The Academic Synopticon

John R. Shook (c)2024

Part Twelve.
Morality, Ethics, and Ethical Theories

Moral philosophy, along with history, sociology, psychology, and anthropology, makes a crucial distinction between basic common morals and intellectual ethics. Common morals consist of the core virtue and firm rules instilled into all children and expected from any adult. Helpfulness is better than hurtfulness, cooperation is better than betrayal, honesty is better than deception, fairness is better than cheating, generosity is better than coercion, toleration is better than domination, and so on. By the age of six or seven years old, most every child of any society around the world is socialized into obeying these norms, and well aware that violations had better get justified or else punishment is deserved.

Moral Psychology

Moral philosophy is best conducted with input from *moral psychology*: how do people actually form moral ideas and make moral (and immoral) judgments and decisions during daily life? The notorious "Trolly Problem" mainly shows how anyone perceives the tension between "don't cause the death of someone" with "do save people from dying".



Do you feel morally better by doing nothing (five surely die) or doing something (one surely dies)? There is no "right answer" to any Trolley Problem because the human brain is evolutionarily and developmentally designed to see both options (I can kill one to save five, or let five die so I can't be a killer) as genuinely moral options worth considering. The Trolly Problem is a problem for moral cognition in sort of the same psychological way that an optical illusion is a problem for perceptual cognition. Your brain is trying to "see the situation" in both ways, but it can only manage one way at a time, and switching back and forth for a while is typical, for a properly functioning brain. This is akin to the famous Necker Cube, that seems to "move" between two perspectives in alternation.



When the observer of a hypothetical Trolley Problem can see some legitimacy to both answers (kill, or let die) before thoughtfully settling on one option, this is a sign of properly functioning moral cognition (the two evolved moral operations, to avoid harming and being helpful).

It is also a sign of normal moral cognition to ask, "Tell me if any of those people trapped on the tracks are anyone I know, or anyone important" because morality is also primed to take "relevance to me" as a key factor (we can kill for kin, or for people of high status, and so on). We also try to shift responsibility away from ourselves (another moral tactic, of fairness). We want all sorts of further information as our moral cognition shifts into high gear.

But the Trolly Problem is relentless; no further information is available, and you are alone at the switch, and time is running out. You will either pull the switch, or you won't (like just watching, or turning and walking away). This is a tough forced choice, when confronted with a simple hypothetical. But moral cognition detests simplicity – the real world is always more complex than that.

By the time that someone reaches a tentative conclusion about what they personally would do, they have reflected on all sorts of salient factors and social conditions ("How would my reputation be affected?" or "What would get me into the least legal trouble?" or "What does my religion tell me to do here?" and so on), which shows how this person is getting past the indecisiveness of this Trolly Moral Illusion by moving up to a higher stage of ethical reflection. Ethical reflection, while surely intelligent and wise for adults, doesn't guarantee "the same right answer" for everyone because real-world situations affecting many people always manage to get bewilderingly complex.



At best, ethical reflection ensures that we do not simply "guess" at moral answers or just revert back to whatever seems convenient for us personally. Moral responsibility never evaporates no matter how complicated and frustrating life can become. Let's look at an overview of moral psychology.

As the Trolley Dilemma reveals, there are several moral intuitions, and multiple kinds of moral thinking, that complex situations can deploy. There are distinctive interpretations of the Trolley Problem and similar empirical studies of human behavior in the ordinary world. Interpretations start from premised assumptions, which may be misguided or incorrect.

Misguided Moral Research Agendas

"Moral Emotions": Moral judgments are grounded in compelling emotions. It is often said that moral behavior starts from compassion, but no justification for morality follows, since compassion is thoroughly moral in the first place. What is needed is the basis for all moral judgment – for example, why should compassion, or love (etc.), be so moral? *Moral* motives do not explain morality. Seeking an explanation in the emotions has had psychology's attention since our moods and passions are both natural and potent. Frustrated with philosophy's fables about objective morality suspended over humanity, psychology pointed to drives for subjective morals within human beings. Even Immanuel Kant, who looked to reason's objectivity as

morality's true ground, admitted that our inherent motives explain far more about how we conduct our lives. Thee basic kinds of passions move us, for Kant: "These passions are the manias for honor, for dominance, and for possession." [Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, ed. and trans. Robert B. Loudon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 170.] Paul Ricoeur lists them in this order: "the passion of having (avoir, Habsucht), of power (pouvoir, Herrschsucht), and of worth (valoir, Ehrsucht)." [Ricoeur, Philosophical Anthropology (2016), p. 16.] That ordering arranges them in the ascending manner of firstness, secondness, and thirdness (as Peirce would) so that "having" is about who I think I am (a monadic relation), "power" is about what I can do to you (a dyadic relation), and "worth" is about how others think of my status (a triadic relation).

What I simply want for myself is the ground for selfishness, so egotistical possessiveness is far from morality. What I can force you do from clout or coercion might be moral if I already held authoritative power and applied that power to uphold morality. Moral force makes a great difference in the world, but it presupposes morality. Authority simply as Might never makes Right. What establishes Rightful Authority? True worthiness bestows a special status deserving respect, but there must be a way, a moral way, to distinguish worthy authority from endless pretenders lusting for power. Once again, morality is presumed and not found in mere status no matter how lofty and majestic. Monarchs impose law, not morality. God's moral authority cannot be recognized in divine omnipotence because creativity implies responsibility. Job was satisfied with God's display of power only because the construction of creation implied a vast cosmic justice beyond the ken of insignificant creatures. God's just goodness, while authoritative in some final sense, cannot guide the human world for we are neither God nor godly enough to render justice, and not even wise enough to agree on which god is king. Ultimately, grounding morality in emotions is an academic fallacy as well as worldly folly. Philosophy advises us to abandon monarchs (war is their specialty) and trust ourselves to take responsibility. What else is inherently within us to trust?

"Rational Innateness": Moral intuitions are based in reason. This is a fallacious view since it is self-contradictory: reason consists of inferences from premises to conclusions. If an idea is playing the role of a premise, its not coming from reasoning, but stands prior to the start of reasoning. If an idea is a conclusion instead, then its not intuitive since it had to be learned from thinking. This fallacy is due to the metaphysical principle that reason is essentially innate. Perhaps so, but empiricism and naturalism disagree, so science cannot agree. Even if reason is essentially innate, whether morality is also innate is a separate question. This deduction is a fallacy: (1) Reason is innate; (2) Moral ideas are innate; so (3) moral ideas must be based in reason. That conclusion (3) does not follow, since reason may not be the only innate capacity we possess. Consider: selfishness is innate, reason is innate, so selfishness must be reason-based (no, that doesn't seem right).

Why would any academics commit the Rational Innateness fallacy? They earnestly want to find humanity-wide moral ideas and judgments. Very well, but in the West, the dominant philosophy since Plato says that only reason is genuinely universal across humanity – all humans possess it, and when they use it, reason reliably delivers the same answer to anyone only using reason (obviously, desires and prejudices sway us too). Furthermore, moral ideas should be "correct" rather than "wrong" and reason is our preeminent tool for distinguishing truth from error. The Rational Innateness fallacy can be avoided by taking reason to be methodological instrument, not some final authority. If reason is useful for objectivity, and morality is tested by reason, then morality could become objective knowledge.

"Moral Knowledge": Moral judgments are a kind of knowledge. This is a fallacious view since it is impossible to confirm empirically among humanity. If moral judgments were a kind of knowledge, and reasoning is responsible for gaining knowledge, that would ground morality in reason, and permit morality to be universal across humanity. That's a speculation from philosophy, but empirical studies cannot assume its validity. Suppose among 10,000 random people there are 80% who say "Action A is morally wrong" but 20% say that it could be morally OK. If majority rules, then universal moral ideas are not being found. If the investigator sets aside the "wrong" 20% since A is clearly wrong, then the investigator is assuming that moral judgment rather than discovering it in humanity.

Even if close to 100% of humanity agrees with some particular moral value, that belief need not be "knowledge" in an intellectual sense, because that consensus could have a different origin instead. Close to 100% of humanity enjoy music in a major key, but no "discovery" of musical "knowledge" is made. A universal proclivity or preference could just as well account for that universality. Universality itself needs to be questioned.

"Moral Universality" fallacy: To be truly human, a moral judgment/value must always be followed at all times by all people everywhere. This fallacy persists among academics still hoping that morality will be much like knowledge. People don't ignore or abandon what they think they know. Yet moral ideas aren't like that among humanity. For any moral rule or virtue,

circumstances can arise in any society where many people follow a different moral norm instead. Universality cannot just mean that it has an absolutely supreme status. Academics still associating morality with a God or a Law Giver may think so, but the empirical study of actual humans displays no such consistency, and not because many are depraved sinners. The quest for Moral Absolutes is interesting in philosophy and theology, but the empirical study of humanity is not part of that quest.

Moral Psychology Foundations

After these academic fallacies are avoided, the empirical study of actual human judgments about moral situations can proceed. The empirical study of how people think about moral situations, and how different cultures share common moral thinking, reveals the underlying moral psychology of all humanity. Humanity's moral psychology, and understanding of what morality is, rests on moral "foundations" that were an essential component of Homo's bio-cultural co-evolution going back 4 million years.

When searching for "human universals" to humanity's core traits and capacities, we only have today's living generations to directly observe. Accordingly, a high degree of propensity, proficiency, and proclivity with an activity across all of humanity is a reliable indication that doing that behavior was an adaptation for the entire species, so that it is part of "human nature" or at least a "cultural generic".

> A "propensity" for X means that all (or almost all) humans do activity X when opportunity allows.
>
> A "proficiency" with X means that all humans are cognitively prepared for becoming skilled in activity X.
>
> A "proclivity" for X means that all humans are usually enthusiastic about participating in X and ensuring that next generations do X too.
>
> An activity is "pervasive" for humanity if >95% of Sapiens do A and recent conventionality is ruled out.
>
> An activity is "prevalent" for humanity if all human subgroups (cultures, societies) have a preponderance of members doing A, and recent conventionality is ruled out.

Morality has to be operationally defined. What kinds of core features to humanity's psychology can be empirically discerned, which (a) involve high propensity, proficiency, and proclivity; and (b) result in moral activities that are pervasive across humanity or at least prevalent.

Jonathan Haidt has made major advances in the search for human moral foundations. He provides five criteria that a moral foundation must meet:

Criterion 1: A common concern in third-party normative judgments. One of the most significant steps in the evolution of morality may have occurred when human beings developed "shared intentionality" – the ability of multiple people to hold a shared mental representation of what they are trying to do together. Chimpanzees seem to have some sense of norms for behavior within the group, and they sometimes get upset when they are not treated according to their expectations. The evidence that they react to third parties who violate norms, however, is mixed or anecdotal at best. But when humans developed the capacity for shared intentionality, our capacity to recognize norms began to grow into a passion for enforcing them on each other. Humans began to live in "moral matrices" – the "consensual hallucinations" that provide a common normative framework against which people can and do judge the actions of others, even when those actions have no direct implications for the self. The sorts of third-party violations that people in a community react to is a good guide to where moral foundations should be sought. If a putatively moral issue never shows up in gossip, even in communities that are said to endorse values related to that foundation, then that's a reason to doubt the existence of such a foundation.

Criterion 2. Automatic affective evaluations. There is not just one moral intuition—a general flash of "wrongness"—just as there is not one taste receptor on the tongue whose output tells us "delicious!" Rather, we posit that there are a variety of rapid, automatic reactions to patterns in the social world. When we detect such patterns, moral modules fire, and a fully enculturated person has an affectively-valenced experience. Not just a feeling of "good!" or "bad!", but an experience with a more specific "flavor" to it, such as "cruel!", "unfair!", "betrayal!", "subversive!", or "sick!" If a moral reaction can be elicited

quickly and easily, with a variety of images, bumper-stickers, or one-sentence stories, that is a point in favor of its foundationhood. Reactions to unequal distributions among children are often visible on the face of the disadvantaged child within one second, and fMRI studies repeatedly show that people have rapid, affectively-laden reactions to being cheated, and those reactions tend to activate brain areas related to emotion, including the anterior insula and the orbitofrontal cortex.

Criterion 3. Culturally widespread. We have proposed that moral foundations are part of the "first draft" of the moral mind. These drafts get edited during childhood development within a particular culture, and some cultures actively suppress some of the foundations. So it is not necessary that a foundation be shown to underlie morality in all human cultures. Innate does not mean universally visible in the adult phenotype. It means "organized in advance of experience," such that we should expect to see it expressed in some form in most human cultures. Additionally, we should not treat all cultures as equally informative. Hunter-gatherer societies should carry added weight, because they may more closely resemble lifestyles of the "environment of evolutionary adaptation" in which the moral foundations presumably evolved. If moral foundations were shaped by gene-culture co-evolution in response to long-standing adaptive challenges, then a candidate foundation should be easily visible in anthropological reports from these societies. Modern Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies are arguably the worst places to look for moral foundations because such societies have narrowed the moral domain in order to grant individuals the maximum freedom to pursue their projects. Nonetheless, when similar moral concerns are found across WEIRD societies, agricultural societies, and hunter-gatherer societies, the case for foundationhood gets stronger. Fairness certainly passes this test – nobody has yet identified a society in which reciprocity is not an important moral concern. The other foundations also show up widely in anthropological accounts, and in Brown's (1991) list of human universals.

Criterion 4. Evidence of innate preparedness. The fact that a behavior or ability is found in most or all human societies does not prove that anything is innate. All human societies face some similar challenges, and it is quite possible that all societies have hit upon similar solutions using their general-purpose, non-domain-specific intelligence. For example, all societies have invented ways to carry water. Perhaps all societies have invented fairness and turn-taking as efficient solutions to the challenge of dividing scarce resources; perhaps all societies have invented food taboos in response to the real dangers of toxins and contaminants. Perhaps there are no innate moral foundations. The case for innateness grows much stronger when a behavior or ability is found in nonhuman primates (particularly chimpanzees and bonobos) and when it can be shown to emerge in young children before they have been exposed to relevant teaching or reinforcement. Infants and young children have been shown to have surprisingly sophisticated social-cognitive abilities, often including affective reactions to third-party violators (i.e., puppets who do bad things to other puppets). For example, infants don't like puppets who harm others, but they do like puppets who help others. Infants are also sensitive to thirdparty fairness violations; interestingly, this sensitivity predicted infants' own altruistic sharing behavior. Children as young as three are adept at sharing rewards equally, but only when they both cooperated to produce the benefit. Infants notice markers of ingroup membership and prefer members of their ingroup, and even prefer those who help similar others and harm dissimilar others. Cooties games tend to emerge around the age of 7 or 8, which is the age at which disgust sensitivity becomes pronounced. In other words, these games seem to reflect the externalization of children's developing social-emotional abilities, not the internalization of prevailing cultural norms.

Criterion 5. Evolutionary model demonstrates adaptive advantage.

> "A good evolutionary theory will specify—often with rigorous mathematical models—exactly how a putative feature conferred an adaptive advantage upon individuals (or upon other bearers of the relevant genes), in comparison to members of the same group who lacked that feature. A good evolutionary theory will not casually attribute the adaptive advantage to the group (i.e., appeal to group selection) without a great deal of additional work, e.g., showing that the feature confers a very strong advantage upon groups during intergroup competition while conferring only a small disadvantage upon the individual bearer of the trait." – [source (with edits): Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). "Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Academic Press), vol. 47, pp. 55-130.]

Applying these criteria, Haidt has empirically discovered six "moral foundations" in humanity's common psychology and cognitive capacity that are responsible for the different kinds of ways that our activities follow the normativity of morality.

> 1) Care/harm: This foundation is related to our long evolution as mammals with attachment systems and an ability to feel (and dislike) the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and nurturance.

2) Fairness/cheating: This foundation is related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism. It generates ideas of justice, rights, and autonomy.

3) Loyalty/betrayal: This foundation is related to our long history as tribal creatures able to form shifting coalitions. It underlies virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group.

4) Authority/subversion: This foundation underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to legitimate authority and respect for traditions.

5) Sanctity/degradation: This foundation was shaped by the psychology of disgust and contamination. It underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble way.

6) Liberty/oppression: This foundation is about the feelings of reactance and resentment people feel toward those who dominate them and restrict their liberty.

– source: J. Haidt, http://moralfoundations.org/

Other researchers, applying these operational criteria, have found more nuanced moral foundations similar to Haidt's. Oliver Curry at Oxford University has recently announced seven moral foundations, that cover a wider breadth of human moral experience and practice: (1) Family, (2) Group, (3) Reciprocity, (4) Heroism, (5) Deference, (6) Fairness, and (7) Property. "Our research has shown that examples of these seven types of cooperative behavior—help your family, help your group, return favors, be brave, defer to your superiors, be fair, and respect others' property—are considered morally good all around the world." See http://behavioralscientist.org/whats-wrong-with-moral-foundations-theory-and-how-to-get-moral-psychology-right/ See also: Curry, O. S., Jones Chesters, M., & Van Lissa, C. J. (2019). "Mapping morality with a compass: Testing the theory of 'morality-as-cooperation' with a new questionnaire." *Journal of Research in Personality* 78: 106-124.

The foundations of Haidt and Curry can be combined for even more comprehensiveness. After eliminating duplication, we arrive at twelve foundations to what humanity regards as morality, listed in the probably order of their evolutionary development. Later items on this list are refinements of some earlier items. Each moral foundation involves normative moral practices, that carry real consequences for violating them.

(1) Aid Family. The duty to fulfill the emotion of loving concern, by caring for and protecting close kin. This moral capacity requires the empathetic ability to sustain loving attachments to those that one grows up with. Violating this duty can lead to other kin deciding to abandon the unloving individual. This moral capacity is needed for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Family*.

(2) Don't Harm. The duty to avoid bodily hurt or mental harm to others without good reason, where reasonable excuses for harm are heeding other items on this list. This moral capacity requires the sympathetically ability to understand another's suffering. Unnecessarily harming others can cause immediate retribution (second-party punishment) and/or group avoidance. After third-order intentionality develops, third-party punishment is in place within the group. This moral capacity is needed for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Play*.

(3) Do Reciprocal Good. The responsibility to cooperate with others who are cooperating with you, instead of selfishly doing what seems best for yourself right now. This moral capacity requires the ability to sympathetically understand another's welfare and value familiar friends. Direct reciprocity is sufficient for this moral capacity, although it is enhanced after indirect reciprocity becomes possible with third-order intentionality. If someone can't be a good cooperator, others learn to avoid engaging with that individual (ostracism). This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Ally*.

(4) Be Compassionate. The propensity to feel empathetic with another's feelings is evidently powerful when another is undergoing suffering and fear. Beyond the compulsion to take care of family, and the urge to protect any infant, there is a moral motive to generously assist anyone truly vulnerable and in need of help. Unlike reciprocal good where future recompense is expected, and unlike fair distribution where merit sets proper portions, compassionate caregiving simply provides assistance to improve someone else's situation without thought of compensation for oneself. This moral capacity supports a variety of symbolic spheres but gets especially expressed in *Morality* itself, along with *Teaching*.

(5) Be Fair. The good results of cooperation should be apportioned among participants in proportion to their respective contributions to the endeavor. Each individual only wants and takes what is fairly theirs from a cooperative engagement, such as a trade bargain or a group undertaking. Small-group competition is a form of cooperation too, such as competition among hunting parties or among athletic teams, so "playing fair" is essential. This moral capacity requires third-order intentionality and the ability for each individual to care about how others assess one's own reputation for being fair instead of trying to cheat. Violations of fairness can include punishment and/or exclusion from future cooperation and trading. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Team*.

(6) Respect Property. The goods that one acquires from one's own effort, along with cooperative goods already apportioned out fairly, must be acknowledged by the whole group as belonging to that individual, and this ownership allows individuals to consume or trade their possessions as they like (consistent with 3 and 4). This moral capacity requires third-order intentionality, the ability to keep what is one's own within their possession (rather than forget or lose things), and the ability for each individual to remember how others get very attached to their possessions. Violations of property may be excusable if (1) or (2) is at stake, but otherwise the act of stealing will be punished. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Trade*.

(7) Be Loyal. The band, especially as group size enlarges towards a clan, requires consistent niceness (2), cooperation (3), fairness (4), respect for property (5), and respect for skill mastery among all members, so that devotion to the group's needs and goals usually takes priority over merely selfish wants. This moral capacity requires the beginnings of fourth-order intentionality, so that each individual can understand how their personal self is more about what the group thinks of them (the superego) rather than how one prefers to think of themselves (the ego). Putting one's own interests first will be viewed by others as a betrayal of trust, causing them to inflict punishment or ostracization, and perhaps permanent banishment. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Ritual*.

(8) Admire Heroism. Those who bravely sacrifice themselves for others merit approval, status elevation, and reward from the rest of the group. Going above and beyond the loving, altruism, and fairness of other moral duties, an individual may voluntarily undertake extraordinary risks and harms for the welfare of others or the whole group. Saving lives (especially babies and children) in danger, hunting animals, scouting out the unexplored, or fighting with another clan are examples of opportunities for heroic self-sacrifice. Sport competition is an analogous opportunity for heroism in miniature. Failing to be courageous when needed, or refusing to acknowledge the heroism of others, is treated as shameful and disreputable, lowering one's status in the eyes of everyone. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Sport*.

(9) Obey Authority. Between family, clan, and masters of expertise, there are leaders who expect deference and obedience to their rightful authority (acquired by proven mastery or heroism) over how things should be done and who should do them. This moral capacity requires the developed distinction between the ego (of childhood) and the superego (of adulthood). As mimetic language develops, communicating rules, traditions, and customs then becomes the easier way to authoritatively instill obedient conformity rather than just learning from a leader by imitation or close direction. The moral expectation of sincerity and honesty in communications, rather than deception and lying, is grounded here. Dishonor and loss of legitimate status comes to leaders abusing authority or caught in dishonesty. Violations of legitimate authority are communally viewed as subversive and treacherous towards both leadership and the whole group, to be punishable by retribution, ostracization, banishment, and perhaps execution. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Tribe*.

(10) Venerate Sanctity. Follow the traditions, customs and rituals about what is sacred and taboo, to avoid degrading oneself below human status and dignity. This moral capacity is a re-purposing of an older fundamental norm of cleanliness, which originally was the family responsibility of parenting and lacked a moral dimension. Once the disgust intuition is in place (usually by age six), later childhood and early adulthood is an opportunity to instill reverence (through appeals to loyalty, heroism, and authority) for whatever the whole group regards with sanctity. The value of sanctity itself has a different origin apart from morality: the symbolic sphere of the Mystic/Mythic orient individuals to what is supremely powerful and important (the sacred) for all human existence. To reinforce customary reverence and piety towards the sacred among everyone, rituals and narratives about moral duty towards the sacred (requiring fully grammatical language) are recruited to ensure adulthood respect for sanctity, although duties to the sacred get elevated above moral duties to humans. Violating sanctity is the most horrific terrible crime imaginable, demanding vengeance, banishment, and perhaps execution. This moral capacity is the basis for sustaining the symbolic sphere of *Religion*.

(11) Appreciate Autonomy. The value of autonomy for most everyone (except the young and most vulnerable) arose to counterbalance the conformities of excessive tribalism or intense nationalism. As Tribe developed further and enlarged towards the Nation (of perhaps 100k up to over a million individuals), adult individuals needed to be able to uphold a sense of dignified self-respect based on the mutual respect shared among the whole community. This moral capacity relies on fourth-order intentionality to permit adults to appreciate how everyone else's autonomy enhances one's own effective autonomy. There should be toleration and permission for a high degree of autonomy by adults over their own families, life choices, lifestyles, residencies, occupations, dispositions of property, and so on. This moral capacity is the basis for advancing several symbolic spheres, notably encouraging toleration among Religions and and opening up Trade to market economics.

(12) Respect Liberty. This moral capacity also requires fourth-order and perhaps fifth-order intentionality, so that one's strong sense of superego can take the perspective of the whole group as it stands over and against not just one's own life, but the life of any other adult individual. We each have to answer to rightful authority, but standing up for anyone's unjust degradation or servility takes a moral stand for human liberty. By appreciating how individuals can be unjustly controlled, dominated, and oppressed by the whole tribe or nation despite its legitimate authority, the power of the Whole can be rightly balanced against the self-rule of the One. An inability to appreciate how others are unjustly dominated is a kind of moral blindness and inhumanity that leads to one's participation in great evil, and possibly one's own enslavement next. This moral capacity is the basis for replacing *Tribe* with the symbolic sphere of *Politics*.

The Anthropos Praxes: Techne, Learning, Language, Play, Family



The top row of Making, Mimesis, and Maternity was the inheritance from Australopithecus around 4mya.

The essential kinship of mimetic language and playful acts accounts for the enormous flexibility to human signaling, going infinitely beyond primate capacities for vocal signs. Only Homo babies enjoy babbling and then bestowing unique names on innumerable things with adult guidance. That permits symbolization embodied in vocalizing, gesturing, and making. Those Homo capacities long pre-date discursive speech.

The second row – Techne, Learn, Lang, Play, Family – constitutes the H. Habilis achievement around 2mya.
By 1mya, H. Erectus had Tool Improvement, Teaching, Mimetic language, some Music, some Ritual, basic Morals, Teams, and Kin.

The bottom row of capabilities, in place by 100kya for H. Sapiens, are the twelve "forms of life". They together constitute Human Culture = **HUMANITY**.

Morality in Traditional Societies

Any number of examples of pre-modern societies and their moralities crowd the volumes of ethnology and cultural anthropology. One will suffice here, a list of moral virtues and precepts from the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin and Nebraska, recorded over one hundred years ago.

1. It is always good to be good.
2. What does life consist of but love?
3. Of what value is it to kill?
4. You ought to be of some help to your fellow men.
5. Do not abuse your wife; women are sacred.
6. If you cast off your dress for many people, they will be benefitted by your deed.
7. For the good you do every one will love you.
8. Never do any wrong to children.
9. It is not good to gamble.
10. If you see a helpless old man, help him if you have anything at all.
11. If you have a home of your own, see to it that whoever enters it obtains something to eat. Such food will be a source of death to you if withheld.
12. When you are recounting your war deeds on behalf of the departed soul, do not try to add to your honor by claiming more for yourself than you have actually accomplished. If you tell a falsehood then and exaggerate your achievements you will die beforehand. The telling of truth is sacred. Tell less than you did. The old men say it is wiser.
13. Be on friendly terms with every one and then every one will love you.
14. Marry only one person at a time.
15. Do not be haughty with your husband. Kindness will be returned to you and he will treat you in the same way in which you treat him.
16. Do not imagine that you are taking your children's part if you just speak about loving them. Let them see it for themselves.
17. Do not show your love for other people so that people notice it. Love them but let your love be different from that for your own.
18. As you travel along life's road, never harm any one or cause any one to feel sad. On the contrary, if at any time you can make a person feel happy, do so. If at any time you meet a woman away from your village and you are both alone and no one can see you, do not frighten her or harm her.
19. If you meet any one on the road, even if it is only a child, speak a cheering word before you pass on.
20. If your husband's people ever ask their own children for something when you are present, assume that they had asked it of you. If there is anything to be done, do not wait till you are asked to do it but do it immediately.
21. Never think a home is yours until you have made one for yourself.
22. If you have put people in charge of your household, do not nevertheless act as though the home were still yours.
23. When visiting your husband's people, do not act as if you were far above them.

[A. Edel and M. Edel, *Anthropology and Ethics* (1959), pp. 122-123.]

The Place of Morality in Culture

> The Master said, "In ancient times, people had three types of shortcomings. Today, even these shortcomings can perhaps no longer be found. The ancients who were impetuous were unreserved, today's impetuous people are reckless; the ancients who were self-esteemed were restrained, today's self-esteemed are resentful and irritable; the ancients who were stupid were straightforward, today's stupid are nothing but devious." *Analects* 15.40
> (Peimin Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 2017, p. 399)

Morality concerns the management of social relations. Proto-morality in early hominid species involved kinship emotions like love and social capacities such as compassion and trust. As homo sapiens began living in much larger tribal groups, the peculiar features of morality emerged to manage social interactions among non-kin as well. Morality proper consists of generic obligations of non-maleficence to members of one's ingroup to permit stable cooperation over lifetimes.

When we think of morality, we tend to think of abstract universal rules. However, most of morality, as people actually do morality, does not consist of following abstract universal rules. When researchers discover what really motivates and guides people in their real-life conduct, it is rarely anything abstract or universal. For example, people are far more motivated to help people much like themselves, and they aren't much motivated to do anything about harms to people they don't know and who live far away. In the abstract, people may vigorously assent to propositions such as "people suffering terribly should receive relief to save their lives," but they infrequently help distant unknown people. We praise beneficent acts of charity, but we infrequently do it ourselves. As cognitive and behavioral researchers are noticing, we are not that moral. In fact, it has become fashionable in certain quarters to announce that no one is ever really moral at all. Although such announcements drape themselves in stern scientific data, they actually rely on abandoning naturalism. Morality is quite real and robust, if you know where to look for it.

Consider how there is no agreed-on criteria for what exactly counts as moral conduct. What one researcher judges to be moral conduct by a two-year old, another researcher cannot recognize as any kind of moral conduct at all. This is a familiar problem; since Kohlberg's controversial proposal to categorize stages of morality, there has been much contested ground over what ought to count as moral conduct. When researchers impose their own standards of what counts as genuinely moral conduct, distances between standards and peoples' behavior open wide fast. On the other hand, researchers could pick out modes of conduct that most people successfully do, and figure out how they do it.

This pragmatic approach to human morality regards morality as a common natural practice that almost all humans do for most of their lives. Those high abstract principles of idealized conduct which few people follow should not be set as the essence of morality. Why people would think about those ideal principles, and even try to fulfill them, would be something to be explained only after a satisfactory account of ordinary human morality has been achieved. In fact, we might take as a starting clue they way that ordinary people do not want anyone to actually obey simple abstract principles. For example, take generalized beneficence – an ethical principle that you ought to take opportunities to altruistically benefit others – and consider how this is hardly an appropriate principle to try to fulfill. How would you ever meet your daily obligations and duties if you were constantly seeking ways to help everyone else? No one likes the opportunistic helper who is always trying to help others at every minute of the day. Indeed, we would regard as mentally unstable someone who could never finish anything for having to help yet another and another person. What each of us really wants is for others to focus on our group projects – we don't want our cooperative partners to keep dropping work to be altruistic do-gooders. Similarly, we don't want people we are working with to try to follow any rule of general non-maleficence – we don't want our cooperative partners to keep worrying about harming others. If someone was constantly attending to whether what we are doing is any sort of harm to other people, she would soon be useless to the group projects. However, we don't want our partners to be going out of their way to severely harm others, of course, since that also disrupts the group projects.

Morality is not alone in having an important socially regulatory role. The management of social cooperation and social roles is so crucial to human success that several related cognitive capacities function for promoting social coordination. Morality should be distinguished from these related capacities, most importantly our sympathetic, compassionate, and altruistic motives. Although morality takes advantage of these capacities, it cannot be reduced to them. For example, morality is not reducible to our compassion towards others – many kinds of compassionate acts towards others are immoral. Nor is morality reducible to prohibitions against harming others – many kinds of moral actions involve deliberate harms done to others.

Morality cannot be reduced to loving bonds of kinship; it cannot be reduced to politeness and etiquette; and it cannot be just a form of legal obedience. Humans developed morality in order to handle social problems that no other form of habitual conduct could manage.

Most of life is consumed with our practical projects, by ourselves or together with others. That's what we attend to – the people that we actually have to interact with to get what we want done. This realm of daily life is where morality lives, or nowhere at all. The way to find morality in peoples' lives is to first look at what people are actually accomplishing, not at what they are *not* accomplishing. When occasion for moral judgment and moral action arises, it arises in the everyday situations of our social interactions with others. This pragmatic and situational starting place for morality tells us a few things about what moral judgments naturally are.

1. Moral judgments are essentially about bodily control. Moral judgments guide ongoing embodied action – conduct performed, or conduct refrained from. Moral judgments are about the direct control of one's own conduct. A judgment that something ought to be done, but never issues in any modification to conduct, is not a moral judgment. Moral judgments are a kind of practical judgment that by definition results in and guide immediate conduct. Moral judgments are pro-active, not reactive – they are made by people engaging life, not passively reacting to events. Abstract hypothetical beliefs simply about what ought to be done are not sufficient by themselves to be moral judgments. The notion that moral judgments are purely mental assents to abstract propositions about hypothetical events is not a notion arising from natural morality, but must have some other source.

2. Moral judgments are about guiding conduct towards other people that we are affecting in concrete situations. Absent anyone else who could be affected by our conduct, there is no occasion for any moral judgment. The notion that we can offend some moral rule in isolation from any impact on others does not come from natural morality, but from a different realm of abstract ideal principles. Furthermore, morality operates locally. Because moral judgments concern actual social interactions, we do not feel moral responsibility for situations that we are not affecting in any way. Distant events happening to unknown people we have never affected may arouse emotions of sympathy or pity, but they do not call for moral judgments. The notion that we must take moral responsibility for distant events happening to complete strangers over which we have no control is not a notion from natural morality, but must be from another source in abstract ideal principle.

3. Moral judgments do not arise in interactions with abstract generic people, but real people with whom we already have some kind of social relationship and standing. Moral judgments and social roles are intrinsically connected. Moral judgments proceed from our own sense of our social roles and the roles of others. This permits us to judge the moral salience of situations – which situations call for moral judgments and what specific moral judgments are worthy. We conduct ourselves in light of our understanding of our proper social roles and the social roles of other from situation to situation. We cannot help but play social roles, as we undertake our group cooperative projects with particular responsibilities. Someone who had no idea what their social role is in a particular situation would be pondering many judgments about what to do, but none of them would be moral judgments. Yet morality would still be involved, because others are continually judging us. Even if we do not intend to play any particular social role in some situation, the others in that situation automatically assign social roles to us. If we do not conceive another person as being in any proper social role calling for a moral situation, we won't be considering any moral judgment about what to do towards them. We don't consider moral judgments, much less act on them, if we don't think that we are in a moral situation. When we do judge that we are in a moral situation, our sense of identity and our proper social roles guide our moral conduct. The notion that we could be treated as just generic people comes from a different realm of abstract ideal principle.

4. Moral judgments are largely habitual and acquired through social training. Since social interactions are so frequently and thoroughly absorbing to the human mind from birth, our fast and frugal cognitive habits handle all but the most difficult and confusing situations. Moral judgments rarely issue from prolonged self-reflective deliberations, but more typically from the habits of innate personality, developed character, and social training. The use of our moral habits engage our immediate sentiments and emotions – that is why morality is thorough infused with emotion. Moral habits should not be considered as reflexively instinctive or rigidly unchangeable – human social habits are flexible and modifiable with effort and training. Like all cognitive habits, our moral habits are all about practical efficiency – they are designed to enhance group cooperation while minimizing disruptive conflict. It is unnecessary to locate moral knowledge in infants in order to account for the way that basic moral rules and common virtues are universal across all human cultures. Human babies are born to be highly sensitive and responsive to social interactions. By the time young children are socialized into family and neighborly life, they will largely share those common moral habits. Of course, large cultural differences emerge around the world in older children by

age eight or so, as they fully enter into encultured social roles. Humans do basic socialization pretty much the same way the world over, but they do enculturalization into more adult roles somewhat differently. The notion that there must be one exclusive set of abstract principles valid for all cultures is not consistent with actual morality, and that notion must have some other source beyond morality.

5. Moral judgments are primarily about sustaining and managing social cooperation, both with ongoing group projects and with occasional interactions with the rest of one's society. The primary occasions calling for moral judgments are (1) situations in which our social roles call us to prioritize our social responsibilities over other personal urges and desires; (2) situations in which our social roles conflict so that we have to know how to prioritize which social responsibility should be fulfilled; and (3) situations in which we could seriously harm another person in the course of our conduct. For example, we morally judge that serious obligations to family typically have priority over other social obligations, although we also prioritize refraining from seriously harming others even if that would help family. People find themselves in very confusing and conflicted situations at times, and prolonged moral reflection is often worth the effort. Like any sort of habits, moral habits work best for frequent and expected social situations and don't always work in unusual situations. Humans have developed the capacity to reflect upon and modify their moral habits and their social roles. However, the sustained moral reflection and deliberation that is sometimes forced upon us does not characterize the essence of morality. The notion that moral judgments always issue from sophisticated rational calculations is a notion that comes from a quite different realm of abstract ideal principle.

6. Moral judgments are conventional yet objectively binding. The false dichotomy between norms that are merely subjectively conventional and those that are objectively valid does not apply in the moral realm and must have some other source. In a sense, the morality of adults is culturally conventional because only cultures supply the social projects and social roles that call for morality. Basic morality and virtue is pretty much universal, but much of adult morality can vary widely across cultures. The notion that there naturally is but one culture that gets morality completely right is long longer acceptable. However, adults raised in a culture do not regard their norms of morality as merely conventional, since they are thoroughly habituated into those norms. No one regards local moral norms as simply "up to them" as if personal whim dictated them and people can transgress or change them as they please. Within a society, we hold each other to objective moral norms that have standing independently of any of us, and we do not regard them as easily modifiable, if at all. Morality is what may be called *culturally objective*: morality is dependent on and relative to the functioning of cultures, and the proper functioning of a culture produces adults who regard their moral norms as objectively binding. The notion that this is an irrational perspective, because it inconsistently regards moral norms as simultaneously relative and objective, must have some other source beyond morality.

In summary, Morality is Embodied, Situated, Role-embedded, Habitual, Cooperative, and Culturally Objective.

Human are capable of morality because we use social cognition and collective intentionality to actively control and manage ongoing modes of social interactions. Morality does not operate at the simpler level of control of ongoing social interactions – we have innumerable simple social habits for engaging with others in cooperative projects or just casual interactions. Morality operates at the higher level of control of control – the supervisory management of how well we are coordinating our social interactions. Morality helps to regulate social performance over long stretches of time.

The evidence is overwhelming that people form moral judgments about what to do about other people by first applying social categories to those people. We first assign social identities to others – we assign some estimate of social standing and social role to others as we assess what sort of situation we are in. The notion that we figure out that we are in moral situations and we make moral judgments simply by treating other people simply as generic individuals is disproven by the scientific study of actual human conduct. The notion that social roles are irrelevant to moral situations and judgments must have a separate origin apart from real human morality.

Morality for Complex Sociality

After the Neolithic Revolution, as tribes became nations and then empires, the intense social pressures aroused by the close proximity of peoples having different cultures and social role expectations demanded that morality itself become an object of reflective scrutiny. The notion that morality must be extendable beyond the domains of clan and tribe emerged in early human civilizations.

Morality is not enough for culturally pluralistic societies. As nations developed laws that apply to all citizens regardless of social role or tribal origin, the notion gradually arose that there are truly universal principles of abstract right applicable to all humanity.

The Axial Age (roughly 800BC to 200BC) and its obsession with universally human principles and some way to ontologically ground those principles in reality is a manifestation of this urgent need to surpass the social limitations to ordinary morality.

Today, common social morality and high cultural ethics uneasily co-exist. The Enlightenment's attempt to entirely replace common morals with abstract ethical principles, along with its dichotomy between emotion and rationality, has caused much lingering confusion in the West. The scientific investigation of human morality must set aside the Enlightenment's obsession with abstract rationality and universal principle. Once we have a clear understanding of the way that human morality evolved and naturally functions, we can then better appreciate how and why abstract ethical principles have developed in recent civilizations.

Table: The Natural Evolution of Morality and the Cultural Evolution of Law and Universal Ethics

KINSHIP GROUPS	**PRIMARY SOCIAL BONDS**
Families: 8 to 15 individuals.	Capacities: Kinship altruism Emotions: Love, sympathy, compassion Social mechanisms: Family upbringing
Bands: Closely interrelated families, up to about 50 individuals.	Capacities: Kinship altruism, direct reciprocity Emotions: Sympathy, compassion, trust Social mechanisms: Family upbringing, civility norms of not harming conspecifics
Clans: Several distantly interrelated families, as many as 150 individuals or more.	Capacities: Kinship altruism, direct reciprocity among familiars, indirect reciprocity with relative strangers Emotions: Trust, respect to conspecifics, artificial kinship bonds through mythical ancestors Social mechanisms: norms of civility to all clan members, norms of morality promoting cooperation and preventing harms among clan members,
Tribes: Clans on a much larger scale; 200 to 500 individuals before Neolithic revolution, over 500 individuals afterwards.	Capacities: Stable social roles, fidelity to tribal identity Emotions: Trust, civility, social duty, artificial cultural bonds through mythical ancestors and religious cosmogonies Social mechanisms: responsibilities of social roles for regular cooperation, norms of civility and morality towards all tribe members, hierarchical power structures for enforcing norms
Nations: Very large tribes or aggregates of tribes sharing a culture; many thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals. Modern nations can number in the millions.	Capacities: Stable social roles, class distinctions, fidelity to national identity, obedience to law Emotions: Trust, civil etiquette, social duty, artificial cultural bonds through religious and national narratives. Social mechanisms: responsibilities of social roles for regular cooperation, norms of civility and morality towards all national

Empires: Aggregates of large tribes and/or nations; no upper limit to size.	members, hierarchical power structures for enforcing national laws Capacities: Stable social roles, class distinctions, fidelity to empire and citizenship identity, obedience to law Emotions: Trust, civil etiquette, social duty, artificial cultural bonds through religious/empire/humanity narratives. Social mechanisms: responsibilities of social roles for regular cooperation, norms of civility and morality towards all peoples, hierarchical power structures for enforcing laws, notions of abstract ethical principles valid for all humanity, use of empire power to enforce universal moral and political norms

Non-Moral Dimensions of Culture

"I am quite incapable of understanding how any work of art can be criticized from a moral standpoint."
– attributed to Oscar Wilde

There are non-moral areas of culture, where basic norms such as caring, fairness, justice, and obedience do not apply. Five components to human culture, among the twelve "cultural praxes" or "symbolic spheres", are not regarded as entirely answerable to the ten moral foundations. They are: Art, Techne, Language, Religion, and Music.

The reason is because these five praxes are grounded in independent and pure forms of creative originality. Genius, like genesis, is not answerable to mundane mass morality. What can be expressed, what can be invented, what can be said, what can be worshipped, and what can be harmonized are always more valuable in the long run than the things that common morals happen to uphold in the short run. The moralistic opinions of the masses are almost surely wrong in the eyes of posterity anyways. Art, Techne, Language, Religion, and Music lead that moral progress into the future. Put another way, morality is designed to maintain what humans need to be doing to live, but the five creative spheres supply what life is worth living for. All the same, the productions of all praxes remain under scrutiny from Ethics, which sets a higher standard than customary and traditional morals. Nothing about culture gets immunity from academic scrutiny, however. Philosophy of ___ for each of these five praxes, and the other seven as well, investigates the authenticity and legitimacy of any practices conducted in their name. Ethics in particular is responsibility for evaluating the long-run ethicality of any artwork or performance, a new technology, a literary work, or a religious idea.

Ethics starts its investigation with the fundamental purpose of a praxis. These five cultural praxes/symbolic spheres do incorporate five of the moral foundations in order to operate well. If the conduct of a cultural praxis abuses its own moral foundation, it is vulnerable to internal moral critique.

PRAXIS **Morality**	(MUSIC) **Performing Arts** *song, dance, theater*	(TECHNE) **Practical Arts** *craft, invention, science*	(ART) **Plastic Arts** *painting, sculpture, architecture*	(LANG) **Poetic Arts** *epic, tragedy, poetry, satire*	(RELIGION) **Prophetic Artsd** *myth, prophecy, divination*
Moral Foundation:	manifests TEAM	manifests TRADE	manifests FREEDOM	manifests EDUCATION	manifests RITUAL
Moral Obligation:	Performances should foster a collective sense of unifying TEAM among performers, between the performances and audiences, and among all audiences.	Inventions should yield an additive growth of useful TRADE among its adopters, from its good design for wide adoption and further translation into many applications.	Artworks should inspire an original idea of genuine INDIVIDUALITY in its appreciators, by conveying fresh possibilities to human experience and expression.	Creative writings should deliver an honest viewpoint of apt OBSERVATION, by offering lucid perspectives upon powers, institutions, customs, and dogmas.	Religious events should induce the sincere enactment of rapt PIETY, by orienting the community towards conformity with the ways of ultimate reality.

Moral Function:	The purpose is *Harmony*, gaining a shared sympathetic understanding, that in turn opens up fair opportunities for taking responsibility and offering just reconciliation.	The purpose is *Utility*, providing workable solutions to inconveniences or problems, that in turn increases the value of users' productivity and property.	The purpose is *Liberty*, exalting the value of uniqueness, difference, and diversity, that portrays individual perspective and choice as worthy and nonthreatening.	The purpose is *Clarity*, suggesting how to discriminate between what truly merits one's loyalty and devotion, and what does not deserve one's trust and credibility.	The purpose is *Fidelity*, fortifying communality not only among the faithful but also commonality between humanity and transcending divinity.
Moral Failure:	*Animosity*, inciting hostilities among audiences or even encouraging open conflicts.	*Servility*, reducing users of technology to subhuman parts in the technological processes.	*Docility*, generating propaganda aiding current powers to manipulate minds of populations.	*Conformity*, offering views on life that pander to popular opinions, fashions, and trends.	*Exclusivity*, dividing humanity over piety so a religion thinks that its access to divinity is superior.

The five great arts will not hold themselves accountable to moral standards. The very idea of "immoral" art, "immoral" technology or science, "immoral" free speech, "immoral" free religion, and "immoral" music or drama, are themselves obscene and anti-humanistic notions.

PRAXIS **Moralism**	(MUSIC) **Performing Arts** *song, dance, theater*	(TECHNE) **Practical Arts** *craft, invention, science*	(ART) **Plastic Arts** *painting, sculpture, architecture*	(LANG) **Poetic Arts** *epic, tragedy, poetry, satire*	(RELIGION) **Prophetic Arts** *myth, prophecy, divination*
Popular Moralism:	Condemns themes "offensive" to public morals and politics.	Condemns tech enabling "deviant" conduct by users.	Condemns values "contrary" to public order and decency.	Condemns views too "critical" of popular morals and politics.	Condemns prophecy too "heterodox" for priestly leaders.
Political Populism:	Protect the public by criminalizing any offensive arts.	Protect the public by criminalizing deviant technoscience.	Protect the public by criminalizing the dangerous artworks.	Protect the public by criminalizing all offensive speech.	Protect the public by criminalizing heresy and impiety.
Cultural Arts are immune to moralism & populism:	Compositions need to hold society up to higher standards.	Invention is needed for new forms of human engagement.	Artistic liberty needs to express novelty and personality.	Free Speech has to criticize ideology and excessive "___ism".	Free Religion has to elevate the spirit above dogmatism.

Reducing humanity to moralism and populism amounts to a violation of the nature of Humanity and Culture.
The Composer, the Inventor, the Artist, the Poet, and the Prophet are exempt from the moralistic judgments by the masses.

The Genesis of Ethics from Morality

Developmental psychology and cultural anthropology has observed how every human society instills four basic moral norms into children. Toddlers learn quickly that hurting others intentionally is the very worst thing to do, and then they are gradually taught how to cooperatively participate in household activities and games. After some participatory proficiency is attained, young children are next shown why fairly sharing and playing with others is always important. By the age of six or seven, children then acquire an understanding of how others value their liberty to make their own decisions.

If morality was entirely understandable and never puzzling, ethics would be unnecessary. However, no aspect of human culture has been perfected, or made perfectly clear. Any cultural praxis or practice can benefit from reflective examination and inquiry – perhaps to offer improvements to it, or at least make it more comprehensible to everyone. That reflective inquiry can be called "moral philosophy" but it has usually been classified as "ethics" since Aristotle.

Basic Moral Norms (for guiding daily life)	**Ethics Principles (for deriving further rules)**	**Individual Rights**	**Paired Ethical Theory**
Do Not Harm & Do not allow harms	Prevent Degradation + protect the vulnerable	Dignity	Legalism
Do Benefit & Promote benefits	Grow Prosperity + enlarge health & welfare	Opportunity	Utilitarianism
Be Fair & Defend fair treatment	Uphold Justice + grow ranges of opportunity	Equality	Egalitarianism
Allow Freedom & Support freedoms	Enlarge Liberty + no selfishness & freeriders	Autonomy	Libertarianism

This ordering of nonmaleficence first, followed by beneficence, justice, and freedom in that order of priority, is not arbitrary. Human dignity must remain the top priority.

Each principle can override a lower priority. For example, some liberties have to be restricted to advance justice; some injustices may be necessary for collective welfare; and prosperity must be sacrificed to save lives. As for freedom, although three higher principles can overrule it if necessary, autonomy does trump any other lesser moral norm (and there are dozens) not appearing on this minimal listing.

Why dignity? Upholding human dignity is the essence of the function of morality and the nature of ethics. Loss of dignity – getting treated like an animal, a mere convenience, or as property – is the very definition of immoral abuse and unethical evil, that always lacks any possible excuse or justification because no greater good could possibly override it. An authentic ethics must prioritize human dignity without exception; any ideology or religion claiming to be ethical but allows dehumanization and degradation is an intolerable threat to all humanity.

Respect for fairness and autonomy, amplified during the ages from eight to fourteen, are then ready as grounds for the next developmental stage in adolescence, the enculturalization into a particular culture's manner of specific and stratified roles for adulthood. Each culture regards its own arrangement of roles as the most moral, and different cultures display a bewildering variety of role arrangements (eg what count as a "good wife" or a "good neighbor" varies enormously across cultures), but it is a mistake to suppose that *morality* is fundamentally different too. Moral relativism should not be inferred from cultural relativity. Basic morality for all humanity is the same thing. Nor should moral relativism be inferred from observing how adults from different cultures won't easily agree about highly sensitive and consequential issues.

Adult life gets complicated in any culture, precisely because social roles inevitably arouse conflicts among equally valid moral norms. When is murdering criminals the right remedy? When is going to war justified? And so on. The very fact that anyone already senses moral tensions among optional arguable answers actually proves that one morality is fundamental and everyone feels its importance. We are all human.

This primal ordering of human moral development (niceness, cooperativeness, fairness, tolerance) makes sense from the perspective of the evolution of cognition. Since basic morality is universal across humanity and rapidly acquired by any child, this morality must have a very deep evolutionary basis (akin to music and language). However, cognitive paleoanthropology informs us how the mental sophistication of our Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis only gradually developed alongside brain size/complexity over the million years. The progress from second-order intentionality (grasping what another individual wants and doesn't want) to third-order intentionality (knowing how you and I share goals and plans) on to fourth-order intentionality (observing how our group pursues what is valued by everyone) makes a match with the ordering of "Don't Harm", "Seek Benefits", "Satisfy Fairness", and "Respect Everybody". H. Heidelbergensis and H. Neanderthalis evidently attained fourth-order intentionality from the study of complex artifacts and group survival abilities, and the ample cohesiveness of those small groups is best explained by robust morality already in place in their social mentality.

Since developmental psychology tends to correlate with evolutionary development, where the initial youthful skills match the oldest evolved traits (because the brain's firmest architectures were the earlier ones to evolve), the ordering of (niceness, cooperativeness, fairness, tolerance) could not proceed in the reverse order. Basic morality is not arbitrary or conventional. Any cult or cabal imposing absolute justice or liberty first at the sacrifice of prosperity or dignity is a group that inevitably disintegrates and disbands.

What is Ethical Theory

Ethics ponders key questions about morality, questions coming from the four main areas of philosophy itself (cosmology, epistemology, axiology, ethics). Here are some illustrations of questions from these four modes of ethics:

A. What is the ontological status of morality: where does morality exist; how is morality grounded in reality; where did morality come from?

B. What is the epistemic status of morality: is morality knowable or just practical; when is morality true or valid; what methods improve moral understanding?

C. What is the value of morality: where does the motivation for following morality come from; what may be more important than morality; when does morality serve other ends?

D. What is final meaning of morality: are rules, or virtues, or duties the essence of morality; are moral terms and judgments more like imperatives, prescriptions, or recommendations?

Ethics especially ponders ordinary moral norms and moral values as they prove to be inadequate or inconsistent for tough situations inherent to complex societies. Such puzzles about morality account for the big questions listed above.

Ethics, like any area of philosophy, consults expertise from other disciplines to better comprehend morality. These sub-disciplines are particularly relevant:

History of Morals and Ethics
Ethnography of Morality
Cultural Anthropology
Sociology of Morality
Moral Psychology
Neuroscience of Morality
Morality in Economics
Public and Political Ethics
Professional Ethics
Theological Ethics

Ethics is NOT the same as everyday morality (set aside dictionaries saying otherwise) for the obvious reasons that (1) there is no thinking about ethical priorities, until some troublesome situation prevents someone from knowing how to do the obvious

moral action; and (2) in the history of literature, the first appearance of what can be called ethical wisdom and reflection already presumes that basic moral norms are in place but they aren't enough.

Moral philosophizing is only around 3,500 years old, about as old as the invention of the chariot, writing, and early empires. Ethical thinking arose in several civilizations from North Africa and Mesopotamia to India and China. Indigenous cultures, with heritages preceding agriculture, lack "ethical theorizing" not because they aren't fully moral (of course they are) but because they don't require it. Moral wisdom is surely ample and abundant in indigenous oral narrative (myth and legend, for example), but the point of such wisdom is education and reinforcement.

Although any reasonable ethical theory has to take morality into account, that basic morality evolved for small groups of maybe 100 to 200 individuals, which was the only way of life on the planet until the agricultural revolution around 10,000 years ago. Size matters for the sociology of morality. It is well-known to moral psychology that ordinary morality is unable to "scale up" beyond the size of social groups of 500 or more, where too many strangers (not of one's kin) populate one's own society and members of other societies seem too unfamiliar and alarming to deserve full moral concern. "Stranger danger" is equally instilled into our evolved brains, and we simply don't care to be as equally generous towards distant unknown people as we are to neighbors who look like us.

During the period of around 20kya to 5kya, large tribes did manage to combine kinship clans, through the mediation of invented totemic religions about common mythic ancestors. However, ordinary morality encountered a critical bottleneck with villages and cities of a thousand or five thousand inhabitants. Public disorder was inevitable. That is why politics grew more complex to legitimate central control from a supreme authority, and ethics was then invented to propagate intelligible explanations for upholding regulations and rights so that governments didn't have to bear the entire burden of guaranteeing order.

Theologies soon followed in the early civilizations, combining religion with ethics and politics to preach to all inhabitants that the god(s) command their devout ethical obedience (or else a divinely approved king will crush you in this life). Political theology proved to be a durable ethical remedy for nations and empires from Europe to Japan until the twentieth century, manifested in such models as the "Divine Right of Kings" theory of medieval Christian Europe and the "Islamic Emirate" politics of Muslim fundamentalism.

Philosophy, for its part, always viewed ethics as its own subfield, independent from theology. Just as conflicts and confusions among basic moral norms calls for ethics, theories of ethics offer reflective explanations for managing tensions and conflicts among ethical principles.

Folk Psychology of Punishment

Punishment in general is a third-party sanction or harm imposed on someone who is believed by the punisher(s) to be in violation of local morality. A "third party" punishment is imposed by someone else besides (a) the individual who committed the violation or (b) the person(s) who were violated. The purpose of sanctioning/harming can be retributive, reconciling, instructive, or restorative (or have more than one end) – but at minimum punishment represents and expresses the community's commitment to upholding deep respect for its morality.

Theories of moral punishment and legal punishment can be formulated from the various ethical and political theories. However, because punishment is inherent to the very existence of morality (no punishment, then nothing moral at stake), and any human society enforces some morality, there is a common understanding about when and how to punish morally. This is labeled as a "folk psychology" of punishment according to social theory (e.g. sociology, ethnography, social psychology), and it does not vary much across human societies around the world.



Main Theories of Ethics

Legalism = the deontological approach that expects universal rigid rules to uphold dignity by forbidding harms and degradations unjustly done to anyone. Lower priorities are prosperity and freedom, although any legalism will try to show how rules also yield general welfare and liberty. Universal rules may be based on reason alone (Kantian ethics), or a God (divine command ethics), or a Sovereign (Statism, Fascism), and so on.

Utilitarianism = the consequentialist approach that aims to preventing injustice from missed opportunities to provide greater benefits and improved opportunities for all of society. Lower priorities are harms and freedoms, although any version of utilitarianism strives to explain how greater overall welfare across a society won't harm or constrict the less advantaged. Act utilitarianism is less calculable than rule utilitarianism, which approximates deontology.

Egalitarianism = the personalist approach that aims at entirely equitable and equal status for all persons, regardless of group custom or individual talent. Lower priorities are opportunity and liberty, although egalitarian theories argue that opportunities for superior wealth and independent status are anti-social evils. Examples of egalitarianism include agrarianism, social anarchism, communalism, "back to nature" movements, and utopian religious communities.

Libertarianism = the formalist approach that aims at preventing the harms of restricting free choices. Lower priorities are opportunities for prosperity and social justice, although libertarians rationalize the inevitable wealth and status inequities by blaming individuals for wasting their liberty to improve their conditions. Versions of libertarianism disagree over government's scope; some simply want less economic intervention, while others approach social anarchism.

Virtue Ethics = the performance approach that aims at arranging good social roles that enhance overall harmonious justice. Lower priorities are harms and liberties, although a virtue ethics theory will try to explain how everyone benefits by dutifully performing the responsibilities of one's own assigned role, regardless of low or high status. Theories of virtue ethics work more effectively for small and homogenous groups, such as families and ethnic groups.

Communitarian = the integration approach that aims at arranging social responsibilities that ensure beneficial Ethics interrelationships promoting the welfare of the group as a whole. The lower priority is freedom, although communitarianism points out how mere liberty to be divisive is neither good for the individual or the group. Communitarian ethics, while intolerant of disruptive nonconformity, tolerates other communities and their different customs.

Common Sense Ethics

Morality's purpose is to manage inter-human relations, aiding collaboration and harmonization. Ethics offers reflections on upgrading morality and its work in the world, guiding its priorities and improving its influence.

Thinking about being virtuous personally and working for a good society deploys **teleological** reasoning (from the Greek telos for goal and logos for reason. Virtue Ethics relies on teleological ethical reasoning. Thinking about what is strictly right or wrong employs **deontological** reasoning (from the Greek deon for duty). Teleological reasoning and deontological reasoning agree that there is intrinsic worth in the character of a person (virtuous) or the deeds of a person (righteous) regardless of whether they actually guarantee useful results. By contrast, **consequential** reasoning finds the moral merit of a deed in the net amount of benefits that results.

Example: The company CEO explains why 10 employees were fired last month. She might explain that "Those employees were no longer needed for the next growth stages of the company" (teleological-TELE). Or, she might say, "Those employees were violating company policies, so I had a duty to fire them" (deontological-DEON). Or, she might explain that "In order to lower expenses and make more company earnings, those employees had to be let go" (consequential-CONS).

Did this CEO do an ethical action here? That depends on (a) this person's position of responsibility; (b) what justification explains this action, and (c) whether that justification fits the actual factual situation.

Unethical scenario 1: Consider the person's responsibilities. The CEO didn't offer any of three kinds of moral justifications, but instead fired the employees because she didn't personally like them, or she likes to feel powerful, or she wanted to impress other corporate executives, or she is greedy for a share of the extra earnings (and so on). These motivations are unethical because her position as CEO makes her morally responsible for the company and employees. She must give a moral justification.

Unethical scenario 2: Consider if the explanation is appropriate. The CEO offered one of the three moral justifications, but that type of justification looks inappropriate for the company. Suppose the CEO gives the TELE explanation but the company isn't going to be growing with new stages soon. This explanation hence looks *purposeless*. The CEO should be told, "Those firings are pointless before they serve a real purpose." Or, suppose the CEO gives the DEON explanation but the company didn't inform all employees about minor policies, so some of them couldn't understand how they were in violation. This explanation hence looks *unfair*. The CEO should be told, "Those firings are unjust, and maybe illegal too, because those employees don't deserve punishment." Or, suppose that the CEO gives the consequentialist explanation but the company already has good earnings. This explanation hence looks *impractical*. The CEO should be told, "These firings are premature and counterproductive until the company really needs to cut expenses."

Unethical scenario 3: Consider the explanation's fit with the real facts. If the CEO said "New growth stages are the priority," but those employees are useful for those stages too, then the CEO is offering a *misrepresentation* of the employment situation. Misrepresenting the actual workplace situation is a kind of misinformation, which is usually unethical anyways, and especially so for a CEO leader. Or, if the CEO said "Those employees violated policy," but no investigation actually exposed any violations, then the CEO is making a false accusation, which is unethical dishonesty, and particularly unethical for a CEO leader. Or, if the CEO said, "Our net profits will rise," but the CEO actually knows that those firings must mean other costs to make up for that work so really no extra earnings will come, then the CEO is lying, and a plain lie is almost always unethical, and especially unethical for a CEO leader.

To summarize, this flowchart of key questions can track the evaluations of a person's action.



Ethical reasoning exposes the kinds of "rationalizations" offered by people to intentionally or unconsciously avoid responsibility for their conduct. reason." Ethics urges reasoning, not more rationalizing, so we continually and critically reflect on our plans and the true motivations behind those agendas.

In moral psychology, a rationalization is usually immoral, because a person hides one's real motivation for an action and instead tells other people what they want to hear. This is a kind of moral dishonesty. A "moral rationalization" leads to unethical behavior, because a person is telling others how one's action has a moral explanation, when it really doesn't.

Virtue ethics uses teleological explanations. Duty ethics uses deontological explanations. Utilitarian ethics uses consequentialist thinking. Also, deontology upholds two or more specific duties, so lists of moral principles get longer than three items on the morality checklist because more than one comes from deontology. For example, "Don't harm others" and "Don't be unfair" are two very important rules from deontology.

Individual people can be ethical, or unethical, and so can groups – such as an organization, a company, and even a whole society or country. Without a moral explanation, appropriate for that group, and fitting the real facts, then behavior or conduct is unethical. Groups rationalize just as well as individuals, too. A group will take the position, "We don't need to be morally accountable here" (but they should be accountable). Or, "We have good moral explanation," but they actually have just a poor explanation. Or, "We know the facts of this situation," but they are misrepresenting facts or lying about those facts.

Ethics is not the same as morality. People offer moral explanations and moral excuses all the time, mostly to hide real motives and get others' approval. Everyone knows plenty of moral values, virtues, and rules. Knowing what is morality cannot be enough. Criminals know about morality as much as anyone else. And, until one gets caught, it's not that difficult to look moral all the time, especially if one is clever about what one tells others. It's much harder to actually be a moral person who is trying to follow morality. That effort is called ethics, and it requires conformity with moral explanations and honesty about facts.

Ethics is part of philosophy. Philosophy asks questions about the ultimate explanations for what we believe, and explores different answers about how we should live our lives together. Ethics has to get philosophical, because TELE, DEON, and UTIL are used properly only through critical self-examination and checking with the facts of the situation. Furthermore, ethics gets very philosophical because it is sometimes difficult to figure out whether TELE, DEON, or UTIL would be the more appropriate kind of moral explanation, depending on the responsible people involved and the complexity of the situation.

In addition, complex situations can lead people to disagree about whether a TELE, DEON, or UTIL explanation is actually the most valid moral justification. There are lots of moral rules: what if a situation makes one unsure about which moral rule applies? Or, perhaps two moral rules should be obeyed, but obeying one requires violating the other? Or, worse, what if you think that your DEON justification is good enough, but others disagree and call you unethical because they think that only a CONS justification is appropriate? Everyone involved wants to be moral, but group consultation and thinking is required in such cases to figure out a consensus.

Finally, ethics get very philosophical because it can sometimes happen that a CONS justification must look immoral from the standpoint of DEON (e.g. "let's kill him, to save the rest of us"). Or, a DEON justification must seem immoral according to TELE, and so on. Ethics examines whether one of the three kinds of justifications is truly supreme and overrules the other justifications, or whether these three principles are independent and deserve satisfaction. Philosophy as a whole has been debating that question for 3000 years without a clear result. That is why Ethics provides list of important principles and rules, but it can't yet say which one covers everything or overrules the others. ADVICE: make sure that at least one principle is satisfied and the other two do not disagree. If you find that a proposed action is OK by one principle but not OK by another principle, that is a serious warning of caution, and more thinking and consultation is required. If you plunge ahead and do it anyways, others will judge you to be unethical although you weren't trying to be immoral.

Most philosophers are not impressed by "relativism" in ethics – the idea that moral norms and values are never more than whatever individuals personally think are appropriate (subjectivism), or whatever one's own society/culture has taught to be appropriate (cultural relativism). Anthropology likes relativism about morality so that many cultures can be studied and compared without academics imposing rankings and prejudgments. Whether some cultures are more ethical than others is an important question, but that is the province of philosophical anthropology and ethics to explore. Here, we can at least

agree that ordinary ethics for typical people all around the world involves TELE, DEON, and CONS, and all human societies already apply them. Specific moral virtues and rules do vary somewhat across cultures, mostly having to do with traditional customs. However, basic moral principles are found everywhere, because we are all human and we want to be treated morally.

Utilitarian Cost-Benefit Analysis

Ranking	Concern	Criterion	Assessment	Cumulative Scoring
1.	Harm	Protecting the vulnerable?	weigh + / –	Net positives for both concerns?
2.	Happiness	Enlarging health and welfare?	weigh + / –	

Ethical Public Policy Analysis

Ranking	Concern	Criterion	Assessment	Cumulative Scoring
1.	Harm	Protecting the vulnerable?	weigh + / –	Net positives for all four concerns?
2.	Happiness	Enlarging health and welfare?	weigh + / –	No? May one net negative receive some compensation?
3.	Hope	Expanding freedom of choice?	weigh + / –	
4.	Harmony	Enforcing one law on all?	weigh + / –	Two (or more) net negatives = disapproval.

To evaluate an offered policy analysis, ask these key questions.

(1) Have all four ethical concerns been addressed? If one or more receive no consideration, there must be a particular justification for omission(s). If impacts on freedoms and legalities are unaddressed, then the analysis is actually just a cost/benefit analysis.

(2) Has a ranking of concerns been explicitly provided, and justified? Although the (1, 2, 3, 4) ranking above is typical, a different ranking such as (4, 2, 1, 3) may be appropriate instead. Any ranking, including an "equal weight" approach, should be directly discussed and explained, because an analysis usually settles on one factor that breaks ties or tips the balance scales.

(3) Has the weighing of each concern's plusses and minuses been supported with ascertainable facts in evidence? Relying on the assent of readers' presumptions and prejudices is a serious weakness, showing how an analysis is hiding some sort of tilting of the scales in its desired direction.

(4) Has the discussion of cumulative scoring and overall concluding judgment taken into account the kinds of criticism and counter-views that would be expected from citizens and civic interest groups?

It is one thing to critically assess and improve a well-composed public policy analysis to ensure that it has thoroughly considered all ethical factors. It is quite another thing to additionally form the judgment that a thorough public policy analysis is truly ethical, or at least more ethical than a rival analysis.

The final court of ethical appeal is to consider the three modern ethical theories in the West: Kant's deontology, Mill's utilitarianism, and the cosmopolitanism of thinkers such as Du Bois, ML King Jr, and K. Appiah. IF all three theories would approve of a public policy analysis, a gold standard of ethicality is attainable. But even if an analysis can only achieve approval from two out of three theories, then it is still worth serious consideration, and its weaknesses might be compensated with supplemental compromises.

Ethical Theory, Naturally

Naturalism's compatibility with ethical humanism is neither automatic nor impossible, but it must be negotiated with plenty of philosophical wisdom. Naturalism is about the environing stage on which the human drama is played, not a just a database of facts where all answers can be located. No moral value or human right will appear in a science textbook of confirmed hypotheses or natural laws. However, the human capacity for living morally cooperative and virtuous lives, and our ability to intelligently manage the moral side life, is 100% natural and explicable in terms of natural processes.

Morality is first and foremost a human activity, that evolved in conjunction along with our other distinctive hominid behaviors, and distinctive among them is our readiness to socialize the young and their receptivity to formative habits. Enculturalization is a natural process conducted by organic beings – we humans – so moral behavior is simultaneously accomplished by we the living, yet we are passing on what we did not invent. To say that "We decided what is moral" is both a naturalistic truism and a foolish error, for that "We" is ambiguous and omits our environs. Going back millions of years, we were sculpted by evolution as the environment rewarded socializable, cooperative, and dutiful hominids. Only after Homo sapiens applied its impressive intelligence to cultural matters, developing social structures and explanatory narratives during the late Paleolithic era, were people discussing their social conflicts and justifying moral stands. But morality already existed in abundance by then as a human universal – our capacity for morality was not invented, any more than our musicality. (Its not as if the whole species was tone-deaf and no caveman hummed a tune until a brilliant fresh mind drilled holes in a bone to make a flute and taught people how to sing along.)

When one thinks about how well people are being moral (or not), and discusses what might be done about increasing moral conformity, that is not the practice of morality itself, but the advanced cultural practice that needs its own label, which we shall call "ethics." No one thinks about ethics unless there is already shared dissatisfaction with moral matters that should ordinarily be just habitual and reliable. Ethics most obviously arises when moral duties conflict in a particular situation: which moral obligation should prevail, when both cannot at the same time? Ethics also is useful when moral priorities need adjusting: for example, should our society expect rule A to be paramount during times of famine, or of war, when some moral flexibility is needed for the good of all?

Questioning what should be a moral priority, or re-evaluating moral priorities, is now an essential part of every human culture: pondering ethics and its perennial problems are now also humanly universal.

Just as asking "How does physics find moral values in particles and energy fields?" or "When will evolutionary biology prove the existence of a human right?" are plain misunderstandings of naturalism, so too is "When will science say what is morally true?" Science itself will not directly say what moral values are, but that does not mean that values are as invisible and mysterious as fairies. Moral values are naturally located where human societies regulate the obligations that all members have towards each other and dictates duties for special relationships between members. (Just as cuisine values are naturally located where human groups perpetuate favored food recipes, and aesthetic values are located where human groups prize artistry in their surroundings.) Values are among the most natural things in the world, and they are entirely open and evident for observation, so long as one is not already blinded by unnatural religious or philosophical axioms.

A chief illustration of that self-induced blindness is the arbitrary requirement that morality primarily consists of rigid precepts ready for propositional declarations. Naturalism must already reject this notion, for morality is primarily a human activity, not a cognitive formulation. Furthermore, that requirement confuses morality with ethics. Because ethics must be amenable to broad discussion and deliberation, expressing priorities as statements ready for inferential support and countering contradiction makes sense for doing ethics. But those intellectual formulations are not appropriate for ordinary daily morality, nor would anyone think so. When we navigate a sensitive situation with due moral care, nothing may enter our minds so intellectually abstract as a moral principle or even a moral platitude. (Just as you can sing a familiar song without ever having seen the sheet of musical notations for that song.)

Besides that naturalistic objection, it must also be pointed out that morality does not consist of a static set of rigid norms regarded as true everywhere. Social scientists understand that well – human societies typically regard morality as locally valid and find the notion that distant peoples must do likewise, or be treated as morally as one's neighbors, to be incomprehensible. Only ethics ever contemplated such abstract idealizations, and even fewer ethical systems, such as those promulgated by large empires (Rome, Britain, e.g.) or continent-spanning religions (Buddhism and Christianity, e.g.) put much

effort into promulgating a supposedly universal code of ethics. Another kind of self-induced blindness happens when it is supposed that authentic morality can only consist of some set of propositional precepts easily put on parchment for public consumption. Politicians and priests have wished that popular morality could be compressed into ethical rules and civil laws so easily, but genuine human morality always overflows and outlasts any dictums, even commands from gods.

The main symptom of cultural blindness is that one does not realize how blind one is. If one is already thinking, "Show me real morality, where the exclusively true set of principles are, and I will be satisfied," then the world will seem devoid of morality, especially is one already suspects that only an unnatural source of moral directives is responsible for any morality. That unnatural source might be pure reason (whatever that is), prophetic sainthood (whoever has that), or perfect divinity (wherever God is).

Whatever the cause of one's moral blindness, what is left in darkness is the full naturality of morality, which is objectively in the world no matter whether one cares to notice it there. Morality is already objective in three primary senses that are entirely consistent with naturalism: (1) Since morality exists where humans are flourishing, and human beings are naturally organic beings, moral activity is entirely natural; (2) Since morality is a capacity naturally acquired from biological evolution and universally used by all human societies, moral ability is entirely natural; and (3) Since morality is ethically developed and deliberately transmitted by human practices in religious and wisdom traditions, and there is nothing unnatural about those crafted practices including the intelligence behind them, moral discussion is entirely natural.

Those three sense of morality's naturality are rejected, of course, by the morally blind, who will counter with their own three views: (1*) Since so few humans are fulfilling the One True Law, there is hardly any true moral conduct in the world; (2*) Since the so-called morals driven by evolution take all manner of specific forms across societies, including some highly immoral forms, there is no natural basis to true moral ability; and (3*) Since no amount of ethical deliberation guarantees universal assent to one morality, a singular absolute ethical code, there is no natural hope for true morality. With such moral blinders in place, one may conclude that naturalism is completely inhospitable to morality, which not coincidentally meshes with supernaturalism's negative assessment of naturalism. It is not coincidental indeed, where religious ethics erects a singular absolute ethics as the only possible way to think about morality, and then nonreligious people follow that thinking when looking for morality in nature. Ordinary people still standing in the shadow of God (to repeat Nietzsche's warning) might be excused, but philosophers and scientists have no excuse, unless their real agenda is to support supernaturalism.

Inadequate notions about naturalism can also cause moral blindness. The three most prevalent distortions to naturalism are Positivism, Materialism, and Scientism. The worldview deserving the label of "naturalism" does include elements of those three "-isms" because naturalism respects empirical evidence, centers on physical matters, and expects scientific methods to expand knowledge. However, excessively narrow expectations about objectivity only contort naturalism into something it is not.

Positivism results when it is thought that naturalism's legitimacy comes from only accepting what can be positively verified in unbiased observation, where "unbiased" implies "nothing human is involved." The ideal scientist is the passive spectator looking at the world itself, unfiltered by anything of human origin clouding the senses or confusing the mind. The epistemic point of Positivism is to record what the world is like as if no humans were around – objectivity means "subtract everything human to know what is still really there." What happens when a Positivist scientists gazes upon the human world of people being sociable? Nothing inhuman there, so only objectivity's opposite of "subjectivity" could be there. The ideal remains "descriptivism" – only record measurable or photographable facts – but no values or norms will be described about the human subjects under observation, for the distinctively human must be omitted and the observer's own biased interpretations are unwanted. If Positivism dictates naturalism, and there won't be anything natural or objective about values and norms. Notoriously, the Positivism does not know what to do with values and norms except to relegate them to some unnatural status (just in "the mind" as intuition or emotion have been proposed) but it is a poor naturalism that must beg for unnatural rescue. Positivism is an epistemic criterion, not a scientific theory, since there is no science designed for empirically figuring out what "objectivity" must mean for all sciences. Fortunately, physical matters are more then what can be passively measured and scientific methodologies can be more sophisticated than factual descriptivism.

Materialism results when just one kind of science – such as the physical sciences – are elevated to the status of getting reality most right. If chemistry, classical mechanics, cosmology, and quantum physics are supposed to be the sciences knowing the natural laws governing all the basic entities and energies to everything natural (e.g. nothing exists that is free from those physical entities and energies) then everything that is natural is at least physical. "Physicalism" is the update label for

nineteenth century "materialism," with the same idea: unless something that people like to talk about can be understood as just consisting of physical matters, then those people cannot be talking about something that objectively exists. Here, the opposite of physical objectivity is not subjectivity, but phenomenality: people are only talking about things that just seem to be there, but nothing is really there. Subjective matters can be physically real – e.g. if a felt pain in my finger "really is" just a nervous irritation understood by biology and neurology (two sciences subscribing only to entities such as neurons and synapse reactions reducible further to chemical and physical scales).

Physicalism is a philosophical system resting on purely logical or metaphysical premises, not a scientific theory, since there is no scientific method or controlled experiment for deciding which sciences get nature "more right" than others. Fortunately, the many sciences themselves are capable of coordinating their confirmed theories across fields and disciplines, although coordinating theoretical ontologies and formulas is almost as difficult as discovering them in the first place.

Scientism results when just one viewpoint on science's intellectual power and prestige is imposed on social issues and culture in general. Scientism can easily ensue when foremost scientists of one field make pronouncements about controversial matters beyond their academic expertise, commenting on the conduct of other disciplines or recommending agendas in applied science and technology, perhaps reaching all the way to public policy and social welfare. This kind of scientism can be helpful; Albert Einstein's Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists to warn the world about the threat of nuclear weapons is one example. Scientism can be deleterious; the prevalent derogation of the social sciences to unscientific status during the twentieth century is still influential. Scientism can also ensue when a society uncritically accepts a narrow or distorted picture of science and allows that picture to dictate how matters of broad social, cultural, and political significance should be understood and handled. Social Darwinism's influence on American political and judicial systems is a prominent illustration of scientism; the Pro-Abortion movement's selective appeal to medicine's authority for claiming that fetuses are just disposable excess tissue is another illustration. Uncritical scientism is reduced when all relevant science is studied and many kinds of experts are consulted for engaging in vigorous debate. If Positivism and Physicalism can be avoided, Scientism can be kept at a manageable level that remains useful to society. Fortunately, academic settings open for all scientific input and evidence-based judgment can be congenial to the public understanding of science and citizen participation in deliberations affecting society.

If Positivism, Materialism, and Scientism are not taken for the last word on naturalism, what sort of naturalism is straightforwardly more scientific? To avoid Positivism, epistemic objectivity cannot be equated with restrictions to observer passivity and meaning-free description. Observer participation by way of controlling experimental conditions for physical processes and acquiring meaningful understandings of social processes can be scientifically accomplished with due precautions and procedures. To avoid Materialism, ontological objectivity cannot be equated with reducibility to mechanistic causality and linear equations. Dynamic relations and systemic processes among things at all scales, including the mundane scale of human world, are just as real as the smallest elements or largest energies. To avoid Scientism, methodological objectivity cannot be equated with resignation to whatever the prestigious sciences regard as exclusively sound. All fields using legitimately experimental methodologies with proven predictive success, no matter their observational techniques and theoretical ontologies, are accorded their proper place in a comprehensively coordinated naturalism. To summarize, a naturalism that follows the sciences themselves, instead of logical, metaphysical and/or religious axioms, will generically emphasize Interactionism, Dynamism, and Pluralism. The actual content to such a naturalism cannot be philosophically stated in advance, for only the sciences themselves in their current conditions fill out the theoretical "substance" to what naturalism says about reality. Hereafter, this summary will be what is meant by Naturalism.

In an earlier paragraph, it was claimed that human morality is compatible with naturalism, and now that claim can be justified. It was claimed that

(1) Since morality exists where humans are flourishing, and human beings are naturally organic beings, moral activity is entirely natural.

(2) Since morality is a capacity naturally acquired from biological evolution and universally used by all human societies, moral ability is entirely natural.

(3) Since morality is ethically developed and deliberately transmitted by human practices in religious and wisdom traditions, and there is nothing unnatural about those crafted practices including the intelligence behind them, moral discussion is entirely natural.

Claim (1) fits with naturalism's Interactionism, for morality primarily exists where humans are meaningfully participating in relationships. Claim (2) fits with naturalism's Dynamism, for morality had its origin with evolving hominids and developed within ever-changing processes of human societies. Claim (3) fits with naturalism's Pluralism, for morality requires many theoretical approaches to its multi-faceted nature. Furthermore, morality's natural status makes it amenable to objective scientific inquiry. (A) Sciences with expertise on human relationships can objectively observe and track morality in all its manifestations; (B) sciences studying the effectiveness of moral cognition and conduct can explain morality's proper functions and practical limits; and (C) ethics itself can become scientific by incorporating A and B while experimentally testing alterations to morality for the improvement of life.

Naturalism and ethical humanism are therefore compatible as well. Ethical humanism takes moral values, moral responsibilities, and ethical transformations to be features of the natural world and amenable to practical intelligence. Ethical humanism agrees with naturalism that those features are all open for empirical study by various social, life, and natural sciences. Worldviews denying these compatibilities stand on the claim that nothing interesting about human beings is part of the natural world or answerable to practical intelligence. Such worldviews endorse mysticism, spiritualism, intuitionism, rationalism, dualism, and/or supernaturalism in some combination sufficient to deny that all-natural humans could be genuinely moral or take responsibility for morality. All those unrealistic worldviews all deny that morality exists in the service of earthly life and they all reject science's inquiries into such exalted and sacred matters.

A few more pointers are helpful. It is a mistake to suppose that morality itself supplies the point of morality, or contains the supreme moral duty by which all other moral obligations are measured. No human activity is like that. The art of fine cuisine does not include a recipe explaining why one should eat nutritious and delicious food; the cultivation of agriculture does not include a technique for determining when people should want to eat. Arts and technologies exist within the already-ongoing ways of life that human live in order to live well. Morality is a social art, and ethics is a social technology, in just this sense. To ask, "Why be moral?" is to ask, "Why be human?" And to ask, "Why should we work at ethics?" is only to ask, "Why bother trying to live better?" Neither morality nor ethics is made for people who lose interest in their humanity or their lives, and people who do lose those things have no serious challenge to make against morality or ethics – those questions are practically meaningless, and morality and ethics answer only to practical intelligence, not the loss of sanity or humanity.

When ethics becomes scientific, it experimentally explores ways to improve humanity's moral existence. Few ethical systems are prepared for any scientific mode, however, since they reject scientific advice on what morality is and how it works, and impose unrealistic views about moral knowledge and moral responsibility. Those outdated systems may be set aside. Secular humanism is prepared to be scientific, even if its public expressions have had to be more dogmatic. Secular humanism searches for ethical improvement, so it regards lists of civil rights and human rights as works in progress, not commandments written in stone.

THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY

Human Morality

A rough definition of human morality would start from the way that morality is practiced. Morality is naturally embodied in the ways that human individuals voluntarily and habitually conduct themselves in accord with understood norms regulating social interactions and related deeds of social concern, by not only regulating their own behavior, but also by participating in the needed enforcements of moral norms, and by teaching these norms and the modes of enforcement to those who need moral education. Morality is primarily designed to regulate social relationships. Moral rules about what a person does in private have their ultimate basis in what society deems as unfit for relationships: disgusting, vulgar, disabling, sacrilegious, or dishonorable deeds that offend society and render a person unfit for some social relationship. Enforcement and education are essential to morality because morality is embodied in the voluntary habits of understood normative conduct.

The noticeable way that people frequently avoid or violate norms of conduct reinforces this crucial point about morality: while morality must be to some degree habitual, it must also be voluntary, and hence violable and irregular. By "habitual" we do not mean instinctive, reflexive, or robotic — there is nothing necessary or fixed about learned human habits. Indeed, precisely because acquired habits inculcated by cultural training have only a modest way of guiding our conduct, so much enforcement and education is needed throughout life. On the other side, "habitual" should not be taken to always mean rule-following – people can acquire habits by guided imitation and not memorization of express rules, and people usually practice habits without reflecting on any rules governing their habits. Some cultures may get around to expressing and teaching expected moral habits and social roles with explicit rules, and many need not. Self-conscious rule-following is not essential to morality, but only comprehension of what normally ought to be done in a particular situation.

A morality, like any normative practice, is largely internalized. When people are conducting themselves morally, they are following moral norms not because they feel a sudden urge to be kind, or they are forced or coerced to do so, or because they strategically regard obedience as simply a means to obtain what they really want, but rather because habitual respect for moral norms and other people are among their own important motivating values. Neither sympathy to needs, obedience to commands, nor compliance with expectations, is sufficient to constitute morality (although those three factors can enhance moral conduct). A person is not being moral by feeling motivated to help because a sudden discomfort of sympathy or pity has been aroused. A person is not being moral simply by obeying a command because it is backed by threats of punishment that she wants to avoid. A person is not being moral by complying with a rule of conduct because compliance is the best way to get what he wants anyways. A person is behaving morally when they willingly conform to a moral norm because this person's respect for that norm is a sufficient and effective motivation to habitually want to conform.

Moralists frequently demand that genuine morality must spring from a purely altruistic desire to help another regardless of any estimation of duty. Perhaps the idea that morality should be like the characteristic altruism of close kinship has perpetuated this intense moralism. Finding so little angelic purity across humanity, disappointed moralists are heard to complain that people have little or no morality, but such cynicism arises from looking in the wrong place for morality. Philosophical ethicists frequently demand that genuine morality occurs when that person's respect for moral obligations provides an overriding and compelling reason for complying regardless of that person's emotions, desires, or values. But we are not undertaking philosophical ethics here, either. Moral naturalism need not postulate anything like a detached rationality capable of dictating conduct quite apart from emotions, desires, or values. This is fortunate, since there may be no such detached thing in human psychology (see for example Gazzaniga 2005, Greene 2008). Nor is moral naturalism premised on moral realism, or on any claims that truth or rightness attach to the moral judgments people make. Moral naturalism is unaffected by the alleged prevalence of vast moral error (as claimed by many such as Joyce 2002 and Lillehammer 2003) and morality has not been "debunked," so moral naturalism still has a subject matter. Whether morality is actually what people suppose it to be is a concern for philosophical ethics, not moral naturalism. Despite the fond dreams of some moralists or ethicists, neither pious altruism, pure reason, nor perfect judgment has been powering human morality, even if we may presently want to modify morality to become more altruistic or rational.

Moral conduct, when it occurs, is primarily motivated by a perceived duty. There may be other motivations to conform as well: nonconformity may bring unwanted punishment; conformity may be a means to get what one really wants; or conformity may assuage one's uncomfortable emotions. However, when a person sufficiently respects a norm, that person conforms even where nonconformity may bring no punishment or personal benefits, and even if no compassionate emotions are dominant. There are degree of respect for moral norms, and enforcement and education are common means to increase

respect. Enforcement and education rely on the deeper morality-building motivations of caring for others, avoiding harms from others, or getting benefits from others, but encultured morality results in motivating habits not reducible to any combination of these more basic and evolutionarily older motivators. Because human societies can promulgate a wide variety of moral habits, we may say that in a sense morality is socially convention, but only in one sense. While morality persists in human culture largely because humans do the training, that does not mean that humans must regard their moralities as conventional. Indeed, many societies teach that their own morality is the only morality, and some additionally teach that their morality is grounded on non-human matters like nature's ways or a god's wishes. A well-trained moral individual is not likely to regard moral duty as based merely on what society wants – the moral individual is more likely to regard what is morally right as enjoying a foundation independent from humanity. Similarly, although the practices of mathematics persist because human societies promulgate them, mathematics practitioners are unlikely to regard the truths of mathematics as dependent on what society happen to promulgate. Socially designed morality is functioning well for people when they do not regard it merely as locally and conventionally designed. We must not make too much of this looming paradox when we are pursuing moral naturalism. It is a peculiar problem for ethics, and not moral naturalism, to help reconcile the seeming independence of general moral duty with its actual dependence on local moral education.

Morality is designed to function somewhat differently from other socially normative practices. In human societies, morality can be distinguished from two similar social practices concerning relationships that extend beyond the range of the family: the norms of political laws on the one side and the norms of etiquette on the other. Political laws backed by government force can secure widespread and uniform obedience from the people, but entirely voluntary respect for those laws may be weak or far from universal. Laws backed by effective threats do their proper work of preventing harms and violence by appealing to an individual's basic desires to avoid public shame and harsh punishment. Civil etiquette is commonly quite voluntary, but it can vary so widely among individuals in the same society, and so irregularly enforced by sanctions, that specific norms accepted by all cannot be clearly identified. Nevertheless, norms of etiquette do their proper work of promoting aid and altruism by appealing to an individual's basic capacities for feeling sympathy and compassion towards others. Research on primates indicates that a proto-moral sense of compassionate altruism and respectful fairness can occasionally be observed in their social behavior, approximating what is labeled here as "etiquette" (not in the sense of refined manners, of course, but just the simple gestures of nice and fair treatment).

Morality is in the middle ground between law and etiquette and overlaps them on each side – it concerns specifiable norms about social relationships and interactions for the entire society to willingly conform and mutually enforce. In every human society, such norms are evident and powerful, although their specific scope and content varies widely across cultures. A type of social interaction dictated by morality in one culture may be left up to etiquette in another; what is assigned to law to enforce in one culture may be left up to morality in another; and some societies may not regulate some kinds of conduct which other societies heavily regulate using morality and law. However, morality has a distinctive role in every society: it concerns those norms in a society where that society regards them as both universally applicable and universally worthy of sufficient respect. Society demonstrates its regard for morality by expecting voluntary conformity to its norms, expecting people to help enforce conformity where needed, and expecting people to help instruct the young to acquire moral norms. Where society encounters individuals unable or unwilling to conform morally, even if they conform obediently or self-servingly, that society expends efforts to reform that person's attitudes and habits, or failing in that effort, re-classifies them into some sub-normal status (e.g. with unreformed criminals, the mentally ill, or the cognitively disabled).

Just as morality, while having universal applicability within a society, can vary in scope and content from society to society, morality can vary in effectiveness. If it were somehow impossible for morality to vary in its effective impact on the lives of society's members, they would not even think to try to modify it. Since morality obviously can and does have varying noticeable impacts on different individuals, so where there is sufficient intelligence, morality can there become an object of interest, and an object of manipulation.

The opportunities for deliberate modification of morality are everywhere, since individuals can acquire some intelligent control over their conduct, even much of their habitual conduct, if they can consider their conduct as something controllable and modifiable over time. The story of the evolution of culture is essentially the story of the increased capacity for humans to regard some of their habitual conduct as modifiable with attention and practice, and as teachable through instruction. The story of the evolution of morality, as a mode of enculturation, is essentially the story of the increased capacity for hominids to regard and enforce some social norms as worthy of everyone's willing conformity. As objects of intelligent attention in their own right, humans then gradually came to regard such moral norms as deliberately modifiable, and proceeded to experimentally redesign the many moralities now embodied in diverse human cultures. By analogy, early hominids developed

habitual tool-use over two million years ago, but few modifications to choppers, flakes, and blades occurred until brain size had dramatically increased; the immense proliferation and complexity of tools associated with homo sapiens indicates how hominids and humans gradually took deliberate control over experimental tool construction.

The Function of Morality

Humans would not experimentally re-design morality unless it came to be viewed as something not just modifiable, but as modifiable for serving some end. An experimental modification to something, as opposed to an accidental, sporting, or aesthetic modification, treats it as a means for achieving envisioned consequences. What is it like to regard morality as a means functioning to serve ends? What would be the function of morality? We have located morality among the modes of human conduct, where individuals willingly regulate their social interactions out of respect for its norms and they expect everyone to do likewise. This descriptive view of morality omits its functionality: why would humans have morality? Couldn't human societies do well with just familial altruism and social etiquette, or some combination of familial love, etiquette and law?

Morality supplies something that neither familial love, etiquette, nor law can provide. Morality permits standardized modes of interactions which each individual can reliably expect from all others under conditions when kinship is absent, etiquette is doubtful, and punishment is uncertain, unwise, or too costly. Etiquette is not standardized and not evenly enforced; indeed, norms of etiquette are precisely those optional norms which lack overriding respect and little punishment if any is attached to their enforcement. (That is why reciprocal altruism cannot be the essence of morality, but only a display of optional etiquette – see Tullberg 2004 on differences between altruism and reciprocity.) The most important norms of etiquette overlap with the minor norms of morality, and in modern human societies that range of normative conduct makes up what we call civility. On the other side, where a society uses law, the most important codes of morality overlap with much of law, and that range of normative conduct presently makes up what can be called good citizenship. Law promises standardized modes of interactions and high probabilities of punishment, but enforcing law has many costs because it is very intrusive on individuals and requires large resources for adjudication and punishment; that is why societies which use laws are regulating only the most important kinds of social interactions. Morality serves to regulate conduct across a broad array of human interactions where norms must be both universally respected and efficiently enforced.

What sorts of social interactions would benefit from something like morality? The obvious kinds of interactions are cooperations. Moral norms, because they regulate everyone's conduct in an efficiently uniform manner, are highly useful for promoting cooperation among all members of society. Where the more basic components of morality are already in place, especially the norms of etiquette encouraging mutual assistance and fair treatment, stable patterns of mutually beneficial cooperation can emerge and grow. If individuals can be confident that mutual assistance will reliably yield sufficient benefits, without worry that unfair treatment might occur, they will naturally undertake cooperative projects with some frequency. In short, the original effects of occasional friendly etiquette can magnify into the repetitive trusting cooperation that can deliver even higher benefits for individuals in intensely social societies. Indeed, a highly social society is precisely that society in which both simple etiquette and complex cooperation are regularly occurring to the high benefit of all members across lifetimes, and over generations.

The mutual helpfulness and fair cooperation permitted by basic etiquette can yet remain unstable and less frequent compared to other strategic modes of social interaction going on within a society. To become the dominant mode of social interaction, robust cooperation across societies requires more than just etiquette. The additional assistance comes from morality's universal and stricter obligations. The deliberate invention and design of law was a further extension of this same process in highly complex human societies, increasing the benefits of cooperative social environments by applying more costly regulation to the most important behaviors threatening the proper functioning of a civil society. The continuities between stages of moral development, proposed at the outset of our expectations for moral naturalism, can be observed in theory and fact. If etiquette had utility for small groups, morality would evolve that utility to larger groups; and law extends that normative development to fully complex societies, making higher civilization possible. A society concurrently utilizing all three modes of etiquette, morality, and law would then maximize efficient continuity: making everything a matter of law would be too costly, as would folding all of etiquette into morality. It may be theorized that an optimal society, therefore, would attempt to match its expenditures for normative implementation to the social significance of the behavior regulated. We do observe many modern human societies displaying such effort to efficiently utilize etiquette, morality, and law concurrently, although societies design their own distinctive modes of assigning expected conduct to each category.

Morality and Cooperation

Intuitively, cooperation and morality are a good functional match. However, we must not hastily assume that morality only exists where intense cooperation is ongoing, and we must not assume that cooperation requires morality. Species can evolve intense forms of social cooperation without any morality or even social intelligence (take ants for example), because such cooperation can be sustained by close kinship alone. For its part, morality could theoretically serve other functions besides cooperation. There are competitive "zero-sum" games of winners and losers, what can be called "win-lose" games, that can be better sustained if some moral norms are added to the rules of the game. However, the impressive value of morality is revealed when it is added to cooperative "win-win" or "non-zero-sum" games of mutual benefit. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how any sustained forms of intense cooperation across large societies would last without support from moral norms. All the same, the question stands: could non-zero-sum cooperation be worth it, relatively speaking? Numerous studies of forms of reciprocity generally suggest that this is the case (see for example Trivers 1971 and 1985, Hirshleifer 1988, Sober and Wilson 1998, Henrich, Boyd, et al. 2001, Sachs et al. 2004, Taylor and Nowak 2007).

It is widely agreed that, in theory, non-zero-sum cooperation tends to delivers greater overall benefits to most individuals over time in a complex society than any combination of competitive zero-sum games, provided that individuals have cognitive skills sufficient for conducting such social cooperation. A resulting overall advantage of cooperation over competition would practically explain why larger groups of increasingly intelligent hominids and humans evolved to have greater reliance on non-zero-sum cooperation than all other zero-sum interactions combined. Cooperation for common and mutually beneficial ends is a pervasive and important feature of any human society; indeed, across several hominid species, social cooperation largely determines the welfare of any of its members. For modern humans especially, avoiding social cooperation is the path to death; even a "self-sufficient" hermit or a combative aggressor was taught survival and fighting skills by others.

Where does the role of morality enter? The modest amount of social cooperation that gradually arose in early hominid species would have benefitted greatly from simple moral norms, over and above the contributions to cooperation made by the sentiments of sympathy, compassion, and altruism. Those crucial sentiments secure the bonds of commonality among closely related kin and a few caring friends, but they do not function well for impartial extension to everyone. The value of morality only increased as homo sapiens gradually lived in larger tribal units and invented more complex forms of social cooperation occurring across the boundaries of close family and friends. Where the emotions guiding family commonality are absent, a different kin of cooperative relationship with acquaintances can develop instead, one based on reciprocity. Given the above sketch of what morality is and how it basically functions, we can understand why morality is well-suited to facilitating widespread cooperation for high mutual benefit. The universality and overriding respect for moral norms is a good functional match with the widespread and repetitive modes of cooperation going on within social groups. Reliance on etiquette doesn't vanish as reciprocal cooperation increases, but its unsteady and varying force would enjoy a dramatic supplementation with morality. In fact, etiquette and morality would re-enforce each other among the most cooperative members of a society; that is why distinguishing merely compassionate acts from genuinely moral conduct is no simple matter. (Similarly, when modern humans invented political law, it hardly replaced etiquette and morality, but supplemented them in an integrated fashion, so that refraining from murder is simultaneously legal, moral, and nice.)

Where any two members of a group can both have some assurance that significant mutual benefit is possible and no unfair harm is forthcoming, they have a greater rational incentive to engage in reciprocity cooperation. Core moral norms helpful for such cooperation would naturally include prescriptions against coercion or harms by physical domination, deception, cheating, stealing, and unfair treatment. Respect for morality provides needed assurances for all parties, and the value of that assurance increases with the size of the social group. In very small groups where everyone is closely related and quite familiar to each other, instinctive emotions of sympathy and compassion could be strong enough to ensure care and cooperation, so familial love and kind etiquette is usually sufficiently and no morality is needed. But in larger groups, where individuals will encounter distant relations (or non-family as well), morality adds its distinctive service to increasing cooperation over and above the bonds of family and vagaries of etiquette. In such societies, where individuals could benefit from cooperation with others known primarily by reputation, moral norms increase the chances of successful cooperation. In effect, morality would be displayed in situations where two or more individuals know each other primarily by reputation, they have repeated opportunities to mutually benefit from cooperation, and they conform to moral norms about cooperating fairly and not harming each other in the process.

This view of morality's functioning presupposes that individuals have enough cognitive resources to absorb and understand prevailing moral norms in their society, to know how to strategically comply or ignore those moral norms, and to judge the other members' reputations for complying with those norms as well. There is no well-established theory about when early hominids developed all of these cognitive resources and began doing what we know as morality. Perhaps our primate cousins are capable of occasionally performing very simple versions of morality. But it may prove difficult to determine whether their conformity to norms is due to sympathetic feelings, strategic aims, or actual respect for the norms themselves (just as judging motives of fellow humans is not easy). In any case, as hominids gradually came to rely on social strategies demanding intense daily cooperation, it is reasonable to suppose that the basic primate toolkit for proto-morality underwent development too. That development led to us: we can observe how the intelligence of homo sapiens is highly developed for tracking the conduct and reputations of many individuals, and for enforcing and teaching morality right along with the other aspects of complex culture.

When morality is supplemented into the manner in which individuals cooperate, this moral cooperation is dramatically enhanced in two ways: they will cooperate more frequently, and their cooperation will be much more efficient. Where cooperation is conducted morally, the participants will generally display a high level of cooperativeness with most if not all other members of the society. Specifically, each member will tend to be willing to cooperate when there is an opportunity, and each member will take an opportunity to cooperate with most or all other members of the society as situations warrant. In simplistic terms, where morality is robust, we would expect to observe lots of niceness and very little choosiness. On an emotional level, robust morality is experienced as trust: a felt confidence that reciprocity interactions with another will be reliably safe, beneficial, and fair.

We should not over-rationalize the gradual emergence of a rational morality within social groups. It is unnecessary to depict hominids as cold calculators thoughtfully rationalizing cooperation. The cognitive capacities needed for morality's emergence would not need to be more sophisticated than the "fast and frugal heuristics" of severely bounded rationality (see Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). Like so many other evolved features of hominid brains, the evolving emotions do most of the work of social intelligence anyways, and humans have inherited and use them (see Haidt 2003, Nichols 2004). Individuals growing up in a relatively cooperative society will be guided by the feelings of enjoying mutual trust. Nor is necessary to depict early hominids or homo sapiens as utilitarians who regard morality as a means to enhancing social welfare. Actually, individuals committed to morality will instead generally regard morality as binding regardless of calculations of social welfare. On a personal level, a moral person will try to be virtuous on a daily basis, and a group of moral people will regard each other as dutiful agents. Perhaps only when a society's morality is under widespread dispute or under discussion as a problem in itself, would people think to inspect morality in regard to its service to society. Whether virtue theory, deontology, or utilitarianism has greater merits is an issue for philosophical ethics, not moral naturalism. For its part, moral naturalism can at least account for the distinctive ways that morally trained people would regard how morality works. Moral psychology has the unenviable task of sorting out the actual motivators for moral judgment from the stated justifications that people will supply when asked (see for example Doris 2010, Brinkmann 2011).

So far, a naturalistic explanation involving both natural and cultural evolution for morality's enhancement to routine and widespread cooperation seems possible. However, as already noted, there are many other strategies for conducting social interactions besides morality. Even if we might see how morality can enhance cooperation, individuals can still benefit from competitive, neglectful, unfair, or harmful conduct towards others too. Why would morality come to have any large role to play in hominid societies? Perhaps morality has long been just one optional mode of social conduct among many others, and individuals could vary widely in the extent to which they rely on morality over other strategies. Perhaps a society that does use much morality could be successfully "infiltrated" by individuals using more selfish strategies. Is there good reason to conclude that individuals in societies using lots of moral cooperation enjoy enough benefits to survive, or to conclude that societies using moral cooperation might just as well drift away from morality as time goes by?

There is no point to accounting for the widespread reliance on morality among contemporary humans with an evolutionary story of hominid development unless moral cooperation can work well, at least better than zero-sum interactions. It is unnecessary to think that the proliferation and supremacy of non-zero cooperation was in some sense evolutionarily inevitable (as suggested in Wright 2000), but there are good reasons to think that plenty of non-zero-sum cooperations would be stumbled upon and repeated by sufficiently intelligent species, such as our primate and hominid ancestors, giving rise to culture (a survey of reasons is given by Boyd and Richerson 2005). Are there good reasons to think that moral cooperation delivers generally high benefits to the members of a society, and delivers results more beneficial to all

individuals within that society than any other strategy? Further study is needed to analyze the benefits of moral cooperation in a society.

It does seem clear that adding education and punishment to nice reciprocal cooperation enhances morality, since imitating better strategies and supplementing shunning and shaming with punishment tend to enhance widespread cooperation (see Boyd and Richerson 1992, Henrich and Boyd 2001, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, Alexander 2007). The role of punishment, from simple shunning and shaming to direct infliction of physical harm, is as crucial to indirect reciprocity as it is to morality and law, as would be evolutionarily expected. Sripada (2005) claims that only punishments and not reciprocity's benefits are behind morality, but this cannot be right since agents would not long suffer the costs of enforcing something that itself offers few benefits. Furthermore, precisely because the retaliation of the punished against punishers can diminish punishment's effectiveness (and hence effective reduce the situation to a zero-sum game of whom can dominate the other – see Janssen and Bushman 2008), genuine morality would depend on a high degree of internalization so that just punishment is usually passively accepted (this dependency on internalization may account for the intuitive rightness of retribution.) In large societies, the development of law to reinforce important moral norms is commensurate with the emergence of police to wield sufficient force to forestall retaliation.

Much earlier in hominid evolution, shunning and shaming would have been the primary means of punishing enforcement, along with intermittent physical violence. Shunning would be very effective by itself, and other indirect reciprocity studies show that physical punishment would only heighten enforcement and obedience. It is therefore reasonable to find both proto-morality and the emergence of universal moral habits in those groups able to engage in non-zero-sum patterns of cooperation and to track each others' performance with just a small amount of information about reputation. The dominance and stability of such habitual social niceness does make a good practical fit with the sort of forms of intense and widespread cooperation our hominid ancestors were developing.

Natural Morality

Despite intriguing modeling of the development of moral cooperation, we cannot forget how these capacities for reciprocal cooperation and proto-morality would still be "in-group" features emerging among members of a social group. Even as cruelty or betrayal are subsiding within hominid tribes over hundreds of thousands of years as social intelligence increases to decrease reputation errors, those nasty deeds can robustly survive between tribes. Familiarity and closeness remain essential to our evolved sense of morality, as they have remained essential to charity. Efforts to expand the range of morality would hence require further reductions to errors of social judgment, expansions of who shall count as part of the "in-group," and enhancements of the sense of closeness to others through such things as new technologies of communication. And the field of ethics has indeed typically focused of these factors; cognitive psychology has also recommended increasing the availability of reliable information about other people, their reputations, and their social interactions (Pollock and Dugatkin 1992, Paolucci and Conte 2009).

Furthermore, once humans were able to cognitively appreciate how the norms of moral cooperation were modifiable, they could take some control over their habits and try to deliberate enhance morality's effectiveness at making cooperation even more reliably beneficial for all. Such experimental efforts must have been halting and unsteady, yet not without practical value, since humans did not abandon the effort and social morality eventually came to dominate human life. Without having to suddenly invent compassion, niceness, fairness, cooperativeness, civility, and trust, humans did intensify efforts to deliberately instill strong respect for morality's norms through operant conditionings and educational training, so that everyone would be more likely to habitually and voluntarily comply in all situations even if motivational feelings, strategic benefits, or punishments are not there.

Moral cooperation appears to be so consistently of higher benefit to all members of a social group in the long run that no one would be smarter for reverting to nothing but ruthless zero-sum games or outright harmful treachery. Of course, morality is hardly the only kind of practice that would enjoy long-term survival; we are just the sort of species in which multiple "strategies" would be distributed across a population. The habits of morality, installed by instinct and instilled by instruction, will always be statistically distributed: people will occasionally be mean, short-sighted, and selfish. Morality is designed to prevent, so far as possible, lapses by individuals into hurtful conduct and unintelligent non-cooperation, and to foster firm reforms of nonconforming members. In any society, of course, actual conduct will only approximately track that society's moral expectations, but those noticeable deviances are the exceptions that prove the normative rule.

Morality appears to be just the kind of low-information and largely-habitual practice that could stably emerge among agents capable of recognizing many individuals, observing others' interactions, and tracking their reputations. Social intelligence leads to moral intelligence, and morality improves society. In essence, during moral cooperation's long unconscious evolution in social groups, it represented long-term wisdom for most members even if individuals could not yet cognitively appreciate that fact. Furthermore, if indirect reciprocity morality can be propelled by group selection over long stretches of time (as suggested by Boyd and Richerson 1990 and Soltis et al. 1995), in-group moral cooperation can also serve as a smart survival strategy for competing groups of hominids. The fact that no human society in recorded history has entirely abandoned morality of its own accord further indicates morality's durable value. Morality among hominids displayed a functional design by natural evolution, and our human moralities now display the imprint of our own re-designs as well.

Moral naturalism appears to have the resources needed to account for the origin and gradual development of the human practice of morality, so that no great leaps in emotional, cognitive, or spiritual abilities need to be postulated. Moral naturalism also appears to be able to account for why humans living in large societies put so much deliberative effort in ethical redesigns of moralities and their enforcement with law. During the past ten thousand years, dramatically larger societies have been suffering from the inherited limitations of morality and getting obsessed with ethics and law, precisely because morality is naturally so emotional, limited to familiar in-groups, controlled by perceived reputation, and yet so essential to the needed expansion of nonviolent encounters and reciprocal cooperations among strangers.

Moral Problems, Social Roles, and Ethical Theory

An ethical theory that takes real moral problems seriously can show why moral problems are a type of practical problem and share in the basic features of any problem. Central to all practical problems is the opportunity for deliberation on both means and ends pursued. Moral problems are characterized by deliberation on the means (moral duties) to fulfilling social roles that exist for pursuit of social goals. Moral deliberation is required because of conflicting moral motivations that can arise, of various sorts, that cause a person to be unsure which action is morally right in that doubtful situation. The primary causes of moral conflict and the primary methods of resolving them are briefly delineated. This ethical theory's proposal to reconcile practical and moral reasoning suitably modifies the neo-Humean theory of moral motivation to defuse worries over the amoralist, while offering a culturally and historically pluralistic approach to understanding moral reasoning.

What is the proper relationship between practical reasoning and moral reasoning? Against the view that moral reasoning is a type of practical reasoning stands the claim that moral reasoning has a different aim and different premises. Moral reasoning, it is said, must stand in judgment of ends, while practical reasoning can only reason about means to given ends. Furthermore, moral reasoning must appeal to truths about such things as the nature of persons or the principles of autonomy, and these truths have no role in practical reasoning. However, a way to see how moral reasoning and practical reasoning are indeed closely related can be found by studying the nature of moral problems. What sort of ethical theory would result from taking the existence of real-life moral problems seriously? Many ethical theories do not proceed from a careful consideration of the nature of moral problems, and hence they obscure or destroy the connections between practical and moral reasoning. (This section is not directly concerned with the question of moral dilemmas: situations in which a person morally ought to do A and morally ought to do B but cannot do both.) Moral problems, as shall be seen, exist where it is not known whether a moral duty exists.

The central features of a contrasting approach to ethical theory can be sketched, starting from the reality of moral problems and incorporating the view that social roles are an intrinsic component of morality. The way has been indicated by some types of virtue theory, contextual and situational ethics, and by pragmatism; we shall not pause in this brief paper to delineate their respective contributions. The nature of the moral problem, it will be argued, has three components: it is an active personal process of goal-seeking, it is a reasoned deliberation on conflicting obligations of social roles, and it concludes with a decision on a provisional course of action aiming at reconciling role conflict. The conclusion will consider to what extent the moral theory sketched here modifies the neo-Humean view that moral reasons must depend on the agent's actual motivations.

The Basic Features of Moral Problems

If moral problems are a type of practical problems, then they share in the basic features of human problems. At minimum, the features of a practical problem are: (1) a problem is a doubtful situation for a person who does not know what to do next to achieve a goal that the person has been pursuing, causing him to hesitate, even if only for a brief time; (2) a problem's outcome is uncertain during the duration of the problem; (3) a problem's process, including its continuation or eventual resolution, is at least partially within the control of the person suffering from the problem; (4) the problem will reach some sort of resolution only when the person decides what action should be done (either in pursuit of the original goal or the goal modified in some fashion) and this decision is sufficient motivation for his intentional performance of this action; thus leading to (5) the person performs this action, resuming his activity towards the envisioned goal. It should be noted that these five features do not rule out the typical possible scenarios of (a) a person fails to ever decide what action should be done to achieve the goal and instead decides to something quite different, permitting the problem to remain unresolved and the goal abandoned, or (b) the activity decided upon does not in fact prove to be a means towards the envisioned goal, which can cause another problematic situation to arise.

The Active Process of a Moral Problem

Real-life moral problems do fit this basic pattern of any practical problem. The moral problem, like any practical problem, is a active personal process, not a passive accomplished fact. This process has at minimum the following features: (1) a moral problem is a doubtful situation for a person who does not know what to do next to achieve a goal that the person has been pursuing, causing him to hesitate, even if only for a brief time; (2) a moral problem's outcome is uncertain during the duration of the problem; (3) a moral problem's process, including its continuation or eventual resolution, is at least partially within the control of the person suffering from the moral problem; (4) the moral problem will reach some sort of resolution

only when the person decides what action should be done (either in pursuit of the original goal or the goal modified in some fashion) and this decision is sufficient motivation for his intentional performance of this action; thus leading to (5) the person performs this action, resuming his activity towards the envisioned goal.

In summary, moral problems are at minimum lived problems experienced by uncertain and questioning people who don't know what morally right action to take, and moral problems conclude when people do know what morally right action to perform and then perform that action on the basis of that knowledge. Our experience of genuine moral problems displays at minimum all five traits. However, all that has been done is to insert the term "moral" at the appropriate places.

What precisely distinguishes "moral" problems from other kinds of practical problems? It will be asserted below that social role conflict is the additional factor, but before proceeding to that claim, let us consider one common answer. Is not a moral standard necessary to the existence of a moral problem? We are invited by this question to distinguish moral problems from practical problems with a very simple addition: the person's activities, both at the start of the problem and at its conclusion, must be judged by independent moral standards. Simply put, the moral problem exists so long as any activity is not in accord with moral standards. But should we welcome this addition? Are moral standards necessary in this way for the active process theory to be able to discriminate between moral and practical problems?

No ethical theory should hold that moral standards are independent of human cognizance, because if they were, it would be possible for a moral problem to come into existence and arrive at a right resolution, without questioners undergoing problems having any cognizance of these events. A moral standard, in order to be normatively involved in the process of resolving moral problems, must be available as a reason for acting for the rational questioner. This "internalism" requirement, assumed by the major ethical theories, implies a further principle also required by the active process theory of moral problems: (6) where a moral problem has concluded in agreement with a moral standard, a questioner in that problem must understand that moral standard. However, principle 6 appears to make nonsense out of moral problems, for this next question can be asked:

> Q. If questioners must understand the moral standard confirming the rightness of a moral problem's outcome, then why did the moral problem even exist at all for those questioners? If people know the moral standards, then presumably they would know which action is morally right, and not have any uncertainties or questions.

This concern cannot be used against principles 1-6 of the active process theory, because it smuggles in a notion of the independence of moral standards that principles 4 and 5 have already ruled out. It assumes the existence of the moral standard from the start to the end of the moral problem, and assumes that people know the moral standard all along. Principle 6 does not assert that a questioner must grasp the moral standard throughout the duration of a moral problem, but only at its conclusion. In other words, the questioners learn the moral standard only at its conclusion.

But it must be asked at this point whether the understanding of a right action is something other than the understanding of the moral standard of rightness involved in that action. Could a person ever possess one but not the other? The answer must be negative. A person does not first establish that his action is morally correct, then compare it with the moral standard establishing its correctness to see if there is agreement. They are but different descriptions of the same result. Now, a person could be told that an action simply is right, without being informed of the moral standard applied. However, a moral theory which would equate being told by an authority that an action is right with understanding that an action is right is contrary in spirit to principles 1-5. If we were able to rely on moral authorities, the very existence of genuine moral problems for us would evaporate.

Therefore, moral standards cannot be independent of the comprehension of questioners trying to resolve moral problems rightly. We simply judge that a decided-upon action is right and the moral problem is concluded. Independent moral standards are epicycles lacking any explanatory contribution and must be rejected as irrelevant to genuine moral problems.

With these insights the question of the relationship of the moral standard to the moral problem comes into sharp focus. At a specific time, when a person is considering a certain action, either a person understands the relevant moral standard for the rightness of that action, or she does not. If the former, then she can know whether her action would be right. If the latter, then she cannot know. By principles 1-6, if she does know, then her present situation is not a moral problem. The active process theory thus implies that (7) only ignorance of what is the morally right action to be performed in this situation is

compatible with the continued existence of a moral problem. Known moral standards cannot in and of themselves be used by the active process theory to discriminate between moral and practical problems.

The distinction between moral and practical problems must be sought elsewhere. That moral standards cannot be taken for granted as givens during moral problems should be our clue: it is the very fact that moral standards cannot be taken for granted, and thus can be questioned during moral problems, which is a prominent feature of moral problems.2 In merely practical problems, moral standards are not uncertain; they are accepted as unproblematic and do not receive deliberative attention. That is not to say that my practical activities necessarily ignore moral standards – the pursuit of a practical goal like mowing my lawn can be performed with due attention to the rule against disrupting sleeping neighbors. Rather, a non-moral practical problem lacks the sort of active questioning and deliberation on moral standards which characterize moral problems.

Let us therefore add principle (8) a moral problem arises when a person has hesitated in pursuit of a goal because of doubt concerning moral standards, and the moral problem is resolved when a person decides on an action which he believes to be morally right. It should be remembered that as a type of practical problem, a moral problem's features cannot rule out the typical possible scenarios of (a) a person failing to ever decide what right action should be done to achieve the goal and instead decides to something quite different, permitting the problem to remain unresolved and the goal abandoned, or (b) the activity decided upon does not in fact prove to be a morally right means towards the envisioned goal, which can cause another problematic situation to arise.

Moral Doubt and Social Roles

Principles 1-8 together define the active process theory of the moral problem. However, they cannot help us to understand how to resolve moral problems. How a person comes to learn during a moral problem what action is best, principle 8 cannot say. But in conjunction with the other considerations, a great deal can be said. First, a person can only choose among those actions which are considered during the problem, and among these actions will be those that actually are motivating to some degree. A person in a moral problem will have a variety of motivations, including moral motivations towards optional actions. During the problem, none prevail to the extent that the questioner acts on one in the knowledge that is the right action. The sort of motivators that count as "moral" motivators are those motivations to perform actions in accord with moral standards, but what is the role of moral standards in moral problems? Of course, if we were permitted to postulate the existence of necessary and independent moral standards, we could define the "moral" motivator simply as a motivation to perform an action that is moral according to moral standards. But the active process theory of the moral problem cannot appeal to such independent moral standards. Furthermore, any problem, including a moral problem, must have as a feature a person's pursuit of a goal (often forgotten by rival ethical theories!) What sort of goals characterize moral problems?

Our actual experience of moral problems shows us that there is a primary kind of moral motivator and a primary type of goal pursued: the moral motivation is a motivation to perform an action that satisfies an obligation of a social role, and the goal pursued is a goal for which the social role is designed to facilitate. We can thus add another principle: (9) the moral problem contains motivations to act on what a person believes to be the duties of his social role(s) which facilitate the pursuit of social goals. Adding the idea that a moral problem contains a moral conflict between possible obligatory actions, it follows that (10) the moral problem contains conflicting motivations to act on what a person feels to be the duties of his social role(s), and deliberation on the right action is guided by considering the social goal(s) for which the social role(s) exist.

There are many ways for social duties to generate conflicting motives. Three primary ways are sufficient as examples. A. A person does not know whether a social duty applies, or which social duty applies, in this specific situation, so that several weak moral motivations arise and conflict without any of them yet able to prevail. B. A person does not know which of the multiple social duties from the same role applicable in this situation to follow, because they motivate contradictory actions and so none prevail. C. A person does not know which of two social duties from two different roles to follow because they motivate contradictory actions in this situation, and hence neither can prevail.

Conflict Resolution

In order for a moral problem to come to a resolution, the conflicting motivations must be reconciled to the degree that will permit a person to decide on what ought to be the prevailing moral duty and thus which action is morally right. Principles 8, 9 and 10 together imply that (11) a moral problem is resolved when a person decides what action is right by reducing the

conflict between the duties of his social role(s) so that one moral motivation to prevails in that situation. A person should deliberate on resolving moral problems by hypothesizing how to take an action which best reduces the conflict between social duties.

Some possible ways of accomplishing conflict resolution include the following. First, the conflict might, on further investigation of the facts of the present doubtful situation, turn out to be only apparent, clearing the way for taking an action that satisfies one's duties. Second, the conflict could be settled by an appeal to a moral principle prioritizing one duty, and hence one social goal, over another (laws often function in this capacity). Third, the person could adjust her conception of a social role, deciding in light of a social goal involved that the social role should not impose the conflicting duty, leaving her free to follow the other duty. Fourth, the person could abandon a social role and its concomitant social goal, and thereby abandon a conflicting duty, leaving her free to follow the other duty.

In conclusion, an ethical theory which takes the existence of moral problems seriously must consider why moral problems are a kind of practical problem, and thus why moral problems are situations of doubt concerning what is morally right in the face of conflicting duties. The independent existence of moral duties cannot be taken for granted; so a source of moral duties in ordinary life must be located. It has been proposed here that moral duties originate in our social roles that function to promote the achievement of social goods. The notion that moral rules have a function in the life of social roles and relationships gives moral rules a teleological existence since they function towards the attainment of an end: the (more or less) efficient maintenance of cooperative endeavors among people. Rival ethical theories, questing for absolute and universal moral principles that can legislate a priori upon which endeavors are moral, cannot embrace the cultural and historical situatedness of moral problem solving. But this is just an elaborate way of saying that such theories are irrelevant to genuine moral problems.

While hostile to the Aristotelian and Kantian theories, which require the existence of "categorical" reasons for moral action that do not depend on an agent's actual motivations, the ethical theory sketched here does build a bridge between an agent's actual motivations and genuinely moral reasoning. The frightening specter of the Humean amoralist who cannot identify a sufficient reason to be moral among his current motivations has driven moral theorists to fight such skepticism with a priori arguments. However, we can see that the Humean amoralist would have to be someone who has no social roles and hence does not cooperatively participate in any social goals. Such a person requires socialization, as children do, and could not benefit from moral reasoning since he would not yet have any moral motivations or moral problems. Aristotelian ethical theory at least recommends looking to how people actually do live their lives, but unfortunately seeks one specifiable substantive pursuit common to all humanity to ground moral deliberation. The ethical theory offered here admits that all people do pursue social goals and adopt social roles and duties, but makes the pluralistic claim that people do not, and need not, all have the identical goals, roles, and duties. Our understanding of our moral duties and hence of what is right evolves within the context of our real-life efforts to reconcile the social roles and goals to which we have practical commitments.

Summary

(1) a moral problem is a doubtful situation for a person who does not know what to do next to achieve a goal that the person has been pursuing, causing him to hesitate, even if only for a brief time.

(2) a moral problem's outcome is uncertain during the duration of the problem.

(3) a moral problem's process, including its continuation or eventual resolution, is at least partially within the control of the person suffering from the moral problem.

(4) the moral problem will reach some sort of resolution only when the person decides what action should be done (either in pursuit of the original goal or the goal modified in some fashion) and this decision is sufficient motivation for his intentional performance of this action; thus leading to

(5) the person performs this action, resuming his activity towards the envisioned goal.

Additional principles

(6) where a moral problem has concluded in agreement with a moral standard, a questioner in that problem must understand that moral standard.

(7) only ignorance of what is the morally right action to be performed in this situation is compatible with the continued existence of a moral problem.

(8) a moral problem arises when a person has hesitated in pursuit of a goal because of doubt concerning moral standards, and the moral problem is resolved when a person decides on an action which he believes to be morally right.

(9) the moral problem contains motivations to act on what a person believes to be the duties of his social role(s) which facilitate the pursuit of social goals.

(10) the moral problem contains conflicting motivations to act on what a person feels to be the duties of his social role(s), and deliberation on the right action is guided by considering the social goal(s) for which the social role(s) exist.

Three primary ways for social duties to generate conflicting motives:

A. A person does not know whether a social duty applies, or which social duty applies, in this specific situation, so that several weak moral motivations arise and conflict without any of them yet able to prevail.

B. A person does not know which of the multiple social duties from the same role applicable in this situation to follow, because they motivate contradictory actions and so none prevail.

C. A person does not know which of two social duties from two different roles to follow because they motivate contradictory actions in this situation, and hence neither can prevail.

Finally, in light of A, B, and C, an eleventh principle:

(11) a moral problem is resolved when a person decides what action is right by reducing the conflict between the duties of his social role(s) so that one moral motivation to prevails in that situation.

How Does Ethics Work in Daily Life?

I. Morality and Social Stress

Morality functions best when it is mostly habitual – you know your roles, you understand what you are supposed to be doing, you know how to cooperate with others for group goals. Morality supplies plenty of rules for conforming your conduct to expected habits. However, like all habits, moral habits need to be formed properly, they need to be maintained, and they need to be continually managed in a thoughtful way.

Unlike other animals, human groups are now so complex, involving so many people and so many social roles, and offering innumerable imaginative group goals, that ordinary morality is not easy for us.

When habits are strained and stressed, when we are confronted by novel situations that confuse us, we realize that our moral habits aren't working so well. Like an excessive strain on the body, where we easily fall into dependence on just a few strong bodily habits to get us through the day, moral habits can get unbalanced too.

Any habit will tend to strengthen from use and even overuse. A body under physical stress will try to automatically cope by overusing some muscular abilities. It's the short-term efficient way for the body to cope. The long-term problem from this unmindful strategy is a gradual rigidity into just a few overused bodily habits, which in the long term will result in bodily breakdown and damage. Please notice that specialized bodily capacities is not, in itself, necessarily an unhealthy problem. The athlete, the construction engineer, the soldier – many people have well-developed specialized bodily capacities allowing them to do amazing things with great physical prowess. Nevertheless, overall physical balance and harmony cannot be lost in this process, and physically fit people all know this well and apply thoughtful ways to manage proper balance. It is the high-level stress, the constant unhealthy overuse, which can unmindfully distort the body's healthy functioning.

A person under high interpersonal stress will similarly suffer from this same unhealthy process of excessive unmindful overuse at first, unless and until a more thoughtful approach is tried. Social stress will automatically cause some moral habits to get overused, as swift efficient "solutions" offer an easy way to get a person through the day. This is not in itself "immoral" thinking, just as resorting to overdeveloped body habits is not necessarily "unhealthy" behavior. The question is whether people are mindful and careful in managing the development of their moral habits. For example, we expect people who specialize in moral judgment, such as religious leaders, judges in law, social workers, and personal counselors to have highly sensitive and powerful ways of dealing with moral problems. But these professional "moral experts" must simultaneously maintain their own moral balance and harmony, like everyone else, because they are still ordinary people with ordinary life problems too.

When a few moral habits get overused, to the point where a person constantly resorts to only them, they become morally unbalanced and unhealthy. Their moral perspective narrows, they pass swift moral judgment on situations, they lose a capacity to appreciate other peoples' standpoints, and they fall into prejudices and stereotypes. Unhealthy morality is therefore like unhealthiness generally. Unhealthy morality is NOT the lack or absence or morality – unhealthy morality is not simply "evil". Rather, unhealthy morality results from weak moral habits, stressed moral habits, overused moral habits, and excessive dependence on too few moral habits. Unhealthy morality too easily creates rigid categories of "good" and "bad" people rather than communities of cooperating people. Unhealthy morality can also too easily make people think that "my" group is better than other groups. Unhealthy morality can cause inflexible positions of conflict between groups.

BUT the function of morality is to connect and sustain working relationships between people.

Think about the analogies we are seeing between body habits and moral habits. Unhealthy body habits involve ignoring what is really going on, taking one's body for granted, using the body as a tool rather than as a partner, not respecting the body's capacities and limitations, and forgetting the flexible growth potentials of our body's powers. Social relationships are also based on moral habits, and we can slip into unhealthy moral habits. Unhealthy habits such as ignoring what is really going on, taking each for granted, using each other as tools rather than as partners, not respecting others.

The unhealthy mind-body disconnection is an unhealthy habit that permits the ego to "float away" from the body. At its worst, a mind-body dichotomy lets people suppose mental independence from the physical body. This is where the notion

that the mind is good while the body is evil can begin. Or people can suppose that the body is a merely physical thing that must be struggled with or defeated.

Similarly, unhealthy people disconnections are sets of poor habits that permit a person to "rise above" the rest of the group. An unhealthy moral attitude lets someone suppose that they are quite independent from the group, perhaps more special or more important than the group. Any group is made up of people with distinct talents and contributions, of course. Healthy groups work together, each playing their supporting role. Unhealthy moral habits can lead a person into selfish notions of greater importance or superior judgment, as if only he or she really knows right from wrong all the time. Likewise, unhealthy habits could make other kinds of people feel inferior and worthless to the group, as if they must be dependent on others for evaluations of right and wrong.

II. Reconnecting mind and body can be like reconnecting people

Ethics, unlike morality, is not at all like swift decisions according to strict rules. Ethics helps to keep our moral habits harmonious and flexible so they work better together in dynamic social situations. Any single moral rule, like any one muscle-bone connection, has limited function and range of motion. Only the harmonious cooperation of many muscles, joints, and bones foster great flexibility and nearly unlimited opportunity for activities.

Ethics has three main tasks of managing personal morality. First, trying to build healthy moral habits into a good foundation; second, trying to prevent unhealthy moral habits from arising during stressful times; and third, trying to deal with unhealthy moral habits in a constructive way to regain flexible moral balance and harmony.

Because ethics is the mindful process of managing moral situations, which are always interpersonal situations too, ethics is also a thoughtful way to manage complex communities of people. Whole groups can gradually slide into unhealthy moral habits, as their members each do. When groups become morally unhealthy, that causes a double-sided problem for everyone. First, an unhealthy moral group is not treating its own members as well as it should. Second, an unhealthy moral group is less able to engage other groups in morally appropriate ways. A successful ethical management of morality could potentially be an intelligent way of managing inter-group cooperation, and managing the inevitable inter-group conflict too. Ethics is the hoped-for path to conflict-management and peace, after all.

But all paths to peace must begin with individual people managing their personal moral situations. However, while morality is always about personality and character, this must not be imagined as a private lonely process! Because all morality involves interpersonal relationship, we are continually in moral situations together!

An analogy back to bodily fitness can guide us once again. You might suppose that when it comes to body fitness, we are just talking about the individual body. After all, fitness happens only with one body at a time, right? Seeking fitness might seem lonely at the outset. But this simplistic notion that each person is on their own is just wrong.

There are several obvious ways to see how fitness is really a group matter. First off, fitness and health habits must be learned from more knowledgeable people, so fitness and healthy education is automatically social from the start. Furthermore, practical knowledge about human fitness and health has gradually accumulated over generations and millennia, tested against long human experience. Different cultures have constructed different technical practices for growing and maintaining healthy bodies, that is true. However, it is no surprise that comparison of worldwide healthy practices exposes a broad common foundation once unfamiliar terminology is translated and accounted for. After all, we are all members of the same species with highly similar muscular bodies and metabolisms. The ideal image of the fit and balanced body is not so different from culture to culture. Leonardo's Renaissance image of a standing "Vitruvian Man" resembles images of the seated figures in Kundalini Yoga illustrations. Weirdly divergent images of the "right" body – bloated or emaciated or tortured bodies – are fostered only by spiritual traditions forced to regard the physical body as irrelevant, accidental, or even evil.

III. A Basic Scheme for Ethical Mindfulness

The four components of maintaining and correcting moral fitness is the path of ethical mindfulness and ethical resolutions. Each component can be viewed as a stage in a process of ethical mindfulness. If done well, this ethical process can result in (fallible, correctible) ethical judgments about how to intelligently resolve moral situations. This is the overall process of ethical transformation: how are we intelligently improving our lives and our communities together.

For now, we can simplify ethics by distinguishing the healthy habits of ethical mindfulness from the active process of ethical intelligence. Ethical mindfulness has equally important components of good moral habits that intertwine and enfuse each other for maximum effectiveness. There are no priorities or stages among these moral habits of ethical mindfulness – they are all essential and harmoniously depend on each other. Ethical intelligence starts from robust ethical mindfulness and then sets itself to the task of positive improvement to moral situations for the good of the group and each member. Ethical intelligence suggests a plan of ethical investigation and action leading to a recommended resolution to some moral problem. This pattern of ethical intelligence shares a five-stage sequence of actions with the five-stage pattern of general scientific inquiry. This five-stage inquiry process is useful in both science and ethics: understanding the problem, collecting relevant information about what might be done, proposing hypothetical actions to resolve the problem, experimentally attempting one selected resolution, and comparing actual consequence against expectations to see if the problem is resolved.

Ethics is not a particular science alongside chemistry or geology. However, the general pattern of successful intelligent inquiry is common to all learning processes, from learning about how ecological or chemical systems work to learning about how social systems work. The payoff can be huge: thoughtfully understanding how a system is working can then set the mind free to propose changes to the system to make it work even better. We will explain the process of ethical intelligence after discussing the healthy habits of ethical mindfulness first.

The basic components of ethical mindfulness are each good moral habits. When done together in concert, ethical intelligence can emerge from this transformative process. We propose four moral habits essential to ethical mindfulness and intelligent ethical transformation. They are: inclusiveness, awareness, proactivity, and advancement.

INCLUSIVENESS

– morality lives at a group level, in the interpersonal relations, so morality should be inclusive – ignoring interpersonal relations lets the moral life slip from view
– morality is not about competition or “winning” – the point of morality is to promote productive cooperation in social relationships
– human morality is not a “zero-sum game” where my winning must imply your losing out – morality is a “nonzero positive game” that increases everyone’s winning simultaneously, because cooperation produces extra benefits for all
– morality is not necessarily putting the group first over each person’s own interests – rather, morality promotes the well-being of all members working together, so group achievement at the price of one’s person’s suffering is automatically immoral
– it makes little sense to think that you could be “the one moral person” in a group, since only relationships can be moral or not, not lone individuals
– the moral person conducts themselves in moral relationships with others – any promoting of exclusiveness or “me-firstness” is abandoning the moral life
– communication skills promoting inclusiveness uses language that emphasizes all members, and the group and its well-being
– words such as “we”, “our”, and “let’s” helps people feel included

AWARENESS

– willingness to notice and take seriously emerging moral situation – be a person sensitive to moral problems as soon as possible, be proactively attentive to the moral atmosphere and climate around you
– mindful attention to available information before judging anything – suspend fast gut reaction, swift emotive decision, or verdicts of right or wrong, and don’t try to make your own position the loudest or most important
– listen and watch with receptivity – try to appreciate another person’s stance, ask questions, share perspective, be sympathetic, get the full story from all sides, focus on what is happening right now
– notice your own prejudices, your own temptations to perceive the situation in one slanted way – try to keep judgment suspended for as long as possible while getting the facts straight, don’t get defensive or argumentative
– avoid negative labeling or stereotyping of the facts or of people – don’t assume bad motives, bad intentions, evil characters
– communication skills promoting awareness uses language that draws attention to the present situation and its dynamic aspects now – don’t dwell on past things that can’t be changed or rigid judgments on matters

PROACVITIVITY

– proactive commitment to taking some positive action today about the situation, even if incomplete or imperfect – we can keep learning more about the situation and keep working on it tomorrow, too
– goal is not to hide, ignore, or distract away from the situation – we will be doing several things to try to resolve the situation together
– everyone in the situation should be involved to some degree – no single person should take all the responsibility for deciding and implementing an action
– situations are fluid and dynamic, so our proactive response must be like that too – stay focused on concrete specific actions that can help sort things out and suggest possible ways to manage the situation
– lots of respectful feedback loops are put in place – factual questions that need answering, perspectives that need correction, preliminary judgments that need testing
– communication skills promoting

ADVANCEMENT

– focusing on the current progress of improvement, from where you are right now – rather than fixating on some distant goal or on comparing your place with someone else's
– ideals can give direction and end-goal purposes to the journey – but thinking too much about completion or perfection makes it hard to enjoy today's small steps of achievement and satisfaction
– don't let others dictate your standards of success – there is no single standard of ethical perfection for everyone
– lasting satisfaction comes through setting daily goals and meeting them gradually – without that daily feeling of satisfaction, positive reinforcement is very difficult to attain

V. Personal Ethics and Social Ethics

Any ethical theory has two related aspects to deal with: how people should relate to each other, and how people can live meaningful lives.

It should be difficult to entirely separate the social ethics of relationships from the personal ethics of meaningful lives. The expression of a person's ethos in the social world can be called one's personal "character." People can share a common ethos; for example, humanism is an ethos highly suitable for many people living together. Humanists to some extent will express a core character, while remaining quite distinct persons. It is just as natural for people to share a way of life as it is for them to be unique. Balancing community with individuality is a distinctly human problem, a problem that one's ethos is designed to resolve as best it can. Among one's fundamental values are the priorities assigned to one's self and to others. These set priorities steady us as we navigate the pull of many duties we have to others because of our social relationships. Balancing obligations to others with obligations to ourselves is a primary job of one's ethos. How we maintain our balance is an expression of our own character. Character is personal in one sense since each person has their own character, but character is more essentially social because our character controls our social lives. We are naturally social beings, so our character is naturally who we are. It is no paradox to correctly say that peoples' unique personal characters are the most important social thing about them.

Although everyone must have some sort of steadying general ethos and specific character, no two people could be identical, since no two people would have identical social relationships. But no one needs to feel completely on their own, as if they had to reinvent ethics all over again. After all, we are all human. There is common ground for most everyone's ethos, since we will get into typical social relationships in the course of a lifetime. As we enter into social relationships, we accordingly fulfill the obligations inherent in those roles. When we are in a particular social relationship, we somehow prioritize our duty to meet those obligations. We might not prioritize our duty well, and we may occasionally forget to do our duty, but we do have it nonetheless for as long as we are in that social relationship. It is impossible to sustain a social relationship without somehow prioritizing its inherent duty – relationships and their duties are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. Put another way, if you dismiss a relationship's duty entirely, you are effectively abandoning that social relationship, and others will soon notice this new change. Playing a social role is not unlike playing a theatrical role in a play – if you want to play the role of Hamlet, you can creatively pace the stage but you must at least speak Hamlet's lines. If you speak other lines instead, you are not Hamlet anymore. If you can't handle the basic obligations of a social relationship, you abandon your duty and abandon that relationship entirely.

There are some universal social roles: being a child of a parent and a parent of a child; being a friend and a neighbor; being a student and a teacher; being a member of a team; being a follower and being a leader. Everyone will play most of these social roles again and again. Since these social roles are universal for the human species, the responsibilities inherent in those roles are universal too. Every human culture uses these basic social relationships (and maybe a few more, but you get the idea). The primary obligations of each of these social roles are likewise universal across cultures, and so the duties inherent to these roles are universal too. Once you understand what it means to be a parent, you could serve as a parent in any human culture. If you were abruptly transported through space or time and thrown into the role of a parent, you already basically know what to do, even if linguistic or cultural differences present big obstacles. Suppose you woke up and found yourself in a Mongolian tribe about 15,000 BCE. You would pick up a little language and engage in some social roles (very poorly at first, of course) and you would manage to get along. It's no surprise – you are human. You know how basic social roles work, and you can arrange your own prioritization of your duties. With much effort, you would eventually fit into the community.

We all use an ethos, and we develop a character. While developing a character seems easy because we all must do it, maintaining and growing our character is the humanly hard part. There are so many social relationships to manage, all at the same time. Even though we may be comfortable with our prioritization of current relationships, each day brings fresh challenges. Fulfilling our duties to many people in the course of a day requires constant negotiation and renegotiation. We are called to our obligations (for example) as a parent, as a friend, as an employee, and as a citizen more or less simultaneously. Do I exceed the driving speed limit so that I can make an appointment with my friend for lunch before I have to return to work so that I can complete my work assignment in time for then going home to pick up my child in time to see the promised movie at the theater? Is there some alternative way to satisfy all these obligations? And what happens if I add new relationships?

No general philosophy, not even humanism, can answer such specific questions. Fortunately, we don't have to resort to high-level philosophical reflection here at the mundane level. Managing daily obligations is assisted by the moral rules and virtues taught by society; these practical tools can helpfully guide our daily decisions. Indeed, for most of us, our habitual morality and virtue does most of the work dealing with social relationships without too many acute crises of indecisive paralysis. That's the purpose of moralities: practical guidance for managing social obligations. Some moral rules and virtues negatively tell us what not to do; others positively recommend what we should be doing. All that morality and virtue is a kind of practice, developed in the long human experience of sustaining communities.

Our habitual fulfillment of social morality and the social virtues are a major part of our character, what we can call our "moral character." Children develop a capacity for moral character soon after they acquire facility with social relationships. Guidance from adults about applying morality to specific daily activities and interactions develops this moral character in youth. The social fact that almost all adults in a society are capable of moral conduct (even though some willfully choose otherwise) yield our general observation that a culture exemplifies basic moral expectations. Morality is an essential aspect of culture, and variations in morality across cultures are naturally to be expected. The reason why it is not difficult to discern a common core of basic morality across nearly all cultures is because societies must supply practical guidance for sustaining the social relationships that together compose communities.

Endless variations on lists of basic moral rules and virtues can be generated. An admirable example, just for illustration, is Paul Kurtz's composition of what he calls the "Common Moral Decencies."

> Personal Integrity: telling the truth, being sincere, keeping promises, being honest.
>
> Trustworthiness: loyal, dependable, reliable, responsible.
>
> Benevolence: goodwill, lack of malice (do not harm other persons; do not kill or rob, inflict injury, be cruel or vengeful); in sexual relations: mutual consent (between adults only); beneficent: sympathetic and compassionate, lend a helping hand, contribute positively to the welfare of others.
>
> Fairness: accountability, gratitude, justice (equality), tolerance of others, cooperation, negotiate differences peacefully, without hatred or violence.

It is unnecessary to wonder what important moral rules or virtues are omitted from such a list. With only a little imagination we could quickly double this enumeration. We might even imagine a more statistically impressive effort to gather thousands

of lists, of twenty or so most important rules and virtues, those taught to children and expected from adults, from one hundred cultures spread around the world. After due adjustment for translating all these lists into the same language, merging close synonyms, and eliminating obvious duplication, is it really quite improbable that a core of common morals, not unlike Kurtz's list, will emerge? On the contrary – a quickly recognizable core is inevitable, and cultural studies confirm this in a wide range of ways. Extreme relativism about common morals around the world is factually false. We are all human and live in human communities, after all.

VI. Character and Ethics

The character of adults contains more than just moral character, and we have already indicated why. Following the common morality and virtues only resolves so many daily problems. Difficult moral problems arise when we find ourselves in situations where it is practically impossible to meet continual obligations; where we think we should abandon a social relationship; and where we start new social relationships that require diminishing the importance of other social relationships. One's moral character is evidently inadequate, but it isn't your fault. Ordinary morality and the basic virtues no longer serve as good tools in these serious situations, because they are not designed for them. Common morals serve the maintenance of stable social relationships; they fail as soon as major instabilities arise. Failure is signaled in obvious ways: consulting morals only yields contradictory rules that can't both be obeyed; trying to be virtuous towards two people only makes the situation worse; adding a new relationship strains an old relationship to the breaking point. The stinging guilt of feeling immoral, and having others judge your immorality, only means that your situation has transcended ordinary morality.

Fortunately, long practical experience supplies culture with advanced tools to handle moral crises. We can define ethics as the thoughtful effort to modify social relationships. Just as morality itself is a basic practice for managing many social obligations, ethics is the higher-level practice of managing complex social relationships. The two primary aspects of ethics, social ethics and personal ethics, now makes more sense. Social ethics is the activity of ethics viewed from the perspective of society, emphasizing how your conduct is affecting the welfare of the whole community. Personal ethics is the activity of ethics viewed from your personal perspective, emphasizing how your conduct is affecting your own achievement of a meaningful life.

Ethics would become severely dysfunctional if social and personal ethics collapsed together, or if social and personal ethics diverged completely. Collapsing social and personal ethics would mean that each person must embrace only those relationships deemed best for all society and must find highest personal fulfillment in the community's welfare. Separating social and personal ethics apart would mean that each person would form social relationships in complete disregard for the community welfare and must find highest personal fulfillment independently from community. Humans are neither like ants nor like angels. We must create and recreate our social relations, and hence ourselves, anew over time. This dynamic activity of ethical evolution is expected from adults. Anyone who remains in precisely all the same social relationships at the age of 60 that they had at age 20 would be quite a curiosity.

There is no simple prescription for deciding how to manage entry and exit from social relationships. Basic morals still apply, of course – try not to harm others or the community, for example. Some morals are so important that they get enshrined into law, so violating the law remains serious. The protection of minors, the protection of body and property, and other duties of citizenship cannot be ignored. But at the level of ethics, we are talking about the process of reevaluating social relationships entirely, which is a separate matter from mere morality or law. For example, ethics is the arena in which morals can be questioned and law can be judged to be unjust. Social ethics transcends morality because morality serves social relationships, and not the other way around. Social ethics transcends law because social ethics can recognize immoral laws, and law exists to serve the social welfare, not the other way around. Personal ethics is the highest court of all, but not because one's private ego should prevail over all other values. Far from it! We have already explained that any personal ethics divorced from social ethics is a dead-end. Rather, personal ethics is the highest court because each of us seeks meaningful lives. There is no such thing as "social meaning" or "social fulfillment" over and above the lives of each individual person. Either individual lives are meaningful and fulfilling, or nothing is. It remains a fact about humans that we achieve meaningful and fulfilling lives within social relationships, so personal ethics remains tightly connected with social ethics. If communities die, we all die. And if all individuals are flourishing, then communities are flourishing.

Because the destiny of communities is involved, ethics is central to sustaining entire communities. Obviously, any modification to one's social relations affects the others involved as well, so ethical reflection is automatically social, especially if we consult and forecast results together. Technically, ethics could be done entirely in private, but this would usually be

unwise, since predicting the future conduct of others is assisted by good communication and consultation. Of course, others can deceive us, but this is itself a moral problem to be handled by ethics, and not an insurmountable obstacle to doing ethics altogether. We are talking about social and personal ethics simultaneously, after all. All other things being equal, ethics done socially increases the odds of enhancing general social welfare. This common-sense notion would require another book to justify by philosophical standards, but humanism has already practically demonstrated it with the widespread practice of democracy. Democracy poses the central question of how people can figure out how to best live together.

We have returned full circle to the fundamental issue we first raised when announcing the project of a humanistic ethos. Balancing community with individuality is a distinctly human problem, a problem that one's ethos is designed to resolve as best it can. What ethical tools can culture provide to adults as the embark on this ethical journey? What all adults need are a basic set of ethical tools for evaluating one's general approach to social relationships. These ethical tools would look like a checklist of highest virtues, for judging the wisdom of reprioritizing, abandoning, or starting social relationships. One must hypothetically envision probable outcomes of the options. Will this course, or that course, permit me to exemplify as many ethical virtues as possible?

Again, Paul Kurtz's reflections on humanism exemplify a common approach to the kind of ethics needed. This is Kurtz's list of "Ethical Excellences":

Autonomy
Intelligence
Self-discipline
Self-respect
Creativity
High motivation
Affirmative attitude
Joie de vivre
Good health
Exuberance

It should be needless to cheerfully acknowledge the limitations of such a list. These excellences, like the earlier list of morals, could be expanded at will. However, these ten excellences, or some set much like them, naturally comprise a minimum set of capacities highly useful for pursuing the good life. What culture would unwisely recommend their opposites?

We should also notice that such ethical excellences are simultaneously social and personal – their contributions to social welfare and personal fulfillment are evident. On first glance, they can appear to be exclusively personal, as one might expect from an ethics of the highest court: the ethics of one's personal achievement. However, promoting these sorts of ethical excellences is precisely the recommended regimen for life's success in all things including one's social relationships and the welfare of one's community.

Autonomy is a primary ethical virtue for both social and personal ethics. Autonomy is a Greek term meaning "self-rule" and it stands for a person's capacity to control his or her own life. Autonomy is too often equated with mere freedom from interference, but it is a far broader concept than just liberty. Liberty frees a person from restraint by others, but mere liberty cannot produce autonomy. To control one's life, to take responsibility for one's life, a person must be able to direct her life towards meaningful and fulfilling purposes. Which purposes? That's for each person to decide of course, but what kinds of lives do people have to choose from? People trying to craft fulfilling lives independently from their societies won't have many options. Societies yield far more possibilities – individuality is more a creature of the city than the wilderness. Societies provide innumerable opportunities for creative pursuits, from one's livelihood to one's neighborhood, from the artistic and intellectual to playful and sporting, the opportunities are endless. The notion of "social autonomy" is not self-contradictory, but quite understandable. Freedom to choose from so many of society's possibilities, and the opportunity to creatively invent more possibilities with new social relationships, is the magnificent freedom of real choice.

Modern Ethical Theories: Kant's Deontology

Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is principally explained in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

We are taught morality by society, but society fills a person's will with many desires. We are taught to want to be good, but we are also taught to want many other things too.

It seems like we must balance our wants against each other, morality against other desires, as if we could sometimes trade being good for being happy in other ways. That is why we are tempted to be immoral, and we decide to be immoral occasionally. We maximize what we get out of life, and sometimes being selfish brings us more of what we want than wanting to do the right thing.

However, rationality can control our wills. The question is whether we will allow it to intelligently control our wills. We try to smart about fulfilling our wants. We want morality. We want others to be moral to us, because that is always convenient to each of us, and we think we deserve it. The problem is that everyone else also thinks that they should balance being moral against being happy, so that people are generally not very moral to us. We therefore live in a world where there isn't enough morality, and we sense this, but we don't know what to do about it. Can reasoning help now?

Our individual practical reasoning leaves us in this immoral world. The problem is therefore individuality. We each think that we are controlled by our desires and that we are on our own figuring out what to do for our own good. However, Reason is not individual – it is universal and identical for any creature capable of any rationality. Reason must be the key. However, the will must align itself with Reason, not personal benefit for gaining personal good. Therefore the morally good will must try to ignore personal desires and the goods we want to obtain, and instead try to be good for morality's sake. We don't know exactly how to do that yet, but a good will only feels a duty to be morally good.

"A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because its volition, that is, it is good in itself" (p. 10 – 4:394)

Furthermore, a good will cannot be entirely controlled by mere psychological causes, like drives, intuitions, desires, needs, and so on – and Kant would not accept that the will is necessarily controlled by the material processes of the brain.

Materialism would destroy freedom and the good will, and would deny the reality of Reason, so it is impossible for a good person who believes in morality to agree with materialism. Materialists cannot really think that there is moral responsibility anywhere, and probably accept determinism too. People who are committed to morality must therefore be committed to dualism and the reality of Reason.

A good will must be able to control itself with the assistance of Reason. In fact, a good will must commit to Reason as its sole guide. Still, a person's will must decide to act from some specific reason or another.

We act from maxims (what we also call intentions, or plans). A maxim has three parts:

(a) it starts with "I should ___;

(b) it next proposes an action to do; and

(c) it finally indicates some intended result from the action as a reason for doing this action.

EXAMPLE OF A MAXIM: "I should tell a lie to my friend in order to prevent the truth from hurting my friend's feelings.

NOT A MAXIM: "Telling a lie is a way to keep your friends happy."

In our ordinary practical reasoning, after we decide to act on an immoral action, we can always justify our immoral maxim by thinking, "This is best for me," or "This is really necessary for me." We rationalize an immoral action by thinking about ourselves and prioritizing ourselves. That is why we are controlled by our desires. A good will never does this.

A good will must do the opposite – it cannot involve any particular person at all, not even ourselves, in a decision to act. What does it mean for a maxim to not involve any particular person? It means that the maxim must potentially be about anyone at all doing that action for that reason.

Selfish maxim: "I should steal that person's wallet in order to keep the money in it, and that's OK because I like having that money in my wallet."

To make a Maxim anonymous, replace "I" with "Anyone" or "Everyone", and then remove any other words that specifically involve just you.

Anonymous maxim: "Anyone should steal somebody's wallet in order to possess the money in it (including my own wallet)."

A good will obeys Reason, and Reason requires consistency, not contradiction and counterexample. Therefore, a good will cannot act on a selfish maxim if it cannot act on the anonymous version of it. It cannot act on the anonymous version if it requires a contradiction or expects a counterexample.

In the case of keeping a wallet's money, that anonymous maxim contains a contradiction: No person would be able to keep possession of money (the reason) where everyone is allowed to steal it (the action). Specifically, a person cannot both (a) expect to be able to take another person's property, while (b) keeping her own property. After all, thieves hate getting their own property stolen. That's an inconsistency (and hypocrisy). The only way to avoid the inconsistency is to act on the opposite maxim:

Moral maxim: "I should protect that person's property."

This moral maxim can be consistently followed, because the anonymous version:

"Everyone should protect everyone else's property" requires no inconsistencies or counterexamples.

In general, the good will always follows this supreme Rule:

"I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." (p. 17 – 4:402)

This is the Categorical Imperative, and is the way that impartial Reason informs the good will what its duty is, by telling it which maxims are truly morally good.

Here is another example.

Selfish maxim: "I should avoid helping that lost and suffering person because helping would cost me resources such as time and energy, and my resources are way more important."

Anonymous maxim: "Anyone can avoid helping lost and suffering people (including me if I'm lost and suffering)."

The anonymous maxim is not something that person could will to be true, since each person expects some help when they are lost and suffering. After all, each person regards their time and energy as very important, especially when one has the bad luck to have so few resources. Indeed, each person wants to be the counterexample to the anonymous maxim – a person expects help from others when in serious need. But that is irrational. The opposite maxim can pass the test of Reason:

Moral maxim: "I should help people when they are lost and suffering."

So far, we can use the Categorical Imperative to understand how each person expects to be treated morally, while selfish maxims make a person think that he or she can be the exceptional counterexample. Reason cannot approve. This means that Reason only approves a situation where each person expects to be treated morally and treats each other person morally, too. In that situation, every person treats every person morally. That situation is one where no person acts on maxims which

selfishly exploit others for personal benefit. In other words, that situation is one where each person treats others as people who are worth moral respect and dignity, instead of merely using them for selfish goals.

The Formula of Humanity therefore follows from the Categorical Imperative:

"So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (p. 41 - 4:429)

Translation: Each person deserves to be treated as possessing inherent self-worth, as something infinitely more valuable than anything else people happen to want.

What about all the important maxims that pass the categorical imperative test? They are the core of morality because they are Laws which each good person would be committed to. These Laws are the basis for Human Rights, which are possessed by each person simply because they are persons. Taken together, these Laws upholding Human Rights form the Kingdom of Ends. The Kingdom of Ends follows from the Formula of Humanity:

"For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat itself and all others never merely as means, but always at the same time as an end in itself. But by this there arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e. a kingdom, which -- because what these laws have as their purpose is precisely the reference of these beings to one another, as ends and means -- can be called a kingdom of ends (of course only an ideal)." (p. 45 – 4:433)

Translation: Each moral person wants to live under the same basic Law protecting all people's self-worth equally.

Furthermore, this basic Law isn't something laid down from Heaven or dictated by some ruler or philosopher: each person can understand and obey their own Reason, which is free, and therefore the decision to obey the Kingdom of Ends is freely chosen by each person. That freedom to decide what Law to accept is called "autonomy" – Autonomy is the ability to decide what Laws have to be obeyed – and therefore each person literally makes the Law for themselves.

Fortunately, the free use of Reason guides each person to apply the categorical imperative, which in turn justifies the same set of Human Rights every time. The Law in the Kingdom of Ends is always the same for each person, even though each person freely commits to obeying that Law. A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is also itself subject to these laws. One belongs to it as sovereign when, as lawgiving, one is not subject to the will of any other. (See p. 45 - 4:433)

SUMMARY

The Categorical Imperative: Act only on those maxims which can be consistently universalized.

The Formula of Humanity: Take only those actions that maintain respect for the self-worth of others.

The Kingdom of Ends: Act only on those maxims that you would make Law for everyone.

Modern Ethical Theories: Mill's Utilitarianism

There have been two main ethical theories in the West since 1800:

Kantian Ethics: The ethical thing to do is what passes the Categorical Imperative test: it is moral to do it IF everyone can also do it too without contradiction. The ethical Law for society is a Law that passes the Categorical Imperative test.

Utilitarianism: The ethical thing to do is the action that contributes to happiness, in the long run (not just short-term pleasure). The ethical Law for society is a Law that creates the most happiness for the most people.

Why is Utilitarianism helpful? Consider this situation:

You are a Commissioner on the County Board, elected to decide how county tax money shall be spent. The county can make one big expenditure, on a new building, during the next ten years. Your county needs a new middle school for the kids, and a new jail for the prisoners. The old jail is falling apart, and probably has big security problems. The old school is falling apart, and probably is getting unsafe for the children in it. Problem: You can't build both. They cost the same amount of money. You can only pick one.

Suppose you and the other nine Commissioners vote – it's a tie between the school and the jail. Then you say, Let's use Kant's categorical Imperative test! The problem is that "Our County should build a school for the kids" and "Our County should build a jail for the prisoners" can BOTH pass Kant's test. Every county should have schools, and every county needs a jail. There's no inconsistency with a County having these buildings and every County also having them too.

BUT, right now, your county can only have one. And you must decide which to build first. Kant is NO HELP. Sure, an idealist would say "We must have both!" That's no help. Yes, our county needs both, and we will only have one for a while – which one first?

Utilitarianism is designed to help with this problem. Using utilitarianism, we can ask, "Which building will make the most people the most happy, if it gets built?"

Now, Utilitarianism can make even bigger decisions. Consider this chain of reasoning, from Mill:

1. What is moral is what improves happiness the most for the most people.

2. Greater morality => greater happiness.

3. Greater happiness => greater morality

4. The cultural advancement and social progress of a country is an excellent sign of that country's overall happiness.

5. So, Greater cultural advancement and social progress equates with greater morality.

6. Cultural advancement and social progress can be objectively measured. For example, measure a country's economic wealth, its crime rates, its poverty levels, and how long people typically live there.

7. Because greater morality is associated with greater cultural advancement and social progress, we can measure how moral a country is.

8. Therefore, The most moral countries are the ones who objectively display greater cultural advancement and social progress.

We could, if we had the data, rank countries from the most moral to the least moral. Which countries would you think might be ranked very highly in this way? The United States? Might any country rank even higher? Check statistics – there are countries that do even better than the US on those objective measurements.

Mill used Utilitarianism to rank England – his England of the mid-1800s – at #1. After all, the British Empire was the most economically advanced, the most culturally advanced (in his view), and produced the most happiness for its citizens. Mill also thought that England still needed to do much better (he advocated for reforms such as women's suffrage). Still, England was better than all other countries – objectively better.

Once there is an "objective" ranking of countries available, Utilitarianism can be used to justify allowing the "more moral" countries to interfere with the "less moral" countries. That justification was very convenient for the British Empire, which needed to control many colonies all around the world. Could that control be ethically justified?

Here is how many intellectuals back in Mill's day did justify that empire control:

• The more moral a country is, the greater its duty to help make the rest of the world more moral, too.

• A highly moral country already knows how to make less moral countries more moral: make those lesser countries more like themselves!

• Therefore, a highly moral country has a duty to interfere and control a less moral country – it must try to change its government, its laws, its traditions, and its customs. Obviously, those local ways of doing things are less moral, anyways.

Finally, a highly moral country, like England, has done its ethical duty when that less fortunate country becomes very similar to England. In a later way of speaking, that less fortunate country gets "Westernized." This process is also known as **Colonialism**.

Recently, it also takes the form of **Globalization**. Utilitarianism can be used to justify Colonialism and Globalization. The world's superpowers (obviously, the most moral too, according to Utilitarianism) manipulate smaller and weaker countries to eliminate local culture and tradition, and make the world look more and more like the superpowers.

Is there a way to prevent Colonialism and Globalization, and protect the rights of local cultures and peoples? We next examine the ethical theory of **Cosmopolitanism**.

Modern Ethical Theories: Appiah's Cosmopolitanism

Is there a way to prevent Colonialism and Globalization, and protect the rights of local cultures and peoples? We next examine Cosmopolitanism.

The impasse between Kant's Ethics and Utilitarianism is serious. Kant's ethics supports Human Rights. Human Rights are individual – each person has them because they are persons. Human Rights are also universal – every person alive has the same rights. If a Law would be part of the Kingdom of Ends, and that Law is of high importance, then it provides a human right. For example: the right to life, and the right to liberty. As for Utilitarianism, it can (sort of) support human rights, but any proposed right must pass the utilitarian test.

Cosmopolitanism is inspired by Cultural Pluralism. Appiah stands against the idea that cultures can be compared so easily in order to rank them according to how socially "advanced" they are. Ranking cultures, and upholding just the rights from a single powerful country, is actually a threat to many peoples and their cultures around the world. Appiah asks the question, Can race continue to be a category helping to identify ethnic heritages which deserve to be protected from assimilation into western cultures? He isn't so sure. To get a background picture of his hesitancy, we need to explore the concept of multiculturalism in the next section.

Appiah recommends COSMOPOLITANISM. This is the combination of three principles:

1. Each individual is a part of a cultural heritage, which ought to be respected (unless that culture is dreadful or disintegrating).

2. Each individual has rights because they are persons (human rights) and they can have extra rights as members of a cultural group that needs protection from assimilation by another culture.

3. A crucial right each individual keeps is the freedom to leave one cultural group to join another, or to blend cultural groups. No Group can force an individual to remain a member.

The Socio-cultural theory of Multiculturalism

WEB Du Bois was one of the greatest intellectuals of African heritage in America during the 20th century. Here is Du Bois's definition of the term "race":

"What, then, is a race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life." (Du Bois 1897)

Du Bois's definition of race might equally well be used to briefly define a "culture" or even a "civilization". Such a broad definition can serve a narrow practical goal: a vast multitude can find common bonds of both past history and future potential. Du Bois then went on to speak of the "souls of black folk" which aspire to spiritual and cultural achievements, making a valuable contribution as "a co-worker in the kingdom of culture." Du Bois continues:

"The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, — this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face." (Du Bois 1903, 4)

When Du Bois appeals to terms such as "race" and "soul" and "blood" it can sound something like the racial essentialism refuted by biological fact. Yet Du Bois is not rooting the needed commonality in any actual organic fact, but rather the social realm of shared experience over generations. That shared experience is multi-faceted and multi-perspectival, a genuine plurality having numerous interconnections but no pure core.

This kind of cultural pluralism that inspired Du Bois's thought is heard in Appiah today. The ethos of cultural pluralism translates into the pragmatic politics of a pluralistic democracy. This pluralistic democracy is not any sort of simplistic "multi"-culturalism, as if a democratic society is decomposable into distinct subgroups having no overlap and little in common with each other. The logic of cultural pluralism is not predicated on any deep essential commonality within every member of a group – rather, the people themselves, in their choices of social interactions and sharing experiences, create and compose a group. Because people are busily choosing their social interactions, within prevailing conditions of opportunity, there is no definite cultural boundary at the thin edges where overlap with other groups dominates, and any thick central aspect only constantly shifts over time.

Can a mass of people having only diverse plural interrelationships over time sustain the sort of social solidarity and force needed for democratic activism? It can seem much easier to assume a cultural essentialism grounding a group. Even if the biological essentialism of racism couldn't get confirmed by science, maybe cultural essentialism could be the right approach. However, cultural essentialism is internally self-contradictory, by promising greater power at the price of sacrificing freedom. This trade-off runs counter to the basic principles of democracy, which promise greater power through greater freedom.

Cultural essentialism differs from cultural pluralism by restricting a group's membership to only those who entirely participate in exclusively one culture. Multiculturalism is notoriously torn between two rival versions, two logically extreme versions: a multiculturalism of mutually exclusive groups contained like marbles within one jar of society, or a multiculturalism of partially interpenetrating, overlapping, and constantly shifting groups composing society. The choice between an essentialist multiculturalism or a diffuse multiculturalism is not merely a theoretical choice between abstract visions of pluralism. The practical choice, the political choice, can be determined in favor of essentialist multiculturalism because it can supply strong, stable, and strident political strength for a group, if the group will pull together. Yet logic is not desire. What motivates a multitude, a potential group, to pull together and to unite under a single culture?

Even Du Bois got caught up in this dilemma of presumed motivation after World War II. He urgently called for the solidarity of black pride even while he was forced to recognize that too many successful educated blacks were not motivated to radically challenge the economic and social status quo. As Tommie Shelby explains in his recent book We Who Are Dark, Du Bois illustrates how there is an automatic tension between calling for racial pride in everything that people of black heritage have done and the way that many middle-class blacks have taken greater pride in their integration with white America. (Shelby 2005, 94-98)

If the genuine black community can only exist in terms of confrontation with the worst effects of racism, then those "elite" blacks who are either not suffering enough or actually prospering in white America are not genuinely black and lose their right to speak or act for the black community. As racism and segregation moderates for some blacks, the number of blacks therefore decreases, and if racism ever subsides entirely, on this logic, there will no longer be any black people in America. In the face of possible extinction, essentialism dogmatically emphasizes the unrelenting peril of harsh racism and rigidly defines who is necessarily a group member, tempting cultural essentialism to mutate back into segregationalism, nationalism, militancy, and even biological racism again.

This is the first paradox of essentialist power: any actual success in moderating racism only diminishes and weakens the group. It remains a social fact that a group's magnitude and strength must naturally be proportional to the actual dedicated energy of its constituent members. For cultural essentialism, people get categorized first and their presumed dedication and energy to their assigned group are assumed to automatically follow. However, there is no psychological or sociological warrant for this way of thinking, and perhaps little political justification anymore either, as Tommie Shelby suspects. The second paradox of essentialist power has also been so widely noticed that we only need to mention it here: people within essentialist cultural groups are expected to be so tightly bound to that culture's one way of life that freedoms to communicate and associate with other groups are strictly limited or even forbidden. The strength of the essentialist group is inversely proportional, in theory, to the personal liberties of its members; the stronger the group, the weaker any individual member.

There is a different understanding of social forces, a pragmatist understanding of the strength of unifying and unified social groups, that does not result in these twin essentialist paradoxes. This pragmatist understanding of social force does not dictate to people who they really must be, but only reminds people of who they are freely trying to be. If there is black

power, for example, it exists in the lives of actual blacks living their lives in America. We have heard Du Bois's eloquent call for American blacks to forge better and truer selves in the lived experience of shared opportunity.

Another prominent African American thinker was Alain Locke, the Howard University philosopher who also studied at Harvard with William James and Josiah Royce. He regarded race as a social definition and viewed culture as something created anew in experience. Locke states that "We must consider race not in the fascist, blood-clan sense, which also is tribal and fetishist, but consider race as a common culture and brotherhood." (Harris 1989, 197-198)

For Locke, like Du Bois, any genuinely pluralistic society must be composed of pluralistic individuals – pluralism and diversity must go all the way down to psychology and motivation. Locke's celebration of The New Negro in 1925 proceeds from this sort of diffuse pluralism, as does his 1942 essay "Who and What is Negro?" in which he says,

"There is, in brief, no "The Negro." More and more, even as we stress the right of the mass Negro to his important place in the picture, artistically and sociologically, we must become aware of the class structure of the Negro population, and expect to see, hear and understand the intellectual elite, the black bourgeoisie as well as the black masses. To this common stratification is added in the Negro's case internal splits resulting from differential response to particular racial stresses and strains, divergent loyalties which, in my judgment, constitute racial distinctiveness, not by some magic of inheritance but through some very obvious environmental conditionings. For just as we have, for comparative example, the orthodox and the assimilate, the Zionist and anti-Zionist Jew, so in Negro life we have on practically all of these levels, the conformist and the non-conformist strains, – the conformist elite and the racialist elite, the lily-white and the race-patriotic bourgeois, the folk and the ghetto peasant and the emerging Negro proletarian. Each is a significant segment of Negro life..." (Harris 1989, 210-211)

If yet another first-rank intellectual should be called forth in support of diffuse multiculturalism, we may invoke Martin Luther King, Jr. King was also steeped in the Hegelian and pragmatic pluralism of the Boston personalists (see Deats and Robb 1986), and he borrowed the phrase "Beloved Community" from Royce. In Stride Toward Freedom King says that Hegel's analysis of the dialectical process taught him that "Growth comes through struggle." In his book *Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos Or Community?* we read King writing,

"The Negro is the child of two cultures—Africa and America. The problem is that in the search for wholeness all too many Negroes seek to embrace only one side of their natures. Some, seeking to reject their heritage, are ashamed of their color, ashamed of black art and music, and determine what is beautiful and good by the standards of white society. They end up frustrated and without cultural roots. Others seek to reject everything American and to identify totally with Africa, even to the point of wearing African clothes. But this approach leads also to frustration because the American Negro is not an African. The old Hegelian synthesis still offers the best answer to many of life's dilemmas. The American Negro is neither totally African nor totally western. He is Afro-American, a true hybrid, a combination of two cultures." (King 1967)

The Hegelian synthesis mentioned by King is a social synthesis of strength through shared experience.

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Cosmopolitanism: Appiah on Group Rights

Examples of Group Rights:

In Quebec, Canada, the official language is French – everyone is taught French, all public business is conducted in French, and all businesses must do business in French. If you are a native, all you see is your own native language (French) and you have no worries that your grandchildren won't be able to just as French in the cultural heritage.

In America, the Old Order Amish have the right to keep their children out of high school and keep them on the farms, so the kids can stay content and happy being Amish, and they can keep the Amish way of life going for another generation.

There are pros and cons to Group Rights, as they try to protect persons from cultural disintegration or assimilation.

The PROS

- Group rights prevent other cultures from overriding or eradicating the cultural traditions of the group which allow it to survive.
- Group rights serve to keep generation after generation of people within their cultural heritage.
- Group rights help to prevent the gradual assimilation of group members into some other culture.

The PRICES

- It is necessary to carefully define the Group so everyone knows what it is.
- There must be an "essence" to the Group – cultural ways and ways of thinking that every member of the Group do the same way all the time.
- There can be no blending of Groups – One person, One group. No one can be in two groups at the same time.

The CONS

- Groups are constantly focused on maintaining boundaries – Which people are in the Group, and who isn't really in the group.
- Groups tell individuals what their genuine identity really is – no one has a personal identity by choice, but only a social identity given by membership.
- Groups forbid changing cultural ways and ways of thinking – there can be no change to the social identity, which means that members can't change their lifestyle of ways of thinking much at all.

In his book, Appiah emphasizes these points about culture:

I. Each culture borrows and shares its ways and its values across borders. There is really no such thing as a "pure" and unchanging culture.

II. Every culture changes over time anyways, no matter how hard people try to prevent change. Why is doing things the same way for centuries so great an accomplishment?

III. Any culture claiming greatness is welcome to do so, so long as it admits how its greatness has partially come from creating new ideas and traditions by adopting and adapting things from other neighboring cultures. Greatness is Creative, not Static.

But all that great creative change only can happen because individuals can be creative. They cannot feel stuck and trapped within a group's traditions. They must have freedom of travel, and freedom of thought, to explore and borrow and adapt and create.

Appiah concludes that COSMOPOLITANISM is the wise philosophical compromise between individual rights and group rights.

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Professionalism, Scientific Integrity, and Research Ethics

The Profession

1. Expertise. Members of a Profession possess specialized expertise, comprehending an area of knowledge and its informed practices, which enables them to best assist those in need of that expertise.

2. Membership. A Profession has a well-defined membership, who mutually recognize each other as full members for mastering the Profession's expertise, and take joint responsibility for improving and extending their Profession's expertise.

Criteria 1 and 2 must be jointly satisfied, as only one unified body of knowledge, to which all members are mutually committed, is professed and practiced by a Profession. Genuine knowledge is unifying; opinion and ignorance only multiplies. Members will pursue specialties and modest disagreements are expected, but dissent among practitioners over core matters indicates that they do not compose a Profession.

Because the acquisition and practice of a Profession's expertise requires a long period of devoted effort, most adults can only join one Profession in their lifetime. For example, few people become both lawyers and doctors; even fewer have careers practicing two Professions simultaneously. Education towards a Profession is rigorous, and a career in service is strenuous.

3. Education. A Profession has exclusive internal control over the instruction and training towards its expertise, the access to that education, the assessment of students reaching levels of competence, and the recognition of mastery entitling membership in the Profession.

4. Service. A Profession manages how its expertise is made available, by determining who can benefit from it, deciding how expertise is properly applied for each beneficiary, and prioritizing the recipient's best interests.

Criteria 3 and 4 orient the Profession to its responsibilities for making its knowledge accessible and available. Expertise should expand, and nurture others. A Profession's experts are committed to developing even better experts in the generation after them, and ensuring that the Profession's expertise is only utilized for what it is best designed to do. Experts successfully advancing these goals are recognized for this leadership, and formal roles can emerge, bestowing special privileges and duties on recognized leaders in the Profession.

Because a Profession's knowledgeable expertise is relatively scarce, recipients in need cannot assess how it is provided nor can they evaluate its worth, so recipients are placed in a dependency relationship with experts. That one-sided need and dependency establishes special responsibilities on a Profession to prioritize beneficence and protection. The educator must fulfill moral duties to students; the provider must fulfill moral duties to those served.

5. Sacrifice. A member teaches and utilizes expertise approved by the Profession, in a manner meeting each recipient's actual needs, and not whatever someone thinks that they want, or how much someone can afford to pay.

6. Ethics. A Profession promulgates its own standards of expertise, proper instruction, best practices, and dutiful service (beyond mere legality), and it enforces its standards upon violators with publicized sanctions or revocation of membership.

Criteria 5 and 6 most visibly distinguish a Profession from those making money from a craft or a trade, those earning wages in an industrial, service, or managerial job, and from those profiting by owning a business.

Sacrifice and ethics dramatically reduce competition among a Profession's members and impose a high degree of conformity when dealing with others. There are high incentives and low barriers outside the Professions to promise clients kinds of service different from what rivals offer, and to entice clients by pandering to their desires without worrying much about ethics. Earning as much as possible as quickly as possible (legally), is a sensible approach for ambitious people selling their labor or operating a business, so tough competition among laborers and businesses is inevitable.

By contrast, experts in a Profession do not have to hustle for clients (although advertising helps) because clients seek them, expecting the best care and trusting the Profession's standardized service. However, that conformity and standardization means that experts typically earn less over time than what could be earned if they only served the highest bidders. The difference between earning a wage and accepting a salary is an illustration of this economic sacrifice.

Criteria 1-6 are jointly necessary and sufficient for a Profession's existence. Professional leadership, as they guide a Profession's efforts to continually satisfy these criteria, usually additionally organize formalized structures. Few Professions lack societies, institutions, and ethical codes.

> Professional Societies. Although the membership of a Profession is first determined by its certification of expertise and mastery, a secondary kind of membership in a professional society can make one's professional work more visible, efficient, and influential. A professional Society (by whatever label of 'society', 'association', 'institute' and so forth) can regularize and enforce the Profession's expectations about standard expertise, best practices, educational methods, and ethical priorities.
>
> Professional Institutions. A Profession participates in educational institutions for instruction and training in that Profession's expertise. An educational institution may exclusively serve a single Profession, such as a theological seminary, a medical college, or a law school. More commonly, multi-professional institutions efficiently cooperate within a "university", that additionally offers a common arts and sciences preparation (in a 'major' discipline) prior to admittance into post-graduate study in a professional field.
>
> Professional Codes of Ethics. Each Profession promulgates a practical understanding of ethical conduct in its satisfaction of criteria 4, 5, and 6. Beyond treating all people with moral respect, a Profession tacitly upholds an ethical approach to serving others' best interests. However, the explicit formulation of ethical priorities, that addresses typical ethical concerns arising in the course of professional service, can powerfully elevate compliance. An ethical code, like a legal code, is more substantial and enforceable for all members.

A professional society may form before the Profession itself is fully in existence, as a group of expert leaders forge standards of expertise and service that mark the performance of those worthy to be in the new Profession. professional societies can also apply their collective intelligence and energy in attempts to influence public attitudes, policy application, and political attention. Governments for their part do pay attention to well-organized and persuasive professional societies. Cooperation between Professions and government can be mutually beneficial, although antagonism can occasionally arise as well.

Many Professions develop explicit legal relationships with governments. A government can recognize and support a Profession's worthy service to society by preventing non-members from masquerading as members, and protecting a Profession's internal regulation of its membership. Going further, a government can materially support the service of a Profession widely across society.

7. Autonomy. With authorization from a government, supplying legal protections and monopolies, a Profession can exercise control over its membership, education, application of expertise, and internal sanctions without undue interference from criminal or civil complaints.

8. Privilege. With endorsements from a government, instructing its agencies and the public to recognize a Profession and prefer its expertise, a Profession can perform its services widely across society to all in need, perhaps supported by government funding and subsidies.

Criteria 7 and 8 are not necessary for the existence of a Profession, but they are obvious signs of a Profession's importance. These criteria allow a Profession's membership to enjoy a monopolistic privilege, but lucrative compensation does not usually follow, since conformity, sacrifice, and service restrain the pursuit of income. Furthermore, Professions privileged by a government are typically well-regulated and heavily subsidized, so their salaries are often guided by governmental oversight and budgeting.

Professionality Implies a Concern for Responsibility

The psychological capabilities of those served by a profession cannot be overlooked. Where there are limited capabilities, there is limited responsibility and agency, and no profession should get into a position of exploiting a client's limited agency.

Precision about one's mental capacities is especially important where people get dependent on the care of others. No one is an expert about everything; kindly advice and wise counsel from better experts should be gratefully received and often acted upon. Major social institutions – whether financial, medical, governmental, educational, religious, cultural, and so on – stand ready to render sagacious counsel, for the individual's benefit if provided in a professional manner. Professional counsel, unlike unprofessionally manipulative or coercive advice, responsibly ascertains a level of personal capacity and voluntary will to benefit from counsel. If a client neither understands nor cares much about participating in decisions, that barrier to effective counsel must be acknowledged and managed.

Private sector professions usually (and rightly) decline to take on unprepared clienteles, where "inability to benefit" is reason enough to refuse service. Public oriented professions, such as health care and education, bear a greater burden to assess, classify, and direct potential clients towards services appropriate to current needs and capabilities. Rejection by a university redirects one to community colleges, and a community college accepts matriculants needing a semester or two of remedial preparation. Medical care settings efficiently refer potential patients to priority services, and urgent-care clinics are especially sensitive to psychological as well as physiological symptoms.

Intellectual deficiencies or cognitive deviancies have to be appreciated in contexts where professional services are truly needed by members of the public. That kind of professional responsibility is particularly necessary for civic-oriented professions among governmental institutions and agencies, where officers and officials must engage with any and all among the public. A perceived mental incapacity to minimally and effectively deal with policing, first responders, public services, public housing, government administration, civil or criminal courts, and the like, has serious social import. An individual's mental incapacity to participate with counsels proffered by civil authorities cannot be a merely subjective or personal matter.

Professional Conduct

Those not in Professions often imitate certain features of Professions in order to gain respect and trust from the public, and to meet government expectations about good business practices. Occupations requiring government

licensure must satisfy legal and regulatory rules, and this external government supervision is a substitute for, or a reinforcement of, the internal supervision that a Profession has over its members.

Occupational licensing from a government does not make that occupation into a Profession. No government can create a Profession – only expert practitioners can discover and establish areas of knowledge. A Profession has its own internal certifications to bestow membership. However, a member may also receive a professional licensure from a government. For someone licensed, they can earn a better living in their occupational practice. For the government, it can benefit the public by upholding good standards of occupational practice.

All licensed practitioners (whether members of a Profession or not) are expected to conduct themselves professionally, at the risk of government sanction and loss of licensure. The label of being a "professional" has expanded beyond its original meaning, and no longer refers only to members of actual Professions.

Being a professional now indicates a commitment to doing one's job professionally and conducting business professionally, and those operating with licenses are particularly expected to fulfill that commitment. Exemplifying professionalism in one's career and being a "professional" is therefore about imitating some key features of genuine Professions, which invented and promulgated high standards of conduct. That is why norms of responsible professional conduct are similar to duties upheld within a Profession.

The Norms of Professionalism:

A. Competence. A responsibility to put into practice the set of skills normally expected from one's occupation.

B. Civility. A responsibility to treat people in the workplace (employees, customers, etc.) respectfully and dutifully, without disruptions due to personal issues.

C. Legality. A responsibility to follow all applicable laws and regulations in the conduct of one's job performance.

D. Credibility. A responsibility to be trustworthy, honest, careful with all personal information, and conscientious about financial matters.

E. Integrity. A responsibility to prioritize competence, civility, legality, and credibility over temptations to selfishly benefit oneself or pursue your own agendas.

In the pursuit of meeting these responsibilities, an occupation may see the formation of professional guilds, leagues, councils, and the like. None of them are societies of a Profession. However, they serve a similar function with respect to upholding norms of professional conduct. Professionalism in any occupation is a major component to making practitioners more trusted by clients and more competitive in the marketplace.

The establishment of a Profession's society Is not the same thing as the professionalization of an occupation. For each Profession, there is usually a single society within each country, and if there also is an international society, only one is recognized as primary. The multiplication and duplication of professional organizations operating in a particular sector indicates that no Profession is behind them all. Rather, that multiplicity of professional organizations instead indicates how that field is promoting professionalism for that occupation.

Morality, Ethics, Public Policy, and Professional Ethics

Ethics is the effort to reinforce morality when its norms seem inadequate to rightly handling complex situations, large populations, or long-tern implications. Ordinary basic morality, as taught during childhood and expected from adults in any society, works best for simple situations, small groups, and short-term consequences. It seems so easy to "know what is right" and "know what is wrong" when matters are familiar and few people are involved.

Basic morality is universal for humanity: all societies instill four norms during childhood and enforce them throughout adulthood.

The Moral Rules	The Ethical Principles	Ethical Ideal
1. Do Not Harm, and don't allow harms to others.	Prevent degradation, and protect the vulnerable.	Dignity
2. Do Benefit, and promote benefits for others.	Promote prosperity, and enlarge health and welfare.	Opportunity
3. Allow Liberty, and support freedoms for others.	Expand freedom of choice, and enlarge life's possibilities.	Liberty
4. Be Fair, and defend equal treatment for others.	Expect one rule of law for all, and enforce justice.	Justice

Public Policy Analysis

Concern for:			with a Ranking
Harms?	Protecting the vulnerable groups?	+/-	1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th ?
Happiness?	Making most people better off?	+/-	1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th ?
Hope?	Expanding choices for people?	+/-	1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th ?
Harmony?	Upholding one law for everyone?	+/-	1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th ?

Professional Ethics

The Profession's Best Practices must not harm people overall, or take advantage of vulnerable people.

The Profession's Best Practices should only aim to benefit the people that the profession serves.

The Profession's Best Practices should respect people's freedom of choice, without coercion or duress.

The Profession's Best Practices should be available equally to anyone in society without prejudice.

Scientific Integrity and Research Ethics

Scientific Research Practices

The practices of scientific research involve both procedural rules to be followed by everyone and responsible roles to be played by various members of a research team. Research aims at accumulating reliable knowledge with an ideal of truth guiding it. Violations of rules are serious because those rules are in place to ensure that hypotheses are rigorously tested by reliable evidence, and because not everyone is in a position to be able to verify everything. Put trust in the rules – they are the product of long practical experience conducting good science that tends (in the long run) to accumulate reliable knowledge. Violations of roles are serious because research is done by communities with distributed responsibilities. Unless the research is quite simplistic, more than one researcher will be involved at some point. This means that research is conducted by groups, and each member must trust the other members to be fulfilling roles responsibly.

Research therefore must be intrinsically ethical, in its professional conduct and practices. The importance of sound research is grounded by its relationship to wider society. Research must be extrinsically ethical as well. Bad research has real harms, beyond the circle of researchers. Bad research may affect experimental subjects in unjustifiable ways, and the good of scientific knowledge won't outweigh the evil done. Bad research results may get published, and any other research relying on those bad results will be adversely affected. Bad science only leads to more bad science.

A society relying on scientific "facts" that gained that status in part due to poor research is a society harmed by science. Therefore, any society has an interest in regulating science and holding research to high expectations for quality and ethicality.

Science is never intrinsically "value neutral" or "value free". Scientific knowledge is built on virtue as much as "data." For no data exists to be recorded or related to hypotheses without human decisions about shaping data into reliable evidence and judging how that evidence bears on the correctness of a hypothesis. Hypotheses aren't judged by data – they are judged by people who have made many good decisions on the way to evaluating hypotheses.

Science is as much about judging personal character as it is about judging the truth of hypotheses. For we can never trust an evaluation of a hypothesis unless we first have evaluated the character of the evaluators. Researchers are truly judges. Ask yourself – if you could pick the judge of a trial in which you were the innocent defendant, wouldn't you try to select the judge with the highest character as well as the most legal knowledge? If you could pick the scientific judges of what really is true and false about the world, wouldn't you want people of sound character as well as swift intelligence?

Scientific communities (and the academic disciplines powering them) have every interest in protecting science from people of poor character. There can be little forgiveness, for the very reputation and character of science is at stake.

<u>Key Questions for Exploring Research Ethics</u>

Does it seem like more and more cases of scientific fraud and violations of research ethics are coming to light recently?

Why does the public have difficulty understanding how a scientific field must occasionally change its views and interpretations of discoveries?

Why would cutting-edge science develop in ways that don't look like standard textbook descriptions of 'the' scientific method?

Why would scientific accounts of discoveries leave out details concerning the actual insights behind original discoveries?

How have high-profile cases of misconduct prompted government action and policy regulation?

What is the essence of research misconduct?

What factors are involved with confirming cases of genuine research misconduct?

What factors may be common across many cases of research misconduct?

What are some serious consequences to research misconduct?

What does RCR encompass?

What are the NSF and the PHS definitions of research misconduct?

At Iowa State, these definitions are given, typical among academic standards in the US.
http://www.policy.iastate.edu/policy/research/misconduct

> "Research misconduct means fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research or in reporting research results. It also includes ordering, advising or suggesting that subordinates engage in research misconduct. The misconduct must depart significantly from accepted practices of the relevant research community and must be committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. It does not include honest error or differences of opinion.
>
> Fabrication is making up data or results and recording or reporting them.
>
> Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record.
>
> Plagiarism is the appropriation of another person's ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit.
>
> Respondent is the individual alleged to have engaged in the research misconduct. In some proceedings there may be more than one respondent." [from above website]

Federal Policies

http://ori.hhs.gov/federal-policies

PHS policy:
http://ori.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/42_cfr_parts_50_and_93_2005.pdf

NSF policy:
http://www.nsf.gov/oig/regulations/

Further Questions to Explore

What is the difference between a 'pragmatic' decision and an ethical decision?

Why should science answer to broader ethical standards approved by society?

What are five main characteristics of a profession?

How do normative ethical theories enjoy their status as reasonable expectations to place on everyone?

What does an ethical decision based on utilitarian thinking typically look like?

What does an ethical decision based on deontological thinking typically look like?

How does the ideal of integrity get specifically spelled out by certain virtues for the professional conduct of scientific research?

How does critical thinking about special cases assist future problem-solving?

What are the four components to good moral reasoning in scientific research?

Of the types of moral reasoning, relying on utilitarian thinking is the most consequential, and the most dangerous. Figuring out which virtues are relevant to your situation, and deciding how best to exemplify those virtues, is always wise. Following the rules relevant to your research procedures, and ensuring compliance with those rules (or having a very good reason for deviating from a rule) is always wise. Asking yourself, "How can I do something to produce great good for myself or other that I care about?" is going down a road of temptation and subjectivity.

Well-designed research projects do aim at good results – knowledge is good, and translating knowledge into treatments, technologies, or policies should be beneficial. But keep in mind that only research conducted responsibly in the first place can reliably lead towards those desirable future outcomes.

Questions for Deliberation

Question 1. Does science have its own unique moral values? Perhaps not. There are values important for the proper functioning of human societies in general, even if most of us aren't required to exemplify them every single day. They are important values for any person who holds a position of responsibility in a community. They are also important for a community of people together committed to a profession.

Question 2. Can scientists be held be accountable for any later application of their knowledge? Virtually any kind of knowledge can be used for evil as well as good. Science would completely halt in paralysis. But we want science's benefits, so we must regulate science to minimize the greatest risks to future evil uses. Countries try to control public access to knowledge about high-risk technologies, for example. Do we turn back the clock to pass moral judgment against the great scientists of the past?

Question 3. Perhaps dual-use technology inevitably follows right after the "pure" science. (Is any science pure?) Should we take an extreme precautionary stance, and forbid any research into an area which could lead to frightening technologies. (Stem cells? Genetic engineering? Etc). But ask yourself this question first: knowing what you know now, would you have prevented the development of atomic fission if you had the power? No knowledge of nuclear physics – and no atomic bombs. Tough decision?

Question 4. Are scientists the best trained to even teach the public about the actual science, much less any further moral implications? We should be grateful to the rare scientists who become public intellectuals trying to move public sentiment and opinion in ethical directions. (Examples? Rachel Carson, James Lovelock, Carl Sagan, Neil deGrasse Tyson – look 'em up.) But that kind of stature is very difficult to manage. What is happening now to vocal climate scientists trying to raise the alarm over human-made global warming? There may be a division of labor required – one sort of public intellectual to at least explain the scientific information, and another sort of public intellectual use that science to take ethical stands in the public arena.

Suggested Multimedia Instructional Experience:

HHS – Office of Research Integrity
https://ori.hhs.gov/thelab

> In "The Lab: Avoiding Research Misconduct," you become the lead characters in an interactive movie and make decisions about integrity in research that can have long-term consequences. The simulation addresses Responsible Conduct of Research topics such as avoiding research misconduct, mentorship responsibilities, handling of data, responsible authorship, and questionable research practices.

Mentoring, Authorship, and Peer Review

The practices of scientific research involve both procedural rules to be followed by everyone and responsible roles to be played by various members of a research team.

The role of mentor is essentially one of professional leadership, specifically involving an assigned yet mutually agreed-on role of training and oversight.

In academia, the scientific researcher plays the role of mentor, offering training in:

1. the methodologies of the discipline and research specialization;
2. the good practices of establishing research results for scrutiny by the disciplinary community;
3. the preparation for the transition from doctoral work to a professional position.

The scientific researcher is successful as a researcher by leading a research unit or group. Success requires resources, both material and human, and outstanding expertise, and a tremendous amount of work.

The poor leader is someone unable to place the good of the group and the group goals above their own personal interests. This can directly jeopardize the mentor-trainee relationship. If a mentor is using group resources for his or her own professional interests alone, that relationship can become strained and abused. If a mentor is guiding group research for group aims that are not simultaneously in the interests of junior researchers, relationships will also become strained and potentially damaging.

Above all, a poor mentor fails to prioritize the professional progress of a trainee – that prioritization may require smart compromises and adjustments among other research priorities, but due measures are reasonably expected. In no case must a junior researcher be placed in jeopardy of having to sacrifice academic improvement and professional advancement for "the sake of the research," for "the good of the group," or "for the professor." Mentors can make extraordinary demands of time and effort, but it all must be for the academic improvement of those involved.

Questions to Ponder

Why would effective mentoring contribute to scientific integrity – for an individual, and for a scientific team?

Why aren't mentors just professional trainers in a skill set? Why would more be involved with that role?

Why aren't mentors just supervisors over the activities of junior researchers?

Why does the mentor-trainee relationship have a special status, carrying special and unique responsibilities?

Why would trust play such a crucial role in an effective mentor-trainee relationship?

What would be special about the kind of communication needed between a mentor and a trainee?

What are some crucial factors to consider when seeking and selecting a pre-doctoral mentor?

What are the key questions to ask when considering a particular mentor candidate?

What are some potential obstacles to forming an effective mentor-trainee relationship?

How can professional societies supply institutional resources to promote effective mentor-trainee relationships?

What are some character traits and virtues desirable in a good mentor?

What are the main responsibilities owed by a trainer to one's mentor?

How close should a mentor's supervision over a trainee typically be?

What are a mentor's responsibilities with regard to a trainee's participation in research communications?

How does the Individual Development Plan serve as a template for the evaluation of a trainee by a mentor?

What are some reasonable expectations about the role of diversity in forming mentor-trainee relationships and determining training goals?

Mentors should also be able to guide you well in advance through difficult decisions and problematic situations. When analyzing a hypothetic case, or a real world case, about a potential course of action, apply a series of questions (as your mentor should as well) such as those on this list:

Will it involve me with a clear violation of scientific integrity, by myself or someone else?

Will it lend an appearance of academic misconduct or a violation of scientific integrity, by myself or someone else?

Does it seem to bypass the regular hierarchy of authority above you, or keep certain authority positions in the dark?

Would it require me to do something "on trust" or simply out of loyalty to a fellow researcher or to a senior academic figure?

Does it involve me with conduct serving no obvious academic or research function?

Does it involve me with outcomes that only benefit certain person(s) rather than the purposes of the research group?

Does it make a demand on myself that cannot be viewed as directly or indirectly furthering my academic advancement or my professional status?

Does it allow me, or another person, to gain an unfair advantage over someone else on the research team, in a way that I wouldn't ever want done to myself?

Does it exceed the typical boundaries and responsibilities of the lead researcher/junior researcher relationship?

Does it involve burdening yourself or another person with a disproportionate amount of labor without a clear prospect of proportional credit and reward?

Does it arouse the appearance of a conflict of interest between your position and the positions of others, or between one person's position and the aims of research group?

Could you ultimately justify your involvement with a clear conscience if you had to account for events in front of an academic department or other academic investigation unit?

Because maintaining a healthy mentor-trainee relationship on these grounds calls for special concerns and responsibilities, the character and values of both mentor and trainee as necessarily involved. Shrugging off those matters by thinking, "As long as everyone keeps it professional, there's no need to get personal about it." That's simply not true, however. Keeping it professional, and academically respectable, is precisely what calls for professional character and relevant virtues.

Peer-Review of Research

Most problems associated with assigning authorship, and the ordering of authorship, fundamentally have to do with unclear responsibilities and unclear publication expectations, long before a piece of research is written. In the academic world, it would be extremely unlikely that significant research is undertaken without the leadership

of that research already having some intentions and plans about the eventual credit of authorship upon anything publishable resulting from that research.

The primary responsibility for communicating expectations and plans regarding authorship falls on those leaders. Anyone else involved with their research projects should get their questions answered, early and explicitly, about work expected with preparing a publication and/or its data sets, and about the eventual credit for co-authorship in due proportion.

By the time that a research paper has been organized and writing is underway, everyone involved should have an explicit and agreeable role to play with authorship, and everyone should understand who shall be identified authors, including those who won't be identified as an author. In the absence of that explicit understanding on the part of everyone, or with uncertainties lingering about who may be added or subtracted as a co-author late in the publication process, then confusions and controversies can erupt.

One further helpful factor can prevent misunderstandings and conflicts. At the time of initial submission, all co-authors should be identified to the journal by name in the order of expected listing, and their contact information be provided to the journal. Journal editors are not in any position to determine who should be an author, or determine the author ordering. Journal editors are responsible for ensuring good communication with all authors, especially regarding any proposed alterations to the authorship list.

Journal editors have the discretion to delay a submission consideration process, or even halt the publication process of an accepted article, if authorship confusions or contentions become known to them. For their part, any co-author has the right to identify themselves to a journal editor and stay informed about authorship decisions being made.

<u>Key Questions</u>

What are typical expectations from the process of peer-review of research?

Why have the pressures to publish in quantity called into question features of the peer-review process and the way journals publish articles?

What is the obvious way to judge that someone should not be identified as an author? What is the obvious way to judge that someone is an author?

Where can Instructions for Authors be found for journals?

How have many journals arrived at requiring the way that contributions by co-authors be specified?

What is the difference between assigning copyright to a publisher, and agreeing to an exclusive license to publish?

Why is the simultaneous submission of an article considered to be a severe violation of professional research?

How can a question concerning previously published material in an article be appropriately handled?

What is the PNAS policy on correctly ascertaining whether research has been published already?

What are the wise practices concerning requests for the sharing of research materials or data sets?

What are typical examples of conflicts of interest, which must be revealed to a publication during the submission process?

What are the scientific benefits of requiring the registration of clinical trials in ClinicalTrials.gov or similar registries?

How can authors and publishers responsible handle the reproduction of digital images?

What is “dual-use research” and why are many publishers implementing policies that add a layer of scrutiny to potential biosecurity research?

What are the similar features to the criteria for authorship offered by the ICMJE and PNAS?

What are some clear indicators that someone should be included as a co-author?

What are some clear indicators that someone should not be included as a co-author?

What defines being a “senior author” and what defines a “first author,” and why are those two different roles and usually filled by two different people?

How are second, third (and so on) co-authors appropriately determined, and how should their responsibilities be assigned?

What are ‘ghost’ and ‘guest’ authors, and why are they highly inappropriate?

What are criteria for an ‘impartial’ reviewer, and what is the typical process of peer review?

What the expected responsibilities of a peer reviewer, and why is anonymity and confidentiality important?

What are expected criteria for the full evaluation of a submission by a reviewer?

How have Open Access publishing, publication repositories, pre-print archives, and post-publication review influenced academic publishing?

How have citation metrics, such as a “journal impact factor,” affected academic publishing and raised serious concerns?

Consult the Committee on Publication Ethics at http://publicationethics.org/
for many resources about academic authorship. The flowcharts are very helpful, at
http://publicationethics.org/resources/flowcharts

The PLOS One publishing platform is very current on best practices regarding authorship:
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/ethical-publishing-practice

Consult the American Psychological Association’s website about the principles of publication authorship:
http://www.apa.org/science/leadership/students/authorship-paper.aspx

Typical questions always arise. Examples:

I am a grad student and conducted much of the work behind a research project. But the eventual research paper was entirely written by my supervisor and a couple other professors without my input, and now they won't include me as a co-author.

Answer: Because you did not have any part in explaining the research or its results in the paper, and you won't be part of the final approval of the publication version nor take a large share of responsibility if those research results are criticized in the future, you don't clearly qualify as a co-author. However, depending on the discipline, your senior researchers can include you as a co-author at their discretion, by allowing you to play a small role with evaluating the research and composing some of the paper. Proper mentoring and good communication should have been playing an early role here.

Similar example:

I am a grad student who conducted most of the research using the experimental design from my supervisor, and I can compose the resulting research paper on my own. But my supervisor now expects to participate in the final version of the research paper and be a co-author.

Answer: Since your capacity to conduct and evaluate this research was largely due to their prior advance work of your supervisor, your supervisor wants to shape how the research results are explained in the paper, and your supervisor can share responsibility for the legitimacy and merit of the publication, co-authorship is reasonable. Each discipline enforces its own normal expectations about the level of participation of a senior researcher and the correlated role as a co-author. Those expectations should have been communicated to you well in advance by a supervisor and/or a mentor.

Another example:

I conducted a substantial part of the research and wrote up the research paper. Now the head of the research project who obtained the funding is demanding to be listed as a co-author too, although this person wasn't involved with conducting this research nor the writing of the paper.

Answer: The research project head, or the head of a department, is never automatically entitled to co-authorship with just anything based on research conducted there. Agreeing to the assignment of co-authorship here is a violation of professional standards and calls into question your own academic integrity. Furthermore, this sort of 'guest' or 'gift' authorship isn't something that stays a secret forever. Journal editors have a way of finding things out over time, and professors who routinely impose their unjustified co-authorship gain a reputation for this unprofessionalism. These long-term consequences can influence your own reputation years into the future. There are compromises that could prevent these issues. Depending on the discipline, there are fair ways for research leaders to play minor but legitimate authorship roles with the writing of several papers from their research projects. Those roles should be clarified with good communication long before the completion of the writing of a research paper.

Yet another example:

I finished my thesis/dissertation and I am preparing a chapter for publication as a stand-alone journal article. My primary advisor on my committee was quite inspirational, and also has a prominent status in the discipline. If I approach my advisor about including her name as a co-author, although she didn't compose anything in my work, could I persuade her to agree? After all, that would practically ensure that this paper gets published in a top journal.

Answer: You should not approach your advisor with this idea, even if you think she might agree. She cannot qualify as an author if you go ahead with your plan. Depending on the discipline, it is not uncommon for a senior professor to participate in the writing of a new paper based on a portion of a thesis/dissertation. If substantial writing is contributed and joined or merged with yours, their co-authorship is warranted. But the first author should be yourself, and a clear understanding of the respective roles in composing the new paper should be understood in advance.

Research on Human Subjects

Human subjects research must be the single most important area of research ethics, since the protection of the innocent and vulnerable is a top priority for ethics in general. Interestingly, some of the greatest ethical temptations to violate that duty to protect are the quests for social justice or advancing human welfare in general, neither of which can fall under IRB scrutiny. Reading through those terrible events in the past that have inspired the protection of human subjects today, there are evident cases where the perpetrators were driven by a zeal to advance pure science, or a goal of saving untold numbers of lives in the future. Those cases and many more like them have this in common – the people who conduct that research were willing to sacrifice the health and lives of people today for the lives of other people tomorrow.

There is nothing unusual, or necessarily unethical, about sacrifice now for the sake of the future, and for future generations. However, in the arena of human research, the targeted subjects are usually those among us who are weaker, sicker, poorer, and more disadvantaged and vulnerable than most of us. When only healthy and wealthy people are the subjects of research, perhaps our ethical guards can be lower. But that isn't the situation.

<u>Questions to Keep in Mind:</u>

What are the main stages and events to human subjects research dating from WW II to 1979?

What is the definition of human subjects research according to federal law 45 CFR 46.103?

What does "competence to consent" mean?

What does voluntary (free from coercion) consent mean?

What does informed consent mean?

What are common types of coercion that may be involved with human research?

What is the role of the OHRP with human research?

How is an IRB committee formed, and what does one typically look like?

What does an IRB use for criteria for judging proposed research?

How does an IRB establish that informed consent has been obtained?

Under what conditions should a human subjects research study be halted?

What are types of research exempt from human subjects regulations?

What are common examples of research eligible for expedited IRB review?

What are special concerns for research with incompetent patients?

What are special concerns for research with prisoners?

What are special concerns for research with children?

How does HIPAA impact human subjects research?

What are current federal guidelines concerning experimentation on fetal tissue and embryonic stem cells?

Relying on entirely "medical" or "scientific" standards for deciding who should be the subjects of research, and how research should be conducted on them, if part of the ethical problem, not any sort of ethical solution. But there will always be those who dislike the ethical burdens placed on human research. Some propose to nearly eliminate IRBs and proposes that research be scrutinized only for its suitability to advance scientific knowledge and produce (vague) benefits in the future. However, such utilitarian scrutiny simply can't be so ethical as supposed, and IRBs remain ethically necessary.

Because of this duty to protect the vulnerable, preventing coercion includes the avoidance of "undue influence." Undue influence basically means that there are factors beyond the information required to obtain informed consent that are made known to the subject that make it more likely that the subject will agree to participate, than if that extra information was withheld.

From the HHS we read:

https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/informed-consent/index.html

> The HHS regulations state that "An investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence" (45 CFR 46.116). This requirement applies to all nonexempt human subjects research not eligible for a waiver of the consent requirements.
>
> Coercion occurs when an overt or implicit threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to another in order to obtain compliance. For example, an investigator might tell a prospective subject that he or she will lose access to needed health services if he or she does not participate in the research.
>
> Undue influence, by contrast, often occurs through an offer of an excessive or inappropriate reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance. For example, an investigator might promise psychology students extra credit if they participate in the research. If that is the only way a student can earn extra credit, then the investigator is unduly influencing potential subjects. If, however, she offers comparable non-research alternatives for earning extra credit, the possibility of undue influence is minimized.
>
> In addition to undue influence that can arise with the offering of rewards, undue influence also can be subtle. For example, patients might feel obligated to participate in research if their physician is also the investigator, or students might feel pressure to participate in research if everyone else in the class is doing so. Because influence is contextual, and undue influence is likely to depend on an individual's situation, it is often difficult for IRBs to draw a bright line delimiting undue influence. It is up to the IRB to use its discretion in determining which circumstances give rise to undue influence. For example, an IRB might consider whether the informed consent process will take place at an appropriate time and in an

appropriate setting, and whether the prospective subject may feel pressured into acting quickly or be discouraged from seeking advice from others.

Because of their relative nature and lack of clear-cut standards on the boundaries of inappropriate and appropriate forms of influence, investigators and IRBs must be vigilant about minimizing the possibility for coercion and undue influence. Reasonable assessments can be made to minimize the likelihood of undue influence or coercion occurring. For example, IRBs may restrict levels of financial or nonfinancial incentives for participation and should carefully review the information to be disclosed to potential subjects to ensure that the incentives and how they will be provided are clearly described. Known benefits should be stated accurately but not exaggerated, and potential or uncertain benefits should be stated as such, with clear language indicating how much is known about the uncertainty or likelihood of these potential benefits. [HHS]

As this statement from HHS indicates, there are many sorts of pressures besides threat of intimidation or promise of financial reward.

Before research begins, the recruitment of experimental subjects is also covered by these regulations. Advertising a study falls under recruitment, and undue influence may begin there.

Read these guidelines from the University of Virginia: https://research.virginia.edu/human-research-protection-program/defining-human-subjects-research

Online Resources

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations Title 21 – Part 56 – Institutional Review Boards
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRsearch.cfm?CFRPart=56

Health and Human Services - HHS Regulations governing the protection of human subjects in research
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/index.html

FDA – Institutional Review Boards - FAQs
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126420.htm

University at Buffalo's IRB policies
https://www.buffalo.edu/research/research-services/compliance/irb.html

Science, Technology, and Society

Scientific integrity encompasses the general areas of responsibility that a scientist owes to society. There are specific duties that a scientist has towards society concerning the nature and outcomes of research. Many reasons justify why a scientist is obligated to be concerned about the implications and applications of research. Research into rDNA illustrate duties owed by scientists towards society.

Question to Explore

How does the availability of genetic testing illustrate the dilemmas raised by the development of new biological techniques?

What are the primary ethical concerns raised by the preservation of cell lines for genetic experimentation?

What are the primary ethical concerns raised by the data collection of results of genetic testing?

What is meant by "dual use research"? Wat kinds of concerns should scientists have about the impact on society made possible by dual use research?

What are the main biosecurity concerns regarding the scientific investigation into genetics and genetic engineering?

What is 'DURC' and how has it been defined?

What are the current protocols for evaluating publications involving DURC?

Should genetic information about dangerous pathogens become accessible to the public domain? The 'public domain' here means anywhere beyond the narrow circle of scientists directly involved with the new research, and the government agency officials or defense department personnel directly involved with supervising and advising the research. The 'public' therefore includes: colleagues in the academic department, interested scientists in another country, scholars reading an academic article about the research, researchers working for a corporation, journalists, and basically anyone else. As soon as that pathogenic information gets onto an unsecured computer, it is effectively accessible for broadcasting to the entire internet and hence enters the public domain. If you don't think that it is that easy for something to enter the public domain, you haven't been paying attention to recent headlines about security leaks, rogue journalism, hacking, and terrorism. The reasonable answer to question 1 is "Yes, restrictions are necessary." Is the idea of a scientist artificially creating a killer pathogen just science fiction fantasy. No – this is already happened:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/exclusive-controversial-us-scientist-creates-deadly-new-flu-strain-for-pandemic-research-9577088.html

Should your genetic information be accessible to family members? This issue is not fully settled, by ethics or by law. At Genetic Literacy Project, experts discuss the ethical and legal issues.
http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/

What about genetically engineered foods? Regardless of where you currently stand on GMOs and genetically modified foods, we are questioning whether scientists have performed a responsible job of communicating the science to the public. What is that science? The FDA has resisted GMO labeling in part due to its belief that the public remains confused about the meaning of GMOs and the labeling of GMOs. This concern is understandable – can the public even handle grasping what "organic" really means so that labeling things as 'organic' is truly informative? Skeptics unhappy with the FDA often say that the FDA continues to prioritize the protection of corporate profitability over the public's right to know. In Europe, standard regulations typically require that any food product must be labeled if direct use of a GMO occurs anywhere during food production, even if genetically modified content (eg DNA) is not detectable in the food product. Feeding GM corn to cows? The beef must be GM labeled.

What about frozen human embryos? The use of embryonic stems cells is no longer so controversial, after new techniques don't even need them. Heard of pluripotent cells? Researchers are growing human organelles and organs from any human cell taken from a consenting adult. And yes, they are now growing human brains in labs. How is the scientific community preparing the public for understanding what is going on?

How should research on human genetics be ethically reviewed? That is a huge bioethical topic – we are focused on this specific question, What are researchers doing to prepare the public for evaluating how far genetic research should go? Do you get the sense that there is good communication between researchers and the public? If not, why not? Is journalism bearing most of the burden instead? And how is journalism doing? Is journalism generally conveying the impression that scientists have the ethical issues at the forefront of the minds? Hmmm.... maybe not. Journalists like reporting on the "mad scientists" boldly doing bizarre and risky new things without much supervision. Is the scientific community doing much to counter that impression?

How responsible should researchers feel after their DURC gets into inappropriate hands? My impression from the scientific community is that there are three main ways to respond to this question:

Option One: "No responsibility". "My research is pure research, or at least research that would help humanity. My motives are good, so my moral duties are fulfilled. What other people do with scientific advances is on their heads, not mine."

Option Two: "Some responsibility". "My research is risky, but necessary to advance knowledge for the good. Besides, if I don't figure this out, someone else with less morals will make the discoveries anyways, soon or later. So it is wise to make discoveries first, to be prepared for the day when that knowledge is used against us."

Option Three: "Huge responsibility". "My research could be used for terrible applications someday, so it is best to go very slowly, and regulate everyone else to go very slowly, too. And keep everything secret within the scientific community. We have to take every precaution against making discoveries that could be converted into dangers to humanity."

These three options, assigning "purity" or "preparedness" or "precaution" to new research, continue to divide the scientific community, and divide government officials. The public seems divided, as well.

How should scientists explain their research? That question presumes that (a) scientists are best positioned to inform the public, and (b) scientists are best trained for educating the public. Neither of these presumptions may be correct. Scientists have a hard enough time adequately explaining what they are doing to other scientists. Where do scientists get trained for public education? Science communication is not expected of scientists, and grad students don't take a course in science communication (UB's LAI department offers a graduate course in science communication!) Only scientific organizations such as NIH, NAS, NSF, NASA, and AAAS put impressive efforts into assembling educational projects and disseminating investigative reports that non-scientists might understand.

What about a universal Ethical Code for Scientists? That is a question that arises again and again as biotechnologies are accelerating into more and more controversial and dangerous areas.

Competing Interests and Collaborative Research

<u>Questions to Ponder</u>

What are examples of financial conflicts of interest, conflicts of effort, and conflicts of conscience?

Why are universities settings where conflicts of interest can easily arise?

How might financial interests distort the conduct of research?

How do universities try to limit the amount of conflict of effort that a researcher may encounter?

What is a good definition of conflict of conscience?

What is the standard definition of conflict of interest?

What are the main federal-level organizations that supply policies about conflict of interest?

How has the entrepreneurial climate, especially in biomedicine, deepened problems involving conflicts of interest?

Is there an easy way to distinguish gifts from other forms of compensation?

How may consulting fees, multiple pay for a single job, and nepotism cause problems relating to conflicts of interest?

What is a scientific conflict of interest, and how can risks here be reduced?

What is an academic conflict of interest, and how can risks here be reduced?

How should insider trading conflicts of interest be avoided?

What is an intramural conflict of interest, and how can risks here be reduced?

What is an institutional conflict of interest, and how can risks here be reduced?

How should concerns about equity interests be handled?

What are typical institutional prerogatives?

Online Resources

National Science Foundation – Conflicts of Interest
http://www.nsf.gov/policies/conflicts.jsp

National Institutes of Health – Conflicts of Interest
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coi/

Department of Health and Human Services
http://ori.hhs.gov/conflicts-interest-and-commitment

Further Questions

What are several kinds of factors that are accelerating the amount of collaborate research?

What are some common challenges presented by this increasing scale of collaborative research?

How can collaboration be characterized?

How does accountability play a key role in successful collaboration?

What are some typical relationships between collaborative work and institutional roles?

How can collaborative agreements regulate collaboration?

How can offer letters regulate collaboration?

How do collaborative grant applications work best with transparency?

What are the useful features of team building and development, trust, maintaining vision, and setting expectations for producing successful collaboration?

Why are things like honest discussion, clear language, and attention to power dynamics essential for good collaborative teams?

How does good mentoring relate to working collaborations?

How does respect for diversity relate to working collaborations?

How does clarity about expectations concerning authorship, data control, and publishing all contribute to successful collaboration?

How can an awareness of conflict styles, and a facility with techniques of conflict management, promote successful collaboration?

How might collaborations at international levels require special attention?

There are sound ways to evaluate a request for collaboration from someone who is not already in some working relationship with you. Some common sense factors can be listed.

First, try to determine why your collaboration is valued. Presumably, your academic expertise and experience, and your reputation for valuable research activities, should be the main factors. If so, you should be able to confirm why this invitation has come your way. Does this invitation come from someone who has evidently looked into your skills and expertise? Watch out for invitations from people who don't seem fairly familiar with your research productivity and previous experience.

Second, figure out what additional factors are going on. Did someone else recommend your name? If so, why? Who has been talking about you, and why? Check with your own network if necessary. If this person seems evasive about how they arrived at your name, that is a worrisome clue.

Third, ascertain why your collaboration would be useful for the envisioned project. Does this invitation come with a clear explanation of the envisioned project, and your roles in it? If the project seems fuzzy, are you expected to help develop the project? Why is your assistance particularly needed? Watch out for underdeveloped projects that appear to need a lot of work from you to get beyond the idea stage. You would get good clues about how the other collaborators would be able to build a team with you (or not) from pursuing these questions.

Fourth, if you explore this potential collaboration further, watch out for possible conflicts of interest. Raise concerns early, and often. If you cannot get clear answers and good assurances from the people controlling

the project (not from peripheral people), then back away fast. Make your requests for information in writing (email at least) and get answers in writing. Conversations are meaningless down the road.

Fifth, remember this: no one else is looking out for your own problems with conflicts of interest. In fact, it might be in someone else's best interest to ensnare you into a conflict of interest, and they won't tell you that up front. Only you can guarantee preventions of conflicts of interest.

Animals in Biomedical Experimentation

Questions to Contemplate

Why does the destruction or torture of an animal raise concerns that something morally wrong may be occurring?

What are some moral reasons able to support the use of some animals in scientific and medical research?

How does Peter Singer argue that no animal experiment should be done unless the same experiment could be approved for humans?

What is 'speciesism', and why does it have ethically troubling features?

What is 'inherent value', and why might humans not be the only animals possessing it?

What is the Animal Welfare Act and what kinds of animals does it cover?

What are the typical features and responsibilities of an IACUC?

How does protocol review by an IACUC usually proceed, and what kinds of issues does this review encompass?

Who has the legal responsibility within an academic setting for ensuring compliance with animal use protocols and IACUC approval?

What have long been the three general guidelines concerning the ethical use of animals in research?

How have alternative experimental techniques reduced the need for animal research?

What have been the major priorities and activities of animal rights groups?

Would animal protections be strengthened ethically and legally if they become recognized as persons? Few people are persuaded that chimpanzees are persons. However, chimpanzees deserve the highest levels of protection that laws can enforce. The high worth to the life of a chimpanzee should be something that anyone could intuitively understand, thanks to the sort of acquaintance with chimpanzees that one could get from nature shows on television and narratives written by primatologists. Compassion for animals didn't depend on the right labeling or abstract arguments.

It is quite reasonable to protect nonhuman species from unnecessary pain, cruelty, and domination at our hands. Laws preventing such abuse and maltreatment protect against those harms. By assigning legal status to protected animals and criminalizing offenses against those animals, they are given legal rights. Such legal rights are 'equal' rights in the sense that persons should be protected like that as well. Assigning 'personhood' equality

with humans isn't necessary for establishing protection rights – compassion and moral courage are plenty enough. If we can't see with our hearts how animals deserve good treatment, thinking about abstract labels with our heads won't be enough.

Assigning personhood goes much farther than protection rights. Personhood involves assigning the very highest level of moral worth and equality that we can bestow. Persons deserve not just equal protection but also equal treatment, and our staunch efforts to extend and save their lives. If there is a forced choice between saving the life of a chimpanzee or the life of a child, is it really a moral toss-up? Also, persons are guaranteed additional equal rights by civilized societies, such as the right to freedom of movement, travel across borders, own property, get fair trials, enjoy privacy, gather together in groups, and so on. If we won't be granting those rights to chimpanzees, then we are really only talking about extending protection rights, not full personhood rights.

Additionally, the effort to justify assigning personhood to nonhumans runs into some obstacles erected by scientific fact and a little logic.

First, let's at least assume that assigning personhood to all the species in the animal kingdom is not what we are aiming to do. Therefore, some criteria must be chosen which satisfy (a) and (b) -- (a) the chosen criteria select out only those "higher" species that seem sensible (for example, the criteria forbids insects but includes birds; or forbids birds but includes aardvarks; or forbids aardvarks but includes lions), and also (b) every human being possesses all the chosen criteria -- after all, it's not a good result to leave some humans out of personhood.

Next, consider the factual trouble: any criteria capable of including all humans will also include far too many nonhuman species. If comatose humans are in, then frogs surely are in. If six month old fetuses are in, then birds are in. If newborn babies are in, then wolves are in. The same problem arises for any similar category like "rights-bearer".

Biting the bullet here and saying that only a subset of humans are really persons so that horses or foxes can be persons will arouse far more controversy than protecting animals from cruelty. Have animal rights activists intrigued by personhood come to any agreement about exactly when a human fetus becomes a person in the womb, if ever? What happens if their criteria for scientific criteria for personhood suggest that the line has to be drawn two months after birth? Advocates for chimpanzees probably don't have answers to such questions. Philosophers have no consensus to share, either.

Key issues about assigning personhood to nonhumans can be itemized.

1. Advocates say, "Non-human animals deserve rights too!" Yes, they do – so let's pass more laws assigning protective rights, as quickly as possible.

2. My question to advocates: Why are chimpanzees "persons"? "Because they deserve protective rights!" Yes, perhaps, but why do they deserve protective rights? "Because they are persons!!" But that's not an explanation, you are going in circles.

3. Advocates say, "We should stop using humanity as the standard for rights!" Yes indeed – but then stop using "similarity to human features" as personhood criteria. Why are chimpanzees next in line for personhood? Is it about their similarities to us?

4. Advocates say, "Only persons have rights!" That is historically and legally false – lots of non-human animals enjoy protective rights, right now.

5. Advocates say, “Being a person guarantees the highest and equal rights!” Yes, it does – that’s why we must pause and think before agreeing that a chimpanzee and a baby are equal and must be treated equally, and their lives are equally worthy of being saved.

6. Advocates say, “Non-humans have the right to be persons too!” Yet personhood is embedded in the struggle to grant rights to all human beings, simply because they are essentially human. If we need to get beyond centering everything around humanity, why focus on “personhood”?

7. Question for advocates: Why are chimpanzees “persons” but horses won’t be? Or, if horses too, what about pigs, or cats? There is no criteria for personhood applied so far. If chimpanzees and cats are persons, what about an eight-month fetuses? An eight-month fetus has greater cognitive development and potential than a newborn chimpanzee.

8. Advocates say, “We need to accelerate public sympathy about laws protecting some non-humans!” Yes, we do, but “personhood” arouses few emotional or moral intuitions in people – that’s hardly a way to arouse immediate and intense compassion.

It instead seems wiser to think about how to use new science about nonhuman sentience and suffering to arouse human compassion for many species, than to risk limiting personhood to fewer humans. Furthermore, I think that animals deserve better than treatment as persons. Persons on this planet can be abandoned, discarded, left without a homeland, exported, deported, and left starving to die without governments guaranteeing any rescue, all over the world. Animals deserve better from us, then we deliver to each other.

If there is going to be a “post-human” category of personhood, then the criteria for personhood must get beyond narrow human criteria. Prioritizing animals that are most like us, like the chimpanzee, is a counter-productive first step for expanding personhood. But it makes sense if advocacy just needs human sympathy, for there is plenty of human sympathy for those who are most like us. Ultimately, however, the most human sympathy is aroused when we can get to intimately know what other species are like, how they live, and why they enjoy life just as much as we do, in their own special ways.

Human compassion can be amply aroused for animals not much like us at all. We’d best get used to that stretch of the emotional imagination. Post-humans will try to not be like us, and alien civilizations won’t share in any human essence. If we want to stop privileging humanity, we have to stop thinking like humans all the time.

Online Resources

Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, 8th edition:
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/Guide-for-the-Care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf

American Association for Laboratory Animal Science (AALAS)
http://www.aalas.org/iacuc/iacuc_resources