolf, 2174
Kallen, Horace Meyer, 535r, 541r, 561-2, 678-9, 824-6, 852r, 918r, 947r, 963, 996r, 1017r, 1080, 1180-1, 1209r, 1259-60, 1359r, 1374, 1420, 1428, 1572r, 1629, 1667r, 1676, 1766, 1827e, 1920, 1966e, 2027r, 2037, 2111-2, 2238, 2309, 2375, 2419r, 2428e, 2431e, 2565, 2628, 2687, 2692n, 2781
Kallen, John J., 1481
Kaltenbach, Jacques, 827
Kaltenborn, Hans von, 445
Kandel, Isaac Leon, 1767e, 2038, 2110
Kanovitch, Abraham, 1677
Kantor, Jacob Robert, 947r, 1334r, 1538, 1628r, 2381r
Kantorovich, Haim, 1768
Karmin, Otto, 656
Katuin, Gerald A., 1581
Katuna, Arthur, 2611r
Kaufmann, Felix, 2612r
Kaul, Vishwanath, 1979
Kayden, Eugene Mark, 1969r
Keane, W. M., 828
Keliher, Alice, 2163r
Keller, Adolf, 1081
Kennard, G. V., 2680r
Kennedy, Gail, 2172e, 2430
Kennedy, W. B., 2430
Kenny, Michael, 1864r
Kent, John B., 627s, 640s
Kerby-Miller, Sinclair, 1630
Kern, Berthold, 829
Kernan, Fergus, 1390
Kessler, Hubert, 2760
Ketchum, Roland, 2486
Ketner, Kenneth Laine, 18e, 93n
Keyser, Cassius Jackson, 2322r, 2697

Kiefl, Franz Xavier, 1582
Kiesow, Friedrich, 32t
Killeen, Mary Vincent, 2376
Kilpatrick, William Heard, 32i, 1182, 2110, 2310, 2540n, 2687, 2696, 2698, 2720
King, Irving, 125, 255, 519r, 830, 1358r
Kirkpatrick, E. M., 2748r
Kleinpeter, H., 831
Kling, Carlos, 2239
Kloesel, Christian J. W., 275n
Klubertanz, George Peter, 2699
Klyce, Scudder, 1980
Kneale, William Calvert, 2612r
Knickerbocker, William S., 2761
Knight, A. Rex, 2175, 2200
Knight, Frank Hyneman, 1270s, 2498, 2681r
Knode, Jay C., 2762
Knox, Howard Vicenté, 680, 689r, 705r, 957r, 1109r, 1146r, 1183, 1209r, 1261, 1580r, 1678r, 1981, 2113
Knudson, Albert Cornelius, 1921, 2566
Koch, Donald F., 7e, 47e
Koekebakker, Willem, 126
Kohler, Wolfgang, 2629
Kohn, Helmut, 1855r
Koons, William George, 127
Kortsen, Kort K., 1482
Korzybski, Alfred, 2311
Kotliarevskii, S., 832
Kozlowski, W. M., 656
Krakowski, Edouard, 2312
Kraushaar, Otto F., 2499, 2630, 2700, 2763
Kremer, René, 1583
Krikorian, Yervant Hovhannes, 1922
Kunitz, Stanley J., 2313
Kuypers, Mary, 1910r, 1969r
Kvitko, David Iur'evich, 2500

L., Th., 833
Laberthonnière, Lucien, 580a
Labeyrie, Cyrille, 446
Ladd, George Trumbull, 672r, 681-2, 1135r, 1184, 1262, 1322
Ladd-Franklin, Christine, 1375
Lafferty, Theodore Thomas, 2039, 2176, 2240, 2255r
Laing, Bertram Mitchell, 1741n, 2170r
Laird, John, 1326r, 1809r, 2114, 2501, 2612r, 2633r, 2640r, 2670r, 2701r, 2720r, 2721r, 2737r
Lalande, André, 335-6, 447, 563, 580a, 672r, 675r, 834, 916r, 964, 1082-3, 1185, 1323, 1539
Lamont, Corliss, 2357r, 2377, 2502, 2567
La Monte, Robert Rives, 1231r
Lamprecht, Sterling Power, 1584, 1609r, 1725, 1763r, 1770, 1788r, 1792r, 1869, 2115, 2184r, 2501r, 2643r, 2720r, 2764
Lane, Albert C., 965
Lang, Sidney Edward, 337
Lange, Hermann, 438r
Langer, Susanne Katherina Knauth, 2040
Langford, Cooper Harold, 2242
Langley, George H., 889r
Lanier, Lyle H., 2612r
Lapan, Arthur, 2503
Larrabee, Harold Atkins, 1864r, 2116, 2230r, 2383r, 2394r, 2428r, 2431r, 2572r, 2600r, 2633r, 2634r, 2640r, 2652r, 2676r
Laski, Harold J., 1376
Latta, R., 564, 1440r
Laune, Ferris, 2123e
Leander, Folke, 2568-9, 2701
Léard, H., 139r
Leary, Daniel Bell, 1767
Le Boutillier, Cornelia Geer, 2504
Le Breton, Maurice, 1746e, 1751e, 1982
Le Brun, E., 438t, 907t
Leclerc, Max, 580a
Leclère, Albert, 683
Lee, Otis Hamilton, 2765
Lee, Vernon. *See* Paget, Violet.
Lefevre, Albert, 11r
Legond, J., 139r
Legrand, Georges, 1186
Lehmann, E., 326t
Lehmann, Gerhard, 2601r
Leidecker, Kurt F., 2611r

Leighton, Joseph Alexander, 144r, 181, 203r, 338, 836, 1187, 1475r, 1492r, 1726, 2076, 2663r
Lemaire, J., 1086
Lemmel, W. H., 2746r
Léo, Albert, 837
Léon, Xavier, 2102n
Leonard, Henry S., 2442r
Lepley, Ray, 2702
Leroux, Emmanuel, 1540, 1678, 1870, 2102n
Le Roy, Édouard, 35, 66-7
Lersch, Philipp, 2505
Leslie, Elmer A., 2766
Leuba, James, 68-9, 182, 1087, 1324, 1771
Levi, Adolfo, 966
Levi, Allesandro, 217n, 448
Levy, Beryl Harold, 2309r
Lewis, Clarence Irving, 838, 1088-9, 1188-90, 1263-5, 1325, 1377, 1429, 1483-4, 1585, 1631, 1679-80, 1727-80, 1727-9, 1734r, 1828, 1871-2, 1923, 1983, 2041, 2117-9, 2241-2, 2314, 2338n, 2378-9, 2506-8, 2703
Lewis, Edwin Herbert, 2509
Lewkowitz, Albert, 1730
Liebendorfer, Robert, 2381r
Lillie, Ralph Stayner, 1312a
Lin, J. Reese, 797s, 859s
Lind, Levi Robert, 1955n
Lindeman, Eduard C., 2381r, 2611r, 2612r, 2683, 2789r
Lindsay, Alexander Dunlop. 256, 578r, 829r, 958r, 1840
Lindsay, James, 44n, 672r, 675r, 1430, 1485, 1541
Linville, Henry R., 2110
Lippman, Walter, 839, 1231n, 1358r
Lipps, Hans, 2570
Lipps, Theodor, 248n
Littel, P., 1580r
Lloyd, Alfred Henry, 257, 449, 565, 840, 1191, 1431-2, 1494r, 1542-3, 1924
Locke, Alain, 2431
Lodge, Rupert Clendon, 1486, 2571-2, 2631
Loewenberg, Jacob, 1378, 1834r, 2042, 2076, 2120, 2600
Loewenberg, Kate, 1101t
Logan, J. D., 92
Lombardo Radice, Giuseppi, 1925
Lombroso, Cesare, 62r
Long, Marcus, 2767
Long, Wilbur Harry, 1926, 2435r, 2573, 2633r
Lorenz-Ightham, Theodor, 40t, 566, 684
Louïs-Léda, 675r, 705r
Loveday, Thomas, 347r
Lovejoy, Arthur Oncken, 339r, 360r, 540r, 567-8, 685, 790r, 967, 1090-1, 1192, 1260r, 1586-7, 1681-2, 1772, 2076, 2121, 2186n
Lovett, Robert Morss, 1907r
Lowie, Robert H., 968
Lyman, Eugene William, 339, 841, 2315
Lynch, Jarmon Alvis, 2177, 2704, 2768-9

μ, 11r, 90r
M., J., 879r
M., S. G., 2300r
McAndrew, William, 2022r, 2295r, 2357r
McAuliffe, Agnes Teresa, 2445
MacBride, Ernest William, 2395
McCadden, Helen M., 2043
McCallister, W. J., 2178
McCaskill, Agnes, 1021t
McClintock, James Alfred, 2380
McClure, Matthew Thompson, 1094, 1352r, 1487, 1829, 1882r
McClusky, Howard Y., 2483r
McComas, H. C., 1379
McConnell, Francis John, 2254n
McCormack, Thomas Joseph, 16r, 30r, 32r
McDermott, John Joseph, 591e, 709e, 1389e
MacDonald, Loren Benjamin, 969
MacDonald, M. S., 87s
MacDonald, Margaret, 2432, 2670r

McDougall, William, 149r, 842, 970, 1261r, 1773
Mace, Cecil Alec, 2200, 2261n, 2263n
MacEachran, John M., 843, 1683
McGiffert, Arthur Cushman, 844
McGill, Vivian Jerauld, 575n, 2603r, 2606r, 2705, 2759r
McGilvary, Evander Bradley, 450-3, 540r, 569-70, 592r, 672r, 686, 710s, 971-3, 1095-7, 1116r, 1326r, 1370r, 1684, 2076, 2244r, 2316, 2706-7
Macintosh, Douglas Clyde, 668r, 793r, 845-6, 1098, 1326, 1815r, 1830, 2161e, 2179-80, 2294n, 2770-1
McIntyre, J. L., 251r, 252r, 1042r
McIver, Robert M., 1281n
Mackay, Donald Sage, 1829r, 1984, 2243, 2600
Mackenzie, John Stuart, 300r, 333r, 454, 499r, 732r, 1244r, 1433
Mackie, A., 380r
McKie, J. I., 2632
McLellan, James Alexander, 19a
MacLennan, Simon Fraser, 118, 128, 183
McManis, John T., 1297n
Macmillan, M. T., 1266
MacMurray, John, 1927, 2264
McMurrin, Sterling M., 2378e
McNutt, Walter Scott, 1685, 1831
McRae, Robert, 2772
McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 96r, 259, 438r
McWilliams, James A., 2574, 2750r
Macy, John, 1580r
Maddox, William A., 1767
Mahan, W. B., 1973r
Maire, Gilbert, 2317
Maitra, Shishirkumar, 607t
Major, David R., 2318
Malherbe, Ernst Gideon, 2360e
Malik, Charles, 2369r, 2386r
Malisoff, William Marias, 2681r
Mallet, F., 340
Mally, E., 656a
Manny, Frank Addison, 540r, 652r, 1358r, 1434
March, John Lewis, 1049n
Marchesini, Giovanni, 258
Marcuse, Hebert, 2681r
Marett, Robert Ranulph, 2575
Margenau, Henry, 2614r
Margreth, Jacob, 687
Marhenke, Paul, 2510, 2600
Maritain, Jacques, 1632
Marron, William R. A., 184
Marshall, Henry Rutgers, 36, 70, 847, 1092, 1488
Martin, Mattie Alexander, 237s, 288s, 307s, 481s
Marty, Henri, 957t, 1243t
Marvin, Francis Sydney, 2181
Marvin, Walter Taylor, 274r, 540r, 607r, 1071, 1187, 1193, 1435
Masci, Filippo, 1093
Mason, Alfred C., 1320t
Massa, C., 2773
Massis, Henri, 1267
Masson, Charles, 1832
Mather, Frank Jewitt, Jr., 2444r
Mathews, Shailer, 1623e, 1633e, 1657e
Matthews, W. R., 1333r
Maurice-Denis, Noele, 1588
Maurois, André, 2097r
Mauss, Marcel, 1169n, 2102n
Mauthner, Fritz, 848
Mavit, Henry, 2708
Mayhew, Katherine, 2483
Mead, George Herbert, 14, 37, 52, 71, 129, 185-6, 260, 341-2, 455-6, 571-2, 688, 849-51, 974-5, 1099, 1194, 1327-8, 1420, 1436, 1489-91, 1544, 1633, 1686, 1731, 1774, 1833, 1873, 1928, 2022, 2044-2046, 2110, 2122-3, 2182, 2244, 2381, 2433, 2511, 2633
Mead, Henry C. A., 2633
Mearns, Hughes, 2196r
Mecklin, John M., 1634
Meecham, H. G., 2434
Meiklejohn, Alexander, 2124
Meiklejohn, Donald Waldron, 2512
Meland, Bernard Eugene, 2534
Mellone, Sydney H., 196r, 261, 434r

Mellor, David Hugh, 1934e, 2133e
Melville, F. H., 274r
Melvin, A. Gordon, 2310r
Melvin, Georgiana, 2576
Ménard, Alphonse, 852-3
Mendel, Alfred O., 2748e
Mendoza de Montero, A., 2774
Mentré, Françoise, 457, 852r
Menzel, Theophil, 1658t
Mercier, Charles Arthur, 1280a, 1393n, 1503a
Merriam, Charles Edward, 2678r
Merrill, William Stetson, 2041r
Merrington, Ernest Northcroft, 1380, 2709
Merton, Robert King, 2381r, 2633r
Merz, John Theodore, 1100
Mesnard, Pierre, 336n
Metz, Rudolf, 2249r, 2435, 2601r, 2640r
Metzger, D., 225n
Metzger, Wilhelm, 675r
Meyer, Adolfe E., 2183, 2710
Meyer, B. Ethel, 1119t, 1136t
Meyer, Heinrich, 2245r
Meyer, Max, 438r, 573
Meyers, A. J. W., 2611r
Meyerson, Émile, 1101
Meyerson, Frank, 2408r
Miceli, R., 2720r
Michaud, E., 90r
Michel, Virgil George, 1907r, 1910r, 1969r, 1985, 2094r, 2110r
Milhaud, Gaston S., 15, 854
Miller, Clyde R., 2047e
Miller, David L., 2633e, 2775
Miller, Dickinson Sergeant, 16, 38-9, 541, 855, 918r, 957r, 958r, 996r, 1635, 1850r, 1929, 1986, 2513
Miller, Hugh, 2041r, 2271r
Miller, Irving Edgar, 540r, 689
Miller, Randolf C., 2514
Miner, J. B., 689r
Minot, Charles Sedgwick, 976
Mitchell, A. W., 675r
Mitchell, Arthur, 900a, 947r, 1027a, 1437
Mitchell, F. D., 212r, 241s, 261s, 368s, 457r
Mitchell, William, 458
Moisant, Xavier, 629r
Molina, Enrique, 856
Molloy, M., 510s
Monroe, Paul, 937e
Monster, C., 326t
Montague, William Pepperell, 262, 690-1, 744a, 817n, 857, 958r, 1492, 1834, 2076, 2085e, 2096e, 2117e, 2121r, 2577, 2776
Montgomery, Annie D., 120s, 138s
Montgomery, George R, 858
Moore, Addison Webster, 1n, 17, 30r, 53, 118, 130, 139r, 152r, 188-9, 197r, 263, 279r(2), 279n, 301r, 339r, 343, 360r, 459-60, 532r, 574, 669r, 692-3, 705r, 719r(2), 859-60, 909r, 977, 1102-4, 1195, 1260r, 1268, 1329, 1358r, 1420, 1438, 1475r, 1479r, 1493, 1578r, 1589, 1687, 1930
Moore, Edward Caldwell, 1105
Moore, Ernest Carroll, 1313r, 1358r, 2110
Moore, George Edward, 94, 187, 279r, 575, 861
Moore, Harry E., 2578
Moore, Henry T., 1470s, 1476s, 1505s, 1581s, 1591s, 1603s
Moore, Jared Sparks, 857n, 1196, 1519n
Moore, John Morrison, 2634
Moore, Merritt Hadden, 2436, 2511e
Moore, Thomas Vernor, 649
Moore, Vida F., 4s
More, Paul Elmer, 695, 1688
Morehouse, Frederic C., 1187a
Morgan, C. Lloyd., 1874
Morgan, F. Grover, 1106
Morgan, Joy Elmer, 2048
Morgan, William Joseph, 1636, 1875, 1987
Morgenbesser, Sidney, 2712n
Morrill, Edith H., 570s, 612s
Morris, Bertram Jasper, 576
Morris, C. R., 1809r

Morris, Charles William, 1705r, 1931, 1961r, 1984r, 1988-9, 1993r, 2008r, 2023r, 2042r, 2046r, 2071, 2076, 2125, 2245-6, 2381e, 2382-4, 2392r, 2437-8, 2515-6, 2527n, 2579, 2633e, 2635-6, 2696
Morris, Frank E., 2215r, 2219r, 2235r
Morrison, Bakewell, 2227r
Morrison, Charles Clayton, 2294n, 2517, 2580
Morrison, David, 276r(2)
Morrow, Glenn Raymond, 1535r, 2381r
Moulton, F. R., 2678r
Muelder, Walter George, 2786e
Muir, Matthew Moncrieff Pattison, 960r, 978, 1107
Muirhead, John Henry, 90r, 519r, 718, 979-80, 1554, 1763e, 1792e, 1876, 1990, 2027r, 2184, 2191r, 2435e, 2439
Mukerji, N. C., 1197
Müller, Ernst, 1108
Müller, Gustav Emil, 2185, 2518
Muller, Tobias Ballot, 1198
Müller-Freienfels, Richard, 577, 672r, 675r, 981, 1199
Mumford, Lewis, 1877, 1906n, 2126
Munro, Thomas, 1689
Munro, William Bennett, 1907r
Münsterberg, Hugo, 344, 461, 696-7
Murchinson, Carl Allenmore, 153n, 1942e, 2078e, 2093e
Murphy, Arthur Edward, 1878, 1932, 2049, 2186-7, 2244e, 2247, 2366r, 2381r, 2392r, 2408r, 2415r, 2443r, 2452r, 2503r, 2511r, 2571r, 2584r, 2593r, 2598r, 2650r, 2683, 2711, 2720, 2781
Murphy, C., 700r
Murphy, Frances Harder, 2777
Murphy, Gardner, 11e, 64e, 670e, 676e, 2050
Murray, David Leslie, 33r, 698, 860r, 1000n, 1109, 1879
Murray, Elsie, 310s
Muscio, Bernard, 645r, 1159r, 1200
Muzzey, David Saville, 591r
Nagel, Ernest, 2051, 2188, 2319, 2322r, 2369r, 2386r, 2442r, 2460r, 2579r, 2614r, 2635r, 2642r, 2712, 2737r, 2750r, 2778, 2781
Nash, J. V., 1775
Nathanson, Jerome, 2612r
Naumberg, Margaret, 1991, 2052
Negley, Glenn, 2759r
Neilson, William Allan, 462
Nelson, Charles H., 2663n
Nelson, Leonard, 578, 656
Nelson, Sven, 2295r
Neumann, Henry, 1776, 1907r
Neurath, Otto, 438r
Nève, Paul, 1110
Newhall, Jannette Elthina, 2189, 2713
Newlin, William Jesse, 1159r
Newlon, Jesse Homer, 2110, 2299
Nichols, Herbert, 345, 463, 1690
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 2357r, 2419r, 2759r
Nield, Jonathan, 519t
Nilson, Sven, 2135r
Noble, John H., 190
Noël, Léon, 464, 699, 862, 982
Nofsinger, Stephen Alan, 27e
Norero, H., 90r, 346
Norris, Orlando O., 2190
Norton, Edwin, 118r
Nota, John Hille, 1216n
Nunn, Thomas Percy, 347, 880

O'Connell, Geoffrey, 2637
O'Connor, William P., 2445
Oehler, Klaus, 656n, 2755n
Oesterreich, Konstantin, 90r
Offner, M., 32r
Ogburn, William Fielding, 1903e
Ogden, Charles Kay, 1017t, 1732, 2440, 2638
Ogden, Robert Morris, 321s, 421s, 453s, 852r, 918r
O'Hara, James Henry, 2053
O'Keefe, D., 1111
Olin, Doris, 477e, 575e, 575n, 592e
Oltramare, Hugo, 1112
Oppenheim, James, 1411e
Ormond, Alexander Thomas, 348

Ortega y Gasset, José, 2127
O'Shea, Michael Vincent, 19n
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 90r, 438r
O'Sullivan, John Marcus, 700
Otto, Max Carl, 1359r, 1420r, 1733, 1776r, 1777, 1866r, 1880-1, 1992, 2027r, 2128, 2244r, 2357r, 2385, 2441, 2581-2, 2701r, 2714, 2718r, 2779
Ou, Tsuin-chen, 1528t
Overstreet, Harry Allen, 276r, 322r, 484s, 535r, 541r, 662r, 961r, 1475r, 1492r
Owen, Roberts Bishop, 1545

Padellaro, Nazereno, 2780
Paetz, W., 466
Page, Kirby, 1963e
Paget, Violet, 34, 835, 1084-5
Paine, E. T., 1057s, 1118r
Palante, Georges, 983
Palhoriès, Fortuné, 1201
Palmer, George Herbert, 863, 1590, 2076
Palmer, W. Scott, 900a, 1012a
Palyi, Melchior, 2419r
Pape, Leslie Manock, 2110r, 2129, 2511r
Papini, Giovanni, 131, 264-9, 349-52, 467-70, 864, 984, 1113, 1202-3, 1269, 1471e, 1749a, 2248
Park, Robert E., 1907r
Parker, Charles P., 1114
Parker, DeWitt Henry, 812r, 2076, 2227r
Parker, Willis Allen, 1115
Parkes, Henry Bamford, 2320, 2519
Parodi, Dominique, 579-80, 1204, 2130, 2720
Pascual, Ricardo Roque, 2583
Paton, Herbert James, 645r
Patrick, George Thomas White, 1609r, 1691, 1799r
Patten, Arthur B., 2294n
Patten, Simon Nelson, 985
Patterson, Herbert Parsons, 1205
Pattison, Edwin W., 2781
Patty, William L., 2639
Paul, Cedar, 1521t
Paul, Eden, 1521t
Paul, Nancy Margaret, 900a, 1012a
Paulhan, Frederic, 701, 1206, 1209r, 1270, 1381
Paulsen, Friedrich, 40
Payne, J. B., 1121r
Payot, Jules, 54
Peattie, Elia W., 986
Peck, Walter Edwin, 2357r
Peckham, George William, 1260r, 1320r
Peek, F. A., 568s
Peillaube, E., 225n, 581
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 18, 55, 72, 80r, 93-4, 96r, 118r, 191, 195n, 270-3, 277n, 353-4, 582-4, 771n, 1375a, 1734, 1848a, 2054-6, 2191, 2249, 2321-2, 2386, 2442, 2737
Pell, Orlie Anna Haggerty, 2131
Penney, Alma Thorne, 948n
Penney, Mark E., 1124s, 1124s
Pepper, Stephen Coburn, 1907r, 1993, 2132, 2250, 2443, 2600, 2720
Pérès, Jean, 987
Perrier, Joseph Louis, 585, 664r, 1086r, 1110r, 1382
Perrin, Raymond, 620a
Perry, Charles M., 1994
Perry, Charner Marquis, 1995-6
Perry, Ralph Barton, 274, 471-3, 865-6, 879r, 988, 1042r, 1071, 1078e, 1116, 1207, 1310n, 1330-1, 1383, 1420r, 1439, 1494, 1572r, 1579e, 1809r, 1882, 2024r, 2027r, 2076, 2192, 2251-2, 2323, 2444, 2640
Pétavel-Oliff, 225n
Peterson, Houston, 1512r
Peterson, Joseph, 1898r, 1982r
Petty, Orville A., 2520
Phillips, Daniel Edward, 19
Phillips, David, 276r
Phillips, Denis Charles, 575n
Phillips, John Herbert, 702
Piat, Claude, 586
Piatt, Donald Ayres, 1835, 1969r, 1997-8, 2446, 2720
Piazza, G., 355
Picard, Maurice, 1591, 1692
Picard, Roger, 958t

Piccoli, Raffaello, 1384, 1933
Pickard-Cambridge, W. A., 1393n, 1445a
Pidoux, L. S., 32t, 54t
Pikler, Julius, 587, 656
Pillon, François, 90r, 438r, 490r, 549r, 588, 625r, 629r, 672r, 675r, 719r, 909r, 948r
Pillsbury, Walter Bowers, 474, 792r
Piper, Raymond Frank, 2057
Pitkin, Walter Boughton, 356-8, 371n, 475, 867, 879r, 1071, 1226r
Plantinga, Theodore, 1216n
Pogson, Frank Lubecki, 659t
Pokrovskii, Iosif Alekseevich, 1385
Polakov, Walter N., 2716
Porret, J. Alfred, 476
Pradines, Maurice, 703-4
Prall, David Wight, 1637, 1735-6, 1778, 2324, 2356r
Pratt, Cornelia Atwood, 32r
Pratt, James Bissett, 477, 589, 705, 830r, 922r, 989-90, 1208, 1693, 2076, 2193, 2387, 2444r
Prezzolini, Guiseppi, 90r, 132-6, 192-5, 275, 359, 478-9
Price, Henry Habberley, 2027r, 2110r
Prichard, Harold Arthur, 489a
Prince, Morton, 154n
Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth, 86n, 196, 604e, 1440
Prout, F. R., 932s, 1083s
Provine, Robert Calhoun, 2325
Putnam, Hilary, 18i
Putnam, James Jackson, 868

Quick, Oliver Chase, 869, 991, 1117, 1332
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 2249r, 2321r, 2322r

R., M., 490r
Raby, Sister Joseph Mary, 2253
Race, Henrietta V., 2641
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 1386, 1592
Rageot, Gaston, 218a
Ragusa, Thomas Joseph, 2584
Raiser, Konrad, 1842t
Ramsdell, Edward Thomas, 2254, 2388, 2447-8
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 1934, 2133
Randell, J. G., 2511r
Randall, John Herman, Jr., 1546, 1638, 2024r, 2097r, 2356r, 2357r, 2449, 2561r, 2568r, 2720, 2781
Randle, E. H., 706
Rashdall, Hastings, 90r, 375, 1333, 1554
Rasmussen, Carl, 1694
Ratner, Joseph, 8e, 49e, 87e, 1779, 1969e, 2024e, 2126n, 2134, 2450-1, 2519r, 2521, 2680e, 2680n, 2720, 2746e
Ratner, Sidney, 2781
Raub, William Longstreth, 282s, 360
Rauh, Frédéric, 266n
Raup, Robert Bruce, 2715
Ray, Binayendranath, 2452
Raymond, Mary E., 2585
Read, Carveth, 276, 322r, 490r
Read, Waldemar, 17n
Reeder, Edwin Hewitt, 2453
Reeder, Paul A., 2194
Reichenbach, Hans, 2642, 2720, 2742n
Reid, John R., 2454
Rein, E., 870
Reiser, Oliver Lesley, 2135
Reisner, Edward Hartman, 1334, 2326
Renauld, J., 1495
Rénon, Louis, 629a
Reverdin, Henri, 1209
Révesz, André, 1796n
Rey, Abel, 590, 656, 992
Reyburn, Hugh A, 1935
Reymond, Arnold, 1695
Ribot, Théodule Armand, 118r
Rice, Philip Blair, 2612r, 2693r, 2720r
Ricci, U., 1018e
Rich, Gertrude V., 2511r
Richards, I. A., 1732
Richardson, C. A., 1740
Richardson, Edward Elliot, 142r, 300r
Richey, Homer, 2455
Rickert, Heinrich, 1593
Rieber, Charles Henry, 197, 682r, 1496

Riley, Isaac Woodbridge, 438r, 467r, 707, 954r, 993-4, 1335, 1639, 1848r, 2058
Rippe, F., 2601r
Ritchie, A. D., 2663r
Ritchie, D. G., 20
Ritchie, E., 258r, 417r
Ritter, William Emerson, 2194
Robertson, John MacKinnon, 56, 1737
Robertson, Noralie, 95t
Robet, Henri, 1118, 1210-1
Robieson, M. W., 1433r, 1452r
Robin, L., 2102n
Robinet, André, 78e, 218e, 753e, 907e, 1299e, 1746e, 2476n
Robins, Sidney Swain, 871
Robinson, Arthur, 1145r
Robinson, Daniel Sommer, 709e, 1119e, 1389e, 1441, 1594, 1658t, 1721a, 2059, 2255
Robinson, Edward Schouten, 2444r
Robinson, James Harvey, 2110, 2256
Robinson, Lydia Gillingham, 902t
Robinson, M. E., 1084r
Roe, Chungil Yhan, 1999
Roff, Merrill F., 2041r
Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, 21, 33r, 41, 57, 80r, 96r, 118r, 139r, 159r, 176r, 198-9, 279r(2), 348r, 361, 480, 490r, 499r, 841r, 1271, 1387-8, 1497, 1595, 1696, 2071, 2076, 2389
Rogers, Reginald A. P., 700r, 1272
Rorty, Richard McKay, 2693i
Rosenberger, Harry Emerson, 1936
Ross, G. R. T., 1279n
Rossi, Mario M., 1738, 1780, 2386r
Rossi Longhi, M., 1937
Roth, John K., 32n
Rothman, Robert, 2522-3, 2678r
Rothman, Walter, 1883
Rothwell, Fred, 1609t
Rotta, Paolo, 362
Roustan, Desiré, 1273-4
Rowland, Eleanor Harris, 708
Roy, Dhirendra Nath, 1884
Royce, Josiah, 22, 200, 211a, 591, 656, 709, 872, 995-6, 1119, 1212-3, 1389-90, 1547
Royce, Katherine, 470t
Ruckmich, Christian A., 822s, 1214
Ruediger, W. C., 1781
Ruge, Arnold, 656, 1119e, 1136e
Ruger, Henry A., 272r
Rugg, Harold Ordway, 2196
Runes, Dagobert David, 1782e, 2577e
Runyon, Laura Louisa, 30r
Runze, Georg, 90r
Rusk, Robert R., 363, 2000
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, 535r, 541r, 592, 710, 873, 918r, 957r, 1078r, 1121r, 1275-7, 1548-9, 1604, 1640, 1697, 1782, 1938, 2001, 2643, 2720, 2782
Russell, Francis C., 277, 593, 1278
Russell, John Edward, 23, 364-7, 443, 481-2, 672r, 874, 991n, 1215
Russiano, Thomas B., 2586
Ruttman, W. J., 875
Ryan, Francis A., 2097r
Ryle, Gilbert, 2160e, 2192e, 2198e
Rynin, David, 2227r

S., M., 947r, 958r
Sabin, Ethel Ernestine (Mrs. Ethel Sabin Smith), 1391-2, 1498-9, 1550, 1596
Sabine, George Holland, 112s, 153s, 159s, 174s, 180s, 242s, 243s, 244s, 249s, 250s, 253s, 254s, 270s, 272s, 278, 282s, 296s, 336s, 483, 805r, 917r, 948n, 958r, 1116r, 1120, 1130r, 1244r, 1397r, 1442e, 2136, 2308r, 2717
Saenger, Gerhart H., 2562r
Sage, Michel, 95
Sageret, Jules, 1597
Sahlin, Nils-Eric, 1934n, 2133n
Sait, Una Bernard, 1288r, 2070r
Salmond, C. F., 1809r
Salomaa, Jalmari Edvard, 2060
Salomon, Michel, 1598
Salter, William Macintire, 594, 876, 1500
Sanborn, Herbert Charles, 711
Sanders, Charles Finley, 33t

Sanders, William Joseph, 2456, 2783
Sanford, Hugh W., 1809r
Santayana, George, 279, 997-8, 1310r, 1501, 1599, 1641-2, 1836, 2076, 2643, 2784a
Sarailieff, Ivan V., 2390
Sarkar, Benoy Kumar, 2002
Sauvage, George M., 999
Savery, William, 1885, 2257, 2587, 2644, 2720
Sayers, Ephraim Vern, 2061, 2746r
Scales, Albert Louis, 1443
Scalise, Victor F., 2197
Schaub, Edward Leroy, 33r, 841r, 905r, 1298r, 1352r, 1442, 1643, 1837, 1987r, 1992e, 2022r, 2071r, 2135r, 2137, 2146r, 2170r, 2180r, 2191r, 2321r, 2322r, 2346r, 2381r, 2353r, 2354r, 2357r, 2369r, 2386r, 2389r, 2399, 2442r, 2720
Scheler, Max, 1216, 1783, 1886
Schelsky, Helmut, 2601r
Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, 11r(2), 16r, 17r, 33r, 42, 58-9, 73-4, 78r, 90r(2), 96-7, 118r, 138-41, 201-2, 251r, 252r, 279r(2), 280-4, 301r, 333r, 368-75, 438r, 482n, 484-90, 494r, 509r, 587r, 595-600, 607r, 656, 672r, 703r, 704r, 710n, 712-8, 719r, 752r, 877-80, 889r, 909r, 922r, 947r, 958r, 1000-2, 1017r, 1109i, 1109n, 1121-5, 1159r, 1202r, 1217-21, 1277r, 1279-86, 1305r, 1310r, 1316r, 1332r, 1336-40, 1352r, 1393-5, 1406r, 1420r, 1422r, 1444-8, 1500r, 1502-6, 1531r, 1551-4, 1563r, 1600-4, 1609r, 1644-7, 1653r, 1661r, 1698-1701, 1739-40, 1784-92, 1809r, 1813r, 1838-40, 1850r, 1871r, 1887, 1914r, 1939-46, 2003-4, 2008r, 2022r, 2023r, 2027r, 2041r(2), 2042r, 2046r, 2062-5, 2071r, 2097r, 2113r, 2135r, 2138-40, 2141r, 2157r, 2170r, 2191r, 2198-2200, 2244r(2), 2245r, 2249r, 2258-64, 2309r, 2321r, 2322r, 2329-34, 2357r, 2366r, 2381r, 2386r, 2391-5, 2408r, 2428r, 2431r, 2435r, 2442r, 2444r, 2444n, 2457-9, 2511r, 2518r, 2524-8, 2588-91, 2718
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, 575n, 2099e, 2124e, 2141-2, 2261e, 2394e, 2550n, 2633r, 2719, 2720e, 2784e
Schinz, Albert, 601-2, 705r, 719-21, 1003, 2005
Schmidt, Karl, 1119r, 1136r
Schmidt, Raymund, 1017e, 1675e
Schneider, Herbert Wallace, 1449, 1456n, 1648-9, 1678r, 1827r, 2009r, 2022, 2066, 2110, 2389r, 2399r, 2445r, 2529, 2537r, 2601r, 2660r, 2663r, 2673r, 2678r, 2680r, 2681r, 2693r, 2701r, 2721-2
Schneider, Karl, 22
Schoenchen, Gustav G., 2723
Scholz, Heinrich, 90r, 2249r, 2386r
Schott, 90r
Schroeder, Theodore Albert, 1396, 1507
Schuetz, Alfred, 2785
Schultze, Martin, 1222
Schurman, Jacob Gould, 6s, 16r, 60r
Schwartz, Benjamin, 1836e
Scoon, Robert Maxwell, 2357r, 2563r
Scott, J. W., 300r, 380r, 591r, 1785a
Scott, William Henry, 1508
Search-Light. *See* Frank, Waldo.
Sears, Laurence, 2265, 2786e, 2794r
Seashore, Carl Emil, 652r
Seillière, Ernest, 1223
Seliber, G., 656n
Seligman, Edwin Robert Anderson, 2225e, 2258e, 2296e, 2297e, 2335e, 2361e
Sellars, Roy Wood, 491, 603, 1126, 1397, 1414r, 1450-1, 1809r, 2076, 2300r, 2378e, 2592
Sellars, Wilfred Stalker, 1728e
Selsam, Howard, 2720
Serol, Maurice, 438r, 918r, 1127, 1224
Seth, James, 16r, 75, 604, 675r, 1128, 1741
Sewall, Frank, 90r
Shackleford, Thomas Mitchell, 723
Sharga, Ikbal Kishen, 724
Sharp, Frank Chapman, 591r, 2227r

Sharp, Stella E., 3r
Shaw, Charles Gray, 2067, 2460
Shaw, Charles Gregory, 1287
Shaw, Marvin C., 2294n
Shearer, Edna Aston, 2461
Sheen, Fulton J., 1841
Sheffer, Henry Maurice, 1484r
Sheldon, Wilmon Henry, 33r, 118r, 291r, 376, 509r, 564r, 575r, 757r, 1004, 1341, 1442r, 1650
Shelton, H. S., 881, 1280a, 1393n, 1503a, 1509
Shenk, William Washington, 285
Shepard, Berenice Barnes, 2572r
Shepherd, Queen L., 1555
Shi, Hu, 2201, 2781
Shields, Allan, 2549n
Shipman, Carolyn, 438r
Shoemaker, Robert V., 1651
Shook, John Robert, 653n
Shouse, James Blaine, 2530
Sidgwick, Alfred, 139r, 286, 492, 605, 725, 947r, 1125n, 1337a, 1359r, 1393n, 1398, 1496r, 1793, 2386r, 2444r
Sidgwick, Henry, 2202
Simmel, Georg, 1510
Simon, Linda, 461e, 471e, 778e, 783e, 839e, 868e, 872, 898e, 967e, 1590e, 1599e, 1647e, 1821e, 2565e
Simon, Paul, 1511
Simons, H., 2068
Simpson, George, 2531t, 2531n
Sinclair, May, 1452
Singer, Beth J., 2720e, 2781e
Singer, Charles Joseph, 1448e, 1664e
Singer, Edgar Arthur, Jr., 1225, 1512, 2143
Sisson, Edward Octavius, 2069, 2203, 2787
Slattery, Charles Lewis, 1005, 1513
Slochower, Harry, 1947, 2204
Slosson, Edwin Emery, 438r, 1453-4
Smart, Harold Robert, 109e, 162e, 314e, 643e, 644e
Smith, Bernard, 2655e
Smith, Gerald Birney, 1623e, 1633e, 1657e
Smith, H. Arthur, 970n
Smith, Henry Bradforth, 2242r
Smith, John Alexander, 1840
Smith, John Edwin, 1212i
Smith, Marshall P., 2266
Smith, Martin J., 2724
Smith, Norman Kemp, 63r, 1605
Smith, Richard, 909r, 1009r
Smith, Thomas Vernor, 1702, 1907r, 2027r(2), 2070, 2071e, 2095r, 2168r, 2170r, 2205, 2267-8, 2335, 2396, 2716
Smith, Vivian T., 2144
Snedden, David, 2206, 2746r
Snellman, J. W., 1006
Snyder, William S., 2723r
Sobotka, V., 726
Sofista, Giuliano il. *See* Prezzolini, Guiseppi.
Sollier, Paul, 727-8
Somerville, John, 2397
Sonneberg, Walter, 1514
Sorel, Georges, 729, 1652
Sorensen, Alban D., 159r
Sorley, William Ritchie, 196r, 675r, 1950e
Spain, Charles L., 2072
Spaulding, Edward Gleason, 377-8, 730, 941, 1007-8, 1071, 1515, 2006
Spiller, Gustav, 98, 203
Spirito, Ugo, 1653
Sprague, Mary Winifred, 188r, 201s, 317s, 373s
Sprinkle, Henry Call, 2073
Stadelhofen, Prosper Meyer de, 217n, 225n
Stallknecht, Newton P., 2725
Starbuck, Edwin Diller, 90r
Starr, Mark, 2310r
Stearns, Harold, 1556
Stebbing, Lizzie Susan, 1125n, 1129, 1226, 1288, 2386r, 2442r, 2462
Stein, Leo, 1888
Stein, Ludwig, 606-7
Stephenson, Corrinne, 690s, 844s, 949s, 964s

Stettheimer, Ettie, 142, 708r
Stevens, George B., 90r
Stevens, H. C., 149r
Stewart, Herbert Leslie, 490r, 1130
Stewart, J. A., 1261r
Stewart, J. McKellar, 1009
Stikkers, Kenneth W., 1783e
Stimson, Rufus W., 2336
Stocks, J. J., 1914r
Stocks, John Leofric, 2261r
Stolberg, Benjamin, 2145
Stone, Mark, 2726
Stoops, John Dashiel, 1889
Störring, Gustav, 656
Stout, A. K., 1799r
Stout, George Frederick, 490r, 1950e
Stratton, George Malcolm, 76, 204, 1010
Strong, Anna L., 608
Strong, Charles Augustus, 205, 609, 1645n, 2076
Strong, Edward W., 2592, 2600
Strong, Margaret K., 389s
Strong, Samuel M., 2633r
Stuart, Henry Waldgrave, 118, 206, 379, 607r, 1420, 2720
Student, 438r, 438r
Study, Eduard, 1289
Stumpf, Carl, 1948
Sturt, Henry Cecil, 80e, 96e, 130r, 143, 380, 793r, 2435t
Sudre, René, 1764a
Sullivan, L. E., 2357r
Suppes, Patrick, 2712n
Suryanarayanan, S. S., 1290
Sutton, William S., 30r
Swabey, Marie Collins, 776t, 1840n, 2146, 2269, 2337
Swabey, William Curtis, 776t, 1606, 2593
Swain, Joseph Ward, 1054t
Swenson, David F., 1516, 1607, 1693r
Switalski, Wladimir, 882

T., G. A., 2357r
Taeusch, Carl Frederick, 1561r, 1579r, 1654
Talbert, Edward L., 1704
Talbert, Ernest Lynn, 1704
Talbot, Ellen Bliss, 33r, 493, 731, 916r, 1260r, 1322r, 1435r, 1442
Tanner, Amy E., 591r
Tanner, W. E., 1121r, 1221n
Tannery, Jules, 580a
Tarozzi, Guiseppi, 884, 1011
Tarter, Harry, 2242r
Tate, Allen, 2270
Tattvabhúshan, Síttánáth, 732
Tausch, Edwin, 733
Tawney, Guy Allen, 207, 509r, 540r, 734, 905r, 1703-4, 1777r
Taylor, Alfred Edward, 144, 208, 287, 380r, 381, 675r, 696r, 718, 735, 962r, 1012, 1018r, 1021r, 1086r, 1110r, 1475r, 1492r, 1701
Taylor, Henry Osborn, 2271
Taylor, Malcolm, 1187
Taylor, Thomas Whiting, 2398
Teisen, Niels Carl Gustav, 1013
Ten Hoor, Martin, 1714r
Thalheimer, August, 2531
Theodore, Samuel Joseph, 2272
Thilly, Frank, 33r, 149r, 540r, 591r, 610, 1131, 1227, 1291, 1310r, 1890
Thomas, A. J., 1247s, 1287s
Thomas, Albert Sidney, 1187a
Thomas, Bonaventure, 2645
Thomas, George Brown, 1228
Thomas, J. M. Lloyd, 2356r
Thomas, Milton Halsey, 2066e, 2721e
Thomas, Wendell Marshall, 2646, 2727, 2788
Thomas, William I., 437r
Thompson, Helen Bradford, 118
Thorndike, Edward Lee, 541, 885, 1580r
Thorne, Alma Rose, 948n, 987s, 1176r, 1288r, 1320r, 1323t
Threlkeld, Archie Lloyd, 2594
Tiles, J. E., 2498e, 2576e, 2648e, 2782e
Tilgher, Adriano, 1342
Tillich, Paul, 1842
Tissi, Silvio, 1794
Titchener, Edward Bradford, 273n, 1655
Todd, Arthur J., 2123e
Tonness, Alfred, 2273

Törnudd, Allan, 1343
Tower, Carl Vernon, 288, 2207, 2595
Townsend, Harvey Gates, 728s, 1108r, 1366r, 1966r, 2007, 2191r, 2249r, 2322r, 2399, 2442r, 2463
Townsend, James G., 1132
Tragesser, Gertrude A., 2400
Trask, Ida M., 2532
Troeltsch, Ernst, 1133
Troiano, P. R., 494
Troilo, Erminio, 1517
Trueblood, Charles K., 1949
Truman, N. E., 46s, 59s, 76s
Tsanoff, Radoslav Andrea, 520r, 886, 915n, 1121r, 1352r, 1801r, 2511r
Tseng, Tso C., 2401
Tuckwell, James Henry, 1344
Tufts, James Hayden, 23a, 23n, 99, 339e, 540, 591r, 645r, 1310r, 1420, 1458r, 1850r, 1882r, 2022r, 2024r, 2027r, 2028r, 2076, 2227, 2353r, 2354r, 2444r, 2647, 2673r, 2781r
Tugwell, Rexford Guy, 985e
Turner, Ewart Edmund, 2027r
Turner, John Evan, 1557, 1592r
Turner, John Pickett, 1109r, 1130r
Turner, William, 1014-5
Tuttle, J. R., 798s, 816s, 918r
Tyrrell, George, 209, 289
Tzu, Lien Chao, 2074

Ubbink, J. G., 1134, 1229
Ulich, Robert, 2789
Underhill, Evelyn, 1016
Unna, Sarah, 1656
Upton, Charles B., 96r
Urban, Wilbur Marshall, 736, 1298r, 1445-6, 1591a, 1891, 2076
Ushenko, Andrew Paul, 2208, 2242r, 2244r, 2338, 2402, 2790

Vacca, G., 1018e
Vaihinger, Hans, 1017
Vailati, Giovanni, 16r(3), 32r, 43, 62r, 100, 145-6, 176r, 180r, 210, 242r, 243r, 248r, 272r, 290-4, 382-4, 438r, 495-7, 611, 737-8, 887, 1018, 1471
Valle, Guido della, 498
Van Becelaere, E. G. Lawrence, 211
Van de Waele, A., 665
Van Dusen, Henry Pitney, 2465
Varisco, Bernardino, 888
Vaz Ferreira, Carlos, 739, 1608
Veblen, Thorstein, 385
Veil, L., 672t
Vexler, Feliciu, 1202r
Viator, Britannicus, 2533
Vibbert, Charles Bruce, 860r, 916r
Victoroff, David, 2381r
Vidari, Giovanni, 656n, 2209
Villa, G., 145n
Vitali, Guilio, 386
Vivas, Eliseo, 1969r, 2612r, 2633r, 2648, 2670r, 2693r, 2728
Vlastos, Gregory, 2244r, 2381r
Vogt, P. B., 1292
Von Kempski, Jürgen, 2596
Vorbrodt, G., 1230

Wadsworth, Mary C., 177t
Wagner, Donald O., 2097e
Wahl, Jean, 1609, 1705, 2102n
Waibel, Edwin P. B., 1345-6
Waldapfel, J., 656
Walker, Leslie Joseph, 612, 889, 1019
Walling, William English, 1230
Wallis, Wilson, 2381r
Walsh, Francis Augustine, 2147, 2445
Walter, John Estep, 1347
Warbeke, John Martyn, 1209r, 1558-9, 1610, 2729
Ward, James, 295, 1176r, 1950
Ward, Leo Richard, 2148, 2466
Ward, Paul W., 1917r, 2057, 2149
Warner, Winifred, 2791
Warren, G. O., 890
Warren, Howard C., 1335r
Warren, William Preston, 603e, 1126e, 2792
Washington, Johnny, 2431n
Waterhouse, Eric S., 387, 613, 891-3
Waterlow, J., 925r
Waterlow, Sidney, 675r, 879r, 951r, 1084r

Watson, Arthur Clinton, 1657
Watson, Genevieve Margaret, 2210
Watson, John, 44, 380r, 499, 740, 894, 1135, 1159r
Watson, John Broadus, 1159r
Watts, Henry, 2649
Weaver, H. E., 716s
Webb, Clement Charles Julian, 101
Weber, C. O., 1777r
Weber, Emilie, 519t
Wehrlé, Jean, 2539n
Weigle, L. A., 174s, 180s
Weinberg, Albert, 1742
Weinberg, Carlton Berenda, 2597
Weiss, A. P., 587r
Weiss, Paul, 2191e, 2244r, 2249e, 2274-2319n, 2321e, 2322e, 2322n, 2339, 2386e, 2442e, 2612r, 2650, 2670r, 2678r, 2680r, 2693r, 2720r, 2793
Welby, Victoria Lady, 43a
Wells, Herbert George, 212
Wells, Wesley Raymond, 1370r, 1457, 1518-9, 1560-1, 1706
Weltner, George, 2531t
Welton, J., 1503n
Wen, Lien Chung, 2276
Wenley, Robert Mark, 438r, 1458, 1809r
Werkmeister, William Henry, 2612r, 2680r, 2720r
West, C., 563s
Whateley, Arnold Robert, 614, 668r
Whetnall, E. M., 1809r
Whipple, Guy Montrose, 2610e
White, Carl Milton, 2340
White, Morton Gabriel, 2693r, 2712n, 2720r
White, Stephen Solomon, 2651
Whitehead, Alfred North, 2550n, 2720
Whitehouse, J. C., 1169t
Whitford, William G., 1855r
Whitney, A. S., 30r
Whitney, George W. T., 665r
Whittaker, Thomas, 276r, 879r
Whittlesey, Walter Lincoln, 2419r
Wickham, Harvey, 2150
Widgery, Alban Gregory, 427t, 1951, 2202
Wieman, Henry Nelson, 1843, 2211, 2294n, 2403, 2467, 2534
Wiener, Norbert, 1293, 1399, 1484r
Wiener, Philip Paul, 2094r
Wilde, Norman, 119r, 540r, 1294, 1358r, 1964r
Williams, C. H., 421s, 452s, 571s
Williams, Donald Cary, 2341-2, 2404-5, 2535
Williams, H. H., 1572r
Williams, Howard Y., 2027r
Wilm, Emil Carl, 426r, 1352r, 1799r
Wilson, Roland K., 1562
Windelband, Wilhelm, 741, 1136
Winter, P. E., 333r, 438r, 541r
Wisdom, Arthur John Terence Dibben, 2242r, 2321r
Wiseman, M. W., 696r
Witmer, Lightmer, 615
Witter, Charles Edgar, 1137
Witwicki, Wladyslaw, 1232
Wobbermin, Georg, 90t, 500, 1658
Wohlsetter, Albert, 2670r
Wolf, Abraham, 388, 672r, 743, 1286
Wolfenden, J. F., 2264
Wood, Ledger, 1291
Woodbridge, Frederick James Eugene, 213, 296-7, 501, 744a, 1138, 1187, 1295, 1580r, 2075, 2151, 2536, 2598
Woodbridge, Homer Edwards, 2678r
Woodburne, A. Stewart, 2227r, 2381r, 2511r
Woodworth, Robert Sessions, 744, 2212
Woolley, Helen Thompson, 705r
Woolsey, Florence B., 1714r
Wright, Charles H., 1383s
Wright, Henry Wilkes, 298, 480r, 616, 889r, 1072r, 1139, 1159r, 1233, 1348, 1397r, 1400-1, 1422r, 1442, 1520, 1611, 1892, 2213
Wright, William Kelley, 947r, 1234, 1349, 1422r, 1678r, 1830r, 2021r, 2071e, 2193r, 2315r
Wrinch, Dorothy, 1452r
Wrinch, F. S., 483r
Wu, Shu-Pan, 2406
Wundt, Wilhelm Max, 1020

Yarros, Victor S, 1572r, 1667r, 1707, 1743, 1844-6, 1893, 2027r, 2244r
Young, Ella Flagg, 102, 1358r
Young, Kimball, 2794

Zanoni, Candido P., 145n, 2105n
Zeno of Elea, 675, 958
Ziegler, Leopold, 1952
Zigrosser, Carl, 1358r
Znaniecki, Florian, 1563

Subject Index

Aars, Kristian B. R., 699
Absolute, 57, 152, 201, 250, 282, 302, 371, 438, 483, 675, 686, 1261, 1293, 1316, 1352, 1572, 1698, 1807, 2027, 2076, 2150, 2215, 2747
  Bradley on a., 128, 423, 680, 836, 877, 958, 1338, 1702, 1839
  madness and a., 324, 329, 370, 485
  morality and a., 411, 435
  Royce on a., 50, 89, 118, 184, 200, 1046, 2110, 2663
  truth and a., 176, 263, 313, 558, 705, 717
Absolutism. *See* Hegelianism.
Abstraction, 176, 314, 438, 442, 489, 645, 689, 738, 879, 890, 894, 937, 957, 1311, 1359, 1417, 1699, 1741, 2100, 2118, 2244, 2408
  logic and a., 1121, 2612
  meaning and a., 1604, 2063
  mind as an a., 64, 1245, 2433
  reason as an a., 162, 878
Action, 2, 17, 35, 75, 93, 132, 162, 264, 276, 336, 352, 408-9, 422, 428, 438, 519, 693, 703-4, 743, 766, 948, 950, 964, 982, 1044, 1311, 1358, 1449, 1494, 1547, 1572, 1655, 1660, 1666, 1878, 1880, 1907, 1966, 1981, 2106, 2246, 2282, 2285, 2389, 2418, 2633, 2711, 2765, 2781-2. *See also* Practice; Thought, action and
  belief and a., 13, 70, 259, 357, 369
  character and a., 1402
  experience as a., 154
  knowledge and a., 1169, 1381, 2027, 2104, 2633
  knowledge as an a., 139, 1190, 1268
  motor a., 32, 77, 304, 677, 752, 852, 1379
  Philosophy of a., 949, 2130
  rules for a., 13, 90, 1667, 2681
  science and a., 429, 1101, 2104
  self and a., 7, 76, 2036, 2751
  will and a., 227, 879, 1139, 2539, 2720
Activity, 30, 57, 96, 130, 159-60, 198, 240, 265, 299, 300, 304, 540, 637, 645, 677, 958, 1159, 1569, 1663, 1667, 1697, 1709, 1970, 2725
  education and a., 1150, 1358, 1521, 2253, 2360
  experience and a., 5, 21, 41, 87, 243, 317, 653, 1359, 1536
  meaning and a., 1604, 1934, 2106, 2703
  mental a., 111, 836, 1140, 1249, 1367, 1587, 2078, 2135, 2388
  social a., 5, 17, 534, 1099, 1974, 2041, 2408, 2419, 2498, 2633, 2636, 2683
Adams, Henry, 2538
Adaptation, 22, 59, 98, 118, 509, 679, 790, 797, 1249, 1358, 1402, 1420, 1666, 1799, 2093, 2352, 2356, 2611, 2794
  belief as a., 1046, 709
  knowledge as a., 301, 690
  mind as a., 32, 149, 1261
  social a., 3, 7, 1358, 1611, 2244
Aesthetics, 16, 33, 52, 99, 299, 541, 987, 1240, 1298, 1384, 1847, 1855, 1873, 1891, 2078, 2111, 2270, 2356, 2398, 2461, 2743, 2772, 2781. *See also* Art; Beauty; Experience, aesthetic
Agassiz, Louis, 957, 1949
Age, 32, 48
Agent, 243, 319, 546, 564, 616, 936, 1417, 1981
Agnosticism, 34, 53, 75, 405, 535, 565, 629, 879, 969, 2770
Aims. *See* Ends
Alexander, Samuel, 1594, 2064, 2150, 2561

Aliotta, Antonio, 994
Altruism, 7
America, 236, 540, 918, 950, 995, 1143, 1481, 1766, 1877, 1907, 1918, 1963, 2110, 2196, 2394, 2433, 2512, 2600-1, 2640, 2657, 2668, 2696, 2716, 2720
  education in a., 1767, 2637
  ideals of a., 719, 996, 1159, 1527, 1533, 1862, 2094, 2097, 2309, 2412
  politics of a., 1556, 2754, 2781
Ames, Edward Scribner, 1535, 2741
Analysis, 17, 65, 88, 183, 354, 675, 796, 940, 1071,1359, 1569, 1640, 1665, 1702, 1912, 1970, 2117, 2217, 2408
Analytic/Synthetic, 738, 792, 2712
Anarchy, 152, 438, 483, 506, 698, 901, 964, 1032, 1287
Anderson, B. M., Jr., 974
Angell, James Roland, 304, 310
Animal, 455, 1667, 1857, 2244, 2720
Animism, 2160, 2776
Anthropocentrism, 1175, 2740, 2747
Anthropology, 536, 830, 1572, 1903, 2357
Anthropomorphism, 879, 1084, 1250, 2060, 2291, 2319, 2740, 2747
Anticipation, 1, 13, 158, 423, 1997, 2055
  concepts and a., 673, 2041
  ideas and a., 128, 438, 792
  meaning and a., 93, 317, 567-8
Anti-intellectualism, 438, 494, 733, 797, 865, 867, 948, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1092, 1102, 1515, 1575, 1598, 1762
A posteriori, 1728, 2349, 2709
Appearance, 140, 423, 489, 645, 647, 684, 877, 958, 1161, 1259, 1281, 1420, 1676, 1904, 2006, 2027, 2104, 2720
Apperception, 32, 242
A priori, 66, 118, 197, 237, 257, 360, 364, 565, 568, 607, 628, 756, 964, 999, 1216, 1311, 1326, 1344, 1625, 1728, 1871, 1913, 2041, 2098, 2106, 2217, 2247, 2269, 2341, 2349, 2610, 2709
Architectonic, 1734, 2736
Aristocracy, 49, 719, 1015, 1172, 1749
Aristotle, 43, 51, 59, 97, 146, 264, 353, 428, 438, 581, 607, 630, 716, 771, 842, 882, 889, 906, 957-8, 1121, 1279, 1311, 1912, 2191, 2461, 2695
  logic and A., 1121, 1279, 1420, 1444, 2027
Armstrong, A. C., 699
Art, 217, 279, 532, 950, 987, 1180, 1810, 1855, 2356, 2454, 2461, 2648, 2716, 2720
Asceticism, 90, 437, 2482
Assertion, 245, 591, 1495, 2027, 2359, 2378, 2782
  truth and a., 253, 368, 600, 680, 705, 939, 941, 1000
Astronomy, 1420, 1714
Atheism, 242, 438, 1287, 1737, 2357
Atomic energy, 1601
Attention, 1, 24, 32, 52, 81, 220, 301, 459, 535, 852, 1809
Avenarius, Richard, 438, 889, 1074
Axiom, 96, 193, 286, 568-9, 675, 700, 889, 1912

Babbit, Irving, 2568
Bacon, Francis, 268, 2137
Bain, Alexander, 879, 1446, 1663, 2054
Baldwin, James Mark, 9, 77n, 107, 138, 171, 188, 304, 1326
Balfour, Arthur James, 39, 2770
Baron, E., 699
Barrow, George A., 1457
Baumann, Julius, 90
Bawden, H. H., 148, 171, 310, 788, 963, 1326
Beauty, 87, 90, 103, 248, 679, 691, 1677, 2461, 2495
Behavior, 537, 716, 790, 944, 1359, 1473, 1488, 1536, 1667, 1686, 1910, 1962, 1965, 1970,1988, 2093, 2408, 2659, 2693, 2720. *See also* Conduct, Habit
  consciousness and b., 1045, 1463, 1589
  intelligence and b., 1613

judgments and b., 2246
knowledge and b., 2770
logic and b., 118
meaning and b., 1560
mind and b., 1049, 1912
morality and b., 6, 540
psychology of b., 1142, 1238, 1419
social b., 2066, 2381, 2681
truth and b., 964
universals and b., 2191, 2473
value and b., 357
Behaviorism, 1245, 1326, 1359, 1419, 1462, 1474, 1497, 1595, 1681, 1699, 1880, 1928, 2193, 2408, 2444, 2564
Being, 50, 55, 59, 71, 83, 130, 158, 176, 265, 300, 315, 501, 653, 663, 672, 682, 737, 879, 912, 914, 935, 940, 958, 1007, 1061, 1071, 1267, 1352, 1510, 1549, 1574, 1625, 1809, 1914, 1930, 1970, 1993, 2022, 2027, 2128, 2168, 2207, 2354, 2477, 2612, 2776.
See also Reality; Substance
consciousness as b., 155, 183, 248, 288, 511, 752
knowledge and b., 44, 128, 690, 2593
logical b., 2029, 2092
meaning of b., 105, 1965, 1974
traits of b., 1312, 1809, 1913
truth and b., 996, 1046, 1572, 2008
value and b., 1456, 1591, 1641, 2076
Belief, 60, 75, 97, 118, 200, 203, 245, 250, 255, 315, 357, 376, 428, 473, 563, 567, 721, 737, 792, 950, 998, 1109, 1213, 1309, 1338, 1363, 1419, 1548-9, 1755, 1788, 2066, 2081, 2114, 2168, 2316
b. as rules of action, 13, 90
Bain on b., 1446, 2054
biology and b., 1561
certainty and b., 518
consequences of b., 568, 672
cultural b., 2168
credulity and b., 91
definition of b., 2, 272, 568, 1046, 1195
doubt and b., 630, 639
fixation of b., 1734
instinctive b., 199, 270, 675, 1159
meaning and b., 1604
moral b., 86
origin of b., 490, 575, 889, 1149, 1311
power of b., 743
rationality and b., 198, 675, 2001
religious b., 69, 90, 150, 184, 259, 331, 369, 520, 594, 629, 672, 766, 824, 1039, 1054, 1366, 1457, 1636, 2357
satisfaction and b., 568, 1322, 1343
suspension of b., 1527
truth and b., 173, 208, 438, 499, 592, 672, 690, 705, 861, 869, 1023, 1121, 1326, 1387, 1765, 1782, 2404, 2643
utility of b., 549, 909, 2404
will and b., 36, 70, 195, 227, 1109
Bellonci, Goffredo, 1201
Bentham, Jeremy, 273
Bergson, Henri, 35, 136, 405, 456, 531, 549, 590, 629, 664, 675, 703, 816, 818, 900, 918, 943, 948, 950, 966, 979, 993, 1009, 1012, 1021, 1027, 1036, 1048, 1069, 1075, 1083, 1102, 1108, 1110, 1145, 1159, 1167, 1175, 1192, 1222, 1126, 1260, 1263, 1267, 1272, 1295, 1316, 1320, 1326, 1330, 1361, 1382, 1575, 1592, 1594, 1639, 1716, 2150, 2266, 2312, 2317, 2416, 2476, 2501, 2565, 2641
B. on cognition, 825, 852
B. on concepts, 822
B. on experience, 958
B. on knowledge, 637, 999, 1275, 1676

Bergson, Henri (cont.)
B. on time, 1091, 1594, 2244
B. on truth, 1266, 1288
determinism and B., 1072, 1684, 2073
dualism and B., 1928
metaphysics and B., 1259, 1882
perception and B., 1044
pluralism and B., 836
Prezzolini and B., 133, 135, 161, 193, 195
rationalism and B., 780, 857, 867, 951
religion and B., 1132, 2634
Berkeley, George, 90, 180, 690, 737-8, 1145, 1495, 2044
Berthelot, René, 549, 1057, 1082
Biography, 818
Biological
b. empiricism, 1170
b. factors in morality, 114
b. history, 2259
b. methods in philosophy, 1480, 1874
b. reaction to Hegel, 1074
b. types of pragmatism, 2636
b. view of belief, 1561
b. view of experience, 1420, 2770
b. view of ideas, 162
b. view of individuals, 539
b. view of knowledge, 213, 690, 2417
b. view of logic, 2612, 2781
b. view of meaning, 2063
b. view of mind, 32-3, 155, 1666, 1855, 2096
b. view of nature, 240
b. view of self, 2751
b. view of thought, 422, 2110, 2146, 2720
b. view of truth, 607
b. view of value, 1589, 1603
Biology, 96, 118, 384, 412, 752, 790, 1032, 1145, 1536, 1589, 1603, 1714, 2747
forms and b., 648
metaphysics and b., 148
philosophy of b., 1312
political ethics and b., 7
psychology and b., 173, 1220, 1359, 2412
realism and b., 1071
religion and b., 1317, 1514, 2357
society and b., 2408
Bixler, Julius S., 1945
Blame, 2102
Blanshard, Brand, 2628
Blondel, Maurice, 335, 464, 549, 629, 683, 949-50, 993, 1288
Blood, Benjamin Paul, 820
Bode, Boyd H., 234, 247, 1195, 1520, 1586, 1643
Body. *See* Mind, body and; Dualism
Bois, Henri, 2770
Boodin, John E., 886, 1326, 2328, 2770
Boole, George, 1121
Bosanquet, Bernard, 118, 196, 380, 1120, 1159, 1574, 1698, 2767
Bourdeau, Jean, 993
Boutroux, Émile, 588, 629, 664, 818, 834, 950, 993, 1021, 1101, 1230, 1288, 1597, 2073, 2130,2539
Bowne, Borden Parker, 2254, 2388, 2447-8
Bradley, F. H., 140, 176, 183, 241, 250, 375, 380, 423, 569, 574, 597, 605, 675, 680, 699, 725, 816, 836, 877, 1012, 1021, 1159, 1218, 1338, 1446, 1574, 1911, 2027, 2113, 2174
concepts and B., 742, 958
knowledge and B., 128
meaning and B., 569
scepticism and B., 1839
truth and B., 202, 486, 878
value and B., 1702
Brain, 11, 32, 63, 84
Bridgman, Percy W., 2593
Broad, C. D., 1828, 1858
Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan, 2217
Brown, Thomas, 1053
Buckham, John Wright, 2467
Business, 30, 137, 257, 332, 398, 1046, 1859, 1862, 2082, 2097, 2412, 2678

Cabot, Richard C., 615
Caird, Edward, 740
Calderoni, Mario, 145n, 195, 269, 275, 382, 497, 1201, 1236, 1241, 1269, 1408, 1495
Campanella, Tommaso, 264
Capitalism, 1749, 2678
Carlyle, Thomas, 1661
Carnap, Rudolf, 2359, 2387, 2564
Carus, Paul, 272, 526, 1365
Casuistry, 2063, 2590
Categorical imperative, 75, 232, 402, 1749
Category, 46, 99, 118, 176, 243, 354, 374, 438, 499, 700, 751-2, 916, 952, 1142, 1234, 1352, 1419, 1497, 1670, 1536, 1728, 1912, 1914, 2041, 2056, 2117, 2132, 2247, 2319, 2369, 2636, 2686, 2695, 2736, 2740, 2793
  c. as functional, 1538
  evolution of c., 96, 253
  Kant on c., 360, 364
  practical c., 1032
  purpose as a c., 139, 162
  scholastic c., 438
  social as a c., 1970, 2096
Causation, 98, 118, 139, 145, 217, 243, 752, 759, 816, 958, 1250, 1470, 1515, 1549, 1670, 1714, 1809, 1912, 1922, 2022, 2133, 2243, 2372, 2408, 2747
  freedom and c., 2771
  Helmholtz on c., 416
  Hume on c., 484
  Kant on c., 484
  mind and body c., 1092
  moral c., 256
  pluralism and c., 438, 1039
  teleological c., 531, 752, 860, 2636
  will and c., 879
Certainty, 23, 39, 97, 276, 347, 375, 428, 482, 518, 792, 969, 1039, 2027, 2106, 2775
  knowledge and c., 1111, 2041
  religion and c., 90, 339, 529, 1224
  sense-data and c., 1268, 1666
  truth and c., 348, 482, 568, 658, 1305
Cesca, Giovanni, 994
Chance, 35, 628, 683, 879, 899, 1065, 1440, 1684, 1913, 2034, 2257, 2233, 2319, 2584. *See also* Novelty, Possibility, Tychism
  evolution and c., 648, 1799
  free will and c., 24, 82, 818
  future and c., 130, 568
Change, 7, 80, 158, 451, 608, 695, 958, 1312, 1353, 1402, 1572, 1698, 1809, 1858, 2244, 2260, 2611. *See also* Dynamic; Emergence; Novelty
  experience of c., 50, 452, 675, 816
Character, 7, 32, 75, 90, 114, 149, 256, 459, 480, 536, 540, 602, 644, 696, 772, 1005, 1366, 1402, 1667, 2033, 2720
Characteristics, 2477
Charity, 90
Chateaubriand, François René de, 549
Chaumeix, André, 993
Chemistry, 118, 1452
Chiappelli, Alessandro, 994
Chicago
  University of C. schools, 25, 102, 2483
Chicago school, 118, 130, 149, 173, 539, 746, 963, 1103, 1210, 1326, 1461, 1568, 2078, 2307
Chide, Alphonse, 950
Child, 14, 32, 49, 113, 1381, 1667, 2305
  c. education, 30, 85, 168, 1958, 2110, 2611, 2687
  value for a c., 1814, 2681
China, 826, 1528, 1573, 1976, 2401, 2615
Choice, 16, 315, 454, 568, 712, 801, 1667, 1966, 2102
Christianity, 79, 90, 106, 160, 255, 323, 551, 582, 599, 641, 708, 858, 879, 882, 1005, 1056, 1203, 1212, 1316-7, 1400, 1670, 1674, 1737, 1830, 2027, 2036, 2287, 2434, 2682, 2744, 2781

Christian Scientists, 190
Circuit
c. of primary and reflective experience, 1809
consciousness as c., 154
organic c., 7
sensori-motor c., 1, 1044
Civilization, 87, 179, 385, 1565, 1908, 2126, 2170, 2356, 2600
Class, 1359, 2110, 2412, 2429
kind and c., 2477-8
Classicism, 1624, 2569
Classification, 88, 267, 1714, 1728, 2117
Cognition, 67, 69, 88, 105, 118, 153, 157, 169, 191, 196, 205, 212, 314, 338, 354, 483, 574, 690, 752, 758, 836, 889, 986-7, 1071, 1120, 1126, 1169, 1242, 1321, 1501, 1536, 1574, 1578, 1670, 1702, 1762, 1809, 1826, 1871, 1985, 1988, 2027, 2100, 2661, 2758. *See also* Mind; Non-cognitive; Reason; Reflection
action and c., 90, 125, 152, 197, 1666
Bradley on c., 486, 1244, 1574, 1839
c. as *a priori*, 756
c. of need, 1814
c. of past, 1756
c. relative to ends, 153
certainty and c., 428
clearness of c., 438, 528
consciousness and c., 279
conflict and c., 173
doubt and c., 51
empirical study of c., 325
error and c., 1000, 1515
evolutionary account of c., 790
experience and c., 26, 317, 1091, 1419-20
experience prior to c., 109, 374
Firstness and c., 2421
function of c., 271, 279, 442, 672, 1104, 1359, 1497, 1578, 2281
habit and c., 409
Hegel on c., 71
historically conditioned c., 645
ideas and c., 460
imagination and c., 172, 420
induction and c., 1665
Kant on c., 360, 1753
knowledge and c., 473, 489, 653, 953, 2282
laws of c., 241, 286, 1352, 1516
logic and c., 188
meaning and c., 162, 2027, 2063, 2720
motives and c., 509, 638
object of c., 545, 568, 680, 1401, 1516, 2433, 2700
perception and c., 2134, 2781
postulate of c., 140
practicality of c., 81
precision of c., 354
problems and c., 21
psychology and c., 714, 1792
qualities and c., 914, 2100
reality and c., 171, 176, 205, 221, 238, 289, 343, 422, 628, 690, 998, 1061, 1409
relations and c., 1557
religion and c., 429
scientific fact and c., 570
situational origin of c., 860, 1046, 1121, 1359, 1474, 2088, 2100, 2168
social character of c., 1473
solipsism and c., 199
stages of c., 51
success of c., 139
teleology and c., 402
transcendence of c., 313, 338
truth and c., 574, 717, 814
utility of c., 282, 327, 549, 627, 719, 948
validity of c., 23, 182, 377, 423, 506, 574, 814
value and c., 734, 1311, 1722, 1778, 1811
will and c., 276, 1109, 1383
Cohen, Morris R., 1704, 2204, 2747
Comte, August, 351, 519, 1826

College, 342, 557, 2110, 2124
Common good, 7, 540
Common sense, 35, 279, 491, 535, 613, 889, 933, 939, 964, 1078, 1261, 1309, 1907, 2778. *See also* Philosophy, Scottish
  categories of c., 176, 438
  dualism of c., 249, 554
  knowledge and c., 242, 250, 743, 2282
  realism and c., 475, 514, 664
  religion and c., 394, 2520
Communication, 32, 1809, 1907, 2356, 2678, 2720, 2781
  spiritual c., 90, 676, 839
Communism, 2364, 2678. *See also* Marx, Karl
Community, 563, 1532, 1607, 1907, 2097, 2110, 2213, 2227, 2686, 2720. *See also* Society
  c. of knowledge, 2117
  Great c., 1907
  language and c., 186, 2041
  religion and c., 339, 1366, 2781
Comte, Auguste, 351, 519, 1826
Concept, 93, 171, 176, 199, 212, 250, 266, 300, 302, 321, 438, 673, 742, 790, 792, 798, 816, 818, 822, 879, 958, 999, 1169, 1326, 1343, 1359, 1495, 1686, 1771, 1840, 1871, 1961, 1995, 2041, 2612, 2709, 2781
  Bergson and c., 753, 816, 822, 948
  consciousness and c., 678, 821
  dialectic and c., 675
  essences and c., 894
  function of c., 889, 1111
  knowledge and c., 5, 867, 1676, 2118
  meaning of c., 62, 105, 2778
  observation and c., 1420
  origin of c., 38, 149
  philosophical c., 13, 1753
  precision of c., 226, 472, 1888, 2565
  reality and c., 212, 759, 816, 958, 980, 1090, 1812, 2041
  reconstruction of c., 2100
  scientific c., 72, 143, 675, 1352, 2118
  sensation and c., 176, 438, 664, 675, 958, 2356
  static c., 158, 860
Conduct, 13, 18, 52, 139, 811, 961, 1201, 1360, 1474, 1686, 1731, 2244. *See also* Behavior; Habit
  concept and c., 93, 1666
  education and c., 32
  experience and c., 2093
  human nature and c., 913, 1667, 1709
  knowledge and c., 5, 703, 2110, 2433
  moral c., 76, 86, 298, 540, 571, 1071, 1452, 1461, 1889, 2102, 2720
  religious belief and c., 583, 1117
  self and c., 1194
  thought and c., 90, 191, 273
  truth and c., 939, 1381, 2244
  utilitarianism and c., 7
Conflict, 82, 1667, 1855, 1966, 2029. *See also* Problem
  attention and c. of habits, 535
  c. of selves, 370
  c. of values, 241, 540, 1589
  emotion arising in c., 1895
  feeling arising in c., 120
  judgment and c. resolution, 574
  meaning and c., 850
  mind arising in c., 587, 752
  morality and c., 86, 2102
  science and opinion c., 2022
  sensation arising in c., 220
  social c., 1907, 2110, 2412, 2720
  thought arising in c., 173, 1359
Conformity, 257, 1191, 1907, 2110, 2678
Confucius, 1999
Connotation, 1686, 2118
Conscience, 672, 1333, 1410, 1556, 2036, 2396
Conscientiousness, 7, 540

Consciousness, 7, 16, 29, 96, 103, 180, 204, 248, 271, 317, 319, 514, 520, 1147, 1193, 1237, 1352, 1420, 1555, 1595, 1618, 1640, 1686, 1716, 1809, 1938, 2121, 2244, 2495, 2510, 2536, 2556, 2720, 2770. *See also* Mind
action of c., 973, 1045
c. as adjustment, 22, 1666, 2356
c. as behavior, 1463, 1488
c. as meaning, 155, 971
c. as natural interaction, 1596
c. as postulate, 96
c. as purposive, 241, 300, 564, 1249, 1261, 1391
c. as function, 174, 222, 288, 303, 537, 830, 1353, 1451, 1589
c. as relations, 262, 296, 678, 971, 998, 1094, 1096
c. as selective interest, 2168
c. as tension in activity, 154, 752
c. in experience, 23, 183
Bergson on c., 78
Bode on c., 1520
changeless c., 139
continuity of c., 590
contrary experience and c., 2055
cosmic c., 670
creativity of c., 456
dualism and c., 248, 1782
experience and c., 314, 288, 2503
experience beyond c., 312
fringe of c., 972
higher grades of c., 675
God as widest c., 242
knowledge and c., 307
matter as c., 177
monism and c., 958, 1781
moral c., 571, 1194
motor process and c., 677, 1379
neo-realism and c., 2452
nervous system and c., 11, 32, 63, 90
object and c. in sensation, 1131
optimism and c., 969
others' c., 243
pathological c., 898
private c., 996, 1245
pure experience and c., 379
reality and c., 515, 546, 589, 661, 690, 759, 911-2, 1026, 1451
relations in c., 220, 262
religious c., 68, 151, 255, 369, 608, 614, 841, 891, 894, 1165, 1320, 2005
self-c., 22, 70, 105, 183, 310, 564, 1194, 1508
social c., 22, 100, 154, 334, 511, 693, 705, 849-51, 1099, 1243, 1420
society and c., 9, 975
stream of c., 116, 147, 167, 218, 244, 247, 453, 625, 675, 740, 852, 1091, 1347, 2076, 2785
sub-c., 90, 190, 515, 821, 1062, 1186, 1749, 2056
subliminal c., 64, 90, 182, 190, 821, 902, 1186
superhuman c., 1324
thought and reality in c., 153
universal c., 645
will and c., 948, 1083
Consequences, 114, 375, 438, 737, 1000, 1045, 1360, 1474, 1745, 1826, 1973, 2105, 2390
c. of belief, 253, 592
c. of directed ideas, 2308
c. of intelligent action, 2027
c. of moral value, 116
c. of religion, 90, 499, 2211
c. of theories, 1213
c. of voluntary action, 227
criteria to judge c., 46, 1159
democracy and practical c., 719
intelligent consideration of c., 1811, 1966
meaning as practical c., 93, 568, 1670
morality and c., 540, 1197, 1201, 1310, 1584, 1912
past event and c., 1669, 2720

truth and c., 176, 253, 280, 367, 373, 381, 410, 416, 421, 568-9, 581, 592, 672, 690, 939, 949, 958, 1288, 1326, 1666, 2643
universal law and c., 1666
value and c., 2102, 2454
Consumer, 883, 2097
intellectual c., 2678
Consummatory experience, 1997, 2134
art and c., 2461
c. of goods, 1959
knowledge and c., 2720
Context
c. of consciousness, 154, 288
c. of experience, 911
c. of judgment, 506, 698
c. of knowledge, 672, 797
c. of meaning, 2063, 2075, 2408, 2781
c. of object, 760
c. of proposition, 492, 1985
c. of statements, 2599
c. of thought, 1121, 1359, 2168, 2636
method and c., 2768
mind as behavior in natural c., 1912
quality and cognitive c., 914
Contextualism, 2443, 2509, 2689, 2720
Continuity, 11, 86, 223, 233, 347, 1046, 1091, 1459, 1572, 1800, 1970, 1993, 2611
c. of experience, 114, 118, 139-40, 180, 188, 196, 220, 226, 314, 318, 358, 501, 520, 590, 675, 836, 852, 958, 987, 1120, 1244, 1284, 1353, 1420, 1809, 2022, 2192, 2394, 2458
c. of humans and nature, 1905, 1966, 2051
c. of ideals and nature, 1359
c. of nervous system, 1379
c. of organism, 752
c. of self, 345
c. of thought, 325, 374, 574, 1359, 2007, 2720
logic of c., 18, 158, 272, 2056
mental c., 98, 2191, 2244
synechism and c., 93, 2034, 2231, 2421
Contradiction, 128, 158, 200, 675, 719, 877, 899, 1547-8, 1762, 1871, 2250
c. in experience, 50, 698, 1420
c. in reality, 161
coherence and c., 631, 1120
concepts and c., 816, 1090
pluralism and c., 1452
principle of non-c., 140, 286, 368, 720, 2029, 2092
Control, 88, 279, 509, 1379, 1419-20, 1546, 1666, 2041, 2290, 2415, 2611, 2633, 2678
c. of democracy, 1015
c. of experience, 27, 96, 176, 241, 250, 428, 599, 642, 890, 1670, 1800, 2356
c. of ideas by facts, 421
c. of inquiry, 1311
c. of nature, 6, 1308, 2095
c. of religious belief, 1366
c. of thought, 792, 1451, 2100, 2357
inquiry and situational c., 2612
intellectual c., 527, 638, 772
linguistic c., 2217
logic and c., 2781
meaning and intelligent c., 316, 1912
knowledge and c., 128, 165, 392, 2151, 2747
morality and c., 86, 114, 1745, 2265, 2720
natural values and c., 1709
philosophy and c. of living, 511
physical as c. of means, 77
science and c., 890, 1584, 1601, 1701, 1908
scientific c. of error, 1390
self and social c., 1833
thought and c. of situations, 422, 1589
Cook, E. A., 2770
Cooley, Charles H., 2122

Cooperation, 1572, 2770
Copernican revolution, 450, 618, 1250, 1871, 2027, 2049, 2224
Cosmology, 173, 1086, 1690, 2015, 2160, 2257, 2354, 2633, 2636, 2747
Cournot, Antoine Augustin, 854
Couturat, Louis, 35
Crawley, Ernest, 1084
Creativity, 112, 134, 192-3, 568, 645, 1073, 1159, 1359, 1431, 1510, 1799, 1855, 2636, 2696, 2754. *See also* Novelty
  c. of mind, 133, 456, 1383, 1420, 1616, 1667, 1770, 2094, 2584, 2663
  c. of will, 134, 161, 269, 350-2, 359, 468, 568, 1139
  moral c., 256, 1959
Croce, Benedetto, 135, 1021, 1384, 2167, 2461, 2728
Culture, 3, 43, 87, 385, 644, 658, 1510, 1563, 1667, 1670, 1766, 2226, 2276
  American c., 1877, 2110, 2196, 2412, 2640
  androcentric c., 1724
  ethical c., 1776
  freedom and c., 2678
  logic and c., 2612
  philosophy and c., 511, 1572, 1908, 2027, 2168, 2720
  religion and c., 499, 2634
Curiosity, 30, 32, 75, 276, 792, 1409, 2110
Custom. *See* Tradition
Cynicism, 675

D'Arcy, Charles F., 71, 1394
Darwin, Charles. *See* Evolution.
Data, 98, 653, 710, 792, 816, 852, 1549, 1666, 2117, 2405, 2415
  d. of experience, 118, 672, 889, 953, 1260
  knowledge and d., 1359, 1420, 2098
  meaning and d., 1025, 1829
  qualities as d. for values, 1311, 2027
Davidson, Thomas, 957, 1850
Deduction. *See* Logic, deductive
De Laguna, Theodore, 1103
Democracy, 557, 675, 710, 719, 928, 1159, 1172, 1181, 1487, 1650, 1766, 1782, 1907, 2058, 2383, 2486, 2654, 2678, 2683, 2693, 2696, 2718, 2720, 2754, 2759, 2781
  aristocracy and d., 1015, 1749
  d. as logical method, 883
  education and d., 111, 1297, 1300, 1313, 1358, 1467, 1526, 1880, 2220, 2236, 2412, 2480, 2546, 2609, 2720, 2753, 2789
  Emerson and d., 112
  free inquiry and d., 2720
  individual mind and d., 29
  metaphysical d., 1428
  morality and d., 536, 1704, 2646
  philosophy and d., 236, 1529
  religion and d., 1366, 2573
  social ethics and d., 746
Denotation, 792, 1686, 1974, 1993, 2104, 2118, 2250, 2564, 2593
Descartes, Réne, 528, 703, 918, 958, 1305, 1661, 2027, 2458, 2603, 2778
Deschamps, Cardinal, 683
Desire, 16, 243, 369, 644, 673, 718, 1173, 1311, 1419, 1575, 1588, 1850, 1855, 2105, 2227, 2350, 2356, 2389, 2611, 2681
  morality and d., 2102
  science and d., 700, 1101
  thought and d., 690, 1250, 1260
  truth and d., 259, 530, 1072, 1569
  value and d., 2480
  will and d., 149, 195, 1966
  world and d., 96, 134, 249 2495
Dessoulavy, C., 336
Determinism, 7, 16, 24, 63, 80, 82, 241, 480, 524, 569, 630, 718, 879, 909, 930, 958, 965, 1312, 1440, 1459, 1684, 1807, 1981, 2073, 2113, 2771
  morality and d., 256, 712
  scientific d., 395, 909, 1716, 2588

Dewey, John, 1304, 1370, 1434, 1454, 1571, 1649, 1694, 1711, 1846, 1865, 1896, 1955, 1980, 1991, 2011, 2014, 2018, 2030, 2037, 2047-8, 2066, 2069, 2072, 2089, 2115-6, 2141, 2166, 2172-3, 2255-6, 2280, 2304, 2313, 2348, 2366, 2385, 2455, 2472, 2519, 2533, 2567, 2581-3, 2607, 2619, 2621, 2664, 2692-4, 2698, 2701, 2705, 2719, 2721, 2728, 2731, 2761, 2766, 2773-4, 2788, 2792
collection of works by D., 1969, 2024, 2680, 2746
credo of D., 2095, 2679
D. compared to other pragmatists, 46, 157, 540, 569, 589, 705, 963, 998, 1032, 1055, 1253, 1316, 1326, 1335, 1382, 1443, 1550, 1560, 1587, 1782, 1788, 1816, 1880, 1914, 1954, 1989, 2341, 2552, 2626, 2651, 2686
D. on James, 118, 165, 167, 540, 799, 800, 1078, 1666, 1862, 2444, 2548, 2751
D. on Mead, 2169, 2244
D. on Peirce, 164, 1360, 1666, 1734, 2191, 2412, 2421
D. on Schiller, 139, 1121, 2549
development of his thought, 27, 677, 1359, 1630, 2096, 2223, 2283, 2370, 2412, 2433, 2684, 2720
influence of D., 746, 1714, 1898, 1910, 2038, 2078, 2201, 2203, 2350, 2368, 2615-6, 2668
influences on D., 102, 746, 1458, 1770, 1838, 2685
James on D., 173, 176, 242, 438, 440, 672, 1360, 2444
John D. Society, 1470
Lewis on D., 2119, 2703
Mead on D., 185, 2433
Peirce on D., 118
philosophy and D., 789, 1071
Schiller on D., 703, 752, 1336, 2357
Dialectic, 958, 1547, 2078, 2098, 2151, 2247, 2747
absolutism and d., 250, 675, 790, 2456, 2717, 2758
Discipline, 792, 1297, 1478
Discourse
inquiry and d., 2790
meaning in d., 43, 349, 1965, 2781
nature relative to d., 1836
ontology and d., 2725
origins of d., 2203
philosophy and d., 35, 1721
Discovery, 213, 316, 1071, 1448, 2094-5
inquiry and d., 941, 1855, 2063
positivism and d. of laws, 1420
reality and d., 153
religious d., 2357
truth and d., 97, 266, 743, 889, 1141, 1250, 1425
Dogma, 387, 428, 449, 683, 790, 939, 958, 969, 1107, 1109, 1117, 1169, 2080, 2098
Doubt, 118, 130, 270, 272, 315, 317, 568, 630, 647, 727, 939, 998, 1121, 1572, 1809, 1912, 2720
belief as relief from d., 639
Cartesian d., 2778
d. as natural trait, 1572, 2720
d. of all beliefs, 1121
d. of external world, 1309, 1549
duty to d., 26, 39
inquiry starting from d., 51, 118, 299, 752, 792, 911, 1809
knowledge creating d., 2104
knowledge resolving d., 235
mental development and d., 587
moral d., 1311
philosophic d., 481, 488, 683
subjectivity and d., 315
systematic d., 2040
truth arising from d., 368
will to d., 565
Draghiscesco, Demetrio, 260
Dreams, 201, 1338, 2720
Driesch, Hans, 2488

Dualism, 162, 301, 554, 724, 752, 1044, 1092, 1297, 1311, 1358, 1418, 1421, 1427, 1442, 1451, 1586, 1595, 1693, 1809, 1855, 2078, 2593
absolute and d., 718, 860, 894
aesthetic and d., 2356
consciousness and d., 174, 1782
d. of fact and idea, 883
d. of ideals and nature, 1359
d. of means and value, 2176
d. of New England culture, 2096
empiricism and d., 238
epistemological d., 421, 679, 1308, 1388
knowledge and d., 1988
logical d., 393
mathematics and d., 2217
origins of d., 2027
psychophysical d., 32, 1432, 1531, 1681
radical d., 519
radical empiricism and d., 244, 248-9, 254, 733, 1498, 2700, 2751
realism without d., 1669, 1682, 1725
rejection of d., 77, 98, 153, 155, 303, 1431, 1497, 1928, 2121, 2186, 2193, 2433, 2636
religion and moral d., 1366
religious d., 675, 2357, 2770
transcendence of d., 685
Whitehead's d., 2025
Duhem, Pierre, 378, 1021
Duns Scotus, John, 2686
Durkheim, Émile, 549
Duty, 7, 68, 114, 503, 540, 616, 1333, 1530, 2097, 2102, 1169, 2227, 2722
d. to believe, 1322
d. to doubt, 39
knowledge and d., 1412
intellectual d., 438, 681, 1322, 2363
Dynamic, 1451, 2058. *See also* Change
d. experience, 118, 380, 752
d. logic, 1957
d. psychology, 587
d. universe, 155
life as d., 811, 1402
life as d. adaptation, 118
mind as d., 5, 98, 1587, 2100, 2499, 2584
reality as d., 143, 153, 393, 816, 999, 1914, 2352
time as d., 158
truth as d., 331, 575, 637, 642, 680, 810, 1572, 1782, 1871

Economics, 7, 273, 536, 883, 974, 1233, 1366, 1420, 1724, 1749, 1907, 2077, 2097, 2355, 2678, 2680
e. doctrine of concept, 1840
education and e., 2310, 2371
Eddington, Sir Arthur Stanley, 2073
Education, 25, 30, 32, 118, 137, 168, 214, 501, 534, 746, 903, 1024, 1067, 1166, 1240, 1306, 1359, 1426, 1454, 1571, 1612, 1667, 1750, 1758-9, 1761, 1767, 1823, 1854, 1897, 1900, 1902, 1937, 1977-8, 1999, 2028, 2038, 2043, 2053, 2061, 2109, 2110, 2150, 2155, 2183, 2209, 2221, 2222, 2229, 2237, 2299, 2302, 2310, 2401, 2406, 2433, 2453, 2471, 2483, 2608, 2613, 2639, 2641, 2664, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2693, 2696, 2699, 2734, 2746, 2762, 2780
agricultural e., 2336
art and e., 1856
child e., 8, 85, 2305
college e., 122, 342
creativity and e., 2094
culture and e., 2196, 2276
democracy and e., 111, 1297, 1300, 1358, 1467, 2220, 2236, 2412, 2486, 2546, 2609, 2789
development of e., 2710
economics and e., 2371
experience and e., 2611
freedom and e., 2781
individuality and e., 1718
industrial e., 2082

Jewish e., 1899
logic and e., 337
mass e., 2392
morality and e., 536, 652, 1776, 2265, 2724
new realism and e., 2665
philosophy of e., 27, 102, 794, 1369, 1528, 1897, 1916, 2000, 2010, 2031, 2090, 2099, 2144, 2163, 2210, 2347, 2360, 2422, 2456, 2571, 2594, 2637, 2669, 2720, 2723, 2783
progressive e., 1313, 1958, 2052, 2124, 2253, 2284, 2298, 2326, 2414, 2540, 2602, 2715
psychology and e., 10, 49, 54, 115, 437, 765, 1150, 1248, 1521, 2084, 2096, 2641
purpose of e., 1426, 1720, 2206
religious e., 117, 538, 858, 1800, 2682, 2744
reflection and e., 792, 2295
science and e., 102, 342, 792, 795, 1358, 2028, 2090, 2095, 2613, 2696
society and e., 30, 32, 49, 85, 137, 337, 557, 644, 1313, 1358, 1466, 1526, 1720, 1759, 1854, 1958, 1999, 2031, 2096, 2310, 2358, 2412, 2547, 2611, 2656, 2681
sociology and e., 2656
values of e., 937
Edwards, Jonathan, 995, 1540
Effort, 32, 78, 149, 189, 193, 435, 939, 1159, 1166, 1666, 2027, 2357
universe amenable to e., 138, 261, 406
Ego-centric predicament, 797, 939, 1071, 1097, 1220, 1311, 1480
Egotism. *See* Selfishness
Einstein, Albert, 2150. *See also* Relativity, theory of.
Elliot, Hugh, 1048
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 90, 112, 121, 160, 707, 995, 1287, 1540, 1580, 2020, 2601, 2674, 2740
Emergence
creation and e., 2138
e. event, 2244
e. of matter, 1924
e. of mind, 1691
evolution and e., 2354
intelligence as e., 1928
life's e. with environment, 2244
properties and e., 2352
Emotion, 7, 16, 198, 248, 406, 629, 707, 769, 898, 1049, 1233, 1333, 1625, 1677, 1895, 1908, 2050, 2356
aesthetic e., 2270, 2648
body and e., 513, 721
Lotze on e., 2499
morality and e., 1474
practical judgments and e., 1311
religious e., 90, 105, 369, 499, 599, 1338, 1843, 2467, 2751
subliminal e., 821
thought and e., 188, 527, 690, 752, 1335, 1515, 1530, 1702
value as e., 1814, 2027, 2681
Empirical, 222, 472, 711, 1007, 1081, 1335, 1390, 1871, 1914, 2409, 2451, 2612, 2711-2
e. account of appearance, 1904
e. application of logic, 2029
e. concept of mind, 33
e. concept of God, 139
e. denotation, 2104
e. description of thought, 1536
e. idealism, 1547
e. inquiry, 2610
e. knowledge, 2041, 2709
e. logic, 164, 1359
e. methods in philosophy, 790, 1201, 1960, 2110, 2285
e. naturalism, 1809, 2098
e. nature of inference, 1549
e. nominalism, 313
e. realism, 2244

Empirical (cont.)
e. sciences, 2438
e. study of cognition, 325, 2025
e. temperament, 438
e. test of realism, 1007-8, 1207
e. test of religion, 90, 970, 1366
e. test of values, 1449
e. truth, 2117
induction and e. tests, 2756
psychology as e. science, 1716
science and e. verification, 2118
scientific and e. methods, 792
thought and e. research, 51
Empiricism, 38, 118, 163, 173, 232, 339, 407, 409, 422, 432, 490, 511, 592, 617, 653, 808, 913, 933, 1127, 1170, 1311, 1326, 1844, 2066, 2130, 2417, 2526, 2636, 2670, 2720, 2778, 2786, 2793. *See also* Radical empiricism
absolute and e., 282
aesthetic and moral e., 16
British e., 166, 471, 879, 1670, 2575
certainty and e., 2027
dualism and e., 238
education and e., 534, 903
evolutionary e., 568, 881
Green on e., 1770, 1838, 2113
idealism and e., 364, 675, 1420, 2235, 2747
immediate e., 215, 233, 237, 297, 338, 1149, 2770
Kant's e., 96
knowledge and e., 798, 2764
logical validity and e., 2670
logical positivism and e., 2378
Mach and e., 1350
moral belief and e., 86
naturalistic e., 1802
passive e., 17, 484
pluralistic e., 840, 1418, 2433
psychological e., 1501, 2399
rationalism and e., 331, 958, 1184, 1572, 1690, 1753, 1792, 2460, 2781
religion and e., 892, 1133
scientific e., 2438, 2516, 2597, 2636
truth and e., 184, 1961, 2286
value and e., 2027
Ends. *See* Purpose
Energy, 59, 98, 656, 1316, 1352
human e., 437, 438, 1667, 2611
mental e., 78
mind as e., 515
reality as e., 148, 516, 607
religion and personal e., 90, 1366
scientific view of e., 155, 599
supernatural e., 90
truth and increased e., 568
Environment, 3, 7, 153, 253, 1572, 2088
awareness and e., 535, 1596
body and social e., 1962
child's e., 14, 1358, 2611
experience of e., 672
knowledge and e., 158, 301, 841, 1116
mind as adjustment to e., 22, 32, 98, 118, 1451
mind as dependent on e., 1710, 2584
morality and e., 6, 114, 1709
organism and e., 240, 690, 752, 936-7, 1149, 1220, 1420, 1666, 1670, 1686, 1855, 2076, 2093, 2244, 2408
religion explaining e., 583
self and e., 1667, 2751
thought and uncertain e., 2720
thought arising in stress of e., 758
utility relative to e., 575
value and equilibrium with e., 691
Epicurus, 703
Epiphenomenalism, 197, 963
Epistemology, 241, 280, 317, 367, 426, 581, 672, 687, 690, 700, 730, 797, 870, 879, 886, 889, 936, 937, 948, 955, 1069, 1071, 1083, 1116, 1176, 1414, 1420, 1451, 1480, 1497, 1515-6, 1549, 1572, 1606, 1712, 1721, 1988, 2027, 2041, 2254, 2288, 2344, 2593, 2633, 2709, 2720, 2770
Bergson on e., 943
dualistic e., 1308, 1388, 1418, 1421, 2751

experience and e., 21, 1809, 2352
facts and e., 421
functional e., 752
genetic e., 905
idealism and e., 196
Locke and e., 130
logic and e., 118
mind and e., 23, 33
morality and e., 1057, 1207
neutral and e., 1416
perception and e., 1812
psychology and e., 103
radical empiricism and e., 219
reality and e., 315, 535, 556, 678, 1311, 1360, 2088
religion and e., 1320, 1850
selves and e., 71
social e., 1460
value and e., 2454
Equality
e. of opportunity, 2097
natural lack of e., 719
Error, 56, 94, 130, 153, 159, 205, 241, 316-7, 489, 492, 551, 574, 600, 680, 710, 798, 1000, 1006-7, 1083, 1109, 1129, 1195, 1268, 1381, 1420, 1446, 1497, 1515, 1792, 2063, 2104, 2147, 2378, 2405, 2495, 2756
absolute and e., 176, 705
a priori and e., 364
Bradley on e., 486, 877, 1839
idealism and e., 316
knowledge and e., 318
Locke and e., 130
logic and e., 2063
measurement e., 1390
mind and e., 317, 1359, 2510
philosophical e., 2, 1359
Plato and e., 598
realism and e., 889, 1988
training of thought and e., 792
universals and e., 2088
Essence, 184, 894, 1359, 1811, 1961, 1968, 1970, 1993, 2192, 2593
experience and e., 2758
Plato and e., 1114, 1116, 2481
Ethics, 7, 33, 44, 46-7, 52, 60, 76, 94, 119, 139, 241, 536, 539-40, 543, 571, 634, 700, 721, 799, 813, 910, 1071, 1159, 1164, 1197, 1216, 1249, 1333, 1452, 1461, 1572, 1580, 1582, 1584, 1621, 1702, 1717, 1742, 1745, 1775-6, 1797, 1809, 1903, 1909, 2027, 2058, 2202, 2227, 2389, 2475, 2484, 2541, 2590, 2720, 2776
e. of belief, 56
e. of terminology, 272
education and e., 49, 102, 652
evolution and e., 6, 163, 298, 709
historical method in e., 86, 1889
idealism and e., 1741
intellect and e., 75
Judaism and e., 1402
Kant on e., 1780
knowledge and e., 1559
logic and e., 375, 2444
metaphysics and e., 138, 1207, 1570, 1626
naturalistic e., 1709, 2129
Nietzsche on e., 1057
philanthropy and e., 2123
psychology and e., 116, 1449, 2078
realistic e., 2558
reflective thought and e., 1714
religion and e., 184, 1320
social e., 532, 536, 709, 746, 793, 1413, 1797, 1892, 2227
social self and e., 1194
subjective e., 1474, 2074
Eucken, Rudolf C., 266, 951, 1592
Eugenics, 1281
Events, 471, 537, 792, 958, 1312, 1359, 1549, 1669, 1912, 1932, 1965, 1970, 2246, 2740
causation and e., 2022
emergent e., 2244
future and e., 1858
perception as natural e., 936, 1050, 1418, 1420
truth and e., 438, 650, 2782

Evidence, 208, 225, 356, 600, 673, 936, 1390, 2076, 2417
belief and e., 195, 1363, 2001
religious e., 79, 369, 499, 1087
Evil, 6, 22, 76, 89, 411, 492, 651, 675, 879, 2211
monism and e., 242, 958, 1452
moral choice and e., 712, 2102
reality of e., 90, 438, 630, 894, 1112, 1359
Evolution, 11, 90, 118, 153, 173, 200, 207, 232, 245, 263, 265, 568-9, 594, 623, 648, 675, 700, 710, 730, 790, 906, 930, 937, 958, 995, 1069, 1139, 1250, 1261, 1316, 1359, 1515, 1531, 1652, 1714, 1867, 2055, 2399, 2512
Bergson on e., 1102
community and e., 2213
e. of *a priori*, 1326
e. of meaning, 2098, 2106
e. of mind, 96, 253, 752, 1316
e. of truth, 680
e. of values, 1349
empiricism and e., 881
experience and e., 752, 1292
idealism and e., 1867
intelligence and e., 648, 879, 889, 1138, 1396
Judaism and e., 1402
knowledge and e., 213, 301, 690, 1019
logic and e., 643
morality and e., 6, 86, 163, 298, 616, 709, 2412
personality and e., 1674
rationalism and e., 656
religion and e., 960, 1312, 2504
social mind and e., 2663
Spencer on e., 166, 175
truth and e., 1111
universal e., 96, 155, 189, 302, 637, 692, 1390, 1614, 1617, 1734, 1799, 2354, 2636
usefulness and e., 139
Existence. *See* Being; Reality
Existentialism, 2570
Expectation. *See* Anticipation
Experience, 21, 32, 46, 65, 96, 109, 118, 140, 174, 207, 242, 278, 321, 353, 438, 441, 459, 484, 490, 511, 583, 600, 659, 672, 675, 752, 792, 800, 805, 902, 911, 918, 944, 1127, 1176, 1209, 1293, 1359, 1407, 1420, 1451, 1473, 1681, 1800, 1871, 2036, 2076, 2080, 2093, 2105, 2192, 2352, 2421, 2640, 2720. *See also* Reality, experience and.
absolute and e., 89, 128, 152, 313, 371, 423, 483, 709, 718, 1046
active e., 5, 57, 85, 243, 1536
aesthetic e., 299, 393, 1810, 1847, 1855, 1873, 2356, 2461, 2574, 2648, 2683
a priori and e., 1728, 2041
belief tested by e., 2, 125
categories and e., 1912, 2247
cognitive e., 219, 1418, 2134, 2150
concepts and concrete e., 738, 790, 958, 2118
consciousness and e., 29, 288, 296, 379, 971, 998, 1686, 2503
continuity of e., 226, 987, 2034, 2458
control of e., 27, 599, 890, 1800
correspondence within e., 486
e. as activity, 154, 380, 1249
e. as natural process, 240
e. as self-contained, 242, 594
e. of others, 481
e. of qualities, 880
e. of relations, 180, 219, 233, 336, 672, 740, 860, 889, 958, 1053, 1078, 1244, 1420, 1557, 1697, 1809, 2352
e. of time, 1091, 2022
e. of truth, 242, 545, 549, 574, 589, 591, 865, 954, 978, 1988, 2046, 2328
e. of values, 651, 1311, 1702
education and e., 2611, 2641

explanation of e., 80, 199
functions in e., 148, 157
future e., 17, 2119, 2756
given e., 360, 2426, 2446
harmony of e., 198, 201
idealism and e., 300, 316, 364, 648, 756, 952, 1120, 1159, 1799
ideas and anticipated e., 128, 673, 958
immediate e., 65, 215-6, 233, 238, 338, 374, 565, 603, 1025, 1083, 1309, 1409, 1569, 1669, 1686, 1809, 1836, 1974, 1997, 2118, 2328, 2595, 2720
individuality and e., 1860
inquiry and e., 1665
knowledge and e., 23, 44, 237, 261, 297, 473, 653, 685, 249, 977, 1071, 1292, 1866, 1988, 2151, 2642
knowledge by accumulated e., 3
knowledge e., 234-5, 317
logic and e., 2631
meaning and anticipated e., 13, 93, 567-8, 956, 1190, 2378
meaningless e., 50, 1843, 1974, 2041
monism and e., 950, 1063
moral e., 82, 114, 571, 634, 1064, 1201
nature and e., 1809-10, 1836, 1867, 1905, 1910, 1971, 2740, 2747, 2758
non-cognitive e., 886, 1745
observation and e., 2022
possible e., 55
problematic e., 52, 77, 2168
pure e., 176, 180, 220-1, 244-5, 247-50, 314, 338, 422, 450-1, 483, 818, 889, 971, 999, 1158, 1205, 1260, 1416, 1697, 1852, 2758
reality as e., 71, 88, 171, 254, 282, 303, 312, 318, 366, 418, 450-1, 463, 483, 546, 570, 608, 618, 698, 914, 1244, 1353, 1431, 1882, 2235, 2770
reason and e., 26, 825, 1855
religious e., 31, 69, 79, 84, 90, 106, 110, 182, 190, 326, 346, 387, 499, 519-20, 529, 531, 687, 830, 841, 845-6, 853, 891, 922, 978, 1054, 1070, 1085, 1087, 1117, 1165, 1175, 1177, 1186, 1223, 1287, 1344, 1366, 1394, 1457, 1730, 1737, 1771, 1797, 1801, 1843, 2022, 2027, 2032, 2079, 2112, 2211, 2357, 2445, 2467, 2566, 2630, 2634
science and e., 226, 327, 1209, 1652, 2095, 2191
self and e., 192, 1194, 1852, 2244, 2458
social e., 480, 554, 752, 836, 1358-9, 1928, 1970, 2215, 2498, 2781
stability in e., 103, 254, 1809, 2041
subject and object within e., 21, 53, 77, 156, 241, 248, 254, 356, 889, 911, 1497, 1670, 1809, 2433
subjective e., 52, 237, 241, 247, 279, 314, 321, 343, 452, 797-8, 1359, 1420, 1670, 1809, 1932, 1988, 2027, 2076, 2100, 2770
thought and e., 124, 162, 183, 196-7, 254, 374
thought arising in conflicting e., 173, 2055
transcend e., 139, 153, 1311, 1678, 2046
transcendency of e., 358, 506
truth and satisfactory e., 482, 810, 879, 939, 954, 969, 1141, 1233, 1745, 2088
truth and systematic e., 530, 914, 948

Experience (cont.)
truth serving e., 41
unity of e., 314, 278, 453, 709, 1249, 2100, 2356, 2421, 2720
universality of e., 99, 300, 312, 645, 752, 1670
universals and e., 188, 1360
verifiability and e., 477, 680, 690, 953, 1026, 1961, 1989
whole of e., 2, 21, 77, 118, 124, 250, 956, 964, 1459, 2100, 2612, 2720
Experiment, 96, 163, 272, 354, 1008, 2056, 2143, 2469
e. as stage of reflection, 792, 1666, 2612, 2720
e. as stage of science, 35, 792, 889, 1420
education and e., 534, 903, 2110, 2220, 2347, 2406, 2471
knowledge and e., 1927, 2120
moral e., 540, 2412
Experimental, 86, 98, 192, 1176
e. habit of mind, 536
e. idealism, 139, 2027
e. knowledge, 2104, 2417, 2429
e. logic, 509, 623, 1359, 1417, 1496, 1788, 2720, 2781
e. meaning, 2429
e. naturalism, 2428
e. observation, 2550
e. order in experience, 316
e. psychology, 273, 438, 1379, 2017, 2050
e. realism in religion, 2179
e. science, 1714, 1908, 2095
e. theory of knowledge, 317, 1311
e. truth, 41, 1425, 1984, 2357
inquiry and e. conditions, 537
philosophy and e. verification, 1173, 1425
sensation and e. observation, 1309
valuation and e. knowledge, 1671
Experimentalism, 272, 1914, 2027, 2096, 2406, 2471, 2706
Fact, 278, 690, 958, 998, 1008, 1233, 1473, 1497, 2001, 2250, 2271, 2408.
See also Data
affectional f., 249
belief and f., 592, 672, 1121, 1322
education and empirical f., 534
f. arising in experience, 207
f. as given, 889, 1078, 2117
f. based on values, 138-9
f. independent of thought, 96
ideas and f., 279, 421, 501, 883, 1176, 2295, 2720
induction and f., 1665
intuited f., 266, 529
knowledge and f., 197, 337
morality and historical f., 86
moral ideals and f., 217
practical judgment and f., 1311
propositions and f., 672, 939, 1934
reality and f., 1727, 1941
reason and f., 2238
reflection and f., 792
relativity of f., 1932
role of f. in religion, 90, 978
scientific f., 429, 570, 1006, 1448
theory and f., 173, 347, 1250
truth and f., 3, 499, 545, 600, 760, 861, 911, 939, 950, 1184, 1251, 1782, 1871
value and f., 118, 138, 1272, 1448, 1811, 1940, 2027, 2507, 2629, 2702
Faith. *See* Religious faith
Fallacy, 152, 201, 240, 535, 565, 604, 710, 953, 963, 1312, 1518, 1606, 1698, 2056, 2250, 2720, 2770
activist f., 663
analytic f., 2168
external observer f., 1026, 1195
f. in education, 2221
f. of excluded middle, 2770
f. of false attribution, 1457
f. of scientific method, 1706
f. of unlimited extension, 2168

f. of vicious metaphysics, 279
genetic f., 153
intellectualist f., 797
pathetic f., 2324
philosophic f., 1809
pragmatic f., 1457
psychologist's f., 7, 103, 301, 1697
Fallibility
evidential f., 600
f. of *a priori*, 364
f. of perception, 998
religious f., 596
truth criterion and f., 1125, 1425
Fallibilism, 2191, 2319, 2778
False. *See* Truth, falsity and
Fanaticism, 2098, 2482
Fascism, 350-1, 1920, 1973, 2718
Fear, 32, 90, 249, 957, 2110
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 177, 657, 671, 675, 2488
Feeling, 120, 244, 249, 289, 317, 607, 821, 836, 958, 1359, 1474, 1809, 2421, 2426
f. of causation, 243
f. of freedom, 44
f. of process, 2285
f. of relation, 219, 453, 767, 816
meaning and f., 1965, 1997
reality and f., 171, 423
religious f., 90, 590, 672, 2357, 2445
thought and f., 69, 152, 169, 172, 191, 198, 261, 273, 276, 375, 480, 486
will and f., 69, 169, 191, 276, 486, 1321
truth and f., 198, 634, 1130, 1305
value and f., 1814
Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas, 968
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 39, 142, 274, 493, 660, 954, 1305
Final cause. *See* Teleology
Firstness, 2319, 2421, 2426, 2667
f. and Secondness, 2319, 2421
f. and Thirdness, 272, 2412
Fite, Warner, 343, 975, 1308, 1329, 1996
Flournoy, Théodore, 1063, 1230, 1638
Force
causation and f., 18
consciousness as f., 155
divine f., 879, 2294, 2357
f. of mental states, 543, 1176
form and f., 2356
logical f., 675, 2269
social f., 1054, 1907
worship of f., 710
Form, 999, 1099, 2485, 2612
activity and f., 2725
art and f., 1855, 2356, 2461, 2729
continuity as a f., 2034
f. of experience, 499, 608, 2357
f. of judgment, 877
f. of nature, 648
f. of reasoning, 149, 354
f. of thought, 118, 752, 790
mind as f., 1140
potentiality and f., 1312
reality and f., 912
useful f. of reality, 599
Fouillée, Alfred, 665, 950, 1031, 1082-3, 1176, 1288, 1661
Franklin, Benjamin, 2537
Frederick the Great, 1543
Freedom, 139, 192, 257, 311, 315, 430, 480, 540, 731, 818, 1032, 1159, 1431, 1667, 1966. *See also* Determinism
art and f., 1180
education and f., 792, 2178, 2611, 2678, 2781
f. of inquiry, 644, 2720
f. of will, 24, 32, 44, 62-3, 80, 98, 227, 242, 438, 541, 673, 703, 879, 958, 979, 1072, 1181, 1260, 1272, 1394, 1981, 2513, 2539, 2720
necessity and f., 63, 879
religion and f., 90, 2660
society and f., 7, 536, 939, 1907, 1966, 2678
Fullerton, George S., 673

Function, 148, 156, 249, 271, 550, 565, 647, 939, 1214, 1809
f. of belief, 255, 1046
f. of brain, 11
f. of doctrines, 1551
f. of dualism, 1431
f. of experience, 836, 1358, 1451, 1670, 1847, 2720, 2747
f. of fact, 173
f. of habit, 7
f. of ideas, 421, 684, 889, 1116, 1538
f. of inquiry, 1665, 2550
f. of knowledge, 17, 21, 30, 174, 180, 261, 301, 535, 797, 1800, 1935, 1988
f. of logic, 883, 1249
f. of meaning, 2063
f. of mind, 9, 155, 205, 222, 288, 303, 537, 700, 830, 1338, 1419, 1988, 2078, 2245
f. of moral judgment, 114, 116
f. of needs, 157
f. of observation, 316
f. of organism, 7, 1032
f. of qualities, 2352
f. of relations, 219
f. of religion, 429, 1054, 1087, 1301, 1442, 1535, 2294
f. of sensation, 185, 1044
f. of the personal, 539
f. of theory, 173
f. of thought, 51, 77, 98, 273, 279, 752, 1104, 1358, 1496, 1666, 2025
f. of universals, 2473
f. of will, 24
idea as f. of experience, 162, 183
mind as f., 675, 1962
perspective and f., 2039
self as f., 1809
social f. of statements, 2599
structure and f., 32, 103, 118, 240, 310, 319, 437, 458, 545, 565, 752, 1209, 1419, 1449, 2093
truth as f., 1572, 1988
truth tested by f., 143, 554, 672
Functionalism, 21, 157, 171, 220, 240, 296, 421, 483, 963, 1025, 1537, 1777, 1988, 2352, 2408, 2584
psychological f., 1, 7, 77, 105, 118, 120, 130, 149, 154, 199, 299, 304, 310, 314, 319, 389, 437, 790, 811, 1214, 1326, 1353, 1535, 1655, 2017, 2078, 2307, 2499
Future, 17, 247, 254, 607, 743, 1292, 1501, 1586, 1666, 1684, 1858, 2372, 2534, 2681
contingency of f., 130, 568
f. of humanity, 134, 1431, 2591
hypothesis and f., 1473, 1669, 2022
judgment and f., 197, 1663, 1682, 1756
knowledge and f. experience, 685, 1725, 2119, 2378, 2720, 2756
meaning and f. experience, 567-8, 939, 1360, 1809, 2106
reality of f., 1420, 1681, 2244

Genetic
g. analysis, 88
g. logic, 301, 509, 648, 905, 1298
g. method, 86, 118, 139, 163, 940, 1007, 1335, 2022, 2550, 2720
g. psychology, 19, 107, 116, 733, 889
g. view of mind, 33, 87, 1809, 1928
g. view of the personal, 539
g. view of thought, 118, 153, 181
g. view of truth, 607, 2042
Gentile, Giovanni, 2530
Geography, 1358
German National Socialist Party, 2350, 2562, 2603
Gesture, 186, 408, 850, 1099, 1686
Giardini, Andrea, 384
Goblot, Edmund, 1539
God. *See* Religion

Good, 7, 76, 90, 97, 114, 530, 540, 616, 645, 691, 703, 897, 1017, 1187, 1305, 1428, 1515, 1572, 1820, 1959, 2077, 2102, 2227. *See also* Value
communication as g., 1809
consummatory g., 1959
criterion of g., 76, 197, 492, 557, 2117, 2389
democracy and g., 1650
g. and evil, 22, 89
growth as final g., 1572, 2425
instrumental g., 1584, 1648
intrinsic g., 1584
knowledge and g., 392
nature and g., 651
religion and g., 950, 969, 1452, 2294, 2357, 2445, 2534
tragedy and g., 1080
truth and g., 232, 348, 950, 1017, 1141, 1569
value and g., 1311, 1814
Gore, Willard C., 185, 329, 485
Government. *See* Politics
Green, Thomas Hill, 380, 1770, 1838, 2113
Growth, 937, 958, 1187, 1697, 2191
education and g., 1358, 2360, 2412, 2540
g. as only moral end, 1572, 1650, 2412, 2425
g. of experience, 77, 96, 130, 423, 752, 2168, 2747
g. of form, 2356
g. of ideas, 337
g. of knowledge, 642, 879, 1007
g. of mind, 154, 458, 682, 792, 2760
g. of reality, 77, 130, 233, 438, 675, 712, 818
moral g., 540, 1776, 2227
religion and human g., 583
Guyau, Marie Jean, 1145

Ha'am, Ahad, 1402
Habit, 7, 18, 22, 158, 193, 198, 301, 316, 409, 459, 898, 1005, 1420, 1578, 1667, 1855, 1966, 2056, 2191, 2227, 2244, 2319, 2412
attention and h., 1, 535
education of h., 32, 792
effort and h., 78
logic and h., 2337, 2742
meaning and h., 850, 1560, 2778
mental h., 245
social h., 1731, 1914
truth as h., 3
Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich, 519
Haldane, John Scott, 1078
Halevi, Jehuda, 1402
Hall, Granville Stanley, 1047
Happiness. *See* Pleasure
Harmony, 120, 159, 181, 201, 241, 679, 840, 879, 1233, 2102, 2350
h. of activity, 59
h. of experience, 198, 423, 480, 752
mental h., 140
religion and h., 34, 958, 1771
Harris, William Torrey, 10, 1823
Harvard University, 122-3, 445, 462, 522, 620, 818, 837, 868, 872, 957, 1318, 1512
Hedonism, 298, 418, 540, 1311, 1335
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 26, 241, 272, 351, 380, 553, 675, 700, 871, 883, 1316, 1459, 1555, 1590, 2096, 2308, 2317, 2630, 2743
H. on art, 2461
H. on experience, 767
H. on logic, 52, 2007, 2717
H. on reality, 71
Hegelianism, 16, 21, 74, 194, 289, 395, 406, 492, 618, 651, 860, 963, 996, 999, 1042, 1071, 1074, 1078, 1116, 1159, 1244, 1459, 1555, 1592, 1625, 1770, 1889, 1917, 2412, 2433, 2456, 2490, 2495. *See also* Absolute
evolution and h., 692
knowledge and h., 889
psychology and h., 1449
religion and h., 72, 394, 622, 732
self and h., 71
thought and h., 57, 1666
truth and h., 649, 915, 1195

Heidegger, Martin, 2622
Helmholtz, Hermann Ludwig von, 416
Heraclitus of Ephesus, 266, 948
Herbart, Johann F., 268
Heroism, 840, 2312
Heymans, Gérard, 438
Hinduism, 732, 1386, 1592
History, 88, 118, 121, 177, 179, 279, 402, 521, 557, 635, 645, 675, 818, 869, 949, 1216, 1295, 1358, 1670, 1701, 1858, 1889, 1908, 2022, 2117, 2259, 2308, 2678, 2711
  morality and h., 86, 295
  religion and h., 90, 177, 331, 339, 499, 519, 841, 969, 1320, 2439
Hobbes, Thomas, 948, 1475
Hobson, E. W.,1774
Hocking, William E., 1326, 1771, 2098, 2139, 2660, 2747
Hodgson, Richard, 676
Höffding, Harald, 331
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1964, 2754
Holt, Edwin B., 1560
Hook, Sidney, 2443, 2628, 2686
Humanism, 139, 157, 194, 202, 242, 261, 280, 282, 284, 300, 363, 380-1, 391, 399, 400, 412, 414, 438, 446, 454, 484, 490, 492, 494, 498, 504, 539, 546, 557, 563, 612, 633, 640, 654, 672, 690, 710, 713, 715-6, 717-8, 731, 843, 879, 916, 963, 980, 1079, 1084, 1159, 1175, 1308, 1414, 1452, 1527, 1550, 1666, 1784, 1788, 1792, 1795, 1944, 1951, 2048, 2103, 2130, 2147, 2258, 2318, 2561, 2575, 2590, 2673, 2718, 2754
  logic and h., 2063, 2135
  naturalism and h., 809, 2568
  religion and h., 231, 560, 1400, 1562, 2065, 2279, 2357, 2376, 2420, 2445, 2514, 2520, 2566, 2573, 2676, 2741, 2770
  truth and h., 176, 245, 253, 596, 1001, 2063
  value and h., 869, 874, 991
Humanity, 6, 112, 192, 339, 920, 1159, 1949, 2573, 2755
  future of h., 134, 1431, 2591
Human nature, 90, 96, 110, 203, 769, 855, 913, 916, 998, 1479, 1575, 1667, 1707, 1792, 1890, 1907, 2022, 2041, 2225, 2227, 2389, 2569, 2573, 2740
Hume, David, 276, 420, 453, 484, 703, 711, 756, 958, 1359, 1699, 2355, 2458
Husserl, Edmund, 118, 1216e
Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 2624
Huxley, Thomas H., 6, 2096
Hypostatization, 77, 1181, 1359, 2636
Hypothesis, 37, 97, 118, 138, 149, 188, 198, 261, 282, 301, 337, 406, 438, 488, 550, 599, 628, 670, 675, 684, 693, 710, 718, 730, 879, 883, 889, 915-6, 969, 998, 1046, 1078, 1133, 1146, 1213, 1311, 1359, 1417, 1473, 1531, 1644, 1665, 1669-70, 1734, 2029, 2055, 2063, 2088, 2217, 2378, 2412, 2477, 2550, 2612, 2756, 2770
  axiom as h., 96, 139, 192, 568-9, 700, 916
  idea as h., 423, 537, 1572
  religion as h., 68, 90, 583, 1087, 1366, 1782
  scientific h., 282, 423, 568, 599, 647, 705, 792, 1111, 1117, 1156, 1360, 1714, 2055
  truth and h., 41, 208, 623, 642, 693, 758, 1326, 1448, 1871, 2417, 2443

Idea, 17, 32, 46, 62, 72, 75, 78, 118, 128, 159, 162, 165, 183, 207, 220, 238, 243, 248, 266, 279, 337, 372, 421, 437-8, 441-2, 460, 491, 501, 511, 537, 590, 628, 653, 672, 684, 752, 790, 792, 859-60, 883, 948, 964, 972, 977, 998, 1084, 1141, 1176, 1195, 1213, 1216, 1249, 1316, 1335, 1428, 1442, 1532, 1595, 1734, 1809, 1878, 2027, 2075, 2100, 2244, 2293, 2295, 2308, 2550, 2593, 2670, 2693

truth and i., 50, 367, 375, 405-6, 423, 440, 443, 486, 499, 506, 545, 575, 589, 649-50, 709, 793, 920, 964, 1116, 1338, 1501, 2088, 2417
value and i., 681, 790, 1814
Idealism, 16, 20, 44, 51, 60, 139, 141, 153, 158, 164, 184, 197, 201, 215, 222, 233, 240, 242, 252, 263, 279, 299, 300, 303, 312, 314-5, 327, 333, 358, 370, 374, 379, 401, 421-3, 438, 472, 475, 484, 511, 522, 535-6, 546, 570, 588, 591, 606-7, 650, 653, 661, 665, 675, 683, 685, 698, 707, 718, 724, 740, 752, 756, 759, 790, 796, 816-7, 840, 843, 878, 889, 892, 910-1, 936, 939, 946, 950, 952, 964, 980, 1004, 1046, 1074, 1089, 1098, 1102, 1120-1, 1130, 1154, 1159, 1180, 1195, 1200, 1220, 1225, 1284, 1296, 1311, 1316, 1326, 1347, 1359, 1390, 1409, 1413, 1420, 1452, 1459, 1480, 1483, 1496, 1515, 1533, 1538, 1547, 1587, 1619, 1651, 1659, 1670, 1674, 1698, 1702, 1715, 1740-1, 1770, 1782, 1799, 1809, 1838, 1867, 1871, 1911, 1928, 1974, 2027, 2060, 2130, 2151, 2167, 2193, 2213, 2215, 2235, 2331, 2433, 2571-2, 2575, 2631, 2636, 2660, 2675, 2720, 2743, 2747, 2754, 2770, 2776
objective i., 295, 316, 364, 756, 798, 1025, 1190, 2378, 2758
religion and i., 92, 630, 1430, 1626
personal i., 63, 380, 433, 494, 889, 1592, 1609
science and i., 344, 1021
subjective i., 21, 23, 57, 238, 321, 371, 642
Ideals, 13, 32, 77, 87, 189, 328, 402, 682, 692, 793, 826, 910, 969, 1029, 1181, 1358, 1494, 1546, 1572, 1581, 1633, 1677, 1707, 1777, 1809, 1836, 1878, 2027, 2071, 2077, 2097, 2104, 2352
American i., 996, 1143, 1862, 2444
Greek i., 540
moral i., 76, 86, 116, 571, 1559, 1876, 1889
religious i., 45, 1403, 2357, 2410, 2467
Identity, 248, 675, 752, 1101, 2029, 2231
organic i., 7, 2244
personal i., 244, 711, 1249, 1347
Illusion. *See* Appearance
Imagination, 7, 172, 341, 420, 508, 532, 752, 816, 1165, 1374, 1447, 1534, 1548, 1572, 1580, 1618, 1855, 1908, 1972, 2022, 2027, 2356-7, 2410, 2461, 2623, 2720
Imitation, 32, 107
Immediacy, 675, 1913, 2720
Immortality, 11, 58, 63-4, 73, 79, 90, 92, 139, 315, 732, 812, 879, 1181, 1257, 1260, 1302, 1324, 1438, 1798, 1852, 2488, 2718
Impulse, 32, 90, 279, 298, 480, 1197, 1667, 2022, 2102, 2227, 2356, 2611, 2720
Indeterminism. *See* Determinism; Freedom
India, 2551
Individual, 11, 50, 55, 72, 89, 121, 257, 260, 266, 336, 360, 380, 539, 662, 752, 760, 879, 957-8, 1124, 1152, 1420, 1510, 1577, 1686, 1718, 1860, 1910, 2213, 2339, 2663, 2720, 2733, 2754, 2763. *See also* Particularity
ethics and i., 7, 540, 607, 2227
religion and i., 969, 1020, 2416
society and i., 7, 1907, 2097, 2389, 2424, 2681, 2739
Individualism, 219, 698, 707, 921, 930, 967, 975, 1326, 1572, 1633, 1792, 2097, 2309, 2412, 2600, 2739
democracy and i., 32, 112, 719, 1297, 1358, 2781
psychological i., 300, 625, 1419, 2492
Induction. *See* Logic, inductive

Infinity, 72, 718, 879, 958, 962, 1625, 1633, 1785, 1905, 2663, 2756
Inquiry, 48, 55, 118, 237, 535, 583, 644, 672, 792, 796, 941, 1359, 1420, 1665, 1669, 1682, 1712, 1756, 1809, 2027, 2056, 2098, 2134, 2217, 2550, 2610, 2659, 2678, 2706, 2711, 2720, 2778
  doubt and i., 51, 752, 911
  ideas and i., 537
  logic and i., 354, 941, 1311, 1417, 1538, 1788, 2063, 2612, 2781, 2790
  meaning and i., 105, 611
  metaphysical i., 1312
  scientific i., 164, 315, 347, 653, 939, 976, 1360, 1448, 1549, 1706, 2095, 2164, 2191, 2232, 2244, 2429, 2658
  truth and i., 423, 696, 939, 2720, 2782
Instinct, 2, 32, 188, 308, 428, 898, 902, 943, 1057, 1420, 1474, 1667, 1773, 2055, 2412, 2416, 2492
  belief on i., 199, 270, 272, 675, 1159
  morality and i., 6, 1349
Institutions, 7, 30, 49, 121, 257, 316, 1015, 1366, 1731, 2027, 2066
Instrument, 265, 328, 644, 703, 978, 1180, 1233, 1461, 1809, 1914-5, 1962, 2100, 2265, 2425, 2747
  concept as i., 212, 752, 889, 1111, 1343, 2781
  knowledge as i., 158, 301, 337, 545, 645, 690, 1169, 1249, 1549, 1666, 1676, 1800, 1827, 2763
  logic as i., 199, 623, 752, 793, 1359, 1473, 1538, 2071, 2096, 2612, 2720
  mind as i., 32, 132
  science as i., 51, 438, 1041, 1274
  thought as i., 118, 279, 282, 534, 756, 969, 1138, 1516, 1586, 1826, 2146, 2194, 2239, 2282
Instrumentalism, 627, 685, 690, 752, 793, 797, 1102, 1210, 1225, 1359, 1420, 1442, 1473, 1538, 1549, 1558, 1665, 1712, 1756, 1831, 1910, 1992, 2013, 2071, 2104, 2106, 2110, 2137, 2190, 2246, 2255, 2318, 2340, 2348, 2720, 2765, 2792
  education and i., 2414
  experience and i., 483
  idealism and i., 1046, 1578, 1867, 2215, 2235
  metaphysics and i., 1353
  naturalism and i., 1413, 1867
  origin of i., 623, 1770, 1838, 1880, 2096
  other pragmatisms and i., 157, 438, 916, 963, 1032, 1335, 1550, 1666, 2686
  politics and i., 2781
  religion and i., 1535, 1546, 1801, 2211
  science and i., 1525
  values and i., 1589, 1648
Intellect. *See* Reason
Intellectualism. *See* Rationalism
Intelligence, 16-7, 52, 112, 124, 428, 534, 648, 663, 703, 879, 916, 950, 983, 1138, 1187, 1359, 1410, 1413, 1419-20, 1572, 1586, 1613, 1626, 1667, 1681, 1702, 1757, 1792, 1841, 1880, 1966, 1981, 2027, 2117, 2151, 2244, 2357, 2433, 2449, 2454, 2573, 2636, 2708, 2720, 2781
  Bergson on i., 637, 943, 1275, 2416
  education and i., 1358, 1759, 2611
  experience and i., 196, 316
  morality and i., 536, 2227, 2389
  social i., 534, 902, 1907, 1928, 1973, 2213
  values and i., 651, 2454, 2523, 2681
Interests, 13, 32, 85, 149, 168, 302, 556, 672, 905, 958, 1166, 1182, 1366, 1611, 1792, 2022, 2084, 2168, 2177, 2611, 2636, 2720

knowledge and i., 337, 638
morality and i., 7, 540, 2227
shared i., 241, 1358
social i., 87, 348, 939, 2681
theoretical i., 48, 245, 460, 792, 1326, 1409
value and i., 1637, 1814, 2436, 2681
Introspection, 98, 163, 278, 625, 799, 952, 1052, 1071, 1148, 1419, 1474, 1598, 1666, 2417, 2476, 2671, 2770
Intuition, 35, 114, 164, 266, 529, 586, 590, 672, 826, 838, 918, 952, 958, 999, 1044, 1102, 1130, 1173, 1259-60, 1275, 1296, 1676, 1961, 2564, 2670, 2770
Intuitionism, 7, 86, 298, 713, 948, 1021, 1061, 1083, 1288, 1311, 2217

Jacoby, Günther, 1230
James, Henry (brother), 2230
James, Henry (father), 90, 2230
James, William, 398, 432, 445, 461-2, 513, 577, 579, 694, 763, 783, 787, 856, 872, 901, 918, 927, 942, 947, 997, 1011, 1013, 1076-7, 1081, 1100, 1146, 1157, 1162-3, 1229, 1235, 1261, 1266, 1290, 1318, 1368, 1396, 1428, 1443, 1513, 1517, 1527, 1533, 1540, 1557, 1590, 1598-9, 1620, 1632, 1657, 1672, 1705, 1726, 1744, 1746, 1748, 1794, 1816, 1832, 1848, 1870, 1879, 1888, 1948-9, 1982, 2012, 2019, 2150, 2218, 2230, 2251-2, 2320, 2343, 2390, 2429, 2439, 2444, 2464, 2474, 2518, 2565, 2585, 2601, 2640, 2735, 2754, 2784, 2786
collection of works by J., 672, 957, 1078, 1579-80, 1751, 1764, 1827
development of his thought, 1091, 1580, 1661, 1852, 2281, 2444, 2513, 2532
Dewey on J., 118, 165, 167, 540, 799, 800, 1078, 1666, 1862, 2444, 2548, 2751
influence of J., 118, 193-4, 218, 328, 350, 826, 898, 951, 1068, 1094, 1587, 1663, 1738, 1782, 1796, 1821, 2066, 2078, 2128, 2189
influences on J., 284, 405, 675, 1259, 1335, 1926, 2499, 2630, 2700, 2763
J. compared to other pragmatists, 146, 157, 176, 195, 227-8, 245, 336, 450, 672, 835, 963, 1116, 1326, 1335, 1382, 1666, 1880, 1914, 1954, 2105, 2444, 2636, 2671, 2686, 2776
J. on Dewey, 173, 176, 242, 438, 440, 672, 1360, 2444
J. on Peirce, 13, 175-6, 438, 2444
J. on Schiller, 194, 350, 438, 440, 686, 2444
memorials to J., 745, 748-50, 755, 761-2, 768-70, 774, 777-8, 781, 783, 785, 799, 800, 804, 808, 811, 823, 826-7, 837, 839, 842, 847, 855, 863-4, 866, 868, 873, 884-5, 893, 898, 903, 921, 956, 959, 967, 970, 980, 982, 988, 995, 1003, 1022
Peirce on J., 271
Schiller on J., 280, 369, 1220, 1284, 1647, 1944, 2394
Janet, Pierre, 437
Jannsens, Edgar, 284
Japan, 1572-3
Jastrow, Joseph, 2055
Jefferson, Thomas, 2678, 2748
Jerusalem, Wilhelm, 1074
Joachim, H. H., 680, 714
Jones, E. E. Constance, 1123
Judaism, 1402, 1576, 1899, 2036
Judd, Charles H., 1379
Judgment, 21, 27, 79, 90, 138, 149, 167, 171, 197, 200, 299, 301, 314, 337, 423, 474, 535, 570, 597, 602, 698, 709, 752, 792, 877, 1046, 1311,

1336, 1343, 1359, 1366, 1417, 1448, 1486, 1495-6, 1527, 1569, 1648, 1663, 1669, 1745, 1839, 1912, 1989, 2046, 2063, 2094, 2134, 2194, 2246, 2315, 2454, 2507, 2512
ideas and j., 589, 653
knowledge and j., 118, 173, 1111, 1268, 1497, 2378
moral j., 76, 86, 114, 256, 1197, 1333, 1474, 2074, 2102, 2265, 2412
proposition and j., 1007, 1839, 2612
truth and j., 33, 143, 241, 263, 375, 506, 574, 631, 680, 793, 882, 977, 1098, 1446, 1961
universality of j., 114, 121, 143, 152-3, 316, 790
value j., 114, 1311, 1439, 1449, 1476, 1637, 1702, 2315, 2507, 2720
Justice, 7, 540, 1489

Kaftan, Julius, 2566
Kallen, Horace M., 1299, 1639, 1862
Kant, Immanuel, 13, 50, 96-7, 264, 274, 336, 351, 360, 405, 607, 700, 703, 711, 738, 803, 840, 844, 879, 922, 948, 954, 958, 1017, 1067, 1137, 1250-1, 1310, 1359, 1543, 1652, 1753, 1780, 1837, 1912-3, 1947, 2035, 2054, 2088, 2458, 2528
K. on practical reason, 75, 202, 328, 684, 705
K. on religion, 39, 90, 719, 1105, 1817
K. on thought, 316, 364, 2027
Kantianism, 232, 270, 360, 499, 535, 565, 599, 675, 683, 700, 756, 841, 889, 921, 993, 1067, 1409, 1547
neo-k., 428, 484, 660, 979
Keynes, John Maynard, 1680
Keyserling, Hermann Alexander Graf von, 1061
Kilpatrick, William Heard., 2637
Kinds, 2477-8, 2481, 2612
King, Irving, 113, 1535
Klyce, Scudder, 1625
Knowledge, 21, 33, 35, 67, 97, 143, 162, 173, 180, 197, 213, 217, 232, 244, 250, 260, 268, 279, 291-2, 297, 307, 317, 321, 361, 367, 369, 392, 413, 420-1, 428-9, 466, 489, 491, 508-9, 527, 549, 565, 568, 570, 578, 581, 590, 624, 645, 653, 665, 672, 675, 682, 685, 700, 702, 718, 730, 752, 758, 769, 779, 792, 798, 805, 829, 831, 838, 841, 879, 889, 909, 914, 916-8, 941, 943, 948-9, 953-4, 958, 962, 964, 996, 998-9, 1019, 1030, 1045, 1055, 1057, 1109, 1111, 1116, 1159, 1170, 1180, 1242, 1251, 1254, 1262, 1268, 1270, 1296, 1308, 1311, 1316, 1326, 1335, 1341-2, 1358-9, 1366, 1412, 1414, 1420, 1448, 1459, 1497, 1507, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1559, 1572, 1587, 1589, 1610, 1668-70, 1685, 1696, 1701, 1725, 1745, 1756, 1800, 1834, 1866, 1871, 1886, 1927, 1935, 1988, 1997, 2006, 2022, 2027, 2055, 2057, 2063, 2066, 2088, 2098, 2104, 2114, 2117-9, 2121, 2130, 2142, 2191, 2234, 2240, 2244, 2282, 2349, 2378, 2389, 2397, 2408, 2417, 2429, 2445, 2454, 2460, 2485, 2510, 2559, 2566, 2584, 2593, 2626, 2640, 2642, 2670, 2703, 2709, 2720, 2763-4, 2767, 2770, 2776, 2778, 2782.
See also Truth, knowledge and.
absolute and k., 313, 1555
action and k., 118, 337, 703, 1381, 1878, 2104, 2622, 2633
Bergson on k., 637, 816, 867, 1044, 1226, 1275, 1676
Bradley on k., 128, 423, 597, 816
evolution and k., 3, 301, 623, 690
hypotheses and k., 261
ideas and k., 165, 183
k. as relation, 174, 242, 442, 1595

k. as representation, 17, 139, 242, 244, 379, 450, 672, 758, 964, 2378
k. experience, 234-5, 237, 480
Locke on k., 17
object of k., 57, 627, 690, 878, 1008
power and k., 268, 2137, 2498
practical value of k., 75, 96, 103, 158, 207, 644
purpose of k., 5, 300, 569, 1391, 1451
reality and k., 23, 44, 60, 139, 213, 241, 315, 366, 376, 401, 442, 450, 452, 460, 472-3, 490, 535, 537, 569, 627-8, 642, 672, 743, 756, 759, 796-7, 860, 911, 936, 1007-8, 1071, 1190, 1329-30, 1359, 1420, 1765, 1792, 2006, 2088, 2110, 2130, 2151, 2417, 2740, 2747
relativity of k., 405-6, 1015, 1293
sensation and k., 321, 1141, 1249, 1292, 1309, 1418, 2041
theoretical k., 30, 266, 276, 348, 534, 776
transcendence of k., 235, 297, 318, 325, 358, 860, 999, 2378
value and k., 237, 1055, 1439, 1637, 1671, 1709, 1721, 2522, 2566
will and k., 75, 261, 446, 703, 1342
Knox, Howard V., 569, 1337
Korea, 1999
Külpe, Oswald, 1239

Laberthonnière, Lucien, 549, 683
Labor, 7, 1358
Lalande, André, 629, 950, 1101
Lange, C., 513
Language, 146, 186, 266, 1560, 1668, 1809, 1965, 2041, 2217, 2337, 2356, 2432, 2509, 2564, 2599, 2612, 2638, 2671
thought and l., 752, 792, 1995
La Rochefoucauld, Duc François de, 264
Law, 62, 217, 536, 1005, 1247, 1422, 1714, 1754, 1769, 1859, 1909, 2102, 2781
scientific l., 90, 260, 429, 438, 703, 1101, 1420, 1914
Learning, 30, 32, 929, 1419, 1907, 2110, 2253, 2360, 2611, 2641, 2687. *See also* Discovery; Education
l. of habits, 78, 1667
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 232, 703, 711, 738, 958, 1190, 1592
Le Roy, Édouard, 223, 336, 464, 531, 549, 580, 664, 683, 703, 949-50, 993, 1021, 1069, 1101, 1226, 1288, 1326, 1661, 2130, 2317
Leuba, James, 990
Levi, Allesandro, 1201
Lévy-Brühl, Lucien, 1201
Lewis, C. I., 1399, 1961, 2098, 2152, 2159, 2234, 2247, 2269, 2337-8, 2349, 2387, 2552, 2564, 2591, 2709, 2725
Liberalism, 607, 644, 1556, 1964, 2110, 2418-9, 2449, 2498, 2640, 2655, 2720
Lichtenberger, Henri, 1219
Life, 11, 59, 217, 328, 540, 590, 625, 675, 703, 811, 855, 879, 1073, 1181, 1312, 1431, 1510, 1855, 1910, 2086, 2244, 2356, 2394, 2433, 2534. *See also* Organism
meaning of l., 32, 90, 627, 1180, 1584, 1880, 2539
Literature, 807, 2735
Locke, John, 17, 130, 353, 703, 738, 1311, 1861, 2113, 2328, 2397, 2417
Logic, 18, 27, 51-2, 115, 132, 143, 146, 164, 213, 217, 266, 270, 277, 293, 299, 337, 375, 383, 447, 482, 492, 537, 583, 593, 607, 643, 672, 680, 683, 690, 709, 719, 771, 790, 857, 862, 877, 909, 998, 1007,

Logic (cont.)
1051, 1055, 1088, 1109, 1111, 1119, 1121-4, 1136, 1159, 1188-9, 1217, 1221, 1250, 1264-5, 1275, 1280, 1286, 1325, 1335, 1360, 1370, 1374, 1399, 1417, 1420, 1429, 1437, 1441, 1445-6, 1450, 1484, 1492, 1503, 1506, 1509, 1516, 1524, 1549, 1552, 1572, 1585, 1630-1, 1646, 1666, 1679, 1714, 1728, 1734, 1754, 1829, 1834, 1855, 1872, 1923, 1943, 1957, 2003, 2007, 2056-7, 2063, 2098, 2100, 2104-5, 2117, 2135, 2146, 2152, 2175, 2200, 2203, 2241-2, 2249, 2262-3, 2269, 2274, 2296, 2314, 2319, 2321, 2337-9, 2379, 2392, 2459-60, 2473, 2481, 2506, 2548, 2565, 2590, 2631, 2670-2, 2685-6, 2776, 2778, 2793
Aristotelian l., 771, 1279, 1420, 1444, 2027
Bergson on l., 1145
Bosanquet on l., 917, 1120, 1409, 2767
Bradley on l., 423, 1663, 2174
deductive l., 52, 537, 583, 690, 792, 1213, 1507, 1665, 1734, 2056, 2295, 2378
dialectical l., 72, 675, 790, 1078
dualism and l., 153, 393
ethics and l., 47, 114, 206, 602, 1709, 2444
functional l., 103, 118, 883, 1249, 1537, 2078
genetic l., 86, 88, 181, 301, 509, 648, 905, 1298
inductive l., 51-2, 583, 690, 792, 923, 1184, 1356, 1390, 1507, 1665, 1734, 2056, 2081, 2295, 2322, 2378, 2742, 2756
instrumental l., 199, 623, 752, 792-3, 941, 1311, 1359, 1444, 1473, 1496, 1538, 1549, 1665, 1669-70, 1745, 1756, 1770, 1809, 2071, 2096, 2110, 2612, 2655, 2675, 2693, 2715, 2720, 2738, 2740, 2767, 2781, 2790
psychology and l., 103, 139, 252, 367, 415, 442, 606, 689, 714, 972, 1292, 1788-9, 1792, 2215
reality and l., 188, 642, 1124, 1190, 1572, 1913, 2029, 2051, 2092, 2706
religion and l., 90, 766, 1457, 2573
retroductive l., 583, 2056
scientific l., 86, 164, 438, 1213, 1282, 1356, 1359, 1448, 1525, 1901, 2081, 2433, 2756
truth and l., 94, 171, 368, 375, 530, 545, 558, 574, 596, 680, 757, 948, 1181, 1383, 1765, 1782, 1913, 2063, 2152, 2337
Loisy, Alfred F., 549, 683, 949
Lorenz, Theodor, 699
Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 118, 184, 196, 634, 675, 2499, 2630, 2700, 2763, 2767
Love, 7, 32, 159, 249, 1806, 2642, 2720
Lovejoy, Arthur O., 573, 678, 699, 1613, 1669, 1703, 1724, 1756, 2186
Loyalty, 6, 591, 1741, 2720
Loyola, Ignatius, 264
Luther, Martin, 90, 1543
Lyman, Eugene W., 2741, 2770

McDougall, William, 572, 2492
McGilvary, Evander B., 1026
Mach, Ernst, 77, 98, 268, 438, 924, 1074, 1326, 1350, 2597
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1543, 2649
Macintosh, Douglas C., 2294, 2749
McTaggart, John M. E., 286, 673, 2272
Maeterlinck, Maurice, 938
Magic, 2027

Maine de Biran, 1288
Maier, Heinrich, 2228
Manichaeism, 894
Martineau, James, 612, 713, 1197
Marx, Karl, 883, 1768, 2308, 2364, 2502, 2531, 2687, 2743, 2759
Masaryk, Tomás Garrigue, 726
Materialism, 32, 86, 189, 197, 240, 315, 720, 724, 901, 970, 1003, 1063, 1186, 1311, 1481, 1651, 1681, 1782, 1890, 2244, 2572, 2776
  dialectical m., 2308, 2531
  religion and m., 11, 13, 90, 438, 675, 969, 1256, 1318, 2713
Mathematics, 19, 72, 94, 96, 115, 139, 143, 164, 181, 210, 381, 383, 590, 607, 645, 672, 703, 771, 941, 958, 1312, 1420, 1679, 1714, 1871-2, 1980, 2022, 2105, 2217, 2319, 2322, 2550, 2612, 2670-1, 2697, 2781
Matter, 67, 80, 98, 154-5, 177, 303, 438, 590, 752, 798, 879, 918, 943, 1352, 1442, 1693, 1910, 1924, 2025, 2027, 2720
  form and m., 2356, 2485, 2612
Mead, George Herbert, 1, 155, 310, 1326, 1995, 2078, 2153-4, 2156, 2158, 2169, 2205, 2267-8, 2273, 2316, 2335, 2372, 2557, 2561, 2578, 2599, 2636, 2711, 2727, 2739, 2760, 2794
Meaning, 43, 62, 72, 89, 149, 207, 269, 359, 364, 539, 592, 611, 680, 792, 796, 879, 918, 998, 1025, 1064, 1146, 1358-9, 1398, 1523, 1604, 1625, 1627, 1645, 1670, 1682, 1686, 1732, 1745-6, 1843, 1880, 1908, 1912, 1914, 1932, 1941, 1946, 1965, 1974, 2071, 2075, 2098, 2118, 2159, 2319, 2340, 2345, 2359, 2365, 2408, 2429, 2468, 2515, 2552, 2593, 2636, 2711, 2720, 2778, 2781
  action and m., 2106, 2703
  experience and m., 162, 234, 316-7, 911, 1190, 1249, 1809, 1871, 1997, 2032, 2041, 2215, 2378
  Locke on m., 130
  logic and m., 52, 118, 537, 1217, 1311, 1337, 1393, 1448, 1665, 1829, 2063, 2117, 2612, 2790
  m. of assertion, 2027
  m. of belief, 13, 1343
  m. of concept, 93, 105, 226, 472, 816, 958, 1360, 1666
  m. of idea, 402, 421, 444, 977, 1116
  m. of judgment, 1669
  m. of proposition, 272, 567-8, 939, 1616, 2208
  m. of rule, 569
  m. of sentence, 1934, 2790
  m. of statement, 143, 492, 1985, 2711
  m. of theory, 1261
  m. of thought, 90, 301, 509, 905, 1121, 2433
  m. of words, 62, 672, 1109, 1560, 1666
  mind and m., 148, 155, 515, 714, 850, 971, 1026
  purpose and m., 334
  truth and m., 492, 518, 545, 568, 573, 680, 1989, 2008, 2022, 2247
  universality of m., 1358, 1604, 1666, 1686, 2356
  value and m., 1604, 1811
  verifiability and m., 2387
Means, 2, 77, 159, 183, 590, 644, 790, 1358, 1666, 1670, 1731, 1809, 1855, 2022, 2027, 2356-7, 2461
  concept as m., 958
  deliberation on m., 1311, 1667
  end justifies m., 645, 1178, 1249, 2649, 2681
  judgment and m., 1311
  knowledge as m., 1381, 1676
  mind as m., 1261, 1358
  morality and m., 1584, 2077, 2102
  truth as m., 33, 118, 658
  value and m., 1702, 2176

Mechanical, 189, 260, 1149, 1308, 1510, 1531, 1809
m. biology, 96, 961
m. causation, 2022, 2408
m. evolution, 752
m. explanation, 1922
m. materialism, 970
m. science, 344, 1308, 1312, 1731, 2630
Mechanism, 295, 2639, 2763
human as m., 1962, 2097
mind as m., 32, 1099
Mediation, 233, 247
knowledge as m., 234
mind as m., 7, 338, 374
reflection as m., 1669
truth as m., 1098
universals as m., 188
Meliorism, 406, 438, 630, 922, 947, 958, 1440, 2076
Melville, Herman, 2686
Memory, 32, 852, 1347, 1812, 2050, 2316
Mental illness, 324, 329, 370, 485
Metaphysics, 12, 52, 59, 83, 90, 125, 140, 144, 147-8, 153, 161-2, 172, 183, 197, 207, 213, 219, 232, 241, 252, 272, 276, 278-9, 318-9, 321, 357, 361, 424, 438, 468, 486, 490, 492, 504, 574, 603, 623, 628, 662, 672, 675, 695, 710, 718, 745, 783, 793, 797, 801, 873, 879, 886, 889, 916, 918, 943, 958, 1000, 1039, 1069, 1071, 1081, 1124, 1144, 1193, 1195, 1200, 1220, 1259, 1261, 1268, 1288, 1312, 1347, 1352, 1353, 1366, 1390, 1423, 1428, 1431, 1452, 1536, 1578, 1600, 1610, 1667, 1703, 1721, 1752, 1765, 1792, 1836, 1845, 1868, 1905, 1914-5, 1993, 2063, 2076, 2112, 2233, 2240, 2244, 2250, 2260, 2274, 2303, 2317, 2319, 2339, 2357, 2382, 2394, 2534, 2590, 2592, 2640, 2666, 2671, 2686, 2720, 2736, 2739, 2776, 2778, 2793
inquiry in m., 1312, 1809
morality and m., 138, 571, 1207, 1570, 2740
science and m., 759, 1531, 1570, 2034, 2442, 2604
Milhaud, Gaston S., 1539
Mill, John Stuart, 180, 540, 604, 703, 790, 879, 948, 1292, 1584, 1749
Miller, Dickinson S., 26, 36, 205, 1642, 1945, 2004, 2062
Mind, 7, 23, 33, 35, 64, 90, 129, 132, 197, 241-2, 249, 261, 268, 280, 289, 308, 320, 423, 428, 499, 511, 527, 543, 545, 569, 587, 590, 618, 628, 675, 751, 756, 772, 798, 889, 898, 918, 936, 939, 948, 950, 998, 1007, 1030, 1049, 1078, 1096, 1111, 1196, 1220, 1268, 1305, 1338, 1358, 1367, 1389, 1420, 1474, 1478, 1554, 1578, 1586-7, 1640, 1643, 1669, 1710, 1734, 1799, 1809, 1815, 1835, 1871, 1876, 1912, 1970, 1988, 1995, 2041, 2134, 2247, 2289, 2350, 2356, 2388, 2510, 2566, 2584, 2636, 2661, 2693. *See also* Consciousness; Cognition; Reflection
body and m., 174, 254, 724, 1003, 1092, 1311, 1531, 1693, 1855, 1962, 2397
creativity of m., 133, 1616, 2094
development of m., 9, 28, 48, 87, 458, 792, 1312, 1691, 2760
function of m., 32, 98, 111, 118, 149, 171, 337, 752, 1025, 2078, 2146, 2245, 2282
m. as dynamic, 5, 1140, 1249, 1405, 1587
m. as reality, 410, 486
matter and m., 77, 80, 98, 130, 148, 154-5, 174, 204, 303, 356, 546, 672, 752, 918, 1268, 1416, 1427, 1442, 1852, 1910, 2025, 2720
other m., 180, 244, 250, 345, 463, 716, 989
social m., 33, 1151-2, 1225, 1419, 1686, 2244, 2381, 2663

subjectivity of m., 241, 317, 515, 693, 1245, 1311, 1359
will and m., 16, 191, 291, 428, 486, 948, 1083
Monism, 13, 90, 98, 124, 153, 160, 242, 331, 370, 406, 421, 438, 469, 485, 495, 519, 675, 696, 718, 820, 889, 892, 926, 947, 950, 958, 990, 1063, 1083, 1178, 1254, 1326, 1431, 1452, 1609, 1669, 1727, 1781, 1831, 2193, 2700. *See also* Unity
neutral m., 1416, 1640, 2207, 2595, 2689
Montague, William P., 679, 685, 734, 817, 1195, 1988, 1998
Montessori, Maria, 1823
Moore, Addison W., 304, 392-3, 720, 734, 1326, 2078, 2182
Moore, G. E., 672, 675
Moral, 234, 568, 571, 634, 736, 819, 909, 948, 1197, 1512, 1572, 1650, 1704, 2482, 2777
m. anarchy, 203, 902, 1287
m. development, 9, 31-2, 616, 1223, 1776, 2724
m. holiday, 435
m. psychology, 103, 168
m. right, 536, 2102, 2117, 2198, 2227, 2495
Morality, 5-6, 60, 86, 116, 138, 163, 217, 225, 257, 295, 298, 375, 422, 428, 449, 536, 549, 590, 644, 652, 684, 692, 703, 719, 843-4, 947, 950, 983, 1169, 1187, 1201, 1273, 1311, 1315, 1333, 1358-9, 1418, 1420, 1461, 1495, 1568, 1667, 1721, 1809, 1819-20, 1876, 1889, 1910, 1959, 2058, 2074, 2091, 2102, 2171, 2198, 2227, 2265, 2389, 2412, 2433, 2720, 2740, 2747. *See also* Virtue
freedom and m., 82, 256, 712, 721, 1966, 2678
religion and m., 90, 438, 531, 616, 841, 969, 1332, 1366, 2357, 2566, 2713
science and m., 86, 114, 295, 535, 602, 712, 1310, 1709, 1731, 1753, 2027, 2096, 2671
self and m., 7, 76, 206, 403, 540, 616, 634, 1064, 1366
value and m., 86, 103, 540, 734, 2227
More, Paul Elmer, 2568
Morris, Charles W., 2775
Morris, George Sylvester, 1458, 2096
Morselli, Enrico, 495
Mosca, Gaetano, 1749
Motion, 80, 96, 958, 1250, 1316, 1353, 1851, 1871, 2027
Motive. *See* Purpose
Mumford, Lewis, 2368
Münsterberg, Hugo, 42, 615, 673, 1021, 1379, 1449
Mussolini, Benito, 1796, 1920, 1973, 2628
Myers, Frederick William Henry, 64, 90, 520, 670

Native Americans, 2100
Natural
n. context, 1912,
n. event, 796, 936, 1046, 1050, 1359, 1965, 2121, 2740
n. processes, 936, 1420, 1596, 1961
Naturalism, 53, 60, 139, 205, 250, 261, 279, 327, 406, 422, 438, 519, 540, 622, 640, 743, 809, 812, 879, 1089, 1116, 1139, 1358, 1413, 1420, 1451, 1589, 1641, 1674, 1688, 1709, 1711, 1802, 1812, 1836, 1867, 1890, 1905, 1910, 2027, 2064, 2098, 2104, 2129, 2151, 2235, 2315, 2399, 2420, 2428, 2430, 2445, 2520, 2568, 2573, 2612, 2617, 2633, 2636-7, 2653, 2693, 2720, 2740-1, 2744, 2794
Nature, 88, 96, 99, 112, 240, 276, 449, 499, 590, 627, 648, 651, 690, 841, 1003, 1247, 1359, 1572, 1666, 1670, 1809-10, 1815, 1835, 1878, 1966, 1970-1, 1974, 2029, 2085, 2097, 2104, 2146, 2164, 2240, 2352, 2357, 2410, 2417, 2433, 2503, 2555, 2598, 2747, 2758, 2764, 2770, 2776

Nature (cont.)
control of n., 6, 1308, 1419, 1792, 2282
law of n., 67, 438, 698, 1101, 1390, 1572, 1578, 1633, 1881, 2319, 2481, 2636
uniformity of n., 16, 96, 336, 490, 879, 954, 1734
Nazism. *See* German National Socialist Party
Necessity, 20, 270, 438, 703, 1296, 1727, 1734
freedom and n., 63, 879
experience and n., 257
n. of history, 2678
n. of judgments, 143
n. of knowledge, 197, 354, 2720
n. of logic, 217, 337, 375, 909, 1393, 2098
n. of postulates, 916, 2217
n. of propositions, 2117, 2712
n. of thought, 675, 718
n. of truth, 162, 197, 1169, 2050
Needs, 2, 30, 96, 157, 200, 337, 517, 568, 681, 879, 948, 1173, 1250, 1575, 1650, 1667, 1907, 2077, 2118, 2128
knowledge and n., 644, 1335
mind and n., 75, 98, 300, 499, 752
reality and n., 198, 200, 690, 1200
religion and n., 90, 591, 608, 845, 2022
thought and n., 118, 207, 690, 1871
truth and n., 200, 266, 563, 939, 1111, 1251
Neo-Platonism, 1413
Nervous system, 32, 243, 273, 752, 2352. *See also* Brain
mind and n., 154, 1379
Newman, John Henry, 428, 683, 1977
New Thought movement (America), 190
New Thought movement (China), 2615
Newton, Isaac, 96, 703, 1046, 1250, 2027, 2244
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 351, 512, 549, 909, 948, 1057-8, 1145, 1178, 1199, 1219, 1275, 1305, 1500, 2461, 2601
Nominalism, 153, 313, 328, 429, 495, 606-7, 663-4, 678, 685, 865, 913, 999, 1111, 1287, 1360, 1914, 2319, 2481, 2686, 2793
Non-cognitive, 440, 886, 1418, 1809, 2100, 2612
Novelty, 32, 158, 162, 199, 315, 438, 499, 696, 703, 818, 939, 958, 1172, 1272, 1413, 1448, 1510, 1700, 1843, 2022, 2138, 2244, 2354, 2636. *See also* Chance, Creativity
Nys, D., 1729

Object, 52, 173, 215, 242, 244, 288, 301, 354, 428, 452, 463, 539, 545, 631, 642, 653, 672-3, 675, 914, 1175, 1293, 1604, 1669, 1682, 1686, 1709, 1809, 1858, 1912, 1932, 1959, 2022, 2027, 2100, 2151, 2356, 2510, 2700, 2709, 2711, 2758
aesthetic o., 1997, 2356
consummatory o., 1997, 2134, 2720
external o., 289, 1586, 2025, 2056, 2550, 2592
general o., 270, 272, 2191, 2636
ideal o., 958
known o., 235, 237, 450, 473, 535, 796, 1190, 1359, 1497, 2378
logical o., 1359, 2092
o. beyond mind, 289, 307, 307, 321, 330, 690, 759, 998, 1988
o. of belief, 357, 672, 1195
o. of concept, 93, 438, 99
o. of idea, 440, 649, 792, 920
o. of judgment, 167, 977, 1497
o. of knowledge, 57, 266, 361, 442, 490, 535, 690, 752, 796, 878, 936, 953, 1007-8, 1270, 1330, 1359, 1676, 2098, 2234, 2244, 2747, 2770

o. of meaning, 1025
o. of moral judgment, 1197
o. of perception, 354, 790, 936, 1050, 1311, 1401, 1640, 2244
o. of reflection, 1809
o. of thought, 118, 219, 453, 489, 568, 680, 1026, 1078, 1131, 1220, 1359, 1401, 1516, 1555, 2100, 2433
o. of truth, 207, 440, 705, 760
o. of valuation, 1476
o. prior to thought, 57, 422, 2098
past o., 245
religious o., 90, 348, 520, 1366, 2023
scientific o., 2244, 2451, 2720
self as o., 1194
social o., 851, 1099
static o., 247, 2250
subject and o., 53, 248, 460, 565, 685, 1270, 1284, 1347, 1459, 1604, 1809, 2217, 2282, 2378
subject and o. within experience, 21, 53, 77, 156, 241, 248, 254, 356, 889, 911, 1497, 1670, 1809, 2433
unity of o., 564, 914, 1858, 1912
Objective
o. categories, 2369
o. conditions, 114, 454, 487, 537
o. experience, 21, 118, 162, 241, 698, 797, 911, 2247
o. fact, 1811, 1932, 2001
o. harmony, 241
o. ideals, 87
o. ideas, 165
o. knowledge, 300, 578, 627, 798, 882, 909, 948, 1420, 2417
o. meaning, 714
o. order, 124, 247, 261
o. perspective, 1309, 1928
o. qualities, 1311, 2100
o. reality, 130, 181, 350, 452, 570, 713, 737, 950, 1420, 1459, 1548, 1928, 1932, 2027, 2352
o. reference, 180, 221, 247, 549, 1814, 1885
o. relativism, 1932, 2121, 2352, 2720
o. situation, 422, 860, 1451, 1709
o. space, 254
o. time, 96, 1027
o. truth, 181, 365, 418, 717, 721, 776, 909, 939, 948, 1541
o. universal, 2636
o. validity, 23, 90
o. value, 1311, 1709
Objectivism, 1912
Objectivity, 97, 183, 200, 240, 316, 422, 484, 603, 889, 998, 2331
o. of moral judgment, 1333, 2074
o. of religious experience, 519
o. of science, 860, 939
o. of thought, 118
social o., 139
Obligation. *See* Duty; Responsibility
Observation, 32, 278, 428, 461, 534, 650, 792, 1008, 1158, 1207, 1309, 1359, 1714, 1989, 2022, 2056, 2357, 2417, 2550, 2720, 2778
external o., 321, 1026, 1195, 1697, 1699
scientific o., 316, 1420, 1549, 2778
Ollé-Laprune, Léon, 683
Ontological argument, 423, 915, 1698, 2357
Ontology, 46, 71, 272, 316, 378, 642, 672, 690, 718, 1195, 1207, 1383, 1416, 1421, 1451, 1455, 1606, 1788, 1913, 2051, 2088, 2092, 2356, 2481, 2550, 2706, 2725, 2740
Operation, 302, 1116, 1809, 2027, 2481, 2612, 2712
concept and o., 2118
meaning and o., 2106, 2365
Operationalism, 2027, 2429, 2593
Opinion, 56, 200, 506, 835, 964, 1046, 1425, 2022, 2102, 2114, 2573, 2593
belief and o., 75, 91, 245, 673

Optimism, 63, 90, 92, 133, 438, 630, 658, 733, 879, 910, 969, 1187, 1897, 2230, 2573, 2740
Order, 90, 124, 189, 247, 261, 564, 602, 653, 675, 792, 907, 954, 1101, 1312, 1377, 1665, 1734, 1809, 1826, 1914, 2041, 2088, 2443, 2756
moral o., 438
o. in experience, 316, 698, 2046
social o., 137, 168, 193, 1670, 1741, 1906, 2110, 2358
Organism, 7, 57, 96, 148-9, 155, 240, 337, 648, 651, 679, 1032, 1044, 1048, 1420, 1449, 1560, 1572, 1709, 1799, 1809, 1962, 2078, 2088, 2096, 2352, 2720
environment and o., 32, 535, 690, 752, 936-7, 1149, 1220, 1596, 1666, 1670, 1686, 1855, 2076, 2093, 2408, 2584, 2751
Organization, 155, 703, 2356
social o., 7, 1928, 2244
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 1074
Otto, Max C., 1863, 2294
Otto, Rudolf, 1730, 2634
Overpopulation, 2591

Pain, 120, 266, 289, 2027
Panpsychism, 177, 490, 670, 1802
Papini, Giovanni, 100, 134-5, 161, 227, 328, 382, 464, 495, 549, 629, 636, 737, 1084
Pareto, Vilfredo, 1749
Particularity, 265, 267, 270, 545, 790, 877, 958, 1111, 1309, 1360, 1420, 1665, 2088, 2421, 2433, 2707
Pascal, Blaise, 56, 264, 549, 719, 1294, 1570, 2482
Past, 52, 130, 197, 245, 450-1, 607, 635, 672, 939, 964-5, 1149, 1420, 1501, 1586-7, 1589, 1651, 1669, 1682, 1701, 1714, 1725, 1731, 1756, 1772, 1858, 2022, 2041, 2244, 2273, 2316, 2372, 2711, 2720
p. experience, 321, 345, 792, 1244, 1473
Paul, Saint, 846
Peace, 34, 90, 179, 675, 746, 958, 1054, 1223, 1490, 1797, 1850
Peano, Guiseppi, 146, 464, 526, 549
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 266, 665, 1201, 1253, 1278, 1354, 1372, 1375, 1390, 1678, 1732, 1990, 2185, 2275, 2355, 2369, 2399, 2429, 2463, 2518, 2543, 2559, 2626, 2666, 2670-1, 2686, 2690-1, 2695, 2697, 2736, 2752, 2757, 2777-8, 2793
collection of works by P., 1734, 2191, 2249, 2321-2, 2386, 2442, 2737
Dewey on P., 164, 1360, 1666, 1734, 2191, 2412, 2421
James on P., 13, 90, 175, 176, 438, 1590
influence of P., 146, 1738, 2565, 2685
P. compared to other pragmatists, 138, 161, 176, 195, 227-8, 336, 602, 835, 1335, 1382, 1666, 1880, 1914, 2105, 2636
P. on Dewey, 118
P. on James, 271
Perception, 118, 171, 174, 248, 316, 354, 450, 455, 541, 574, 703, 821, 880, 898, 933, 943, 998-9, 1044, 1053, 1071, 1311, 1418, 1420, 1549, 1686, 1697, 1809, 1812, 1932, 2027, 2134, 2292, 2316, 2352, 2499, 2633, 2650, 2670, 2689, 2720
conception and p., 958, 2282, 2356
idea and p., 220, 444, 1141
knowledge and p., 242, 936, 1044
meaning and p., 444, 792
objects and p., 354, 463, 790, 1050, 1131, 1401, 1640, 2192
private p., 32, 1697, 2480
reality and p., 242, 245, 401, 1311, 1572, 1587, 1812, 2244

thought and p., 374, 816, 1107, 1670, 2244
truth and p., 1116, 2023
Permanence, 118, 207, 263, 282, 344, 506, 705, 969, 999, 1348, 1698, 1809, 2088, 2098, 2411, 2720
p. of human nature, 1907, 2227
p. of ideals, 13, 90, 438
p. of meaning, 90, 790
Perry, Ralph B., 460, 797, 1090, 1097, 1220, 1284, 1339, 1476, 1996, 2131, 2513, 2565
Person, 174, 181, 257, 319, 537, 539, 772, 1159, 2168, 2681
Personal identity, 244, 711, 1249, 1347
Personalism, 1914, 1921, 2346, 2590
Personality, 9, 12, 49, 63, 71, 80, 121, 160, 370, 560, 630, 676, 772, 816, 878-9, 1380, 1674, 1852, 2050, 2458, 2467, 2687, 2794
corporate p., 1859
Pessimism, 63, 90, 133, 313, 879, 910, 969, 2392
Peterson, James B., 353
Phenomenalism, 987, 1316, 1515, 1826, 2088
Phenomenology, 865, 1627, 2421, 2670, 2736, 2785
Phenomenon, 64, 197, 243, 272, 324, 556, 670, 852, 1360, 1547, 1812, 1826
Philosophy, 2, 4, 13, 18, 52, 88, 90, 103, 236, 434, 517, 645, 648, 675, 794, 958, 1004, 1173, 1180-1, 1233, 1248, 1331, 1359, 1420, 1493, 1529, 1542, 1546, 1572, 1634, 1651, 1656, 1673, 1713, 1743, 1908, 1967, 2026, 2066, 2070, 2128, 2168, 2261, 2361, 2524, 2555, 2589, 2631
American p., 211, 241, 328, 464, 789, 997, 1042, 1094, 1096, 1143, 1326, 1335, 1420, 1428, 1501, 1540, 1588, 1609, 1616, 1632, 1890, 1918, 1990, 2070, 2076, 2130, 2184, 2191, 2235, 2384, 2399, 2452, 2518, 2512, 2529, 2577, 2647, 2652, 2754, 2786
British p., 13, 108, 166, 187, 194, 232, 241, 438, 464, 471, 494, 549, 569, 606, 629, 665, 737, 780, 805, 909, 1042, 1094, 1128, 1198, 1609, 1670, 2130, 2192, 2184, 2380, 2575, 2720
Chinese p., 826, 1528, 1573, 1976, 2401, 2615
European p., 672, 993-4, 1100, 1133, 1435, 1572, 2758
Finnish p., 826
French p., 136, 166, 335, 396, 407-8, 464, 531, 590, 665, 827, 834, 889, 993, 1021, 1042, 1082, 1091, 1143, 1159, 1169, 1288, 1323, 1511, 1539, 1588, 1616, 1622, 1678, 2130, 2482
German p., 46, 89, 90, 118, 166, 241, 380, 438, 536, 606, 656, 660, 665, 669, 675, 803, 889, 909, 918, 1042, 1061, 1074, 1159, 1254, 1305, 1310, 1319, 1483, 1533, 1543, 1678, 1782, 2107, 2537, 2562, 2575, 2601, 2603, 2755
Greek p., 75, 118, 316, 372, 536, 540, 703, 931, 1572, 1652, 1670, 2027, 2102, 2104
Italian p., 100, 145, 271, 328, 468-9, 496, 502, 549, 636, 994, 1042, 1159, 1678, 1738, 1920, 1933, 2105
medieval p., 719, 1559
modern p., 41, 232, 351, 1202, 1316, 1341, 1661, 1670, 1841
Polish p., 1068
Roman p., 2102
scholastic p., 17, 90, 94, 232, 245, 270, 272, 438, 585,

Philosophy, scholastic (cont.)
664, 719, 818, 828, 889, 958, 999, 1111, 1249, 1296, 1316, 1414, 1660, 1985, 2191, 2367, 2376, 2445, 2580
Scottish p., 273, 933, 2433
South American p., 1894
Physical, 1359, 1670, 1809, 1970, 2356
emotional and p., 721
mental and p., 22, 77, 148, 155-6, 174, 204, 244, 249, 356, 1078, 1268, 1416, 1427, 1852, 1962, 2285
p. constants, 96
p. event, 1420
p. object, 463, 1311, 1549, 2244, 2758
p. reality, 32, 118, 130, 198, 424, 452, 958, 1407, 1572, 2443, 2740, 2747
Physicalism, 2564
Physics, 1145, 1250, 1572, 1652, 1714, 1901, 2022, 2353, 2408, 2711, 2747, 2781
Physiology, 11, 32, 198, 238, 273, 428, 536, 625, 688, 799, 1112, 1309, 1379, 1782, 1855, 1962, 2096
Pioneers, 1428, 2094, 2097
Pikler, Julius, 737, 1749
Pillon, François, 918, 1091
Piper, Leonora Evelina, 95, 438, 676, 1395
Plato, 94, 97, 279, 372, 598, 675, 703, 806, 958, 1114, 1116, 1133, 1413, 1420, 1749, 1813, 2013, 2015, 2110, 2184, 2356, 2391, 2481, 2620, 2718
Play, 48, 583, 1358
Pleasure, 59, 90, 92, 120, 266, 289, 604, 721, 936, 1180, 1381, 1431, 1546, 1667, 1702, 1722, 1811, 1997, 2005, 2027, 2110, 2211, 2454, 2681
Pluralism, 11, 13, 21, 32, 63, 88, 124, 182, 250, 266, 320, 324, 331, 406, 435, 438, 469, 485, 555, 628, 630, 672, 675, 718, 733, 775, 820, 836, 840, 879, 922, 926, 947, 958, 980, 990, 1031, 1039, 1115, 1254, 1440, 1452, 1494, 1557, 1592, 1598, 1609, 1632, 1652, 1669, 1727, 1744, 1771, 1792, 1913, 2036, 2207, 2272, 2317, 2399, 2433, 2587, 2700
community and p., 1907
empirical p., 1418
p. of experience, 162, 1420
p. of selves, 90, 159, 181, 603, 1827
p. of truths, 743
political p., 1917
Poe, Edgar Allan, 2686
Poetry, 13, 112, 526, 532, 675, 806, 921, 1533, 1572, 1598, 2005
Poincaré, Jules Henri, 549, 590, 909, 993, 1145, 1213, 1226, 1251, 1288, 1326
Politics, 29, 267, 350, 536, 1040, 1159, 1240, 1281, 1310, 1319, 1327, 1376, 1422, 1475, 1483, 1528, 1543, 1650, 1670, 1712, 1749, 1783, 1907, 1909, 1917, 1966, 1973, 2002, 2024, 2077, 2097, 2136, 2226, 2282, 2350, 2355, 2444, 2458, 2480, 2562, 2678, 2716-7, 2720, 2726, 2781
ethics and p., 7, 47
government p., 1181, 1907, 2097
international p., 1328, 1717, 1939, 2045
national p., 2045, 2401
Polus the Acragentine, 353
Positivism, 66, 133, 227, 272, 328, 438, 468, 525, 532, 556, 590, 607, 629, 636, 645, 665, 683, 833, 923, 932-3, 993, 1101, 1222, 1420, 1570, 1625, 1749, 1814, 2105, 2130, 2720, 2776, 2778, 2793
legal p., 62, 1909
logical p., 2378, 2387, 2515, 2579, 2681, 2686, 2775
Possibility, 26, 72, 88, 270, 354, 554, 630, 675, 958, 969, 1138, 1209, 1667, 1684, 1727, 2034, 2095, 2097, 2211, 2389, 2421, 2426, 2433, 2636, 2725. *See also* Chance

Possible worlds, 34, 1727
Postulate. *See* Hypothesis
Potentiality, 546, 698, 718, 879, 1046, 1312, 1914, 2421
energy p., 1316
goodness p., 2534
p. of life, 969, 2678, 2716
p. of meaning, 1912
p. of organism, 1044
p. of thought, 2566
p. of truth, 438, 545
Power, 59, 90, 133, 227, 265, 268-9, 328, 359, 437, 484, 645, 659, 743, 958, 969, 1150, 1159, 1601, 1626, 1827, 1861, 1907, 1966, 2137, 2213, 2357, 2498, 2601, 2643
Practical, 5, 13, 125, 131, 139, 162, 198, 232, 501, 521, 532, 539, 575, 645, 716, 722, 737, 793, 879, 950, 1322, 1358-9, 1527, 1533, 1580, 1663, 1762, 2027, 2072, 2107, 2110, 2270, 2763. *See also* Truth, practical value and
category and p. value, 96, 1032, 1912
concept and p. value, 38, 93, 227, 673, 675, 790, 816, 958, 999, 2105
idea and p. effects, 709
knowledge and p. value, 75, 103, 213, 337, 549, 644, 690, 949, 1044, 1216, 1341, 1451
logic and p., 1121, 2200, 2460
morality and p., 86, 103, 1223, 2058, 2454
p. certainty, 2775
p. faith, 124, 241, 255, 919
p. judgment, 1311, 1336, 1745, 1989, 2454
p. nature of thought, 51, 81, 118, 164, 196, 423, 442, 534, 637, 948, 1109, 1275, 1496, 1641, 1826
p. reason, 96, 133, 138, 202, 328, 599, 675, 684, 705, 719, 1444, 2063, 2200
p. situation, 449
reality and p., 159, 200, 248, 491, 535, 599, 623, 647, 1338
religion and the p., 90, 190, 209, 841, 1674
science and the p., 590
theoretical and p., 2, 30, 245, 438, 492, 599, 725, 1111, 1159
Practice, 85, 139, 223, 250, 521, 761, 801, 1159, 1311, 1572, 1670, 1989
knowledge and p., 17, 118, 644, 675, 805
moral p., 60, 86
social p., 49
theory and p., 2, 91, 168, 202, 438, 486, 494, 645, 725, 1261, 2104, 2308, 2392, 2394, 2720
thought and p., 32, 152, 919
truth and p., 35, 75, 96, 107, 159, 287, 644, 662, 810, 1159, 1547, 1961
Pragmatic
p. absolute, 1807
p. *a priori*, 1728, 2041
p. attitude, 1424
p. criteria, 452
p. fallacy, 1457
p. meaning, 62, 998, 2118
p. method, 243, 267, 279, 1480, 1531, 2022, 2757
p. realism, 698, 759, 1153, 1326, 1609, 1912, 2315
p. test, 201, 1006, 1224, 1266, 2118
p. universal, 188
p. value, 330
Pragmaticism, 270, 272, 336, 354
Pragmatism, 3, 46, 93, 125, 178, 181, 263, 276, 285, 313, 322, 333, 336, 355, 359, 362-3, 373, 382, 386, 391, 399, 400, 404, 424-5, 436, 438, 457, 468, 470, 472-3, 481, 505, 511, 521, 523, 525-6, 544, 547-8, 550, 559, 566, 576-7, 580, 613, 619, 621, 628, 633, 642, 646, 669, 699, 700-2, 705,

Pragmatism (cont.)
710, 715, 719, 722-3, 739, 747, 752, 754, 788, 802, 815, 828, 831-3, 843, 848, 856, 860, 889, 896, 908, 925, 932, 937, 954, 981, 999, 1002, 1014-5, 1023, 1066, 1073, 1093, 1100, 1109, 1111, 1116, 1118, 1130, 1146, 1178-9, 1185, 1202, 1211, 1288, 1307, 1316, 1346, 1351, 1385, 1471-2, 1533, 1597, 1623, 1652, 1696, 1765, 1787, 1795, 1803, 1853, 1869, 1882, 1887, 1914, 1951-2, 1956, 1979, 2035, 2065, 2088, 2107, 2116, 2127, 2157, 2187-8, 2214, 2228, 2278, 2318, 2327, 2375, 2435, 2496, 2500, 2570, 2579, 2596, 2745
conceptual p., 2041, 2709
contributions of p., 667, 789, 952, 1020, 1382, 1461, 1616, 2075
future of p., 184, 1575, 2075
neo-p., 1988, 2142
origin of p., 13, 90, 139, 184, 241, 335, 438, 442, 513, 606, 636, 695, 738, 790, 924, 933, 1074, 1169, 1510, 1547, 1666, 1782, 1880, 1884, 1944, 2054, 2096, 2281, 2323, 2463, 2649, 2652, 2691, 2763
surveys of p., 139, 232, 241, 464, 531, 549, 590, 594, 606-7, 629, 665, 683, 790, 909, 948, 1021, 1042, 1145, 1159, 1198, 1253, 1291, 1326, 1335, 1345, 2518,, 1653, 1661, 1666, 1678, 2130, 2518, 2537, 2601, 2636, 2652, 2786
types of p., 139, 157, 161, 176, 195, 227-8, 269, 280, 380, 438, 497, 504, 539, 549, 568-9, 573, 645, 690, 737, 835, 963, 1069, 1098, 1326, 1335, 1343, 1360, 1382, 1666, 1738, 1914, 2105, 2671, 2686
Prall, David Wight, 1722, 1811, 2131, 2337
Pratt, James Bissett, 440, 693, 964, 977
Predication, 27, 272, 958, 2046, 2100, 2612, 2675, 2778
Predictability, 712, 1448
Prediction, 429, 743, 792, 1701, 2246, 2642
concept and p., 250, 958
p. theory of truth, 1989, 2246
theory and p., 743
Present, 197, 1651, 1669, 1701, 1858, 2022, 2244, 2372, 2378, 2534, 2720
Prezzolini, Guiseppi, 161, 226-8, 266, 269, 350, 382, 408, 468, 497, 636, 737, 923, 1021
Prince, Katherine James, 1850
Probability, 1213, 1680, 1734, 2119, 2133, 2244, 2319, 2322, 2756
Problem, 17, 52, 96, 241, 339, 349, 468, 491, 509, 1201, 1352, 1420, 1709, 1913, 2046, 2097, 2110, 2118, 2128, 2756, 2781
thought and p., 21, 77, 118, 149, 421, 1120, 1311, 1572, 1665, 1667, 1809, 2027, 2063, 2088, 2098, 2168, 2612
Problematic,
p. experience, 52, 118, 1366
p. situation, 149, 509, 535, 1809, 2046, 2100, 2246, 2345, 2550, 2612
un-p. activity, 21
Process, 59, 298, 402, 499, 537, 692, 958, 1312, 1572, 1851, 2244, 2633
activity p., 154, 240
experience and p., 154, 171, 183, 188, 1249, 2285
logical p., 118, 293, 792, 1213, 2612
natural p., 936, 1420, 1961
reality as p., 181, 302, 331, 608, 663, 675, 899, 1309, 1420, 1538, 2025, 2433
social p., 7, 1532, 2389
truth and p., 158, 173, 920

Progress, 6, 138, 155, 279, 394, 438, 511, 710, 712, 792, 879, 969, 1275, 1359, 1400, 1402, 1688, 1697, 1914
social p., 7, 9, 385, 939, 1419-20, 1572, 1650, 1741, 2439
Properties, 1359, 2352, 2612, 2658
Proposition, 270, 272, 672, 796, 939-41, 1007, 1311, 1548, 1839, 1934, 2029, 2117, 2133-4, 2152, 2478, 2612, 2712, 2782, 2790. *See also* Judgment; Statement
generic p., 2612, 2712
meaning of p., 492, 567-8, 1340, 1548, 1616, 2139, 2208
truth and p., 94, 139, 184, 287, 545, 568, 690, 939, 964, 1141, 1195, 1839, 2063, 2134
universal p., 1393, 1445, 1503, 2029, 2612, 2712
Protagorus, 372, 406, 490, 598, 806, 913, 948, 1001, 2105, 2593
Protestantism, 31, 438, 683, 1015, 2580, 2713, 2781
Psychical research, 16, 58, 64, 73, 90, 95, 283, 438, 615, 670, 675-6, 748, 768, 839, 898, 970, 1144, 1258, 1283, 1324, 1395, 1602, 1764, 1942, 2140, 2395, 2407, 2413
Psychological
p. association, 345, 453, 1292, 1970
p. atomism, 96, 484, 756, 852, 1765, 1970, 2394
p. determinism, 16, 80
p. holism, 2223
Psychology, 29, 42, 52, 88, 98, 103, 149, 171, 186, 191, 238, 241, 246, 273, 310, 438, 461, 519, 587, 615, 620, 625, 645, 675, 677, 690, 724, 733, 782, 799, 842, 852, 855, 875, 898, 944, 995, 1038, 1071, 1109, 1183, 1213, 1220, 1232, 1237-8, 1245, 1248, 1316-7, 1359, 1420, 1481, 1501, 1522, 1620, 1697, 1699, 1716, 1818, 1880, 2017, 2050, 2078, 2093, 2096, 2145, 2212, 2307, 2350, 2397, 2499, 2529, 2684
biology and p., 173
dynamic p., 587
education and p., 10, 32, 49, 765, 1150, 1313, 1521, 1767, 2084, 2412, 2641
ethics and p., 7, 47, 76, 116, 536, 1474
knowledge and p., 489
logic and p., 27, 103, 139, 252, 338, 367, 375, 415, 442, 490, 537, 606, 689, 714, 719, 909, 972, 1292, 1549, 1665, 1788-9, 1792, 2215
mathematics and p., 19, 115, 603
metaphysics and p., 153, 183, 219, 248, 303, 801, 1261, 1347, 1432, 1531, 1845, 2394
physiological p., 273, 688
reason and p., 682
religion and p., 11, 31, 64, 69, 90, 101, 106, 117, 127, 190, 500, 668, 687, 853, 922, 1010, 1020, 1037, 1087, 1105, 1117, 1133, 1165, 1320, 1344, 1366, 1535, 1730, 1953, 1987, 2189
social p., 9, 12, 49, 260, 572, 688, 830, 849-51, 1020, 1151-2, 1413, 1419, 1544, 1667, 1773, 2381, 2492, 2557, 2720
structural p., 103, 240, 310, 319, 437, 458, 565, 752, 1209, 1449, 2093
truth and p., 315, 639, 1383, 1446, 1507
value and p., 734, 1449, 1591
Ptolemy, 618, 1871, 2027
Punishment, 1489, 2265
Puritanism, 411, 438, 1530
Purpose, 5, 149, 183-4, 245, 299, 438, 509, 521, 564, 673, 718, 790, 958, 1032, 1648, 1666, 1670, 1962, 1966, 1979, 2066, 2411, 2563, 2693. *See also* Truth, purpose and

Purpose (cont.)
action as p. of science, 429, 1101
action and p., 93, 703
agents and their p., 243
belief as means to p., 2
Bergson on p., 1132
causation and p., 2022
deliberation on means to a p., 1311, 1667
desires and p., 2681
education and p. of action, 792, 1358, 2611
education and social p., 1720
ethics and p., 7, 1584, 1745
experience as means to p., 2356
experience as p. of knowledge, 2720
experience of p., 57, 180, 243
faith and p. of action, 369
final p., 438, 879, 2433
growth as moral p., 1650, 2412
idea as means to p., 421, 491
ideals as means to p., 1572
logic and p., 337
knowledge as p. in itself, 162, 1381, 1578
make-believe for a p., 736
meaning and p., 334, 977, 1359, 1666, 1809, 1912, 2118
morality and human p., 7, 298, 536, 540, 571, 1127, 1144, 1402, 1474, 1584, 2077, 2102, 2227, 2389
p. as a category, 139, 162, 1032
p. judged by reason, 261
p. justifies the means, 645, 1178, 1249, 2649
p. of *a priori*, 1216, 1728
p. of behavior, 944
p. of brain and mind, 32
p. of history, 1295
p. of instruments, 2211
p. of knowledge, 96, 118, 301, 535, 569, 841, 1098, 1391, 1451
p. of re-organized experience, 299
p. of sensations, 1311
p. of shared experience, 2215
p. of thought, 111, 241, 300, 327, 568, 629, 953, 1121, 1249, 1358, 1496, 1520, 2244, 2356
pleasure as a p., 120
politics and human p., 2350
practical judgment and p., 1311
practical p. of philosophy, 511, 722
reality and p., 109, 184, 401, 583, 628, 648, 698, 759, 1670, 1809, 2725
reason and p., 133, 138
religion and p., 659, 1366
science and p., 599, 1731, 1352, 2097
self and conflicting p., 2110
society's widening p., 939
theory as means to p., 159
values and p., 1180, 1449, 1456, 1702, 2610

Qualities, 158, 248, 452, 914, 939, 1311, 1669, 1809, 1812, 1836, 1858, 1912, 1988, 2022, 2027, 2093, 2100, 2352, 2356, 2421, 2477, 2481, 2720
concepts and q., 792
knowledge and q., 235
Locke on q., 1861
meaning and q., 1965
primary/secondary q., 880
value q., 1804, 1811
Quantity, 1312, 2022, 2027, 2756

Radical empiricism, 124, 180, 221, 288, 330, 336, 366, 475, 519, 607, 672, 894, 918, 947, 1078, 1112, 1158, 1181, 1209, 1244, 1254, 1260, 1498, 1512, 1557, 1587, 1598, 1808, 1882, 1994, 2004, 2192, 2207, 2285, 2317, 2700
activity and r., 243
agnosticism and r., 565
dualism and r., 249
epistemology of r., 367

evidence and r., 356
idealism and r., 740, 1917, 2215
knowledge and r., 2640
logic and r., 278
metaphysics and r., 889, 1259
mind and r., 1405
other minds and r., 244
perception and r., 999
psychology and r., 219, 852, 1344, 2050
relations and r., 250
religion and r., 1135, 1527, 2022, 2036
solipsism and r., 247
truth and r., 2286
Wundt and r., 254
Rational, 132
anti-r., 581
non-r., 60, 279, 645, 740, 797, 877, 879, 886, 1913, 2595
r. reality, 499, 718
r. religion, 599, 1186, 1366, 2005, 2709
r. science, 35
r. self-interest, 1611
Rationalism, 16, 90, 96, 124, 143, 180, 194, 203, 223, 241, 247, 266, 275, 282, 289, 331, 336, 368, 372, 380, 396, 407-8, 423, 438, 490, 494, 528, 534, 568, 574, 578, 589, 596, 607, 642, 649, 653, 656, 672-5, 695, 698, 703, 705, 707, 716, 719, 733, 780-1, 790, 797, 816, 825, 857, 867, 879, 889, 918, 933, 943, 948, 951, 957-8, 999, 1021, 1031, 1046, 1055, 1057, 1083, 1091, 1098, 1102, 1109, 1139, 1159, 1173, 1178, 1184, 1218, 1227, 1311, 1326, 1359, 1435, 1485, 1515, 1527, 1572, 1575, 1598, 1619, 1690, 1716, 1737, 1762, 1792, 1830, 2025, 2027, 2041, 2157, 2447, 2460, 2550, 2628, 2781. *See also* Anti-intellectualism.
empirical r., 17
experience and r., 250, 314, 374, 675, 958
ir-r., 26, 138, 405, 490, 602, 703, 836, 857, 954, 1287, 1547, 2001
Kant and r., 50, 1753
truth and r., 406, 590, 649, 672, 717
Rationality, 91, 131, 272, 300, 402, 480, 1114, 2001, 2250
belief and r., 195, 198
knowledge and r., 313
morality and r., 1667, 2102, 2720
purpose and r., 162, 564, 2681
Rauh, Frédéric, 1273
Ravaisson-Mollien, Jean Gaspard Félix, 1145
Realism, 66, 72, 88, 336, 343, 376, 379, 421, 452, 546, 554, 650, 653, 678, 685, 690, 796, 798, 817, 860, 865, 911, 933, 936, 939-40, 964, 1004, 1007-8, 1050, 1097, 1159, 1190, 1207, 1239, 1284, 1289, 1292, 1330, 1339, 1352, 1359, 1497, 1515, 1606, 1669, 1702, 1782, 1809, 1989, 2022, 2027, 2060, 2076, 2134, 2150, 2341, 2404, 2571-2, 2593, 2631, 2650, 2686
American r., 1094, 1096, 1326, 2235, 2577
common sense r., 475, 514, 665
critical r., 603, 1397, 1451, 1587, 1662, 1687, 1809, 1830, 2592
empirical r., 2244
English r., 1094
epistemological r., 936
ethical r., 2558
experimental r., 2179
functional r., 2352
logical r., 2191, 2399, 2612
mathematical r., 2217
naïve r., 541
natural r., 180, 661
new/neo- r., 401, 963, 1071, 1220, 1326, 1420, 1523, 1538, 1595, 1609, 1632, 1673, 1681, 1918, 1930, 2193, 2452, 2665

Realism (cont.)
nominalism and r., 429, 1360, 2088, 2481
objective r., 570
Platonic r., 2481
practical r., 491
pragmatic r., 698, 759, 1153, 1326, 1609, 1912, 2315
presentative r., 936
representative r., 2387
Russell and r., 592, 1309, 1549
scholastic r., 889, 999, 1296
Reality, 35, 86, 90, 98, 105, 107, 109, 121, 128, 131, 140, 148, 152-3, 158-9, 162, 166, 176, 181, 197, 203, 233, 261, 265, 300, 309, 315, 331, 339, 351-2, 357, 359-60, 364, 394, 402, 405, 438, 469, 488, 490, 501, 511, 535-6, 583, 653, 675, 690, 797, 826, 880, 894, 940, 1015, 1029, 1101, 1120, 1126, 1139, 1159, 1200, 1292, 1298, 1308, 1352-3, 1366, 1381-2, 1386, 1403, 1420, 1431, 1452, 1548, 1594, 1598, 1670, 1698, 1701, 1727, 1876, 1878, 1913-4, 1930, 1941, 1965, 1970, 1974, 2006, 2027, 2029, 2071, 2092, 2100, 2119, 2128, 2151, 2192, 2228, 2244, 2250, 2354, 2356-7, 2372, 2477, 2612, 2718, 2720, 2770, 2787. *See also* Being; Knowledge, reality and; Matter
antecedent r., 1809, 2098, 2706, 2720, 2740
Aristotle on r., 59
Bergson on r., 637, 1288, 1676
Boutroux on r., 818
Bradley on r., 1574
concept and r., 212, 302, 759, 816, 958, 980, 1090, 1360, 1812, 2041
consciousness and r., 515, 546, 589, 661, 690, 911-2, 1026
cultural r., 1563
experience and r., 23, 71, 77, 88, 130, 139, 156, 171, 176, 201, 254, 282, 303, 312, 318, 366, 371, 418, 422, 463, 450-2, 483, 501, 546, 570, 608, 618, 642, 653, 698, 840, 914, 918, 952, 1244, 1353, 1431, 1799, 1809, 1882, 2235, 2378, 2387, 2758, 2770
external r., 21, 23, 118, 199, 245, 317, 343-4, 376, 422, 452, 549, 554, 556, 570, 661, 672, 690, 759, 796, 798, 805, 861, 950, 964, 998, 1285, 1309, 1329, 1420, 1423, 1549, 1572, 1587, 1669, 2056, 2592, 2706, 2711, 2720, 2740
Kant on r., 499, 565, 844, 1753
Locke on r., 17, 130
logic and r., 188, 642, 1124, 1190, 1572, 1913, 2029, 2051, 2092, 2612, 2706, 2720
mathematical r., 96
noumenal r., 330, 441, 565, 1625
objective r., 130, 181, 350, 452, 570, 713, 737, 950, 1420, 1459, 1548, 1928, 1932, 2027, 2352
perception and r., 242, 245, 401, 1050, 1107, 1311, 1572, 1587, 1812
physical r., 32, 118, 130, 198, 424, 452, 958, 1407, 1572, 2443, 2740, 2747
practical and r., 159, 162, 200, 248, 491, 535, 623, 647, 1338
purpose and r., 109, 184, 401, 583, 628, 648, 698, 759, 1670, 1809, 2725
satisfaction and r., 140, 198, 200, 472, 527, 1702
science and r., 35, 203, 327, 463, 599, 743, 1728, 2720
thought and r., 21, 44, 118, 143, 153, 171, 197, 205, 207, 221, 1141, 1169, 1244,

1409, 1666, 1809, 1826, 2046, 2100, 2378, 2495, 2711, 2758
traits of r., 403, 912, 1312, 1572, 1809, 1913-4, 1965
transcendent r., 156, 376, 423, 535, 648, 845, 964, 1311, 2244
truth and r., 46, 94, 143, 158-9, 171, 181, 406, 410, 423, 442, 451, 481, 486, 499, 554, 575, 589, 628, 642, 690, 693, 705, 760, 786, 793, 861, 878-9, 907, 916, 928, 939, 969, 972, 996, 1017, 1046, 1106, 1116, 1149, 1175, 1195, 1288, 1498, 1501, 1572, 2008, 2041, 2247, 2720
unity of r., 250, 320, 324, 331, 438, 469, 591, 675, 718, 740, 775, 878, 958, 1015, 1181, 1452, 1727, 2027, 2334
unknowable r., 97, 173, 405, 519, 535, 565, 879, 1570
value and r., 651, 752, 869, 910, 991, 1180, 1201, 1259, 1456, 1591, 1641, 1702, 1809, 2064, 2076, 2228, 2466, 2534
Reason, 18, 75, 88, 121, 149, 179, 223, 241, 279, 336, 348, 423, 428, 482, 623, 629, 675, 703, 790, 792, 840, 958, 1039, 1078, 1184, 1275, 1322, 1447, 1494, 1629, 1666, 1753, 1805, 1839, 2055-6, 2066, 2085, 2164, 2238, 2444, 2612, 2759
desire and r., 1250
education and r., 32
feeling and r., 198, 276, 2445
ideals and r., 402, 682
law and r., 1247
moral r., 536, 2227
practical r., 96, 133, 138, 202, 328, 599, 675, 684, 705, 719, 1444, 2063, 2200
purpose and r., 133, 138, 162, 261, 2282
reality and r., 212, 499, 753
religion and r., 39, 90, 124, 172, 279, 369, 407, 466, 499, 582, 680, 766, 1133, 1830, 1919, 2445
scientific r., 372, 1549
truth and r., 90, 163, 241, 289, 316, 644, 687
value and r., 197, 316, 369, 574, 983, 2102
value of r., 969, 983, 2063
will and r., 480, 527, 752, 772, 889, 1111, 1305, 1855, 2056
Reconstruction, 155, 1670, 1955
consciousness and r., 7
judgment and r., 2046
knowledge and r., 173, 337, 1420
morality and r., 6, 1194
philosophy and r., 1542, 1572, 1712, 2025, 2720
r. of concepts, 2100
r. of experience, 1670, 2235
r. of logic, 1121, 2781
r. of science, 2063
r. of values, 1702
thought and r., 51, 118, 752, 2027
Reference, 143, 1686, 1874
r. of idea, 539, 790
r. of proposition, 567, 2612
r. of the past, 2244
r. of thought to purpose, 368, 568
r. of thought to reality, 180, 205, 221, 247, 549, 1756, 1814, 1885
r. of value, 1814
Reflection, 51, 279, 438, 499, 792, 1046, 1143, 1249, 1417, 1589, 1665-7, 1714, 1770, 1809, 1910, 2295, 2357, 2612, 2636, 2717, 2720
ethical r., 7, 540, 2102, 2227, 2720
experience and r., 65, 77, 154, 250, 316, 483, 653, 1359, 1416, 1745, 1910, 1988, 2150

Reflection (cont.)
knowledge and r., 260, 1669, 2244
logic and r., 118, 1359, 1829, 2057
reality and r., 156, 450, 1360, 2046, 2063
value and r., 1311, 1702, 2389
Reflex arc, 1, 52, 2078, 2170
Reichenbach, Hans, 2742
Reid, Thomas, 270, 933
Relation, 18, 88, 354, 675, 790, 958, 1004, 1190, 1501, 1604, 1932, 1989, 2027, 2029, 2051, 2098, 2118, 2282, 2612, 2707, 2712, 2720, 2758, 2787
awareness and r., 535
consciousness and r., 220, 262, 296, 515, 678, 690, 752, 971, 998, 1094, 1096
experience and r., 118, 174, 215, 244, 250, 367, 438, 860, 958, 1025, 1809, 2100
experience of r., 180, 219, 233, 336, 672, 740, 860, 889, 958, 1053, 1078, 1244, 1420, 1557, 1697, 1809, 2352
internal r.,
knowledge and r., 128, 235, 242, 423, 442, 535, 537, 631, 642, 792, 796, 911, 936, 1007, 1071, 1126, 1268, 1414, 1595, 1640, 2720
reality as r., 1572
social r., 99, 563, 850, 939, 975, 1046, 1194, 1251, 1358
space and r., 347
truth and r., 440, 545, 549, 589, 672, 814, 948, 998, 1000, 1006, 1501
Relativism, 213, 472, 526, 673, 696, 920, 964, 1293, 1606, 1659, 1747, 1786, 1928, 2350, 2593, 2725
objective r., 1932, 2121, 2352, 2720
Relativity, 35, 2590
organic r., 2352
r. of knowledge, 44, 405-6, 535, 1015, 1293
r. of truth, 1249, 1292, 1515, 1606, 1998
theory of r., 1034, 1799, 2150, 2244, 2711
Relevance, 1124, 1839, 2232
Religion, 34, 63, 72, 75, 87, 96, 105, 169-70, 177, 190, 199, 232, 242-3, 257, 315, 335, 348, 372, 387-8, 394, 409, 419, 424, 431, 448, 490, 500, 507, 510, 531, 547, 549, 555, 560, 585, 608, 622, 671, 675, 702, 708, 710, 719, 729, 791, 793, 808, 824, 841, 844, 874, 879, 891-2, 894, 918, 922, 927, 935, 947-8, 950, 954, 958, 960, 969, 990, 996, 1005, 1032, 1070, 1106, 1132-3, 1177, 1181, 1196, 1204, 1240, 1252, 1257, 1260, 1271, 1318, 1332, 1334, 1359, 1366, 1394, 1402, 1420, 1440, 1442, 1452, 1482, 1514, 1518, 1535, 1554, 1557, 1572, 1580, 1592, 1598, 1617, 1626, 1658, 1661, 1695, 1724, 1763, 1806-7, 1817, 1841-2, 1850, 1875, 1921, 1972, 1975, 2005, 2009, 2016, 2025, 2027, 2036, 2065, 2071, 2083, 2087, 2096-7, 2104, 2110, 2161, 2179, 2189, 2197, 2211, 2219, 2272, 2291, 2294, 2317, 2333, 2346, 2351, 2353, 2357, 2377, 2388, 2410, 2416, 2423, 2427, 2441, 2445, 2458, 2467, 2469, 2479, 2482, 2489, 2504, 2534, 2561, 2574, 2617, 2660, 2663, 2683, 2688, 2690, 2720, 2741, 2770, 2781, 2791.
See also Humanism, religion and; Psychology, religion and.
arguments for r., 259, 531, 583, 664, 1364, 1457, 1469, 1636, 2566, 2673, 2713
function of r., 429, 1054, 1087, 1301, 1442, 1535, 2294
materialism and r., 11, 13, 90, 438, 675, 969, 1256, 1318, 2713
meaning of r., 90, 1366, 1737, 2315

morality and r., 90, 438, 531, 616, 841, 969, 1332, 1366, 2357, 2566, 2713
rational r., 599, 1186, 1366, 2005, 2709
reason and r., 39, 90, 124, 172, 279, 369, 407, 466, 499, 582, 680, 766, 1133, 1830, 1919, 2445
science and r., 16, 60, 72, 83, 141, 405, 429, 519-20, 588, 599, 683, 918, 970, 1067, 1117, 1246, 1256, 1366, 1601, 1723, 1782, 2058, 2480
society and r., 110, 1054, 1366, 1403, 1688, 1730, 1800, 1907, 2022, 2211, 2534, 2720, 2749, 2781
value of r., 90, 138, 209, 241, 255, 331, 519, 551, 827, 845, 969, 1005, 1054, 1186, 1224, 1338, 1420, 1457, 1505, 2294, 2566, 2781
Religious, 209, 432, 438, 568, 1010, 1228, 1512, 1527, 1832, 2068, 2268. *See also* Belief, religious; Experience, religious.
r. consciousness, 68, 151, 255, 369, 608, 614, 841, 891, 894, 1165, 1320, 2005
r. conversion, 31, 84, 90, 127, 476, 1177
r. dogma, 255, 259, 529, 1005, 1107
r. education, 117, 538, 858, 1800, 2682, 2744
r. emotion, 90, 105, 369, 499, 599, 1338, 1843, 2467, 2751
r. evidence, 79, 369, 499, 1087
r. faith, 16, 39, 44, 63, 90, 105, 124, 142, 172, 241, 255, 369, 438, 465, 551, 594, 599, 630, 641, 668, 680, 683, 841, 846, 873, 919, 969, 1039, 1177, 1223-4, 1295, 1322, 1366, 1400, 1494, 1580, 1632, 1685, 1771, 1807, 1919, 2095, 2180, 2357, 2388, 2403, 2410, 2439, 2444, 2465, 2573, 2673, 2720, 2781
r. feeling, 90, 590, 672, 2357, 2445
r. healing, 190
r. ideals, 45, 1403, 2357, 2410, 2467
r. institutions, 90, 520, 969, 1320, 2095
r. mysticism, 84, 90, 182, 190, 433, 438, 482, 511, 519, 529, 540, 630, 668, 793, 820-1, 918, 958, 1016, 1021, 1084, 1087, 1114, 1177, 1186, 1218, 1223, 1256, 1261, 1275, 1287, 1318, 1344, 1515, 1625-6, 1771, 1782, 1797, 1843, 2005, 2291, 2420, 2445, 2482, 2498, 2555, 2673
r. myth, 341, 1546
r. object, 90, 348, 520, 1366, 2022
r. optimism, 92
r. skepticism, 39, 990
r. symbol, 90, 255, 429, 549, 1403
r. truth, 16, 79, 90, 176, 209, 259, 339, 369, 429, 520, 670, 743, 841, 869, 918, 978, 1017, 1084-5, 1117, 1127, 1315, 1366, 1457, 1505, 1519, 1953, 2315, 2357, 2566
Remacle, 266
Renan, Joseph Ernest, 1652
Renouvier, Charles Bernard, 284, 428, 665, 918, 958, 1091, 1288, 1609, 1661, 1926, 2072
Representation, 72, 293, 790, 939, 999, 1378, 1586, 1669, 2720
aesthetic r., 52
ideas as r., 118

Representation (cont.)
knowledge as r., 17, 139, 242, 244, 379, 450, 672, 758, 954, 964, 1418, 2378
science as r., 35
thought as r., 21, 1681
truth as r., 961, 1098, 1111
Representational
r. epistemology, 196, 642, 1026
r. pragmatism, 1098
r. realism, 2387
Responsibility, 7, 139, 438, 503, 692, 1072, 2265, 2771. *See also* Choice; Duty; Freedom
moral r., 82, 138, 1169, 2227, 2722, 2777
intellectual r., 681, 1322, 2363
social r., 2097, 2433
Rey, Abel, 889, 993
Ribot, Théodule Armand, 629, 1031
Rickert, Heinrich, 673, 1021
Right
liberty r., 1907
moral r., 536, 2102, 2117, 2198, 2227, 2495
religious r., 1875
Rights, 7, 719, 2227
natural r., 1327, 2678
Riley, Isaac Woodbridge, 699
Ritschl, Albrecht Benjamin, 184, 519, 634, 841
Rogers, Arthur K., 1669, 2770
Roman Catholicism, 284, 668, 1203. *See also* Philosophy, scholastic; Thomas Aquinas
education and r., 2253
Papini and r., 1203
philosophy of r., 642, 2376, 2645
r. and Modernism, 596, 683, 949, 1661
Romanticism, 64, 265, 909, 997, 1227, 1661, 1788, 2444
Roosevelt, Theodore, 390
Rosati, S., 2464
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques., 549, 719, 721, 1823, 2005, 2109
Royce, Josiah, 50, 55, 72, 89, 90, 118, 154, 183-4, 191, 574, 660, 675, 696, 803, 1021, 1025, 1046, 1079, 1155, 1316, 1326, 1362, 1371, 1436, 1540, 1577, 1762, 1883, 2007, 2110, 2235, 2423, 2433, 2553, 2640, 2663, 2754
Rugg, Harold O., 2637
Rule, 257, 1201, 2481. *See also* Standard
meaning of r., 569
r. for action, 13, 90, 1667, 2681
Russell, Bertrand, 210, 600, 672, 958, 998, 1006, 1023, 1098, 1265, 1268, 1309, 1373, 1399, 1423, 1464, 1592, 1699, 1739, 1934, 1983, 2150, 2480, 2587
Russell, John E., 487-8, 1326, 1404

Sabatier, Armand, 189
Saint-Sulpice, 1652
Santayana, George, 248, 1089, 1295, 1629, 1635, 1719, 1779, 1816, 1905, 1968, 2150, 2362
Satisfaction, 34, 89, 442, 673, 756, 1329, 2227, 2513. *See also* Truth, satisfaction and
belief and s., 568, 1322, 1343
ideals and s., 402
intellectual s., 878
judgment and s., 1311
knowledge and s., 672, 1728
reality and s., 140, 198, 200, 472, 527, 583, 1702
religion and s., 1338
standard of s., 418, 700, 1169
value and s., 1814
Schiller, F. C. S., 108, 120, 157, 159, 176, 181, 242, 261, 266, 286, 289, 299, 320, 324, 329, 380-1, 452, 464, 482, 531, 546, 549, 562-4, 569, 579, 629-30, 665, 672, 680, 703, 710, 725, 731, 787, 806, 889, 891, 906, 927, 930, 950, 998, 1021, 1042, 1051, 1055, 1061, 1072, 1084, 1129, 1146, 1201, 1207, 1231, 1316, 1330, 1380, 1398, 1452-3, 1509, 1516, 1533, 1535, 1561, 1575,

1592, 1609-10, 1627, 1663, 1697, 1762, 1914, 1929, 1936, 2088, 2147, 2175, 2203, 2208, 2315, 2341, 2376, 2770
compared with other pragmatists, 139, 157, 176, 195, 227, 336, 440, 504, 549, 569, 835, 963, 1069, 1116, 1159, 1326, 1382, 2651
Dewey on S., 139, 1121, 2549
influence of S., 96, 135, 192, 194-5, 227, 1113, 1493, 1738
James on S., 194, 350, 438, 440, 686, 2444
memorials to S., 2544, 2549, 2560, 2575, 2618, 2627, 2632
S. on Dewey, 703, 752, 1336, 2357
S. on James, 280, 369, 1220, 1284, 1647, 1944, 2394
Schinz, Albert, 699, 788, 1031
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst, 500
Scholz, Heinrich, 1730
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 241, 268, 522, 662, 876, 1075, 1305
Science, 35, 43, 66, 75, 100, 139, 155, 200, 203, 223, 257, 273, 279, 317, 347, 385, 463, 483, 497, 499, 511, 532, 603, 615, 628, 645, 648, 653, 683, 700, 719, 751-2, 775, 788-90, 795, 801, 847, 854, 860, 909, 918, 948, 958, 961, 964, 1021, 1034, 1044, 1048, 1059, 1067, 1073, 1181, 1187, 1233, 1250, 1283, 1305, 1311, 1329, 1341, 1352, 1374, 1382, 1415, 1420, 1495, 1512, 1522, 1572, 1578, 1601, 1616, 1676, 1701, 1714, 1728, 1760, 1774, 1783, 1792, 1828, 1856, 1863, 1898, 1905, 1908, 1960, 1993, 2027, 2068, 2075, 2104, 2110, 2118, 2168, 2195, 2216, 2232, 2271, 2282, 2352, 2384, 2395, 2417, 2437-8, 2490, 2521, 2658, 2720, 2741, 2747, 2793. *See also* Religion, science and
action and s., 429, 1101, 2104
art and s., 1809, 1855
control and s., 890, 1584, 1601, 1701, 1908
education and s., 102, 342, 792, 795, 1358, 2028, 2090, 2095, 2613, 2696
experience and s., 226, 327, 1209, 1652, 2095, 2191
experiment and s., 35, 792, 889, 1420, 1714, 1908, 2095, 2469
mechanical s., 344, 1308, 1312, 1731, 2630
metaphysics and s., 759, 1531, 1570, 2034, 2442, 2604
morality and s., 86, 114, 295, 535, 602, 712, 1310, 1709, 1731, 1753, 2027, 2096, 2671
purpose and s., 429, 599, 1101, 1731, 1352, 2097
reality and s., 35, 203, 327, 463, 599, 743, 1728, 2720
s. as instrument, 51, 438, 1041, 1274
society and s., 7, 532, 1650, 1755, 1907, 1970, 2097, 2170, 2181, 2356, 2480, 2614, 2678, 2681
success of s., 67, 141
values and s., 114, 138, 315, 2064, 2562, 2566, 2681, 2782
Scientific
s. agnosticism, 879
s. concept, 72, 143, 675, 890, 1352, 2118
s. determinism, 395, 909, 1716, 2588
s. dogma, 387
s. empiricism, 2438, 2516, 2636, 2597
s. facts, 429, 570, 1006, 1448
s. hypothesis, 282, 423, 568, 599, 647, 705, 792, 976, 1111, 1117, 1156, 1360, 1714, 2055

Scientific (cont.)
s. inquiry, 164, 315, 347, 653, 939, 1360, 1448, 1549, 1706, 2095, 2164, 2191, 2232, 2244, 2429, 2658
s. law, 90, 260, 429, 438, 703, 1101, 1420, 1914
s. logic, 86, 164, 438, 1213, 1282, 1356, 1359, 1409, 1448, 1525, 1901, 2081, 2433, 2756
s. measurement, 638, 1390, 1714, 2374, 2720
s. object, 2244, 2451, 2720
s. observation, 316, 1420, 1549, 2778
s. progress, 124, 590, 1208
s. reasoning, 372, 1549
s. revolution, 450, 1250, 1871, 2027, 2097, 2104
s. skepticism, 172, 672
s. truth, 35, 75, 94, 336, 369, 377, 429, 590, 710, 950, 976, 1175, 1251, 1425
Scientism, 590, 934
Séailles, G., 1288
Secrétan, 549
Seillière, Ernest, 2568
Self, 80, 90, 135, 153, 161, 192, 198, 345, 438, 453, 468, 509, 840, 858, 875, 879, 987, 1380, 1598, 1809, 1824, 2096, 2356, 2458, 2713, 2751. *See also* Personality
action and s., 76, 1823, 2036, 2751
experience and s., 192, 1194, 1852, 2244, 2458
morality and s., 7, 76, 206, 403, 540, 616, 634, 1064, 1366
s. consciousness, 22, 70, 105, 183, 310, 564, 1194, 1508
s. determination, 24, 63, 1159
s. interest, 540, 1611
s. realization, 206, 402, 616
social s., 71, 1194, 1686, 1833, 2158, 2244, 2381, 2760, 2794
subliminal s., 64, 265, 519
unity of s., 80, 345, 2720
Selfishness, 6-7, 644, 1287, 1310, 2554
Semantics, 2311, 2775
Semiosis, 2775
Semiotic, 2516, 2625, 2736
Semon, Richard, 607
Sensation, 185, 744, 821, 1025, 1114, 1359, 1572, 1604, 1618, 1640, 2356, 2373, 2417, 2564
attention and s., 52
concept and s., 176, 438, 664, 675, 958, 2356
conflict and s., 220
function of s., 185, 1044
knowledge and s., 321, 1141, 1249, 1292, 1309, 1418, 2041
reality and s., 642, 759, 2192
thought and s., 118, 364, 422, 653, 752, 889, 1311, 1753, 2041, 2781
Sensationalism, 375, 790, 1498, 1515, 1770
Sense, 1, 77, 289, 807, 852, 1044, 2027, 2352
s. data, 29, 118, 321, 675, 911, 1268, 1311, 1420, 1666, 1812, 1871, 2096, 2117, 2342, 2378, 2446, 2689, 2720, 2758
s. organs, 32, 1379, 1812, 2093
s. perception, 1131, 1311, 1812, 2027, 2192, 2499, 2689
Sensori-motor, 1, 852, 1044
Sentence, 574, 939, 2599. *See also* Words
meaning of s., 143, 492, 1934, 1985, 2711, 2790
sensation s., 2564
Sentroul, C., 699
Shaw, Robert Gould, 957
Shi, Hu, 2615
Sidgwick, Alfred, 164, 569, 680, 1663
Sidgwick, Eleanor Mildred, 1395
Sidgwick, Henry, 86
Sidis, Boris, 12

Signs, 354, 1311, 1501, 1604, 1686, 1965, 2027, 2319, 2322, 2433, 2612, 2635-6, 2720, 2775, 2793
Sigwart, Christoph, 118, 241, 266
Simmel, Georg, 266, 1074, 1822
Sin, 76, 552, 2357
Singer, 266
Situation, 240, 449, 792, 818, 1071, 1311, 1417, 1451, 1459, 1497, 1569, 1666, 1702, 2100, 2149, 2244, 2310, 2720, 2727
  behavioristic s., 1560
  cognitive s., 879
  consciousness and s., 860, 1046, 1121, 1359, 1474, 2088, 2100, 2168
  doubtful s., 235, 911
  moral s., 540, 2389
  objective s., 422, 860, 1451, 1709
  purpose and s., 118, 1121
  problematic s., 149, 509, 535, 1809, 2046, 2100, 2246, 2345, 2550, 2612
  religion and empirical s., 1366
  social s., 860, 2408
  thought arising in s., 149, 173, 1311, 1359, 1383, 1745
  truth and s., 2636
  value and s., 1449, 1456, 2021
Skepticism, 41, 44, 124, 141, 152, 198, 212, 263, 405, 454, 472, 482, 526, 556, 581, 596-7, 642, 698, 703, 710, 717, 724, 869, 879, 889, 948, 950, 990, 1046, 1109, 1111, 1218, 1249, 1549, 1570, 1580, 1719, 1747, 1782, 1839, 2303, 2566, 2778
  positivism and s., 133
  Pyrrhonist s., 276
  religious s., 39, 990
  scientific s., 172, 672
Slavery, 121, 957, 2480
Smart, Harold R., 1872
Social, 2244
  philosophy's s. purpose, 35, 1233, 1359, 1422, 1673, 1717, 2433, 2555
  s. activity, 5, 17, 534, 1099, 1974, 2041, 2408, 2419, 2498, 2633, 2636, 2683
  s. adaptation, 3, 7, 1358, 1611, 2244
  s. as a category, 1970, 2096
  s. behavior, 2066, 2381, 2681
  s. conflict, 1907, 2110, 2412, 2720
  s. consciousness, 22, 100, 154, 334, 511, 693, 705, 849-51, 1099, 1243, 1420
  s. environment, 1962
  s. epistemology, 1460
  s. ethics, 532, 536, 709, 746, 793, 1413, 1797, 1892, 2227
  s. experience, 480, 554, 836, 1358-9, 1928, 1970, 2215, 2498, 2781
  s. force, 1054, 1907
  s. function of mind, 9
  s. function of statements, 2599
  s. habit, 1731, 1914
  s. ideals, 1707
  s. immortality, 1302
  s. intelligence, 534, 902, 1907, 1928, 1973, 2213
  s. interests, 87, 348, 939, 2681
  s. interpretation, 1242, 1303, 1634
  s. mind, 33, 1151-2, 1225, 1419, 1686, 2244, 2381, 2663
  s. object, 851, 1099
  s. objectivity, 139
  s. obligation, 139
  s. order, 137, 168, 193, 1670, 1741, 1906, 2110, 2358
  s. organization, 7, 1928, 2244
  s. philosophy, 746, 1745, 1892, 1907, 2205, 2429, 2576, 2663, 2714, 2720, 2730
  s. process, 7, 1532, 2389
  s. progress, 7, 9, 385, 939, 1419-20, 1572, 1650, 1741, 2439
  s. psychology, 9, 12, 49, 260, 572, 688, 830, 849-51, 1020, 1151-2, 1413, 1419, 1544, 1667, 1773, 2381, 2492, 2557, 2720
  s. purpose, 162
  s. reform, 37, 334, 969, 1918, 2101, 2720

Social (cont.)
s. relations, 99, 563, 850, 939, 975, 1046, 1194, 1251, 1358
s. science, 789, 985, 1745, 1893, 1973, 2149, 2168
s. self, 71, 1194, 1686, 1833, 2158, 2244, 2381, 2760, 2794
s. situation, 860, 2408
s. stimulus, 2704
s. truth, 203, 438, 889, 939, 1111
s. value, 557, 974, 1111, 1221, 1589, 2681
s. work, 1491
Socialism, 1231
Society, 188, 257, 879, 1468, 1615, 1667, 1907, 1910, 2381, 2408, 2419, 2600, 2663, 2678, 2693, 2720, 2759. *See also* Community
consciousness and s., 9, 29, 975
education and s., 30, 32, 49, 85, 137, 337, 557, 644, 1313, 1358, 1466, 1526, 1720, 1759, 1854, 1958, 1999, 2031, 2096, 2310, 2358, 2412, 2547, 2611, 2656, 2681
freedom and s., 7, 536, 939, 1907, 1966, 2678
individual and s., 7, 1907, 2097, 2389, 2424, 2681, 2739
morality and s., 6, 9, 114, 298, 536, 709, 1876, 2227
reason in s., 279
religion and s., 110, 1054, 1366, 1403, 1688, 1730, 1800, 1907, 2022, 2211, 2534, 2720, 2749, 2781
science and s., 7, 532, 1650, 1755, 1907, 1970, 2097, 2170, 2181, 2356, 2480, 2614, 2678, 2681
Sociology, 16, 31, 260, 315, 454, 519, 532, 1169, 1176, 1191, 1234, 1721, 1773, 1783, 2031, 2374, 2492, 2656
Socrates, 549, 1203, 1712, 1813, 2054, 2105, 2193, 2499
Solipsism, 139, 159, 199, 221, 238, 247, 313, 343, 366-7, 371, 480, 514, 527, 556, 565, 589, 672, 693, 716, 860, 964, 998, 1141, 1335, 1740, 2378
Sollier, Paul, 699
Sophist, 133, 931
Sorel, Georges, 1084
Soul, 174, 345, 657, 671, 675, 969, 1177, 1196, 1246, 1256, 1310, 1324, 1670, 1697, 1962, 2027, 2050, 2097, 2410, 2488
sick s., 90, 435, 438, 560, 2444
Sovereignty, 7, 1318, 1376
Space, 35, 158, 176, 254, 309, 321, 347, 403, 438, 515, 752, 879, 898, 912, 943, 1352, 1729
s.-time, 1799, 1858, 1932, 2244, 2402, 2408
Species, 2141, 2772
Spencer, Herbert, 3, 166, 175, 360, 405, 519, 703, 879, 948, 957-8, 1145, 1249, 1361, 2392
Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch), 90, 703
Spirit, 182, 190, 201, 438, 479, 519, 676, 1159, 1557, 1693, 2399, 2476, 2566, 2663, 2751
Spiritual, 90, 394, 449, 591, 596, 630, 645, 658-9, 846, 879, 969, 1057, 1117, 1181, 1254, 1358, 1737, 2022, 2350, 2357, 2630
s. needs, 198, 845
s. reality, 529, 1175, 1723
s. substance, 174, 438, 2488, 2584
s. values, 86, 90, 315, 323
Spiritualism, 79, 223, 645, 675, 748, 1003, 1324, 2439. *See also* Psychical research
Stability, 1180, 1391
religious s., 958
s. in experience, 103, 254, 1809, 2041
s. of belief, 173
s. of meaning, 1448, 2063
s. of truth, 961
s. of values, 2097
social s., 193, 536, 1650

Standard, 257, 299, 954, 1172, 1420, 1741, 1809, 1820, 2150
cultural s., 1572, 1914
s. of living, 1491
s. of needs, 118
s. of satisfaction, 418, 700, 1169
s. of value, 364, 418, 634, 1311, 1689, 1702
Stanford University, 332
Starbuck, Edwin D., 31, 90
Statement. *See* Sentence
Stimulus, 1, 17, 118, 198, 587, 630, 939, 1099, 1249, 1311, 1560, 1686, 2093, 2704, 2769
Stoicism, 703, 2100
Stout, George Frederick., 569
Strong, Charles Augustus., 154, 303
Sturt, Henry, 569
Subject, 80, 88, 756, 769, 1071, 2751
object and s., 53, 248, 460, 565, 685, 1270, 1284, 1347, 1459, 1604, 1809, 2217, 2282, 2378
s. and object within experience, 21, 53, 77, 156, 241, 248, 254, 356, 889, 911, 1497, 1670, 1809, 2433
s. of judgment, 27, 167, 958, 2046, 2612
Subjective, 90, 118, 403, 442, 568, 638, 690, 1083, 1116, 1124, 1195, 1249, 2088, 2168, 2281, 2709, 2711, 2720
ideas as s., 165
inter-s., 96
mind as s., 241, 317, 515, 693, 1245, 1311, 1359
morally s., 602
s. and objective generality, 272
s. experience, 52, 237, 241, 247, 279, 314, 321, 343, 452, 797-8, 1359, 1420, 1670, 1809, 1932, 1988, 2027, 2076, 2100, 2770
s. idealism, 21, 23, 57, 238, 321, 371, 642
truth as s., 207, 690, 1083, 1141, 1169, 1175, 1249, 1292
Subjectivism, 16, 63, 142, 245, 263, 313, 315, 334, 343, 380, 428, 438, 472, 504, 514, 549, 639, 642, 672, 865, 889, 913, 954, 1027, 1190, 1207, 1292, 1359, 1497, 1587, 1594, 1652, 1702, 1893, 1912, 1932, 2142, 2341, 2356, 2387, 2593, 2633
ethical s., 1474, 2074
Substance, 59, 958, 1195, 1515, 1698, 1861, 1920
spiritual s., 174, 438, 2488, 2584
Success. *See* Practical; Satisfaction
Suggestion, 792, 1359
mental s., 12, 969, 2071
Supernatural, 31, 90, 1359, 1459, 2027, 2095, 2357, 2534, 2573, 2673, 2720
Swedenborg, Emanuel, 90, 551, 1287, 1661
Symbol, 35, 266, 537, 663, 752, 1560, 1686, 1863, 1931, 1989, 2217, 2244, 2345, 2612, 2787
religious s., 90, 255, 429, 549, 1403
Sympathy, 35, 90, 150, 599, 675, 816, 855, 1165, 2110
Syntactics, 2775
Synthesis, 675, 792, 1338, 1341, 2096, 2126, 2613, 2663
Synechism. *See* Continuity
System, 438, 675, 752, 1078, 1181
conceptual s., 958, 1496, 1961, 2117
Systematic, 564, 2793
s. doubt, 2040
s. experience, 88, 418, 530, 914, 1233, 1359
s. knowledge, 17, 143, 321, 325, 337, 718, 775, 998
s. meaning, 118
s. reality, 265, 282, 344, 499, 1572, 1727
s. truth, 124, 139, 143, 171, 173, 197, 263, 530, 639, 814, 914, 948, 1120-1, 2007

Taylor, A. E., 282, 373, 1218, 1474
Technology, 385, 1753, 1783, 1907, 2027, 2356, 2480, 2678, 2720

Teleological
human t., 395, 1731
natural t., 96, 402, 499, 607, 692, 879, 1292, 2027
organic t., 1032
t. causation, 531, 752, 860, 2636
t. experience, 53, 98, 103, 316
Teleology, 46, 98, 184, 189, 260, 263, 282, 438, 531-2, 648, 684, 860, 879, 1064, 1154, 1390, 1545, 1550, 1553, 1558, 2636, 2763
Theism, 13, 34, 60, 90, 242, 438, 585, 618, 675, 845, 892, 947, 1403, 1430, 1737, 2036, 2087, 2108, 2281, 2380, 2398, 2403, 2514, 2566, 2770
mono-t., 879, 935
pan-t., 11, 90, 664, 675, 879, 894, 1651, 2317
poly-t., 182
Theology, 83, 90, 124, 161, 184, 230, 285, 289, 339, 372, 438, 528, 567, 582-3, 585, 608, 634, 648, 675, 719, 841, 845, 949, 954, 960, 978, 990, 1017, 1020, 1107, 1134, 1312, 1355, 1359, 1535, 1652, 2357, 2666
Theoretical, 385, 568, 645, 948, 958, 1017, 1041
practical and t., 2, 30, 159, 245, 492, 599, 645, 725, 1159, 1343, 1663
t. interests, 48, 118, 245, 460, 556, 672, 792, 1326, 1409
t. knowledge, 30, 266, 276, 348, 534, 1044, 1315
t. reason, 96, 599
Theory, 642, 792, 800, 818, 1213, 1734. *See also* Practice, theory and
fact and t., 173, 347, 1250, 1448
prediction and t., 743
truth and t., 217, 241, 639, 710, 998, 1261, 1311, 1356, 1448, 2088
value of t., 140, 176, 438, 639, 1249
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 581, 585, 958, 2253, 2485, 2584. *See also* Philosophy, scholastic
Thorndike, Edward L., 246, 1072, 1750, 2637
Thought, 3, 27, 51, 118, 375, 689, 776, 877, 986, 1213, 1566, 1616, 1664, 1871, 1893, 2063, 2100, 2289, 2433, 2566, 2661. *See also* Cognition; Consciousness; Mind; Reflection
action and t., 32, 118, 125, 149, 197, 200, 266, 338, 409, 422, 491, 509, 543, 589, 663, 752, 792, 918, 1116, 1261, 1316, 1343, 1442, 1681, 2007, 2720
biological view of t., 422, 2110, 2146, 2720
brain and t., 11
conduct and t., 90, 191, 273
context of t., 1121, 1359, 2168, 2636
continuity of t., 325, 574, 1359, 2720
control of situations and t., 422, 1589
control of t., 792, 1451, 2100, 2357
desire and t., 690, 1250, 1260
emotion and t., 188, 527, 690, 752, 1335, 1515, 1530, 1702
environment and t., 758, 2720
experience and t., 124, 162, 183, 196-7, 314, 374, 1359, 1702
facts and t., 96, 570
feeling and t., 69, 152, 169, 172, 191, 198, 261, 273, 276, 375, 480, 486
form of t., 118, 752, 790
function of t., 51, 77, 98, 273, 279, 752, 1104, 1358, 1496, 1666, 2025
genetic view of t., 118, 153, 181
history and t., 118
language and t., 752, 792, 1995
meaning of t., 90, 301, 509, 905, 1121, 2433
necessity of t., 675, 718
needs and t., 118, 207, 690, 1871

object of t., 118, 219, 453, 489, 568, 680, 953, 1026, 1078, 1131, 1220, 1359, 1401, 1516, 1555, 2100, 2433
object prior to t., 57, 422, 2098
perception and t., 374, 816, 1107, 1670, 2244
practical nature of t., 51, 81, 118, 164, 196, 423, 534, 637, 948, 1109, 1275, 1496, 1641, 1826
practice and t., 32, 152, 919
problem and t., 21, 77, 118, 149, 421, 1120, 1311, 1572, 1665, 1667, 1809, 2027, 2063, 2088, 2098, 2168, 2612
purpose of t., 111, 149, 241, 300, 327, 368, 568, 629, 953, 1121, 1249, 1358, 1496, 1520, 1530, 2244, 2356
reality and t., 21, 44, 118, 143, 153, 171, 197, 205, 207, 221, 1061, 1141, 1169, 1244, 1409, 1666, 1809, 1826, 2046, 2100, 2378, 2495, 2711, 2758
reconstruction and t., 51, 118, 752, 2027
sensation and t., 118, 364, 422, 653, 752, 889, 1311, 1753, 2041, 2781
t. arising in conflict, 173, 1359
t. arising in situation, 149, 173, 1311, 1359, 1383, 1745
t. as instrumental, 118, 279, 282, 534, 756, 969, 1138, 1516, 1586, 1826, 2146, 2194, 2239, 2282
t. as representation, 21, 1681
training of t. and error, 792
value and t., 118, 130, 316, 734, 792, 1311, 1702, 1714, 1722, 1778, 1811, 1814, 2027, 2102, 2389, 2610, 2681
will and t., 69, 96, 124, 169, 276, 327, 375, 886, 1109, 1111, 1383, 1855, 1981
Time, 35, 57, 90, 96, 120, 153, 158, 176, 181, 197, 218, 240, 286, 321, 402-3, 438, 515, 608, 628, 675, 709, 718, 752, 841, 879, 894, 920, 943, 987, 996, 1027, 1090-1, 1120, 1145, 1296, 1352, 1359, 1382, 1572, 1594, 1682, 1698, 1809, 1812, 1850, 1858, 1913, 1993, 2022, 2088, 2244, 2354, 2372, 2415, 2443, 2561, 2633, 2750
space-t., 1799, 1858, 1932, 2244, 2402, 2408
Tolerance, 32, 517, 596, 743, 1159, 1243, 1305, 1580, 2389, 2480, 2678
Totalitarianism, 2628
Tradition, 3, 7, 256, 707, 792, 928, 939, 954, 969, 1420, 1572, 1721, 1731, 1914, 1959, 2027
Tragedy, 1080, 1310
Traits, 87, 696, 939, 1311, 1420
t. of reality, 403, 912, 1312, 1572, 1809, 1913-4, 1965
Transaction, 90, 2093, 2408
Transcendence, 685, 758, 936, 1087, 1625, 1682, 1772
experience and t., 139, 153, 358, 506, 1311, 1678, 2046
self-t., 247, 358,
t. of cognition, 313, 338
t. of knowledge, 235, 297, 318, 325, 358, 860, 999, 2378
t. of reality, 156, 376, 423, 535, 648, 845, 964, 1311, 2244
t. of thought, 313, 338, 377
t. of truth, 477, 717, 1678, 2046
t. of universals, 188
Transcendentalism, 51, 89, 233, 288, 358, 406, 558, 707, 756, 892, 911, 939, 1102. *See also* Idealism
Troeltsch, Ernst, 1020
Trotter, Wilfred, 2492
Truth, 16, 66-7, 94, 97, 130, 141, 153, 173, 181, 205, 208, 241, 263, 289, 333, 364, 368, 379, 392, 439, 443, 458, 477, 490, 492, 499, 504, 548,

Truth (cont.)
556, 561, 596, 607, 609, 649, 659, 672-3, 675, 680, 696, 700, 702-3, 706, 758, 773, 793, 806, 818, 882, 886, 907, 915-6, 918, 920, 925, 950, 961, 980, 983-4, 1006, 1073, 1080, 1124, 1146, 1159-61, 1201, 1222, 1226, 1229, 1252-3, 1279, 1289, 1346, 1365, 1373, 1381, 1383, 1406, 1414, 1499, 1500, 1510, 1534, 1578, 1616, 1652, 1660, 1678, 1745, 1884, 2042, 2046, 2075, 2117, 2133, 2192, 2282, 2367, 2393, 2643-4, 2670, 2693, 2793. *See also* Belief, truth and; Error; Idea, truth and; Fact; Reality, truth and
Absolute and t., 176, 263, 313, 558, 705, 717
absolute t., 333, 438, 486, 490, 596, 642, 696, 709, 730, 760, 954, 976, 1039, 1072, 1111, 1187, 1292, 1448, 1501, 1515, 1547, 1572, 1807, 1839, 2098, 2130
action and t., 703, 1084, 1547, 2246
assertion and t., 253, 368, 600, 680, 705, 939, 941, 1000
behavior and t., 964
biological view of t., 607
certainty and t., 348, 482, 568, 658, 1305
cognition and t., 574, 717, 814
conduct and t., 939, 1381, 2244
consequences and t., 176, 253, 280, 367, 373, 381, 410, 416, 421, 568-9, 581, 592, 672, 690, 939, 949, 958, 1288, 1326, 1666, 2643
consistency and t., 530, 631, 639, 758, 776, 840, 925, 939, 1116, 1191, 1233, 1496, 1727
criterion of t., 23, 41, 260, 423, 506, 530, 690, 935, 1032, 1125, 1169, 1293, 1387, 1425, 1765, 2063
desire and t., 259, 530, 1072, 1569
discovery and t., 97, 266, 743, 889, 1141, 1250, 1425
empiricism and t., 184, 1961, 2286
energy and t., 568
events and t., 438, 650, 2782
evolution and t., 680, 1111
experience of t., 242, 545, 549, 574, 589, 591, 865, 954, 978, 1988, 2046, 2328
experimental t., 41, 1425, 1984, 2357
fallibility and t., 600, 1125, 1425
falsity and t., 94, 171, 217, 241-2, 253, 287, 317, 392, 440, 506, 649, 672, 680, 690, 710, 861, 878, 909, 939, 964, 1201, 1311, 1343, 1501, 1515, 1728, 2041, 2088, 2134, 2782
feeling and t., 198, 634, 1130, 1305
genetic view of t., 607, 2042
good and t., 232, 348, 950, 1017, 1141, 1569
humanism and t., 176, 245, 253, 596, 1001, 2063
hypothesis and t., 41, 208, 623, 642, 693, 758, 1326, 1448, 1871, 2417, 2443
inquiry and t., 423, 696, 939, 2720, 2782
intelligence and t., 1138, 1880
judgment and t., 33, 143, 241, 263, 375, 506, 574, 631, 680, 793, 882, 977, 1098, 1446, 1961
knowledge and t., 139, 245, 266, 317, 333, 377, 379, 410, 438, 473, 592, 687, 710, 717, 882, 961, 1006, 1169, 1548, 1961, 2282, 2603
logic and t., 94, 171, 368, 375, 530, 545, 558, 574, 596, 680, 757, 948, 1181, 1383,

1765, 1782, 1913, 2063, 2152, 2337
making of t., 423, 490, 575, 743, 1159, 1347, 1541, 2599
meaning and t., 492, 518, 545, 568, 573, 680, 1989, 2008, 2022, 2247
necessity of t., 162, 197, 1169, 2050
needs and t., 200, 266, 563, 939, 1111, 1251
object of t., 207, 440, 705, 760
objective t., 181, 365, 418, 717, 721, 776, 909, 939, 948, 1541
perception and t., 1116, 2023
pluralism of t., 743
potentiality of t., 438, 545
power and t., 2642
practical value and t., 2, 33, 38, 94, 96-7, 103, 118, 139, 162, 181, 184, 253, 259, 266, 280, 331, 348, 360, 381, 410, 428, 438, 472, 506, 518, 530, 539, 549, 554, 556, 558, 568, 574-5, 581, 589, 591-2, 628, 637, 639, 645, 672, 680-1, 690, 720, 752, 776, 783, 790, 835, 889, 969, 1017, 1023, 1032, 1057, 1116, 1125, 1129, 1141, 1159, 1233, 1261-2, 1315, 1326, 1338, 1343, 1382, 1507, 1827, 1961, 2404, 2566, 2593, 2603
practice and t., 35, 75, 96, 107, 159, 287, 644, 662, 810, 1159, 1547, 1961
prediction theory of t., 1989, 2246
process and t., 158, 173, 920
proposition and t., 94, 139, 184, 287, 545, 568, 690, 939, 964, 1141, 1195, 1839, 2063, 2134
purpose and t., 97, 118, 143, 153, 368, 473, 487, 530, 545, 556, 658, 710, 752, 1000, 1141, 1381, 1409, 1496, 1793, 1839, 2063
psychology and t., 315, 639, 1383, 1446, 1507
rationalism and t., 406, 590, 649, 672, 717
reason and t., 90, 163, 241, 289, 316, 644, 687
relation and t., 440, 545, 549, 589, 672, 814, 948, 998, 1000, 1006, 1501
relativity of t., 1249, 1292, 1515, 1606, 1998
religious t., 16, 79, 90, 176, 209, 259, 339, 369, 429, 520, 670, 743, 841, 869, 918, 978, 1017, 1084-5, 1117, 1127, 1315, 1366, 1457, 1505, 1519, 1953, 2315, 2357, 2566
satisfaction and t., 159, 176, 198-9, 245, 313, 365, 410, 438, 482, 499, 518, 568, 574, 628, 672, 790, 810, 861, 879, 889, 939, 953-4, 969, 991, 1098, 1141, 1233, 1326, 1343, 1745, 2088, 2022, 2063, 2076
scientific t., 35, 75, 94, 336, 369, 377, 429, 590, 710, 950, 976, 1175, 1251, 1425
situation and t., 2636
social t., 203, 438, 889, 939, 1111
subjective t., 207, 690, 1083, 1141, 1169, 1175, 1249, 1292
systematic t., 124, 139, 143, 171, 173, 197, 263, 530, 639, 814, 914, 948, 1120-1, 2007
t. as coherence, 139, 321, 452, 631, 680, 725, 757, 917, 1098, 1120, 1159, 1268, 1343, 1409, 1557, 2593

Truth (cont.)
t. as correspondence, 118, 139, 143, 159, 173, 176, 202, 406, 410, 421, 438, 443, 450, 460, 473, 481, 486, 488-9, 491, 499, 527, 627-8, 649, 672, 693, 705, 752, 861, 879, 889, 939, 950, 964, 972, 977, 1098, 1121, 1268, 1279, 1335, 1442, 1548, 1669, 1708, 2088, 2443, 2450, 2593, 2599
t. as dynamic, 331, 575, 637, 642, 680, 810, 1572, 1782, 1871
t. as function, 1572, 1988
t. as habit, 3
t. as means, 33, 118, 658
t. as mediation, 1098
t. as representation, 961, 1098, 1111
t. as unchanging, 96, 139, 173, 263, 535, 575, 664, 1572, 1871, 1945
t. as value, 368, 438, 574, 634, 718, 869, 879, 889, 954, 1000, 1046, 1251, 1505, 1603, 1689, 2228, 2315, 2436, 2491
t. in the long run, 313, 743, 1159, 2636, 2720, 2756
t. tested by function, 143, 554, 672
theoretical t., 217, 241, 639, 710, 998, 1261, 1311, 1356, 1448, 2088
transcendence of t., 477, 717, 1678, 2046
universality of t., 162, 181, 207, 212, 530, 545, 709, 889, 1083
validity and t., 23, 50, 163, 212-3, 241, 300, 315, 375, 377, 438, 518, 583, 590, 696, 798, 880, 882, 922, 1111, 1121, 1125, 1393, 1549, 2046, 2117, 2200, 2454, 2612
verification and t., 17, 46, 118, 164, 318, 339, 367-9, 421, 423, 438, 443, 477, 499, 545, 567-8, 575, 591, 635, 649, 672, 680, 690, 705, 717-8, 743, 776, 889, 916, 939, 953, 964, 1026, 1046, 1098, 1116, 1141, 1149, 1174, 1311, 1425, 1569, 1570, 1669, 1678, 1961, 1989, 1993, 2076, 2088, 2098, 2118, 2118-9, 2216, 2246, 2282, 2378, 2387, 2443, 2508, 2564, 2720, 2770
will and t., 159, 208, 645, 662, 709, 741, 1130, 1141, 1383, 1547, 2130
Tufts, James Hayden, 734, 1889, 2078
Tychism, 899, 1390, 1734, 2399
Tyrrell, George, 549, 683, 949, 1661

Understanding. *See* Cognition
Unity, 88, 563, 743, 775, 878, 911, 2680. *See also* Monism; Whole
u. of experience, 314, 278, 453, 709, 1249, 2100, 2356, 2421, 2720
u. of object, 564, 914, 1858, 1912
u. of reality, 250, 320, 324, 331, 438, 469, 591, 675, 718, 740, 775, 878, 958, 1015, 1181, 1452, 1727, 2027, 2334
u. of self, 80, 345, 2720
social u., 257
Universalism, 630
Universality, 131, 265, 1296, 1343, 1666, 2294, 2636
u. of experience, 99, 300, 312, 645, 752, 1670
u. of judgment, 114, 121, 143, 152, 316, 790
u. of knowledge, 241, 301
u. of meaning, 1358, 1604, 1666, 1686, 2356
u. of truth, 162, 181, 207, 212,

530, 545, 709, 889, 1083
u. of value, 634, 1709
Universals, 107, 118, 171, 188, 266, 301, 790, 1015, 1111, 1503, 1932, 2088, 2369, 2433, 2473, 2481, 2587, 2636, 2707. *See also* Kinds
concrete u., 1120
experience and u., 188, 647, 1078, 1360
Universe, 88, 90, 138, 155, 189, 354, 402, 424, 438, 499, 583, 618, 672, 675, 703, 712, 820, 899, 907, 1039, 1180, 1275, 1277, 1287, 1341, 1352, 1625, 1696, 1799, 1836, 1912, 2025, 2086, 2161, 2334, 2354, 2756
static u., 535, 1799
Urban, Wilbur M., 1439, 1449, 1470, 1476
Useful. *See* Practical
Utilitarian, 46, 66, 75, 207, 328, 719, 948, 1032, 1661, 2058
Utilitarianism, 7, 16, 232, 313, 536, 604, 606, 629, 761, 790, 846, 909, 1159, 1178, 1326, 1819, 1979, 2102, 2370, 2776
Utility. *See* Practical; Satisfaction

Vaihinger, Hans, 1000, 1035, 1061, 1073-4, 1219, 1326
Vailati, Giovanni, 350, 636, 923, 945, 1113, 1202, 1495, 1749, 2105
Validity. *See* Truth, validity and
Valli, Luigi, 1201, 1285
Valuation, 249, 315, 891, 1476, 1667, 1671, 2681
Value, 103, 139, 163, 181, 357, 364, 537, 645, 679, 681, 691, 734, 1021, 1111, 1168, 1180, 1216, 1303, 1343, 1349, 1366, 1420, 1449, 1455-6, 1470, 1541, 1575, 1581, 1589, 1591, 1648, 1692, 1702, 1715, 1735-6, 1791, 1804, 1891, 1996, 2021, 2027, 2094, 2097, 2131, 2148, 2211, 2301, 2431, 2480, 2633, 2720. *See also* Truth, practical value and
absolute v., 344, 651, 696-7, 700, 922, 1259, 1285
biological view of v., 1589, 1603
conflict of v., 241, 540, 1589
emotion and v., 1814, 2027, 2681
experience and v., 299, 651, 1311, 1702
fact and v., 118, 138, 1272, 1448, 1811, 1940, 2027, 2507, 2629, 2702
humanism and v., 869, 874, 991
idea and v., 681, 790, 1814
intelligence and v., 651, 2454, 2523, 2681
interests and v., 1637, 1814, 2436, 2681
knowledge and v., 237, 1055, 1439, 1637, 1671, 1709, 1721, 2522, 2566
meaning and v., 1604, 1811
means and v., 1702, 2176
morality and v., 86, 103, 540, 734, 2227
objective v., 1311, 1709
psychology and v., 734, 1449, 1591
purpose and v., 1180, 1449, 1456, 1702, 2610
qualities and v., 1311, 2027
reality and v., 651, 752, 869, 910, 991, 1180, 1201, 1259, 1456, 1591, 1641, 1702, 1809, 2064, 2076, 2228, 2466, 2534
reason and v., 197, 316, 369, 574, 983, 2102
science and v., 114, 138, 315, 2064, 2562, 2566, 2681, 2782
situation and v., 1449, 1456, 2021
social v., 557, 974, 1111, 1221, 1589, 2681
spiritual v., 86, 90, 315, 323
standard of v., 364, 418, 634, 1311, 1689, 1702

Value (cont.)
thought and v., 118, 130, 316, 734, 792, 1311, 1702, 1714, 1722, 1778, 1811, 1814, 2027, 2102, 2389, 2610, 2681
truth as v., 368, 438, 574, 634, 718, 869, 879, 889, 954, 1000, 1046, 1251, 1505, 1603, 1689, 2228, 2315, 2436, 2491
universality of v., 634, 1709
v. judgment, 114, 1311, 1439, 1449, 1476, 1637, 1702, 2315, 2507, 2720
v. qualities, 1804, 1811
Veblen, Thorstein, 1490
Verification. *See* Truth, verification and
Vico, Giambattista, 351
Virtue, 7, 75-6, 87, 540, 712, 1667, 1712, 2102, 2227, 2454, 2542
Vitalism, 961, 1312, 1882
Voluntarism, 131, 135, 152, 161, 186, 195, 203, 227, 241, 284, 328, 360, 380, 428, 484, 497, 606-7, 636, 700, 728, 733, 737, 840, 860, 948, 1083, 1173, 1218, 1233, 1288, 1311, 1316, 1348, 1362, 1485, 1604, 1738, 1882, 1981, 2007, 2063, 2325, 2709

Walker, Leslie J., 699, 713
War, 34, 131, 179, 437, 746, 819, 957, 1203, 1410, 1481, 1483, 1491, 1494, 1584, 1588, 1697, 2297
Ward, James, 53, 218, 569, 1592, 2272
Warrant, 2119
Warranted assertibility, 2720, 2782
Waterhouse, Eric S., 2566
Watson, John Broadus, 1379, 2408
Wealth, 87, 332, 1907, 2412
Weiss, Paul, 2379
Wells, H. G., 1518
Whitehead, Alfred North, 1265, 1594, 1851, 1856, 1878, 1928, 1932, 1983, 2025, 2073, 2150, 2235, 2244, 2293, 2550, 2660, 2777
Whitman, Walt, 2686
Whole, 32, 88, 331, 675, 718, 958, 1071, 1078, 1312, 1733, 1785, 1799, 1858, 1876, 1965, 2086. *See also* Unity
w. of experience, 2, 21, 77, 118, 124, 250, 956, 964, 1459, 2100, 2612, 2720
Wilbois, Joseph, 1226
Will, 7, 16, 24, 32, 80, 83, 108, 149, 159, 188, 198, 227, 268, 315, 349, 423, 454, 465, 529, 676, 710, 801, 879, 897, 1423, 1495, 1521, 1667, 1966, 2102, 2601, 2623
action and w., 227, 879, 1139, 2539, 2720
belief and w., 36, 70, 195, 227, 1109
creativity of w., 134, 161, 269, 350-2, 359, 468, 568, 1139
desire and w., 149, 195, 1966
feeling and w., 69, 169, 191, 276, 486, 1321
knowledge and w., 75, 261, 446, 703, 1342
mind and w., 16, 191, 291, 428, 486, 948, 1083
reason and w., 480, 527, 752, 772, 889, 1111, 1305, 1855, 2056
thought and w., 69, 96, 124, 169, 276, 327, 375, 886, 1109, 1111, 1383, 1855, 1981
truth and w., 159, 208, 645, 662, 709, 741, 1130, 1141, 1383, 1547, 2130
Will to believe, 16, 26, 34, 36, 39, 56, 60, 73, 83, 96, 124, 126, 142, 160-1, 172, 195, 228, 241, 259, 348, 350, 352, 359, 387, 438, 442, 499, 513, 560, 630, 636, 673, 680, 684, 708, 710, 736, 846, 886, 923, 947, 1084, 1174, 1202, 1322, 1512, 1531, 1696-7, 1737, 1850, 1945, 1981, 2027, 2057, 2063, 2076, 2315, 2410, 2429, 2444-5, 2640, 2770
w. and right to believe, 68, 430, 438, 560, 708, 1083, 1322, 2640

Windelband, Wilhelm, 803, 1021
Wisdom, 97, 540, 928, 1315, 1712
Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann, 1934
Wobbermin, Georg, 1020, 2189, 2713
Women, 746, 1724
Woodbridge, F. J. E., 235, 971, 2098
Worcester, Elwood, 615
Words, 956, 958, 2277, 2462, 2535, 2638
    meaning of w., 62, 672, 1109, 1560, 1666
Work. *See* Practical
World. *See* Nature; Universe
Wright, Chauncy, 2430
Wundt, Wilhelm Max, 118, 186, 254, 273, 341, 500, 615, 852, 1544, 1730

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