The Academic Synopticon

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Part Fourteen.
Political Theory and Democracy

Defining Democracy, if successful, helps to distinguish other forms of government as well. The history of democracy reveals what it stands for, and what it stands against. The Greeks knew democracy well, having invented several kinds of democratic "city-states" (small nations, around the size of a 'county' today). The Greek state was called the "polis" and the ancient Greek term Πολιτεία (Politeia) is our word "politics". The Romans used the similar word "publica" and called the state the "Res publica": the Republic. Politics is the art of understanding the government of a State (regardless of size). The Greeks knew well how non-Greeks to their north in Europe did not use the "polis" for government but instead preferred mobile tribal chiefdoms or small short-lived kingdoms. The Greeks also knew other civilizations to the east and south, such as Egypt and Persia, that organized their politics into large nations and sprawling empires.

The Greeks were extremely proud of their basic sort of "Polis" government, because it ensured "self rule" – for a people to be able to rule themselves was far better than being ruled over by a distant emperor. It made complete sense to the Greeks that a typical polis governed by a local elite family was infinitely superior to living in a land ruled by some popular emperor who didn't know his many peoples. To have to live one's life as a 'subject' under a 'ruler' was just like slavery to the Greek way of thinking. If instead one lived as a citizen in a free state (free from domination by a kingdom or an empire) then this political liberty was extremely valuable. To our minds, it seems strange to picture a small state with a government controlled by a few wealthy families (an 'aristocracy') as a free republic. But the ancient world (or the medieval world) did not imagine that freedom required all the common people to be involved in politics. So long as the government (1) was local and native to the land, and (2) upheld laws for the benefit of the whole state, then this state is a Republic and enjoys freedom. Many Greeks were especially proud to live in democracies. They invented the word: dēmos "common people" plus "kratos" power yields 'demo-cracy'.

So far, we have distinguished two kinds of government.

A. Local government ruling with public law for the welfare of the homeland.

B. Distant government ruling with fickle dictates that mainly benefit the rulers.

Type A government, for the Greeks, was the best kind of government. Maybe the common people had some political power, or maybe only the rich families had power, but at least this Polis was a free state made up of citizens, not subjects. The Romans labeled this kind of government as "Republican" government and (until Caesar) they were proud to live in their Roman Republic. Type B government was what the Greeks called "Tyranny". They witnessed two sub-types of Tyranny: Local and Empire. Rome learned the same lesson. Roman senators assassinated Julius Caesar in 44 BCE to prevent a tyranny and save the Republic. His heir Augustus ended the Roman Republic and inaugurated the Roman Empire as its Emperor.

Local tyranny happens when a local aristocrat or warlord – the Dictator – takes all political power and uses it only for selfish goals (gaining more wealth and power). This Dictator violates or voids public law, imposes arbitrary commands, tries to destroy any opposition, and usually degrades the homeland over time. When a Polis is threatened by a Dictator, some combination of the common people and aristocratic families have to coalition together to remove the Dictator. Dictators tend to de-stabilize government (corruption, assassinations, civil wars, etc.) so a small state becomes an easy target to get conquered.

Empire tyranny happens when one's Polis gets conquered by a neighboring kingdom or a distant empire. That Monarch may attempt to benefit the entire kingdom but local peoples aren't impressed (unless they are co-opted by government money through bounties and bribery). When a polis is subjugated into a kingdom/empire, that polis has to attempt rebellion, expel the foreign army, and regain freedom. Very often, a successful rebellion puts the winning commander into the role of local tyrant... and the cycle continues.

Because the Greeks had about 600 years (c.900-300 BCE) to experiment with various kinds of governments for the Polis (there were several hundred of them over that time), the Greeks debated the question, which type of government proves to be best for a city state? Different criteria were applied: Does a city state prosper from military might? Or from economic power? Or from friendly neighbors and lasting peace? The Greeks became adept at political theory, expressed in their revered legends (such as Homer), their dramatic theater (e.g. Sophocles, Euripedes), and their philosophers (such as the Sophists, Socrates, and Plato c.400 BCE). The poets and dramatists usually credited political success to a polis's good relations with their gods (public piety), but philosophers instead credited good laws (legal justice) for stability and prosperity.

Political theory separates away from mythology (our laws were set long ago) and theocracy (our laws are from god) when intellectuals come to the realization that a state's laws are just made by people for earthly ends. Three questions are therefore essential for political thinking:

Who makes the Law? This is the Legislative question.

Who enforces the Law? This is the Executive question.

Who obeys the Law? This is the Judicial question.

We begin to consider what is special about democracy here. The people of a polis can have political power (to varying degrees) over answers to these three core questions.

The Legislative. The simplest sort of government gives the Executive all law-making powers: this is the Monarch. If the Monarch also controls the judiciary (and the religious establishment) then a country has an Absolute Monarch. Alternatively, an independent Legislature will either be controlled by wealthy families or by the common people. If controlled by the few with great wealth, the Legislature is "Oligarchic." If controlled by the masses (at least adult men) the Legislature is "Representative." In rare cases, a state may allow "direct democracy" where a law is passed on majority vote of all the voters. "No taxation without representation" is a plea for citizen participation.

The Executive. The easiest question to answer, in ancient times and today, is the Executive question. The people themselves do not want the burden of enforcement – too much effort and risk, and tends towards vigilante revenge and mob violence. The primary point of any government, from tribal and kingly to national and constitutional, is the efficient enforcement of law and homeland protection by trained experts. Since two (or more) supreme enforcers (with their own police or armies?) won't be efficient, law enforcement and government administration must be concentrated in the lone Executive authority. (A country might divide power with two executives, e.g. a "Prime Minister" and a "President" or "Chancellor" but this allows political inefficiencies.) Like chiefs, kings, and emperors, this Executive gets invested with the duty of military "commander-in-chief" and the image of "representing the whole people" while "caring the most" for the homeland. "God save the President" is a plea for national unity.

The Judicial. The judiciary (including judges, jurors, etc.) determines who should be accused of violations, how trials are conducted, when convictions should be made, and how punishments should be sentenced. Our modern answer to the question, "Who obeys the Law?" is "Everyone!" But that is a modern answer from

constitutional democracy. Government in general may exempt a portion of society from having to obey many laws, so that the judiciary in effect handles two kinds of Law: one public law for the masses and another special law for the privileged. The point of "privileged law" is to allow the high-status portion of society to dominate and control the commoners for profit, amusement, and abuse. An example is when a rich man can kidnap, harm, or even kill a commoner without any consequences. Another example is when a high-caste born person is exempt from regulations or taxes for lower-caste people. Yet another example is when judges ignore the operations of criminal gangs or illegal businesses. Yet another example is when the judicial system refuses to punish police for unjustifiable murders. "No one is above the Law" is a plea for justice from the judiciary.

For the Greeks and Romans, and down to this day, three different political questions frame how to determine what kind of government a state has. Monarchist political theory is interested in how much executive, legislative, and judicial power can get concentrated in a single individual. Aristocratic political theory is interested in how a privileged class maintains domination over government and the rest of society.

Democratic political theory investigates how much power the population has in these three political domains.

Who makes the Law? This is the Legislative question. Put democratically, we can then ask:
Are a country's inhabitants able to participate in deciding the laws that they must obey?
The range: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

Who enforces the Law? This is the Executive question. Put democratically, we can then ask:
Do a country's citizens have the opportunity to replace executive leadership with their choice?
The range: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

Who obeys the Law? This is the Judicial question. Put democratically, we can then ask:
Are a country's masses free from domination by privileged classes with legal exemptions?
The range: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

Put in Abraham Lincoln's pithy words – "a government of, by, and for the people" – a democracy is:

Democracy is Of the People: all people are included in sharing political power together.

Democracy is By the People: all people are participating in deciding the government and its laws.

Democracy is For the People: all people benefit from government with equity and justice.

Democracy in principle should maximize Participation, Contestation, and Liberation. In practice, actual governments will reach only certain degrees of democratic politics.

The History of Democracy

In small tribal societies, such as the Celtic and Germanic peoples of Iron-Age Europe (c.600 BCE–600 CE), leadership was accountable to everyone. The Greeks were an earlier migratory people from the Steppe populations moving West that later populated Europe. They shared a deep distrust of political power, and they expected leadership to be accountable to everyone. Temporary chiefdoms, few kings, open councils, and elections were typical. To avoid exploitation by would-be kings, this "tribal democracy" valued *Transparency*: decisions were openly debated and made by the group (most men and sometimes women too). During the early Iron Age in Greece, the polis continued this tradition of transparency and added *Accountability*: to prevent oppression by any ruler, the people expected to restrain and replace authorities.

Around Greece, huge nations and vast empires rose and fell, featuring permanent oligarchies of wealthy clannish elites who preferred dynasties. Some Greek city-states were more democratic than others, but Athens characterized Greek democracy after the reforms of Cleisthenes (c.500 BCE). In 400 BC there were around 60,000 Athenian citizens, of whom 20,000 were free men eligible for politics. The rest of the population consisted of many thousands of "metics" (residents working in Athens but not native) and perhaps 80,000 unfree servants and slaves. The democratic city-state was characterized by *Transparency, Accountability, and Representation*: free men could vote on laws, policies, and leaders in the Assembly and other councils. Only men from more elite families could hold high political office, although most men could hold minor offices at any time for short durations. Athenian democracy were quite "direct" – adult men who showed up for political service were legislating because they were no "elected legislators" in the manner of modern democracies. Another important feature of Greek democracy was its principle of *Isonomia*: One rule of law over everyone.

The transition from Renaissance to Modern Europe during 1600-1800 added two further features of increasingly democratic governance, Ideology and Rights. Competitive elections for a legislative body was an opportunity for different parts of society to organize movements for their political agendas and place their confidence in political parties. The social sciences later assigned the label of "ideology" to political ideas and ideals vitalizing these movements. As a neutral academic term (not "my politics is righteous truth, your bad politics is mere ideology") political theory observes how any effective movement gets organized around *Ideology*: segments of of society advance visions of civic life and justice. Beyond all ideology, however, stand *Rights*: supreme responsibilities of government to protect citizens from severe harms from either government itself or from dominating parts of society.

Transparency. Governing deliberations, decisions, and decrees are conducted and enforced in public view.

Accountability. Governing officials and administrators can be freely and peaceably replaced by the citizenry.

Representation. Citizens run for office and win competitive elections that are openly and fairly conducted.

Isonomia. One rule of law and one judicial system has jurisdiction over the whole country and its population.

Ideology. Citizens promote civic ideals and form political parties without restraints on speech or assembly.

Rights. Society's members are protected by rights (indiv./group) from unjust discriminations and dominations.

<u>Political Science Nomenclature</u>

A "People" share a language, a cultural heritage, a sense of common ancestry, and a homeland (in the past, if not at present). They may have a tribal existence, reside within a larger society, or be scattered in a diaspora.

A "Nation" is a People of sufficient numbers (usually more than 10,000) residing together in a territory who are maintaining their own social institutions (e.g. family, customs, education, production, trade), but they might not have their own sovereign government.

A "Country" is a Nation, or an mixed population, that is politically free with its own sovereign government.

A "State" is a Country where its government holds effective enforcement authority (with supreme force) over the whole land. If not, due to insurrection, civil war, or chaotic collapse, it is a Failed State.

While objective as academic categories, these terms are not used without controversy. For example, the Kurds of Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia have been a Nation since ancient times, but the anti-Kurdish Turkish government disagrees (for fear of Kurdish separatism). A typical Nation once had its own Country but got subjugated by neighboring countries, or it could have had its own Country but opportunities proved fleeting.

Plato and Aristotle developed a categorization for all possible kinds of governments.



https://seventhcoalition.org/2016/09/30/classical-western-influence-in-american-government/

Democratic Participation

Three main types of democracy, with a total of six sub-types, distinguish ways that citizens can exercise political power to hold governing power and choose their legislators, generically called the 'Assembly'. Similar methods can be used for citizens to choose the head of administration, generically labeled as the 'Executive'.

I. Direct Democracy. All eligible citizens are voting as an Assembly upon motions to make law, budget, and policy decisions. A direct vote on a new proposed law by all citizens is a plebiscite vote in a referendum.

II. Sampling Democracy. Eligible citizens are picked in a random lottery (by "sortition") to serve in office for a short duration (a month, a year, e.g.) as a member of an Assembly. Lottery may also apply to choose a magistrate, a large council, a small tribunal, or a jury.

III. Indirect Democracy. Eligible citizens can be a candidate and together they vote for candidates; winners (by majority or at least plurality) serve terms of office as members of an Assembly.

There are several varieties of Indirect Democracy:

IIIA. Popular Assembly. The Assembly of elected citizens does not make all laws and policies itself, but holds votes to choose members of higher councils, judicial magistrates, heads of administrative departments, and the military chiefs. This popular Assembly can choose and remove executive authorities.

IIIB. Elected Legislature. Each member of the Legislature is elected by the voting citizens as a whole. This Legislature makes laws and policies and chooses administration ministers, judicial magistrates, and generals.

IIIC. Apportioned Legislature. Of the 100% of available seats in a legislature, a portion (30% say, or 20%, etc.) is reserved for classes of society who get representation. For example, the Prussian *Dreiklassenwahlrecht* system (1848-1918) ensured that the working class only held a third of the seats, always outvoted by the other two thirds: Junkers (landed nobility) and urban wealthy (bourgeoisie) classes.

IIID. Representative Legislature. Voters are divided into geographical districts. From each district, its voters chose its representatives in the Legislature, who then make laws. This kind of Legislature usually has to work with an elected Executive who separately selects the administration, military heads, and judges. Before the 1900s, a Constitutional Monarchy would pair an unelected hereditary monarch with an elected Legislature.

IIIE. Party Parliament. Citizens vote for political parties, not on individual candidates. Each party gets a share of seats in the Parliament matching the percent of whole vote received. The majority party in Parliament (or coalition of parties reaching 50.1%) controls legislative processes and law making. The leader of the majority party (i.e. a Prime Minister) may also serve as the Executive, or else the Parliament has to work with an elected Executive with some administrative and military powers. Before the 1900s, it was common for a Constitutional Monarchy to pair an unelected hereditary monarch with an elected Parliament.

Democratic Participation versus Democratic Contestation and Liberation

> "It is not unfrequent to hear men declaim loudly upon liberty, who, if we may judge by the whole tenor of their actions, mean nothing else by it but their own liberty—to oppress without control or the restraint of laws all who are poorer or weaker than themselves." –Samuel Adams of Boston, 1748

A majority of citizens can easily apply their political power to prevent the rest of citizens from full participation, fair contestation, and equal liberation. The greatest threat to liberty, as the history of democracy displays, is not from the eager dictator but from the people themselves. When the government is controlled by a willful majority, that majority becomes the Tyrant. Democracy, if not managed, is indistinguishable from Dictatorship.

A majority party in political power can try to obstruct the success of smaller parties in elections in endless ways. By applying legal, administrative, and judicial powers, a smaller party can be harassed by propaganda, obstructed by policy, and even criminalized. When the majority party (again) wins an election, was this a democratic process? By the Participation criterion, yes: not a single citizen was prevented from voting. By the Contestation criterion, no: a smaller party could not properly contest this election, and all those voters were not actually voting in a contested election.

A majority party in political power can also become a regime that imposes dominations on minority groups in the country. Legislation can burden minorities with disadvantages and disparities. The judiciary can treat the majority portion with special favoritism and oppress minorities with a sterner version of the law. The administration can obstruct the voting of minorities with election barriers. Effectively, the majority sets up a kind of second-class citizenship for minorities. A majority party naturally claims that all of this domination is actually entirely constitutional and legal, and so it may be, but citizens are not equally liberated and they aren't participating in fully contested elections.

Democratic Theory has to deal with the problem of Majority Tyranny to uphold Liberation and Contestation. Essentially, how should a democratic constitution ensure that majorities cannot dominate and oppress minorities? Two different kinds of protections have been predominantly tried by various democracies since the 1700s. (1) Equal citizenship treats each citizen as a holder of basic rights as an individual regardless of identity or membership in any group. (2) Parochial Law treats a citizen as a member of a protected group following laws somewhat different from the general law.

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP:	PAROCHIAL LAW:
One Law for All	Group Law for each Group
Rights are Personal for Individuals.	Rights are Collective for Groups.
Individualism is more "democratic".	Pluralism is more "democratic".
Individual rights promotes greater diversity, for individuals pursuing their distinctive own lives.	Collective rights promotes greater diversity, for societies respecting their distinctive cultural heritages.
Individualism tends to promote integration and cultural blending over generations.	Pluralism tends to promote segregation and prevents cultural dissolution over time.
Citizens usually vote for their own interests.	Citizens usually vote for their groups' interests.
Voters seek numerical representation.	Minorities seek proportionate representation.
Citizen individualism leads towards a political party system.	Minority pluralism leads towards a political caste system.

Basic Categories for Governments

Six Democracies	Six Nondemocracies
1. Direct Democracy (max. transparency, accountability)	14. Tyranny (no transparency or accountability)
2. Sampling Democracy (max. representation)	13. Dictatorship (no representation, no power sharing)
3. Popular Assembly (max. participation)	12. Populist Autocracy (power from sham participation)
4. Elected Legislature (rule by electable elites)	11. Nobility (control by prominent families/clans)
5. Apportioned Legislature (rule by dominant classes)	10. Oligarchy (control by a small wealthy class)
6. Representative Legislature (laws benefit majorities)	9. Aristocracy (laws benefit a privileged class)
7. Party Parliament (laws benefit many cultural groups)	8. Ethnic Nationalism (laws benefit dominant ethnicity)

Each pairing (e.g. 1+14, 2+13, 3+12, and so on) easily combine together. A democratic form of government attracts and even generates its non-democratic twin. In practice, besides dynastic monarchy (e.g. kingdoms like ancient Egypt, medieval France, Saudi Arabia today) and fascist despotism (e.g. Rome's Caesars, Hitler's Nazi Germany, today's Egypt), there are seven distinguishable forms of government with democratic features.

<u>Democracy Combinations</u>

1+14. Direct democracy is indistinguishable from tyranny for any in the minority. Even a member of the majority will feel constrained into being the "right type" of person who "belongs." The majority thinks that the government is 100% accountable (to that majority, of course) while any minority feels that the government has 0% accountability. The "tyranny of the mob masses" has a notorious place in the history of politics. Where a small city or country is highly homogenous and culturally unified, direct democracy can be civil and peaceful. Accurate label: Pure Democracy. Examples: ancient Athens, Swiss cantons.

2+13. Sampling democracy is usually tried by small city-states, communes (like a 'soviet', 'kibbutz', 'ashram'), or business cooperatives. Because time and talent varies widely, a few experts gain enough institutional memory and trust to dominate major decisions. When communalism is attempted at the larger scale of a nation, this system superficially engages the whole people but it effectively devolves into a revolving dictatorship that draws administrative expertise from the educated public. Accurate label: Communal Dictatorship. Examples: China's Ming Dynasty with Confucianism, the Soviet Union with Communism.

3+12. A popular assembly consisting of elected citizens allows for office holders who possess greater experience than most, who in turn choose high officials with genuine expertise (e.g. magistrates, judges, generals). However, as history attests, popular assemblies usually get dominated by highly charismatic leaders – "demagogues" – who gather great power from peaceful elections or public emergencies: popular democracies attract populist autocrats. Accurate label: Populist Autocracy. Examples: Greek city-states, 20th C. Argentina, Germany's Nazi election (1932-33), France's DeGaulle rule (1960s).

4+11. Elected legislatures mostly consist of older nobility of the "right" heritage who have the leisure and the money to get themselves known among the population. Their nationalistic rhetoric convinces the masses again and again, but in office they make laws favoring their own privileged class and impoverishing the masses. If the lower classes or minority groups can find political solidarity, their own political parties may gain some balance

against the oligarchic party (e.g. liberal vs. conservative parties). If the common people revolt, they are repressed by the military who sides with the nobility (or the military takes power if a revolution succeeds). Accurate label: Hereditary Regime. Examples: Republican-era Rome, Renaissance Florence, 1800s England, 20th C. Mexico, current Turkey.

5+10. An apportioned legislature establishes a quota system to distribute membership seats according to segments of the population. Historically, early proto-democracies used apportionment to include lower classes among traditional "estates" such as the nobility, the clergy, and city elites. Effectively, apportionment obstructs real power for the masses, extending the life of feudalism and rule by a nobility or ethnic elite. A bicameral legislature's "upper" part can serve this apportionment function for elites; England's House of Lords (until 1911) and Sweden's First Chamber (until 1918) are illustrations. The U.S. Constitution provided for state apportionment in the Senate (each state gets two members) as well as elite apportionment (the Founders expected local aristocrats to be Senators.) Today's example is India's Parliament since 2008: 412 seats are general, 84 seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes and 47 seats are reserved for the Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST peoples are about 25% of India). India's rural governments must have a minimum of 33% women as well. Well-educated elites around the world get labeled as a "Brahmin" class in imitation of India's caste tradition. Long-term effects of apportionment are mixed, ensuring some minority visibility and equity in politics but guaranteeing majority rule by the elites, while entrenching those civic divisions for future generations in society. Accurate Label: Electoral Oligarchy. Examples: Monarchist England, 19th C. Prussia, current India.

6+9. A representative legislature apportions by geography so it consists of members more similar to their local constituencies, shrinking the gap between their status and the public. However, that "representativeness" divides this legislature into factions – over geographical divides, cultural divides, religious divides, etc. – while no member is prioritizing the whole nation. By emphasizing individual equal citizenship and majority rule, this kind of legislature makes it difficult for minority groups to sustain their own political parties. Two major parties eventually dominate all politics in a nation, ensuring that minority groups get no party representation. Eventually, one or the other major party will resort to devout nationalism to achieve a permanent voting majority, by elevating one social group possessing the "best" birth (old 'nobility'), or heritage ('nativism'), or religion, and so on. Aristocratic elites gain power as heads of political parties promoting their own groups, and promote supremacist laws and policies that assign minorities a second-class sort of citizenship. The end of democracy may then come with the rise of an autocracy or a theocracy. Accurate label: Representative Aristocracy. Example: 1800s America, 20th C. France, current India.

7+8. A party parliament consists of representatives of social groups, ensuring that minority groups get proportionate representation. However, they may get out-voted in parliament. A majority in the population establishes a majority party control over the parliament, leading towards ethnic nationalism. If one or two minority parties can sustain effective checks on that majority, a stable opposition supplies balance. Where compromise fails, the next resort is plenty of parochial law to meet the partisan demands of various ethnic/religious groups for protection from assimilation into the majority. The ideal of one equal rule of law for all individuals is replaced by separate (and not necessarily equal) sets of laws that apply depending on what social group one belongs to. Elites push their respective groups into public conflicts in order to win elections with their competition for power. Worse-case scenarios result in segregation by caste, religion, or assigned race (apartheid). Accurate label: Partisan Parliamentarianism. Examples: 20th C. Italy, Israel, South Africa.

Typical non-democracies since 1800 have imitated democracies by establishing constitutions that provide for citizenship, legislative bodies, and executive authorities. These countries are non-democratic because any elections are deeply manipulated by the governing regimes. Either most people cannot vote, or most can vote but few candidates are allowed, or the masses vote from ignorance due to state propaganda. In any case, voting has little effect on legal or administrative action anyways. Society continues to be militarily, ethnically, religiously, or aristocratically controlled.

After 1900, partial democracies and non-democracies combining occasion "elections" with 8, 9, and/or 10. For example, in Putin's Russia, he wins sham elections whenever he wants (#12) and his power rests on Russian nationalism (#8), Army generals (#9), and oligarch billionaires (#10).

Extreme Democracies

Democracy demands three dimensions: Representation, Contestation, Liberation. Maximizing one dimension tends to conflict with maximizing the others. However, "Extreme Democracy" takes a dimension to 100%. During the 20th century, experiments with "extreme democracies" were designed in theory and occasionally put into practice in a few countries.

Representation: Does the government get controlled by this or that faction representing only some portion of the citizenry, or does the government always represent all of the citizenry?
Options: Many combative factions——————A few conflicting parties——————One people's party
How democratic: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

Contestation: Do elections give opportunities for any and all citizens to be part of the government?
Options: Only elites are electable——————Many people are electable——————All citizens hold offices
How democratic: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

The Judicial question: Does the government prevent domination by higher-status segments of society?
Options: Vast gaps in status——————No privileged classes——————Equal distribution
How democratic: 0%——————————————50%——————————————100%

Three kinds of politics **maximize** the three democratic dimensions: the Mono-party Regime, Direct Democracy, and Egalitarianism. One political theory attempts their three-fold combination: ***Communism***.

Three kinds of politics **minimize** the three democratic dimensions: Combative Factionalism, Electoral Elitism, and Wealth Concentration. One political theory attempts their three-fold combination: ***Libertarianism***.

New "Democracies"

> "I don't think there are any more Russians, and there ain't no yanks, just corporate criminals, playing with tanks.."
> – "The Walls Came Down" (1983) lyrics by Michael Been and his band The Call

By the 1980s, academics and intellectual pundits were noting the rise of "sorta" democracies that maintained the façade of free elections but governments actually fixate on other agendas. Just a sampling:

Corporatocracy. The priorities of major corporations and major industries are the priorities of government. Few laws or regulations that they dislike get passed, but they get most everything they lobby for. Unlike libertarianism, where corporations get little help from government, Corporatocracy finds government arranging expansive laws, low taxes, and spending programs to assist investment, capital, trade, and finance. Robust Corporatocracy has multi-national corporations manipulating countries, global trade, and geopolitics.

Kleptocracy. The blurred boundary between government officials and pro-government businesses allows secret transfers of public money into private hands (and then usually sent out of the country into off-shore hidden accounts). The most blatant kleptocracy has heads of government personally channeling government funds into their own off-shore accounts (or picture a kleptocrat's truck full of gold leaving the country.)

Technocracy. Invention and innovation are hardly questioned, always promoted, and thinly regulated, so that the public never gets an opportunity to control technological change. Accelerating technological usage and transforming society to enhance technological progress are the governing imperatives. Government modifies law, policies, and regulations to reward prompt adopters and penalize resisters to new technology.

Pseudo-Democracies

These forms of governing once promoted democracy during periods of struggle against monarchy and aristocracy. By the twentieth century, they had devolved into degenerate forms of democracy, the 'pseudo'-democracies. They fail to be genuine democracies because they lack trust in full and equal citizen participation.

Types of PSEUDO-DEMOCRACY	democracy's purpose:	democracy's success is:	too much success?	what happens to education?	a criticism is:
Fanatical	democracy fixates on a few absolute rights, without compromise despite the risk of social harm or uncivil unrest	toleration or independence (for any individual or subgroup) is enshrined as inviolable	a society is all the more 'democratic' if it hosts and protects many autocratic subgroups	each autocratic subgroup operates its own educational institutions, perpetuating both values and prejudices	How could submission to one subgroup's dogmas be empowering for one's individuality and freedom of thought?
Grievance	democracy is the remedy for any injustices perpetrated on victimized persons deprived of opportunity	subgroups solicit victimization status, demanding compensatory exemptions from the uniform rule of law	a society is all the more 'democratic' as more and more subgroups can set the laws that they want to obey	victimized groups opt out of public education to promote subgroup identities, thereby perpetuating victimization in future generations	Oppressed peoples aren't empowered from paternalistic protection or their own sets of laws. ONE rule of law for ALL benefits justice in the long run.
Contractual	democracy is a social contract for protecting what people already possess, to prevent theft and anarchy	subgroups make dangerous threats to social order if they don't get their way, so they can get included in power-sharing	a society is more 'democratic' where power-sharing deals among uncivil subgroups permit a government to function	Each dangerous subgroup operates its own educational institutions, perpetuating the ideologies that keep them dangerous	Government must promote equal opportunity for all future citizens, not just protect whoever happens to possess the most right now.
Elitist	democracy is manageable by educated elites, who manipulate public opinion enough to make democracy safe for infrequent voting	subgroups are led by their own capable elites, who each uphold the government, in return for rightful control over their own subgroups	a society is all the more 'democratic' with a stable 'multicultural' balance of power, protected and promoted by the government	each subgroup's elites can operate educational institutions for their own members, perpetuating group identities and loyalties across future generations	Education is NOT the formation of rigid identities to be manipulated by elites. Education is true empowerment to become a free individual.
Fatalist	democracy is a realistic and convenient power arrangement to maintain stability, since values and ideals are unreal and ineffective	subgroups of every sort are accommodated within the country, regardless of the values they each uphold	a society is all the more 'democratic' while many subgroups can at least control themselves as they please in a non-violent way	Each isolated subgroup operates its own educational institutions for their own members, preventing much appreciation for other cultures.	Public education that respects all subgroups is the best prevention AGAINST hegemonic uniformity that stifles creative thinking.

THE 25 OLDEST DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD

OLDER — YOUNGER

Note: This infographic uses data from Boix, Miller and Rosato's "Comparative Political Studies" which goes back to the year 1800 and uses 219 countries.

They define a country as democratic if they meet the following conditions:

The executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature.

The legislature (or the executive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections.

A majority of adult men has the right to vote.

Universal suffrage came later. In the U.S., for example, all women could not vote until 1920.





THE ECONOMIST



V-DEM 2001 (above) and V-DEM 2022 (below)





Source: https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights



Quick Glance Test: Democratic or Not?

Country A.
The current head-of-government (chief executive) came into office in 2022 without winning a national election by citizens. The executive he replaced hadn't won any election either. This executive is the country's fifth since 2016, and he doesn't plan on any election until 2025, even though his party hadn't won an election for a few years. He ascended to power only because his own party of fewer than 200,000 members chose him, in country of many millions of people. The son of immigrants into this country, this executive now leads a very different ethnic population from his own (while the country's monarch is from that majority ethnicity). Even his party is a minority party unable to get a majority of votes, getting a little over 40% in that previous election.

Country B.
The current head-of-government (chief executive) came into office in 2023 by winning a national election. In that contested election he got less than 40% of the vote, but most of the registered voters apparently didn't vote, so around 10% of the eligible electorate voted for him. Accusations of violence at polling places and voting fraud have made rivals denounce and reject his election. This new executive, a staunch proponent of democracy in recent years, replaces a military general. That general rose to power in a coup d'etat many years ago, ran the country for many years as a dictator, and later won a popular election too. The new executive himself had aided military coups in this country during civil wars decades ago as a younger military officer.

In order to fairly compare countries on the quality of their elections, their Constitutions must be studied and their civic life must be examined, to check not only for proper participation but specifically for "polyarchy".

Polyarchy

Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (1989), p. 233 (exact quotation):

1. Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections in which coercion is quite limited.

3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections.

4. Most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which candidates run in these elections.

5. Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology.

6. They also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group.

7. Finally, they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means.

Dahl's seven criteria for "Polyarchy" effectively fulfill the six features observed across the history of the strengthening of democracy from ancient Greece to the 1800s.

Transparency. Governing deliberations, decisions, and decrees are conducted and enforced in public view.

Accountability. Governing officials and administrators can be freely and peaceably replaced by the citizenry.

Representation. Citizens run for office and win competitive elections that are openly and fairly conducted.

Isonomia. One rule of law and one judicial system has jurisdiction over the whole country and its population.

Ideology. Citizens promote civic ideals and form political parties without restraints on speech or assembly.

Rights. Society's members are protected by rights (indiv./group) from unjust discriminations and dominations.

—— Polyarchy should ensure Freedom from any Autocracy and Liberty from a Majority ——

Democratic Ideal	Civil Right/Liberty	Polyarchy Criterion	Feature of Political Life
Transparency	Civil Liberty	Alternative information sources and media	Citizens access ample **Information** to debate ideas and form majorities.
Accountability	Civil Right	Government officials are electable by all citizens	**Freedom** of elections allow majorities to make their preferred choices.
Representation	Civil Right	All citizens can run, and vote In elections fairly conducted	Citizens chose government to enjoy the political **Liberty** of self-rule.
Uniform Law	Civil Right	Citizenship, law, and justice is the same for everyone.	Nothing legal obstructs **Equality** and full participation in civic life.
Ideology	Civil Liberty	Freedom of speech and social expression.	Segments of society forge **Solidarity** around causes to improve their lives.
Rights	Civil Right	Individual and Group rights to maintain independence.	**Autonomy** to associate in subgroups such as cultures or political parties.



Polyarchy only helps to discriminate among electoral democracies who fall short of polyarchy and demarcate where there is enough polyarchy for a country to have liberal democracy rather than "illiberal" democracy. Polyarchy has little to do with ultimate questions about judicial matters: fundamental human rights, the right of a Nation to have sovereign independence as its own country, or the right of natives and immigrants to acquire full citizenship within a country.

Polyarchy cannot illuminate Representation very much, either. For example, measures of polyarchy are blind to tough issues about (a) an election between two candidates pre-approved by elites, or elections long delayed by the government, or elections repeatedly won by one political party.

Populism

Polyarchy's blindness to problems with Representation makes it difficult to understand the role of Populism in democracy: is it democratic, or undemocratic? Populism is a category for mass ideological movements that protest long-term political management by the elite class, delayed elections keeping a regime in power, and the prolonged control of government by one party. Populism is not just about a majority finding its voice and power in contested elections. Populism aims to re-claim the entire government in the name of "The People."

<u>Historical Populism</u>

Historically, populist movements have battled against elitist classes for greater political participation and representation. By definition, populist movements from medieval to modern times were always pro-Republican (against monarchies and autocracies) and pro-Democratic (all men, at least, should be voting).

From the mid-1800s to 2000, achievements of democracy allowed Populism to evolve beyond just removing kings from thrones and electing legislatures and presidents. With that increasing political influence, Populism could aim higher than just attaining the minimums of Electoral Democracy. Populism separated into two basic types, but both types are capable of yielding either pro-democratic results, or anti-democratic results.



The explosive sort of Populism combines features of all three anti-democratic movements: A large segment of the population, resentful towards the unrepresentative and uncaring government, blames other segments of society who do not deserve their wealth/prestige/power. This aggrieved movement threatens to overturn the government by electing a sympathetic autocrat, or resorting to revolutionary force.

Religion and Secularism

Religions may not prove able to prevent their decomposition, and enough speculative theology can only accelerate that process. A religion can lose persuasive cohesion to the point where its aspects become separable and optional components as far as many adherents can tell, and when enough people are treating those aspects as optional as well, the religion itself is fading out. Those adherents are not becoming 'non-religious' or secular by default. Only if all religious convictions and practices are dropped would a person be quite secular in lifestyle.

The formulation and destiny of secularism depends on the course of that perennial debate between philosophy and theology. Philosophy starts from the position of epistemic fallibilism (rather than foundationalism) about any religious knowledge. Theology counters with epistemic foundationalism about knowledge of divine matters, and the presumption that religion (in theological hands) understands its own faith the best.

PHILOSOPHY		THEOLOGY	MORAL THEOLOGY
Epistemic Fallibilism Any knowledge from learning could be inadequate or wrong	vs.	Revelatory Dogmatism Knowledge from God can never be wrong.	A religion's theology knows that religion's essential beliefs and moral duties.
Epistemic Individualism One has responsibility only for one's own beliefs.	vs.	Social Theology The religion has responsibility for everyone's beliefs.	A religion holds all members morally responsible for their beliefs and their conduct.
Epistemic Objectivism Non-followers can tell what a religion requires.	vs.	Epistemic Internalism Only followers reliably say what is religiously required.	A religion's theology has the exclusive knowledge about the moral duties of followers.
Sociology of Religion Religions can be objectively sorted by their requirements.	vs.	Ecumenical Theology Religions respect each other's internal authority over piety.	Each religion is the authority over pious followers knowing their moral duties.
Politics of Religion Each religion is objectively classifiable as "civil" or "uncivil".	vs.	Political Theology Each religion understands how followers should be civil or not.	A religion's theology knows when its pious followers should be civil, and when to be uncivil.
Political Philosophy Governments can neutrally classify different religions as either "civil" and lawful religions, or as "uncivil".	vs.	Political Theology Theologies can classify governments as either religiously oppressive or as religiously supportive.	A religion's theology knows how to instruct its pious followers how to stay morally righteous by lawful or unlawful conduct.
Political Philosophy Citizens are told to control their beliefs so that their religion stays "civil" rather than "unlawful".	vs.	Political Theology Citizens are informed about how to resist oppressive governments that try to regulate faith and piety.	A religion's theology justifies why pious followers must conflict with anti-religious governments.
Political Liberalism Religious citizens only have the right to be civilly religious and have no right to be uncivil.	vs.	Political Theology Religious citizens always have the God-given right to ignore laws restraining their pious conduct.	A religion's theology justifies why pious followers must do what is required by their religion.
State vs Church A government only respects the right of individuals to be lawfully religious, and only tolerates those	vs.	Church vs. State A religion only respects legitimate governments that respect the freedom of its followers to stay	Pious Morality vs. Secular Evil A religion's theology knows how to classify governments as either favorable towards religion or as

religions sharing that politics. pious and righteous. driven towards secular tyranny.

Furthermore, even if some religious convictions and practices get widely dropped due to persuasive secular ideologies or worldviews, that process of secularization isn't destined for culminating in the final secularization of society. Most adherents will re-adapt or re-invent other religious convictions and practices rather than become atheists. Atheism would only rise significantly in the long run if strong secular institutions have reasonable and beneficent ideologies and nonreligious worldviews had satisfying cosmologies and intelligible 'big histories'. Atheism by itself can be artificially promoted by materialistic totalitarianisms, but long-terms results are unstable and undesirable.

Long-lasting secularisms rely on speculative philosophies for merging scientific cosmology and 'big' history, ethical humanism, and democratic political theory. In the west, the last great syncretic worldview was High Medievalism. The next great nonreligious worldview will be no mere "shadow" lingering from the death of God, but a comprehensive atheological alternative needing no sacred foundations.

Atheism is merely the view that it is reasonable to leave out deities (and anything supernatural) from one's worldview. Atheism is not the same as secularism. Atheism raises objections to god-belief in people's minds; secularism opposes the influence religion has over people's conduct and civic life. Secularism is the dedicated effort to reducing the influence of religion upon social institutions and personal lives. Political secularism specifically tries to reduce the amount of control that religion(s) and the government can have over each other.

Atheism by itself needn't object to lots of people being religious, so long as atheists themselves aren't the object of prejudice and discrimination. Atheists tend to be vocal and energetic secularists when conservative religion and dogmatic theology seek parasitic control over government.

Seven Core Disciplines and their Approaches to Religion and Secularity

DISCIPLINE	What are religions?	How to be a religious person?
PHILOSOPHY		
Debates theories about what is most fundamental and valuable.	Religions are like rival worldviews speculating about ultimate reality.	Contemplate what is truly real and supremely responsible for everything.
HISTORY		
Chronicles timelines of significant events and important actions.	Religions are like enduring dynasties headed by charismatic leaders.	Believe tales of miracles and follow those performing wondrous deeds.
SOCIOLOGY		
Observes how social relations and organizations operate and succeed.	Religions are like solidarity groups enforcing behavior conformity.	Participate in group practices that orient members' priorities and duties.
THEOLOGY		
Discerns the essential commitments that contribute to the religious path.	Religions are like inferior prototypes approaching the one true faith.	Concentrate on the doctrines fostering fidelity to living the truly spiritual life.
POLITICS		
Compares structures of ruling power and standards for legitimate authority.	Religions are like ideological parties contending for civic domination.	Agitate for church control in government and more laws enforcing religious rules.
ECONOMICS		
Formulates how exchange systems make and distribute goods and wealth.	Religions are like esoteric guilds selling access to salvific practices.	Commit time and resources to churchly agendas that reward this life and the next.
SCIENCE		
Confirms hypothetical explanations through experimental methods.	Religions are like mass delusions caused by deceptive cognitive biases.	Allow tradition and authority to override rational thinking and scientific facts.

DISCIPLINARY ALLIANCES	**How to think about Religion**
A. Philosophy + History = **Philosophical History**	The developments and blendings of religions over many millennia display trends of reasonable progress with improving ideas about divine qualities and moral ideals.
B. Sociology + History = **Cultural Genealogy**	The diversity and dispersion of religions around the world reflect various pathways of cultural adaptation to geographical and ecological opportunities and challenges.
C. Philosophy + Sociology = **Social Ethics**	The relevance and usefulness of religions within any society match needs of social cohesion for preventing public disorder and promoting collective welfare.
D. Theology + History = **Theological History**	The history of the universe and our world proceeds according to the sequence of God's providential plan towards an ultimate destiny.
E. Theology + Sociology = **Theological Anthropology**	Human nature is designed for living the good life that God intends for us to have.
F. Theology + Philosophy = **Philosophical Theology**	Ideas of supreme reality should be maximally coherent with all knowledge and ethics.
G. Philosophy + Politics = **Political Philosophy**	Justifying an optimal kind of government takes into account popular religious values.
H. Theology + Politics = **Political Theology**	Good governments promote religious social ethics and enact divine law into state law.

DISCIPLINARY ANTI-SECULARISM	**Objections against secular thinking, secularization, and political secularism**
Philosophical History	1. Secular thought is original but new and naïve, and won't be more advanced than the proven insights provided by far older and wiser religious traditions.
Cultural Genealogy	2. Secular ways of life may work in a few countries, but most societies should keep their cultural customs and religious practices which already work well for them.
Scientific Theology	3. No secular worldview appreciates how scientific methods and knowledge of nature leads to the reasonable conclusion that a supernatural creator must be responsible.
Theological History	4. A secular worldview leaves humanity adrift in a random and hostile world without any guidance about how to live with a sense of dignity and a hopeful destiny.
Theological Anthropology	5. A secular worldview views human nature as selfish and competitive, more fit for mere survival and sinning than ascending to a virtuous and noble stature.
Political Theology	6. Political secularism erodes basic religious values justifying good government, such as rights to life and liberty, and it obstructs the people's demand for righteous laws.
Theological Economics	7. Political secularism allows government to ignore the human degradation – labor exploitation, poverty, crass materialism, and excess wealth – caused by worldly greed.

DISCIPLINARY SUPPORT	**Responses to the seven objections in support of secularism**
Philosophical Ethics	**1*** Secular thought can progress beyond religions by adopting their sensible views and values, rejecting their irrational rules, and adding reasonable ideas for life today.

Inter-Cultural Ethics	**2*** Secular ways of life can work better for societies because countries are cooperating and integrating internationally, on a path to increasing global peace and prosperity.
Scientific Naturalism	**3*** No god or supernatural worldview can be reasonably inferred from the empirical study of nature, knowledge of the cosmos, or theorizing about the universe's origin.
Naturalistic Ethics	**4*** Humanity can take more responsibility for choosing its future in a universe of limitless possibility, than it can have in a universe pre-determined by a divine dictator.
Social Ethics	**5*** Humanity is highly social and fairly moral through bio-cultural evolution, and good conduct benefitting everyone is reinforced by cultural customs and conventional law.
Political Philosophy	**6*** Legitimate government protects human rights known by reason, not just religion, and good government has worldly goals of civic harmony, security, peace, and justice.
Political Economy	**7*** Government financing and regulating of the economy should promote the general public welfare and individual opportunity regardless of personal religious beliefs.

PHILOSOPHICAL SECULARISM	**Philosophical Naturalism + Secular Humanist Ethics + Political Secularism**
Scientific Naturalism + Logical Reason =	**Philosophical Naturalism**: No supernatural/theistic religion can be reasonably accepted; Nature itself can be regarded as ever-lasting and self-sufficient.
Naturalistic Ethics + Philosophical Ethics =	**Secular Ethics**: Religion is no longer needed to provide life with purpose and meaning; Ethics itself can be trusted with determining what is right and just.
Social Ethics + Inter-Cultural Ethics =	**Humanist Ethics**: Social intelligence, freed from dogma and prejudice, can experimentally improve civic institutions and international relations over time.
Political Philosophy + Political Economy =	**Political Secularism**: Government focus on public legal and economic agendas requires a distanced neutrality towards religions and religious people.

Religious Reactions to Secularisms

Secularism may say:	Religion is a free choice of irrational faith.
Religion can reply:	Faith is reasonable and practical for living a meaningful and moral life.
Secularism may say:	Religion should steadily lose even more social control.
Religion can reply:	People live best in a rich religious culture, not a thin and empty materialistic culture.
Secularism may say:	Believers should let secular institutions lead.
Religion can reply:	Believers want strong multiculturalism for social leadership of their religious group.
Secularism may say:	Believers should surrender faith for citizenship.
Religion can reply:	Believers should stay loyal to religious leaders for political guidance from their church.

The Study of Secularism

From "Introduction" to *The Oxford Handbook of Secularism* (2017) by Phil Zuckerman and John R. Shook.

The origin of the word "secular" is Latin: "saeculum" typically meant a fixed period of time, an age, one hundred years or so.[1] The saeculum was not defined in contrast to any sacred concerns, and had a freestanding usage in Latin. In Christian Latin of medieval times, "saeculum" was a useful term for distinguishing this temporal age of the world from the eternal realm of God.

This term was borrowed by the Romance languages, and easily entered Middle English. Basically, something "secular" has more to do with worldly affairs rather than with religious affairs. Secular princes exercised their civil authority (piously, the people hoped), while secular monks provided their priestly services among the people (reverently, the church hierarchy hoped).

Consult "The Meaning of 'Secular' as a Scientific Concept" by John Shook
https://secularismandnonreligion.org/articles/10.5334/snr.124

One of the earliest large English dictionaries, *Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum: Or, A General English Dictionary* (London: 1708) by John Kersey, gave these three definitions:

> Secular, belonging to the space of 100 years; also relating to this world, or Life. Also that is convenient in the World, without being engaged in a Monastick Life.
>
> Secularity, the Condition of a Secular Person, a Secular Life.
>
> To Secularize, to make Secular.

Nathan Bailey's *An Universal Etymological English Dictionary* (enlarged second edition, London: 1731) does not list 'secular' but it does include 'secular games' ("once in an age or an hundred years"), 'secularization' ("converting a regular person, place, or benefice to a secular one"), and 'secularness':

> Secularness [*secularis*, L.] worldliness, addictedness to the things of this world.

Samuel Johnson's famous *A Dictionary of the English Language* (1755) gave these definitions:

> Secular, adj. [*secularis*, Latin; *seculier*, French] 1. Not spiritual; relating to the affairs of the present world; not holy; worldly. 2. [In the church of Rome.] not bound by monastic rules. 3. [*Seculaire*, Fr.] Happening or coming once in a *secle* or century.
>
> Secularity, n. s. [from *secular.*] Worldliness; attention to the things of the present life.

English dictionaries after Johnson's typically repeated his definitions. The *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* (London, 1773) included 'secular' as "something that is temporal; in which sense, the word stands opposed to ecclesiastical"). Thomas Sheridan's *A General Dictionary of the English Language* (London, 1780) re-states

Johnson's definitions for 'secular' and 'secularity'. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (1880s) followed the earlier dictionaries, and currently provides those two primary meanings for 'secular':

> Of or belonging to the present or visible world as distinguished from the eternal or spiritual world; temporal, worldly.
>
> Belonging to the world and its affairs as distinguished from the church and religion; civil, lay, temporal. Chiefly used as a negative term, with the meaning non-ecclesiastical, non-religious, or non-sacred.

The *OED*, like earlier dictionaries, supplies the primary meaning of 'secular' in two concepts – the temporal and worldly – and both of those concepts can be accurately defined without reference to anything religious. All the same, the secular does make sense as the contrary of the religious, and the alternative to religious ways of life. Hence two meanings for "secularization" are primary in the *OED*:

> The giving of a secular or non-sacred character or direction to (art, studies, etc.); the placing (of morals) on a secular basis; the restricting (of education) to secular subjects.
>
> The conversion of an ecclesiastical or religious institution or its property to secular possession and use; the conversion of an ecclesiastical state or sovereignty to a lay one.

The first definition for secularization highlights how a secular standpoint does not regard any religious standpoint (however religion or the religious may be characterized) as necessary for expressive or intellectual activities, moral conduct, or learning in general. Without waiting for religion to congeal or define itself (and pessimism about that is warranted), secularization would guide humanity in a manner very different from that presumed by religions, unable to see why human culture and human achievement must be forever incomplete without the guidance offered by a religious standpoint about other-worldly or non-natural matters and values.

Secularization refers to some sort of process or set of processes which, if meaningful for those who live through it, could at most serve as a means, not as an end in itself. The prior questions must be asked and answered, why should religious conviction relax its grip on the mentalities of people, and why should religious institutions surrender control over the workings of society? Those are precisely the questions taken up by secularism. If there are reasonable answers, secularism must provide them, and the destiny of the secular may depends on its success.

Due to Christendom's cultural, intellectual, and political dominion over Europe for so long, distinct agendas raising rivals to that multi-dimensional hegemony were inevitable. And any other civilization's experiences with a more complex and pluralistic religious history would naturally witness even greater variability to nonreligious agendas. Is secularism one, or many? Perhaps we can see one-in-many. If those distinct agendas each claim to represent the secular and fulfill secularism, that only displays their family resemblance. If any of these secularisms claim exclusivity and dismisses the rest as subsidiary or counterproductive, that preeminence similarly reveals a shared heritage. So it was before Holyoake attempted their cohesion, and so it remains today.

A considerable amount of definitional disparity is evident. More books with "secularism" in the title are appearing, but unless its author is leading a particular secular approach, it seems harder to find a clear definition of the term within those books' pages. As Steven Kettel rightly observes, "there is no consensus on what it actually means … secularism can be seen in a number of different ways: such as a 'doctrine', a 'worldview', an 'ideology', a 'normative stance' (usually negative) towards religion, or a 'constitutional approach' referring to the specific institutional relationship between religious and non-religious authority."

The lack of consensus over the meaning or purpose of secularism should no longer be any surprise, given its multi-form history and multi-purpose potential. Most words, terms, and labels that seek to capture something that is simultaneously social, philosophical, legal, demographic, historical, and cultural are typically difficult to adequately define. After all, consider how difficult it is to define "family," "religion," "environmentalism," "art," or "fundamentalism" in a way satisfactory to all interested parties.

Our considered view, shared by most of the contributors to this volume, judges that it is best to conceive of secularism as multi-pronged and multi-faceted. And its meaning surely varies for different societies the world over. To collect a limited but robust set of chapters, purporting some degree of adequate coverage to this topic, surely requires more preparation that the ritual acknowledgments of secularism's multiplicity. The next section explains how the secular has become a legitimate object of objective research, bringing into view expansive fields and enticing questions sufficient to compel further academic exploration.

Admitting how secularism is not easily defined in theory and rarely organized in practice cannot be avoided by any scholar serious about the subject. Still, that admission is no excuse for complacency towards the study of secularism lapsing into disarray. Editors of even a modestly comprehensive volume about secularism cannot avoid their duty to lend some organization to the ventures of academic inquiry. Fortunately, the root meanings to both 'secular' and 'secularity' have been relatively stable for several centuries, and the 'secular' lends its meaning to all of its cognates. To seek what is secular is to observe the signs of secularity, and the capacity to identify secularity in turn permits the objective study of any of its manifestations.

The non-obsolete meanings to "secularity" are these, according to the *OED*:

> The condition or quality of being secular. (a) Occupation with secular affairs (on the part of clergymen); secular spirit or behavior. Also occas. in wider application: Worldliness, absence of religious principle or feeling. (b) Lay character (of persons claiming to be in holy orders). (c) Secular or non-sacred character; absence of connection with religion.

Setting aside the two specific references to the character or conduct of religious clergy mentioned in (a) and (b), we are left with these two primary meanings for "secularity":

> Worldliness, absence of religious principle or feeling.
>
> Secular or non-sacred character; absence of connection with religion.

A secular person, social activity, or cultural institution is worldly, concerned for matters of daily life. To study the secular and secularity is to study the temporal and worldly. From the concept of the secular itself, five

additional broad topics emerge, each dependent upon prior concepts higher on the list, amounting to six foundational concepts:

The Secular: features of personal and social matters concerning the mundane temporal world and one's daily life.

Social Secularity: observing and explaining how social/political/economic (etc.) norms, structures, and institutions have primarily secular functions and aims.

Secularization: measuring, analyzing, and explaining any growth trends in social secularity discerned in countries around the world; and studying correlations between secularization and other socio/cultural features.

Personal Secularity: studying and explaining trends in the numbers and types of secular people, their degrees of secularity, the correlations with social secularity and secularization, and the ways that secular people avoid, enter, or cease religious participation.

Secular Living: inquiring into how people understand their lives and seek meanings and values in worldly ways, along with the study of contrasts between secular and religious living, and ways secular people interact with religious features of their society.

Secularism: explanatory justifications for secularization in society and personal secularity for individuals, and the promotion and improvement of partially or fully secular living.

The last topic of secularism is here defined schematically, reliant on more basic secular concepts yet open to various justifications for any sort of enhancement of secularization or degree of personal secularity, and undefined with regard to what type(s) of secular living may be promoted and to what extent. Conceptions of secularism utilized by our contributors are less schematic and more concrete in order to play useful roles in research and theorizing from discipline to discipline.

Secularism is also listed last rather than first because secularism functions as an "ism" or viewpoint – a view of things with some point to it: more about recommending answers to contentious questions than about asking questions answerable with confirmable facts. The first five topical areas are views upon specified matters that can be roughly understood through the basic concept of the 'secular' and objectively described wherever found by whoever takes the trouble to do it with some scientific care. Particular devotion to some specific kind of secularism can shape what one sees, yet such partiality needn't doom the academic study of secular matters to subjectivity or relativism, or to ideology.

Furthermore, no preference or commitment to secularism is needed, by the observer or the observed. One can live a secular life and participate in secular folkways and institutions without thinking of oneself as secular, adhering to secularism, or undertaking secularist action. Being secular is more like being a pedestrian than a podiatrist. If you are observed taking advantage of public walkways, you are a pedestrian no matter whether you'd care to tell anyone that you are a pedestrian. On the other hand, if you aren't familiar with what being a podiatrist is like, you aren't a podiatrist. Secular people, in other words, don't have to know how to be a

'secularist' and no endorsement of secularism is required. As for scholars, they can theorize accounts of secularity and secularization for due consideration by scholarly communities quite independently of whether they personally approve, or whether they can sympathize with any of secularism's agendas.

By contrast, secularism is the sort of thing that typically finds its advancement and advocates in secularists. There's no single type of secularist to be identified, and secularist attitudes can be found in unlikely places. Religious people may endorse one or another agenda of secularism, such funding public education or separating church from state, and to that limited extent they could be tagged with holding a 'secularist' stance. Like religious allies, secularists will pick and choose their own priorities, and any such advocacy occurs within the particular local context where one resides and expresses one's views.

What is manifested as secularism and secularist activism on the ground will vary greatly from one country to another, and even from one small territory to another. Secularism in a Buddhist society may have little in common with secularism in a Christian society. Islamic culture is hardly the same in every Muslim country, so secularisms in those countries will correspondingly look different. Any kind of secularism offers a characteristic view with a point that makes sense in its proper context, but no formulaic method to secularism should be abstractly sought in advance.

Secularism is distinct from secularization. Secularization can occur in the course of human history without any explicit or organized efforts to justify or advance it.

Secularization does not require lots of secular people, any work of secularists, or the public promotion of secularism, because secular dimensions to social institutions and cultural practices can emerge and develop from the ordinary activities of people in large groups, even large religious groups. Over long periods of time, religious societies have developed vast secular dimensions, such as educational, economic, or political institutions, in the absence of any deliberate attempt to promote secularity or secularization, simply because modified social conditions turned out to arouse and develop those secular features. Governments refraining from requiring a single religion or promoting any religion, for example, emerged occasionally in the course of civilizations and empires, without any political secularists involved at all. It is actually an unusual feature of modern Western civilization and its inheritance from the Greco-Roman civilization that intellectuals have formulated secular justifications for governments and established somewhat secular governments.

Although secularism involves the advocacy for and advancement of secularization in some form or another, secularism is not reducible to a judgment that "nonbelief is growing," "secularization is expanding," "secularization follows modernization," "secularization follows science," or "secularization is inevitable." Religion's admirers can admit to such judgments, if genuinely confirmable, without feeling that they are thereby endorsing secularism. And secularism can be vibrant where nonbelief and secularization is declining, no modernization or science is around, or even where religiosity's expansion seems inevitable. Secularism may (unjustly) gain comfort from sociological or political predictions, but disappointed predictions cannot touch secularism's point.

Because secularists agree in their secularity but don't necessarily agree about why religion should be resisted or about specific agendas for resisting religion, the phenomenon of "polysecularity" has to be recognized. As some chapters explore in more detail, the emergence of secularity in the form of open opposition to religion

lacks a uniform manifestation. Across human history and cultures, there have been many phases and modes of secularism operating in resistance to religious ideas and institutions. Historians of narrow scope assume that secularism and modernism are twins born of the same western European mother, but intellectual resistance to religion was not an uncommon struggle across the ancient world and the history of eastern thought.

Six major modes of modern secularism stand out to Western eyes: educational secularism, economic secularism, political secularism, ethical secularism, scientific secularism, and religious criticism.

Educational Secularism: advocacy of the widespread availability of primary and secondary education that is not infused with religious indoctrination or denominational proselytizing. Because this may require supervision over private schools and/or government-supported public schools, advocacy of political secularism can be involved.

Economic Secularism: the promotion of material values and economic progress by economic systems relatively free from religious control, along with scrutiny of proposed measures of secular well-being. Because economic secularity may require some government scrutiny, advocacy of political secularism may be involved.

Political Secularism: defenses of the secular functions of government, the constitutional secularity of government, and the promotion of governments showing legal neutrality towards, and relative independence from, religions.

Ethical Secularism: scientific and philosophical explanations for nonreligious morality, and promotion of kinds of ethical systems having only naturalistic bases and secular aims, such as human excellence and happiness.

Scientific Secularism: studying the development and promotion of the sciences and their methodologies, scientific and naturalistic worldviews, and the virtues/ideals which scientific research and scientific communities exemplify. The scientific study of religion and religious experience is included here.

Religious Criticism: criticizing religion and justifying nonbelief, by applying rhetorical, polemical, and logical means of persuasion. Increasing personal secularity in society is a major goal, along with decreasing religious influence in society. Intellectual arguments against religion proceed into the area of atheology.

This list could easily be subdivided or extended, so no claims for exhaustiveness are implied. It also bears repeating that different societies will witness their own characteristic patterns of active secularisms. Perhaps economic and political secularisms happen to be most dynamic for a time, followed by educational and ethical secularisms at another time, or any other combinations, including their decay, decline, or even disappearance. They certainly cannot be expected to march together, or necessarily proceed at the same paces.

SECULARISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Secularist's Image of God

It is said, We have rights, equality, dignity (and so on) because we are "made in the image of God". What image of God do people happen to respect? Surely people are respectful and devout towards an image of God that they can understand and appreciate. Or must they accept something less? A dilemma looms. Do people think they deserve X only because they see X in God's image? Or, do they see X in God's image because they firmly think they deserve X? If the former, then people would have to be satisfied with whatever image, call it Y, of God which happens to be already accessible. Aspiring to more than just Y is not relevant; God's image yields Y and nothing more. On the other hand, if people aspire to X instead, they surely can aspire to an image of God yielding X, and the second option is taken. If people say, "God would surely have an image yielding X rather than Y," the second option is taken.

Put the dilemma like this: either people's aspirations for moral dignity and rights can exceed what God's image yields, or God's image always yields people's highest aspirations. Can't we all prefer the latter? Secular people aren't seeing God, but they can be curious about that divine image that religious people think they see. Why look in that faithful mirror, unless you can see yourself as you truly should be? A divine image of God mustn't be ugly when one looks. If we expect that mirror to tell the truth, the mirror isn't creating the truth – we are making our truth. Belief makes the fact. If a secularist thinks about that "image of God," all there is to really think about is what all people aspire to truly be. Secularists already respect what all people aspire to be: equally worthy of moral dignity and human rights.

Why feel it necessary to gaze into God's mirror, when we can easily see each other? In that human immediacy and intimacy, there is truth. Besides, mirrors might distort. There are many gods, many images. The secularist can't get entranced by a vision of the chosen enthroned over the rest. Secularists truly understand what equality looks like.

RELIGION'S CHALLENGE

Main Question: Can secularism, on entirely secular grounds, explain how humans could know valid justifications for human rights?

ASSUMPTION ONE: A genuine human right is universal, inalienable, and inviolable.

Universal: Every human has this right, simply by virtue of being human.

Inalienable: There can never be a contingency where the annulment or non-existence of a human right is conceivable.

Inviolable: There can never be a justification for violating a human right. If some other priority legitimately trumps a supposed human right, then that priority is the genuine human right.

Discussion: These three features of human rights together imply that having a human right is non-contingent, and any ultimate justification why a right is a human right is similarly non-contingent. If the best justification explaining why a right is a human right involves any contingency, then it is conceivable that this right might possibly not be a human right under differing circumstances. But that possibility is already ruled out by the definition of a genuine human right. Therefore, if some justification explaining why a right is a human right is conceivably contingent, that justification is inadequate.

CONCLUSION ONE: No valid justification for anyone's genuine human right could be conceivably contingent.

Question 1: Could any valid justification for a genuine human right involve divine or human decisions?

Answer 1: Since a decision is by definition a contingent matter (a decision is dependent on a non-automatic and non-predetermined process), no valid justification for a genuine human right involves divine or human decisions.

Question 2: Could any valid justification for a human right involve divine or human learning?

Answer 2: Since all learning is by definition a contingent matter (learning is dependent on happenstance available information and path-dependent cumulative inquiry), no valid justification for a genuine human right involves divine or human learning.

ASSUMPTION TWO: All human knowledge arises from some natural combination of deciding and learning.

CONCLUSION TWO: It is impossible for humans (by themselves) to justify what human rights are.

ASSUMPTION THREE: A God exists who determines human rights without deciding or learning.

CONCLUSION THREE: God's existence can ultimately justify what human rights are.

ASSUMPTION FOUR: Assumption Two is false – Some human knowledge comes from knowledge of God and God's determination of human rights.

CONCLUSION FOUR: Commitment to God is required for reasonably justifying human rights.

COROLLARY ONE: No secular person, in willful ignorance of God, can reasonably justify what human rights are.

COROLLARY TWO: If a secular person is committed to human rights, that commitment is somehow derivative from religious people and their commitment to human rights.

Religion's Answer to Main Question: Secularism, on entirely secular grounds, cannot explain how humans could know valid justifications for human rights.

COROLLARY THREE: Secular people by themselves could not be as committed to human rights and hence could not fully respect them, and they would live as if they were not very important.

COROLLARY FOUR: Only religious communities ultimately sustain civilized societies upholding human rights.

COROLLARY FIVE: Only governments following and prioritizing religion can maintain civilized nations upholding human rights.

<u>SECULARISM'S RESPONSE</u>

CHALLENGE to Assumption One: Is a genuine human right, such as the right to life, truly universal, inalienable, and inviolable?

Assumption One: All people always have an inalienable (mustn't be annulled) and inviolable (mustn't be violated) right to life. Does this assumption lead to any contradictions?

Situational Dilemma: A situation in which person P will kill person Q unless person R kills Q first. Presumably, R must not let P be killed because P has a right to life. Must R violate Q's right to life? If R does not act, R fails to respect P's right to life. If R does act, R fails to respect Q's right to life. No matter what the outcome, someone's right to life will not be respected. Is it really the case that all people have an inalienable and inviolable right to life under all situations?

Resolution A: R can respect P's right to life while doing nothing to prevent the violation of P's right to life. R must respect Q's right to life by not killing Q. The duty to respect a right to life is dyadic, not triadic: only R's relation to P matters, and R's relation to Q matters, with respecting rights. So long as R is not participating in P's death, R is respecting P's right to life while respecting Q's right to life by not killing Q. P has done nothing to cause the annulment of P's right to life; P's right to life is being violated by Q. In general, anyone must allow the violation of a person's right to life under such circumstances. Therefore, a person's right to life is never violable, except when it must be violable.

Resolution B: R can respect P's right to life while killing Q. R The duty to respect a right to life is dyadic, not triadic: only R's relation to P matters, and R's relation to Q matters, with respecting rights. R can kill Q because Q lacks a right to life while trying to kill P, since R does not violate a right to life where none exists to be violated. The only situational difference here is that Q is not respecting a right to life, while P and R haven't lost respect for a right to life. Q lacks a right to life while trying to kill P because Q is not respecting P's right to life. A person's own right to life is annulled if that person won't show the same respect for the same right to life of others. In general, everyone must allow the annulment of a person's right to life under such circumstances. Therefore, a person's right to life is inalienable, except when it must be alienable.

Resolution C: R can respect P's right to life while killing Q. The duty to respect a right to life is also triadic: R's relation to P implies that a relation to others such as Q also matters with respecting rights. R can kill Q because Q's right to life is violable while trying to kill P. The only situational difference here is that Q is not respecting a right to life, while P and R haven't lost respect for a right to life. A right to life is never annulled but it must be occasionally violable, in situations where the person to be killed has compromised one's own right to life. A person's own right to life is violable if that person won't show the same respect for the same right to life of others. In general, everyone must allow the violation of a person's right to life under such circumstances. Therefore, a person's right to life is never violable, except when it must be violable.

CHALLENGE to Assumption One is Upheld: Contradictions within assumption one are unavoidable. It is impossible in the real world (where people can threaten to take lives) for a right to life to be universal, inalienable, and inviolable. Either a right to life is not universal; or, it is alienable or violable depending on circumstances.

Alternative Presumption One: An inalienable and inviolable right to life is only held by a subset S of humanity. This presumption is exposed to the same contradictions where P, Q, and R all belong to S. Therefore, for all humanity or any subset of humanity, a right to life is either alienable or violable depending on circumstances. This results leads towards Presumption Two.

Alternative Presumption Two: All people have an alienable and violable right to life. A right to life is annullable or violable under conditions where reciprocity is lacking. The right to life is a right that requires reciprocity (it is among the class of 'reciprocity rights') – meaning that a person can expect others to recognize one's own right to life so long as this person simultaneously recognizes the right to life of others. On this presumption, Resolution A is rejected, since it allows P's right to life to be violated even though P fulfills reciprocity. Resolutions B and C are accepted.

Next Question: Who are these 'others' in this reciprocity relationship grounding the right to life? These 'others'

could be a limited number, or practically unlimited.

Discussion: There are two potential subtypes of reciprocity rights: generic and universal. If the group of 'others' only extends so far as those people who would normally be encountered locally by this person in the course of a lifetime, then the reciprocity right has generic status. "The individuals who I normally encounter are within this reciprocity circle." If the group of 'others' has no practical limit, including any 'other' human anywhere, then the reciprocity right has universal status. Regarding the right to life, we maintain Presumption Two, so the right to life is a universal reciprocity right: Each and every person who respects the right to life of all others (and no other qualifications are relevant) maintains one's own right to life.

We have found one Universal Reciprocity Right:

URR-1: All people simply respecting the right to life of all others sustain their own right to life.

This universal reciprocity right is passive, not active: a person only needs to remain innocent of threatening another's right to life in order to sustain one's own right to life. This is not an "opt-in" membership, but just an "opt-out" membership. However, this universal reciprocity right requires recognition eligibility in order to function in the real world. Although some members of the reciprocity community needn't fully grasp what this reciprocity community is doing or why (infants and children can be included, for example), it is necessary that a core to the reciprocity community does share a complete consensus about who is eligible for recognition. They all recognize each other as mutually holding that status, and they all recognize other persons as reciprocity-eligible even if those persons lack the cognitive capacity to provide that level of recognition in return. [If no single core to a group fulfils this consensus requirement, then no reciprocity community has been realized.]

The dangers inherent to trying to maintain a reciprocity community without that core of consensus are extremely serious. If core A recognizes a number of humans (set W, let us say) as reciprocity-eligible which another core B does not, then members of B won't respect the lives of those in W, and members of core A can judge that some Bs can be killed to rightly protect the Ws. As for Bs, who regard such a threat of death from As as a violation of reciprocity, can judge that As are rightly no longer recognition-eligible. These two cores effectively divide from each other as two separate reciprocity communities and regard each other with suspicious hostility. Therefore, a reciprocity community can exist only where a single core shares a complete consensus about who is recognition-eligible.

TERMINOLOGY. If an individual is accepted as reciprocity-eligible with a reciprocity community that respects the right to life, that individual is said to be a PERSON.

There are additional applications of reciprocity which may be incorporated or paired with personhood, lending the concept more depth and breadth. For example, personhood may encompass Moral Dignity, and personhood can be allied with Civil Freedom and Equal Opportunity.

URR-2. Moral Dignity: A person has a right to non-degradation – having as much moral concern shown for oneself that is expected by others. Degradation includes losing social respect and one's sense of self-worth; feeling humiliated or ashamed of oneself; or feeling ignored and abandoned in one's situation.

URR-3. Civil Freedom: A person has a right to autonomy – having as much autonomy as is capacity-appropriate (eg. less autonomy for children). Civil freedom rules out slavery (no control over the body), oppression (no control over living and lifestyle), and subservience (no control over deference to power).

URR-4. Social Justice: A person has a right to equality – having the same political equality, equal opportunity, and equal protection under the law as all others. Social justice in turn fosters the foundations to civil rights and liberties for effective functioning as a productive member of society and a participating citizen of a republic.

We now reengage with the broader issue: Must it really be impossible for humans (by themselves) to justify what human rights are?

Discussion: Start with URR-1: All persons simply respecting the right to life of all others sustain their own right to life. The validity of URR-1 does not carry with it the reality of a rights community, in which (at least some) persons do actually commit to respecting the right to life of all others in that community (which potentially extends to all humanity). A Rights Community requires commitment. Where does this commitment come from? Religion may argue as follows:

1. No person would reasonably commit to a rights community without a guarantee that those rights have a reality and ground beyond just the community itself.

2. The only external guarantee so capable of grounding rights is the determination of rights by a god.

C. Therefore, commitment to god is required for reasonably committing to a rights community.

Interestingly, a religion burdens a person with an additional qualification to belong to a rights community: one must also affirm the god that determines human rights. A person unwilling to affirm this god cannot belong to the rights community unless granted reciprocity-eligibility by the core members of that community who do affirm god. Effectively, that core membership is entrusted with knowing the god that determines the genuine human rights. BUT many religions offer different gods that (allegedly) determine human rights, or gods that at least (allegedly) dictate fundamental human laws.

CHALLENGE to Conclusion Four: Commitment to a god is not a reasonable way to commit to a rights community.

Discussion: Given the information presented so far, there is no reasonable way to figure out which religion is dealing with an actual god, or the right god on human rights. There is no reasonable way to figure out what sort of rights community to commit to, among so many equivalent options. “If you want to know the right set of human rights, you would affirm our God, and you will know that you’ve selected the right God, since only this God did determine the correct set of human rights.” This fallacious argument begs the whole question, of course. More generally, there is no valid theological argument for figuring out the “real” God who determines exactly the right set of human rights. Every attempted argument will essentially try to reason from some actual set of fine-sounding human rights to a God who seems predisposed to authorize exactly that set. But this “reasoning” method can be accomplished for any set of human rights and any number of well-crafted deities. And if this theological reasoning does presume that a person already knows a set of genuine human rights from the start, no affirmation of God is additionally needed, since this person already knows those rights and needs no God to chime in. Knowledge of human rights is, in this context, more basic than knowledge of any god.

When a religion requires an individual to affirm the real God who determines human rights, it places an unreasonable burden on a person, who is left with an arbitrary decision and an unfortunate moral situation no matter what God is chosen. In the real world, it is not the case that everyone will affirm the same God and the same divine list of human rights. Rights communities and their respective sets of human rights will remain divided over inscrutable religion. Furthermore, rights communities relying on the determinations of a god (which will not change over time) tend to endorse rights that cannot change over time. Are the rights regarded as most important for humanity 2,000 years ago still the exact same rights adequate for today, and tomorrow?

CHALLENGE to Conclusion Four Upheld: Commitment to a god is not a reasonable way to commit to a rights

community. Whether a god's existence can ultimately justify human rights is a matter that must be deemed irrelevant and unhelpful to people here on earth.

Discussion. Conclusion Three has no standing here. Inscrutable gods are not informative about rights. Furthermore, even if some human knowledge comes from knowledge about this or that god, such knowledge cannot in turn reasonably justify commitments to moral communities. This verdict is not based on the evident fact that religions neither settle on a definite set of human rights themselves nor agree on some set of human rights among each other. That fact is also evident among nonreligious political systems. The diversity and fluidity to religion is a manifestation of its all-too-human origins. The concern raised about grounding rights on gods goes deeper than that. There will be no universal human rights, and human rights will only be a divisive issue here on earth, if the choice of a (correct) religion is pre-required of persons wanting to belong to a rights community. A rights community can also be a community endorsing religious devotions; but one's commitments to rights should not be predicated on those devotions.

If a set of genuine rights cannot be ascertained from a somewhat mysterious source, then only human decision and learning can justify genuine rights.

What about premises 1 and 2 to the above argument? Premise 2 is judged to be false. Premise 1 can be true, so long as correct identifications are made for the rights community and for the external guarantee. Premise 1 needs to be re-stated as follows:

Premise 1*. Few people would reasonably commit to a rights community without a guarantee that those rights have a reality and ground beyond just the *present* community itself.

This re-stated premise has much truth to it. A few people may be capable of whole-heartedly committing to a rights community simply upon the simultaneous reception and responsive affirmation of the rest. The formation of a small community bonded together by abiding mutual interests can be arranged quickly, for example, if a measure of trust among them already prevails. But large rights communities would not be practically formed in this manner, and there appears to be no other satisfactory substitute.

The resolution is obvious: the reality and ground to the rights of an existing rights community lie in that community's continuity with the *past*.

Premise 1*. Few people would reasonably commit to a rights community without a guarantee that those rights have a reality and ground beyond just the present community itself.

Premise 2*. The external guarantee capable of grounding rights is historical success of a long-standing rights community perpetuated down to the present day.

Premise 2* is compatible with the way that human knowledge arises from natural combinations of deciding and learning. Justifying human rights should prove to be within the capacities of natural humans.

CHALLENGE TO Conclusion Two: Must it be impossible for humans (by themselves) to justify which rights should be human rights?

Discussion: Secularism retains Assumption Two:

ASSUMPTION TWO: All human knowledge arises from some natural combination of deciding and learning.

Each person considering membership in a rights community can look to its distinctive history to evaluate how much confidence is wisely placed in that community. No two people need to evaluate that history in precisely the same way. However, the overall capacity of a rights community to fulfill the point of a rights community –

to sustain full reciprocal respect for every members' rights – is the basic matter to be scrutinized. Each rights community, and every individual evaluating those communities, apply their capacities for learning and deciding over time. A rights community undergoes accumulated learning from innumerable practical decisions taken by members as they try to maintain respect for rights. Although no single member could embody or even clearly express all that accumulated learning, the rights community as a whole embodies that learning in its successful practices. Similarly, no individual evaluating a right community could fully appreciate everything that makes that community (more or less) successful, but adequate evaluations are not beyond the capacity of typical adults. Some may ask, "Do the rights that I selfishly want protected receive adequate respect in that rights community?" Other may ask, "Do the rights that any reasonable person really need receive enough respect in that rights community?" And so forth. It is a separate question whether some ways to evaluate right communities are wiser than others. All that has been shown is that typical adults would be able to intelligently evaluate rights communities for the capacity to perform the function they are designed to perform.

CHALLENGE TO Conclusion Two Upheld: It is possible for typical adults to reasonably justify which rights should be human rights.

Discussion: The reasonable justification of a right worthy of status as a human right essentially involves the generation and maintenance of a rights community upholding respect for that right. Not all rights communities are the same – far from it. The greatest variety of rights communities have been formed and may be formed under wildly different circumstances of time, place, environment, social stresses, cultural strengths, technological advancement, and any other relevant factors. What rights communities have in common is their effort to sustain comprehensive respect for some right(s) understood by their core memberships as worthy of mutual respect. What makes those rights, rather than some other rights, truly worthy? Only the sustained evaluations and commitments of their core members make those rights worthy at all, and the collective judgments of others who haven't yet joined determine what the more worthy human rights should look like. A rights community of dubious provenance that is gathering few new commitments isn't promoting rights of much worth, while a rights community with an impressive heritage and an impressive recruiting and retention trajectory is promoting rights of greater worth.

This understanding of rights communities and their comparative worthiness carries three crucial implications:

Premise 3. At any particular period of time, many rights communities are flourishing of greater or lesser sizes, promulgating somewhat different sets of rights (some rights may be similar, too).

Premise 4. Over time, people educated about multiple rights communities will occasionally modify their evaluations of the relative worthiness of those communities and their rights.

Premise 5. Due to the multiplicity of rights communities, and the varying evaluations of those communities, some people will alter their community commitments during their lifetimes, either by compelling change within a rights community, helping to blend two rights communities together, or switching commitments from one rights community to another.

Together, premises 1* and 2* along with 3, 4, and 5 further imply that it is unreasonable to expect that any "fixed" or "final" set of worthiest human rights would emerge from this planetary process. Unless additional premises were added to supplement these five, there is no way to see how rights communities would gradually converge on the same list of human rights, or how any rights community can claim lasting status as the best, even if one currently enjoys more esteem than the rest. However, these premises do imply that (a) any dominant rights regime today could fall from favor if its practices and tactics lose the confidence of insiders and outsiders, and (b) a worthier rights regime could come from anywhere, including an overlooked smaller rights community with better ideas for the times or a quasi-religious rights community willing to

flexibly adapt to planetary needs. An example of the former

Religious or ideological communities uninterested in timely flexibility or planetary suitability cannot look favorably on the view that fixed or final rights won't be an approachable outcome. The multiplicity of rights communities, the plurality of rights, and (ultimately) the contingency of the evaluation processes are disturbing matters for those conservative communities, which complain that justifications for genuine human rights must not be contingent. That assertion must now be challenged.

CHALLENGE to Conclusion One: Must a valid justification for anyone's genuine human right never be contingent?

Discussion: The religious basis for confidence in the validity of Conclusion One rested on the assumption that a human right that is universal, inalienable, and inviolable is a coherent conception. As discussed already, it is not coherent, and must be abandoned as unachievable in the real world inhabited by humans as we are. (Among angels, perhaps...) Upon abandoning that notion of a human right, we agreed that a human right has to be annullable and/or violable when reciprocity is broken. We accordingly formulated an initial Universal Reciprocity Right:

URR-1: All people simply respecting the right to life of all others sustain their own right to life.

Just as a genuine human right can be universal for humans yet contingently held in this reciprocity sense, evaluating a right as a worthy human right can be accessible to any informed adult while only appealing to ongoing evaluations of the contingent genealogies behind rights communities.

CHALLENGE to Conclusion One Upheld: A valid justification for anyone's genuine human right can be contingent.

Discussion: With Conclusion One, Conclusion Two, Conclusion Three, and Conclusion Four all denied as unreasonable, and an alternative process for forming rights communities and reasonably justifying them has been assembled, we have reached a final verdict.

Secular Answer to Main Question: Secularism, on entirely secular grounds, can explain how humans could know valid justifications for human rights.

Discussion: Secularism is not in itself a rights community, but it can serve as a template for a governing rights regime. Which rights community should secularism ally with? Without premises supplemental to 1*, 2*, 3, 4, and 5, secularism cannot proclaim its adherence to any demonstrably superior rights community and governing regime of enforcement. Different secular political theories, such as social contract theory, utilitarianism, socialism, pragmatic liberalism, communitarianism, and cosmopolitanism offer supplemental premises and design governments in the abstract. Various political secularisms can follow those alternatives, but no clear victor in academic debate or real-world practice has emerged yet.

Secularism in general surveys a planet hosting many rights communities, each with its strengths and weaknesses, and only somewhat relatively ordered from the more successful to the less successful. Secularism only needs to attach itself to one or another relatively successful rights community that includes URR 1–4 (personhood, moral dignity, civil freedom, and social justice), but does not require religious commitments, in order to be secularly well-grounded. Secularism has already done so, multiple times, over the past three centuries. That is why the current situation is one of "multi-secularism" – secularism in the U.S. is somewhat different from that of other countries, and no two countries enact secularism in the same manner. Comparative secularism offers studies of those differences across many countries, such as England, France, Turkey, Israel, Mexico, Brazil, India, and China.

The future of human rights for the planet lies with the conversations and negotiations among various secularisms and liberal religious regimes. Protecting human rights guarantees that they are real, but the real-world consequences of that protection Any rights regime, whether secular or religious, which tries to impose its will on unready populations not only betrays its own principles, but it betrays the trust it hopes to gain from the rest of the world. Reciprocity can never be ignored: the rights regime that uses illegitimate means will degrade the legitimacy of its ends. Defending rights wrongly cannot ennoble those rights.

Varieties of Secularism

Secular

— Of or belonging to the present or visible world as distinguished from the eternal or spiritual world; temporal, worldly.

— Belonging to the world and its affairs as distinguished from the church and religion; civil, lay, temporal.

Secularization

— The conversion of an ecclesiastical or religious institution or its property to secular possession and use; the conversion of an ecclesiastical state or sovereignty to a lay one.

— The giving of a secular or non-sacred character or direction to (art, studies, etc.); the placing (of morals) on a secular basis; the restricting (of education) to secular subjects.

Modern Secularism

D. L. Munby, 1963. *The Idea of a Secular Society and its significance for Christians*. A secular society:

- Refuses to commit itself as a whole to any one view of the nature of the universe and the role of man in it.
- Is not homogenous, but is pluralistic. It respects individual and group diversity.
- Is tolerant. It widens the sphere of private decision-making.
- Has some common aims, agreed-on methods of problem-solving, and a limited common framework of law.
- Problem solving is approached rationally, through examination of the facts.
- Lacks official images. Nor is there a common ideal type of behavior with universal application.

Five Degrees of Secularism:

Structural Secularism: Society's core political, legal, economic, and educational organizations ought to be independent from religion.

Political Secularism: Government and religion are mostly separate. Government does not obey or endorse religion, but it may aid religions.

State Secularism: Government is completely separate from religion, and uses law to positively discourage religious belief and practice.

Ethical Secularism: Ethical principles guiding society's welfare ought to be free from religious control or orientation.

Atheist Secularism: All political and social institutions should actively contradict, disparage, and discourage all forms of religious belief and practice.

<u>Detailed versions:</u>

Structural Secularism: Society's core political, legal, economic, and educational organizations ought to be independent from religious control. The number of political and social institutions that religions control ought to decrease over time. Religious organizations should devolve into voluntary social associations. Not to be confused with the legendary "secularization thesis" that religious belief will fade away over time. Structural secularism is about power, not faith. Indeed, faith may increase around the world even as the power of religious institutions diminishes. People can cling harder to mere faith when religion does little else for them. Don't be impressed by claims that "secularization" has been "disproved".

Political Secularism: Government and religion are mostly separate. Government does not obey or endorse any one religion, but it may give religions funding and special privileges. Government imposes impartial justice on everyone, but does not inhibit personal religious belief and practice. State neutrality is hard to balance: let some religion into institutions for equal exercise, or deny all religious expression in public to ensure no establishment? There are sub-kinds of political secularisms, ranging from governments inhibiting public religious expression (France) to governments protecting free exercise and giving believers special exemptions (USA, Canada, Britain), to governments supporting one religious culture (Nazi Lutheranism, Italian Catholicism, Indian Hinduism, Turkish Islam), and to governments supporting many religions equally (historical examples are numerous, including some American colonies during the 18th century).

State Secularism: Government is completely separate and independent from religion, and uses law to positively discourage religious belief and practice. Laws should place special and expensive burdens on all religious believers to make it harder to practice and teach religion. The primary aim is to abolish religion from all aspects of public life. Communist countries (former USSR, current China, etc.) are the clearest examples of state secularism. France is viewed as possibly moving closer towards state secularism. Is moving towards State Secularism the main point of public advocacy of Atheism? If so, does that mean that Atheism Advocacy is not content with resting on Political Secularism?

Atheist Secularism: All political and social institutions should actively contradict, disparage, and discourage all forms of religious belief and practice. The aim is to diminish and eliminate religious belief and practice from everyone in society. Laws should place heavy burdens and severe punishments on all religious believers to make it practically impossible to practice and teach religion. If religious believers worry that Atheism Advocacy aims at State Secularism and finally Atheist Secularism, how would atheists reassure them? No country has yet attempted full atheist secularism (even the USSR and China tolerated the survival of certain religions).

Three Political Secularisms

COUNTRY	PERSONAL LIBERTY	CULTURAL EQUALITY	SOCIAL FRATERNITY	CITIZEN ALLEGIENCE
INDIA	⟷	↑	↓	goes to both country and religion
USA	↑	⟷	↓	goes primarily to the country
FRANCE	↓	⟷	↑	goes exclusively to the country

INDIA "Equality" Secularism	How the Government treats Religion	The Preferred Image of Religion	Religions supposedly fitting Image
CULTURAL EQUALITY ↑	Government equally supports all religious institutions	Religion is about supplying a complete culture	Hinduism Catholicism
SOCIAL FRATERNITY ↓	Government promotes strong multiculturalism	Religion is good at keeping people in their own separate social order or caste	Catholicism (social order) Hinduism (caste)
PERSONAL LIBERTY ↔	Government reinforces people belonging to one in-group	Religion provides only as much personal liberty as people need	Hinduism (karma) Catholicism (original sin)

USA "Liberty" Secularism	How the Government treats Religion	The Preferred Image of Religion	Religions supposedly fitting Image
PERSONAL LIBERTY ↑	Government does not obey or help religious institutions, but permits private practice	Religion is about private conscience, so believers want maximum liberty	Protestantism
SOCIAL FRATERNITY ↓	Government promotes mild patriotism without any religious help	Religion promotes some core virtues useful for social cohesion and order	Protestantism
CULTURAL EQUALITY ↔	Government supports mild multiculturalism at most	Religion tends to diversify into many odd but tolerant denominations	Protestantism

FRANCE "Fraternity" Secularism	How the Government treats Religion	The Preferred Image of Religion	Religions supposedly fitting Image
SOCIAL FRATERNITY ↑	Government represses religious institutions and personal expression	Religion is about totalitarian control over public and private life	Islam (theocratic) Catholicism (Pope)
PERSONAL LIBERTY ↓	Government inhibits religious expression and promotion	Religion is a much worse oppressor of personal liberty	Islam (under sharia law)
CULTURAL EQUALITY ↔	Government aids assimilation and makes society homogenous	Religion demands far greater in-group conformity and strict obedience	Islam (has alien values)

Secularist Philosophy / Type of Political Secularism	Image of how Religion works for people	How the Government treats religion	Secularist remedy for religious trouble
INDIA "Equality" Secularism	Religion's wise culture supplies one's identity and larger purpose for living the good life	Government partners with all religions equally, and it mirrors society's diversity	Help religions exercise semi-autonomous control over their different groups
USA "Liberty" Secularism	Religion's non-rational faith is about private conscience and personal morality	Government neutrally enforces law and policy, leaving morality up to the people	Advocate reason , science, and rights; enforce separation of church and state
FRANCE "Fraternity" Secularism	Religion's tyranny forces itself on people's minds, moralities, and social habits	Government is a vigilant and strong force against any religious intrusion into public life	Citizens abandon allegiance to alien culture, religious leaders must help enforce the law.

Comparative Political Philosophy

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Comparative political philosophy can be stimulated by imposing a categorization scheme upon possible varieties of political philosophies. This article develops a categorization scheme using four essential features of political philosophies, resulting in twelve archetypal political philosophies. The four essential features selected are a political philosophy's views concerning human nature, the proper function of morality, the best form of society, and the highest responsibility of citizenship. The twelve archetypal political philosophies range from the communal (Rousseau), the democratic (J. S. Mill), the representative (Aristotle), the aristocratic (Plato), and the autocratic (Calvin), along with seven more archetypes: the political forms of aloof anarchy, social anarchy, contractarian, progressive, natural law, sage ruler, and tyranny. A wide variety of Western political philosophers are assigned their places within this categorization scheme to illustrate its utility and comprehensiveness.

1. Categorizing political philosophies

Plato offered the first comprehensive political philosophy, in *The Republic*. He also suggested an intriguing categorization of five forms of government and outlined how philosophical justifications could be raised for each. Attempts to define and categorize possible forms of government have frequently been made since Plato. Aristotle promptly discerned six basic types of government and compared their philosophical justifications. Many political philosophers and political scientists have exercised their wits on this intellectual puzzle ever since. Rather than survey and judge these interesting efforts over the centuries, one more categorization is outlined here. This categorization attempts to be both exhaustive and systematic. All significant political philosophies find a place in this categorical scheme, and this scheme relies on a small number of features essential to all political philosophies.

Important features of any political philosophy are numerous, and deciding upon a select few for designing a categorization scheme can only be a hazardous venture. Inspired by the Greeks, we could include among essential features the quantity of people holding political power (the many, the few, the one, etc.), or the quality of people wielding political power (the wise, the virtuous, the courageous, the greedy, etc.), or the distribution of political power within a government (by federated states, by competing parties, by separate branches, etc.), or the size of the state to be optimally governed (a rural town, a small polis, a country, the entire world, etc.). These important traits of governments have remained useful for positive descriptions and classifications of observed political systems. The field of political science, and comparative politics in particular, has carefully surveyed these and many more conspicuous features of actual governments.[1]

This essay is about political philosophy; it is not an exercise in comparative politics and the categorization of states and political systems. Political philosophy is not reducible to political science, but they are related. Political science pursues questions about why governments exist and evolve, how governments seek legitimization and citizen participation, how governments acquire and allocate political power, what goals governments pursue, how governments interact with wider society and with each other, which organizational structures and deliberative processes do governments use, why governments succeed or fail in their aims, how governments can be compared and evaluated, and the like. Political science encounters highly theoretical issues while answering these sorts of questions. Examples found in political theory include: What is political power? How can political activity be distinguished? What is the purpose and value of citizenship? Is politics grounded in human nature? Is politics necessary and/or useful for human welfare? Does politics require ideology? How is morality relevant to politics? How is religion relevant to politics? This vital continuity between political science and political theory extends further to political philosophy, because highly theoretical issues bridge the "fact/value" division of labor between political science and political philosophy. Proposing answers to such theoretical questions can require normative evaluations of the rational, beneficial, ethical, and even the spiritual dimensions of political activity. Political theory naturally generates political philosophies.[2]

Political philosophy proceeds further than political science or political theory, by asking and answering the two crucial philosophical questions: (1) On what grounds, if any, are governments justifiable? and (2) Are some governments more justifiable than others? Plato and Aristotle not only discerned some basic types of governments, but also sketched various kinds of philosophical justifications that could be offered for them, and ranked governments according to the plausibility of these justifications. A classification scheme for political philosophies should usefully distinguish types of philosophical justifications for governments. Accordingly, the classification scheme developed here does not aim at classifying forms of government, but rather at the classification of philosophical philosophies, or in brief, the identification of the basic "political forms." The categorization scheme offered in this essay provides for twelve basic, or archetypal, political forms. This scheme is radically new and therefore of intrinsic interest as an exercise in metaphilosophy. However, this effort also offers many practical benefits to both political philosophers and political scientists.

Despite the robust academic activity in political science and political philosophy, there is little evidence that elaborating classifications of political theories is presently encouraged or rewarded.[3] Comparative politics is in healthy shape, while comparative political philosophy slumbers. During the early decades of the 20th century, thinkers struggled to comprehend the burst of vast philosophical effort justifying varieties of democracies, communisms, socialisms, fascisms, and military dictatorships then erupting around the world. After World War II, by contrast, no significant political philosopher expended much effort at comparative political philosophy. Perhaps the cold war and its obsessive tensions between democracy and communism undernourished further creative work. That might help explain current lack of attention to comparative political philosophy, but it does not reasonably justify such neglect.

Does it matter that comparative political philosophy is presently moribund? Given the complexities of politics on the world scene today, political philosophy's complacency is unjustified and irresponsible. Comparative politics and political philosophy are now burdened with an outdated and inadequate manner of categorizing political theories. Regrettably, the extent of contemporary consensus about the categorization of political systems and philosophies does not go much further than the typical "left–center–right" spectrum found in textbooks. The more sophisticated versions usually look something like this:

anarchism	communism	democratic socialism	constitutional liberalism	conservatism	fascism	monarchism

Most everyone complains about the evident limitations of this linear scheme, but too few do anything about it. At the start of the 21st century, political thinkers are now surveying a global scene of rich political variety and an opportunity to sample and compare political philosophies originating in diverse cultures. The time is ripe for dramatically re-thinking and globalizing the field of comparative political philosophy. Unfortunately, most work in comparative political philosophy now involves selecting two familiar political philosophies, or two rival traditions of political philosophy, for analysis and contrast.[4] Very few comprehensive schemes, more detailed or philosophically penetrating than the typical "left–center–right" spectrum, can be located in the literature.[5] The arena of comprehensive comparative political philosophy is presently bereft of serious contestants, which is remedied by this essay. Comparative political philosophy deserves a fresh start.

The classification scheme of twelve archetypal political philosophies developed in this essay is quite different from the outdated spectrum approach, avoiding several of its serious problems.[6] For example, the "left–center–right" spectrum conveniently locates constitutional liberalism at the center, lending it an air of moderate reasonableness that it may not deserve. My classification scheme brings the twelve archetypes into a rounded circle, eliminating any favored middle position, and forcing an archetype's proponents to return to direct arguments for their views. The spectrum uses the label of "conservatism" as if it were self-explanatory, yet the meaning of "conservative" is entirely relative to one's own views, or to the mood of the times – for example, absolute monarchists once played the role of "conservatives" to the "liberal" advocates of strong parliaments to balance monarchs. My classification scheme eliminates relativistic labels like "conservative" or "liberal," again forcing archetype adherents to actually provide arguments for their views. The "left–center–right" spectrum is a model of its distinctive era, developing between the aftermath of the American and French revolutions and the rise of liberal democracies after World War II. My classification scheme is independent from

historical or geographical contexts, avoiding the influence of convictions about political progress or historical inevitability which infect parochial political ideology. In this scheme, no archetype can enjoy undeserved placement as privileged or suffer undeserved denigration as "extreme." For a final example, the "left–center–right" spectrum cannot explain why these seven ideologies are the only primary political options. My classification scheme of twelve archetypes is theoretically comprehensive, explaining why the archetypes can be arrayed in a rational systematic ordering, and showing how each archetype has a diametrically opposed archetype.

Twelve major Western philosophers are selected as close approximations to these twelve political forms, and in this sense they could be called "archetypal" political philosophers. However, it would be no criticism of my categorization scheme to find discrepancies between the views of an "archetypal" philosopher and an archetypal political form. Such discrepancies are not only admitted at the start, but occasionally highlighted in this essay. This scheme is not designed to fit historical philosophers, but rather to frame a comprehensive array of theoretically possible political forms. Whether any political philosopher closely approximates an archetypal political form is an entirely separate and secondary matter. It should also be noted that only Western philosophers are mentioned in this paper, as any adequate attempt to categorize non-Western philosophers would require another essay. However, this categorization scheme was designed with non-Western philosophers in mind as well. This scheme is by no means narrowly Western in scope, nor is it reliant upon assumptions peculiar to Western philosophy or civilization.

Political philosophers have offered a bewildering variety of justifications for types of governments – where should categorization start?

2. Central features of political philosophies

Politics in its broadest sense may be briefly defined as the technology of controlling large-scale human organization using persuasion and coercion. Political philosophy is therefore the intelligent justification and improvement of political technology. Any technology must carefully consider the fit between its techniques and its materials. Hence, it is irresponsible to recommend a type of politics without considering its fitness for the "human raw materials" with which a political system must deal. Accordingly, different political philosophies will have varying estimates of what humans are like and how malleable they are to cultural and political influences. Political power can have an enormous influence on people, but no reasonable political philosophy would assume that political persuasion and coercion will be the only formative influences on human maturation. As political systems are primarily concerned about the use of power by adults and the use of power for the control of adults, political philosophies explicitly or tacitly rely on notions about the proper maturation and socialization of humans. Since a political system must account for the kinds and amounts of coercion exercised by a government, a political philosophy has an obligation to explain why such additional coercion is required in order to control already socialized humans.

Political philosophies can be expected to align with compatible social theories about the motivations of humans, the socialization processes that developing humans undergo, their capacity for kinds of moral duties and social relations, and their capacity to responsibly maintain their social organizations. Many political philosophies undertake such theorizing, aiming at completeness by offering both a justification of a political system and also a justification of a corresponding social theory. The plausibility of a political philosophy to a large degree depends on its completeness and the coherence of its political and social components. No political conclusions can be deductively drawn from facts about human nature, human morality, or human sociality, of course. Nevertheless, a large degree of coherence between a political philosophy's theory and its understanding of human nature, morality, and sociality enhances its rational plausibility and practical influence.

Plato recognized these obligations of completeness and coherence, and he set high standards for a complete and coherent political philosophy. He elaborated sophisticated theories about human nature, the nature of morality, the normal mode of sociality, and the proper function of responsibility. Plato regarded these theories are crucial for justifying his own political philosophy, and his approach has been highly influential upon subsequent political philosophers. Without apologies for crudely trimming a philosopher's views into narrow categories (necessary for initiating a categorization scheme), Plato's views on human nature, morality, sociality, and responsibility can be summarized as follows:

Plato on human nature Humans naturally have *composite* tendencies that can lead toward both good/virtue and evil/vice. Plato believed that these tendencies are highly relevant for explaining the forms of government attempted by humans, and for justifying one form of government over the rest.

Plato on morality Human morality should be rationally *principled* so that it can appeal to intelligence. Plato believed that reasoning is the best way to discern and justify the genuinely moral life. Many humans are moral despite ignorance of principles, but the wise seek them, respect them, and try to teach them to others.

Plato on sociality Humans flourish best when socialized into culturally *traditional* ways. Plato believed that novel or alien modes of social life are dangerous to morality and social stability, and he preferred a static and closed culture of conformity to established ways of life.

Plato on responsibility Human responsibility functions best when its priority is to be *just*. Plato believed that each person's highest responsibility is to respect the political order, and that personal responsibility is optimized when people ensure that the political order prevails over other interests.

Plato's combination of principled morality together with traditional sociality will seem strange to many at first glance. Modern Western philosophy, in the wake of the Enlightenment, more easily associates appeals to reason with criticisms of traditional ways, not justifications of tradition and custom. The notion that grounding morality on reason alone can only produce novel and unconventional moralities has but a recent and local provenance, when contrasted against the wider panorama of political philosophies across the world's civilizations during the past three millennia. Political thinkers who fall most closely into the Platonic archetype are comfortable with the alternative notion that intelligence and custom confirm the same truth, and that respect for traditional ways is the wisest and most justifiable course. These Platonic thinkers also tend to believe that their rationality, like their culture, has universal scope and superiority. They assume that their modes of reasoning are the only legitimate modes, and that they are discovering absolute and timeless truths about morality, culture, and government that are forever valid for all humanity. Plato's political philosophy aims at justifying an *aristocratic* political form, recommending rule by the most excellent leaders, over the rival political forms that he considers. We will not mean by "aristocracy" only what Plato intended, but use the term more generally to cover political rule by a relatively small number of people who abundantly possess the required political qualifications. There are many specific kinds of aristocratic governments, depending on the sort of political excellences required (some aristocracies are fascist or militaristic or theocratic, etc.). To summarize this archetype:

Philosopher	Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
Plato	composite	principled	traditional	just	aristocratic

Using Plato's categorization, we can proceed to expand upon these selected essential features of any political philosophy. What are the basic modes of human nature, morality, sociality, and responsibility? Starting with human nature, the five logical options are as follows. Human nature naturally has (1) mostly good tendencies; (2) neither good nor evil tendencies; (3) varying ratios of good and evil tendencies across people; (4) a common composite mixture of good and evil tendencies; or (5) mostly evil. Natural "good" and "evil" in this political context means the presence in infancy of innate dispositions resulting in behaviors which are (a) appraised by adults as socially positive acts that should be encouraged by moral training, or (b) appraised by adults as socially negative acts that should be discouraged by moral training. Since the terms "good" and "evil" carry some connotations that distract attention away from political philosophy, towards evaluative meanings valid only in some cultures but not others, "good" and "evil" are replaced by less pejorative terms in the final version of the categorization scheme.

Some philosophers do not provide a psychological theory on the question of innate morality, but their approach to moral education yields clues. For example, a philosopher who sees little difficulty with socializing most adults into

lifelong moral agents has a much more positive view of human nature than a philosopher who believes that adults will eventually lapse into antisocial behavior without constant supervision and reinforcement. We must also be clear that most political philosophers, regardless of their divergent views about human nature, are of the opinion that many, if not most, human beings can become good (either through their own efforts or through socialization). When a philosopher announces that people really are good, that can be interpreted either as the view that human beings are naturally good at birth, or as the view that human beings will be good if certain conditions are fulfilled (for example, if introspective meditation reveals to them their inner divinity, or if environing society during childhood promotes good conduct). A philosopher's pronouncements on human nature must be carefully interpreted to discover whether actual good or potential good (and likewise the converse, actual evil or potential evil) is being predicated of infants.

The next essential feature is morality itself: how does morality best function for human beings? Let us consider what views about morality best pair up with the five modes of human nature. If human nature is mostly good, then it seems plausible that one's natural insights and motivations are mostly good, and therefore if a person wants to consult morality she need only to consult herself. No outside source or authority is needed, as each person is their own best *intuitive* guide to morality. On the other hand, if human nature has no significant tendencies towards either good nor evil, the individual is not the source of morality and instead morality is culturally constructed and maintained. This does not mean that anything goes; a constructed morality should still be constrained by the actual human beings and local conditions which it serves. Therefore, a morality should be carefully *designed* to fit the social situation. The third option holds that all people have some innate good and evil, but each person has a unique ratio of these tendencies and many kinds of ratios are found distributed across society. Perhaps these ratios are distributed across society in a bell curve pattern, or perhaps ratios are distributed by class or caste, where "higher" segments of society display ratios weighted more towards goodness. No single morality or way of life fits all people; a morality functions best when it is a *natural* match to people and their place in life. The fourth option is Plato's: he paired a view of human nature as a composite of good and evil, in pretty much the same ratio for all, with a view of morality as functioning best when it is rationally *principled*. This pairing seems sensible because the human conscience, already deeply conflicted, cannot easily deliver a morality; while reason offers a alternative way, apart from emotion or desire, to justify a morality. The fifth option for morality is the view that if human beings are mostly evil, then they can best understand and follow a morality if it is *commanded* by an authority figure. On this pairing, a sufficiently impressive authority figure can be an effective moral leader by somehow understanding a morality and imposing it on evil human beings who can be motivated to obey from respect for power, fear of punishment, greed for reward, and the like.

The five basic options regarding morality become these: Morality functions best when it is (1) internally intuited by a conscientious individual; (2) creatively designed for the social situation; (3) naturally matched to the classes' lifestyle; (4) rationally justified in a principled way; or (5) decisively commanded by an authority figure.

Summarizing the categorization scheme so far:

Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
good	intuitive			
neutral	designed			
distributed	natural			
composite	principled	traditional	just	aristocratic
evil	commanded			

We can fill in this scheme by completing the other four archetypes besides Plato's. Let us begin by considering a political philosophy that proceeds from the view that humans are naturally good and can discover morality by intuition. In the real world, not all humans have intuited the same morality, although some philosophers hold out hope for a future moral unification. Humans that have discerned a common morality would most easily live together, and not want to have much social interaction with humans following a quite different morality. An obvious social pairing with intuitive morality is therefore *sectarianism*: let humans divide themselves into separate communities according to their moralities. For a political philosopher who believes that there is one superior morality, sectarianism is additionally appealing because the

truly moral can segregate themselves apart from the immoral, minimizing bad influences caused by contact with evil humans. If such segregation were achieved, the moral human would achieve in practice what nature ideally intended: that the good humans would attain the liberty to be what they were always meant to be. The primary responsibility of each moral person is to be *free*: to exercise one's liberty to follow the moral conscience. For this archetype, the ideal political form is *communal*, in which only minimal political organization and coercion is necessary to preserve a social order that is sustained by the community's common moral values and principles. To summarize:

Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
good	intuitive	sectarian	free	communal

The next archetypal political philosophy holds that humans have no natural tendencies towards good or evil robust enough to help justify any particular form of government, and that humans design moralities to pragmatically fit their situations. Since morality is entirely a cultural artifact, there are no innate guidelines for human decisions about social relationships. Humans will form various social associations for the ends of life: the innumerable and ever-changing cooperative ventures that yield desired goods. Morality thus serves sociality: morality must be judged by its utility for advancing overall social welfare, and morality must try to keep up with the *pluralistic* flux of sociality. Some modes of social organization are traditional and operate by traditional moralities, but even these older ways must undergo modification, especially where new modes of human association are experimentally invented. What does this multitude of partially overlapping and constantly shifting social groups look like from the perspective of an individual human who is a member of many social relationships and groups and has opportunities to join more? Managing the responsibilities that come with social relationships is not easy under the best of circumstances; managing a pluralistic flux of social relationships without either an intuitive, natural, principled, or commanded morality is even harder. People must therefore take *autonomous* responsibility for designing their own unique set of social relationships, for creatively managing their attendant responsibilities, and for prioritizing moral duties accordingly. For this archetype, the ideal political form is *democratic*, in which the government enforces those laws which protect and enhance basic liberties, healthy toleration for pluralism, and robust political participation by citizens. In summary:

Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
neutral	designed	pluralistic	autonomous	democratic

The third archetypal political philosophy holds the view that people are endowed with varying ratios of good and evil, and that they need a morality that is *natural* for their way of life. This view could (and does) lead some philosophers towards sectarianism, but for a political philosophy that respects nature, sectarianism seems forced and unnatural. Why does nature distribute good and evil, and other key talents and virtues, so unevenly? For a thinker attuned to the biological realm, such distributions are good evidence that nature intends human beings to live together for the good of all. Each person should contribute their own particular excellences to the *organic* life and happiness of the whole society. If a virtue is understood as just that sort of personal excellence which enlarges the social good, then the highest responsibility of everyone is to be *virtuous*. For this archetype, the ideal political form is *representative*, in which all social classes have a share of power proportional to their social significance and/or their political wisdom. The term "representative" is easily associated with the type of government called "representative democracy," but in this categorization scheme, representative democracy is but one type of government that is classed as having the representative political form. To summarize:

Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
distributed	natural	organic	virtuous	representative

The fifth archetypal political philosophy holds that humans have a dominating natural tendency towards evil, and that they can best understand and follow a morality if it is *commanded* by a powerful authority figure. In large-scale human

societies, it is impractical for any single authority figure to directly give commands to everyone about all of the duties for everyday life. The simplest solution is to systematize authority into *hierarchical* social relationships where each person has an assigned level and area of responsibility for (1) obeying the commands of a higher-level person, (2) relaying higher-level commands to people at lower levels in their area, and (3) giving additional commands to people at lower levels in their area which refine or supplement the higher-level commands. In such hierarchies, people exercise their responsibility best through *obedient* deference to proper authority. For this archetype, the ideal political form is *autocratic*, in which ultimate responsibility for the law and enforcement of the law rests on a single authority (perhaps a monarch, or a supreme deity). In summary:

Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
evil	commanded	hierarchical	obedient	autocratic

3. Archetypal political philosophers

We have so far completed the categorial scheme of five fundamental archetypes for political philosophy. Plato is a good example of the fourth archetype, and his preferred political form of aristocracy can be viewed as an archetypal form. Which political philosophers, and which political forms, exemplify the other four archetypes?
Four more major political philosophers and their political forms are needed to complete the categorical scheme: Rousseau's communalism, John Stuart Mill's democracy, Aristotle's representative polity, and John Calvin's autocracy. As promised, the pejorative and misleading terms "good" and "evil" are now replaced by "simple" and "obstinate," which carry the meaning intended by these archetypes and translate better across cultures.

Philosopher	Humanity	Morality	Sociality	Responsibility	Political Form
Rousseau	simple SIMP	intuitive INT	sectarian SECT	free FREE	communal
Mill	neutral NEUT	designed DES	pluralistic PLUR	autonomous AUTO	democratic
Aristotle	distributed DIST	natural NAT	organic ORG	virtuous VIRT	representative
Plato	composite COMP	principled PRIN	traditional TRAD	just JUST	aristocratic
Calvin	obstinate OBST	commanded COMM	hierarchical HIER	obedient OBED	autocratic

In light of this article's opening remarks about political philosophies having to justify the scale of political control, it should be no surprise to observe the archetypal ordering of the five basic political forms: communal, democratic, representative, aristocratic, autocratic. This ordering represents a decreasing confidence in the peoples' capacity for political authority, an increasing desire for the narrowing and centralization of political power, and an increasing dependence on special individuals possessing political knowledge and skill. There should be no surprise that Aristotle takes the middle ground between extremes on this scale of archetypes. His preferred form of government, the representative polity restrained by constitutional laws, distributes a measure of political power to each social class and incorporates democratic, aristocratic, and autocratic features. Modern representative democracy has added the feature of mass voting, distributed across geographic regions, for elected representatives.

The ascending quantity of available coercive power for communal, democratic, representative, aristocratic, and autocratic political forms is clearly correlated, as is commonly recognized by political philosophers themselves, with the descending quality of innate human morality. This categorization scheme does not assume that political philosophy ultimately rests on moral philosophy, or that politics itself rests on morality. Politics can proceed quite independently of

morality, and political conclusions need not depend on moral premises. However, sound political philosophy is directly or indirectly steered by views about morality, and ultimately grounded in theories of anthropology. If human nature is mostly good, then moral education is a matter of self-reliance with little social formation needed (so long as evil influences are shunned), and political coercion upon mostly good adults can be minimized. If human nature is neutral, then moral education through proper socialization is necessary, but this socialization is not struggling against any innate evil; relatively good adults can be produced that still need a measure of political supervision and occasional coercion. If human nature is some sort of mixture of good and evil, then strenuous moral socialization for the young, and continued political coercion for adults, has a decent chance of ensuring stable social order. If human nature is mostly evil, strenuous moral socialization combined with relentless political coercion is necessary for social order.

Selecting Rousseau, Mill, Aristotle, Plato, and Calvin as five archetypal political philosophers is even more hazardous than selecting humanity, morality, sociality, and responsibility as four basic features of a political philosophy. Starting with Rousseau, he was convinced that humanity was for the most part naturally good, but is he the best example of a philosopher who argued that morality is acquired by intuition? Perhaps not; Ralph Waldo Emerson would be a more obvious modern representative of that view, although Rousseau did strenuously defend personal innate conscience as a genuine guide to morality in several of his major writings. However, Emerson did not offer a positive political philosophy to justify one form of government (he is more of an anarchist), while Rousseau's political philosophy is designed to justify the sovereignty and laws necessary to provide a community with a state while preserving the citizens' natural freedom and moral virtue. We can also notice that even though Rousseau was an influential inspiration for many later communal political philosophers among the socialists, communists, and utopian commune founders (and some contemporary communitarians), Rousseau's mature social contract theory does not sound like the communal archetype. But it must be recalled that Rousseau maintained his conviction that the best state will encompass a smaller community of citizens largely agreeing on morality, rather than encompassing a larger aggregation of citizens having more diverse views on morality. Rousseau is not a good example of a social contract theorist, because social contract theory is designed to apply the solution of a legally neutral government to the problem of a large state encompassing a society having significant moral pluralism.

Turning to John Stuart Mill, his status as an archetypal political philosopher seems obvious due to his reputation as one of the staunchest defenders of pluralistic and participatory democracy. It is true that Mill defended a set of rights and liberties as foundationally definitive for modern democracy, but for Mill, these rights and liberties were neither based on any social contract on the one hand, nor on some universally valid moral principles on the other. For Mill, basic rights and liberties must be justified by their long-term utility to society, and can be modified in the future if deemed necessary for the greater good. As for Aristotle, there may be better examples of this third archetype among the Stoics or eighteenth century conservatives, though Aristotle was not unknown to them. We understand that Plato's views on politics underwent development from the *Republic* to the *Laws*, placing into question the degree of his commitment to aristocracy. And Calvin's political philosophy distinguishes church government from secular government, recommending types of aristocratic governments for each, although the supreme autocrat for both governments is God.

It must be admitted that alternate minor thinkers may better exemplify these five archetypal political philosophies than Rousseau, Mill, Aristotle, Plato, and Calvin. Nevertheless, among the greatest political philosophers, these five thinkers serve as the closest Western exemplars of these five archetypes.

4. Twelve political archetypes

The five archetypes do not by themselves organize all political philosophizing. Most political philosophizing consists of thinkers exploring various possible combinations of the sixteen basic features of political philosophies. Furthermore, much of the territory of political philosophizing falls between the five archetypes discerned so far, because many significant thinkers have borrowed and blended neighboring archetypal views.

The paradigm case of creative blending is the natural law approach to politics, which was formed by those impressed by both the representative and aristocratic archetypes. Natural law political theorists typically have the following five features in common: (1) they believe that people naturally need a fitting place in society in order to become

fully human; (2) they hold that moral and political principles are ultimately justifiable by the universal order of things; (3) they affirm that humans are happiest when they assume roles available in customary institutions; (4) they discern close affinity or even identity between justice and virtue; and (5) they defend aristocratic governments which follow the universal principles of right and duty.

Six political forms can be identified as adjacent to the first five archetypes: the "social anarchy," "contractarian," "progressive," "natural law," "sage ruler," and "tyranny" forms. These six additional archetypes are located as follows:

Philosopher	**Humanity**	**Morality**	**Sociality**	**Responsibility**	**Political Form**
people are naturally amicable and live best as authentic individuals in social anarchy					
Rousseau	simple	intuitive	sectarian	free	communal
people are naturally diverse and live best with maximal liberty arranged by social contract					
Mill	neutral	designed	pluralistic	autonomous	democratic
people are naturally adaptable and live best with civil rights in a progressive socialism					
Aristotle	distributed	natural	organic	virtuous	representative
people are naturally partial and live best in corporate institutions conforming to natural law					
Plato	composite	principled	traditional	just	aristocratic
people are naturally emotional and live best as dutiful subjects under a sage ruler					
Calvin	obstinate	commanded	hierarchical	obedient	autocratic
people are naturally egotistical and live best as antagonistic competitors trying to be tyrants					

There is one additional political archetype that must be added for completeness before proceeding further: Ralph Waldo Emerson's philosophy of "aloof anarchism." This archetype falls between social anarchy and tyranny, which brings this categorization scheme into a rounded circle. I am speaking of Ralph Waldo Emerson's self-reliant individualism, which refuses to endorse any common morality or scheme of formal social organization, much less an optimal form of government. Standing exactly opposite from Aristotle, Emerson denied that people are made for social life, and he notoriously proclaimed that neither intuition, reason, nor nature can guarantee human alignment on moral, social, or political matters. For Emerson, it suffices that one's independent lifestyle is authorized by one's own true nature, in a pure state beyond mere good and evil, however that nature may be judged by anyone else. For this archetype, *people are naturally divine and live best as self-reliant creators in aloof anarchy*.

Emerson	divine	mystical	atomic	original	aloof anarchy

For better comparison, we can now assemble all twelve primary political philosophies, attached to twelve archetypal philosophers, and compressed into their characteristic slogans.

Emerson	People are naturally divine and live best as self-reliant creators in aloof anarchy.
Kropotkin	People are naturally amicable and live best as authentic individuals in social anarchy.
Rousseau	People are naturally simple and live best in collective freedom within a communal organization.
Locke	People are naturally reasonable and live best with maximal liberty arranged by social contract.
Mill	People are naturally neutral and live best in plural groups utilizing participatory democracy.
Dewey	People are naturally adaptable and live best with civil rights in a progressive socialism.
Aristotle	People are naturally distributed and live best in social harmony enforced by representative polity.

Aquinas	People are naturally partial and live best in corporate institutions conforming to natural law.
Plato	People are naturally composite and live best in traditional culture controlled by wise aristocrats.
Machiavelli	People are naturally emotional and live best as dutiful subjects under a sage ruler.
Calvin	People are naturally obstinate and live best in fearful obedience to a supreme autocrat.
Thrasymachus	People are naturally egotistical and live best as antagonistic competitors trying to be tyrants.

Because the six additional archetypes fall into the logically available intervals between the first five archetypes, they will share family resemblances with their adjacent neighbors. Indeed, advocates of one archetype may frequently appeal to the philosophies of neighboring archetypes for good arguments and sound wisdom. Similarly, an advocate of one archetype may try to increase that archetype's plausibility by representing it as the best combination of the two other neighboring archetypes between which that archetype logically falls. For example, traditional advocates of the natural law archetype frequently borrowed and blended views from Aristotle and Plato, and modern advocates of the progressive archetype have praised its combination of the best features of the democratic and representative archetypes. The evident close relationships and similarities between archetypes may arouse questions about the value of refining political philosophies so carefully. Have our distinctions become excessively refined?

Three sufficient answers to this issue are the following. First, each archetype does rely on quite distinctive views about the nature of humanity, morality, sociality, and responsibility, which are not satisfactorily reducible to those of any neighbor. Second, the peculiar combination of an archetype's four distinctive views possess an inherent coherence of mutual support which lend them a much higher level of reasonable plausibility than they would enjoy separately, or in any combination with neighboring archetypal views. Third, because each archetype does enjoy that cohesive plausibility, they all have many significant advocates across the history of philosophy, and most of these advocates understood themselves to be advocating for that archetype and not any neighbor. Natural law theorists were not confused about the distinctiveness of their tradition; social contract theorists would protest classification with Mill's manner of utilitarian calculation; and social anarchists put great effort into preventing their views from inflating into Rousseau's manner of political organization, or from deflating into disorganized aloof anarchy. The fact that these twelve archetypes are robustly represented in the history of political philosophy lends further confidence to this essay's thesis that political philosophy logically and historically has these twelve archetypal forms.

The selection of representative philosophers for all the archetypes admittedly remains hazardous and tentative. Space forbids any lengthy justification for these choices; it must suffice here to disclaim precision and admit that any number of lesser figures might be more fitting representatives.

The example of John Dewey is instructive and can be briefly discussed to illustrate this lack of precision. Dewey is rightly remembered as a major force for the progressive socialist movement in America, but did he not endorse cultural pluralism and participatory democracy? Why does he not properly fall under Mill's archetype, especially considering how Mill was the philosophical predecessor closest to Dewey's political theory? The answer is that Dewey departs from Mill in two crucial respects. First, Dewey defended a small number of moral ideals about human dignity and value which he refused to subject to utilitarian calculations of happiness. He instead regarded them as essential for human co-existence as naturally interdependent beings, so that these ideals are more about a practical fit with nature rather than being entirely artificial and variable depending on current human happiness. Second, Dewey appealed to an civically educated and community-spirited body of citizens living in organic interdependence (the Great Community) in order to ensure that pluralistic democracy could actually function in practice. Dewey hence devised a compromise between the organicism of Aristotle and the pluralism of Mill, by advocating multiculturalism as the best type of sociality for humans. In Dewey's vision of multiculturalism, social groups overlap in various ways, because people enjoy being members of multiple groups and they should freely share cultural ways to enhance their valuable individuality. In this vision of multiculturalism, mere democracy is insufficient because it cannot ensure a high level of participatory civility and concern for the welfare of the whole society. Dewey does exalt the noble aim of personal autonomy, like Mill, but Dewey ultimately requires the supreme responsibility of civility from all citizens, as he looks ahead to a cosmopolitan theory of pluralistic political obligation at a global level. Hence the political form of progressive socialism (not Marxist or Leninist communism) is preferred by Dewey, although he is happy to utilize democratic government to bring about socialist results, often

advocating “democratic socialism.”

The other additional archetypes can be briefly explained. Standing opposite to Dewey’s progressivism is Thrasymachus’ tyranny: humans are selfish to the extreme and naturally unadaptable to society. Socialization can occur of course; when morality does its work, humans are reduced to servile status as sheep readied for the slaughter by the wolf. The wolf is that rare human who realizes that one’s supreme responsibility is to dominate the competition and survive for as long as possible as a tyrant.

The political form of social anarchy starts from a view of human nature as amicably disposed towards all people (although a corrupt society or the State can override this natural sympathy). Inspired by moral ideals of fulfilling this natural demand for human equality, people will live cooperative and authentic lives without any need for coercive government. Standing exactly opposite from social anarchy is the political form of natural law, which views human nature as partial in a double sense: humans are partial creatures that become complete only when brought into static social relationships fixed by customary institutions; and humans are also partial in the sense that they are not favorably predisposed towards all, but only to a few. Humans must not try to become authentically themselves, but instead they must be normalized. Moral and social norms are knowable through the study of the natural order of things, ensuring that these norms are universal rather than culturally relative. The natural law political form usually results in the approval of an aristocratic form of government (or a representative government having strong aristocratic elements) that is answerable to, and reformable by, natural law.

The political forms of contractarianism and sage ruler are the opposed forms that complete the classification scheme. For contractarianism, humanity can be relied upon to be naturally reasonable, whatever else human nature entails. Reason supplies the political boundaries of liberty under minimal but potent government, and these boundaries protect personal moral life and mobile social structure. Contractarian political philosophers tend to approve constitutional democracies with substantial representation by the people. The contrary political form to contractarianism is the sage ruler political form, which views human nature as fundamentally controlled by the passions. To control such an unstable and unruly population, morality is of supreme public concern and some sort of rigid caste system is recommended, so that everyone knows their proper place and obligations of duty. The sage ruler political form seeks a special and rare type of autocrat, who possesses the great wisdom to rule in a way that preserves the social caste system. Sage ruler political philosophers tend to approve a highly centralized and totalitarian government (such as a fascist state of military supremacy, an oligarchic state of hereditary wealth, or a noble state of virtuous officials) headed by a clearly defined supreme leader.

The full categorization scheme of the twelve archetypes of political philosophy is presented below, first in table format, and then in a circular diagram to better display the interrelations among the twelve archetypes.

Philosopher	**Humanity**	**Morality**	**Sociality**	**Responsibility**	**Political Form**
Emerson	divine DIV	mystical MYST	atomic ATOM	original ORIG	aloof anarchy
Kropotkin	amicable AMIC	inspired INSP	egalitarian EGAL	authentic AUTH	social anarchy
Rousseau	simple SIMP	intuitive INT	sectarian SECT	free FREE	communal
Locke	reasonable REAS	personal PERS	mobile MOB	liberated LIB	contractarian
Mill	neutral NEUT	designed DES	pluralistic PLUR	autonomous AUTO	democratic
Dewey	adaptable ADAP	practical PRAC	multicultural MULT	civil CIV	progressive
Aristotle	distributed DIST	natural NAT	organic ORG	virtuous VIRT	representative
Aquinas	partial	universal	corporate	normal	natural law

	PART	UNIV	CORP	NORM	
Plato	composite COMP	principled PRIN	traditional TRAD	just JUST	aristocratic
Machiavelli	emotional EMOT	public PUBL	caste CAST	dutiful DUT	sage ruler
Calvin	obstinate OBST	commanded COMM	hierarchical HIER	obedient OBED	autocratic
Thrasymachus	egotistical EGO	servile SERV	antagonistic ANT	dominant DOM	tyrannical



5. Categorizing more Western political philosophers

Concluding this essay, we may ask how the categorization scheme may be applied to additional Western philosophers. The short list below includes the twelve archetypal political philosophers, and is organized in the order presented by the categorization scheme, from aloof anarchy to tyranny.

Ralph Waldo Emerson	DIV, MYST, ATOM, ORIG	aloof anarchy
Peter Kropotkin	AMIC, INSP, EGAL, AUTH	social anarchy
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon	REAS, NAT, PLUR, FREE	
William Godwin	REAS, PERS, EGAL, FREE	
Jean-Jacques Rousseau	SIMP, INT, SECT, FREE	communal
Karl Marx	AMIC, PRAC, EGAL, LIB	
Immanuel Kant	REAS, PRIN, EGAL, FREE	
John Locke	REAS, PERS, MOB, LIB	contractarian
Thomas Jefferson	REAS, NAT, EGAL, FREE	
John Rawls	NEUT, PERS, PLUR, AUTO	
John Stuart Mill	NEUT, DES, PLUR, AUTO	democratic
Isaiah Berlin	NEUT, DES, PLUR, AUTO	
Jürgen Habermas	NEUT, UNIV, PLUR, CIV	
John Dewey	ADAP, PRAC, MULT, CIV	progressive
Bernard Bosanquet	DIST, DES, ORG, AUTO	
G. W. F. Hegel	ADAP, PUBL, ORG, AUTO	
Aristotle	DIST, NAT, ORG, VIRT	representative
John Adams	DIST, NAT, CORP, VIRT	
Cicero	PART, UNIV, CORP, VIRT	
Thomas Aquinas	PART, UNIV, CORP, NORM	natural law
Hugo Grotius	PART, UNIV, CORP, JUST	
Edmund Burke	PART, UNIV, TRAD, JUST	
Plato	COMP, PRIN, TRAD, JUST	aristocratic
Richard Hooker	COMP, UNIV, CAST, DUT	
Augustine	OBST, COMM,TRAD, JUST	
Niccolo Machiavelli	EMOT, PUBL, CAST, DUT	sage ruler
Thomas Hobbes	OBST, PRIN, PLUR, OBED	
Carl Schmitt	EMOT, COMM, HIER, OBED	
John Calvin	OBST, COMM, HIER, OBED	autocratic
Thrasymachus	EGO, SERV, ANT, DOM	tyrannical

These tentative assignments are made with all due humility. Scholars devoted to each figure can ponder their accuracy, as inevitable concerns about which treatise, or which period, etc., of a philosopher's career are raised. Stimulating further such deliberation is a primary goal of this essay. The field of comparative political philosophy can progress under the twin proddings of demands for careful exegesis and lucid categorization. Valuable clarity will result even where improved scholarship successfully explains why a political philosopher's theories cannot be so easily categorized or compared with rivals.

NOTES

1. The field of comparative politics, once called “comparative government,” has dramatically expanded in scope and influence since the 1960s. Guidance to exemplary texts in this field is beyond the scope of this essay, but the reader may usefully consult Scarrow 1969, Blondel 1990, Lane 1997, and Stepan 2001. The related field of comparative political economy is surveyed in Boettke et al. 2005.

2. Freeden 1996 amply illustrates how the pursuit of political theory blends into the study of ideologies and then intersects with political philosophy. His thesis that the normative values of ideologies are essential to sophisticated political theories, and hence deserve as much scholarly attention as political philosophy itself, is congenial to this essay’s aims. In this author’s view, the political philosophy that disclaims any ideological prejudice only the more clearly reveals its own ideological norms. Ideology seems in this way like metaphysics: those who would bury metaphysics get trapped by their own metaphysical cages, even if they can’t see the bars. Once the crucial role of ideology is recognized for all political thinking, there is little reason to deny that the construction and criticism of political ideologies is at the core of political philosophizing.

3. Interestingly, the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Boix and Stokes 2007) does not contain an essay devoted to the theoretical problem of classifying political systems. Indeed, works in comparative politics that provide nuanced and reflective thought to classifying political systems and philosophies are quite rare. Exemplary examples are found among the essays in Bebler and Seroka 1990. Academic journals for political science and political philosophy are almost completely devoid of any original work in comparative political philosophy. The greatest energy for classifying governments has been expended on distinguishing kinds of democracies. The impact of Dahl 1956 and Dahl 1972 has been enormous; see for example the chapters of Diamond and Plattner 2001. The field of political philosophy itself does not consider comparative political philosophy to be significant. For example, the authoritative Blackwell *Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Goodin et al. 2007) has chapters on the obvious systems, such as anarchism, conservativism, liberalism, and socialism, but there is no evidence of reflection about the categorization of the basic political forms, even within modern western political thought.

4. The paradigm examples in recent literature are *Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political Theory* (Dallmayr 1999) and *Comparative Political Philosophy: Studies under the Upas Tree* (Parel and Keith 2003). *Border Crossings* contains chapters on Islamic, Indian, and Chinese political theories. Dallmayr’s introduction laments the stultifying reliance of comparative politics solely on structures of modern western politics, claiming that “reliance on these structures permits the comparativist or comparative political scientist to assume the stance of a global overseer or universal spectator whose task consists basically of assessing the relative distance or proximity of given societies to the established global yardstick” (Dallmayr 1999, 2). The chapters of *Comparative Political Philosophy* separately cover aspects of Western, Chinese, Indian, and Islamic political thought. Parel’s introductory chapter on “The Comparative Study of Political Philosophy” echoes Dallmayr, warning that “no comparative study of political philosophy is possible within the framework of modern western political philosophy” (Parel and Keith 2003, 13-14).

5. Only a couple of interesting comprehensive schemes for comparative political philosophy deserve mention. Neither *Border Crossings* nor *Comparative Political Philosophy* contain any comprehensive schemes. Lane 1996 does not offer a comprehensive scheme, but the major theoretical issues relevant to creating a scheme are amply discussed, in the course of comparing numerous types of constitutions. Roger Masters’s essay “Human Nature, Nature, and Political Thought” (in Pennock and Chapman 1977, 69-110) applies three primary dimensions (“relation of human action to cosmos,” “relation of human law to cosmos,” and “relation of human thought to cosmos”) for distinguishing eight basic types of political

theory, arranged as the eight points of a cube. Christopher Berry similarly emphasizes the modes of grounding political theorizing on views of human nature, discriminating a wide variety of political philosophies without supplying any categorization scheme (Berry 1986). David Dilworth's comparative hermeneutics has been inspirational for my own comparative project, but the degree of congruence between my categorization scheme with the archic matrix of his seminal *Philosophy in World Perspective* (Dilworth 1989) cannot be explored here.

6. A survey of the problems mentioned here, and several additional problems, are described in Leach 1993.

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