

**JOHN DEWEY'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM**

by

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Abstract

The story of John Dewey's philosophical travels from Hegelianism to instrumentalism during the period from 1882 to 1896 has become codified into a fairly rigid and schematic explanation which appears nearly uniformly across literature on Dewey. Despite warnings from a few perceptive scholars who have suggested that we really do not have a firm grasp of Dewey's relationships with his early major influences, little close study has ever been made of the early years of his philosophical career. This would be irrelevant if the codified explanation were adequate, but in many central ways it is instead incorrect and deficient.

This dissertation argues for five points to correct these problems. First, while clearly idealistic, Dewey's early philosophy shared little with the neo-Hegelian T.H. Green's philosophy and even less with Hegel's, because of its absorption of the little-understood Aristotelian organicism of George Morris. Second, the influence of Wilhelm Wundt's philosophy and psychology on Dewey was far greater than that mentioned by the standard story; recent original research on Wundt makes it now possible to reveal the actual nature of his contribution to Dewey's thought. Third, due to this influence and that of Morris, Dewey upheld the indissoluble integration of cognitive and volitional processes independently of James's and Peirce's efforts in that direction. Fourth, Dewey's revolutionary "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" in 1896 was the expression of his commitment to such an integration, and was not due to the influence of James. Fifth, and this is the most controversial claim, Dewey did not completely abandon his kind of idealism in order to complete his transition to instrumentalism in the 1890's. Rather, the foundations of instrumentalism made an early appearance in Dewey's idealist philosophy, and instrumentalism itself remained enfolded in an idealism which held that experience and reality are identical.

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My heartfelt love and gratitude is extended to my father, who disregarded the suspected impracticality of philosophy and unfailingly supported my education, and to my mother, who was really the first philosopher of the family. My love and gratitude also goes to my grandparents and my fiancée's parents for their support. This work is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Harold C. Shook. Finally, to my fiancée, Karen, I owe the most. Without her I would be an unsuccessful philosopher and an incomplete human being.

Chapter One

The Issues and Questions

Dewey's idealism had many sources and was not so unoriginal as to be wholly traceable to any one or two. My conclusion is that if we mean to answer these questions, we must first understand what the main tenets of Dewey's idealism were and why he held them. To achieve that understanding we must further come to grips with absolute idealism itself. Unless or until a thorough-going analysis of Dewey's contributions to nineteenth century idealism is performed, the problem of Dewey's early philosophy will remain unsolved.¹

Jennifer Welchman, 1989

It is well known that during his graduate education Dewey became some sort of an absolute idealist, under the tutelage of George S. Morris. What is not understood so well is how Dewey traveled away from absolute idealism to arrive at a version of pragmatism which Dewey called instrumentalism. How was it possible for Dewey to become a voluntarist, a functionalist, an anti-intellectualist, a process mentalist, and a pragmatist? These philosophical positions are far from native to Hegelian idealism.

The story of John Dewey's philosophical travels through Hegelianism to instrumentalism during the period from 1882 to 1896 has become codified into a fairly rigid and schematic explanation which appears nearly uniformly across literature on Dewey. Despite warnings from a few perceptive scholars (here Welchman's work has been outstanding), who have suggested that we really do not have a firm grasp of Dewey's relationships with his early major influences, very little close study has ever been made of the first few years of his philosophical career. This would be irrelevant if the codified explanation was adequate, but in many central ways it is instead incorrect and deficient.

I. The Problem of Dewey's Early Philosophy

The lineup of the major influences on Dewey before 1896 is fairly well established, as is the approximate order of their temporal priority: G.S. Morris, whose Hegelian idealism at Johns Hopkins first gained Dewey's discipleship; T.H. Green, the leader of the British neo-idealist movement; Wilhelm Wundt, the German experimental psychologist and philosopher; and William James, whose 1890 *Principles* had a profound effect on Dewey. What complicates matters is that there is a great deal of overlap between the philosophies of Morris, the neo-idealist movement, Wundt, and James. The effects of such diverse philosophies on the maturing Dewey will not be easily determined. Recognizing this, a search for their influences on Dewey should proceed by carefully distinguishing principles according to their predominate origins. The story of the influences on Dewey must be very complex, but their sorting out will have enormous benefits.

This dissertation argues for five points to correct the deficiencies of the standard account of these four major influences and gain the prospective benefits. First, while clearly idealistic, Dewey's early philosophy actually shared little with the neo-Hegelian T.H. Green's philosophy, and even less with Hegel's, because of its absorption of the little-understood Aristotelian organicism of George Morris. Second, the influence of Wilhelm Wundt's philosophy and psychology on Dewey was far greater than that mentioned by the standard story; recent original research on Wundt makes it now possible to reveal the actual nature of his impact on Dewey.

Third, due to this influence and that of Morris, Dewey upheld the indissoluble integration of cognitive and volitional processes independently of James's and Peirce's efforts in that direction. Fourth, Dewey's revolutionary "The Reflex Arc Concept" in 1896 was the expression of his commitment to such an integration, and was not due to the influence of James. Fifth, and this is the most controversial claim, Dewey did not completely abandon his kind of idealism in order to complete his transition to instrumentalism in the 1890's. Rather, the foundations for instrumentalism made an early appearance in Dewey's idealist philosophy, and instrumentalism itself remained enfolded in an idealism which held that experience and reality are identical.

These corrections will permit several explanations. For example, they explain how Dewey's interest in Wundt and experimental psychology could have been gained from G.S. Hall at Johns Hopkins, since Dewey had already made a considerable commitment to Morris' idealism prior to taking Hall's psychology courses. The importance of Wundt should affect the estimation of the influence of Morris, and the depth of Dewey's commitment to portions of absolute idealism. It will also be a contribution towards the explanation of the issues and problems which inspired to Dewey to move away from his version of absolute idealism in precisely the way he did. An overview of John Dewey's mature philosophy, and a summary of the Dewey's education at Johns Hopkins will prepare the way for a closer look at the standard account of the evolution of Dewey's philosophy.

Dewey and nineteenth century philosophy

John Dewey was a nineteenth century philosopher. For those acquainted with Dewey, this pronouncement would be a surprise. Was he not philosophically active until his death in 1952? Still, a close examination reveals that Dewey had deep ties to Romanticism, Leibnizian and Aristotelian revivals, Hegelianism, Darwinian evolutionism, functionalism, voluntarism, and process philosophy. Each of these developments were fundamentally of the nineteenth century and together dominated that era's philosophical activity; the same could hardly be said to also hold for philosophy in the twentieth century, especially in England and America.

The roots of Dewey's pragmatism lie in Fichte's voluntarism, Schelling's organic conception of nature, and their Greek-inspired view of man's natural life. It owes a debt to the Leibnizian and Kantian portrait of the active mind and Trendelenburg's neo-Aristotelianism. Dewey's roots are observed in Hegel's portrait of experience, organicism, and in the social mind and the emergent individual mind; Hegel also stressed the unity of existence and thought, and the supremacy of the process of Becoming over the stability of Being. They are also found in the pragmatism and fallibilism of Peirce, the voluntarist psychology of Wundt and the biological psychology of James, and their functionalist portrait of an evolving and ceaselessly active mind. Dewey's philosophy was also born of the injection of Darwinian principles into philosophy, which encouraged the rejection of the fixed and final in favor of the changeable and adaptable.

To classify Dewey as a twentieth century philosopher would confer no honor or distinction. Those who think that such an appellation is required so that a philosopher can be "up-to-date" or "relevant" to today's intellectual needs are gravely mistaken. Lumping Dewey together with most of those philosophers whose careers fall within the bounds of this century can only serve to do him an injustice. John Dewey rejected most of the philosophies of the first half of the twentieth century, seeing in them only the revival of seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophies. His battles were consistently fought with those contemporaries who would be heirs to Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant.

Dewey perceived a return to the eighteenth century in the positions taken by the New and Critical realists, the logical positivists, and the analytic philosophies of the twentieth century. Throughout his long career Dewey was moving directly against Anglo-American tides; this accounts for Dewey's declining influence among those philosophers, and for the increasing appreciation from Continental philosophers. Dewey's persistent complaint that his critics failed to understand him is not explained away by taking refuge in the counter-complaint that Dewey was an obscure and difficult writer. Rather, most of his critics simply did not share, and could not comprehend, his fundamental philosophical principles. These principles, among which are organicism, continuity, functionalism, teleology, voluntarism, and anti-nominalism, are all central to major nineteenth century philosophies; they are completely antithetical to the tenets prevailing in the following century.

The twentieth century did of course impact on Dewey's thought. His exchanges with his analytically-minded contemporaries caused some modifications, as did those with philosophers sympathetic to Dewey's philosophy. Dewey records a major debt to one of the latter, Frederick Woodbridge, who encouraged a closer position with Aristotelian metaphysics. Still, this sympathy did not by any means guarantee a deep understanding of Dewey's position. For example, Woodbridge wrote as late as 1930 that he could not see how Dewey could justify his claim that things exist prior to being known, and that Dewey always falls back on dialectical argument for his theories instead of demonstrating them empirically.² Woodbridge's difficulties indicate that he did not closely understand many of Dewey's fundamental methodologies and principles.

Dewey's philosophical principles were generated in a process which began with the primary influences on him in his graduate education, and proceeded as Dewey tried to work out the contradictions inherent in these influences. The nearly unique character of Dewey's education is responsible for the extraordinary nature of the primary influences, and thus to understand Dewey's philosophy we must begin with a look at the two years (1882-1884) he spent at The Johns Hopkins University pursuing his Ph.D. in philosophy.

Dewey at Johns Hopkins

John Dewey was one of the very few recipients of an American Ph.D. in philosophy who did not study in Germany. This fact in itself may not seem unusual,

considering that in 1884 Dewey was among the first dozen or so recipients of the recently created American Ph.D. in the field of philosophy. However, nearly all of Dewey's professors had done what Dewey did not, as would most of his own generation's philosophy students. It was considered customary during the latter-half of the nineteenth century for advanced students of philosophy (and of many other sciences, especially medicine) to spend one or more years at Leipzig, Gottingen, Jena or Berlin. Why was John Dewey an exception to this rule? The simple explanation lies in the fact that in an era when American philosophy was looking to Germany for its inspiration and education, Dewey did not have to go to Germany. Germany came to John Dewey at Johns Hopkins University, in the persons of George Sylvester Morris and Granville Stanley Hall.

While Dewey attended Johns Hopkins, the philosophy department consisted of Morris, Hall, and C.S. Peirce. Peirce had little effect on the young Dewey, but the other two professors were a profound, if often contradictory, influence. George S. Morris and G. Stanley Hall had each spent two years in Germany during their educations, and brought back to America the latest philosophical thought. Morris learned Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, tempered by the Aristotelian criticism of Trendelenburg. Hall also studied with Trendelenburg, and then Wundt, being the latter's first American student. Despite their German travels, there was little philosophical overlap between them. Morris espoused an objective idealism, while Hall taught a kind of experimental dualism, the Wundtian physio-psychological parallelism.

Both Morris' and Hall's philosophies were extremely new to America. Morris was one of only a handful of professors in America who taught neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian doctrines. Hall's experimental psychology was an even greater rarity, as only James at Harvard and Ladd at Yale were extensively familiar with this new psychology. The convergence of these two philosophies at John Hopkins is quite remarkable, and proved to be very fortunate, as they collided with great force in the absorbing mind of one graduate student who found both philosophies powerful and impressive. Notice should be also taken of the fact that Dewey was prepared for the education he would receive, having learned much philosophy, especially of Kant, with H.A.P. Torrey at the University of Vermont during and immediately after his undergraduate education.

George S. Morris taught at John Hopkins during the fall semesters from 1878 to 1884. He left a semester before Dewey did, both for permanent positions at the University of Michigan. From 1882 to Dewey's departure from Michigan for Minnesota and Morris' death in 1888, Dewey and Morris were a team, sharing an idealistic outlook on philosophy. While Dewey studied under Morris the tenets of this idealism were shaped by Morris' criticisms of British and Kantian thought, which found it to have an unsatisfactory description of experience and hence a poor psychological theory of the origin and extent of knowledge. A ruling concept for both philosophers was the "*organic*", where the nature of anything must be conceived only through an explication of the role it serves as a part of a greater whole. Dewey has described his favorable encounter with this conception as an undergraduate at

the University of Vermont,³ and Morris reinforced it, having a vision of truth as the comprehension of the interdependence of all portions of reality (by way of Trendelenburg's Aristotelianism). For Dewey, the organic conception would at first play a role in his Hegelianism, and then later would manifest itself in Dewey's attacks on all dualisms. Throughout his career, Dewey would regard any philosophical dualism as defective and requiring repair.

However, Dewey received two theories of the mind as a graduate student; in addition to the idealism from Morris, Dewey learned the new experimental psychology of Wundt from G. Stanley Hall. Hall was the first recipient of the Harvard Ph.D. in philosophy, in 1873. As his philosophy doctorate was awarded (by William James) in the area of psychology, he received the first American Ph.D. in psychology as well. He began teaching at Johns Hopkins in the spring semester of 1883, and Dewey took classes with Hall for two semesters. Dewey was the first of Hall's students to graduate, and as Dewey's dissertation was nominally in the area of psychology ("The Psychology of Kant"), Dewey was the second recipient of an American Ph.D. in psychology.⁴

Hall regarded Morris' philosophy with antipathy, seeing in idealism everything which his own philosophy was fighting against. Hall was brought to Johns Hopkins for one purpose: to promote the "new" psychology and its practical applications. This psychology was largely the work of one man, Wilhelm Wundt, and mostly consisted of one text: the second (1880) edition of his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*. In Hall's words, "the psychology I taught was almost entirely experimental and covered

for the most part the material that Wundt had set forth in the later and larger edition of his *Physiological Psychology*.¹⁵ The psychology which Dewey received at the hands of Hall thus was Wundt's, whose influence on philosophy and psychology in America was just starting. While Hall came to disagree with Wundt in many ways, Hall's own psychological views did not significantly differ from Wundt's for the time Dewey studied under him.

The story of Wundt's influence on Dewey is essentially that of a young American philosopher who, having a thorough understanding of German idealism, was able to appreciate Wundt's philosophical framework and psychological methodology and use much of it for his own purposes. The depth of the influence of the Wilhelm Wundt on John Dewey has never been adequately explored. This may be largely due to the question of the proper interpretation of Wundt's psychology. Recent investigations into the Wundt's thought have argued that Anglo-American philosophers, psychologists, and historians of psychology have had a view of Wundt which differs from his actual principles and doctrines. The difference is supposedly due to Wundt's membership in the German idealist tradition, which was not properly understood or ignored by those sympathetic to the English psychology of associationism. It is claimed that E.B. Titchener's appropriated and/or distorted those portions of Wundt's doctrines which support Titchener's associationistic theory of the mind. Subsequent writers followed the eminence of Titchener and widely promulgated his views, culminating in Boring's account of Wundt in his highly influential history of psychology.

If Dewey's thought is compared with the older interpretation of Wundt there is little resemblance, but a comparison with the new interpretation of Wundt reveals the exact opposite. The extent of the resemblance is briefly summarized in the following principles. Dewey's and Wundt's philosophies emphasized purposive and voluntary behavior in order to understand intelligence, elevated the importance of the constructive activities and functions of the mind, regarded feeling and aesthetic sense as primary for judgement, and viewed the mental as a process instead of a substance. They also held to the following tenets. The nature of something must be found only through experience. There is a distinction between primary, or unreflective, experience and secondary, or reflective experience; this is crucial to Dewey's account of the origin of knowledge. The subject/object, or thought/thing dichotomy is not absolute, but only relative to a larger unity which includes them both as aspects. The supposedly ultimate components of experience called impressions, ideas, or in twentieth century philosophy, "sense data", are merely the result of the abstracting and analyzing ability of the mind exercised upon experience and hence are not really what experience is ultimately like.

The question of which interpretation of Wundt is correct will not be pursued. It is sufficient to argue that as Dewey came into contact with and was influenced by Wundt, Dewey adopted the principles of the second interpretation. Several writers have mentioned Wundt as a possible source of inspiration and material for the early Dewey, but there remain many unanswered questions concerning the nature and extent of the influence of Wundt on Dewey. What is needed is an accurate portrait

of the place Wundt's philosophy played in the early years of Dewey's career. It will show that Dewey owed a large intellectual debt to Wundt over the years of his early period, roughly 1882-1896, and that much of this debt remained in place for Dewey's later work. Wundt's philosophy introduced to Dewey several positions which Dewey came to permanently adopt, and many other of Wundt's principles reinforced and extended some themes Dewey learned elsewhere.

II. The Standard Account

The origin of the standard account

Morton White's 1943 doctoral dissertation at Columbia, *The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism*, was the first published book-length work on Dewey's philosophy from 1879 to 1903. The account is in many ways very suggestive and satisfactory, and it laid down a pattern for later scholarship in this area. Previous work on this period is marked by Dewey's own comments on his evolution in "The Development of American Pragmatism," "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," and the biography in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*. Also, there is an article which has been completely ignored by researchers: Sterling Lamprecht's "An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalist Logic."⁶ This 1924 article, like White's, found in neo-idealism the stimulus for Dewey's later work, and especially focused on the nature of the debt Dewey supposedly owed to T.H. Green. Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that Lamprecht was also a graduate of Columbia, although Lamprecht's article is not

mentioned in White's book. The article did provoke a sharp rebuttal from F.C.S. Schiller, who denied Dewey's continued debt to Green for instrumentalist logic, and requested that more care be taken when attempting to discover lines of influence.⁷ This request, regrettably, has not been often heeded.

The resulting composite account from Lamprecht, Dewey, and White goes as follows. Dewey was almost completely dependent upon Green, and Morris' use of Green, for his philosophy for a significant length of time. But at some point Dewey was stimulated to reject some aspects of Green, including absolute idealism. This rejection permitted Dewey's version of pragmatism, instrumentalism, to develop from a new empiricist basis, but this empiricism still retained some features perilously close to, if not remaining within, idealism. The timing of the rejection is in two stages. The first comes in the early 1890's, marked by two events: Dewey reads James's *Principles of Psychology*, and he suddenly rejects Green's moral philosophy. The second is Dewey's 1903 *Studies in Logical Theory*, in which Dewey proclaims his freedom from absolute idealism by attacking Lotze, Green, and Bradley, and first expounds a recognizable pragmatism.

The account's evolution

As a broad outline, this scheme is repeated nearly uniformly throughout subsequent discussions of the early Dewey.⁸ Especially faithful are those which are part of an attempt to cover Dewey's entire philosophical career, and those which result from some felt need to mention the earlier stages before treating Dewey's later

and mature thought in a close examination. More original are the article-length researches into particular aspects of Dewey's early philosophy, but they too adopt much of the now standard account, and as a result their analyses suffer.

The first of this category is an excellent example: Wilkins's 1956 "James, Dewey, and Hegelian Idealism." Dewey is portrayed as a complete Hegelian, and experimental psychology and James are credited with diverting Dewey into pragmatism. "It is clear that the two main concepts of pragmatism -- the consequentialist criterion for judging truth and the experimental method of inquiry - - are *not* derived from Hegelian idealism."⁹ The conclusion is that Dewey then must have received them from James and Peirce. Such reasoning on the part of Wilkins has also been adopted and incorporated into the standard account. Unfortunately, it is a total fabrication. It proceeds from the false premise that Dewey was a complete Hegelian, and uses another false premise, that James and Peirce deeply influenced Dewey into pragmatism, in order to achieve the desired result: Dewey became a pragmatist during the 1890's. This conclusion is an entirely appropriate goal, but Wilkins' means must be rejected, as will be seen in the course of our inquiry.

Collins's 1962 "The Genesis of Dewey's Naturalism" is largely free from such simplistic explanations and presents a balanced portrait of how Dewey's dissatisfaction with the absolute led him towards naturalism.¹⁰ Collins is in no rush to determine the exact year in which Dewey's "conversion" took place, yet believes that such a complete conversion had to take place for Dewey's mature pragmatism

to emerge. We shall have reason to doubt that there is a need to find such a conversion. Ratner's Foreward to his edition of Dewey's writings,¹¹ due probably to the brief space allotted, is replete with simplicities and is a good example of an uncritical regurgitation of the standard account. As Eastman observes, Ratner's account seems driven by a heartfelt need to show "that Hegelianism -- and Idealism in general -- is an effete, a somehow suspect, if not dissolute philosophy from which Dewey wisely, and heroically, freed himself."¹² Despite Ratner's protests to the contrary¹³ his account is devoid of any insight into Dewey's early version of Hegelianism.

The same cannot be said for Brodsky's 1969 "Absolute Idealism and John Dewey's Instrumentalism." Anti-dualism and the uniting of reason and experience are revealed to be common goals from Dewey's Hegelian period onward. Yet Brodsky holds that Dewey attempted to overcome inherent problems within absolute idealism as he progressed into pragmatism by using two things: the notion of inquiry as the response to problems in experience, and the view of forms of thought as functional rather than ontological.¹⁴ As we shall see, Dewey actually held both of these during his so-called Hegelian phase. The same sort of distortion, placing principles at the point of conversion instead of its proper place in Dewey's earliest phase, is found in Phillips's 1971 "James, Dewey, and the Reflex Arc."¹⁵ There Dewey's turn towards pragmatism is seen as the result of the imbibing of James's psychological doctrines; the many similarities between James's and Dewey's psychologies are grounds for concluding that Dewey is in debt to James for them.

We shall find that an alternative account is far more satisfactory, which gives the credit to Wundt instead. Dewey's convergence with James is the result of their common but separate inspiration from Wundt, and Dewey's revision of the reflex arc concept owes nothing to James; indeed, it actually had very little to do with Dewey's move away from absolute idealism.

With relief one can turn to Smith's 1976 "The Development and Formulation of John Dewey's Theory of Mind".¹⁶ Smith does not see a devoted follower of Hegel or Green in the early Dewey. Rather, a commitment to experience and some naturalistic tenets were visible, along with a rejection of some tenets fundamental to absolute idealism. The role of James is somewhat diminished, as he is more reasonably portrayed as merely bringing out some pragmatic tendencies lying beneath an overlay of absolutism in Dewey's thought. This portrait is echoed by Buxton's "The Influence of William James on John Dewey's Early Work"¹⁷ and Reck's "The Influence of William James on John Dewey in Psychology",¹⁸ both appearing in 1984. However, the notion that James helped to pull Dewey away from idealism must be reconsidered.

III. The Methodology of the Inquiry

In the second through fifth chapters Dewey's work is discussed sequentially, from his earliest idealist papers to his *Psychology*. There, the relationships holding between Dewey's work and the work of others are drawn out. In the sixth chapter

the previous materials will be used as evidence for the five points stated at the outset which will revise the standard account. In the expository chapters care is taken to achieve some corollary goals, which are intended to clear the usual obstacles from the path to a clearer understanding of Dewey's early work.

First, the philosophical views of others are not discussed until it can be shown that they have some relationship with Dewey's own views. For example, there is no account of Morris' entire philosophy; only those views held by Morris which either are discussed, adopted, or rejected by Dewey in his works are explained in the following account. This helps to prevent unwarranted assumptions and expectations regarding the interpretation of Dewey's writings. Second, no delineation of philosophical positions is attempted prior to their appearance in Dewey's works. This too helps to prevent premature assumptions and also makes for a break with previous (and erroneous) interpretations of Dewey. Third, no attempt is made to classify Dewey's positions save where the relationships between Dewey and other philosophers is in question. Such classifications have very easily served the perpetuation of the standard account and hence must be resisted until they are needed.

Notes to Chapter One

1. Welchman, Jennifer. "From Absolute Idealism to Instrumentalism: The Problem of Dewey's Early Philosophy", p. 418. *TPS* 25 (1989): 407-419. The abbreviations used in the notes to the chapters are explained at the outset of the bibliography. The complete bibliographic information for the books noted is also found there.
2. "Experience and Dialectic," in *Nature and Mind*, pp. 230-239.
3. "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," *LW* 5, pp. 147-148.
4. Harper, Robert. "Tables of American Doctorates in Psychology." *American Journal of Psychology* 62 (1949): 579-587.
5. G.S. Hall, *Autobiography*, p. 234.
6. *Mind* 33 (1924): 415-427.
7. "Instrumentalism and Idealism." *Mind* 34 (1925): 75-79.
8. See Welchman, pp. 408n4.
9. Wilkins, Burleigh. "James, Dewey, and Hegelian Idealism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17 (1956): 340.
10. Collins, James. "The Genesis of Dewey's Naturalism." In *John Dewey: His Thought and Influence*, edited by John Blewitt, pp. 1-32.
11. Ratner, Joseph. "Foreward." In *John Dewey: Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Practice*, edited by Joseph Ratner, pp. 9-15.
12. Eastman, George. "Review of *John Dewey: Philosophy, Psychology and Social Practice*." *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 4 (1965): 95-104.
13. See his "Reply to George Eastman," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 4 (1965): 105-107.
14. Brodsky, Garry. "Absolute Idealism and John Dewey's Instrumentalism." *TPS* 5 (1969): 59.
15. Phillips, D.C. "James, Dewey, and the Reflex Arc." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971): 555-568.

16. Smith, Philip. "The Development and Formulation of John Dewey's Theory of Mind." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (1976): 275-303.

17. Buxton, Michael. "The Influence of William James on John Dewey's Early Work." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 45 (1984): 451-463.

18. Reck, Andrew. "The Influence of William James on John Dewey in Psychology." *TPS* 20 (1984): 87-118.

Chapter Two

Dewey and G.S. Morris

The title 'Hegelian' is rather wildly thrown about nowadays, and has naturally fallen into some disrepute. No one who by trial has become aware of the difficulty of mastering, and still more of appreciating, Hegel's system, would be in a hurry either to accept the title for himself or to bestow it upon another.¹

T.H. Green, 1877

When Dewey came to The Johns Hopkins University in the fall of 1882 at the age of 22, he already had two publications to his credit. The April 1882 "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism" and the July 1882 "The Pantheism of Spinoza" were published in the only American philosophy journal then existing, the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Dewey could read philosophic German, had a close understanding of both Kant and Scottish intuitionism, and had more than a passing acquaintance with Hegel.² His first two articles display a Kantian background.³ His third publication was written after Dewey had begun to study Morris, Green, and other neo-idealists, and accordingly the tenor and methods alter considerably to reflect their theories.

I. Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling

Dewey gave his first presentation to the Metaphysical Club on "Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling,"⁴ which was subsequently published in January 1883. In this

article Dewey attacks the epistemological side of agnosticism, which was the Nineteenth century's version of nominalistic and sensationalistic empiricism. It encompasses positivism, some varieties of neo-Kantianism, associationalism, and some evolutionism. They have in common a way to resolve the dispute between religion and science, by arguing that we cannot have knowledge of ultimate being, of reality, since we are by nature limited in our knowledge to phenomena, appearance, and the relative. Dewey understands it as amounting to the epistemological theory that all of our knowledge originates from, and is relative to, our senses. As Dewey uses the terms, sensations and feelings are interchangeable, and thus Dewey sets himself to showing that it is impossible to prove that all of our knowledge consists of relative feelings. Dewey selects as his principal opponent the major figure of agnosticism, Herbert Spencer. His philosophy of the unknowable attempts to delineate responsibilities for religion and science in a manner prevalent since Kant: science deals with the knowable phenomena, while religion deals with the faith in the unknowable realm safe beyond the reach of science.

Knowledge of the Absolute

Dewey starts by asking how it is, on the premise of sensationalist empiricism, that we could know that all our knowledge is relative. Dewey argues that knowledge must be relative to something else, and for us to know that our knowledge is relative is to know of the existence of that which is non-relative. That which is non-relative is termed the Absolute. The Absolute is the one ultimate reality; it is that which is

not relative to, or dependent on, anything else. Those philosophers who have denied that we could know anything about the Absolute are thus in the position that they must admit that the Absolute exists. Dewey acknowledges that Spencer claims exactly this. But it is one thing to argue that the relative cannot exist without the existence of the absolute, and another to hold that we can only have knowledge of the relative. As the agnostic holds the latter as well as the former, Dewey feels entitled to ask how, on the agnostic's sensationalistic grounds, can we know of the existence of the Absolute, since that kind of knowledge is required in order to know of the existence of the relative. The agnostic cannot answer this question, since he holds that all of our knowledge is of the relative only. Dewey attempts to trap the agnostic by showing that the two positions are contradictory: the agnostic's only argument for the conclusion has the feature that the conclusion contradicts one of the needed premises. Hence the argument fails, and Dewey concludes that we cannot hold that all of our knowledge is relative. If we agree that sensational knowledge is relative, as both Dewey and the agnostic believe, then we must admit that sensational knowledge cannot exhaust all of our knowledge, and thus some of our knowledge does not arise from sensations. Alternatively, even if a philosopher believed that sensational knowledge exhausts all of our knowledge, then she is forced to hold that such knowledge is thoroughly objective (as Hume was). Either way, we must have access to objective knowledge, or knowledge of the Absolute.

Dewey provides another objection to the existence of an Absolute beyond the reach of knowledge. [p. 26] He claims that any statement of the form "X is" lacks

meaning because it fails to predicate anything of the subject. Existence cannot be a predicate, because "when it is said that something *is*, it is meant that *something is*." A concept must have some positive qualification in order to have any meaning, but the notion of the unknowable is a purely negative one; it is supposedly what is forever beyond the reach of consciousness. Furthermore, the assertion of the existence of the unknowable is self-contradictory. "To say that something beyond consciousness is known to exist, is merely to say that the same thing is and is not in consciousness." [p. 26] Therefore the contents of consciousness must exhaust reality.

Dewey's idealism here stated departs from subjective idealism and is instead a preliminary expression of absolute or objective idealism. To see this, remember that the notion of subjective idealism depends on the existence of the subjective, which in turn relies on the relativity of consciousness, which in turn relies on the objective. The notion of a sole *individual* mind exhausting reality is impossible and self-contradictory; absolute idealism holds that while individual minds exist, they are but a portion of the ultimately real consciousness comprising total reality. This "absolute" consciousness cannot be viewed as fundamentally individual or subjective. Objective, or absolute, idealism is the only appropriate term for this philosophical position. Now, this too brief account of absolute idealism cannot do justice to its many issues and problems, but further elaborations and qualifications will be presented as Dewey's philosophy encounters them.

An analysis of relativity

Dewey's next criticism of the unknowable states that in order to show that something is relative, it must be demonstrated that it exists in some relation to something else. This relation is typically one of dependence or of cause and effect, but whatever the relation, it must be asserted to exist for the argument to proceed. The agnostic must admit that this relation must then exist between the unknowable and the knowable: "As long as its sole characteristic is unrelatedness to consciousness, it and the content of consciousness have nothing to do with each other; and to make one the ground of asserting anything regarding the real nature of the other is absurd." [p. 27] Besides, even if there is some such relation, sensationalism must assert that it is unknowable too, since it can't be a sensation or the product of sensations. [pp. 27, 31-32] With this Dewey can put together a summary of the argument required to prove the complete relativity of feeling. There must be four elements: an absolute object, the object must be in consciousness, it must be related somehow to consciousness, and these relations cannot be feelings. Dewey agrees with all four elements but the agnostic cannot, since knowledge of the last three is impossible on sensationalist grounds.

Dewey pursues the point that there must exist a relation between the absolute and the relative by revealing how specific arguments for relativity rely on them. Dewey uses the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' to restate the argument, replacing the 'relative' and 'absolute,' respectively. [p. 28] Dewey states that a feeling, a sensation, can be subjective, just as science tells us: sense-knowledge is relative

because it is conditioned by and dependent on the character of light, the body's sensory organs, etc. If it is then concluded that knowledge of the objective, of unconditioned real existence, becomes problematic, then we are only contradicting the premises: the knowledge of the objective real existence of the light, the body's senses, etc. These premises are objective because they are not given in sensation and cannot be feelings: "the waves of ether [as was the current theory of light], the structure of the retina, etc., - are not themselves feelings, and never have been."

Dewey then takes on the phenomenalist view that these 'objective' things are actually only the possibilities of sensations and hence still relative. However, this only leads to an infinite regress, because then we must still require of this theory that it explain how it could be known that these things are subjective as well. Such an explanation must require reference to other objective things, Dewey argues, because to merely give reference to another subjective feeling would not prove subjectivity: "the mere fact that one feeling is the antecedent of another could never give any reason for asserting that feeling was relative in comparison with an unknown object." [p. 29] Therefore, Dewey concludes "that to prove the relativity of feeling is impossible without assuming that there are objects which are known not through feeling." [p. 29] We can know that something is subjective only if we also know that something else is objective. The doctrine that all of our knowledge is relative or subjective requires an appeal to absolute or objective knowledge. Doubtless *some* of our knowledge is relative, but to know this is to confess that we do have some non-relative knowledge, or knowledge of the absolute.

Dewey then attacks a common argument for the relativity of all sensational knowledge. [pp. 30-31] This is the argument which says that since under the same conditions different people have different sensations, these sensations must be subjective. They cannot be objective because the objective is precisely that which remains the same while any or all other things changed. Dewey simply points out that this argument depends on a statement of "the same conditions." The argument works only if it supposed that it can be known that the conditions are the same. Thus it is assumed that there is knowledge of that which can be independent of the observers, or in others words, the argument assumes that there can be objective knowledge. To give an example, suppose it is pointed out that two people looking at an object can see two different colors. We can conclude that their sensations of color are relative/subjective only if other possibilities are eliminated. Two important ones are (a) they are looking at the same object, and (b) if there is but one object, then it is not multi-colored. Therefore we can get the desired conclusion only if (a) and (b), at least, are assumed to be true. If the arguer does so, he is claiming to know them. But such knowledge cannot be given in the observers' sensations, be they of color or of any other type. The knowledge claims must be of the objective sort, and thus the argument (to show that color sensations are relative) is convincing only if appeals to objective knowledge are made. Now, Dewey believes that colors (and other sensations) can be relative knowledge, since Dewey has no trouble accepting the existence of objective knowledge. However, the sensational empiricist, the one who wants to argue that *all* knowledge is sensational and relative, does have

such trouble. The proof that all knowledge is relative must always fail, since it can proceed only by relying on non-relative knowledge.

The nature of feeling

Dewey is now prepared to give a positive account of the nature of feeling: "a feeling is a specific determinate relation or reaction given in consciousness between two bodies, one a sensitive, the other a non-sensitive object." [p. 31] We can make some important observations at this point. First, Dewey accepts the common psychological view that sensations are caused for an organism by objects existing beyond the body. Second, the sensations, the objects, and the relations between them must be known and hence in consciousness, according to the above arguments. Dewey consistently equates the condition of being known with the condition of being in consciousness, and this sort of terminology is shared by Morris and the other neo-idealists. Third, Dewey must embark upon an examination of the nature of relations since he depends on them in his account. Dewey is quite sensitive to this obligation and next gives us a glimpse into the role relations play in his theory of knowledge.

Dewey states that while others have denigrated subjective knowledge, there is really no reason to consider knowledge concerning the relations holding between a sensitive organism and objects as inferior to some other sort of knowledge. After all, there is no fundamental difference between this and knowledge of the relations between two objects, like gold and acid [p. 31], and furthermore, there cannot be any knowledge where there are no relations. "Except upon the theory that the real

nature of things is their nature out of relation to everything, knowledge of the mode of relation between an object and an organism is just as much genuine knowledge as knowledge of its physical and chemical properties, which in turn are only its relations." [p. 31] With this statement Dewey shows that he holds that the "real nature of things" is provided only through their relations with other things, and since Dewey equates relations with reactions, things' real natures and properties are just the results of their interactions with other things.

Dewey concludes with a statement of his absolute idealism. Since our knowledge of the objective and its objective relations (which indeed must constitute it) cannot be themselves subjective sensations, then they must be provided by the relations of consciousness. [p. 32] Dewey must be here relying on a principle which declares that knowledge is constituted by the relations supplied by consciousness. "Since a feeling can be known as relative only when referred to an object, this object cannot be a feeling, nor constituted by a feeling. The object must, then, be relative to a thinking consciousness." A feeling's "relativity consists in a specific ratio between a sensitive and a non-sensitive object, which are constituted by relations to self-consciousness." [p. 33] And this self-consciousness "is the ground and source of relations" which means that it cannot itself be related to anything else, so it is properly called the absolute. Self-consciousness both exhausts reality and is the absolute, with everything else to be known contained within it by being determined by its relations.

A large number of presuppositions must be supplied in order to make Dewey's rushed conclusions fully comprehensible. Suffice it to say that he is relying on an

elaborate portrait of the nature of self-consciousness and its role in knowledge. We can look to Morris now to see this portrait as we locate Dewey's arguments in Morris' works.

Neo-idealism on relativity

We can find the term "relativity of knowledge" in Morris' *British Thought and Thinkers* as he discusses Sir William Hamilton and Herbert Spencer. Throughout this work he attacks the notion that our knowledge is limited to sensations and completely inadequate to reality. Morris uses the term in question first while discussing Hamilton's acceptance of Kantian doctrine of the unknowability of the unconditioned ultimately real.⁵ Morris says that the notion of the Unknowable "would never occur to the human mind, and be made a theme of inquiry, if the whole nature of mind were absorbed in sensible, static consciousness." Morris' antipathy towards the "thing-in-itself" consistently arises throughout Morris' career. Such antipathy is a necessary component of the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophies; Morris would have acquired it during his German studies and Dewey also heard it in Green, Caird, et al. "But, as we cannot apply to it any one of the categories, the conception of it is for us empty and meaningless," argues Caird in his 1877 *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*.⁶ Morris was convinced of this position before the British neo-idealists since he took from Trendelenburg his critique of Hegelian logic. On this critique, Hegelian logic requires in the dialectical process the conceptions of pure thought and pure being. As Morris reports, since

neither of these can have any significance for us, the dialectical process cannot start unless some positive content is smuggled in.⁷

Those philosophers who equate the unconditioned or absolute with the unknowable are doing so under the influence of a sensationalistic epistemology, which holds that sensations are permanently conditioned and the source of all knowledge. Morris argues that since the notion of the unconditioned or absolute does exist, we should conclude that a person is more than "simply a bundle of perceptions or impressions, or a complex series of mere conscious *states*, but that there is a dynamic element in him, an ideal real nature, a spell of potent reason, a spirit, for whose activity sense is but the occasion and subsidiary instrument."⁸ Again, when discussing Spencer, Morris says that if a person's knowledge is constrained to the realm of the sensible,

It were psychologically impossible that the conception of the sensibly unknowable should enter his mind. The fact that it does thus enter is immediate proof that man is more than a physically sensitive organism, and that knowledge is something more than merely mechanical, analytical dissection and registry of passively felt experiences, or of 'phenomena'. It indicates that his is an actively living, rational nature, capable of organic insight, of rational conceptions...."⁹

Here Morris is not reversing his position on whether we can conceive of the unknowable, since here he qualifies it and speaks only of the *sensibly* unknowable, which is different from the contradictory notion of the consciously or conceivably

unknowable. On Morris' standpoint, since the senses do not provide by themselves consciousness or knowledge, we should not be surprised that there must be many things (indeed, everything) which is Unknowable to the senses. Put another way, Morris accepts the complete relativity of sensations or feelings; the problems begin only when a philosopher (usually a British philosopher, in Morris' view) declares sensations to be the sole source of human knowledge.

Morris has no quarrel with any attempt to "recognize the phenomena as given matters-of-sensible-fact, and to demonstrate the 'law' or rule of order which is observed to hold good concerning their varied coexistences and sequences."¹⁰ Such a Mental Science is "a thoroughly legitimate work," but danger and error awaits if it "takes its own peculiar explanations to be, in the one case, final, or, in the other, exhaustive."¹¹ This Mental Science is no different in method than any other science for Morris. But there is another and far better way to investigate the mind, called Mental Philosophy or real or rational psychology, which is concerned with mental functions. "The names of these functions are many, as, consciousness, memory, intelligence, reason, will. All these, and others, are *active functions* of mind."¹² This view of the mind replaces sensationalism, which holds that these are instead merely mental *states*, and upholds the proper role of an active mind supplying relations. "It is true, the 'relational element,' as such, is not given in sensible, static consciousness, but in rational, dynamic self-consciousness, for it is a characteristically ideal *function*; it is intelligible, and not sensible."¹³

Morris held that knowledge lies in the relations which self-consciousness provides, and combines this with the views that process accurately characterizes the mental and that self-consciousness distinguishes itself into functions as it organically evolves and grows. As we saw, there was no mention of the latter two theories in Dewey's article, but they begin to appear in Dewey's next publication and continue for some time thereafter. In Morris' idealism the question as to the proper relation between consciousness and object is answered by a conception of the two united in one "organic" unity. Due to this unity, the only way a distinction between thought and thing can arise is through a process which takes place *within* conscious experience. Dewey makes the first mention of the organic and the functional in his next publication.

II. Kant and Philosophic Method

Dewey's April 1884 article, "Kant and Philosophic Method,"¹⁴ presents an exposition of Kant's philosophy, together with some Hegelian criticisms of the sort Morris and other neo-idealists have made. The primary inspirations lie in Caird's *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, published in 1877, Morris' *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Exposition*, published in 1882, and Green's *1883 Prolegomena to Ethics*. Dewey is presenting his credentials in the competition for a Johns Hopkins University fellowship for his second year, and the views expressed are

designed to be an account of the neo-idealism he has learned, both from Morris and the British neo-idealists Green, Caird, et al.

The origins of experience

The Philosophic Method is the criterion of truth. This goal is "having some principle which, true on its account, may also serve to judge the truth of all besides." [p. 34] The question is whether Kant accomplished this goal. Kant held the categories, and hence all knowledge, to be subjective because he accepted the notion of the relativity of knowledge in the form of sensational empiricism. Kant was so heavily influenced by British thought that he could only conceive of a mechanical or external relation between Reality, the senses, and the categories. This sort of relation is marked by the theses that they each have a distinct existence, are foreign to the others, and are able to act upon each other. "The material, the manifold, the particulars, are furnished by Sense in perception; the conceptions, the synthetic functions from Reason itself, and the union of these two elements are required, as well for the formation of the object known, as for its knowing." [p. 37] "Though the categories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to which they bear a purely mechanical relation." [p. 39]

These ways of criticizing Kant are ubiquitous among the neo-idealists. Caird, summarizing Kant's Transcendental Deduction, says that "in a way, the identical self, the categories, time and space, and the manifold of sense, appear as independent things, and Kant seems to construct experience, as a watchmaker constructs a watch,

out of pre-existing parts."¹⁵ Morris says that Kant has a "purely mechanistic point of view....Kant persists in considering the process of knowledge, or, more particularly, the relation between subject and object, in its superficial, mechanical aspect."¹⁶ The analogy of the watch which Caird uses gives an apt description of some worries Hegelianism offers about Kant's philosophy. The watch is experience, and the parts are sensory materials and the understanding's categories. Only through the cooperation of both will the watch run, but the two sorts of parts have nothing else in common. Analogously, the categories *per se* are purely formal thought, purely *a priori*; the sensations are bare content, completely contingent. Somehow they work together to produce experience, but aside from this work they have nothing else in common.

As Dewey puts it, Kant argued that "while thought *in itself* is analytic, it is synthetic when applied to a material given it, and that from this material, by its functions, it forms the objects which it knows." [p. 37] Since all of the synthetic functions of the understanding are still producing results which are separate at this point, to ensure that our experience is together in a coherent unity there is another operating synthesizer, which "Kant calls the synthetic *unity* of Apperception, or, in brief, self-consciousness." [p. 38] The term 'apperception' refers to the process by which the existing mental order alters and assimilates incoming perceptions so that they can contribute to the mental unity. The term 'self-consciousness' gains its meaning when it is contrasted with mere 'consciousness'. The latter term refers to the realm of the mind consisting of bare sensations. In Morris' words,

"Consciousness," as distinguished from "self-consciousness," is what we have termed "sensible consciousness." It is consciousness as considered in empirical psychology -- a fixed and finished product, a complex series of "states" or "feelings," a sum of "mental phenomena" which we find already existing, and which, prior to exact investigation, are roughly imagined to be the purely mechanical result of the action, upon one indefinable mental "subject," of "objects" whose nature is wholly foreign to the subject.¹⁷

Morris is here describing what he considers to be Locke's, and well as Kant's, account of phenomenal mind or 'consciousness'. The grounds for saying this lie in the distinction Kant makes between the aesthetic and the analytic, or the sense and the understanding. Sense is the material supplied from without, and the understanding is the set of categories supplied from within. While Kant in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* says that space and time are introduced a priori first into sense, the understanding still has yet to perform its work, and so true experience has yet to be realized. Aside from this difference between Locke's and Kant's account of sense, the only other difference Morris sees is that Kant recognized that such sensory consciousness barely deserves the name and fails to be our experience, because it cannot provide its characteristic unity and wholeness. What can accomplish the latter is 'self-consciousness,' which unifies the work of the understanding's categories.

With this explanation Kant tries to provide what Hume could not: "experience as an intelligibly connected system." [p. 38] Pure sensationalism could never be an accurate description of our experience of synthetic a priori truths, or our experience

as unified whole, since a series of isolated and externally related perceptions could never give rise to the truths of physical science nor the unity of self-consciousness (the 19th century version of Descartes's dictum that the mind has no parts). All of the neo-idealists agreed on this point with Kant, following Green in his decisive attacks on British empiricism in the "Introductions" to his editions of Hume's works. They also agreed that the ultimate criterion for success for Kant is whether our experience is completely accounted for. That is to say, the truths presented in experience require no justification. Most of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* revolves around them. Dewey states that when Kant "inquires what is the criterion of truth for the latter [actual experience],..the answer he finds to be 'possible experience' itself." [p. 37] Hence for Kant the method by which we can verify and know all truths consists in looking to experience itself to see them. Dewey notes that

On the one hand, the criterion of the categories is possible experience, and on the other, that the criterion of possible experience is the categories and their supreme condition [self-consciousness]. This is evidently a circle, yet a circle which, Kant would say, exists in the case itself, which expresses the very nature of knowledge. It but states that in knowledge there is naught but knowledge which knows or is known -- the only judge of knowledge, of experience, is experience itself. [p. 38]

Dewey has begun what will turn out to be a long-term relationship with the term "experience". In this article experience is just self-consciousness, which is also knowledge. The equation of experience with knowing is a defining mark of Dewey's

idealism, and drives many of the arguments. As we saw, it provided the way for Dewey to eliminate the thing-in-itself. Since it impossible, according to Dewey, for there to be anything beyond the realm of self-consciousness (since we could not conceive of, or have knowledge of such a thing), we must conclude that nothing can exist which is not in experience. Kant violated this Hegelian principle at least three times by affirming the thing-in-itself, the phenomena of sensible consciousness, and the categories of the synthetic unity of apperception.

A Hegelian reconstruction of Kant

The easiest way to move from this disastrous position is to see what is left after getting rid of them. If the (impossible) thing-in-itself is eliminated, along with the sensationalism, then the remainder is an experience in which the categories are imminent in, and not external to, experience: "the categories, in and through self-consciousness, constitute experience..." [pp. 38-39] Dewey thus goes back to the notion of experience which motivated Kant originally: experience as we find it is an intelligibly connected systematic whole. There can be no criterion of truth which relies on the existence of something which is not part of this experience, and no part of experience can be set up as the test for the rest, so Dewey is constrained to say that the criterion of truth is simply the whole of experience.

Now, this does not seem to be a substantive answer, but it is a rudimentary statement of the coherence theory of truth. Nothing beyond experience can determine what is true, and one portion of experience cannot be used to pass

judgement on the rest. [p. 38] Dewey does not expand on the latter point, but we can supply an explanation by observing that for Kant, and also for Hegel, one result of accepting the systematicity of the categories comprising experience is that nothing within this whole receives sufficient priority so that it may ground the rest. As Caird quotes from Kant:

Reason so constitutes a sphere so completely separated from all others, and so thoroughly united within itself, that we cannot intermeddle with any part without touching all the others, or settle a single point without determining for everything its place and relation to everything else. *Outside* of this sphere, there lies nothing that could better our judgement in regard to what lies within it; and *within* it, every element is dependent for its value and use in its relation to all the rest. And as in the structure of an organized body, the meaning and purpose of each member can only be deduced from the idea of the whole, so it may be said of such a criticism that it is not to be depended on, unless it has been brought to absolute and exhaustive completeness, and that it has done nothing unless it has done everything.¹⁸

The "criticism" to which Kant refers is the complete account of the operations and bounds of Reason. It is Dewey's goal as well, and is called philosophic method, or the discovery of the criterion of truth. Kant here provides the key metaphor: the organism. It is hardly original with Kant, as Dewey will point out later in his *Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding*. However, it is in some regions of post-Kantian idealism that this metaphor develops from a mere analogy used to help the reader understand an important viewpoint, into the guiding vision

which carries an entire philosophy and without which the reader will never gain entrance. Morris must be included in this latter region, and it didn't take Dewey long to be comfortable using it as well: "the relation of categories to experience is the relation of members of an organism to a whole." [p. 38] The categories constitute the entirety of experience, and "method will consist in making out a complete table of these categories in all their mutual relations, giving each its proper placing" [p. 39] So long as each category coheres with the rest, it is capable of carrying its share of the truth. It cannot provide absolute truth in itself; with the antinomies Kant proved, to the satisfaction of most neo-idealists including Morris and Dewey, that all the categories break down and are untrue if they are isolated and singly applied to absolute reality.¹⁹

Dewey does not elaborate on the connection between the notion of experience as organism and the relative adequacy of each of the categories to attain truth. He instead proceeds to tackle what must be the next question after having asserted that the categories exhaust experience: if Kant's Aesthetic must be rejected as left-over sensationalism, and if the categories are to be synthetic, just what are the categories supposed to be synthesizing? Dewey poses this question and supplies an answer:

Previous methods failed because they made no allowance for synthesis -- Kant's because the synthesis can occur only upon matter foreign to it. Thought in the previous theories was *purely* analytic; in Kant's it is *purely* synthetic, in that it is synthesis of foreign material. Were thought at once synthetic *and* analytic, differentiating and integrating in its own nature, both

affirmative and negative, relating to self at the same time that it related to other -- indeed, through this relation to other -- the difficulty would not have arisen. [p. 40]

Dewey attempts an example. He explains that when Kant believed that a human being's knowledge is conditioned by external things (objects) acting upon bodies (subjects) he was not mistaken. The Hegelian realization is that on this account (and indeed all of the accounts provided by empirical psychologists), both the subject and object mentioned are *known* things, and quite far from being unknown! For example, psychologists tell us that vision is dependent on physical light. Now, is this light a completely unknown entity? On the contrary; there is a great deal of knowledge about it. We can recall here Dewey's similar argument in the preceding article. Remembering that for the idealists, knowledge implies presence for self-consciousness, and that this self-consciousness operates through the categories, Dewey concludes that the known object exists thanks to the work of the categories. Since the same argument can be made for the subject, Dewey says: "Yet this individual and these things are but known objects already constituted by the categories, and existing only for the synthetic unity of apperception or self-consciousness." [p. 41] Both the subject and object of the psychologist are really objects in the true sense of the term, and self-consciousness remains the true subject.

This is hardly a helpful example of how Reason can analyze into elements what can then be synthesized into knowledge. But this is not Dewey's goal, because Dewey has equated experience with knowledge. This means that Dewey must

abandon the view that all knowledge is the result of synthesis. Knowledge cannot be the result of anything, because as Dewey has argued, any attempt to find something prior to knowledge, prior to self-consciousness, must end in failure. This is Dewey's position. Everything in our experience is a known object. The known objects are constituted by (and not created by) the categories. The categories are universals, and the objects are particulars which are composed of the cooperative work of categories. The categories can cooperate in such a way (analytically) so as to distinguish particulars (like sunlight and human visual organs). These things then emerge (for the word "enter" would be incorrect, as it connotes that they existed prior to the work of the categories) in our experience. Once distinguished (or differentiated, the result of negation) they are materials for synthesis. Dewey is careful to point out that they are *known* materials prior to synthesis, and this is the point of the stress Dewey placed on the known character of the object conditioning the known subject in the above example.

The organic relation

Dewey speaks of "relations" in this article, and a clarifying word should be said on this terminology. The distinction between external and internal relations has already been drawn when the Kantian viewpoint of the mechanical and reciprocal relations between the thing-in-itself, the phenomena, and the categories was criticized by the neo-idealists. These relations are also referred to as external relations, because the effects they have on each other and the resulting product of their

cooperation do not alter their own pre-existing essential natures in any way. Just the opposite is true for internal relations, for on the neo-idealist view, things which have internal relations do not have essential pre-existing essences prior to their cooperation in creating a product. The whole which is composed of (and not created by) its constituent members determines the nature of those members. We have returned to the metaphor of the organism, for while it is true that the whole organism is composed of member organs, these organs would lose their status *as organs* if they were considered apart from the whole organism. Thus the internal relation can also be referred to as the organic relation.

Both Morris and Caird believe that content and form, sense and concept, phenomena and category, can only exist when they are elements and members of the higher unities which we have in knowing experience. They agree that this is the true lesson of Kant's efforts in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. When they are disposed to treat Kant charitably, they tell us that Kant should have realized that no part can exist separately after being torn out of the whole. His predisposition to empirical psychology led him to the notion that sensation and category have a nature independent of the other, and that they interact mechanically in order to form our experience. However, post-Kantian criticisms, and especially Hegel's commentaries, have shown that both have an existence and a character only as members of a larger whole. Without this larger whole, they cannot exist. Accordingly, Caird and Morris use the "organic" metaphor to indicate that when we speak of the elements of knowledge we must realize that we can understand what they are only through

reference to a larger whole. These "wholes" are everywhere: they are the objects of our knowledge, they are the things in our experience, and even all of our experience in its entirety can be considered as a whole.

When Dewey proceeds to further describe the relations holding between the subject and the object, he uses this language:

Whether we consider the relations of subject and object, or the nature of the categories, we find ourselves forced into the presence of the notion of organic relation. The relation between subject and object is not an external one; it is one in a higher unity which is itself constituted by this relation. The only conception adequate to experience as a whole is organism. [p. 42]

Does this help explain how Reason can be both analytic and synthetic, as Dewey immediately asserts subsequent to this statement? It seems as if knowledge of members is required (resulting from analysis) before knowledge of a whole can be attained (resulting from synthesis). Yet Dewey has said that true knowledge of the members requires reference to the whole. Which came first, knowledge of the part or of the whole? Dewey does not say. He repeats his contention that the correct philosophic method consists of finding the entire system of categories and determining the role each plays within it. "The method takes the totality of experience to pieces, and brings before us its conditions [the categories, presumably in their entirety. The relations of its content, through which alone this content has character and meaning, whereby it becomes an intelligible, connected whole, must be made to appear." [p. 43] The method seems to be that of first reducing

experience to its components through analysis, and then rebuilding it to discover all of the relations between the pieces through synthesis.

An organic dialectic

Dewey proceeds then to discuss some features of post-Kantian idealism bearing on these issues, "found chiefly in Hegel and his 'Logic'." [p. 43] He begins with Hegel's accusation that Kant assumed that the categories, while objective in the sense that they are uniform and permanent for all human beings (since, as Morris puts it, not even Kant would go so far as admit that his 'Critique of Pure Reason' was only about Kant's own reason²⁰) these categories are still subjective in so far as they are in the realm of the mind-dependent and not the mind-independent. Kant had no right to assume the latter, by the following argument. As the purely mind-independent is impossible, so therefore the notion of the purely mind-dependent is also impossible, as the two notions gain their entire meaning only by opposition to one another. Put another way, there cannot be any purely objective or subjective existences, and thus it is impossible to consider thought and thing as residing in two separate realms.

The notion of the individual mind is constituted by the cooperation of the categories and nothing else, as is the notion of the material object. In this way all of Reality is constituted by the categories. As these are mental, reality consists of the operations of a mind whose operations can be traced through the Dialectic of Reason. This compressed argument provides the cornerstone of Hegelianism and

neo-idealism: Being and Thought are not *ultimately* two different entities, though very often we take them to be so. Doing so can be justified only if we realize that Reason is distinguishing the two within our self-consciousness. The categories are the medium for doing so, and hence they themselves cannot be either objective or subjective; they "belong to a sphere where the antithesis between subject and object is still potential." [p. 44]

The next section finds Dewey explaining the notion of the negative in Hegel. This makes reference to the analytical abilities of Reason. Hegel stressed that the process of making distinctions, separating out objects, requires determinations; for example, red cannot be green. The extreme result of negation would be Hume's portrait of sensory experience, where each impression is unique and among them nothing in common can be found. Spinoza is Dewey's example of the opposite extreme, where every difference is illusory and must be absorbed into ultimate reality, which is but one pure substance. Dewey sees the advantage of Hegel's position consisting of the permission granted to Reason to create both difference and unity.

Dewey proceeds to give the name "Dialectic" to the process which Reason follows while differentiating and unifying. Greater detail is provided as Dewey briefly outlines the Hegelian scheme:

Dialectic is the construction by Reason, through its successive differentiations and resumptions of the differences into higher unities, of just this system [of the categories in their organic entirety]. If we take any single category of

Reason....Reason itself is immanent in this category; but, since Reason is also differentiating or analytic, Reason must reveal itself as such in this category, which accordingly passes, or is reflected, or develops into its opposite, while the two conceptions are then resumed into the higher unity of a more concrete conception. [pp. 45-46]

Hegel's description of dialectic can be found in his *Philosophy of Logic*.²¹ Hegel reserves the term "speculation" for the creation of the higher unity,²² but Dewey compresses Hegel's account of the operations of Reason. I cannot take up here a further discussion of Hegel's *Logic*, and will instead defer to the many commentaries upon Hegel. For our purposes, we need to see that Dewey has adopted the schema (but not the content) of the Hegelian dialectic as the means to attain the criterion of truth. According to Dewey, the dialectic allows us to see how all of the categories relate to each other organically, and will permit us to find the absolute truth when the complete system is exposed. [p. 46] While Dewey does not use the term "Absolute" here, the entire system is to be the Absolute, and can be characterized also by the "Idea," which is the name for the last category produced by the final synthesis. Since the categories are properly termed "mental" (so long as no connotation of the subjective is retained) the Absolute is seen to be an Absolute mind or spirit. This conclusion, while expressed by Dewey, is exactly the essence of Morris' philosophy, announced and defended in every one of his articles and books. However, Morris rarely uses the term "dialectic" except as a term of derision, and nowhere incorporates it into his own philosophy. The reason for this rejection lies

in his acceptance of Trendelenburg's attacks on Hegel's dialectic, and Morris never showed any inclination to attempt his own. Morris simply adopts the view that all of the categories can be placed into organic relations so as to reveal the systematic whole, without going into any details. Dewey adopts this view as well, but also in this article showed some interest in pursuing Hegel's dialectical method of finding this whole. However, like Morris, Dewey does not attempt to follow out such a dialectic, or comment on Hegel's attempt, in this published article or in any other. Nor will Dewey even mention dialectic in reference to his own philosophy ever again. However, the vision Dewey presents of an organically developed system of categories will not fade quickly.

The most important aspect of this article however lies in Dewey's conception of a Reason which both analyses and synthesizes, which creates both the objective and the subjective. It will also be used extensively in future articles, but it marks the first sign that Dewey is by no means shackled to the philosophical system expounded by his teacher and colleague G.S. Morris, because this conception of Reason is almost entirely absent from Morris' philosophy. Nowhere in Morris' writing can there be found any mention of the possibility that mind, Reason, or the understanding is responsible for creating the parts of experience which can then be synthesized. Morris tells us continually that all knowledge is the result of synthesis.²³ He tells us that the notion that there could exist on its own a realm where only disconnected phenomena reside is a notion proven completely false.²⁴ Morris even tells us that the objects of our knowledge can later be broken down into simple phenomena or

impressions by a process of analysis: "the simple impression and its unity are, in the order of our knowledge or conception, late products of analytical abstraction."²⁵ But beyond these positions Morris never proceeded.

Dewey was vitally interested in the question, if knowledge is only the result of synthesis, just what is being synthesized? Morris could not provide an answer, and it led Dewey to the pursuit of issues that Morris never had to deal with. Dewey found in Kant the glimmerings of an answer: maybe the mind was responsible for creating the elements so that they could enter self-consciousness before being synthesized. They must enter self-consciousness, lest they be unknown things-in-themselves and subject to philosophical expulsion by Dewey's own arguments. The place where Dewey found the inspiration for this possibility is in Kant, who after having defended the position that for human beings the understanding can only operate on what the senses provide, remarks that perhaps for a divine being no senses are necessary. Both Caird and Morris repeat this remark. "Now, suppose that the conceiving understanding were to some being also a faculty of perception. Such a being would possess the power of 'intellectual intuition' or of perception through the understanding."²⁶ But Morris does not pursue this notion. Caird declares that "if indeed we had an understanding which generated as well as connected the manifold, which was a source of differentiation as well as integration -- which, in other words, created its own object, then by such an understanding, self-consciousness could be realized without any matter being presented to it from without for synthesis."²⁷ Caird does follow up on the suggestion, and later says:

In a sense, analysis and abstraction constitute an important and even a necessary step toward the truth. It is only when we sever the elements of knowledge from each other by analysis, that we can distinctly see the link of connection that binds them together. It is only when we isolate and fix in abstraction the correlated parts of the organic whole of truth, that we become clearly conscious that they *are* correlated. Synthesis in the highest sense is possible, only when analysis has done its perfect work.²⁸

Caird here has provided a way to understand Hegel's use of negation. It is mentioned by Hegel during a discussion of "Finite cognition" but for Hegel the Analytical and Synthetical methods are but "reason in the shape of understanding" and hence limited in value.²⁹ Caird elevates them to a higher status, and Dewey uses them for participation in dialectic. While negation is absolutely essential, as Dewey observes, its role can be better understood as being that of analysis. Dewey adopts this view and incorporates it into his exposition of the dialectic, following Caird.³⁰

Caird sees the "organic whole of truth" as existing prior to our knowledge of the interrelatedness of its components. Indeed, Caird must do so, since he believes both that all of consciousness consists of knowledge, and that all of our conscious experience consists of wholes, not parts. Thus we can only experience known wholes, and our knowledge of the parts only proceeds by keeping the whole in mind while we create abstractions, which will in turn be "smaller" wholes as well, linked with other "sub-wholes" in internal, organic relations to form the original whole. We can spot the links through the understanding's synthesizing function. Caird then gives us a glimpse at an alternative process:

We begin in knowledge with a part, though this involves a false conception of the part as if it were a whole: but the effort to combine this part with other parts gives rise to a contradiction, which cannot cease till the abstraction of our first conception is corrected, or, in other words, till the parts are deprived of their false independence, and defined anew as elements of a greater whole.³¹

Here the influence of Hegel's logic is evident as Caird is describing a recognizable interpretation of the dialectic process. Our experience begins with a wide assortment of provided wholes. We realize that some "contradict" each other, and the effort to resolve the problem ensues with our understanding's synthetic efforts. Success comes when some of the wholes are gathered together, their independent natures are stripped from them, and they are combined by giving them new characteristics proceeding from the internal relations that they will have as members of a new organic whole. They might retain some of their features in the process, but no longer will it be possible to think that they could exist independent and unaltered apart from their new whole.

This process of reducing conflict and contradiction is also recognizable as the effort to attain truth through coherence. At each stage along the way the new wholes are seen as being "more true" than the previous wholes which formed them. When we realize that absolute truth will be reached only when all contradictions are eliminated, then we will consider our present conceptions of the world as only "relatively" true. Neo-idealism is marked by this common portrait of the efforts of the human mind, whether or not a philosopher follows Hegel's own dialectical

scheme (which few did) or agrees with Hegel that the process will terminate with only one final conception, or "Idea" of the Absolute (which was also very controversial).

Thus we can try to follow Dewey when he says near the conclusion of his article that

Reason must be everywhere, and in all its forms, propose itself as what it is, viz., absolute or adequate to the entire truth of experience; but, since at first its *form* is still inadequate, it must show what is absolutely implicit in it, viz., the entire system. That at first it does, by doing what it is in the nature of the Reason which it manifests to do, by differencing itself, or passing into its opposite, its other; but, since Reason is also synthetic, grasping together, these differences must resolve themselves into a higher unity. [p. 46]

Translation: The understanding of the world must be coherent in a single whole, but it isn't now, since our understanding's conceptions, which together constitute all the things in our experience, contradict each other in all sorts of differences and opposites. There is awaiting us a systematic exposition of all of the content of our experience, but it can't get at it yet. So the understanding or Reason goes about trying to unify the parts for which it is responsible, by synthesizing inadequately true parts into more adequately true wholes. The end of this process is a final conception which allows the understanding to conceive of all of the content of self-conscious experience at once. This conception is both Absolutely true, and since self-consciousness exhausts all of reality, the conception captures all of reality.

We are now in a position where we can better understand Dewey's absolute idealism at this stage. Hegelianism is characterized, among other things, by a refusal to consider being and thought as two ultimately different realms. Dewey agreed with this position, as we have seen. Therefore, the understanding, or Reason, which "captures all of reality" must therefore be nothing other than all of reality itself. This conclusion permits Morris to say that the entire organically related system of the activities of the understanding are nothing other than Absolute reality itself. Morris used the term "spirit" to denote the active understanding, and thus expressed his philosophy often by saying that Absolute reality is Spirit. Dewey does not use the term "spirit" in this article, preferring "Reason"; Dewey is not here concerned to equate this Reason with God, as is Morris, although he will do so later. However, Dewey and Morris here agree that Reason is absolute reality.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Green, T.H. *Works*, Volume III, p. 129.
2. Dykhuizen, George. *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, pp. 14-24.
3. Kurita, Osamu. "John Dewey's Philosophical Frame of Reference in His First Three Articles." *Educational Theory* 21 (1971): 338-346.
4. *EW 1: 19-33*. Abstracted in *The Johns Hopkins University Circulars* 2 (1883): 54.
5. Morris, G.S. *British Thought and Thinkers*, p. 295.
6. Caird, Edward. *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, p. 499.
7. Morris, G.S. "Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg." Reprinted in Marc Jones's *George Sylvester Morris*, p. 349.
8. Morris, *British Thought and Thinkers*, p. 296.
9. *ibid.*, p. 349.
10. *ibid.*, p. 364.
11. *ibid.*, p. 365.
12. *ibid.*, p. 370.
13. *ibid.*, p. 376.
14. *EW 1: 34-47*.
15. Caird, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, p. 371.
16. Morris, G.S. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Exposition*, pp. 120-121.
17. *ibid.*, p. 121.
18. Caird's translation from Kant's *Prolegomena*, in his *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 201-202.

19. See Hegel's *Philosophy of Logic*, pp. 97-101; Caird's *Hegel*, pp. 160-164; Caird's *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 614-619.
20. Morris, G.S. *Philosophy and Christianity*, p. 53.
21. Hegel, G.W.F. *Logic*. Part One of the *Encyclopedia*, translated by William Wallace, 3rd edition, pp. 147-152.
22. *ibid.*, pp. 152-154.
23. See for example Morris, *Philosophy and Christianity*, p. 41.
24. E.g. Morris, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 143.
25. *ibid.*, p. 107.
26. *ibid.*, p. 196.
27. Caird, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 349-350.
28. *ibid.*, p. 372.
29. Hegel, *Logic*, pp. 364-366.
30. This debt to Caird is recorded in Jane Dewey's "Biography of Dewey," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 22.
31. Caird, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 372-373.

Chapter Three

Dewey and Experimental Psychology

Of all the books on psychology this work [Wundt's *Physiologischen Psychologie*] is undoubtably the most indispensable to the student who seeks to become familiar with the science in its present phase.¹

James Ward, 1881

Dewey's introduction to the new experimental psychology came by way of G.S. Hall, who taught mostly from Wundt's second (1880) edition of his *Physiological Psychology*. While Hall never completely agreed with Wundt's psychological orientation and theories, his own independent psychology was still slowly developing out of many influences during his stay at Johns Hopkins, and did not yet significantly affect his teachings.² The best guide to his appreciation of Wundt is his October 1884 inaugural address, published as "The New Psychology" in February 1885,³ which reached publication five months after Dewey's own identically-named article. In this chapter we examine the three articles Dewey wrote during the years 1884-1886 which deal directly with the new psychology.

I. The New Psychology

Morris and psychology

As a preliminary, a look at how Morris viewed the new psychology will aid an understanding of Dewey's probable initial orientation. Morris' standpoint on the

relationship between science and philosophy establishes his stance towards experimental psychology. Philosophy, as the defender of the fundamental character of intelligence against materialist reductionism, must reject any identification of the process of the nervous system with intelligence itself.

But this process is not itself the process of intelligence. For intelligence it is only relatively a process; absolutely considered, it is for intelligence a product, an effect, a final result or object of intelligence. So true is this, that Mr. Spencer, as English spokesman of those who seek in psychology the science of intelligence, says expressly that his belief that he possesses a nervous system, is inferential; it is a 'conclusion' of intelligence. How shall then the process, which is believed to be observed in the object of this inferential belief (the nervous system), be that process of intelligence whereby that belief itself is created?⁴

Morris' argument is that the object of intelligence cannot at the same time be the subject:

Analytico-descriptive, introspectional empirical psychology is a science, and physiological psychology is a science -- each of them devoted to the legitimate work of exploring a portion of the field of phenomena which are at once given for and also dependent for their existence upon intelligence. But neither of them can ask after that nature of intelligence, which is itself the condition of the existence and the observableness of the field of phenomena in the exploration of which each is engaged.⁵

In February 1883, Dewey wrote to H.A.P. Torrey about his study of the new psychology: "I don't find any very close connection between it & Phil. but I suppose it will furnish grist for the mill, if nothing else."⁶ However, Dewey soon believed that the methods and discoveries of experimental psychology did have a deep connection with philosophy as he understood it. In fact, in three years Dewey would make the far-reaching claim that philosophic method was nothing other than the science of psychology.

Dewey's idealism and the new psychology

A presentation Dewey made to the Johns Hopkins philosophy club in March 1884 became the September 1884 article "The New Psychology."⁷ Here Dewey expounds the methods, discoveries, and principles belonging to what Wundt called "physiological psychology". This type of psychology had been brought to its best formulation by Wundt himself, and it is to him that Dewey credits the psychological information presented in this article.⁸

The article begins by drawing a sharp distinction between the British and Scottish psychology on the one hand, and the German new psychology on the other. The former was responsible for reducing "that rich and colored experience, never the same" to a completely finished analyzed and schematized display of mental phenomena. The latter refuses to treat human life as an individualized machine. Human life cannot be individualized, because "we know that his life is bound up with the life of society, of the nation in the *ethos* and *nomos*; we know that he is closely

connected with all the past by the lines of education, tradition, and heredity." [p. 49] It is far from mechanical, because "our mental life is not a syllogistic *sorites*, but an enthymeme most of whose members are suppressed," and "psychical life is a continuance, having no breaks into 'distinct ideas which are separate existences'." [p. 49] As Dewey lists these and many more differences between the two psychologies along the same lines, we can see how this new psychology would have been instantly appealing to someone who has an appreciation for the German idealist heritage. Each of the virtues of the new psychology which Dewey identifies correspond to central tenets of German idealism: the notion that mind is primarily a social entity and only secondarily an individual entity; that mind and conscious experience cannot be equated, since there are in addition mental operations responsible for creating that experience; that the old faculty and associationalistic psychologies used arbitrary distinctions to create unwarranted divisions and breaks into the continuity of the process which is mental life.

The virtues that Dewey identifies can be classified according to their inspirational origins. There are two fundamental kinds of psychology involved with the new psychology, proceeding from the characteristically German distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. There is the physiological and experimental psychology, and the social or ethno-psychology. With respect to the latter, Wundt believed that due to the extreme complexity involved in the socio-historical nature of humanity, which includes morality, language, and in general any portion of human life which essentially requires participation in the larger social

sphere, experimentation is simply impossible. The social sciences here have their proper domain. However, experimentation has its place when the lower functions of the mind are to be investigated, creating the experimental and physiological psychology.⁹

Dewey goes on to say that while the results of these experiments are coming to be widely recognized, there is one serious misconception regarding the new psychology. Despite widespread opinion to the contrary, the new psychology does not mean to assert that its methodology and discoveries permit us to *explain* the psychical life through the physical life. While reference to physical and physiological conditions is used in the experiments, that does not imply that the mental realm can be completely known in terms of, or can be reduced to, the neurological events which undoubtably accompany them. Dewey asserts that there can be no grounds for such an implication: "Physiology can no more, of itself, give us the what, why, and how of psychical life, than the physical geography of a country can enable us to construct or explain the history of the nation that has dwelt within that country." [p. 52]¹⁰

Dewey tries to further justify this position by arguing that since the realms of the physical and psychical are distinct, explanations of psychical events can only be made in similarly psychical terms. Of course, this sort of justification relies on the division between the mental and the physical, which is precisely what comes under attack as the extensive dependencies and correlations between them are revealed by the new psychology. Dewey postpones any mention of further argument on this topic to the very end of the article, when he introduces teleological considerations.

Wundt and the possibility of psychology

After defending the realm of the psychical from invasion by the physiological, Dewey tries to explain how the new psychology has "produced a revolution in psychology." [p. 53] The key to its success lies in its methodology, which is that of scientific experimentation. Such experimentation is possible because physiological psychology

starts from the well-grounded facts that the psychical events known as sensations arise through bodily stimuli, and that psychical events known as volitions result in bodily movements; and it finds in these facts the possibility of the application of the method of experimentation. The bodily stimuli and movements may be directly controlled and measured, and thereby, indirectly, the psychical states which they excite or express. [p. 53]

Dewey does not go into any details concerning the design of the experiments in this new psychology. Their essential nature is that they allow the experimenter to control the nature and extent of sensory stimulations with elaborate devices. This makes it possible to find regular correlations between these stimulations and either volitional motor responses or careful observations of conscious experience. The latter is called "internal perception" by Wundt.¹¹ Physiological psychology, according to Wundt, requires the premise that there is at least a connection or correlation between the physical activities of nervous tissue and the psychical events of immediate conscious experience. The scientific problem is the proper control of both physical and psychical events so that their correlations can be exactly found. In the

experimental work of Fechner, Weber, Helmholtz and others, it was discovered that the stimuli and movements of the subject can be controlled and measured by the experimenter, which results in the control of the psychical events, due to the parallel correspondence between them.¹² Such control is necessary since simple introspection suffered from the problem which Kant pointed out: the act of observation alters the entity which is under measurement.¹³

Dewey proceeds to discuss some of the established results. With regards to sensation, it has been discovered that there is nothing in our experience which should rightfully be termed "immediate" but it is all instead a product of mediating processes. Even the simplest states of consciousness appreciable by introspection, e.g. colors or tones, are really complex, since they can be decomposable through the new experimental method, and thus all experiences are the result of unexperienced sensations. Dewey explains that

The most complex landscape which we can have before our eyes, is, psychologically speaking, not a simple ultimate fact, nor an impression stamped upon us from without, but is built up from color and muscular sensations, with, perhaps, unlocalized feelings of extension, by means of the psychological laws of interest, attention, and interpretation. It is, in short, a complex judgement involving within itself emotional, volitional, and intellectual elements. [pp. 54-55]

Dewey here has stated an all-important theoretical standpoint. Its importance cannot be overstressed, as Dewey notes. To declare that our experience is the

product of the emotional, volitional, and intellectual elements is to leave behind the entrenched notion that these three activities are separately functioning and merely mechanically interacting mental processes. This step marks a tremendous leap for psychology, and throughout Dewey's career it will play a central role. It also marks Dewey's first intellectual intersection with the leading psychologist who helped to establish this stage of psychology. Wundt had arrived at this stage after a long and difficult struggle, first, to establish the new experimental psychology, and second, to create a theory which could explain the experimental findings.

In the introductory statement to his *Physiological Psychology*, 2nd edition, on "The Task of Physiological Psychology"¹⁴ Wundt uses a distinction between the starting points of the natural sciences and psychology. If the natural sciences (like physiology) begin from observing the external world, and psychology starts from observing the internal mental processes in experience, then "physiological psychology" can be the science which attempts to discover the relations holding between them. Ideally, it could attempt to comprehensively understand life by merging the results of external and internal observation into one theory of the mind.

Wundt's own primary research interests concerned sensation and volitional movement. On these two subjects, or more properly, their unification, Wundt from very early on in his career based his theory of the mind. Wundt's first book bore Leibniz's motto, *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, excipi nisi ipse intellectus*, indicating his early allegiance to the view of the mind as active and creative, and his rejection of British empiricism. His use of the concept of

apperception throughout his career is the result. In Wundt's psychology, experience is the result of apperception: an internal constructive *and* attentive volitional process, which provides a mental life different in quality from whatever sensations originated from external stimuli.¹⁵ This emergence of new qualities prevents us from being able to ever experience any original sensations or impressions.

Wundt rejected as contrary to scientific psychology the notion of a Cartesian mental substance, instead preferring to speak of the mind as an activity or process. Most importantly, Wundt goes beyond this familiar Leibnitzian and Kantian theme by including muscular sensations of the body's activities in the apperceptive process, producing directed and controlled movements. The activity of the mind is a unified whole, coordinating sensory input and bodily movements into structures for dynamic purposive responses.¹⁶ Any mechanical theory of the activity of mind is rejected, since it would require distinct mental entities interacting in some realm of mind, and hence would lack an appreciation for the mind's creative and purposive powers.

The processes which are mind do not permit a hard and fast distinction between representation, feeling, and willing; accordingly, the "faculty psychology" should be discarded. The mind may seem to resolve itself into discrete portions, each having different responsibilities, but Wundt regarded such a separation as artificial; the mind was an interrelated whole, performing many connected functions at once, which can only be distinguished and recognized in an advanced stage of psychological development. However, although we can so distinguish them, that does not imply that they have thereby achieved a new state of relative independence. By taking

them too independently, other psychologies have fallen into grave errors; erecting them into separate entities or functions creates the need to postulate even more elaborate mental activities to explain how they can cooperatively operate.¹⁷

The crucial role of volition in the mind's processes for Wundt's psychology aligns him with those philosophers who give the will a central importance for human experience. Wundt accordingly took the label of voluntarism for his psychology, and acknowledged his debt to Leibniz, Fichte, and Schopenhauer regularly in his works.¹⁸ This voluntarism proceeds from the conviction that volitional action, broadly construed, is the paradigmatic mental event.¹⁹ Wundt combined this with the traditional German notion of apperception to form a hybrid which distinguished his psychology. The fundamental volitional activity was characterized by Wundt as a drive or impulse ('Trieb') which was the central apperceptive whole having among its components the ability to synthesize sensational content and motor control and feedback. This apperceptive whole was capable of growth, as the assimilation of experience, broadly construed, created newer and higher abilities and functions.

The organic metaphor

After the discussion of the example of visual perception, Dewey explains the results of other kinds of work in empirical psychology. They are possible because of the increasingly detailed understanding of the components of the nervous system, their functions, and their interrelations. Inferences are then made from an existing physiological process to a perhaps hitherto unknown mental process. The required

principle to make meaningful inferences possible is that "...if a certain nervous arrangement can be made out to exist, there always is a strong presumption that there is a psychological process corresponding to it..." [p. 55] In this way physiology can lead to psychological discoveries. Dewey mentions some examples. After the discovery that nervous impulses take an appreciable time for travel, researchers (principally Wundt himself, though Dewey does not mention any by name) investigated whether the same was true for various mental activities, and succeeded. An even more significant example involves the discovery that

The brain cells which form the physical basis of memory do not in any way store up past impressions or their traces, but have, by these impressions, their structure so modified as to give rise to a certain functional mode of activity.
[p. 56]

This discovery radically transformed older metaphysical views on the nature and purpose of the memory. More importantly, generalizations from this work on memory will proceed to pervade the entire mental realm quickly. Dewey gives no sign he is even aware of these possibilities, though they will later in his career profoundly transform his views on mind.

Dewey goes on to identify his choice for the fundamental concept underlying the new psychology: organism. The entrance of this explanatory conception into psychology has affected the understanding of mind at both the individual and the social level. At the individual level, Dewey views it as responsible for leading to

The recognition of mental life as an organic unitary process developing according to the laws of all life, and not a theatre for the exhibition of independent autonomous faculties, or a *rendezvous* in which isolated, atomic sensations and ideas may gather, hold external converse, and then forever part. [p. 56]

Dewey here has his focus on the use of the metaphor of organism to characterize the mind, which allows stress to be placed on the essential unity of the mind. Such stress will not permit the faculty or the associationist theory to gain a foothold in the new psychology. We can note here that neither Wundt nor his commentators use the organic metaphor in this manner.²⁰ The "laws of all life" reference draws attention to the independent methodology of the new psychology. It has freed itself from the lawful strictures of older metaphysical views, allied itself with biology, developed the proper investigating procedures, and in so doing has become truly scientific. Also, by making regular use of the term 'process' to indicate activity as basic to the mental, Dewey has joined in with a major point of agreement between Wundt and Morris. The two usually disparate thinkers display their common German idealist heritage, well expressed by Morris in speaking of the self-consciousness: "Here we have an *ideal activity* which (paradoxical as this may sound) constitutes the *agent*: the agent is only through its *activity*." For Morris this is true for anything: "Existence, *as such*, or absolutely and truly considered, is in no sense whatever *passive*, but is absolutely and only *active*."²¹

At the social level, Dewey uses the organic metaphor to place the individual mind as a part of the greater social realm forming the whole. From biology we learn that the idea of the organism requires the idea of environment. The same also is true for mind. The concept of the individual mind requires the concept of the organized social life. As a result, we must recognize the "impossibility of considering psychical life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum." [p. 56] Now, Dewey would have to admit that no one would really disagree with this statement. Even a Lockean empiricist requires that the mind grow in an environment which provides sensory inputs. Dewey is here revealing his bias towards the view that the truly mental life can only flourish in an environment which includes other developed minds, which together permit growth and achievement. The correct understanding of the mind requires the "idea of the organic relation of the individual to the organized social life into which he is born, from which he draws his mental and spiritual sustenance, and in which he must perform his proper function or become a mental and moral wreck." [p. 56]

The organic relation, the internal relation, holding between part and whole, is the only way to conceptualize mind for Dewey. He has read into Wundt what he is capable of associating with his Hegelian outlook, producing a novel commentary. The use of the metaphor, however, does not result in a caricature of Wundt's theory. As Dewey understands the metaphor, Wundt's stress on the unity of an interrelated whole which encompasses all of the mind's activities is quite amenable to this sort of characterization.

The organic relation for Dewey encompasses far more than the intellectual element, which is ordinarily a connotation of 'mind'. To stress this, he here uses the term spirit in conjunction with mind. He does not mean to artificially distinguish them, but in order to overcome the presumption in his readers that all along he has been using "mind" in any limited sense created by older psychologies, he wants to emphasize how the broad spectrum of human activity is really under discussion. It is not surprising that the term 'spirit' would come easily to Dewey's pen, as that English translation of the Hegelian 'Geist' carries all of the meaning Dewey wishes to apply here. However, Dewey would not have expected many of his readers to understand this, and so he elaborates on the many fields of study to which these considerations are relevant. From linguistics to folklore, primitive cultures to ethnology, anthropology to politics, morality to art, the new psychology has both contributed to, as well as learned from, every social and historical science. Even the study of children, criminals, and the insane has made an influential contribution to the development of the new psychology.²² From Dewey's point of view, we should not be surprised at the interrelationships and dependencies between all of these sciences and psychology, since every human activity is "permeated with psychological questions and material." [p. 57]

Dewey is following Wundt in seeing close relations between the nature of psychology and the social and historical sciences, or 'Geisteswissenschaften'. As we noted, Wundt uses the Hegelian distinction between the sciences which study nature and those which study spirit. In the second edition of his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, psychology is to be both a bridge between

the two kinds of sciences and the basic doctrine for the social and historical sciences. Also, while we cannot be sure that in 1884 Dewey was familiar with the second volume of Wundt's *Logik* (1883), there Wundt goes further to state that psychology is the basis or grounding ('Grundlage') of the 'Geisteswissenschaften'.²³

Dewey pauses to summarize by saying that the new psychology principally owes its rise and success to physiology, supplying the experimental methodology, and to the "sciences of humanity in general" which provides "objective observation" to replace the faulty method of "subjective introspection." [p. 58] Here again Dewey reveals his Hegelian outlook while interpreting the new psychology. Wundt found the experimental side of the new psychology to be the liberation from the introspective method; this was the common attitude among other proponents of the new psychology as well, in which Dewey shared. But Dewey went beyond this to also locate the all-important objectivity where the study of the larger social realm took place. It must have been only by reminding himself of the topic and intended audience that he kept from using the term 'Objective Mind' outright.

Organism and voluntarism

Dewey ends the article in the manner in which he began, by enumerating its principle results in terms of its superior understanding of human experience. Not surprisingly, considering his focus on logic in his earlier articles, he casts the discussion in terms of the new 'logic' of experience which the new psychology offers:

The chief characteristic distinguishing it from the old psychology is undoubtedly the rejection of a formal logic as its model and test. The old psychologists almost without exception held to a nominalistic logic. This of itself were a matter of no great importance were it not for the inevitable tendency and attempt to make living concrete facts of experience square with the supposed norms of an abstract, lifeless thought, and to interpret them in accordance with its formal conceptions. [p. 59]

The "old" psychologists share the common belief that experience is the source of all knowledge. Dewey does not have a problem with this principle, but rather argues that the notion of experience has been subject to old logical presuppositions, at root sharing a nominalistic attitude. Dewey finds that two major schools have developed accordingly: Humian empiricism and Kantian rationalism. Hume had denied to experience any relations or universality by dividing it up into distinct existences. Kant agreed, and reacted against Hume only by supply necessary truths, imported from traditional logic, which could mysteriously transform primary experience into knowledge. Dewey here is providing an encapsulation of his critiques of these schools from his earlier work, but instead of using them to launch into a discussion of transcendental logic here, Dewey gives a quite different portrait of the view the new psychology provides. This portrait is quite vague and full of terminology which receives no explanation, but as a whole it has a character all its own.

Dewey accuses the nominalists of losing touch with the "reality" of experience by placing too great an emphasis on the abstract and formal. Experience is instead "concrete" [p. 59], is a "process" and constantly in motion [p. 60], and as it is nothing

other than the psychical life, it possesses "unity and solidarity." [p. 60] As a result, any logic which purports to describe experience must abandon the abstract in favor of "the logic of concrete experience, of growth and development," and must use a "dynamic intuitionism" which can provide truth and reality (Dewey here identifies them) in "the living experience of the soul's development." [p. 59]

The use of the term 'development' points to another aspect of Dewey's use of the organic metaphor. Life is fundamentally characterized by both growth and purpose; indeed, the truly organic must display purposive growth. Dewey says that the new psychology "emphasizes the teleological element, not in any mechanical or external sense, but regarding life as an organism in which immanent ideas or purposes are realizing themselves through the development of experience." [p. 60]

We have seen that for Dewey the concepts 'mechanical' and 'external' are opposed to the organic and the internal, though this would not have been so clear to his readers. The term 'immanent' is used to convey the notion of potentiality, where the potential of an organism exists, in some manner, in the actual organism. These notions reflect the Aristotelian framework operating here. What fails to cohere with this otherwise recognizable portrait is Dewey's statement that experience is the medium of expression for the realization of the organism's purposes. Aristotle held that the organism is the medium of expression, and not the organism's experience. The way to see Dewey's intent here is to recall that through the Hegelian viewpoint, the organism has lost its biological orientation: the organism is the mind, not the body. The body is but a portion of experience and experience is

the whole of the organic mind. Life and organism are here being treated as primarily mental, and only secondarily biological. Dewey has in effect reversed the order of concept-metaphor. At first the concept was the biological organism and the metaphor was the organic mind; now the organic mind is the concept. Since for Dewey experience and mind are interchangeable terms, we get the result that the organic mind has as immanent within it a teleological element, which in the course of life expresses that potentiality in the actual developing organic experience.

Dewey is not departing from Wundt's voluntaristic psychology, which also depended on a distinction between the physically mechanical and the mentally teleological. Wundt never thought that the discovery of a physiological structure to which a mental process can be correlated thereby served as an *explanation* of that mental process, regardless of Wundt's suspicion that the mental in some way was interacting with the physiological. This position relied on the principle that the mental realm operates only according to 'mental' or 'psychical' or 'psychological' causality.²⁴ The psychological concepts of purpose and volition are too essential to the understanding of mental events to be replaced with physical causality, which discards purpose in favor of mechanical causes. Wundt was no Hegelian, however, and while his metaphysical views tended towards idealism and/or phenomenalism later in his career, Dewey could not have found license to find in the new psychology any leanings toward equating the organism or life with conscious experience.

When the presence of purposes in the organism is recognized, ethical judgements on them becomes possible, and thus Dewey says that psychology has become

"intensely ethical in its tendencies." [p. 60] The intent here is to provide a bridge to the notion that the basic human drives include "the instinctive tendencies of devotion, sacrifice, faith, and idealism" which ground religion. Thus the new psychology is no threat to religion, since "it can discover in its investigations no reason which is not based on faith, and no faith which is not rational in its origin and tendency." [p. 60] Such a conclusion could not be surprising considering Dewey's close relationship with Morris and the intended audience of the *Andover Review*. The reader can't help but notice the style Dewey uses: a rhapsodic flow of terminology which brings the article to a breathless close. It comes from a student's imitation of a master's technique; Morris set a very high standard in his *Philosophy and Christianity* for the breezy and superficial use of technical language in order to quickly and easily "demonstrate" the compatibility between results of philosophical speculation and revealed Christianity. Dewey would similarly attempt to show the compatibility of the results of the new psychology with Christianity in his next publication.

II. Dewey and Voluntarism

Soon after taking his position as instructor in philosophy at the University of Michigan, Dewey wrote the November 1884 essay, "The Obligation to Knowledge of God."²⁵ Published in the bulletin of the student's Christian association, it was not intended to be a display of philosophical argument or exposition. But this is all to the good, since this article is the first of many in which Dewey found it easy to

clearly expound some essential points of his philosophy to a non-philosophical audience.

Knowledge and action

Dewey begins by pointing out that it is a dictum of Christianity that the failure to gain knowledge of God is a failure of will, and hence is morally wrong. The modern view of the origin of knowledge does not agree, as it has found no role for the will in the process of acquiring knowledge. Dewey is referring to older psychologies which assume the passivity of the mind during learning. Locke's and Hume's empiricism is the paradigm here, but even Kant is guilty of holding to such passivity, for while the synthesizing process is active, there is no engagement of the will. Dewey offers two ways to express the close relationship between knowledge and will: "We have forgotten that every fact known demands something of us; we have forgotten that there is no knowledge except as our desires, our interests, our purposes, in short, the whole bent of our moral nature is concerned." [p. 61]

First, knowledge demands something of us: "knowledge does not become real knowledge until the commands which it lays upon the will have been executed." [p. 61] Here true knowledge is portrayed as something which directs and orders human action in the social and moral spheres. Failure to act on known facts, even those of science, results in excessive intellectualism and leads to their decay into worthlessness. Any knowledge about the world, and even the world itself, is nothing for human beings "save where it is brought into relation with man's nature and

activities." [p. 62] This view is a sign of Dewey's refusal to grant any existence or meaning to a non-participator in the human realm. Dewey applies this general point by adding that since all human activity strives for God, then all knowledge must ultimately aid in our "approach to God." [p. 62]

Second, knowledge will not even come into existence except through the participation of human desires: "there is no knowledge of anything except as our interests are alive to the matter, and our will actively directed toward the end desired." [p. 62] The acquisition of knowledge requires a goal and a desire to attain that goal, which permits an active seeking for knowledge. Dewey is here expressing a *teleological* conception of knowledge to replace a mechanical conception in which knowledge is the result of processes needing little or no volitional activity. We can recall how the ideas of Locke, the impressions of Hume, and the phenomena of Kant require little more than the uncovering and orienting of sense organs. Dewey is requiring much more activity than that, but he provides no further specifics here.

Since our will is required for knowledge, there arises a personal responsibility. "To know or not to know is not a colorless intellectual thing, involving no part of man's moral nature. It is an essentially moral thing." [p. 62] The use of the term 'moral' indicates the presence of obligations, understood broadly. Dewey is arguing that knowledge can be attained only if we acknowledge our obligation to act in order to get it. This can be obscured by Dewey's immediate goal of the article, which is to establish the religious obligation to discover God, and to equate knowledge of the world with the knowledge of God.

We can see the influence of Dewey's understanding of the new psychology in the second description, but not in the first. The distinction made between mere facts and true knowledge is instead Morris' own, for the purpose of emphasizing the need for philosophical reflection after the work of science. According to Morris, the discovery of the facts is the necessary first step, but we still don't know the answers to questions like: "In what way or sense do they exist?" "What is it to be material?" and "Is there such a thing as absolute matter, wholly independent of and unrelated to spirit?"²⁶ As the results of philosophical inquiry (or at least Morris' own inquiry) show how a scientific materialism or a common-sense empiricism cannot be maintained and instead an absolute idealism is indicated, then true knowledge results from the comprehension of how the isolated fact fits into the all-absorbing whole of reality.

Dewey nominally agrees with Morris that knowledge must become related to God, but transmutes it by replacing this absolute reality with "the *whole nature of man*, or with his activities, social and moral." [p. 62] Dewey gets around to bringing God into the argument but there is no continuity; it seems to be an add-on without justification or need. The need of course was to make a religious statement by way of defending a philosophical position, and so Dewey is able to carry off his point with the conclusion that "man's knowledge or lack of it depends wholly upon this original attitude of his will and desires towards God; and because *these* are under his control, because these express his moral tendency, his knowledge does also." [p. 63] It is in this way that Dewey defends a central tenet of Morris' philosophy: voluntarism.

Morris' voluntarism

Morris, like many other thinkers of his day, desiring to retain free-will and morality in the face of a scientific materialism, wanted a compromise between the two. Some, like the British idealists whom Morris closely studied, took refuge in some sort of idealism. Morris was attracted to Hegel's views, but he was worried about an implication of the Hegelian view of God and the world in which the Absolute process of the dialectic took away all personal responsibility. Morris was wary of an Absolute Spirit which controlled all things, including the realm of the human spirit. A dead, mechanical dialectical progress of the Absolute would kill free-will and hence the life of the person. Even on an Aristotelian interpretation which Morris attempted in the manner of Trendelenburg, the teleology of the organic living Absolute could suppress or completely wipe out the teleology of the individual. How could a human being retain its personal inner-directed activities while also having some firm relationship with the greater whole which must encompass everything?

Morris attempted a compromise. The metaphor of the organic unity of the Absolute and the human was chosen, which would preserve the Hegelian Absolute, the organic conception of reality, and the personal potential of humanity. An organ of the body retains its own proper function and purpose, exercising it through the development of its potential into actual activity, all the while being part of a larger organism without which it cannot exist. The organism has distinct purposes of its own, yet cannot achieve them without the complete cooperation of all of its organs.

Morris declares in his *Philosophy and Christianity* that "by his self-conscious personality...man finds himself, not cut off from, but indissolubly bound up with, all the rest of existence, including the Absolute (God) itself. It is thus precisely by his personality that man finds himself taking hold upon the infinite, joined to it, and capable of becoming organically one with it..."²⁷ This position might allow the complete absorption of human initiative and free-will into the Absolute, but Morris continually stressed that the notion of personality must be irrevocably linked with our conception of ourselves and of God. Since Morris' notion of 'personality' includes the existence of individual potential, the individual retains that potential despite any relationship with the larger whole of the Absolute, and insofar as he actively and willingly develops that potential, can participate in the development of the Absolute.²⁸ This sort of idealism has thereby received the label 'voluntarism' since it focuses on the human exercise of the will so that human potential can be actualized into proper participation with the ongoing process of the greater reality. It has also been called 'personalism' to distinguish it from those idealisms which deny any independent existence to individual teleology. We have seen, however, that Dewey's appreciation of the importance of the social realm has shouldered aside Morris' preoccupation with an absolute God.

III. The Soul and the Body

In Dewey's April 1886 article "Soul and Body"²⁹ he continues to use Wundt's principle that the mental realm is uniquely marked by purposes. Dewey explains this in great detail, relying primarily on Wundt's work, and in so doing expands on the subjects broached in "The New Psychology". Dewey is less concerned with the general principles of physiological psychology here than he is with Wundt's principle that mind must be understood as possessing purposes. Research in physiological psychology, especially on animals, seems to support the existence of such purposes in the organism by finding series of reactions to stimuli which could not be explained by purely mechanical means. Dewey uses these findings principally to defend the new psychology against the religious fear of any mechanistic explanation of life, by arguing that if psychological research is properly done, its resulting findings will not be susceptible to materialistic interpretations.

Teleological psychology

Dewey finds in the required psychological category of purpose evidence that spirit is at work in the live organism, not as a separate Cartesian substance, but as "immanent in the body." This immanence is the expression typically used by Morris and Dewey to refer to Aristotelian teleological potentials invested in the organism. Dewey wants to preserve a distinction between soul and body, but it could not result in a substance dualism; as we have stated, this position accorded exactly with Wundt's

own intentions. Therefore it would be a severe error to see in Dewey's use of the term 'soul' an unfortunate Cartesian reversal of Wundt's psychology. If by 'soul' one intends the older psychological notion, then Dewey rejected soul. But Dewey has adopted the word to stand for his conception of mind because he wanted to preserve its religious overtones for his intended audience: the readers of *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

This is the significance of Dewey's warning at the outset of the essay against any attempt to understand the relation between mind and body by trying to see "into the bowels of the molecules constituting the brain, and behold from their mutual attractions and repulsions, a sensation and a thought engendered" or by being able to "contemplate the soul, seated as on a throne in the body, thence sending forth her messengers to lay hold of the nerves and cause them to bring her reports of what is going on in the outlying regions of her domain, or to execute her orders among refractory subjects." [p. 93] Instead of trying to visually imagine the relation between a metaphysically manufactured substantial soul and body, we ought to depend upon our ability to explain the facts: "The sole question is, what principles, conceptions, shall we use in order to explain these facts, i.e., in order to render a consistent, intelligible account of them?" [p. 94] Dewey is telling the reader that the envisioning of a mechanical model to understand something, which may work in the purely physical sciences, will not function in psychology. The paradigm must change to one congenial to understanding life; it will therefore operate on different principles. Not surprisingly, the paradigm offered by Dewey will be that of the organism, with all of the attached traits we have seen Dewey use in prior articles.

Dewey proceeds to give interpretations to the discoveries of physiology and experimental psychology. Dewey reasons from the physiology of the nervous system; since it is homogenous in activity (it is composed entirely, from the brain to the sense organ, of nerve cells and fibers, which both transmit the nervous energy), spirit/soul/mind cannot be limited to activity in only some portions of the nervous system. The soul must then be somehow vitally connected with the entire material nervous system or not at all. Thus the search for that part of the brain which shall be "the seat of the soul," which was occupying many prominent psychologists of the time, must be in vain. Dewey explains the reason for this:

Either there is absolutely no connection between the body and soul at any point whatever, or else the soul is, through the nerves, present to all the body. This means that the psychical is immanent in the physical. To deny this is to go back to the Cartesian position, and make a miracle of the whole matter -- to call in some utterly foreign power to make the transition which is actually found. This may cater to our love of pictures, but it is out of the line which we have laid down for ourselves. The nineteenth century substitute of a double-faced substance is only another excursion into the land of fancy sketches. [p. 96]

If neither dualism nor a revived Spinozism is the answer, then Dewey has but one alternative to offer: the principle of immanence. With the bare mention of this term Dewey sets to defending it, thus requiring the reader to proceed through the defense in order to learn just what Dewey means by it.

Dewey explains that the nervous system is not merely reactive to a stimulus, but alters and impedes the transmission of nervous energy towards a response. The energy released by an initial stimulus flows through a nerve into and through the nerve's cell, both of which can change the amount of energy being transmitted. There is resistance, just as there is resistance to electricity through a wire. There can also be complete impedance on the part of the cell, or the cell can add to the energy, using a continually replenished store or even taking some of the energy from stimuli. [pp. 95, 97-98] This state of affairs prevents an uncontrollable chain reaction of completely released energy.

Every nervous action is, therefore, a reciprocal function of stimulation, excitation, and inhibition; control through repression. Every nervous activity is essentially an adjustment. It is called forth through the stimulus, but the stimulus is not the sole factor; it does not wander at its own sweet will, but is checked and directed by the reacting activity, the inhibiting. [p. 98]

The reflex action

Dewey then makes an enormous assumption in order to bring his discussion in line with a leading concept in psychology, the reflex action. He takes it that the nervous system as a whole is analogous "in a general way" to an individual part. "Since the fibres correspond, in a general way, to the peripheral nerve system and the cells to the central, it may be truly said that the stimulating or exciting is the peripheral, and the reacting and controlling is the central or ganglionic." [p. 98]

It seems that Dewey has forgotten his allegiance to the homogenous character of the nervous system. The reflex action or arc had been widely accepted by Dewey's time as the basic unit of nervous activity. Dewey himself would have been acquainted with the theory early in his education; one of the most influential accounts of the reflex action was contained in T.H. Huxley's *Lessons in Elementary Physiology*. There Huxley offered the theory that while many stimuli from the senses automatically went to the spine and then out to the motor nerves, perhaps the same occurs with the brain involved as intermediary as well. With the interaction of a complex and flexible brain, there could arise innumerable acquired reflex actions.³⁰ The reflex action could then be conceived as a series; senses transmit to a controlling and directing central nervous center which in turn send out a motor response.

Dewey is recommending that the brain, since it corresponds to the cell's adjusting activity, is analogously responsible for the adjusting activity for the nervous system. Dewey sees in this the result of the soul's work, since such adjusting is teleological: "there is a fundamental mode of nervous activity; in this the psychical is immanent. This mode of activity is the adjusting activity; therefore the psychical is immanent in the physical as directing it to a given end." [p. 98] Dewey seems to be lending credence to the notion that it is the brain alone which displays the soul's activity. This is entirely contrary to the intent of Dewey's first argument that the psychical activity must be distributed (though perhaps not evenly) throughout the nervous system. Perhaps Dewey is bending to the pressure of common opinion on this matter. However, it is far more likely that Dewey found attractive the theory that

the undoubted complexity of the brain provides it with the ability to coordinate an unlimited number of reflex actions. Dewey's uncritical acceptance of the reflex action, with its divisions into separate functions, led him into creating an association between the soul and the brain.

Dewey next takes on the task of showing how the reflex action requires the notion of the teleological. Here the experimental evidence revolves around the study of the stimulation of the bodies of decapitated frogs. Such a frog will succeed in touching a stimulated spot on its body with a leg despite a series of obstacles involving the loss of the use of one or another leg. Dewey quotes Wundt's conclusions: "These observations...show that the animal can adapt its movements to its changed conditions." [p. 100] The ability to adapt under diverse conditions is the crucial finding to support the existence of goal-directed behaviors. The frogs' nervous systems are capable of altering the response to a stimulus until the goal is attained. This implies, so goes the argument, the insufficiency of materialistic mechanism, since such a mechanism would never be able to adapt to altered conditions. The final conclusion is that the entire nervous system is permeated with goal-directed activity, or the activity of the soul, directing the activities of the nervous system.

Dewey sums up by stating that "the psychological is immanent in the physical; immanent as directing it toward an end, and for the sake of this end selecting some activities, and adjusting and co-ordinating the complex whole, so as, in the simplest and least wasteful way, to reach the chosen end." [p. 100] Physical causality cannot

explain the experimental results, but final causality can. The materialist cannot help but admit the existence of irreducibly teleological behavior, and such behavior cannot be reasonably attributed to matter without admitting into matter an immanent psychological element. [pp. 100-102] The same goes for the Darwinian-inspired "attempts to make the teleological an accidental product of the mechanical" which use notions like "selection" and "survival of the fittest" and so on. [p. 102] But the terminology used here simply takes teleology from the organism and places it in nature instead. [p. 102-103] And there can be no "cause and effect" interaction between body and soul for Dewey since the soul is "transcendent," although the soul is "awakened" by the physical body. [p. 106] The two are so constituted as to present a unified whole: the organism.

Of great importance is Dewey's final argument for the more sophisticated view that there is a differentiation within the soul, corresponding to differences between nervous structures, and that the soul performs its direction of nervous activity by creating changes and developments in these nerve structures over time. Dewey notes that physiological psychology supports the principle that "the lower the function, the more perfectly and narrowly it is localized." [p. 109] This would indicate that a simple reflex is specific to an area of the spine, while the complex thought or idea would have a broader location. Here Dewey uses the still controversial physiological theory that it is the connections between the cells, and not the cells themselves, which are responsible for nervous structures. Dewey easily draws an analogy: the more complex the spiritual purpose, the more sizeable, complicated, and

interconnected the nervous tissue dedicated to that purpose. "If the idea be very complex, it may possibly have relations to all the cells in the brain." [p. 110]

Dewey then states with approval two of Wundt's principles regarding these matters. The first says that each purpose or function has a developed structure of the nervous system from which to manifest itself. The second says that the development of such a structure will proceed towards greater effectiveness as the organism has the need to use it. [p. 111] Dewey then sums them up by referring to the entire process of development as the formation of habit, and distinguishes between those most necessary for an organism's survival and those which may be needed only as circumstances warrant. The former can take form in unconscious reflexes and instincts, passed on by heredity. The latter cannot; higher activities must be flexible: "There must be a constant growth, adjustment to new relations, intellectual and moral, and this requires plasticity, variability." [p. 111] Dewey concludes by recalling Aristotle's dictum that "the body is the organ of the soul" and declares, "organ presupposes function, and soul and body are related indeed as function and organ, activity and instrument." [p. 112]

Notes to Chapter Three

1. Ward, James. "Notice of *Physiologischen Psychologie*." *Mind* o.s. 6 (1881): 445.
2. Ross, Dorothy. *G. Stanley Hall*, p. 150-157; see also Robert Rieber's "Wundt and the Americans" p. 137n.
3. Hall, G.S. "The New Psychology." *Andover Review* 3 (1885): 120-135, 239-248.
4. Morris, *Philosophy and Christianity*, p. 28.
5. *ibid.*, p. 29.
6. Dykhuizen, George. *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, p. 37.
7. *EW* 1: 48-60.
8. Wundt's *Physiologischen Psychologie*, 2nd edition (1880), and *Untersuchungen zur Nerven und Nervecentren* (1876).
9. See David Leary, "Wundt and After," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 15 (1979): 234-235.
10. Hall makes the same point, using Dewey's analogy, in his "The New Psychology," p. 128.
11. See Kurt Danzinger's "The History of Introspection Reconsidered," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 16 (1980): 244-245.
12. See M.L. Zupan's "The Conceptual Development of Quantification in Experimental Psychology," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 12 (1976): 145-158; also David Leary's "The Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780-1850," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 14 (1978): 113-121.
13. See Theodore Mischel's "Wundt and the Conceptual Foundations of Psychology," *PPR* 31 (1970): 13-14; also Mischel's "Kant and the Possibility of a Science of Psychology," *Monist* 51 (1967): 599-622.
14. "Selected Texts from Wundt" in *Wilhelm Wundt and the Making of a Scientific Psychology*, edited by Robert Reiber, pp. 157-169.

15. Danzinger, Kurt. "The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 15 (1979): 216; also Thomas Leahey's "Something Old, Something New: Attention in Wundt and Modern Cognitive Psychology," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 15 (1979): 242-243.
16. Danzinger, Kurt. "Wundt's Theory of Behavior and Volition." In *Wilhelm Wundt and the Making of a Scientific Psychology*, edited by Robert Reiber, pp. 104-108.
17. *ibid.*, p. 96-98.
18. Blumenthal, Arthur. "Wilhelm Wundt and Early American Psychology." In *Psychology: Theoretical-Historical Perspectives*, edited by R.W. Reiber and Kurt Danzinger, pp. 30-33.
19. Mischel, "Wundt and the Conceptual Foundations of Psychology," p. 7.
20. This writer's examination of Wundt's translated works and commentaries on the untranslated works has not revealed any use of the term 'organic' by Wundt beyond its original biological and physiological meaning.
21. Morris, *Philosophy and Christianity*, p. 73; see also p. 34.
22. Here Dewey mentions three of Hall's deepest interests; see Hall's "The New Psychology" pp. 127-128; Ross, *G. Stanley Hall*, pp. 106-107, 112-133, 157-161.
23. Hoorn, Willem van, and Thom Verhave. "Wundt's Changing Conceptions of a General and Theoretical Psychology." In *Wundt Studies*, edited by Wolfgang Bringmann and Ryan Tweney, pp. 90-93.
24. See Mischel, "Wundt and the Conceptual Foundations of Psychology," pp. 6-7; also Danzinger's "The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt," pp. 207-208; also Hoorn and Verhave, "Wundt's Changing Conceptions of a General and Theoretical Psychology," p. 72.
25. *EW* 1: 61-63.
26. Morris, *Philosophy and Christianity*, p. 5.
27. *ibid.*, p. 87.
28. Jones, *George Sylvester Morris*, pp. 323-324.
29. *EW* 1: 93-115.

30. Phillips, D.C. "James, Dewey and the Reflex Arc." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971): 557.

Chapter Four

Philosophy and Psychology

Dreary at best, metaphysical controversy becomes especially dreary when it runs into rejoinders and re-rejoinders.¹

Herbert Spencer, 1881

In 1885, while teaching at the University of Michigan with George Morris, Dewey worked on two main enterprises. The first was a textbook on psychology, which was in Dewey's plans since his freshman year at Johns Hopkins.² The second was an attempt to clear a philosophical space for his psychological views against rivals, which simultaneously could provide the grounds for a *rapprochement* between the traditional British philosophy and the new Germany-inspired neo-idealist philosophy. In this chapter we will discuss the second enterprise first, as it has chronological as well as logical priority.

Dewey published two articles in *Mind*, receiving the "post of honour" to lead off two consecutive numbers; these were the January 1886 "The Psychological Standpoint,"³ and the April 1886 "Psychology as Philosophic Method."⁴ Dewey was no doubt hoping for an answer from any of his intended audience, be it either from the "subjective idealist" camp or the "absolute idealist" camp, to use Dewey's terminology. Perhaps even Alexander Bain, the elder spokesman for the British associationalists, or Edward Caird, the senior defender of British neo-idealism, would take a pen in response. The editor of *Mind*, G. Croom Robertson, recognized the novelty of Dewey's approach and rewarded it with the lead-off position twice,

probably figuring, and hoping, that it would further provoke the two opposed camps to produce another one of those confrontations in the pages of his journal which flared up periodically.

Both Dewey and Robertson were to be disappointed. A response to Dewey came, but from an entirely unexpected quarter: the private scholar, founder and president of the Aristotelian Society, Shadworth Hodgson. He took up the task with "Illusory Psychology"⁵ in October 1886, to which Dewey replied in the January 1887 "Illusory Psychology",⁶ which in turn stimulated Hodgson's April 1887 "Illusory Psychology,' a Rejoinder."⁷ An independent and original thinker, Shadworth Hodgson's philosophy is impossible to classify. He took issue with all other philosophies in turn and saw little in them but inadequacy and error. Of no school of thought save his own, Hodgson could not understand Dewey's approach and thus took issue with Dewey on Hodgson's own terms, relishing the task at hand with a prejudiced eye towards stamping out a fresh spark of unfortunate Hegelianism. Dewey simply responded with the justified claim that Hodgson completely misunderstood the article and gave some criticisms of Hodgson's own position. Hodgson replied with the claim that he did understand Dewey's articles but his rejoinder gives little evidence of this. He then restated his own criticisms, explained why his could be the only valid philosophy, and graciously concluded the exchange with the tantalizing disclosure that he could "discern several points on which we should find ourselves in substantial agreement."

If Hodgson could have said more than this cryptic confession, the exchange would have had far greater significance and accomplishment. As it stands, it is not a good model for published philosophical argumentation. Dewey must have been frustrated by its lack of fruitfulness and probably regretted his effort's failure to gain appreciation. The irony involved is that Hodgson's fundamental aims were not that far from Dewey's, as perhaps Hodgson eventually saw; both philosophers were pursuing an alternative to the dominant schools in many similar ways.

I. The Psychological Standpoint

In this article Dewey is attempting two tasks. First, he is trying to convert the dualist and the solipsist over to absolute idealism using their own premises. Second, he wants to establish the position that for psychology to be a proper science, it cannot be limited to the study of individual consciousness alone, but must take into account knowledge of the absolute, universal consciousness. The article takes its name, not from Morris, Green, or Wundt, but from the neo-idealist James Seth and the British psychologist James Ward. These two philosophers each used the term "the psychological standpoint" prominently in the first significant work of their careers, in the same year: 1883. This coincidence probably struck the observant Dewey as really no mere coincidence, and besides providing Dewey with an essay title, it gave a spark of light to the issues he was struggling with.

We find Dewey first using the term "psychological standpoint" in a letter he wrote in November 1883 to his former teacher, H.A.P. Torrey.⁸ There Dewey describes his thoughts upon the nature of the unconscious activities which must play an enormous role in determining our conscious experience. Such a role is given to the unconscious both by neo-idealism and by Wundtian psychology; each employ a psychology in which mental processes operate upon materials to create conscious experience, but neither the processes nor the materials are consciously observable by us. Dewey's rejection of the possibility that they are permanently unknowable and beyond any and all consciousness leads him to the alternative view, that they are the content of a self-consciousness which transcends our own conscious experience and constitutes ultimate reality. Dewey declares that his reasonings on this matter started from the "psychological standpoint" but concluded with the transcendentalist absolute self-consciousness. This consciousness is permanent (eternal -- without origin or decay), identical (a complete unity), yet supportive of all the states of consciousness we experience. The details of such support need elaboration, but Dewey believes that the best approach is to consider unconscious psychical activities as functions through which the mind apperceives. He has worked out the outline of a plan which could hopefully preserve both the theories of psychology and the demands of absolute idealism. The key would be the "psychological standpoint".

Seth and Ward

Seth's work was his "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," a contribution to the collection of neo-idealist thought called *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, which Seth edited with R.B. Haldane and published in 1883. There Seth criticised Kant, as did Green, for failing to completely renounce the "psychological standpoint" inherent in British philosophy. This failure's fruit was the retention of paradoxical and contradictory notions: the thing-in-itself, the chasm between the a priori and the a posteriori, and the mechanistic theory of the origin of experience. Hence Kantianism requires a purification and reconstruction in which the origin, purpose, and interrelationships of the categories can be fully understood. Seth does not use Hegelian themes to accomplish this. He, like Green, had as many complaints against Hegel as he did against Kant, and so this essay remains on a critical and negative plane.

Ward's 1883 article in *Mind*, "Psychological Principles I: The Standpoint of Psychology," along with its second part and their inclusion in his 1886 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article "Psychology," was quickly and widely influential. His work in the 1880's has been credited with nothing less than the destruction of the foundations of associationalistic empiricism and faculty-psychology.⁹ Ward rejected the existence of discontinuous elements of experience, hence requiring a mental uniting process, in favor of an experience characterized by continuity and unity through a process of gradual and flux-like change. He owed these views on experience to influences from German psychology and philosophy: Kant, Herbart, Lotze, Wundt, and Brentano.¹⁰

With them Ward effected a quick revolution in British and American psychology nearly singlehandedly. Two philosophers in particular appreciated Ward's work on this topic, as they were making very similar efforts: William James and Shadworth Hodgson. James was much indebted both to Ward¹¹ and to Hodgson.¹² All three espoused what was called the "stream of consciousness" perspective on experience, which Hodgson was the first to mention and use in a philosophical publication in 1878.¹³

To British philosophy Ward owed his principle that psychology dealt with *individual* experience, that is, with experience as it for individual lives. Ward calls this principle "the standpoint of psychology". Other standpoints include that of the "concrete" sciences, like mineralogy and botany, or the "abstract" sciences, like metaphysics. The difference lies in their standpoint on experience: how they take experience to be. Psychology, argues Ward, takes a unique standpoint on experience, the psychological standpoint, when it undertakes its responsibility to investigate the whole of experience individualistically.¹⁴ A universalistic standpoint would consider the objects and events of experience insofar as they are for all, or as they are "objective." Psychology does not deal with experience in such a manner, as it is instead concerned with experience as it is subjectively, for the individual.

Of all the facts with which he [the psychologist] deals, the psychologist may truly say that their *esse* is *percipi*; inasmuch as all his facts are facts of presentation, are ideas in Locke's sense, or objects which imply a subject....Psychology, then, never transcends the limits of the individual: even

the knowledge that there is a real world, as common-sense assumes, is, when psychologically regarded, an individual's knowledge, which had a beginning and a growth, and can have an end.¹⁵

In this manner Ward decides that the standpoint of the psychologist on experience should be that of the subjective idealist. Ward does not mean to say that the psychologist must assume that metaphysical viewpoint personally; rather, the psychologist is studying experience as it is without any ontological commitments, and thus as it is for a subjective idealist. In this standpoint, everything exists solely for the subject. The psychologist, as any other scientist, of course must take a realist attitude towards the existence of the laboratory, instruments, and subjects. Ward was of the vanguard among British philosophers who took the new physiological psychology seriously, although he performed no psychological experiments himself.

It is the psychologist's task to study the genesis of human experience in all its forms and modes, as traditional British philosophy asserts. However, the results of such study have no bearing on epistemology, according to Ward, and he thus rejects the attempt to use psychology to give an account of the origin, process, or limit to knowledge. Epistemology is concerned with questions about what we *ought* to believe or hold to be true, but psychology can only explain how we in fact come to our beliefs. Psychology cannot have a bearing on epistemology because psychology's own principles rely on a theory of knowledge; as science it must, and does, take for granted some epistemological tenets. To ask that it attempt to justify a theory of knowledge would send it on a viciously circular track.¹⁶ For Ward then, psychology

assumes an ontology, including especially the existence of the subject for whom experience occurs, and a theory of knowledge which permits it to make truth claims.

Dewey's psychological standpoint

Dewey begins his article by noting that, thanks to Green's writings, the essential disagreement between German transcendentalism and British empiricism has been laid bare. Dewey does not enter into a discussion of Green's efforts, but he is drawing his readers' attention to Green's attacks in his introductions to the *Works* of Hume, where empiricist sensationalism is assailed for destroying the possibility of self-consciousness. Dewey's deep appreciation for Green's efforts and their incorporation into his own philosophy has been observed. As Dewey puts it, "It is the *psychological* standpoint which is the root of all the differences, as Professor Green has shown with such admirable lucidity and force." [pp. 122-123]

After praising Green, Dewey abandons him and immediately proposes to recast the whole issue. Instead of seeing in Green's criticisms the demonstration of a fundamental impasse on the basic nature of experience between the two traditions, Dewey offers a way of seeing a fundamental agreement. We should not find in empiricism an incorrect psychological standpoint, as Green did, but rather fault empiricism for a failure to consistently hold to the psychological standpoint for which it was originally responsible. Dewey offers the uniting principle, the psychological standpoint, which British philosophers have championed as the true philosophic starting point and method:

We are not to determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind, or is an "idea"....Or, in the ordinary way of putting it, the nature of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out what experience says about them. [p. 123]

Dewey also makes reference to this principle elsewhere in the article by stating that all knowledge is relative: it is always relative to, or dependent on, consciousness. Dewey's attraction to this principle is apparent if we recall how he stressed in previous publications that experience itself must be the sole arbiter of reality and truth. Nothing beyond the realm of conscious experience can be appealed to when doing philosophy; the existence of vast dangers and contradictions involved there have been amply demonstrated by the neo-idealists. This principle was also of utmost importance to British philosophers, who understandably claimed it as their sole guiding light and method. To accuse another philosopher of abandoning experience in favor of some "assumption," "formula," "presupposition," "a priori" tenet, or the like, was the strongest way of expressing disapproval for philosophers of that time.

After requiring that philosophy consistently look to experience, Dewey says that psychology is "the scientific and systematic account of that experience." Without providing any elaboration or justification of this abrupt pronouncement, Dewey moves on to ask that the reader not assume that there is "any assumption regarding its 'individual' or 'introspective' character." [pp. 123-124] Dewey's antipathy towards

introspection has been noted, and the rejection of an individualistic characterization anticipates his disagreement with Ward's formulation of the psychological standpoint. Having made himself quite clear on his version of the psychological standpoint, the need for clarification on the purpose and domain of psychology stands out in sharp relief. But Dewey is content at this stage to move on to a discussion of how British philosophers, having affirmed the psychological standpoint, went on in their philosophies to forget and violate it.

The British desertion of the standpoint

The long and short of the poor history of British philosophy goes like this: Locke explained experience using unknowable substances, Berkeley used a transcendent God, and Hume used unknowable sensations. Dewey does take the trouble to reiterate the neo-idealist attack on sensations since he anticipates the objection that Hume did not appeal to any unknowables but rather simply analyzed experience into its components to reveal that experience is ultimately composed of grouped and organized sensations. Dewey states his agreement with the method and existence of sensations, but points out that, as the results of analysis, they are known entities. On Dewey's interpretation, Hume then decided that they must also be capable of existing prior to conscious, knowing experience. This move is fallacious for Dewey:

The dependence of our knowledge upon sensations - or rather that knowledge is nothing but sensations as related to each other - is not denied. What is denied is the correctness of the procedure which, discovering a certain

element *in* knowledge to be necessary for knowledge, therefore concludes that this element has an existence prior to or apart from knowledge. [p. 125]

Such a conclusion does not worry a philosopher who is untroubled by the assertion of entities beyond the realm of knowledge, but this philosopher has forgotten the psychological standpoint and has gone over to ontology or metaphysics. [pp. 126-127]

With the statement in the quotation above, Dewey has consolidated his central philosophical vision by wrapping up the value he found in the neo-idealists' critiques of empiricism and Kant. It would not be too much to say that with this principle Dewey set down a path he would follow for the rest of his career, as he discovered the consequences of this position. But at this stage of his career he also believed that knowing experience and conscious experience were identical, which he would abandon in later years. This principle and the psychological standpoint are compatible together, and together they shaped Dewey's approach to the question of how experience originated.

Individual and universal consciousness

Dewey realized that psychologists and philosophers often picture to themselves the origin of experience by considering an infant who must be receiving pure, unadulterated sensations. They are able to conceive how the environment stimulates and causes the sensations for the baby. These sensations can be referred to as the "relation" between the organic body and the stimulating environment [pp. 128-129],

and experimenters can try to understand the relations that hold between the outer stimulus and the inner response. Dewey claims that he has no objection to this attempt to understand such an origin of knowledge, since it is the sort of psychology of which Dewey approves.

Dewey avoids contradicting himself by distinguishing between two kinds of consciousness: the individual and the universal. Dewey has no problem with any attempt to scientifically understand the origins of individual consciousness. But since consciousness is not exhausted by the sum of all the individual consciousnesses, the comprehension of their origin in no way provides an explanation of the origin of all of consciousness. Dewey points out that during the psychologist's explanation of the baby's consciousness, the psychologist was using known entities: the environment, the baby, the sensation. All of these existed in consciousness, and not beyond it: "Surely it is not a baby thing-in-itself which is affected, nor a world thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation." [p. 128] How could we make reference to them, or experiment on them, otherwise? And if all along the psychologist only used known entities in the explanation,

Consequently he is not accounting for the origin of consciousness or knowledge at all. He is simply accounting for the origin of an individual consciousness, or a specific group of known facts, by reference to the larger group of known facts or universal consciousness....in short, that the *becoming* of consciousness exists for consciousness only, and hence that consciousness can never have become at all. That for which all origin and change exists, can never have originated or changed. [p. 129]

The dizzying use of the term 'consciousness' with necessarily different meanings obscures Dewey's intentions. Dewey often forgets to specify which kind of consciousness he means when he simply uses the term 'consciousness' alone. We must henceforth take on the task of determining whether Dewey means the individual, subjective consciousness, the universal, objective consciousness, or simply consciousness in the unprejudiced, denotative sense which he asked his readers to adopt at the outset for the purposes of the article. Dewey uses the third meaning while arguing for his major points, as he needs common ground between himself and his readers. When for other purposes he takes for granted the established existence of individual and universal consciousness, he sometimes simply uses 'consciousness' for one or the other; we shall have to understand his intentions through the context. And when he has shown that the individual and universal consciousnesses arise from consciousness proper, he will refer to it as absolute consciousness.

In the above quotation the lone term 'consciousness' is used denotatively. It has at least the following characteristics: it had no origin, it cannot change, it encompasses all known facts, and individual consciousnesses somehow share and grow in it without encompassing all of it. A reasonable question here asks whether for Dewey consciousness and universal consciousness are exactly identical in meaning. The answer is that they are not, and on Dewey's stated principles cannot, be identified, as Dewey will later explain. Dewey's position on consciousness is an echo of Green:

Should the question be asked, If this self-consciousness is not derived from nature, what then is its origin? the answer is that it has no origin. It never began, because it never was not. It is the condition of there being such a thing as beginning or end. Whatever begins or ends does so for it or in relation to it.¹⁷

Dewey characterizes the relationship between the individual and the universal consciousness and the role of the psychologist at this point by saying that the psychologist studies how consciousness differentiates and develops itself into different forms, or sets of relations, which constitute the individual consciousnesses, using elements of universal consciousness (such as the known baby). [pp. 129-130] This genetic account will discover the relations which hold between all of the elements of consciousness. [pp. 130-131] In so doing the psychologist will discover the "relations of subject and object, and the relations of Universal and Individual, or Absolute and Finite." [p. 131] The first task is taken up in part two of the article, and the second task in part three.

The list of tasks for psychology indicates that Dewey regards the individual and the universal consciousnesses as elements *within* consciousness itself. Dewey accordingly finds that when a psychologist assumes at the outset of inquiry that consciousness is subjective or individual solely, a violation of the psychological standpoint has taken place, since the issue of whether consciousness is individual or not must be settled by looking to consciousness with an unprejudiced eye. Unfortunately, psychology has been afflicted with the assumption that consciousness

is subjective only, and two schools of philosophy can result from this assumption: "Reasoned or Transfigured Realism" and "Subjective Idealism." For Dewey, the former is the dualistic position of Locke's representationalism and Kant's transcendental idealism, while the latter is the typical British approach best represented by the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill and Bain.

They share a goal with each other, and with Dewey: to try to find a way to reconcile two undoubted theses, *first*, that all of our knowledge must be relative to consciousness, and *second*, that our consciousness is relative and dependent upon something beyond it. [p. 132] Dewey accepts both theses as well; the problem is their correct interpretation and explanation so that we can consistently accept both as true. Reasoned realism makes its attempt using the 'unknowable' or the 'thing-in-itself' to account for the second thesis, but in so doing violates the first. [p. 133] Subjective idealism distinguishes within consciousness two kinds, subjective and objective consciousness. It declares that the objective consciousness is the external and material universe ordered by space and time, while the subjective consciousness is the internal realm (the "ego" or "mind proper") characterized by feelings, emotions, and ideas. [p. 134]

Subjective idealism, Dewey claims, confuses consciousness in the broad sense (as including both subject and object) with subjective consciousness. This claim by itself is not supportable on the evidence Dewey has produced, and thus appears very weak. Dewey interprets subjective idealism as holding that the subjective consciousness is all that truly exists, and that this consciousness is capable of producing the objective

world, which is still part of itself after all. "The essence of Subjective Idealism is that the subject consciousness or mind, which remains after the 'object world has been subtracted,' is that for which after all this object world exists....to Subjective Idealism, the consciousness for which all exists is the consciousness which is called mind, *Ego*, 'my being'." [p. 135]

This interpretation is self-contradictory, as Dewey explains, but it is far from clear that Bain, or any other philosopher of that time, believes that the subjective ego is all that exists, as evidenced by the quotations from Bain which Dewey uses. Ward himself makes this point.¹⁸ Bain's position lies far from Berkeley's idealism and should be classified instead with phenomenism. This seems to escape Dewey, and thus he fails to see that phenomenism is far closer to his own position than the subjective idealism that Dewey sees instead.

There is something disturbing Dewey which prevents him from fully understanding phenomenism, and it lies in the mentioned assertion by Bain and others that psychology, or mental science, has to deal with the ego or mind proper only, leaving the objective realm to natural science. [p. 134] Interestingly, Ward rejects this position, claiming that by the psychological standpoint, psychology must analyze the very distinction between subjective and objective consciousness and show how it arises from the presentations. The term "presentations" is Ward's denotative term for experience, analogous to Dewey's "consciousness," and used for the same reason, as Ward finds the predominant "phenomena" too connotatively stained.¹⁹ Hence, with this pronouncement Ward has duplicated Dewey's position. However,

Ward has still retained his own version of the psychological standpoint: "the facts of psychology and the facts of physics are, as known *to somebody*, both facts alike facts of psychology, whatever else they may be." Again: "the removal of the subject removes...all presentation or possibility of presentation whatever." And again: "the natural outcome of speculation from the psychological standpoint is [subjective] idealism."²⁰

Ward thus tries to do two contradictory things, which attracts Dewey's close attention. Ward first says that psychology can and should be responsible for seeing how the subject-object distinction arises from presentations (Dewey's 'consciousness'), but then tells the psychologist that such an endeavor is possible only by assuming that this distinction arises *in a subject's* presentations (Dewey's 'individual consciousness'). This contradiction provoked Dewey's criticisms, and his resolution. What if

it were admitted that this subject, mind, and the object, matter, are both but *elements within*, and both exist only *for*, consciousness -- we should be in the sphere of an eternal absolute consciousness, whose partial realization both the individual "subject" and the "external world" are....The only possible hypothesis upon which to reconcile the two statements that mind is consciousness with the object world subtracted, and that it is the whole of our conscious experience, including both subject and object world, is that the term "Mind" is used in two entirely different senses in the two cases. In the first it must be individual mind, or consciousness, and in the second it must be absolute mind or consciousness, for and in which alone the individual or subject consciousness and the external world or object consciousness exist and get their reality. [pp. 135, 136]

Put another way, the subjective and objective find a common origin and unity in the absolute consciousness. Here it must be remembered that when Dewey uses the term "unity" he does not mean identity. Dewey is referring to the organic unity, in which elements possess their essential natures and functions only due to their relationships inside an encompassing whole which gathers them together. Thus Dewey's position is that the individual and the universal arise from, gain their nature from, and have a unity in a larger whole: the absolute consciousness. To understand this position better, ask this question: is the absolute consciousness something beyond an individual consciousness? For Dewey, this question must be answered in the negative, as the better way of putting the relationship would be that the individual consciousness is but a way of viewing the absolute consciousness, and that this way of viewing places a limitation on consciousness, creating the element of individual consciousness. Another question would be that if the absolute consciousness is not beyond individual consciousness, does this imply that my individual consciousness exhausts all of consciousness, and hence all of reality? Dewey's answer is no, because individual consciousness is by nature limited.

Perhaps an analogy is in order. What should be the answer to this question: is a book beyond the realm of one of its pages? The best answer is in the negative, but in so answering we cannot be held to be saying that the page is all there is to the book. How do we characterize their relationship? The organic relationship is the only way: our ability to understand the page is possible only through starting with the whole book and then viewing it in a certain way, concentrating on an element which

performs a certain set of functions. Neither the elements nor the functions can be understood, known, except by reference to other elements and functions of the whole and the whole itself. Morris' otherwise unusual dialogue with a human hand attempts to make this same point, and by analogy tries to demonstrate how the individual self-consciousness must, in light of its ability to universalize and know objective reality, find itself to be a functioning member of the absolute spiritual realm.²¹ Dewey has undertaken a proof of the same point.

Dewey agrees with Ward that psychology must take all of conscious experience for its material, and only requests that this principle be maintained consistently as the true and valid psychological standpoint. The presupposition that experience is necessarily subjective and individual takes an ontological or metaphysical standpoint instead, as it requires an assumed understanding of the distinction between the objective and the subjective realms of reality. [p. 139] As a result, the natural objection to Dewey's position, which he raises himself, asks how it is possible that the individual consciousness can know the universal consciousness, since it is Dewey's own admission that the individual can be distinguished from the universal. If it cannot, then the universal consciousness is an unknowable thing-in-itself; but if it somehow can, then it is just within the individual consciousness anyway and so only the individual consciousness exists from the start. [pp. 138-139]

Dewey's answer starts with the point that this objection assumes that Dewey holds that individual consciousness and universal consciousness are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive for all of consciousness from the start. But this is not Dewey's

position. Since the subjective and the objective find their origin and unity in absolute consciousness, what one typically calls "my consciousness" really is, at bottom, no such thing. Consciousness taken in a certain manner, that is, as the feelings, emotions, ideas, etc. of consciousness, form our understanding of "my consciousness." But consciousness, experience, is not limited to such experiences as these. Here Dewey parts with Bain, Ward, and all others who believe that experience (consciousness) is by nature limited and individualized.

Dewey agrees with those who find great significance in the discoveries of physiology, biology, and evolution. They point to the dependence of individual consciousness on biological and physical processes, which extend continuously from the far past to the present, and are hence mostly prior to personal minds. But Dewey then points out that our knowledge about these events implies that an individual consciousness can transcend itself and know how it arose. British psychology has always been doing this; the universal standpoint is taken whenever an attempt is made to explain how experience, beliefs, or knowledge arise in individual minds. [pp. 140-142] It is sheer perversity to have accomplished so much in this science only to then ask the question which commences the frustrating epistemological enterprise: if I am limited to my individual experience, how can I ever have knowledge about that which must be beyond it? Dewey is trying to show that the only way you could ever know yourself to be a limited consciousness requires you to first know a larger whole, of which your individual consciousness will be but a portion. In brief, the only way for this epistemological question to start is to

already know the answers and then forget them. Dewey's conclusion is that individual consciousness cannot exhaust all of consciousness.

Emergence vs. reproduction

In his summary Dewey manages to completely confuse the issues with loose terminology. He abruptly drops the term "absolute consciousness" and uses "universal consciousness" in its place, departing from Bain's and Ward's usage of "universal."

Consciousness has shown that it involves *within* itself a process of becoming, and that this process becomes conscious of itself. This process is the individual consciousness; but, since it is conscious of itself, it is consciousness of the universal consciousness. All consciousness, in short, is self-consciousness, and the self is the universal consciousness, for which all process is and which, therefore, always is. The individual consciousness is but the process of realization of the universal consciousness through itself. Looked at as process, as realizing, it is individual consciousness; looked at as produced or realized, as consciousness of the process, that is, of itself, it is universal consciousness. [p. 142]

It is unfortunate that Dewey changed his terminology, since it confuses the reader and makes a large difference to the theory. We can see the change best with three selections from three consecutive pages. "Since consciousness does show the origin of individual and universal consciousness *within itself*, consciousness is therefore both universal and individual." [p. 140] "The psychological standpoint is necessarily a universal standpoint..." [p. 141] "It [individual consciousness] knows that it has its

origin in processes which exist for the universal self, and that therefore the universal self has never become." [p. 142] We can see that initially both universal (objective) and individual (subjective) consciousness are manifestations of absolute consciousness, and universal consciousness has an origin. Then suddenly Dewey forgets his dictum that the psychological standpoint must be neither individual nor universal. At the end of the article there are only two kinds of consciousness, the universal and the individual, and the universal consciousness can never have an origin. We must explain this significant alteration, as well as account for the first mention of two things: self-consciousness and a "process of realization."

The use of the term "self" connects Dewey with Morris, who through great stress on the term was able to preserve personality at every level of spirit. Dewey here expresses his agreement that all consciousness is self-consciousness, that is, consciousness is necessarily a continuously organic whole, without divisions or separations. Accordingly, both the individual and the universal consciousnesses are self-consciousnesses; but there are not really two completely distinct selves -- there can be ultimately only one, the universal. The individual self is an aspect, an element within the universal, but none the less possesses a wholeness, a self.

The thesis that the universal consciousness realizes itself through a process involving the "becoming" or growth of the individual connects Dewey with T.H. Green. The essence of Green's metaphysics is that all of reality, since it must depend on concrete universal relations lest it fall apart into an impossible chaos, is composed of objective phenomena resting in a synthesized, organic and absolute

whole. And since relations are essentially mental, the universal absolute is essential mental or self-consciousness. This argument and its conclusion is precisely Morris' in his post-1880 works, who never tired of emphasizing the doctrine that everything requires the relational synthesizing activity of intelligence for its existence.

As for the question of the relationship between the whole and human knowledge, Green states that

the system of related facts, which forms the objective world, reproduces itself, partially and gradually, in the soul of the individual who in part knows it....our knowledge of any part of the system implies a like union of the manifold in relation...[and] is only possible through the action upon feelings of a subject distinguishing itself from them. This being so, it would seem that the attainment of the knowledge is only explicable as a reproduction of itself, in the human soul, by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists -- a reproduction of itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ.²²

Dewey's first theory, let us call it the "emergence" theory, is that both the objective and the subjective together arise out of a logically prior absolute consciousness, and thereby entertain mutual relations between them. But at the conclusion we find instead hints of the "reproduction" theory: Green's vision of the objective, absolute consciousness recreating itself in a subjective and individual self by way of the sensory experience, thereby engendering superior/subordinate relations. On Green's theory, there are only two modes of consciousness; on Dewey's emergence theory, there are three modes of consciousness. The difference between

Dewey's and Green's theories is immense, and is not merely an apparent one caused by terminological problems.

The emergence theory finds in universal consciousness a partiality and abstractness, while the latter finds universal consciousness self-sufficient and complete. The idea that the objective world, constituting the entire absolute consciousness, must reproduce itself and recreate its systematic relations inside the individual so that it may be known to the individual, is completely foreign to the emergence theory. On the emergence theory, absolute consciousness is to be left completely uncharacterized, neither universal nor individual. Also, there is no need at all for the individual to undergo limited and partial experience, taking the contribution of universal consciousness to gain knowledge of the whole. The universal and individual are already united by something more fundamental: the absolute consciousness. On the reproduction theory, if it were not for sensory experience, the individual presumably would be forever cut off by that dualism between it and the absolute consciousness.

Dewey and T.H. Green

The best explanation seems to be that while Dewey is trying to convert his British opponents over to absolute idealism, and to show that psychology cannot be limited to the study of individual consciousness, he wants to use the term "consciousness" in an unprejudiced, uncommitted and fundamental manner. Here both the individual and the universal consciousnesses require each other and the absolute consciousness

for their unity. But at the conclusion of the article, as Dewey enjoys the fruits of his labors, the real fundamental reality announces itself as the universal consciousness, and the individual consciousness becomes solely dependent on it instead. The "aspect" tactic, where consciousness can appear now individual, now universal, depending on the viewpoint taken towards consciousness, is replaced by the "realization" tactic, in which universal consciousness fundamentally exists and gains knowledge of itself only by reproducing itself into an individualized and partial consciousness.

Dewey, although forcing a substantial agreement between his results and Green's at the end of the article, should not on these grounds be found to be a complete disciple. The emergence theory will reassert its usefulness in a couple of years. In the follow-up article, "Psychology as Philosophic Method," Dewey announces his disagreements with Green and other neo-idealists.

II. Psychology as Philosophic Method

Dewey's search for the philosophic method, begun with the "Kant and Philosophic Method" article, continues with the April 1886 "Psychology as Philosophic Method." In the former article Dewey found in Hegelian dialectic the means to determine how all of the categories of experience organically relate, thereby using a coherence criterion of truth. In this article Dewey announces that psychology, since it must deal

with both the universal and individual consciousnesses and all the relations between them (as shown in "The Psychological Standpoint"), must be the ultimate science of reality, *contra* both the British tradition and the neo-idealists. Dewey argues that there is nothing more fundamental for philosophy, the traditional field for these activities, to do. Side issues, like the philosophy of nature, or the science of logic, can remain with philosophy proper. [p. 148] But if the aim is to account for, and give meaning to, all the elements of experience, psychology is in the best position to accomplish every explanation required, and hence can no longer be considered as merely one of the specific sciences. In the process Hegelian dialectic is completely abandoned and Hegel's logic is severely criticized. Even Green comes under fire as Dewey expresses his disapproval of Green's methodology.

Neo-idealism on psychology

Dewey's argument attempts to show that the fundamental character of neo-idealism, lying in its insistence that all reality is self-consciousness, is at odds with the notion that humanity can be regarded in two opposed manners. People can be regarded as limited and individual objects within objective reality so that the objective relations of action and reaction between the environment and the organism's mental phenomena can be studied. They can also be the unlimited, universal self-consciousness which encompasses all relations and experiences. According to the leading neo-idealists which Dewey quotes, psychology is that objective, concrete science which deals with humanity in the former manner, while

philosophy is the universal science dealing with humanity in the latter manner. Psychology thus studies how the limited consciousness of humanity develops out of the absolute consciousness. [pp. 145-147]

There is a sizeable agreement between many British psychologists and neo-idealists on the task of psychology. The only significant difference is that the latter group finds the objective realm to be a manifestation of absolute consciousness, instead of an unknowable matter (Locke, Spencer), or the objective portion of an individual mind (Bain). Dewey accordingly attacks the neo-idealists much in the same manner as he attacked British philosophy: he points out that if psychology is to study how the objective realm manifests itself in an individual consciousness, psychology must already be in a position to cover the entire realm of reality of both the individual and the universal consciousness. Psychology cannot allow consciousness to be pre-divided into two modes or kinds, cannot be asked to limit its study to the effects of the one upon the other, and then told to consider itself as merely of the abstract, partial sciences, studying only one aspect of humanity.

Psychology, as science of the realization through the individual of the universe, answers the question as to the significance of the whole, and at the same time gives the meaning of the parts and of their connection by showing just their place within this whole....Self-consciousness means simply an individualized universe; and if this universe has *not* been realized in man, if man be not self-consciousness, then no philosophy whatsoever is possible. If it *has* been realized, it is in and through psychological experience that this realization has occurred. Psychology is the scientific account of this

realization, of this individualized universe, of this self-consciousness. What other account can be given? [pp. 148, 149]

The conclusion to be reached is that if psychology is supposed to study just individual consciousness, it cannot do so without knowledge of, and reference to, the universal consciousness. Hence it must study all the relations between the individual and the universal consciousness. But when it does that, all pretense that psychology is a limited, abstract science must be dropped. The idea that philosophy can do anything more fundamental than the proper task of psychology must also be abandoned. Hence they must merge as one science.

So too must the notion be dropped that there is in the final way of things a distinction between humanity as a limited consciousness and as the absolute consciousness. Dewey does not question this distinction's *relative* validity, as it makes the science of psychology possible, but as the distinction arises within conscious experience itself (as it must -- otherwise how else could we know the distinction?) then it comes within psychology's purview.

Man in his experience, at different *stages* of it, finds it necessary to regard himself in two lights, -- in one of which he is a particular space- and time-conditioned being...and in the other the unconditioned eternal synthesis of all. At most the distinction is only one of various stages in one and the same experience, both of which, as stages of experience -- one, indeed, of experience in its partiality and the other of experience in its totality -- fall within the science of experience, viz., psychology. [p. 150]

Here we have the first mention of the stages of psychological experience, and to understand what is meant we must take note of Dewey's assertion that "not only does self-consciousness appear as one of the stages of psychological experience, but the explanation of the simplest psychological fact -- say one of perception, or feeling, or impulse -- involves necessary reference to self-consciousness." [p. 151] This sounds paradoxical, as Dewey is saying that all psychological facts, even those of the development of self-consciousness, involve reference to self-consciousness. How could the explanation of its own origin require reference to itself, if it doesn't yet exist? The answer is that there can be a confusion between self-consciousness, as it is taken two different ways: as it is in experience, and as it is in "psychological experience." Self-consciousness is concurrent with every experience, as Dewey repeats throughout the article. Psychological experience is experience taken in the limited, individual sense. Thus it is impossible for us to ever experience without also experiencing self-consciousness, but it quite possible to psychologically experience the origins of an individual self-consciousness as it arises out of materials that are not yet self-consciousness and are the results of the universal consciousness reproducing itself in the individual from the level of perception up through the stages needed to create self-consciousness. The entire story of this process is for Dewey's *Psychology*. Here Dewey is concerned only to describe how such a psychology is possible, and since it is possible, how it must take over the central function of philosophy itself.

Philosophic method

The thesis that psychology is nothing other than philosophic method can now be seen as contrasting with two other philosophic methods: the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of logic. The philosophy of nature begins with the objective science's results and applies them to questions concerning the origins and validity of human knowledge. This is the typically British methodology, and results in a preoccupation with perception alone, as can be seen in its principle that the criterion of truth for an idea lies in its perceptual origins. In an effort to counteract the resulting sensationalism, German methodology starts from the British results and then places all of its stress on the necessary intelligibility of experience. Such intelligibility requires relations, which in turn require a logic to somehow systematize and prioritize them, resulting in Kant's synthetic unity of apperception or Hegel's dialectical logic.

Dewey finds in both of these methodologies a fatal willingness to abstract an admittedly necessary *portion* of experience and make it the criterion of knowledge:

Both of these proceedings go in abstraction from its real being, and cannot give the real method of philosophy. In short, the real *esse* of things is neither their *percipi*, nor their *intelligi* alone; it is their *experiri*. Logic may give us the science of the *intelligi*, the philosophy of nature of the *percipi*, but only psychology can give us the systematic connected account of the *experiri*, which is also in its wholeness just the *experior* -- self-consciousness itself. [pp. 151-152]

Dewey places all his previous, and new, criticisms of both philosophical traditions into this tidy framework. British philosophy has elevated contingent perception to the detriment of necessary intelligence; German philosophy has responded with the reverse movement. For Dewey, both are required parts of the greater whole which needs them both: self-conscious experience. But this position is not Kant's, who denied that the operations of self-consciousness are matters of experienced fact, nor Green's, who in a similar manner declared that the operations of the larger, absolute consciousness are forever beyond the reach of human consciousness.

Psychology/philosophy must have a special relationship with the other sciences. These special sciences abstract away a portion of experience to give an explanation of it on their own terms and categories. Each science's conclusions have a relative validity, but absolute validity can only reside with the final conclusions of the one science which studies all of experience: psychology. "Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious experience reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may make virtual abstraction from the whole, and consider a part by itself, without damage, so long as...the attempt is not made to present this partial science as a metaphysic, or as an explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our uncritical so-called 'scientific philosophies'." [p. 159]

While each of the special sciences gain its materials from selected and analyzed portions of experience, psychology cannot, and so it must confront the question of how it gains a hold on its all-encompassing subject matter and whether it too is responsible for providing explanations. Dewey's answer agrees with Caird's, Green's

and Lotze's: of the whole of experience there can be no explanation (because only parts of the whole can explain other parts) and thus it is sheer fact. [pp. 162-163] This answer doubtless does not get at the real issue confronting Dewey's theory, for if psychology is to somehow provide "the organic living unity and bond" for the sciences, what is the criterion of success for a psychology which proposes to do so? To this question Dewey has no detailed answer, for this article's purpose is to fix a programmatic scheme; it will naturally lack much-needed specifics.

Dewey's critique of Green and Hegel

In Dewey's view, Green demonstrated that reality is a unified, absolute self-consciousness. But Green fell victim to the prevalent notion that human consciousness is limited and individual *only*, and can never reach an identity with the absolute. We are limited to our access to it, by the limitations of the realization/reproduction process. For Dewey such a dualism is completely unwarranted, and creates an unknowable. Many commentators have pointed out these unfortunate results, the first of whom was Green's neo-idealist compatriot, Edward Caird.²³ Dewey's pattern of criticism, as well as the quotations from Green which Dewey uses (with the exception of one sentence), are identical with Caird's at the conclusion of his article, the 1883 "Professor Green's Last Work."²⁴ [pp. 560-561]

Dewey thus has one fundamental agreement with Green, and two fundamental disagreements. The agreement lies in the need to see in all of a reality an absolute self-consciousness, although Dewey reaches this conclusion in a different manner

than Green. Green's methodology relied far more on Kant than Hegel, and it has been rightly observed that Green, least of all of the neo-idealists, should be called a Hegelian.²⁵ Dewey disagrees with Green's adoption of the individualistic standpoint, preferring the psychological standpoint. He also disagrees with Green's insistence that intelligible relations completely constitute ultimate reality, finding instead that experience is the wholeness out of which comes the abstraction of relations.

Dewey's relationship with Hegel can now be explored. In Dewey's eyes, Hegel's helpful corrections to Kant were the rejection of the thing-in-itself and the notion of the organic whole, the *Begriff* [p. 153], but his other central doctrine, the dialectic, cannot achieve its goal to account for all of spiritual reality alone. Dewey here agrees with the neo-idealists Andrew Seth and F.H. Bradley on this matter, and provides extensive quotations from Seth's 1881 "Hegel: an Exposition and Criticism."

Hegel's dialectic cannot be equated with any actually existing reality since it merely sets up a purely hypothetical entity. And the process of the dialectic itself presupposes experience, to give content to the concepts in the categories. Once this is seen, we should understand Hegel's dialectic as being a movement *from* spiritual nature *to* logic, and not the reverse. [pp. 164-165] This critique of Hegel's dialectic is precisely that of Trendelenburg, and subsequently, of Morris. Hegel's oft-noted inability to deal with particular contingency in his system ("Logic cannot reach, however much it may point to, an actual individual." [p. 166]) is symptomatic of his attempt to give absolute explanations of experience using only logic. Neither Dewey

nor many other critics have been impressed with Hegel's assertion that the absolute *Idee*, as reached by the dialectic, must exist since it could not help but include the category of being, as it is the "poorest of the categories." Even if the *Idee* is allowed to stand, it loses all content, as it has swallowed up into itself all of the distinctions which gave it life. [p. 166]

Dewey then concludes the article. The reasonable alternative to the other philosophies is to see that logical entities have their nature as essential members of experience, and not as constitutive creators of experience (Hegel, Green), nor as completely apart from experience (Kant, empiricists, intuitionists). To this end experience itself must never allow ultimate dualisms, only relative ones, and the relations these share making the whole of experience should be the proper subject-matter for psychology, "the complete systematic account of man." [p. 167]

III. Illusory Psychology

Hodgson responded to Dewey's articles with his October 1886 "Illusory Psychology." His aim was to expose and dispose of what he saw as a Hegelian transcendentalist pretending to appeal to experience while all the while clandestinely importing some presuppositions into the argument of the most illegitimate sort.

Hodgson's philosophy

That it should be Hodgson who would take the trouble to quickly respond is understandable, as four aspects of Dewey's articles were especially relevant to Hodgson's own philosophical theories and attitudes. First, of the British-tradition philosophers then active, Hodgson had written the most extensively on the question of the proper dividing line between philosophy and psychology. Nearly every one of his works spends a great deal of effort towards ascertaining the proper scope and methods of psychology, distinguishing it from philosophy. Second, Hodgson had staked his entire philosophy on appeals to experience. He even called his position "experientialism" so that his philosophy would not be taken for an empiricist's, who in Hodgson's view had a poor account of the nature of experience. Third, Hodgson attempted to rehabilitate metaphysics from the low status it had acquired in Britain, by relinking it with Aristotle's original conception of the study of being *qua* being, which was eminently possible using only experience. Dewey's rejection of metaphysics as contrary to the psychological standpoint threatened this endeavor. Fourth, his contempt for German critical and transcendental philosophy, save for the minor figure of Maimon, was boundless. The chief error they made was that they "assumed" that the ego, the subject, possessed a causal agency with which to aid in the creation of experience, "whereupon all Germany went mad."²⁶ Hodgson's recommendation for the proper method of philosophy is that

Instead of having recourse in the first instance to an hypothesis in order to explain the genesis of experience,...hypotheses, which, from the very terms of the problem so stated, must transcend, or have their objects prior to, the things they are employed to account for, -- we must have recourse in the first instance to experience itself, and see what its content is, apart from any hypothesis of its cause or mode of production....Throw yourself frankly on experience. Be not afraid of its misleading you, if only you can get it pure, without admixture of self-made puzzles.²⁷

This attitude created Hodgson's typical method of attack (for examples see his participation in the various symposia published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*). An offender is surveyed for any hint of unwarranted "presuppositions" or "assumptions," which were never lacking since any hint of a disagreement with Hodgson's own philosophy sufficed, and then is skewered on Hodgson's vitriolic rhetoric. Needless to say, his respect for the "principle of charity" was akin to that of Dicken's Scrooge.

This lack of respect was quickly extended to Dewey. Hodgson begins by expressing his allegiance to Dewey's psychological standpoint. From that point on, the greater portion of his article consists of derisive commentary on quotations from Dewey which make mention of a "postulate" or a "presupposition," taken completely out of context so that they can become obvious evidence of Dewey's forgetful yet inevitable betrayal of pure experience. Dewey objects to this procedure in his response: "Mr. Hodgson's aversion to some expressions is so acute that he seems hardly to have asked himself in what connection these phrases are used....It thus

appears to me that the mass of Mr. Hodgson's direct specific criticism is so beside the mark that it is needless to undertake a detailed review of it." [p. 169]

The remainder of Hodgson's article consists largely of an exposition of his "stream of consciousness" approach and his theory of the proper relationship between philosophy and psychology, where the sketchiness of Dewey's definition of psychology is pointed out. [p. lvi] Hodgson takes no notice of Dewey's arguments in either article at all save when it comes time to chastise Dewey for thinking that any experiential evidence exists at all for a universal consciousness. Such thinking surely reveals the spells of those assorted "presuppositions" to which Dewey has succumbed. Hodgson accuses Dewey of falling victim to the typically transcendentalist "fallacy of first generalizing his own consciousness and making an *ens logicum* of it, and then reconvertng it into a really existent consciousness with the attribute of omniscience." [p. xliii] This accusation is good evidence that Hodgson either did not read or ignored Dewey's rejection of Hegel's, and Green's, attempt to make absolute consciousness into a purely logical entity.

Hodgson also did not bother to take seriously the psychological standpoint.

Now there are many assumptions which we have to use care, often anxious care, and take much trouble and acquire painful instruction in order to avoid. But our own individuality is not one of them....When a Germanising enthusiast tells you, as a primary and self-evident truth, that the whole being of the phenomenal world depends on consciousness, instead of arguing the point, ask simply -- on *whose*. [pp. xlvi, xlix]

Apparently Hodgson's dislike for assumptions does not extend to his own, and an opportunity for serious philosophical debate is squandered.

The stream of consciousness

Due to Hodgson's willful disregard for Dewey's position, he had no recourse but to criticize Hodgson's "individualized stream of consciousness" using a repetition of his arguments. Dewey agreed that on the level of perceptual feelings consciousness is individual, since such psychological entities exist due to the provisional distinction between the universal and the individual consciousness. But experience itself possesses no such duality. Hodgson has taken a psychologically constructed (abstracted from experience) entity, the perceptual feeling, and placed it as the immediately given of experience. Then Hodgson has assumed a philosophical interpretation of experience, that of individuality, and configured immediate experience into the pure "stream of consciousness." [p. 171]

Dewey saw in Hodgson merely a revival of Humean psychology. Hodgson has only made a small but misused improvement: a flowing stream has replaced a compartmentalized train. Either way, this sort of consciousness lacks the necessary conceptual contribution:

I speak, not as a Germanizing transcendentalist, but according to my humble lights as a psychologist, when I say that I know nothing of a perceptual order apart from a conceptual, and nothing of an agent of bearer apart from the content which it bears. As a psychologist, I see the possibility of abstractly

analyzing each from the other, and, if I were as fond of erecting the results of an analysis into real entities as Mr. Hodgson believes me to be, I should suppose that they were actually distinct as concrete existences. [pp. 171-172]

Dewey reverts back to his emergence theory to explain his procedure: "it seems to me, not only that the *ordo ad individuum* and the *ordo ad universum* are built out of a common stock, but that the process is a reciprocal one." [p. 172] But not soon enough; Hodgson rightly notes the confusing change in terminology that we examined above. [p. xlviii]

The closest Hodgson manages to come to a potentially fruitful comment on Dewey is the passage in which Hodgson denies that he is a subjective idealist. Hodgson declares that he knows that there is and have been real existences apart from his individual consciousness. But what of the typical idealist inference, from the fact that something is known, or has meaning, to the conclusion that this something must exist in a consciousness, either the individual's or a universal consciousness? Such an existence does not follow, because "there is nothing in consciousness, taking the term simply, to show that it is the real condition of anything whatever." [p. xlviii]

Dewey does rely on this "inference," but what of Hodgson? He later states that "if we want to *know* what Being *is*, we must ask what *it is known as*....for Being is the object known in consciousness." [p. liv] If so, then a known object cannot exist as a thing-in-itself, independent of consciousness. This is one of Dewey's foundations, and it is apparently one of Hodgson's also. However, Dewey did not take notice of this matter, and the potential for a debate on this issue was never realized.

Dreary rejoinders

Dewey concludes his response with more evidence supporting the complaint with which he began, that Hodgson did not trouble himself to understand the purpose or argumentation of his articles. Hodgson's rejoinder challenges that complaint with a mere summary of his previous criticisms. He then points out that, in any case, Dewey was trying to cleave together two traditions using a principle, the psychological standpoint, to which neither can by their very nature be faithful, as they are at root variants of empiricism. Their presuppositions, and Dewey's, deny their admission to the truly philosophical school, which is comprised of Hodgson and Maimon alone: "Barring the writings of Solomon Maimon....my own is the only attempt, so far as I know, to base philosophy directly and solely upon experience, distinguished from empiricism, and without admitting assumptions."²⁸

As for Hodgson's parting comment that he could (finally!) discern several points of agreement with Dewey, we can only surmise what Hodgson saw. Perhaps Dewey's barb that it was Hodgson and not himself who erects abstract entities into prior existence finally hit home. Hodgson must have been sensitive to it, as he never tired of warning of the dangers of taking the sophisticated results of reflection for pre-existing experience. Perhaps Dewey's concise rejection of both sensationalism and excessive transcendentalism in his response reached Hodgson. There are other commonalities between their philosophies, but further conjectures upon an imaginary continued debate can be put aside.

Neither Dewey's articles nor the exchange with Hodgson had any discernible effect; further numbers of *Mind* are devoid of any other commentary, and no reference is made in any published work either by a British or neo-idealist philosopher (nor any other work, until 20th century dissertations and books on Dewey's philosophy look into his early work). In fact, if it were not for a preserved letter, there would be no evidence that it was ever attentively read at all by anyone. In a letter to Hodgson, William James makes mention of the Dewey-Hodgson exchange: "I have read...also your paper on poor Dewey, which I approve in the main."²⁹ This mention of Dewey by James is often quoted to give the impression that James found little value in Dewey's articles.

James's dislike for Hegelianism would naturally place him closer to Hodgson's side. Nevertheless, this disapproval of Dewey should be balanced by the fact that, while James was capable of great honesty concerning the value of another's philosophical efforts, negative judgements that James formed would rarely be written to the philosopher himself. James's habitual deference, humility, gentleness, and praise to the recipient of his correspondence is all but legendary, and truly exemplifies the principle of charity. However, this makes it very difficult, in the absence of other evidence, to ascertain how James really felt about another's work. With respect to James's honest evaluation of the Dewey-Hodgson exchange, perhaps we should also listen to James in another letter. James comments that "Hodgson is constitutionally incapable of understanding any thoughts but those that grow up in his own mind, -- with all the desire in the world to do justice to them, he simply can't

reproduce them in himself."³⁰ We should be content to leave the final word with James.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. Spencer, Herbert. "Professor Green's Explanations," p. 305. *Contemporary Review* 39 (1881): 305-311.
2. Ross, G. *Stanley Hall*, p. 146.
3. *EW* 1: 123-143.
4. *EW* 1: 144-167.
5. *EW* 1: xxv-xli.
6. *EW* 1: 168-175.
7. *Mind* o.s. 12 (1887): 314-318.
8. Dewey to Torrey, 17 November 1883, Torrey Papers.
9. Murray, A.H. *The Philosophy of James Ward*, pp. 2-6.
10. Leroux, Emmanuel. "James Ward's Doctrine of Experience." *Monist* 36 (1926): 78-84; also Rudolf Metz, "James Ward," in his *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, p. 400.
11. Perry, R.B. *The Life and Character of William James*, pp. 58-59.
12. Passmore, John. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 107n.
13. Hodgson, Shadworth. *The Philosophy of Reflection*, Volume I, p. 101.
14. Ward, James. "Psychological Principles I: The Standpoint of Psychology." *Mind* o.s. 8 (1883): 163.
15. *ibid.*, p. 163.
16. *ibid.*, p. 167.
17. Green, T.H. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 119.
18. Ward, "Psychological Principles I: The Standpoint of Psychology," p. 158.

19. *ibid.*, pp. 158-159.
20. *ibid.*, p. 159, 160, 168.
21. Morris, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 124-132.
22. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 76, 77.
23. For others see Arthur Balfour, "Green's Metaphysics of Knowledge," *Mind* o.s. 9 (1884): 77-81; also H. Calderwood, "Another View of Green's Last Work," *Mind* o.s. 10 (1885): 75-78.
24. Caird, Edward. "Professor Green's Last Work." *Mind* o.s. 8 (1883): 544-561.
25. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, pp. 55-56; Metz, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, pp. 272-273; Geoffrey Thomas, *The Moral Philosophy of T.H. Green*, pp. 40-41.
26. Hodgson, Shadworth. "The Metaphysical Method in Philosophy." *Mind* o.s. 9 (1884): 50-53.
27. *ibid.*, p. 55.
28. Hodgson, "'Illusory Psychology' -- A Rejoinder," p. 317.
29. As quoted in Perry, *The Life and Character of William James*, Volume I, p. 641.
30. *ibid.*, Volume II, p. 38.

Chapter Five

Knowledge, Feeling, and Will

As a purely psychological treatise -- implying philosophical principles and portending philosophical issues, but not necessarily to be used for enforcing particular philosophical conclusions -- it has great and obvious merits....Nothing, indeed could be better than the whole general view that is given of the relation of the three phases to one another, except when the disposition to merge and dissolve, in dialectic strain, begins to assert itself for the behoof of Will as "the complete activity," "self," "man," or what not, wherein the opposition of Knowledge and Feeling becomes reconciled.¹

G. Croom Robertson, 1887

Robertson's review is representative of the comments made on the first edition of Dewey's *Psychology*. Its treatment of knowledge, feeling, and will as equally integral factors in mental processes received approval, but no one could fail but notice that it was far from a purely psychological textbook. The intentional comingling of metaphysics and psychology was seen as reducing its value both to the professional and to the student. Not only did it clearly display the absolute idealism underlying the exposition, it was evident that the methods and results of experimental psychology were used to give reciprocal support for that philosophy. As to be expected, the anti-idealist G. Stanley Hall found this antithetical to the scientific spirit and was openly derisive in his review.² More generously, H.A.P. Torrey's review concluded that Dewey's work is no mere textbook on psychology but should be considered as an entire system of absolute idealist philosophy.³

Dewey could not complain that his critics failed to comprehend his intentions. Given his declared view that psychology is philosophic method, this work is, as it was intended to be, Dewey's first statement of his entire philosophy. In a letter to W.T. Harris, the editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (where several of Dewey's

first articles were published), Dewey credits Harris with stimulating him to the study of the *psychology* of German idealism.⁴ Dewey further says that his *Psychology* is an attempt to transform the significance of that psychology into present-day psychological language. As we have seen, the similarities between German idealism and experimental psychology are extensive, but psychology presupposes a dualism while absolute idealism proposes a monism. Their merger will require great dexterity.

I. Psychology and Consciousness

Dewey's principle aim is to fill in the blanks left from the outline presented in his articles in *Mind*. That outline is reprised in the first chapter. Psychology is the science of the phenomena of consciousness or self-consciousness. Dewey uses the terms interchangeably, since there can be no true consciousness in the absence of the self. Consciousness cannot be defined since it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from something else. Distinctions and divisions can only arise within consciousness, so psychology can only study "the various *forms* of consciousness, showing the *conditions* under which they arise." [p. 8] Self-consciousness can be understood to be individual, but only in a preliminary sense. Since psychology has among its subject-matters knowledge and volition, and as both must have a universal aspect (knowledge is available to all individual intelligences, and the content of every potential action is universal), self-consciousness must also be capable of transcending the individual

to attain universality. Therefore in understanding self-consciousness psychology must study how self-consciousness can have these two sides, and how they interact. Dewey supplies the way that this can be accomplished with a revised definition of psychology.

Psychology is the science of the reproduction of some universal content or existence, whether of knowledge or of action, in the form of individual, unsharable consciousness. This individual consciousness, considered by itself, without relation to its content, always exists in the form of *feeling*; and hence it may be said that the reproduction always occurs in the medium of feeling. Our study of the self will, therefore, fall under the three heads of Knowledge, Will, and Feeling. [p. 11]

Dewey goes on to expand his account of this reproduction in the next chapter. The science of psychology aims to order the phenomena or facts of self-consciousness using principles, which will provide all of the relationships the facts have with each other, thus explaining the facts. [p. 11] The facts are not ascertained by using introspection alone, since that method affects the psychological phenomena "so that we observe, not what we meant to observe, but a comparatively artificial product." [p. lix] But experimental psychology (Dewey here uses the older term "psycho-physics"), comparative psychology, and the study of the artifacts and creations of mind can supplement, and perhaps supplant entirely, the problematic and limited introspection. With the latter two, Dewey mentions the wider fields of study in which Hall, Wundt, and many others were engaged, but Dewey himself makes little attempt to use such

studies in the *Psychology*. Dewey concludes the chapter with the reminder that in all of the facts, events, objects, and materials used by psychology there is always found the consciousness of them. This statement is precisely the central thesis of his *Mind* articles, and forms the link between them and the *Psychology*, since for Dewey it makes possible the very existence of both psychology and philosophy.

Consciousness and the mental trilogy

The most significant feature of the *Psychology*, aside from its absolute idealism, was the use of the threefold scheme of knowledge, feeling, and will. This trilogy has alternative terms. Knowledge is cognition, intellect, understanding, or thinking; feeling is emotion, affection, sensibility, or interest; will is volition, conation, or desire. Dewey uses most of these alternates throughout the text. The many different terms are symptomatic of the trilogy's long, varied and controversial history.⁵ Kant gave a powerful defense of the mental trilogy by treating them separately as pure reason, practical reason, and judgement. In general, their advocates have construed them variously as mental powers, faculties, activities, processes, or functions; the only thing these philosophers have in common is their aim to correct the tendency to devote excessive attention to the intellectual aspect of mind. Dewey falls in with this diverse group.

After the two introductory chapters, the book is divided into three parts, devoted to knowledge, feeling, and will. In the second chapter Dewey forestalls some potential misapprehensions about this way of distinguishing these mental

characteristics. First and foremost, they are all legitimate traits of every state of consciousness. Every state of consciousness will make us aware of something, have a value or interest, and express a mental activity.

Feeling, knowledge, and will are not to be regarded as three *kinds* of consciousness; nor are they three separable parts of the same consciousness. They are the three aspects which every consciousness presents, according to the light in which it is considered; whether as giving information, as affecting the self in a painful or pleasurable way, or as manifesting an activity of self...Knowledge is not possible without feeling and will; and neither of these without the other two. [p. 20]

Knowledge relies on feeling since the apprehension of an object starts with the effect of the object upon the mind. This affect is the interest, and it draws the mind's attention, which is an act of volition. Such attention permits learning, which produces knowledge. [p. 20] This brief statement of knowledge formation sounds like a series of easily separable states of consciousness, but the matter is far more complicated, as Dewey shows later on. As a summary of Dewey's theory of mind, some foundations for pragmatism are here solidly laid down. Gone is the Hegelian tenet that the categories, as the pathways of the march of reason, are the sum and substance of self-conscious mind. Gone too is the notion that knowledge is the only state of consciousness to be found in the mind. The spectator theory of knowledge will never be a viable option for Dewey, as the passivity inherent in this theory is entirely antithetical to Dewey's philosophy.

The three aspects of consciousness fit nicely for Dewey into the scheme already set down by the definition of psychology as the science of the reproduction of some universal content in the form of individual consciousness. The universal content is knowledge, its duplicate in the individual consciousness has feeling attached to it, while the will is responsible for the creation of the individualized knowledge as well as the universal manifestation of an individual interest or desire. As Robertson noticed, Dewey gave an enormous responsibility to the will as foundational to self-consciousness. This is a large step towards pragmatism.

The poverty of British psychology was evident to Dewey when compared to this far richer plan, for the British version of the "psychological standpoint" declares that the contents of the mind are only the individualized feelings (sensations). All of its struggles to discover how knowledge arises solely from such thin and abstract entities is hopeless from the start. It is little wonder that from such a barren starting point, the need to illicitly rely on additional mental processes (regular associations, synthesizing categories, etc.), and the need to "prove" the existence of anything external beyond feelings, is so dire and so futile.

Dewey would have philosophers realize from the start that consciousness will not fit into compartmentalized individualities containing only entities abstracted from the truly wider and richer conscious experience. He warns the student against "regarding consciousness as something purely subjective or individual, which in some way deals with and reports a world of objects outside of consciousness." [p. 25] One wonders if Dewey had the premonition as he wrote those words that he would have to

continually repeat this advice to nearly every commentator or critic that he would run across during the remaining fifty-odd years of his life. We should be thankful that his Yankee patience and stubbornness would take care of any premonitions, just as these traits carried him through countless philosophical debates.

Dewey provides a summary of the guiding psychological methodology:

The object of the science of psychology is to take the concrete manifestations of mind, to analyze them and to explain them by connecting them with each other. We shall regard the existing states as the result of the action of certain processes upon a certain raw material. We shall consider, first, the raw material; second, the processes by which this raw material is worked up or elaborated; and third, the concrete forms of consciousness, the actual ideas, emotions, and volitions which result from this elaboration. The first two accordingly correspond to nothing which has separate independent existence, but are the result of scientific analysis. The actual existence is, in all cases, the third element only, that of result. [p. 26]

The different sorts or stages of knowledge are the result of the processes of apperception working on the raw material of sensation. Feeling, as the invariable accompaniment of the mental activities, can be differentiated as resulting from these same processes, starting from the original simple pains and pleasures up to the highest moral judgements. Will has as its materials the sensuous impulses, which are organized into desires, which in turn becomes motives to further self-development in the moral and religious life.

Absolute consciousness

Dewey has reformulated the three types of consciousness used in his *Mind* articles. The universal consciousness is the universal content of consciousness (knowledge), the individual consciousness is the particular effect of consciousness (feeling), while the absolute consciousness is the necessary activity underlying the other two types of consciousness (will). We can immediately draw some conclusions. By Dewey's inexorable logic, if the universal consciousness is just the objective content of consciousness, and if this objective content is but an abstraction from concrete experience, then universal consciousness cannot have any fundamental existence. Its existence relies on the logically prior existence of self-consciousness/absolute consciousness.

This profoundly affects the question of Dewey's fundamental position on consciousness: does he hold the emergence or the reproduction theory? The answer must be, given his reliance on reproduction in the *Psychology*, and given the impossibility of universal consciousness existing independently from conscious experience, that Dewey is clinging to a contradictory position. Green's theory of reproduction did not suffer from this contradiction, as it held that the universal consciousness existed independently of, and logically prior to, individual consciousness. Reproduction can at least take place, although it raises many other important questions that Dewey would pursue in later publications. Now, Dewey rejected the dualistic tendencies of Green's theory, and declared, first in the *Mind* articles and then in the introductory chapters of the *Psychology*, that both the

universal and the individual are but two aspects of a more fundamental consciousness. However, what then of reproduction? The term seems entirely inappropriate, and on further reflection even seems to be the marker for the retention of a theory of the origin of individual experience that Dewey professes to no longer hold.

Dewey is trying to accomplish two things at the same time, which is causing all of this confusion. First, Dewey has no problems with the enterprise of experimental psychology. His textbook differs in the main very little from those of his contemporaries, save that Dewey could not present any results from independent research. It does have its own peculiarities, one of which is the emphasis on apperception-theory that marks Dewey as leaning towards the Kantian/Herbartian/Wundtian tradition of psychology, and another of which is Dewey's theory of impulses, desires, and motives which reveals his debt to Green. Second, Dewey is trying to avoid the two main metaphysical positions resulting from psychology: the British and the Kantian. They share a flirtation with subjective idealism and a reliance on the thing-in-itself, since they regard all consciousness as individual consciousness and then ponder with little success how such a consciousness could know how its origins involve something beyond consciousness.

The reproduction theory of Green is an attempt to combine the two. The recipe is to take the British/Kantian subjective consciousness and add to it the Hegelian absolute consciousness; since relations are the basic components of both, there can be an exchange through duplication. But this recipe bakes two cakes with a layer of

suspicious filling. Dewey appreciates Green's notion that relations and relating activities are the commonality which permits the transmission of in-coming information and out-going practical work. Morris instilled such respect for synthetic relations from the start, as an answer to Trendelenburg's demand that there must be a common ground for the individual organism and the external world to meet and "converse". Trendelenburg's answer was motion, while Morris' was synthesizing spirit. Dewey in the *Psychology* embarks upon his answer: active experience. But if, as Dewey states, consciousness is always knowledge, feeling, and will, where should the line be drawn to distinguish us from ultimate reality? The limits of our bodies will not do, nor does Dewey want to adopt Green's answer that we are all of that consciousness which has feelings attached to it, leaving another kind of consciousness which is purely intellectual/volitional.

We should be only finite subsets of absolute consciousness, lest we be Dewey's God. Does the conscious experience which I have exhaust all of reality? This question would raise a protest from Green and Dewey as it seems to presuppose this "I" business, and uses an individualized notion. Yet Dewey and Green talk about the self, which is what the question is referring to. My self is conscious, and we need to know if that self is co-extensive with all of reality. Dewey dodged this question in the first *Mind* article, preferring to ask another, "are the universal and individual consciousnesses identical?" Dewey was able to distinguish these, but has now re-merged them into self-consciousness/concrete experience. Reproduction makes some sense when there is an original and a copy. It makes more sense if a finite mind

needs copies of external reality to attain knowledge. But how far has Green really come from Locke's notion that some simple ideas can be copies of features of reality?

Dewey did not want to suffer from Green's problems, but created one of his own: the self must be finite, yet infinite. The self would be infinite if it could recognize no boundaries to itself, and finite if it can. Dewey criticizes other philosophers when they say that the self is finite, on the grounds that knowledge of a boundary implies knowledge that something exists beyond, which then requires knowledge of something which is not in consciousness, which is contradictory. Dewey complains about other psychologists when they fail to realize that the external world, which is undoubtedly required in their psychological explanations of the origin of experience, must be always in consciousness all the while, even if the experience is their own. In the *Mind* articles Dewey seemed to be heading towards the theory that the only way to resolve all this is to see that there are different kinds or forms of consciousness, which require each other to make sense. The individual consciousness can have an origin out of materials provided through the participation of universal consciousness; the universal consciousness gains a participatory role only as its contents are differentiated from the contents of individual consciousness. These notions require each other for meaning, and do not have a meaning without the other.

The individual can be seen as finite and growing, while the universal is independent from the individual. But this independence is only a relative independence, as both the individual and the universal must be in consciousness.

There must be a more fundamental consciousness out of which the other two may emerge, in, for example, a psychology. And this consciousness is nothing other than the consciousness of a psychologist! It is not the consciousness of an all-seeing God or an all-pervasive nature. It is the everyday consciousness of normal adult experience. According to Dewey, every day we see ourselves as finite yet infinite. Finite, because we believe ourselves to be bounded by a physical reality surrounding us. Infinite, because we *know* this physical reality and in so doing we have it in our consciousness. Locke and Kant agreed that just because we can have some knowledge of external reality does not mean that *all* of its reality is bound up inextricably with consciousness and unable to exist without it. But Dewey has taken the neo-idealist stand that it is impermissible to hold that anything could have an existence beyond consciousness. He has also taken the stand that this consciousness is not that of the Hegelian Absolute, but rather is simply the self-consciousness we are intimately familiar with. We can sympathize with Dewey's attraction to the reproduction theory, as it would rescue him from "personal pantheism," or being the self that is all of ultimate reality. But on Dewey's own principles, he avoids dualism at the cost of becoming God. Psychology has been traditionally a subjective idealism imbedded in a dualism. Dewey is trying to further imbed this scheme into a monism. The subjective is preserved as the individual, and the dualism is retained as the individual/universal distinction. But these are just manifestations of the more fundamental absolute and concrete self-consciousness.

Dewey, needless to say, has a lot of explaining to do in the body of the *Psychology*. While Dewey states that his primary intent is to keep focus on the unitary nature of consciousness, reminding us that knowledge, feeling, and will are bound up with every experience, the selected method of treatment fails to accomplish this. By examining experience under the three aspects separately, there are two results: it is not clear what the materials and the mental processes are, and there is too much confusing overlap and duplication. With judicious explication, we can attempt to understand the complicated theory of mind Dewey is trying to establish.

II. The Stages of Knowledge

Dewey devotes chapter three to sensations, chapter four to mental processes, and chapters five through nine to the five stages of knowledge which result from the processes. Throughout this treatment Dewey drops all mention of reproduction, and until the last chapter on intuition, no mention is made of individual or universal consciousness. A neo-occasionalistic dualism standpoint is maintained, exemplified by numerous statements. For example,

A sensation is psychical; it is a consciousness; it not only exists, but it exists for the self. The changes in the nervous system, including the brain, are purely physical; they are objective only, and have no conscious existence for themselves. [p. 34]

The nervous change is not, properly speaking, the cause of the sensation, nor is the sensation the passive result of an impression. A sensation is not the simple affection of the soul by some bodily change, although the affection is a necessary prerequisite to sensation. The sensation is the state developed out of and by the soul itself upon occasion of this affection. [p. 42]

The world exists undoubtably absolutely without any dependence upon the individual minds which know it, but which are merely born into it. [p. 140]

Dewey does not attribute to God the required power to occasion the soul's response to physical events. This power resides with the soul. Dewey rejects any dualism which denies the existence of any relations holding between the activity of the body and the soul; such a position would reject the very possibility of experimental psychology and is shown to be false with the physiological studies proving the close correlations between nervous activity and mental events. [p. 38]

Materialism cannot apply to mental entities because they lack the requisite qualities: spatiality, motion, form, etc. Also, a cause-and-effect explanation can occur only when there is a "quantitative identity" between the proposed cause and effect, but a state of consciousness cannot be quantitatively measured. Furthermore, any material object is known only through mind, and cannot be used in turn to explain mind. Dewey is here repeating the argument of his first publication, "The Metaphysics of Materialism," where mind is shown to be at least as fundamental as matter, and hence matter cannot swallow up or account for the mental.

Dewey expresses his commitment to a Leibniz/Kant psychology as he delineates the responsibilities of sensations. All knowledge of nature and of self begins with sensation: "out of the stuff of sensations, upon them as data, are built both the world as known and the self as existing...Without it the self would remain forever unrealized, a mere bundle of capacities." [p. lxxvii] Locke is represented also, as sensation is the result of motion upon the senses and thus all the senses are just basically different sorts of touching. Dewey then adds an all-important qualifier: the bodily senses must also be engaged in activity for proper sensation to result.

No organ can be purely passive, even physically speaking, in sensation. It must adjust itself to the stimulus...The tympanum of the ear must be stretched; the eye-lenses must be accommodated, and the two eyes converged, and each must have muscular connections.... Thus the activities of our own body and those of external bodies are indissolubly associated from the first. [p. lxix]

This psychological principle supports Dewey's contention that volitional activities are ever-present in experiences, even of the most fundamental sort. Dewey also reminds us that sensations are feelings, in the most general sense. The remainder of the chapter is a concise summary of research on sensation in psychology, and only a few issues deserve brief mention. Dewey agrees with Lotze's controversial theory of "local signs," which explains how the mind knows where a stimulus occurs, despite the fact that the resulting sensation seems stripped of spatial cues, having only a quality, intensity, etc. Dewey rejects the Wundtian innervation theory, where the

feeling of muscular exertion is due to an ability to feel out-going energy to the muscles, and instead agrees with the opposing theory that such a feeling is due to sensory nerves picking up the tensions, stretches, etc. of the muscles against surrounding tissues. [p. lxxi] This position was also held by James, from his 1880 "The Feeling of Effort" onward.

Apperception

Chapter four, "Processes of Knowledge," is four times the length of the average chapter, and far more complicated. Making matters worse, the scheme of headings can obscure and obstruct its reading. Even by omitting the last level of headings (save during the significant topic of habit), and supplying a couple of missing headings at divisions, the outline of the fourth chapter of the first (1886) edition remains forbidding.

4	Chapter Four: Processes of Knowledge
4.1	1] The Nature of the Problem
4.1.1	I. The Nature of the Known World
4.1.1.1	(1) A world of related objects
4.1.1.2	(2) Relations
4.1.1.3	(3) Ideal elements
4.1.2	II. The Nature of the Knowing Self
4.2	2] Apperception
4.2.1	I. The Problem of Apperception
4.2.2	II. Kinds of Apperception
4.3	3] Association
4.3.1	I. Definition of Association
4.3.1.1	1. Positive conditions
4.3.1.2	2. Negative conditions

- 4.3.2 **II. Forms of Associating Activity**
- 4.3.2.1 **I. Simultaneous Association**
- 4.3.2.1.1 1. Sensations from one organ are fused
- 4.3.2.1.2 2. Sensations occurring through various organs are also fused
- 4.3.2.2 **II. Successive Association**
- 4.3.2.2.1 1. Association by Contiguity
- 4.3.2.2.1.1 1. Only one idea in the mind
- 4.3.2.2.1.2 2. Re-presentation
- 4.3.2.2.1.3 3. Forms of Contiguous Association
- 4.3.2.2.1.3.1 i. Spatial association
- 4.3.2.2.1.3.2 ii. Temporal contiguity
- 4.3.2.2.2 2. Redintegration by Similarity
- 4.3.2.2.2.1 1. Conditions
- 4.3.2.2.2.1.1 i. Varying concomitants
- 4.3.2.2.2.1.2 ii. Analogy of Feeling
- 4.3.2.2.2.2 2. Forms
- 4.3.2.2.2.2.1 i. Association by resemblance
- 4.3.2.2.2.2.2 ii. Association by contrast
- 4.3.2.2.2.2.3 iii. Assimilation
- 4.3.3 **III. The Function of Association in Psychological Life**
- 4.3.3.1 **Habit**
- 4.3.3.2 **Illustration**
- 4.3.3.3 **Habit as Automatic and Mechanical**
- 4.3.3.4 **The Two-fold end of Habit**
- 4.3.3.4.1 (1) Adjustment to permanent conditions
- 4.3.3.4.2 (2) Frees higher functions for learning
- 4.4 **4] Dissociation**
- 4.4.1 **I. Relation to Association**
- 4.4.1.1 1. Connection of Likeness
- 4.4.1.1.1 1. Simultaneous association
- 4.4.1.1.2 2. Successive association
- 4.4.1.2 2. The Points of Opposition between Association and Dissociation
- 4.4.2 **II. The Conditions of Dissociation**
- 4.4.2.1 1. Natural Value
- 4.4.2.1.1 1. Quantity
- 4.4.2.1.2 2. Tone
- 4.4.2.2 2. Acquired Value
- 4.4.2.2.1 1. Interest of Familiarity

4.4.2.2.1.1	i. Repetition
4.4.2.2.1.2	ii. Recentness
4.4.2.2.2	2. Novelty
4.4.3	III. Function of Dissociation in Psychological Life
4.5	5] Attention
4.5.1	I. Attention as a Selecting Activity
4.5.2	II. Attention as an Adjusting Activity
4.5.3	III. Attention as a Relating Activity
4.5.3.1	1. Identity, or Unification
4.5.3.2	2. Difference or Discrimination
4.6	6] Retention
4.6.1	I. The Implication of Retention in Apperception
4.6.2	II. Apperception as Necessary to Retention
4.6.3	III. Nature of Retention

The task for psychology is to describe the processes which will transform the sensuous materials into self-consciousness. "The best way of approaching this study will be to ascertain what some of the general characteristics of the known world and known self are, and by comparing these characteristics with those of sensations, find out what gap it is which the processes are to bridge over." [p. 75] One could hardly read in this statement anything other than the intention to proceed using the transcendental method of Kant. The modes of activity of the self are to be determined by looking to the inadequacies of sensations to form the varied sorts of self-conscious experiences, so that a mental activity must be postulated to supply the missing factor and transform sensations into experience. Dewey finds four basic inadequacies; three associated with our knowledge of the world, and one with our

knowledge of the self. [p. 75-77] *First*, we know objects which are always continuously in one orderly space and time, which together we call the universe or cosmos. *Second*, we know relations/laws which are real and permanent in the universe. This sort of metaphysical realism fits perfectly with absolute idealism. It also permits science, which goes beyond ordinary knowledge in that it seeks to discover all laws and then attempts to reduce them to one underlying unifying law. *Third*, knowledge is always of the "ideal". Dewey is relying on a theory of psychical entities in which they always have two aspects: existence and ideality (meaning, significance, universality). *Fourth*, the self is more than a bundle of sensations; it is a learning and growing entity.

Dewey finds only two different processes required to account for these features of knowledge. "Apperception may be defined, at the outset, as *the reaction of mind by means of its organized structure upon the sensuous material presented to it*. Retention is *the reaction of the apperceived content upon the organized structure of the mind*." [p. 78] There are three stages of apperception. Association is the mind connecting sensations into larger wholes. [p. 83] Dissociation occurs when the mind, while associating, emphasizes some sensuous elements and neglects others. [p. 105] Attention is relatively active association, where due to some interest or goal the mind exerts greater control over the association process, so that sensations are united "*into one whole, with reference to their ideal significance; that is, with reference to the relation which they bear to some intellectual end*." [p. 117-118] These processes are postulated entities, designed to explain knowing self-consciousness. Dewey finds that there are

five stages of knowledge which require explanation: perception, memory, imagination, thinking, and intuition. Along the way Dewey at every turn appeals to familiar neo-idealist arguments to justify the steps taken.

We can notice first that Dewey distinguishes association and dissociation from attention. The former two are "mechanical," while the latter is teleological. After Kant, the question of which mental processes were under the reign of the self's purposes was central. Many, following Kant, separated the intellectual mental activities from the practical. However, Dewey did not relegate the practical intellect to only the ethical realm. The voluntaristic standpoint, of which instrumentalism is but a refinement, finds in much intellectual activity an essential teleological and selective element. Dewey clearly places himself in this camp, and hence his position has been rightly called "voluntaristic idealism". It differs from Morris' type of voluntaristic idealism in that Morris only remotely saw purposive action in intellectual processes and never elaborated on any details, preferring to stress the moral duties arising from the connections between the individual and God. From Wundtian voluntarism, Dewey has access to the details he packs into the *Psychology*.

Some of these details deserve mention. Association must "fuse" into one whole experience all concurrent sensations, regardless of their sensory origin. Two factors permit changing experience; the sensations themselves alter over time, and the self which is performing the association also alters. Dewey is relying on the central factor of apperception: when a sensation is fused into the whole self, it alters the whole to some degree. Thus altered, the self will apperceive differently from then on. "The

self, in its *specific* character, in short, is changed by every experience through which it passes." [p. lxxv] Since it can happen that a degree of similarity can hold between a present apperceptive act and one in the past, successive association (also called representation or redintegration) also happens, for "when any associating activity recurs, all elements which have been previously involved in it, recur also." [p. lxxvi] This stage permits the next, which is the formation of habits. Habits are "all that is mechanical in the life of the soul....a connection of ideas or acts that, if one be presented, the rest of the series follow without the intervention of consciousness or the will." [p. 100] Habit

arises when the association has been so often performed that one act not only serves as a sign to consciousness that the next must be performed, but when the sign has become fused with the act signified....So in the formation of the act of walking, the various acts necessary for its performance no longer form separate successive members of a series, but the end of one is the beginning of another. [p. 101]

The rejection of the serial for the continuous here is the key to understanding the progress Dewey has been making from the "Soul and Body" towards "The Reflex Arc Concept". Even in the most mechanical and unconscious arena of the mind Dewey sees wholes made from parts. The advantages of habit-formation are easy to enumerate; they allow easy dealings with the more permanent features of the environment, and thus frees up higher mental activities for the "power of adaption to new circumstance, the ability to grow." [p. 103]

Dissociation prepares the mind for attention, by allowing the mind to concentrate on some natural features of experience. The greater the intensity, duration, or frequency of sensations, or the greater the pleasurable or displeasurable the feeling of the sensation, the more easily will the mind be spontaneously attracted to the emphasis of these over other more neutral sensations during the apperceptive processes. [p. 108-109] In addition, sensations can have acquired features. These features are due to the fact that through redintegration, sensations will relate to varying degrees with various portions of previous experience. For the aspect with which there is much for it to relate to, it acquires the feeling of satisfaction and familiarity, which in turn provokes the emphasis of this element during dissociation. For the aspect with which it relates to little, it acquires the feeling of unrest and unlikeness, and also provokes emphasis during dissociation. Either way, the mind has "acquired interest".

Interest

Dewey has explicitly connected a coherence theory with interest:

The new experience will harmonize with some past experiences, and be incongruous with others. There will be on the one hand a feeling of fitness, of satisfaction, which will lead the mind to be content with the connection, and on the other hand a feeling of unrest which will lead the mind to investigate the relations of the two. [p. 110]

This interest will in later stages permit the intellectual comprehension of past experiences and allows future directed mental growth. Dewey then proceeds to attention. He notes that "attention" can be used in a broad sense as synonymous with any mental activity, but in this section he will use it in the more specific sense to distinguish it from the mechanical (and hence non-purposive) mental processes. The notions of control and goal-orientation operate at this level of attention, along with the more familiar meaning of "will". As we saw in its definition, attention involves two new elements: ideal meaning and significance, and intellectual goals. It is no accident that these two factors are involved in the same mental process. Interests from the last stage will serve as the goals, while meaning exists precisely when there is no mere sensation being experienced, but an integrated whole formed out of the sensation plus all of the reintegrated elements it provoked. Briefly put, attention uses meanings to select materials from experience in order to realize interests. [p. 118-119] The key for the transition to mere interest in harmony/disharmony to a goal which looks to the future is this: "attention always selects with reference to some end which the mind has in view, some difficulty to be cleared up, some problem to be solved, some idea to be gained, or plan to be formed." [p. 119]

Dewey is giving the notion of a mental goal its content by linking harmony/disharmony with problem solving. The self acquires its goals by noting coherence or incoherence and then aims to eliminate the incoherencies by somehow using the coherencies. Put another way, since the mind is continually striving to determine if a new experience will mesh with itself, we can redescribe this process

by saying that the mind is goal-directed towards finding out how well a new experience can be idealized and given meaning. It will always gain meaning, but there are degrees of meaningfulness. The mind acquires an interest in attentively attempting to figure out how to make an experience harmonize as much as possible. "Its aim is to see every fact as dependent upon every other fact, or all as members of one organic unity." [p. 127] If a stage of mind cannot deal with an experience successfully, then it becomes a problem at the next level. Dewey is quick to point out that actually there are some similarities and differences among minds as to which sorts of experiences will be harmonized. All minds seek knowledge, but there are different kinds of knowledge. The minds of an artist, a botanist, and a farmer will pay attention to different elements of the experience of a plant because they have different intellectual goals (differing kinds of meaningfulness). As we shall see, the philosopher is the one who is interested in the highest level of knowledge: the harmonious unification of all fields of knowledge.

The concept of adjustment plays an important role here. [p. 122-123] We can see the attentive interests of the mind as trying to adjust to unexpected and poorly harmonized experiences. If such an experience occurs but once, the mind takes little interest at first, but will anticipate for a while a repeat occurrence using the most similar past experiences to give it some meaning, however little. Repeated occurrences will heighten interest and thus raise the attention level, which is to say nothing except that the mind will be better prepared for the attempt at a more complete integration. This attempt will be performed with two activities of attentive

comparison: one for unification, and the other for discrimination. They are like fusion, except they are at the intellectual level instead of the sensual experience level. The mind can simultaneously consider two mental contents to find their similar and dissimilar elements. Similarity will produce a relation of meaning for the two, while a dissimilarity will permit the two to remain separate in consciousness.

Dewey summarizes apperception:

We saw that a sensuous presentation gets meaning by its connection with past experiences given by the mind reading itself into the sensation. We now see that this connection is twofold. The process of adjustment consists in bringing the past experiences to bear upon the present so as to unify it with those ideal elements which resemble it, and separate it from those which are unlike. These two processes necessarily accompany each other, so that, while the goal of knowledge is complete unity, or a perfectly harmonious relation of all facts and events to each other, this unity shall be one which shall contain the greatest possible amount of specification, or distinction within itself. [p. 130]

Unity within difference is possible using relations only if a relation permits experiences of individual objects while providing universal relations between them.

Retention is the corollary to apperception. If the self can affect sensations, this apperception of sensations can affect the self. An infant is born with a few inherent instincts to organize experience from the start, and then apperception takes over to re-mould the self as well as the sensations. [p. 131] Where are our past experiences?

Our past experiences have no more *actual* existence. They are gone with the time in which they occurred. They have, however, *ideal* existence, existence as wrought into the character of the self, and as fixing its definite nature, and this is what we mean by retention.... Retention organizes the mind in certain directions; that is, it gives it organs for certain kinds of activity. [p. 132, 133]

The use of the term "organ" allows us to see that Dewey is using the organic metaphor to understand the mind. Just as the cooperation of the body's organs permit all bodily activities, the mind's mental organs (functions, powers, abilities, etc.) must cooperate for the different stages of knowledge.

Judgement, reasoning, and intuition

At the start of the next chapter on perception Dewey discusses the relations between the individual and the universal further.

Knowledge is, therefore, a self-developing process, one side of which results in the existence for consciousness of a world of things, events and relations, while the other side results in the organized or realized existence of mind....Knowledge...is universal, as manifested by the fact that it consists in the development of a known universe, and by the fact that even the individual self which knows get reality only as this universe is constructed in knowledge. [p. lxxviii]

These statements fit only the emergence theory, and not the reproduction theory. However, it is too close to Kantian psychology to suit Dewey, and he shifts ground:

The statement that knowledge is the construction by the mind of a universe must not be thought to mean that knowledge is arbitrary, or the universe a product of imagination, or of the processes of individual minds. It means that mind or intelligence is necessarily universal in its nature, and that the construction of the universe of knowledge is the necessary manifestation of this universal character of intelligence....The knowledge of the finite individual is the process by which the individual reproduces the universal mind, and hence makes real for himself the universe, which is eternally real for the complete, absolutely universal intelligence, since involved in its self-objectifying activity of knowledge. [p. lxxviii-lxxix]

Dewey seems to be placing all the weight of his position on a mere definition: since the mind is creating universal knowledge, and since "universal" *means* the same for all minds, then the individual can transcend the merely individual to attain knowledge of ultimate reality. The protest is easily made. How is Dewey so sure that the knowledge, which the individual unquestionably *takes* to be universal, is *really* universal? Even though the individual objectifies, can't this objectification still be possibly an illusion? Kant was not so sure, as he settled for the position that at least we are all going to have the same universal knowledge, given his assumption that the central mental processes are basically the same for all. Dewey gives far more liberty to mental processes, but in so doing seems to be retreating back to Locke, who assumed that all individuals were at least able to have the same sorts of experiences from the same external reality, and thus achieve universal knowledge. If this is so, then Dewey really does not ultimately accept a coherence theory of truth. Coherence operates at the individual mental level. The ultimate guarantor of truth is rather a

correspondence between universal reality and the individual's coherent objectifications. The reproduction theory invites a correspondence theory of truth, and Dewey has adopted it.

The stages of knowledge are then seen as stages of correspondence accuracy. Perception, memory, and imagination are the basic stages. Perception objectifies an external world of things and events and thus distinguishes the internal individual from this realm. Memory is the result of the active reconstruction of data, where attention is fixed on some features of present experience so that they can provoke redintegrations, until the desired ideal element is brought out, and recollection takes place. Imagination allows the mind to attentively consider the ideal features of experience without assuming that they are really existing in the world, or in one's past memories. Thinking allows the formation of judgements and inferences. Intuition, the pinnacle of knowledge, is where the philosopher resides to understand the entire scheme. A philosopher describing the highest sort of knowledge will usually be writing a private journal of the course of all of their own speculations, and Dewey is no exception.

The chapter on thinking deserves close attention. The prior stages have permitted conceptions. Every mental state can thus be more than just a mere existence in the mind. It also has meaning, and when we refer to a mental state's meaning, we can call it a concept. A concept is not tied down to any particular -- it is universal. Also, it is not a particular itself, like an image. Images are mere existing mental states, abstracted from their meaning. The meaning of an image is

the conception. The dual nature of ideas, as mere psychological images and as relational meanings, is stressed by Bradley.⁶ Dewey relies on it to avoid the dangers of associationism, since a mere psychological existence, independent of relations, cannot be a part of experience.

The perception of man is referred to some present sensation; it is the idealization of this sensation, so that it symbolizes a present reality. The conception of man is not tied down to any particular object; the sensation which is its basis is idealized so that it symbolizes any and every man....it refers to all men because it *means* all men; it is universal through its ideal element, or what it points to, not from its existence. [p. lxxx]

This "pointing" is the key to the nature of concepts. Dewey says that conception is the "*apperception of the apperceptive process.*" [p. 180] The self is able to attentively consider idealizing activity going on from lower levels. A concept is just such idealizing activity, reaching conscious recognition. The mind recognizes that the concept goes far beyond mere sensuous existence, and brings to attention possible existence instead of actual existence. The mind can now make better use of the ability to attentively focus on one or another feature of that conception, and those of others at the same time. The former is called abstraction or analysis, while the latter is comparison or synthesis. "When any one element or aspect of an image has been isolated the mind does not stop short with the bare abstract universal thus reached, but immediately proceeds to impose this upon its other images, or to find it in them." [p. 181] The mind is never content with the attainment of abstract ideas,

but always tries to find this ideality in other experiences. Success enhances these other experiences, but, due to apperception, the concept itself will also become more significant. This increase is the growth of knowledge, as the mind proceeds from individual to individual, using first analysis and then synthesis in turn. "With all increase of abstract analysis, or widening of extension, goes increase of synthetic connection, or deepening of intension." [p. 183]

All that is needed to make a judgement out of a conception is to consider the concept as actually referring to reality. Concepts were created by freeing ideal meanings from any reference to reality, but judgement introduces such reference. This reference must be identified, so in the judgement it is specified by the subject, while the concept is the predicate. This means that judgement is both analytic and synthetic. It is analytic in that it requires the recognition of a difference or distinction between the subject and predicate, while it is synthetic as it also affirms an identity or connection between the subject and predicate. [p. 188]

Judgements can additionally be found to be true or false by the mind.

From a psychological standpoint a judgement is called true when it harmonizes with all other judgements; false when it is in some contradiction to some other. Suppose, for example, an individual interprets a distant cloud as a mountain. The judgement is false, because it does not agree with other judgements which he would be forced to make about the presentation with growing knowledge of it. [p. 190]

This example is remarkable because Dewey goes beyond mere individual psychological truth, which is always due to harmonious relations, and instead refers to a judgement's "absolute" truth. Here Dewey says that such trans-individual truth is based on a harmony amongst present *and future* judgements. This notion is a definite portion of the scaffolding for instrumentalism.

Doubt (or suspension of belief) will attach to a judgement when there is some disharmony, and disbelief will attend a judgement when there is complete disharmony. From this position, Dewey can reject the possibility of total skepticism, since doubt or disbelief requires the existence of other beliefs. "Denial must be the result of some affirmation." [p. 191]

Reasoning can now take place. Its nature can be seen when, given the proceeding exposition, we understand that knowledge can never be "immediate". Indeed, at every stage of mental activity, experience is mediated. Only at the hypothetical level of sensation can there be immediate entities, but as Dewey reminds us, these entities are as far from being states of knowledge as possible. "All knowledge implies, in short, a going beyond what is sensuously present to its connection with something else, and it is this act of going beyond the present which constitutes the mediate factor." [p. 192] Reasoning is possible because the mind can attentively consider the mediating elements which make judgements possible. Reasoning is typically implicit, as in judgements like "This fire will burn." We can make such a judgement only by reasoning: we are recognizing in one experience a factor (analyzing), connecting it with recalled experiences (synthesizing), and then

turning our attention to other factors which are attached to these recalled experiences. The fire is bright, there have been past bright things, many of those bright things also are hot, therefore this bright fire is also hot fire. This procedure relies on past experiences; limited past experiences will cause error in judgement for a child: "If all bodies which he had thrown in [water] had sunk he would conclude that a piece of cotton would sink likewise." [p. 193] We do not usually notice the reasoning process, instead concentrating on the particular experience before us. But when we do, we can explicitly reason as we pay attention to the universal, connecting, synthesizing factor mediating experiences. Every judgement will have both a universal and a particular element.

This explains the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. We can now see that they are not really two different kinds of knowledge, but are rather just two necessary stages in the development of knowledge.

Empirical knowledge goes from one particular to another by means of the universal element which connects them, but is not conscious of the universal element. Reason recognizes the universal element, the relation, and uses it to connect one particular, one fact, with another....*A posteriori* knowledge is simply the *unconscious* recognition of the universal element, or relation, the ideal significance; *a priori* knowledge is the conscious recognition of it. [p. 195]

Armed with these two elements of knowledge, there can be two kinds of reasoning. Deduction occurs when a universal is imposed upon a particular, as in the fire example above. Induction occurs when the mind finds the relations, the

connections, between hitherto distinct experiences and thus discovers the universal. This is the synthesizing ability of the mind, already mentioned, when it is under conscious attentive control. We can see the activities of the mind in a new light. The mind is always analyzing, yet always uses the products of analysis to synthesize as many other experiences as possible. Thus there is no gap between "fact" and "law". The particular fact is in self-consciousness only because it has meanings, and the universal law is just one of those meanings. Fact and law are but two ways of looking at the same mental state. "When we abstract its particular aspect, its definite side, we regard it as fact; when we abstract its universal side, its relation of identity, we regard it as meaning or law." [p. 199] All knowledge is of individual entities, which consists of the combination of the particular and the universal elements, and these elements cannot exist independently of the individual. The sensation is what we mean by the isolated particular, and while there is no single name for the isolated universal, Dewey has in mind Kant's analytic categories (analytic until given content to synthesize).

Science is marked by the separation of the sciences, which each take a portion of the world to study. Mind demands complete harmonious interrelatedness among all knowledge, and so the task of the philosopher is to attempt a synthesis of all of the knowledge of the sciences. With this statement Dewey has echoed Morris', and Trendelenburg's dreams for philosophy. What remains is to describe the ultimate act of knowledge which is required to make this dream a reality. Such an act is the "intuition".

Intuition is just the knowledge of an individual, but with intuition we "apperceive" that we have such knowledge. This requires the attentive awareness that we use both perception and reasoning when we know individual things. Intuition is usually used to describe an immediate sort of knowledge, but Dewey replaces this with its exact opposite, as intuition is the most mediated sort of knowledge possible. The problem confronting knowledge at such a refined level, using the really large-scale universals (like "the physical world"), is that at some point the mind is going to run out of things to relate. There are basically three such entities which cannot easily be related, because it is hard to see where to get something beyond it to relate it to. They are the world, the self, and God. Knowledge at this level is the grasping of the whole, of seeing all of the relations holding throughout each realm. Dewey's notion of the intuition is just a re-cast version of Hegel's Idee -- the final concept which captures all truth.

The world consists of objects in space and time, which due to their motion have dynamic relations of cause and effect, which in turn provides the laws of nature. When all summed up the world is seen as a harmonious individual encompassing the physical realm. Similarly the self consists of all of its stages of mental activity, each leading up to the next, culminating in the intuition of the self also as a harmonious whole. When it is considered that the world and the self are just correlates of the same process, that process as ultimately completed must be God.

Neither the world nor the knowing self can be called truly self-related. The world gets its existence as known only because of its relations to the activity of the intelligence knowing; the intelligence knowing becomes a definite actuality only through the relations which it puts forth in construing the world. The true self-related must be the organic unity of the self and the world, of the ideal and the real, and this is what we know as God....Every concrete act of knowledge involves an intuition of God. [p. 212]

Dewey has painted himself into a corner. The only way for Dewey to avoid allowing the self to be or become God, is to find a way to individualize consciousness into many selves, one of which can be Dewey, and another can be me. Then Dewey's self can expand without being God, but only if it is assumed that there already exists an outer realm of reality. Such a reality would be God, and as Dewey's knowledge grows, Dewey's self is reproducing (through incorporation) the universal content of God. Such a self would be two things at once: it would be a part of God, but also would be an original creation.

The explanation for Dewey's assumption that this sort of a God exists might come from Green, whose reasonings on these matters went as follows. I am objectifying a known world, but in a slow process of learning. That world looks like a harmonious whole, but I don't have all of the pieces nor know all of the relations. Furthermore, it is undeniable that I am growing in knowledge of this world. The only explanation of these facts must be that there is a harmonious whole really existing right now, which is beyond my present consciousness. Potentially, I could know it all, but practically, I will not. Such an interrelated whole depends on

universal relations, so all of reality must be mind. But it is not my mind, so it must be God's.

While Dewey does not explicitly portray such reasoning, it does account for his position. Dewey's self is similar to Green's self, and Green's God is similar to Dewey's God. Furthermore, both accounts rely on the notion of a completed understanding of everything, which hasn't been attained yet by any individual self but still really exists. We shall have to look to Dewey's account of the will for more light on these matters.

III. The Will

The second part of the *Psychology* involves feeling. Sensations, taken purely as feelings, are the building blocks of the higher emotions. Much of Dewey's exposition here is either a repetition of material from earlier chapters, or too *ad hoc* and simplistic to take very seriously, but a few passages deserve attention. After taking a look at feeling we will move on to the will.

Feeling

Feeling is generally the side of a mental activity considered in abstraction from any intellectual factors. Feelings accompany all mental events and entities, and some play an important role in learning.

Dewey states that every mental activity can be considered as one of adjustment to a stimulus, as it always is either trying to achieve "conformity" with it, or is trying to make it depart. Accomplishment of either of these tasks results in a feeling of "harmony" and "reconciliation". [p. 229-230] When the mind takes a general interest in something, wonder results, which in turn leads to investigation, but this investigation is marked by "disinterestedness". Dewey has not contradicted himself here; disinterestedness is not the complete lack of all attentiveness and volition, but rather is "the surrender of all purely subjective and selfish interests." [p. 263] This issue figures in later disputes over instrumentalism, as many of its opponents wrongly accused it of demoting the lofty search for the truth to a hunt for mere personal satisfaction.

Dewey then discusses the feeling of interest and intellectual goals in general, and manages to reveal much more detail. Dewey states that while all intellectual activity is goal-oriented, the mind does not know what the goal is. If it did, there would be no need for going to the trouble of exerting mental efforts towards it.

We do not know what it is, but we dimly *feel* what it is; and we select material that *feels* congruous with this end, and reject that which *feels* unharmonious. The direction of all intellectual processes by feeling is very commonly overlooked, but it is fundamental. Our knowledge consists in giving feelings definite form and in projecting them. [p. 265]

This is a striking announcement, but even more astounding news follows from this. As logic consists of intellectual propositions which embody the science of investigation, and since investigation is regulated at every step by feelings, then "logic, in short, only generalizes and crystallizes what was originally existing in the form of feeling." [p. 265] Logic only comes into existence after all the real work has been performed by other mental activities. This implies that logic, as a set of propositions, is a product and is discovered, and cannot be fundamental. Logical principles are formed according to the various mental processes; it is not the case that mental processes must learn to conform to pre-conceived or pre-existing logical formulas. With this astounding singular paragraph on logic, Dewey has really set out on a new path of his own making. Dewey seems completely oblivious to the radical nature of this proposal, but he must have known that there awaited an entire field for reconstruction.

The stages of will

The materials for volition are the sensuous impulses; a sensuous impulse is the aspect of a sensation which compels a muscle response. It may not by itself cause such a response as it may be stopped or re-directed by volitional processes, but it is the material from which all other acts of will are produced. If a sensuous impulse is able to cause a physical response without any higher volitional/intellectual processes participating, it has triggered a reflex action. [p. 300-301] A mere sensuous impulse is not a volition, since it has been stripped of the characteristic which is

required of volitions: knowledge of the goal to be attained. Volitions are separated into the stages of desires and motives. The interactions of these stages will be responsible for the higher stages of physical control, prudential control, moral control, and the religious action.

Impulses are "blind" but quickly get transformed, as they are "attached" to sensations, which undergo the apperceptive processes towards knowledge. They are associated with other sensations so that objects are recognized as pleasurable or painful. "Desire and aversion are impulse *plus* respectively the idea of an object which satisfies or thwarts the impulse, as revealed to us by pleasure and pain." [p. 311] Desire is goal-oriented because the mind knows how to satisfy an impulse. Therefore it is not the case that we desire objects, like candy, because candy gives us pleasure. The correct account is that we first have the impulse and then the mind supplies the means to satisfy a particular impulse; the mind desires the candy because the candy has become associated with the satisfaction of that sort of impulse. [p. 311] As desires may conflict, choice is required; the chosen desire is now called a motive. Dewey does not offer an explanation of choice except to say that in choice the self has chosen an ideal for itself to become. Since the self has such control over its destiny, Dewey broadly says that self-realization is the only real goal of all volitional processes.

Physical control is gained by "experimentation": the various impulses have to be coordinated with the resulting experiences so that associations form between impulses and effective responses. Dewey here goes so far as to say that

The performance of the action is the existence of the will. The will is the concrete unity of feeling and intellect; the feeling carries us to a certain result, the intellect takes cognizance of this result, the end, and of the means to it, and now places this as a conscious motive or end in the feelings, and controls them thereby. The whole process is will. The intellectual operation of representing the means and the end, and the feeling which impels us to the end, have no separate existence. [p. 328]

The will is an actuality when three factors interrelate: impulses spur experimentation, intellect keeps track of the results, and feelings provoke the motivated search for coherence among the results.

At the next stage, that of prudential control, physical control becomes the means to the attainment of desires and the avoidance of harms. Desires are continually becoming more complicated, as experiences widen and deepen during learning. More complicated desires require more complicated means, which controlled experimentation strives to discover. This feeds a circle, which is the never ending growth of the self.

Ethical desires are aroused when it is realized that one's actions have an effect on one's own self-development, and can either help or hinder the striving for the ideal self. This ideal self is the perfect will, or God, and so the self is always striving to be God-like. The only good thing is the good will, and the good will is the one which strives to overcome its limitations towards perfection.

Dewey summarizes briefly the scheme at the conclusion of the book. No mention is made of reproduction. The will is the activity which is both subjective and

objective and unites the individual (feeling) with the universal (knowledge). The self progressively realizes that universal self which it postulates as ideal through the will's processes.

Dewey and Green

There are a large number of similarities between Dewey's *Psychology* and Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*. We have already seen where Green and Dewey agree concerning the rise of intellect out of sensations. One of Green's aims in the *Prolegomena* is to refute the notion that desire, intellect, and will are three separate functions which can interact but do not require each other. To do so, Green talks of how "instinctive impulses" are transformed into desires/motives which allow knowledge of impulse-fulfilling objects,⁷ and Green uses the term "feeling" interchangeably with impulse.⁸ Knowledge in turn requires desire.

In all exercise of the understanding desire is at work. The result of any process of cognition is desired throughout it. No man learns to know anything without desiring to know it. The presentation of a fact which does not on the first view fit itself into any of our established theories of the world, awakens a desire for such adjustment, which may be either by further acquaintance with the fact, or by a modification of our previous theories, or by a combination of both processes. The learner of course knows not how he will assimilate the strange fact till he has done so, but the idea of its assimilation as possible evokes his effort.⁹

Green distinguishes between speculative and practical thought¹⁰ but is quick to assert that they need each other to attain their truly common goal: the realization of desires. The most practical activity requires intellect, while even the most abstract cognitive pursuit at every turn requires the motivational desires involved at every step in learning. But at the fundamental level, will encompasses desire and intellect:

Will is then equally and indistinguishably desire and thought -- not however *mere* desire or *mere* thought....but desire and thought as they are involved in the direction of a self-distinguishing and self-seeking subject to the realization of an idea....The will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is.¹¹

Green does not equate will with the absolute consciousness, desire with the individual, or knowledge with the universal, but Dewey does not go far beyond Green when doing so. The major difference between Dewey and Green at the psychological level lies in Dewey's more elaborate understanding of mental processes, provided by experimental psychology. This understanding allows Dewey to cast the main supports for pragmatism while Green never advanced beyond the conclusions expressed above. Above all, Dewey had a deep comprehension of the learning process and believed it to be the very heart of mental activity. Dewey's pervasive examples of infants and children used to illustrate mental activity displays his respect for the principle, if one wants to understand a piece of knowledge, then seek to understand how it is learned. Dewey the educator was never far from Dewey the philosopher and psychologist.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. Robertson, G. Croom. "Review of Dewey's *Psychology*," p. 440. *Mind* o.s. 12 (1887): 439-443.
2. Hall, G.S. "Review of Dewey's *Psychology*." *American Journal of Psychology* 1 (1887): 154-159.
3. Torrey, H.A.P. "Review of Dewey's *Psychology*." *Andover Review* 9 (1888): 437-441.
4. Dewey to W.T. Harris, 17 December 1886, Harris Papers, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California.
5. See Ernest Hilgard's "The Trilogy of Mind: Cognition, Affection, and Conation," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 16 (1980): 107-117.
6. *The Principle of Logic*, pp. 2-9.
7. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 90-94, 123-127.
8. *ibid.*, p. 126-127.
9. *ibid.*, p. 138-139.
10. *ibid.*, p. 138, 140.
11. *ibid.*, p. 158.

Chapter Six

The Foundations of Instrumentalism

Many historians of philosophy...love to represent the history of thought as a continuous stream which carries down into each later age the accumulations of every earlier, and to represent every subsequent philosopher as having read and digested the wisdom of every predecessor....Hence the accepted history of philosophy is filled with mythical constructions.¹

F.C.S. Schiller, 1925

We have set out to argue for the following corrections to the standard account of Dewey's early philosophy. First, while clearly idealistic, Dewey's early philosophy shared little with the neo-Hegelian T.H. Green's philosophy and even less with Hegel's, because of its absorption of the Aristotelian organicism of George Morris. Second, the influence of Wundt's philosophy and psychology upon Dewey was far greater than that mentioned by the standard story. Third, due to this influence and that of Morris, Dewey upheld the indissoluble integration of cognitive and volitional processes independently of James's and others' efforts in that direction. Fourth, Dewey's revolutionary "The Reflex Arc Concept" in 1896 was the expression of his commitment to such an integration, and was not due to the influence of James. Fifth, and this is the most controversial claim, Dewey did not completely abandon his kind of idealism in order to complete his transition to instrumentalism in the 1890's. Rather, the foundations for instrumentalism made an early appearance in Dewey's idealist philosophy and instrumentalism itself remained enfolded in an idealism which held that experience and reality are identical.

The first three points are taken up in the first section, the fourth is discussed in the second section, and the fifth is examined in the third section.

I. Dewey's Type of Idealism

Dewey's early philosophy has been called functional idealism, voluntaristic idealism, and experimental idealism. These three types of idealism delineate Dewey's views on the nature of mind and can together adequately classify Dewey's early philosophy, so long as it is understood that the idealism is not of the subjective sort. There are many alternatives to subjective idealism, however; the nature of Dewey's metaphysics is determined by the relationships between mind and ultimate reality. On the topic of mind itself, Dewey early on distinguished his psychology from all others.

Functional, Voluntaristic, and Experimental Idealism

The doctrine that mind is inherently functional stems from the organic portrait of mind drawn by Morris; the essence of any portion of consciousness is decided by the purpose it serves for the entire whole. Dewey's beliefs concerning the purpose of the whole mind changed slowly over the years, from the reproduction of the eternal relations of the Reason of the Absolute, to the proper harmonization of organic desires with the occurrences of experience. Their juxtaposition informs the entire *Psychology*.

The tenet that mind is primarily volitional arrives from Morris, Wundt, and Green to varying degrees. It was principally Wundt who stressed the organic relationships holding between the senses, the mind proper, and the will. Morris

believed that knowledge was the result of activity, while Green kept the two further apart, preferring to stress the role of the will in ethical behavior. Green's account of learning does make reference to the role of practical activity, but it is poorly developed, and the role of motor volitions is uncertain. Dewey at first was closer to Green, seeing the volitional processes primarily as mere mental activity, as in apperception. In the *Psychology*, Dewey was willing to grant to muscular activity a far more important role in learning.

Morris would have liked to be classified as an experimentalist. His preferred term, "experientialist" stressed his belief that his idealism was surely founded upon ordinary experience. When Morris used the term "experimental" he meant to designate attention to the occurrences of ordinary experience, and it had no connection with actual experiment. As Dewey developed his voluntarism, the term "experimental" changed meaning to reflect the participation of practical activity in the knowledge processes. For Dewey, even the baby who attempts to coordinate the senses with motor actions is performing experiments, though of a very simple kind.

Other terms have been used to classify both Morris' and Dewey's philosophy. For example, "dynamic idealism" suits them both; it denotes the opposition taken to a static or passive picture of the mind. A colleague of Dewey's at Michigan, A.H. Lloyd, entitled a book *Dynamic Idealism*, indicating his close relationship with Morris and Dewey. "Personal idealism" was applied to Morris first, as he was part of the rising opposition (which included Andrew Seth) to the tendency of Hegelianism to destroy any individual teleology or personality, for either mankind or God. Dewey

quickly absorbed the tenet that the purposes of the individual largely define the individual and never relinquished the doctrine that any understanding of the nature or duties of the individual revolved around the goals, broadly construed, of the individual. Due to his heavy reliance on the "organic" metaphor, Dewey is also part of the larger movement called "organicism".² Dewey could even be called a "affective idealist" since Dewey held that all knowledge requires a contribution on the part of the feelings, emotions, and desires.

Dewey and Hegelianism

Marc Jones in his *George Sylvester Morris* repeatedly expresses his contempt for Wenley's interpretation of Morris in his earlier *The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris*. According to Jones, Wenley's depiction of Morris as a relatively orthodox Hegelian after 1878 is accurate only if Morris' debt to Trendelenburg and Aristotelian organicism is completely ignored. It is precisely this debt which animates Morris', and hence Dewey's, functionalism, voluntarism, and experimentalism. Unfortunately, Morton White relied heavily upon Wenley's account (Jones's book was published five years after White's) for information on Morris.³ White's Morris is thus a philosopher who is heavily indebted to Green's critiques of British empiricism, has no independent theory of reality, and no original psychology; Dewey subsequently gets infected with the same interpretation in Whites's account.

Another example of misinterpretation is how Wenley finds in Morris a complete disregard for the sciences. When this supposed lack of respect is transferred to

Dewey, it become mysterious how Dewey could have been attracted to experimental psychology and come to declare that psychology and philosophy are really the same enterprise. It is no surprise then that no one, least of all White, was interested in discovering the relationships between Dewey and Wundt. What made matters worse was that for a long time Wundt was considered as a mere associationist and hardly compatible with German idealism.

Geoffrey Thomas observes that it is with great peril that one affixes the label "Hegelian" to T.H. Green.⁴ If anything, Green is a neo-Kantian first; neo-Kantianism as a movement in both Germany and in England always incorporated three fundamental Hegelian corrections to Kant: the necessary elimination of the thing-in-itself, the required presence of the categories, the synthetic activities, in self-consciousness, and the identification of ultimate reality with the absolute eternal self-consciousness. In order to be more Hegelian than merely neo-Kantian, some took on other features of Kant, primarily including an acceptance of Hegel's dialectical logic or Hegel's vision of the absolute as the working out of the Dialectic. Green adopted none of these, and neither did Dewey. They went their separate ways quickly on the topic of the origins of knowledge after agreeing that synthetic relations are required for constituting experience. There was some overlap on the topic of the origin of motives and ethical duties, though Dewey was always critical of Green's ethical theory.⁵

The heart of the matter lies in Dewey's use of the peculiarly Greenian term "reproduction," and the nature of real relations. Green found reality to be ultimately

composed of real concrete universals. This metaphysical relational realism was for Green expressed in the dictum that "*esse is intelligi*". But as we saw, Dewey rejected both "*esse is percipi*" and "*esse is intelligi*" for "*esse is experiri*," where experience incorporates both perceptions and relations (and, in the *Psychology*, feelings and will). Green's absolute was purely cognitional, while Dewey, since he declared that consciousness was always composed of cognitional, emotive, and volitional elements, found Green's absolute to be a bare abstraction and hardly knowable.

Morris saw the person as a growing entity within a larger whole; Dewey adopted this view. But there is a basic choice which must be made next. Is the larger whole fixed and permanent, so that the person is going over pre-determined ground in the quest for knowledge and self-realization? Green's portrait of the absolute demands an affirmative answer to this question. But Dewey, following Morris, could not accept that answer. Morris' evangelical tendencies required that personal efforts make an creative and original difference to the overall functioning of the whole (God). Dewey similarly believed that ultimate reality was susceptible to human activities; this belief would later be manifested in Dewey's dictum that knowing, like any other experience, changed reality.⁶ What sense then is there in using a term like "reproduction" which so easily fits Green's theory of knowledge but not Dewey's?

The charitable mode of answering this question would suggest that Dewey was struggling for a way to express the notion that there are relations independent of the personal mind, and that this mind is learning how to create an adjustment of internal mental functions to these outer relations. Green saw the aim of reproduction as the

complete internalization of all of the absolute relations; such a theoretical result however would produce two separate minds. Dewey wants to avoid this dualistic result, insisting that as we know, we are really becoming the absolute. However, Dewey was not happy with this formulation and soon went beyond it.

There is one last matter which must be mentioned. It has become a canonical part of the standard account that the criticisms which Dewey made of Green in several articles from 1890 to 1894 signaled Dewey's disenchantment and eventual disengagement from absolute idealism. As Welchman has argued⁷ the standpoint behind these criticisms was largely in place when Dewey discussed Green in "Psychology as Philosophic Method." [EW 1: 153-154] Dewey never saw eye-to-eye with Green on fundamental matters, and the notion that Dewey's relationship with Green should be the key factor in determining Dewey's relationship with absolute idealism must be abandoned.

Dewey's re-examination of Green's moral theory did produce one alteration in Dewey's metaphysical views. Welchman shows that by the 1894 *The Study of Ethics* Dewey had abandoned the notion that the absolute consciousness had a fundamental purpose of its own. We know that Dewey, like Morris, was concerned that such a purpose could choke off personal freedom and purpose for human beings. Morris had achieved a satisfactory balance between God and mankind for his philosophy, but Dewey was not so sure. Welchman explains that

His was an idealism which was not committed to the existence of an overmind imposing itself on human selves, or to a teleological theory of the development of the universe....This he had done without abandoning all of the conceptions central to absolute idealism. For he maintained the absolute nature of consciousness, the dependence of relations on the activity of mind, identity in difference, the existence of concrete universals, and the denial of the real existence of temporal succession.⁸

We will not pursue the evolution of Dewey's metaphysical views farther here, leaving that for the last section.

Dewey and Wundt

In the first chapter we noted that on one interpretation, Dewey's and Wundt's philosophies shared basic principles; let us remind ourselves of them here. They emphasized purposive and voluntary behavior to understand intelligence, elevated the importance of the constructive activities and functions of the mind, regarded feeling and aesthetic sense as primary for judgement, and viewed the mental as a process instead of a substance. They also held to the following tenets. The nature of something must be found only through experience. There is a distinction between primary, or unreflective, experience and secondary, or reflective experience; this is crucial to Dewey's account of the origin of knowledge. The subject/object, or thought/thing dichotomy is not absolute, but only relative to a larger unity which includes them both as aspects. The supposedly ultimate components of experience called impressions, ideas, or in twentieth century philosophy, "sense data," are merely

the result of the abstracting and analyzing ability of the mind exercised upon experience and hence are not really what experience is ultimately like.

Chapter Two has amply demonstrated that Dewey came into contact with and was influenced by Wundt. However, many of Wundt's principles were also fundamental to neo-idealism, and to Morris' organicism. If one aspect of Wundt had to be singled out for its dominating contribution to Dewey's philosophy, it would be his voluntarism. Unfortunately, the deep ignorance that has shrouded Morris and Wundt also fell on Dewey, especially where functionalism, voluntarism, and experimentalism are concerned. Dewey and Wundt were traveling down very close paths, and further investigation into Wundt's philosophy would be able to more clearly reveal their relationships. For example, Wundtian social psychology was well-known to both Mead and Dewey during the 1890's. The finest fruit of Dewey's study of Wundt is the "Reflex Arc Concept" paper, which is examined in section two.

Dewey and James

Due to the combination of Wundt's psychology and Morris' organicism, Dewey upheld the indissoluble integration of cognitive and volitional processes independently of James's and others' efforts in that direction. This runs directly counter to the standard account, but this claim must not be misunderstood. We are considering only one aspect of relationship between Dewey and James; the undoubtable impact of James cannot be underestimated, as Dewey himself has declared.⁹

This impact came mostly from James's *Principles of Psychology*, though Dewey was well aware of James's positions on the theory of local signs, the innervation theory, and associationism by 1886 (Dewey references James frequently on these topics throughout the *Psychology* and in the notes). Dewey was then also aware of one of James's more philosophical articles which presage his pragmatism, the 1879 "The Sentiment of Rationality."¹⁰ James there states that concepts are "teleological instruments" which serve diverse ends. A close connection with Dewey's thinking might be found, but we should be very cautious. James himself provides good ground for caution: he notes that the Hegelian John Watson agrees on this point. [p. 335n] We are reminded that Morris and Dewey both were teleological mentalists as well, and so no conclusions can be drawn here. James was already far along the road to pragmatism, but there is insufficient evidence that Dewey found anything but corroboration in James's writings before 1890.

That changed dramatically with the publication of James's *Principles of Psychology*. But what portions of the *Principles* influenced Dewey right after its publication? Dewey revised his own *Psychology* for a 1891 edition, and there tells us that "the only change involving an alteration of standpoint is in the general treatment of sensation" and credits James among others for the better theory of sensation. [p. 5] Dewey abandoned the notion that psychology must postulate atomistic sensations in the primeval consciousness and replaced it with a conception more like James's and Hodgson's stream of consciousness theory. "There is a certain original continuous substratum of sensation out of which the various apparently distinct

sensations have been slowly differentiated." [p. 35] Dewey had no trouble accepting the "stream" on the level of ordinary experience, but hadn't thought to postulate a version of it at the sensational level, due to neo-Kantian psychology.

Despite Dewey's claim, some other important changes were made due to James's *Principles*, as outlined by Reck in his "The Influence of William James on John Dewey."¹¹ The most significant is the overhaul which the section on conception receives. [pp. 179-180] Conceptions become expressly functional, and this clears up the matter as to how concepts can be universal. Before, Dewey was content to say that a concept was the meaningful universality which captured relations. Now, "the concept is the power, capacity, or function of the image or train of images to stand for some mode of mental action, and it is *the mode of action which is general*." [p. 179] How should we interpret this alteration? It is not a radically new element in Dewey's thinking and involves no fundamental "alteration in standpoint." We can recognize the notion of conceptual functionality as the mode of mental activity long before 1891. Dewey was stimulated to more carefully define concepts as he read his own theory in James's *Principles of Psychology*. Let us look at what Dewey says about the influence of the *Principles of Psychology*.

The psychological tendencies which have exerted an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather than a physiological nature....Briefly, the point of departure of this theory is the conception of the brain as an organ for the coordination of sense stimuli...for the purpose of effecting appropriate motor responses.¹²

This theory does not really look so revolutionary, as it replaces what Dewey would say about the mind with the "brain". However, it should be noted here that Dewey's *Psychology* differed in one central respect from all other psychologies of that time period: Dewey rarely mentions the nervous system. It was considered obligatory to begin one's psychology text with a chapter or two on the results of physiological explorations into the nervous system, but Dewey found little place for it (save during the discussion of sensation) even while discussing the reflex arc, which was closely related to nervous tissues in his "Soul and Body." In that article, Dewey was prepared to draw numerous conclusions from biology, but that field of study was suppressed for the *Psychology* until Dewey read James's *Principles of Psychology*. James should also be credited with convincing Dewey that evolutionary theory can shed light on origin, purpose, and functions of the brain, as it has evolved in the way it has in order to best aid the survival of the organism. This view, when combined with physiological psychology, can draw conclusions about the psychology of belief and knowledge. This introduction to the principles of evolutionary and naturalized epistemology was certainly revolutionary for Dewey's psychology.

Why doesn't Dewey ever credit Wundt in his later reminiscences upon his early influences? Without placing too much weight upon this hypothesis, I would suggest that it was far easier for Dewey to give all the credit to James, a close friend and fellow pragmatist, than to give some credit to a German philosopher whose reputation had gone into a steep decline in the early twentieth century, and with whom Dewey never corresponded during those earlier years. Also, as shall be

discussed in the next section, Dewey abandoned the characteristically Wundtian notion of apperception after reading James.

Since Dewey had already adopted most of the needed foundations for pragmatism before James's influences, it is probably necessary to reconsider the question of the "origins of pragmatism". The desire to discover a smooth linear transmission of the basic pragmatic ideas from Peirce to James to Dewey has resulted in distortions to the historical record and will not stand. Dewey should receive credit for independently formulating instrumentalism. The numerous commentaries on this issue which repetitiously quote Dewey's homages to James should not efface Dewey's accomplishments.

James certainly did call Dewey back to the relations between biology and psychology, and deserves a great deal of credit for this. However, all this cannot justify the oft-made claim that it was here that James led Dewey down the path out of idealism into a realistic naturalism. We shall pick up this trail of thought in section three, after a discussion of another supposed "turning-point" in Dewey's philosophy.

II. The Reflex Arc Concept

We have discussed Wundt's psychology in the 1880's and Dewey's acceptance of many of its tenets in those years. In this section, Dewey's 1896 "The Reflex Arc

Concept in Psychology"¹³ will be our focus, so that we can compare it with his earlier psychology. The manifesto of the functionalists at Chicago, the "Reflex Arc Concept" remains one of the most significant and influential works in the field of psychology. As a springboard to his functional and pragmatic analyses of human learning, scientific inquiry, logic, ethics, and knowledge, Dewey's article is duly acknowledged as one of the most important works Dewey would produce in his ten years, from 1894 to 1904, at Chicago. Searches made for the roots of Dewey's philosophy of pragmatic naturalism always find many such doctrines, explicit as well as anticipatory, imbedded in this publication. Also recognized is the fact that Dewey did not work alone; the collaborative efforts of G.H. Mead, J.R. Angell, and the other members of the Chicago school has been emphasized.¹⁴

Here we give attention to the article, not as a starting point, but rather as the outcome, of Dewey's own gradual process towards biological functionalism. The specific contribution made here is to argue that while its views were never so well expressed, they existed long before its writing; Dewey had adhered to them closely ever since he became acquainted with experimental psychology at Johns Hopkins in 1883.

Researchers who have looked into this matter have typically found James's *Principles of Psychology* to be a primary source of inspiration for Dewey's work on the reflex arc.¹⁵ This matter deserves a closer examination. It will reveal that James reinforced Dewey's views, as the many schemas and examples drawn from James and used by Dewey in his own works easily reveal. It is also beyond question that James

aided Dewey's progress in the direction of a naturalistic and biological psychology. Nevertheless, James does not deserve the amount of credit typically granted for the inspiration behind the "Reflex Arc Concept." An outline of the article's main points will display the early origins of Dewey's views upon the reflex arc.

The organic unity of mental activity

The "Reflex Arc Concept" presents a reconstruction of current psychology's understanding of the nature of the fundamental unit of mental activity, the reflex arc. This understanding incorporates the older trichotomy of all mental activity, that of feeling, judging, and willing, into the three portions of the reflex arc: sensation, thought, and act. Dewey argues that such a transfer only serves to bring along all of the problems faced by the older scheme, since it was formulated in the post-Cartesian period during which dualism dominated the metaphysical landscape. This resulted in a strict division between the nature of sensation and thought. Sensation was conceived nominalistically, while thought was considered to be universal; thought was given the responsibility to organize chaotic and atomic sensations according to associations, principles, or laws. In this way the two were separate entities, able to interact without joining together. The relationship the will, or volition, bore to human activity was similar, as the concern to preserve free will kept volition apart from its effects, the latter being subject to laws of the physical realm.

Hence a means of interaction, without providing unification, was typically desired, and such interaction was passed on to the psychological notion of the reflex arc.

Dewey criticizes such interaction: "As a result, the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes." [p. 97] Dewey argues that from the point of view of physiological psychology such absolute distinctions and divisions between psychological states or events are unwarranted and undesirable. "More specifically, what is wanted is that sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within a single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc." [p. 97]

This sort of criticism of the reflex arc concept repeats itself throughout the article, but by itself seems to lack strength. Dewey's predilection for the organic over the mechanical could on its own win few converts to his theory. A much more effective strategy also used by Dewey was the reason why this article was so influential. Dewey held that the purpose of the reflex arc concept is to explain the twin phenomena of the biological organism aiming and succeeding at goals, and the organism learning from experience. The favored example is the child-candle instance, taken from James's *Principles of Psychology*.¹⁶ The child sees the bright light and, reaching for it, is burned. How can the reaching be successful? And how is it that after the experience, the child is less likely to immediately reach for such a light again upon seeing it? The real failure of the reflex arc concept is that the mechanical relations within the reflex arc fail to explain the phenomena, and hence there is a need for a different conception of the relationships between perception, judgement, and willing. The article's enormous achievement was due to the

plausibility of Dewey's organically-inspired model of the reflex arc, but this plausibility was not based upon the organic model *per se*, but the greater degree of success with which it explained the phenomena.

Coordination

The mechanical model of the reflex arc fails to account for the phenomena basically because it is too simple. On its premises, perception can be a contributing cause of an action, through judgement and willing, but the reverse cannot be true: action cannot be a contributing cause of a perception. Thus the cause of a perception must then be exclusively "sought outside the process of experience itself...in an external pressure of 'environment'." [p. 99] Yet the specific qualities of the perception of the candle light would not exist without the contribution of the act of looking: the motion of the head, the focusing of the eyes, the continued attention fixed upon the light, and so forth. The character of any perception is, Dewey argues, at least in part due to the activity of the organism which brings it to the perception. In Dewey's words,

Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensory motor co-ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the movement of body, head, and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light. [p. 97]

Since action can contribute to perception, as well as the reverse, Dewey then conceives of a reciprocal movement of causes. This movement goes from action to perception and back again, which may account for the first phenomena mentioned above, the reaching for the bright object. Since the reaching is out to the bright object, and not just to anywhere, we must suppose that in this reciprocal chain of causes there is the successful co-ordination of the process of reaching. There must be error-control: the perception of the reaching hand and the perception of the bright light must together guide the hand to an intersection with the light. This guidance process, with perception and action causally working together towards the goal, is referred to as the sensori-motor "circuit".

If the sight did not inhibit as well as excite the reaching, the latter would be purely indeterminate, it would be for anything or nothing, not for the particular object seen. The reaching, in turn, must both stimulate and control the seeing. The eye must be kept upon the candle if the arm is to do its work; let it wander and the arm takes up another task. In other words, we now have an enlarged and transformed co-ordination; the act is seeing no less than before, but it is now seeing-for-reaching purposes. There is still a sensori-motor circuit, one with more content or value, not a substitution of a motor response for a sensory stimulus. [p. 98]

The next event is the stimulus of the burn the child receives upon touching the flame of the candle; in keeping with Dewey's analysis we must say that the quality of the burn sensation is partially due to the previous activity of seeing-and-reaching. Here Dewey brings out the explanation of the second phenomena, that of learning,

although he just as naturally could have discussed the learning process inherent in reaching out to seen objects. At this point Dewey reveals the essential contribution the organic theory makes to the discussion.

Only because the heat-pain quale enters into the same circuit of experience with the optical-ocular and muscular quales, does the child learn from the experience and get the ability to avoid the experience in the future.

More technically stated, the so-called response is not merely *to* the stimulus; it is *into* it. The burn is the original seeing, the original optical-ocular experience enlarged and transformed in its value. It is no longer mere seeing; it is seeing-of a light-that-means-pain-when-contact-occurs. The ordinary reflex arc theory proceeds upon the more or less tacit assumption that the outcome of the response is a totally new experience; that it is, say, the substitution of a burn sensation for a light sensation through the intervention of motion. [p. 98-99]

Mental continuity

Experience itself is organic: experience cannot be disconnected, it cannot have any complete discontinuities. Everything which is in experience is "colored" by some preceding experience, or put differently, experiences come in wide complex stretches and long durations rather than in quick pulses of momentary and completely distinct atomic events. Given this, learning can then be explained in a very similar manner to the way a strictly associationistic explanation would proceed.

The needed principle is stated quite well by James himself. If cerebral processes have once been aroused together or in immediate succession, any subsequent arousal

of any one of them will tend to arouse the others in the original order.¹⁷ If "cerebral process" is replaced by "idea" the associationist theory is expressed. James himself rejected the older atomistic and mechanical view of experience in favor of one very like Dewey's. The change to "cerebral process" permits associationism to adapt itself nicely to a different view of experience, and James used it extensively in his account of learning. Dewey does not expressly state this principle, but he must have it in mind and takes it for granted as he proceeds. So long as the processes are understood to be continuous together, this principle brings in the preservation of the experience required for learning. Dewey would have no difficulty referring to this preservation as memory so long as it is not regarded as a storehouse for ideas. Rather, the preservation is one of habit, ingrained into the organization of the nervous structure. We can see that Dewey has completely replaced Wundtian apperception with the associationism of the reflex arc. Apperception now seemed to Dewey to be too restrictive, an abstraction from the real organic whole which is responsible for mental activity. [p. 99n-100n]

The knowledge that physiology provides about the activity of the nervous structure provides Dewey with another way of arguing for the thesis that continuity prevails over all mental activity. The field of physiological psychology has as one of its guiding theses the legitimacy of drawing inferences from physiological discoveries about the nervous system to the nature of the mind's operations and abilities. Dewey accepts this thesis in this article, and infers from the continuity exhibited by the material structure and chemical activity of the nervous system that continuity must

also reign over the mental life. [p. 103] The brevity of this argument indicates that Dewey did not intend to place great weight upon it. We can understand this by remembering that the nature of such an inference was (and still is) extremely controversial: only materialists, parallelists, or monists could have much sympathy for it. Dewey seems to express the inference in a monistic way by describing the sensori-motor process from both a physical and psychical side; he explicitly rejects the notion of a soul-substance throughout. Therefore when Dewey refers to the psychical he is not talking about something in a purely mental realm. Echoes of the "immanence" theory of the "Soul and Body" article are very strong here.

The significant conclusion Dewey draws from his theory has to do with the nature of mental entities as he answers the question, how are we to understand the relationships between undoubtably different mental events and activities? Due to the reciprocal nature of the sensori-motor process, neither stimulus nor action can be considered to be prior to the other. For every stimulus there was action conditioning it, and for every action there was sensation exciting it. Therefore in any given situation (like the child-candle instance), the question as to what the stimulus was is determined only with reference to the goal involved in the situation. This led Dewey to say that there is no absolute classification of mental entities into stimulus, response, etc; rather, a mental event's label is relative to some situation, and more specifically, relative to the goal or purpose the organism has in that situation. Without some purpose to its activity an organism's mental activity cannot be distinguished into kinds. Therefore such distinctions are purely *teleological*. "The fact

is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an end." [p. 104]

Instrumentalism

In the "Reflex Arc Concept" all the promise portended by the insights of the "Soul and Body" has come to fruition: the anti-dualistic organicism, the continuity of the physiological with the psychical, the functional distinctions for the parts, and the teleology of the whole. When Dewey goes even farther in later work to extend these principles beyond stimulus and response to the mediating control of judgement and ideas, Dewey will arrive at a full expression of instrumentalism. In that theory, the intellectual elements exist solely in reference to goals and their adequacy will be determined solely upon whether they aid in the attainment of those goals.

Every one of those "isms" discussed in the previous section was incorporated into Dewey's instrumentalism, and it would have been almost impossible without all of them. Instrumentalism is a theory of the general forms of conception and reasoning. The guiding principle is that these forms arise in the course of human inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to transform a doubtful or problematical situation into a satisfactory and harmonious experience. Inquiry proceeds through a reflective evaluation of existing conditions to discover the potentialities of the situation, and suggest the proper course of action.¹⁸ This "reflective evaluation" sounds like the inactive Aristotelian theoretical life, but actually requires a great deal of activity of

its own. All of the methodology of science arises here, as does more formal logical reasoning.

The time has come to bring the results of the first two sections to bear upon the final question: what is Dewey's theory on the relationship between human inquiry and ultimate reality? In short, how should we characterize Dewey's metaphysics?

III. Dewey's Metaphysics

Absolute idealism

Despite the changes Dewey made to his *Psychology*, Dewey did not radically or abruptly alter his fundamental standpoint upon the nature of ultimate reality by 1892. These matters were independent from changes made due to new scientific theories. In a letter Dewey rejects the intimation that the *Psychology* is inimical to physiological psychology.¹⁹ Dewey attributes the emendations in the second and third editions to his responsiveness to the progress of the science of psychology, while retaining the essential viewpoint of the work: presenting mind as an active and genetic whole. In another letter written to William James in 1891,²⁰ Dewey comments on James's suggestions concerning consciousness in the *Principles of Psychology*, Volume I, pp. 290-291. The key section of James's discussion goes as follows:

Instead, then, of the stream of thought being one of *con*-sciousness,...it might be better called a stream of *Sciousness* pure and simple, thinking objects of some of which it makes what it calls a 'Me,' and only aware of its 'pure' Self in an abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way....The sciousness in question would be the *Thinker*, and the existence of this thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than as that direct inner perception of spiritual activity which we naturally believe ourselves to have. 'Matter,' as something behind physical phenomena, is a postulate of this sort. Between the postulated Matter and the postulated Thinker, the sheet of phenomena would then swing, some of them (the 'realities') pertaining more to the matter, others (the fictions, opinions and errors) pertaining more to the Thinker.²¹

Dewey expresses his admiration for this passage and tells James that it is an exemplary summary of the core of Hegel. As Dewey sees it, both the "matter" and the "thinker" are the result of growing organizations (at different levels) of the content of "sciousness". Dewey takes the trouble to distinguish his view from Green's; Green believes that the thinker is really the ultimate organizer of sciousness. Dewey also throws a barb at the neo-Hegelians in general for turning Hegel into a pre-modern scholastic. However, the self is really not an agent, as Kant and Green suppose;²² it is rather the unity of the function of sciousness.

This last largely opaque remark must have been a disappointment to James, but it does indicate two things. First, Dewey was a committed absolutist at this point, and second, Dewey was quite prepared to accept the eventual product of James's speculations on consciousness: neutral monism (the ultimate reality is the stream of sciousness), also called immediate empiricism (everything really is what it is

experienced as). A better confirmation of Dewey's early confidence in the psychological standpoint could not have been hoped for, and this explains Dewey's quick acceptance of James's theories as they developed soon after 1900. This realization should inspire a conclusion on our part: if Dewey were still an idealist well into the first decade of the twentieth century, he would have found immediate empiricism very congenial to his idealism, indeed, perhaps as a perfect expression of it. We will pursue this shortly.

Another stage often looked to as a turning point away from idealism was the series of publications Dewey wrote on the topic of morality. However, as we observed in the last section, in 1894 Dewey was still very committed to the existence of the absolute self-consciousness.

Nearly all commentators on Dewey's early period have argued that certainly by the time Dewey has formulated his instrumentalism (1896-1903) we must relent and release Dewey from idealism. How compatible can instrumentalism be with idealism? The standard account inevitably finds Dewey's absolution from idealistic sins taking place no later than his 1903 *Studies in Logical Theory*. There, it says, Dewey routed the idealists and their neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian notions, with the weapons forged out of instrumentalism. And, when this is combined with Dewey's preface, which credits James with the inspiration for instrumentalism [*MW 2: 297*], surely all the evidence one requires is at hand.

These two premises are accurate, but are by no means enough to draw any conclusions about Dewey's metaphysics. We know what Dewey's gratitude to James

means, and furthermore, in the *Studies* Dewey attacks those neo-idealist tenets which he had found wanting 20 years earlier. Granted, the means of attack have grown and developed dramatically, but it is Lotze's neo-Kantianism which dooms his psychology and his theory of reasoning to failure. The *Studies* is a treatise on psychology and thought, and not a discussion of metaphysics.

Immediate empiricism

The evidence that Dewey rejected idealism builds up quickly after 1903. Dewey became engaged in conversations with colleagues who were ready to attack any sign of anti-realism, and responded to innumerable charges of idealism with the claim that his instrumentalism was realistic. However, his defenses were never very convincing. For example, the 1906 "Experience and Objective Idealism," [EW 3: 128-144] is typically cited as a rejection of idealism. There Dewey claims that objective idealism must dissolve into a "thorough-going empiricism." That empiricism is presumably Dewey's immediate empiricism. But the reasons for this dissolution do not center on a stand for an extra-mental reality (as the New Realists were taking); they revolve around Dewey's familiar rejection of the crushing teleology of the absolute.

An article which does not receive as much attention, but has a far greater bearing upon Dewey's metaphysical views, is the 1906 "Reality as Experience." [EW 3: 101-106] Here Dewey defends the position that reality and experience should be assimilated. The charge against this position is that "science makes known a chronological period in which the world managed to lead a respectable existence in

spite of not including conscious organisms." [p. 101] Dewey's analysis demonstrates that the cognition of such a time period is really "a condition of reality as experience." [p. 105] But what of the time period itself?

With this question we run up against one of the most difficult problems for interpreters of Dewey's philosophy. Dewey never allows himself to refer to anything except as it is known or experienced. This is because instrumentalism requires inquiry, and while inquiry requires a commitment to the existence of the external world²³ it also requires the agnostic attitude towards the results of inquiry until inquiry has had its say. But the results are knowledge, and known things are very different from unknown things. Metaphysics for Dewey was dependent upon the characteristics of experience and the results of inquiry just like everything else.

These matters require far more attention than can be given here. I have suggested that while Dewey did give up the notion that ultimate reality was an absolute objective mind sometime during the period 1894-1906, Dewey toned down his idealism to an "immediate empiricism." This held that experience was the ultimate arbiter of human inquiry, and that nothing can be discussed out of relation to experience. Dewey's first philosophical tenet was quite similar: conscious experience provides the only reality for us. In Dewey's *Experience and Nature* he tells us that experience and nature are co-extensive (though not all the time and completely); they are capable of being essentially one. [LW 1: 10-13] The rejection of any fixed distinction between experience and reality is the manifestation of Dewey's second philosophical tenet: no ultimate dualism can be tolerated. Do these

two tenets constitute an idealism, albeit a very unusual and original one, or has Dewey "gone beyond" realism and idealism? This final question must be left as a stimulation to the reader.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. Schiller, F.C.S. "Instrumentalism and Idealism," p. 75. *Mind* 34 (1925): 75-79.
2. See D.C. Phillips's "Organicism in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 31 (1970): 413-432.
3. Jones, Mark. *George Sylvester Morris*, pp. 161-162.
4. Thomas, *The Moral Philosophy of T.H. Green*, pp. 41.
5. On this matter I am happy to defer to Welchman's *The Development of John Dewey's Moral Epistemology*, Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1991.
6. See for example *Experience and Nature*, *LW* 1: 285-286.
7. Welchman, "From Absolute Idealism to Experimentalism: The Problem of Dewey's Early Philosophy," pp. 413-415.
8. Welchman, *The Development of John Dewey's Moral Epistemology*, pp. 160-161.
9. "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," *LW* 5: 157.
10. Dewey references it in the Notes to Chapter 14 of the *Psychology*, *EW* 2: 266.
11. Reck, Andrew. "The Influence of William James on John Dewey." *TPS* 20 (1984): 87-118.
12. "The Development of American Pragmatism," *LW* 2: 14-15.
13. *EW* 5: 96-110.
14. The best account is Darnell Rucker's *The Chicago Pragmatists*.
15. Phillips, "James, Dewey, and the Reflex Arc."; also Reck, "The Influence of William James on John Dewey in Psychology"; also J.E. Tiles, *Dewey*.
16. James, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 37.
17. *ibid.*, p. 36.

18. Thayer, H.S. "Pragmatism." Article in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards, pp. 434-435.
19. Dewey to John W. Cook, 16 January 1892, President's Office, Cook Papers, box 2, folder 27, Northern Illinois University.
20. Dewey to James, 6 May 1891, William James Papers.
21. James, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 290-291.
22. James castigates German idealism, Green, and Caird in his *Principles of Psychology*, Volume I, pp. 341-350.
23. See for example "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem," *MW* 8: 97.

Chronology of Secondary Literature on Dewey's Early Period

1919

Howard, Delton. *John Dewey's Logical Theory*. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell, 1916. New York: Longmans Green, 1919. (Reviewed by Evander McGilvary, *PR* 28 (1919): 424-426.)

1924

Lamprecht, Sterling. "An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalist Logic." *Mind* 33 (1924): 415-427.

1925

Dewey, John. "The Development of American Pragmatism." (1925) [*EW* 2: 3-21].

Schiller, F.C.S. "Instrumentalism and Idealism." *Mind* 34 (1925): 75-79.

1928

Baum, Maurice. "The Logical and Metaphysical Theories of William James and John Dewey." Chapter Four his *A Comparative Study of the Philosophies of William James and John Dewey*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928.

1930

Dewey, John. "From Absolutism to Experimentalism." (1930) *LW* 5: 147-60.

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Chronology of Selected Dewey Writings, 1882-1930 With Significant Responses and Other Works

References are given by series, volume number and page to the *Works of John Dewey* where the series is indicated as follows.

EW John Dewey, *The Early Works, 1882-1898*, in five volumes, 1969-1972
MW John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, in fifteen volumes, 1976-1983
LW John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, in seventeen volumes, 1981-1990

The abbreviations of the collections of essays are as follows:

ID *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, 1910
EE *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 1916
PC *Philosophy and Civilization*, 1931

Abbreviations for journal and serial titles are as follows:

AJP *American Journal of Psychology*
JH *Johns Hopkins University Circulars*, by Number
JP *The Journal of Philosophy*
M *Mind*
N *Nation*
PB *Psychological Bulletin*
PR *Philosophical Review*
PsR *Psychological Review*

Apr 1882	<i>EW</i> 1:	3-8	"The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism."
Jul 1882		9-18	"The Pantheism of Spinoza."
Jan 1883		19-33	"Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling."
Apr 1883	<i>JH</i> 22:	94	"Hegel and the Theory of Categories." (announcement)
Nov 1883	<i>JH</i> 28:	46	"The Psychology of Consciousness." (announcement)
Dec 1883		46	"Delboeuf on Living and Dead Matter." (announcement)
Apr 1884	<i>EW</i> 1:	34-47	"Kant and Philosophic Method."
Sep 1884		48-60	"The New Psychology."
Nov 1884		61-63	"The Obligation to Knowledge of God."
Jan 1886		122-43	"The Psychological Standpoint."
Apr 1886		144-67	"Psychology as Philosophical Method."
Apr 1886		93-115	"Soul and Body."
Apr 1886		116-21	"Inventory of Philosophy Taught in American Colleges."
Oct 1886		xxv-xli	S. Hodgson, "Illusory Psychology."
Nov 1886	<i>EW</i> 2:		<i>Psychology</i> . (2nd ed. 1889, 3rd ed. 1891)
Jan 1887	<i>EW</i> 1:	168-75	"'Illusory Psychology'." (Reply to Hodgson's Oct 1886)
Apr 1887	<i>M</i> 12:	314-18	Hodgson, "'Illusory Psychology'- A Rejoinder." (Reply to Dewey)
Jun 1887	<i>EW</i> 1:	194-204	Review of G.T. Ladd's <i>Elements of Physiological Psychology</i> .
Jun 1887		205-26	"Ethics and Physical Science."
Jul 1887		176-93	"Knowledge as Idealization."
Jul 1887	<i>M</i> 12:	439-43	G.C. Robertson, Review of Dewey's <i>Psychology</i> .
Nov 1887	<i>AJP</i> 1:	146-49	G.S. Hall, Review of Dewey's <i>Psychology</i> .

- 1888 *EW* 1: 227-49 "The Ethics of Democracy."
- My 1888 251-435 *Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition.*
- 1889 *EW* 3: 3-13 "The Late Professor Morris."
1889 *Applied Psychology*, with McLellan.
- Jan 1889 *EW* 2: *Psychology*. (2nd edition)
- Apr 1889 *EW* 3: 14-35 "The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green."
Jan 1890 56-74 "On Some Current Conceptions of the Term 'Self.'"
Jan 1890 75-82 "Is Logic a Dualistic Science?"
Mar 1890 180-84 Review of E. Caird's *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*.
Apr 1890 83-89 "The Logic of Verification."
- Sep 1890 W. James, *The Principles of Psychology*.
- Jan 1891 *EW* 3: 93-109 "Moral Theory and Practice."
- Spr 1891 237-388 *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*.
- Aug 1891 *EW* 2: *Psychology*. (3rd edition)
- Oct 1891 *EW* 3: 125-41 "The Present Position of Logical Theory."
Nov 1891 142-46 "How Do Concepts Arise From Percepts?"
Jan 1892 *PR* 1: 95-99 T. Davidson, Review of Dewey's *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*.
Jan 1892 *EW* 3: 148-54 "The Scholastic and the Speculator."
Feb 1892 211-35 "Introduction to Philosophy: Syllabus."
Mar 1892 3-10 "Christianity and Democracy."
Oct 1892 *LW* 17: 153-60 "Introduction to Philosophy."
Nov 1892 *EW* 3: 155-73 "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive."
Jan 1893 *EW* 4: 189-97 Review of B. Bosanquet's *A History of Aesthetic*.
Apr 1893 19-36 "The Superstition of Necessity."
Apr 1893 37-41 "Anthropology and Law."
Nov 1893 42-53 "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal."
Jan 1894 66-69 "The Psychology of Infant Language."
Mar 1894 70-90 "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty."
My 1894 91-95 "The Ego as Cause."
Jun 1894 96-105 "Reconstruction."
Jul 1894 200-14 Reviews of L. Ward's *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* and B. Kidd's *Social Evolution*.
- Nov 1894 152-69 "The Theory of Emotion I: Emotional Attitudes."
Nov 1894 *PR* 3: 717-22 J. Hyslop, "The Ego, Causality, and Freedom."
- Dec 1894 *EW* 4: 219-362 *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus*.
- 1895 *The Psychology of Number*, with McLellan.
- 1895 *EW* 5: 111-50 "Interest as Related to Will." (rev. ed. 1899)
Jan 1895 169-188 "The Theory of Emotion II: The Significance of Emotions."
My 1895 *PsR* 2: 279-84 D. Irons, "Recent Developments in Theory of Emotion."

- Mar 1896 *EW* 5: 25-33 "The Metaphysical Method in Ethics."
 My 1896 358-67 Review of H. Stanley's *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*.
 Jul 1896 96-110 "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." (*PC*)
 1897 3-24 "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge." (*ID*)
 Jan 1897 84-95 "My Pedagogic Creed."
 Jan 1897 151-63 "The Psychology of Effort."
 Sep 1897 *PR* 6: 471-96 Irons, "The Nature of Emotions II."
 1898 James, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results."
 Apr 1898 *EW* 5: 34-53 "Evolution and Ethics."
 Jun 1898 372-85 Review of Harris's *Psychologic Foundations of Education*.
 Jul 1898 385-99 Review of J.M. Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*.
 Sep 1898 402-22 Review of Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*.
 Nov 1898 xviii-xxvi Baldwin, "Social Interpretations: A Reply."
 Nov 1898 399-401 "Rejoinder to Baldwin's Reply."
 1899 J. Royce, *The World and the Individual, Volume One*.
 Aug 1899 *MW* 1: 113-30 "Psychology and Philosophic Method." (*ID*: "Consciousness' and Experience.")
 1899-1900 "Lectures in the Theory of Logic." (unpublished)
 My 1900 *MW* 1: 241-56 Review of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual*, First Series.
 Sep 1900 151-76 "Some Stages of Logical Thought." (*EE*)
 1902 *MW* 2: 139-269 Contributions to *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.
 Mar 1902 3-20 "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality I: Its Scientific Necessity."
 My 1902 39-52 "The Interpretation of the Savage Mind" (*PC*)
 Jul 1902 20-38 "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality II: Its Significance for Conduct."
 Jul 1902 120-37 Review of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual*, Second Series.
 1903 293-375 *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chapters 1-4 (*EE*)
 1903 *MW* 3: 3-39 "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality."
 Jan 1904 *M* 13: 100-6 F.C.S. Schiller, Review of Dewey's *Studies*.
 Jan 1904 *PB* 1: 1-5 James, "The Chicago School." (review of Dewey's *Studies*)
 Feb 1904 *MW* 3: 62-68 "Notes Upon Logical Topics I: A Classification of Contemporary Tendencies."
 Feb 1904 *JP* 1: 100-5 W.H. Sheldon, Review of Dewey's *Studies*.
 Mar 1904 *MW* 3: 68-72 "Notes Upon Logical Topics II: The Meanings of the Term 'Idea'."
 Apr 1904 207-12 A.K. Rogers, "The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic."
 My 1904 *PR* 13: 328-37 T. de Laguna, "Evolutionary Method in Ethical Research."
 Sep 1904 *JP* 1: 477-91 James, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?"
 Sep 1904 *MW* 3: 312-18 Review of Schiller's *Humanism*.
 Sep 1904 *N* 79: 219-20 C.S. Peirce, Review of Dewey's *Studies*.
 Nov 1904 *PR* 13: 666-77 Pringle-Pattison, Review of Dewey's *Studies*.
 Jun 1905 *MW* 3: 153-57 "The Realism of Pragmatism."
 Jul 1905 158-67 "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism." (*ID*)

- Sep 1905 390-92 C. Bakewell, "An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning Immediate Empiricism."
- Oct 1905 393-97 F. Woodbridge, "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?"
- Oct 1905 168-70 "Immediate Empiricism." (Reply to Bakewell's Sept 1905)
- Nov 1905 *PR* 14: 684-95 B.H. Bode, "The Concept of Pure Experience."
- Nov 1905 *MW* 3: 171-77 "The Knowledge Experience and Its Relationships." (Reply to Woodbridge's Oct 1905)
- Nov 1905 398-404 Bode, "Cognitive Experience and Its Object."
- Dec 1905 *JP* 2: 687-91 Bakewell, "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism." (Reply to Dewey's Oct 1905)
- Dec 1905 *MW* 3: 178-83 "The Knowledge Experience Again." (Reply to Bode's Nov 1905)
- Jan 1906 79-82 "The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness'."
- Mar 1906 83-100 "Beliefs and Realities." (*ID*: "Beliefs and Existences.")
- Mar 1906 *JP* 3: 174-80 J.A. Leighton, "Cognitive Thought and 'Immediate' Experience."
- Apr 1906 234-37 Schiller, "Thought and Immediacy." (Comments on Dewey-Bakewell exchange)
- My 1906 *MW* 3: 101-6 "Reality as Experience."
- Jul 1906 107-27 "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge." (*ID*)
- Sep 1906 128-44 "Experience and Objective Idealism." (*ID*)
- Nov 1906 *PR* 15: 627-33 J.E. Russell, "Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism." (Comments on Dewey's Sept 1906)
- Apr 1907 *MW* 4: 78-82 "The Control of Ideas by Facts I." (*EE*)
- My 1907 82-84 "The Control of Ideas by Facts II." (*EE*)
- My 1907 295-313 E. McGilvary, "Pure Experience and Reality."
- Jun 1907 84-90 "The Control of Ideas by Facts III, IV." (*EE*)
- Jul 1907 50-75 "Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas." (*ID*: "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth.")
- Jul 1907 120-4 "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer." (Reply to McGilvary's My 1907)
- Aug 1907 *JP* 4: 432-35 R.W. Sellars, "Professor Dewey's View of Agreement." (Comments on Dewey's April 1907)
- Sep 1907 *MW* 4: 229-41 Review of George Santayana's *The Life of Reason*, 5 vols.
- 1908 125-42 "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" (*PC*)
- Feb 1908 98-115 "What Does Pragmatism Means by Practical?" (*EE*: "What Pragmatism Means By Practical.")
- Jul 1908 91-97 "The Logical Character of Ideas." (*EE*)
- Oct 1908 317-27 McGilvary, "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism."
- Nov 1908 *JP* 5: 617-28 A. Schinz, "Professor Dewey's Pragmatism."
- Nov 1908 *LW* 17: 548-49 Woodbridge, "Consciousness and Meaning."
- Dec 1908 *MW* 4: 178-91 "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education."
- 1909 J. Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?*
- 1909 *LW* 17: 361-73 "Knowledge and Existence." (unpublished reply to Woodbridge's Nov 1908)
- 1909 *MW* 4: 251-63 "The Pragmatic Movement of Contemporary Thought: A Syllabus."
- Jan 1909 146-55 "Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary." (Reply to McGilvary's Oct 1908)
- Mar 1909 116-17 "Discussion on Realism and Idealism."
- Apr 1909 118-19 "Discussion on the 'Concept of a Sensation'."
- Jul 1909 *PR* 18: 96-415 G.A. de Laguna, "Practical Character of Reality."
- Jul 1909 *MW* 4: 245-49 Review of Albert Schinz's *Anti-pragmatisme*.

- Jul 1909 3-14 "Darwin's Influence Upon Philosophy." (ID: "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy.")
- Aug 1909 76-77 "The Dilemma of the Intellectualist Theory of Truth."
1910 H.H. Bawden, *The Principles of Pragmatism*.
1910 A.W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*.
- Jan 1910 MW 6: 69-79 "Science as Subject-Matter and as Method."
- Mar 1910 177-356 *How We Think*.
- Apr 1910 *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*.
- Apr 1910 LW 17: 39-41 "Preface." (ID)
- Apr 1910 MW 6: 3-11 "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth." (ID)
- Mar 1910 80-85 "Valid Knowledge and the 'Subjectivity of Experience'."
- Jul 1910 472-82 E. Holt, W. Marvin, W.P. Montague, R.B. Perry, W. Pitkin, E. Spaulding, "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists."
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- 1911 357-467 Contributions to *A Cyclopaedia of Education*, vols. 1 and 2.
- Feb 1911 483-500 Spaulding, "Realism: A Reply to Professor Dewey and an Exposition." (Reply to Dewey's Sept 1910 "The Short Cut to Realism Examined")
- Feb 1911 143-45 "Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding." (Reply to Spaulding's Feb 1911)
- Feb 1911 12-68 "The Problem of Truth."
- Apr 1911 JP 8: 244-48 M. Eastman, Review of Dewey's *How We Think*.
- Jul 1911 MW 6: 103-11 "Brief Studies in Realism I: Naive Realism vs. Presentative Realism." (EE)
- Aug 1911 MW 4: 314-16 McGilvary, "Professor Dewey's 'Action of Consciousness'." (Comment on Dewey's 1908)
- Sep 1911 MW 6: 111-22 "Brief Studies in Realism II: Epistemological Realism." (EE)
- Oct 1911 MW 6: 501-11 Spaulding, "A Reply to Professor Dewey's Rejoinder." (Reply to Dewey's Feb 1911 "Rejoinder")
- Oct 1911 146-52 "Joint Discussion with Articles of Agreement and Disagreement: Professor Dewey and Dr. Spaulding."
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- 1912 MW 7: 209-365 Contributions to *A Cyclopaedia of Education*, vols. 3, 4, and 5.
- Jan 1912 64-78 "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism."
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- Mar 1912 MW 10: 431-38 D. Drake, "What Kind of Realism?" (Comments on Dewey's July 1911)
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- Jun 1912 142-48 Review of William James's *Essays in Radical Empiricism*.
- Jun 1912 454-60 McGilvary, "Professor Dewey's 'Brief Studies in Realism'." (Comments on Dewey's July 1911)
- Jul 1912 445-51 McGilvary, "Realism and the Ego-Centric Predicament." (Comments on Perry's "The Ego-Centric Predicament and Dewey's July 1911)
- Sep 1912 79-84 "In Response to Professor McGilvary." (Reply to McGilvary's May, June,

- July 1912)
- Nov 1912 3-30 "Perception and Organic Action." (*PC*)
- Nov 1912 31-43 "What Are States of Mind?"
- 1913 W. Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*.
- ca. 1913 *LW* 17: 415-21 "Brief Studies in Realism III." (unpublished)
- Sep 1914 *MW* 7: 47-55 "Psychological Doctrine and Philosophical Teaching."
- 1915 J. Driscoll, *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea*.
- Jun 1915 *MW* 8: 3-13 "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry."
- Jul 1915 83-97 "The Existence of the World as a Problem." (*EE*: "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem.")
- Sep 1915 *JP* 12: 491-500 A. Tornudd, "Types of Pragmatist Theories of Truth."
- Sep 1915 *MW* 8: 14-82 "The Logic of Judgments of Practice." (*EE*)
- Dec 1915 *JP* 12: 682-87 Schiller, "Are All Judgements 'Practical'?" (Comments on Dewey's Sept 1915)
- Mar 1916 *MW* 10: 89-97 "Logical Objects."
- Jun 1916 319-69 "Introduction." to *Essays in Experimental Logic*.
- Dec 1916 71-78 "The Pragmatism of Peirce."
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- Apr 1917 415-30 D. Robinson, "An Alleged New Discovery in Logic." (Comments on Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*)
- Apr 1917 98-108 "Concerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson." (Reply to Robinson's April 1917)
- Apr 1917 *JP* 14: 246-48 H. Brown, Review of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*.
- Mar 1917 *MW* 10: 49-52 "The Concept of the Neutral in Epistemology."
- Jul 1917 53-63 "The Need for Social Psychology."
- Jul 1917 439-49 Drake, "A Cul-de-Sac For Realism."
- Aug 1917 64-66 "Duality and Dualism." (Comments on Drake's March 1912 and July 1917)
- Nov 1917 *JP* 14: 660-63 Drake, "Dr. Dewey's Duality and Dualism." (Comments on Dewey-Drake exchange)
- Dec 1917 673-80 Sellars, "The Status of Epistemology."
- Jan 1918 *MW* 11: 10-17 "Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind."
- Jan 1918 *JP* 15: 57-64 H.T. Costello, "Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians."
- Mar 1918 149-57 D.T. Howard, "The Pragmatic Method." (Comments on Dewey's 1917)
- 1919 D. Howard, *John Dewey's Logical Theory*.
- Jan 1919 *JP* 16: 5-26 B. Russell, "Professor Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*."
- 1920 *MW* 12: 205-50 "Three Contemporary Philosophers: William James, Henri Bergson, and Bertrand Russell."
- 1920 *MW* 13: 443-81 A.O. Lovejoy, "Pragmatism Versus the Pragmatist."
- 1920 *MW* 12: 77-204 *Reconstruction in Philosophy*.
- Aug 1920 *JP* 17: 449-55 Costello, "Professor Dewey's 'Judgements of Practise'."
- Dec 1920 *MW* 13: 482-91 L. Buermeyer, "Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought." (Comments on Dewey's *How We Think*)
- Jan 1922 61-71 "An Analysis of Reflective Thought."
- Feb 1922 *MW* 14: *Human Nature and Conduct*.

- Jun 1922 *MW* 13: 40-60 "Realism Without Monism or Dualism." (Reply to Lovejoy's 1920)
- Aug 1922 *JP* 19: 469-75 C.E. Ayres, Review of Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*.
- Oct 1922 *MW* 13: 29-39 "Knowledge and Speech Reaction."
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- 1922-3 *MW* 13: 349-95 Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thought.
- Mar 1923 *MW* 15: 14-19 "Tradition, Metaphysics, and Morals."
- Aug 1923 371-77 S. Lamprecht, "A Note on Professor Dewey's Theory of Knowledge." (Comments on Dewey's June 1922)
- Oct 1923 *JP* 20: 596-603 G. Adams, "Activity and Objects in Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*."
- Apr 1924 *MW* 15: 27-41 "Some Comments on Philosophical Discussion." (Comments on Dewey-Lovejoy exchange and Lamprecht's Aug 1923)
- Oct 1924 *JP* 21: 601-11 Lovejoy, "Pastness and Transcendence." (Reply to Dewey's April 1924)
- 1925 *LW* 2: 3-21 "The Development of American Pragmatism." (*PC*)
- Feb 1925 *LW* 1: 3-326 *Experience and Nature*.
- Oct 1925 *LW* 2: 44-54 "A Naturalistic Theory of Sense-Perception." (*PC*)
- Dec 1925 *LW* 3: 367-84 Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics."
- Jan 1926 *LW* 2: 141-57 "Substance, Power and Quality in Locke."
- My 1926 62-68 "Events and the Future."
- Sep 1926 *LW* 3: 385-400 F. Thilly, "Contemporary American Philosophy."
- 1927 S. Hook, *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism*.
- Jan 1927 *LW* 3: 3-10 "The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization." (*PC*: "Philosophy and Civilization.")
- Feb 1927 73-81 "Half-Hearted Naturalism." (Replies to Santayana 1925 and Thilly 1926)
- Aug 1927 55-72 "An Empirical Account of Experience" (*PC*: "Appearing and Appearance.")
- Jan 1928 25-40 "Body and Mind." (*PC*)
- Mar 1928 401-14 E. Hall, "Some Meanings of Meaning in Dewey's *Experience and Nature*."
- Apr 1928 41-54 "Social as a Category." (*PC*: "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea.")
- Jun 1928 82-91 "Meaning and Existence." (Reply to Hall's March 1928)
- Aug 1928 *JP* 25: 477-92 D. Piatt, "Immediate Experience."
- Oct 1929 *LW* 4: *The Quest For Certainty*.
- Dec 1929 *LW* 5: 453-60 Nagel, "Can Logic Be Divorced From Ontology?"
- 1930 147-60 "From Absolutism to Experimentalism."
- Apr 1930 461-76 Hocking, "Action and Certainty."
- Apr 1930 477-86 C.I. Lewis, "Pragmatism and Current Thought."
- My 1930 487-95 Woodbridge, "Experience and Dialectic."
- My 1930 210-17 "In Reply to Some Criticisms." (Reply to Hocking, Lewis, and Woodbridge's 1930)

John Dewey's Early Philosophy: A Research Bibliography

This bibliography of primary and secondary literature is intended to provide a comprehensive guide to materials relevant to the early period of Dewey's philosophical career (roughly 1878-1903). Significant literature on Dewey's later philosophy, excluding social and educational thought, is also included, especially if it concerns Dewey's metaphysics or his participation in the defense of pragmatism during the period 1903-1924. In order to be useful the general categories that guide the reader through this bibliography require some duplication of references.

Abbreviations for journal titles are as follows:

<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Psychology</i>
<i>IJE</i>	<i>International Journal of Ethics</i>
<i>JP</i>	<i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>
<i>JPPSM</i>	<i>The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods</i>
<i>JSP</i>	<i>The Journal of Speculative Philosophy</i>
<i>PPR</i>	<i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i>
<i>PR</i>	<i>Philosophical Review</i>
<i>Ps Rev</i>	<i>Psychological Review</i>
<i>TPS</i>	<i>Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society</i>

JOHN DEWEY 1859-1952

References are given by series, volume number and page to the critical edition of the *Works of John Dewey* where the series is indicated as follows.

- EW* John Dewey, *The Early Works, 1882-1898*, in five volumes, 1969-1972.
MW John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, in fifteen volumes, 1976-1983.
LW John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, in seventeen volumes, 1981-1990.

All are edited by Jo Ann Boydston and published by the Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois. Some texts were substantially revised by Dewey for inclusion in later collections. These revisions can reflect new ideas and changed views, thus to in effect create two texts for study by those interested in the chronological development of Dewey's thought. These texts are identified and the differences are recorded in the textual apparatus of each volume of the *Works*. The date of the first appearance of a text appears after the title, followed by the collection if reprinted. The abbreviations of these collections are as follows:

- ID* *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, 1910
EE *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 1916
PC *Philosophy and Civilization*, 1931

Selected works by John Dewey

- EW* 1: 3-8 "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism." (1882)
9-18 "The Pantheism of Spinoza." (1882)
19-33 "Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling." (1883)
34-47 "Kant and Philosophic Method." (1884)
48-60 "The New Psychology." (1884)
61-63 "The Obligation to Knowledge of God." (1884)
93-115 "Soul and Body." (1886)

- 123-143 "The Psychological Standpoint." (1886)
 144-167 "Psychology as Philosophical Method." (1886)
 168-175 "Illusory Psychology." (1887)
 176-193 "Knowledge as Idealization." (1887)
 194-204 "Review of G.T. Ladd's *Elements of Physiological Psychology*. (1887)
 205-226 "Ethics and Physical Science." (1887)
 251-435 *Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition*. (1888)
- EW 2** *Psychology*. (1887) (2nd ed. 1889, 3rd ed. 1891)
- EW 3:** 3-13 "The Late Professor Morris." (1889)
 14-35 "The Philosophy of T.H. Green." (1889)
 56-74 "On Some Current Conceptions of the Term 'Self.'" (1890)
 75-82 "Is Logic a Dualistic Science?" (1890)
 83-89 "The Logic of Verification." (1890)
 93-109 "Moral Theory and Practice." (1891)
 125-141 "The Present Position of Logical Theory." (1891)
 142-146 "How Do Concepts Arise From Percepts?" (1891)
 148-154 "The Scholastic and the Speculator." (1892)
 155-173 "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive." (1892)
 180-184 Review of E. Caird's *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. (1890)
 211-235 "Introduction to Philosophy: Syllabus." (1892)
 237-388 *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*. (1891)
- EW 4:** 19-36 "The Superstition of Necessity." (1893)
 42-53 "Self-Realization as a Moral Ideal." (1893)
 91-95 "The Ego as Cause." (1894)
 96-105 "Reconstruction." (1894)
 152-188 "The Theory of Emotion." (1894)
 189-197 Review of B. Bosanquet's *A History of Aesthetic*. (1893)
 200-214 Reviews of L. Ward's *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* and B. Kidd's *Social Evolution*.
 219-362 *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus*. (1894)
- EW 5:** 3-24 "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge." (1897, *ID*)
 25-33 "The Metaphysical Method in Ethics." (1896)
 34-53 "Evolution and Ethics." (1898)
 84-95 "My Pedagogic Creed." (1897)
 96-110 "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." (1896, *PC*)
 111-150 "Interest as Related to Will." (1895, rev. ed. 1899)
 151-163 "The Psychology of Effort." (1897)
 358-367 Review of H. Stanley's *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*. (1896)
 372-385 Review of W.T. Harris's *Psychologic Foundations of Education*. (1898)
 385-399 Review of J.M. Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. (July 1898)
 399-401 "Rejoinder to Baldwin's Reply." (1898)
 402-422 Review of J.M. Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. (September 1898)

- MW* 1: 113-130 "Psychology and Philosophic Method." (1899, *ID*: "'Consciousness' and Experience.")
 151-176 "Some Stages of Logical Thought." (1900, *EE*)
 241-256 Review of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual*, First Series. (1900)
- MW* 2: 3-38 "The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality." (1902)
 39-52 "The Interpretation of the Savage Mind." (1902, *PC*)
 120-137 Review of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual*, Second Series. (1902)
 139-269 Contributions to *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. (1902)
 293-382 *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chapters 1-4. (1903, *EE*)
- MW* 3: 3-39 "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality." (1903)
 62-72 "Notes Upon Logical Topics." (1904)
 79-82 "The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness'." (1906)
 83-100 "Beliefs and Realities." (1906, *ID*: "Beliefs and Existences.")
 101-106 "Reality as Experience." (1906)
 107-127 "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge." (1906, *ID*)
 128-144 "Experience and Objective Idealism." (1906, *ID*)
 153-157 "The Realism of Pragmatism." (1905)
 158-167 "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism." (1905, *ID*)
 168-170 "Immediate Empiricism." (1905)
 171-177 "The Knowledge Experience and Its Relationships." (1905)
 178-183 "The Knowledge Experience Again." (1905)
 312-318 Review of F.C.S. Schiller's *Humanism*. (1904)
 351 "The Psychology of Judgement." (1904)
- MW* 4: 3-14 "Darwin's Influence Upon Philosophy." (1909, *ID*: "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy.")
 50-75 "Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas." (1907, *ID*: "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth.")
 76-77 "The Dilemma of the Intellectualist Theory of Truth." (1909)
 78-90 "The Control of Ideas by Facts." (1907, *EE*)
 91-97 "The Logical Character of Ideas." (1908, *EE*)
 98-115 "What Does Pragmatism Means by Practical?" (1908, *EE*: "What Pragmatism Means by Practical.")
 116-117 "Discussion on Realism and Idealism." (1909)
 118-119 "Discussion on the 'Concept of a Sensation'." (1909)
 120-124 "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer." (1907)
 125-142 "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" (1908, *PC*)
 143-145 "A Reply to Professor McGilvary's Questions." (1912)
 146-155 "Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary." (1909)
 178-191 "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education." (1909)
 217-226 Review of *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*. (1907)
 229-241 Review of George Santayana's *The Life of Reason*, 5 vols. (1907)
 245-249 Review of Albert Schinz's *Anti-pragmatisme*. (1909)
 251-263 "The Pragmatic Movement of Contemporary Thought: A Syllabus." (1909)
- MW* 6: 3-11 "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth." (1910)
 12-68 "The Problem of Truth." (1911)
 69-79 "Science as Subject-Matter and as Method." (1910)
 80-85 "Valid Knowledge and the 'Subjectivity of Experience'." (1910)
 86-90 "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism." (1910)

- 91-97 "William James." (1910)
 103-122 "Brief Studies in Realism." (1911, *EE*)
 138-142 "The Short-Cut to Realism Examined." (1910)
 143-145 "Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding." (1911)
 146-152 "Joint Discussion with Articles of Agreement and Disagreement: Professor Dewey and Dr. Spaulding. (1911)
 177-356 *How We Think*. (1910)
 357-467 Contributions to *A Cyclopaedia of Education*, volumes 1 and 2. (1911)
- MW 7:* 3-30 "Perception and Organic Action." (1912, *FC*)
 31-43 "What Are States of Mind?" (1912)
 47-55 "Psychological Doctrine and Philosophical Teaching." (1914)
 64-78 "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumentalism." (1912)
 79-84 "In Response to Professor McGilvary." (1912)
 137-141 "Modern Psychologists." Review of G.S. Hall's *Founders of Modern Psychology*. (1912)
 142-148 Review of William James's *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. (1912)
 209-365 Contributions to *A Cyclopaedia of Education*, volumes 3, 4, and 5. (1912)
 390-408 "The Psychology of Social Behavior." (1914)
- MW 8:* 3-13 "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry." (1915)
 14-82 "The Logic of Judgments of Practice." (1915, *EE*)
 83-97 "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem." (1915, *EE*)
- MW 10:* 3-48 "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." (1917)
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 53-63 "The Need for Social Psychology." (1917)
 64-66 "Duality and Dualism." (1917)
 71-78 "The Pragmatism of Peirce." (1916)
 79-88 "Voluntarism in the Roycean Philosophy." (1916)
 89-97 "Logical Objects." (1916)
 98-108 "Concerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson." (1917)
 109-115 "George Sylvester Morris: An Estimate." (1917)
 319 "Prefatory Note." to *Essays in Experimental Logic*. (1916)
 320-365 "Introduction." to *Essays in Experimental Logic*. (1916)
 366-369 "An Added Note as to the 'Practical'." in *Essays in Experimental Logic*. (1916)
- MW 11:* 10-17 "Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind." (1918)
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- MW 12:* 77-204 *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. (1920)
 205-50 "Three Contemporary Philosophers: William James, Henri Bergson, and Bertrand Russell." (1920)
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- MW 13:* 29-39 "Knowledge and Speech Reaction." (1922)
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 329-64 "The Unfinished Introduction." (1949, 1951)
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 62-68 "Events and the Future." (1926)
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- LW* 3: 3-10 "The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization." (1927, *PC*: "Philosophy and Civilization.")
 25-40 "Body and Mind." (1928, *PC*)
 41-54 "Social as a Category." (1928, *PC*: "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea.")
 55-72 "An Empirical Account of Experience." (1927, *PC*: "Appearing and Appearance.")
 73-81 "Half-Hearted Naturalism." (1927)
 82-91 "Meaning and Existence." (1928)
- LW* 4 *The Quest For Certainty*. (1929)
- LW* 5: 147-60 "From Absolutism to Experimentalism." (1930)
 210-17 "In Reply to Some Criticisms." (1930)
 424-425 "Tribute to James H. Tufts." (1930)
- LW* 6: 22-28 "George Herbert Mead As I Knew Him." (1931)
 273-77 "Charles Sanders Peirce." Review of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. One, edited by Hartshorne and Weiss. (1932)
 307-310 "Prefatory Remarks in *The Philosophy of the Present*." (1932)
- LW* 10 *Art As Experience*. (1934)
- LW* 11: 69-83 "An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms." (1935)
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 464-478 "The Philosophy of William James." Review of Perry's *The Life and Character of William James*. (1937)
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 155-167 "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of William James." (1940)
 189-200 "The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy." (1941)

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 9-17 "William James as Empiricist." (1942)
 141-152 "Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning." (1946)
- LW 16: 1-294 *Knowing and the Known*, with Arthur Bentley. (1949)
 383-389 "Experience and Existence: A Comment." (1949)
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volumes 1-6 edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Harvard University Press, 1931-35), volumes 7-8 edited by A. Burks (Harvard University Press, 1958), is followed by *CP* and the volume and paragraph numbers. If reprinted in *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, edited by J. Buchler (New York: Dover, 1955) the item is followed by *PWP* and page numbers. If reprinted in *Contributions to The Nation* in four volumes, edited by K. Ketner (Texas Tech Press, 1975-1987) the item is followed by *Nation* and volume and page numbers. If reprinted in *The Essential Peirce* in two volumes, edited by N. Houser and C. Kloesel (Indiana University Press, 1992) the item is followed by *TEP* and the volume and page numbers. If reprinted in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition* (Indiana University Press, 1982-) the item is followed by *W* and the volume and page numbers.

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Works ECR *Essays, Comments, and Reviews*, 1987
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