# THE NATURE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY

JOHN R. SHOOK
University at Buffalo

John Dewey's pragmatism and naturalism are grounded on metaphysical tenets describing how mind's intelligence is thoroughly natural in its activity and productivity. His worldview is best classified as Organic Realism, since it descended from the German organicism and *Naturphilosophie* of Herder, Schelling, and Hegel which shaped the major influences on his early thought. Never departing from its tenets, his later philosophy starting with *Experience and Nature* elaborated a philosophical organon about science, culture, and ethics to fulfill his particular version of Organic Realism.

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Dewey's philosophical worldview, early and late, was an organicist Nature Philosophy. Classifying this philosophical system as a pragmatism, or a naturalism, is one-sided and misleading. Treating Dewey first and foremost as a pragmatist is contrary to his own understanding of his philosophy and the systematicity to his worldview. The pragmatist themes in his work on education, science, and culture are predicated on his deeper metaphysical tenets. There is no pragmatist principle required for justifying any of Dewey's metaphysical views, but the contrary dependence of his type of pragmatism on his metaphysics is pervasive and complete. All characterizations of Dewey's philosophy as this or that sort of pragmatism (or instrumentalism, or experimentalism, etc.) are premature until his metaphysics is fully appreciated.

Nor was Dewey principally a naturalist. He did not presume that "nature" has a default or self-explanatory status, he did not think that idealism could be easily dismissed, and he did not assign to science the sole responsibility for understanding reality. There is no naturalistic principle needed for justifying Dewey's metaphysical tenets, but those tenets are necessary for his philosophy's transformation of naturalism. All classifications of Dewey's philosophy as one or another type of naturalism (empirical naturalism, pragmatic naturalism, etc.) are subsidiary to the correct elaboration of his metaphysics.

Explaining the metaphysical roles for his worldview's tenets, and his justifications for those tenets without *a priori* intuitions, transcendental deductions, or practical postulations, is the story of his Nature Philosophy.

**Nature is Reality**

Dewey critically reconstructed the conception of nature. Without that reconstruction, naturalism's promise to fulfill realism with science's knowledge only reverts to dualism, since what really matters in experience must be consigned to an unnatural status. Any rationalism—including scientific naturalism, materialism,

physicalism, and so forth—only engenders dualisms. Knowledge, from whatever privileged source, cannot delimit reality, and reality cannot depend on knowing. Dewey therefore asserts that what can be known is surely real but it is not more real, and what is basically real must enable knowledge. To ensure the tightest ontological bond between the processes of knowing and environing matters eliciting that knowing, mentality cannot be somewhere else apart from worldly matters. For example, the way that something external is separated in space from a brain (a fact of great import for most naturalisms) could not play a crucial role in Dewey's account of inquiry. He renounced any epistemology grounded on mechanistic causality, sensationalism, or representationalism. In Dewey's Nature Philosophy, naturalism enjoys scientific warrant, but a valid naturalism must also answer to a normative view of knowledge, not the other way around.

There must be no discontinuity between mentality and materiality. In a phrase, the most realistic philosophy shall be the most idealistic, and the most idealistic philosophy shall be the most realistic. This is the key to Dewey's resolution of the realism-idealism dispute and his elaboration of a complete philosophical organon. His worldview was no ordinary idealism, or materialism. Idealism attributes all normativity to mentality, demoting any other reality to a dependence on mentality's organizing activity or consigning it to unreality. Materialism denies that fundamental reality has its own organizing capacity, relieving mentality of normativity or rendering it epiphenomenal. Idealism and Materialism therefore agree that Realism's mind-independent reality cannot possess an inherent capacity to organize and regulate itself. This "inert" Realism accordingly requires a metaphysical insertion of structure to make anything else happen, as some initial "first cause" in the form of a supernatural mind, platonic forms, mathematical equations, or an energetic start for the universe.

There is an oft-overlooked fourth option: an "organic" Realism asserting that basic reality has intrinsic organizing capacities. Nature is *naturing*, and *nurturing*. If reality—all of it—does possess intrinsic features conducive to organization, then the notion of

"mind-independent reality" is left meaningless, because mentality can arise from reality's basic processes and participate in any of reality's processes. Organic Realism is not Idealism, however, since it asserts (with Materialism) that nothing real depends on actual mentality making it what it is—most of reality need not fall within mentality's acquaintance at any given time. Organic Realism is not Materialism, either, since it asserts (with Idealism) that everything real must in principle be somehow amenable to mentality's engagement. Organic Realism disagrees with Idealism, Materialism, and Inert Realism by holding that robust mentality can arise from basic material conditions, where conducive circumstances permit within the universe. Furthermore, Organic Realism does not require a "first cause" to structure the universal course of events, so it is compatible with reality having no beginning and needing no explanation.

Dewey's Nature Philosophy exemplifies this Organic Realism. He arrived at this worldview by the early 1890s, before C. S. Peirce or A. N. Whitehead produced their versions. In fact, Dewey was the first American to affirm what would be later labeled as the "ecological" approach to psychology and cognition during the twentieth century. In *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics* (1891) Dewey argued that the individual cannot be constituted to be independent from its surroundings. Quite the opposite is the case: "environment enters into individuality as a constituent factor, helping make it what it is. On the other hand, it is capacity which makes the environment really an environment to the individual. The environment is not simply the facts which happen objectively to lie about an agent; it is such part of the facts as may be related to the capacity and the disposition and the gifts of the agent." (EW 3: 302-303) Dewey denied an ontological divide between environment and agent: "each in itself is an abstraction, and that the real thing is the individual who is constituted by capacity and environment in relation to one another." (EW 3: 303) Although having priority in America, Dewey's worldview had a rich German legacy.

Prior to Dewey, J.G. Herder and F.W.J. Schelling advanced Organic Realism in their original systems of *Naturphilosophie* in order to explain mind's knowledge of the world in terms of mind's activity

transforming nature from within, not without. They in turn credited Spinoza's monism and embraced its implications for pantheism, faulting his worldview only for its uncritical incorporation of mechanistic naturalism. As Frederick Beiser recounts, the issue revolved around reality's basic dynamism:

> With the evident breakdown of mechanism, would it be possible to sustain Spinoza's monism and naturalism? Clearly, these doctrines would have to be reinterpreted according to the latest results from the sciences. For Herder, this meant first and foremost reinterpreting Spinoza's single infinite substance so that it was now living force, the force of all forces, "*die Urkraft aller Kräfte*." Such a move guaranteed the unity and continuity of nature because there was no longer any dualism between the mental and physical, the organic and inorganic. If we assume that matter is living force, then we are no longer caught in the classic dilemma of dualism versus materialism. For we can now explain both mind and matter as different degrees of organization and development of living force.[1]

The first volume of Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, 1784) expressly defended the origin of life on earth from non-life. The energies of living things are not essentially different from energies in the physical environment, but their effects and consequences are distinctive. Expressing that unity-in-difference in a philosophical way, undertaken by Herder and then Schiller, could supply insights into the relationship between the mind and the world. Herder's next book, *Gott, Einige Gespräche* (God, Some Conversations, 1787) further proposed that the universe's vital Force was nothing other than God, and Schiller similarly sought an

[1] Frederick Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 183. See also Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). pp. 145-149.

ultimate living reality in *Von der Weltseele* (On the World-Soul, 1798).[2]

Herder and Schiller appreciated Kant's suggestion in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften* (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 1786) that matter occupies space because it only consists of opposed forces (attractive and repulsive forces), and the shifting balances among forces yields that dynamism to what we call material bodies. If the world fundamentally consists of endlessly novel blendings of shifting forces, rather than aggregates of matter only moving and accumulating into shapes due to external energies, then basic reality is far more similar to the organic, and holistic explanations take priority.[3]

As biologists during the late 1700s proposed theories about self-constructive organic life, the philosophical issue of matter's passivity regained importance. Could organic life rely on, and even arise from, the active causality inherent to a dynamic materiality? The biological theory of abiogenesis—that life might arise from non-life—was demonstrably wrong where organisms birth more of their species, but biologists also pondered how an organism grows from matter around it, and how the first organisms arose from nothing but matter. Growth is far easier to explain if basic materials are dynamically capable of selective affinities or repulsions. The confirmations from elemental physics and chemistry of such dynamism (combustion, electricity, magnetism, and so on) by the 1780s and 1790s promised a new philosophy of science, which in turn heralded the advent of a new metaphysics.[4] The greatest obstacle to that new metaphysics was also supplied by Kant.

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[2] Consult Miklos Vassanyi, *Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul in Modern German Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

[3] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, p. 62. On Kant, see Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

[4] See Peter Hanns Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), and Robert J. Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

**Natural Purpose**

Kant's stance in *Critique of Judgment* (1790) against anything self-organizing or purposive in nature did not derail *Naturphilosophie*, since his preference for mechanistic explanation as the exclusively realistic way to understand nature seemed arbitrary and unjustified to Herder, Schelling, Goethe, Hegel, and several other idealists.[5] His claim that something unassembled cannot be understood only begs the question in favor of mechanistic methodology—we also intimately understand purposive activity. For Kant to say that our intimate grasp of assembling objects permits us to think that natural objects are truly mechanistic, but that our intimate grasp of attaining ends forbids us from thinking that any natural objects are truly purposive, lacks rational justification. Either both modes of explanation understand what reality is actually doing, or they are both "as-if" regulative ideas. *Naturphilosophie*, respecting the progress of the sciences, all of the sciences, accordingly accepted both modes of explanation, and proposed that complex natural processes (such as life) are simultaneously mechanistic and purposive. Nothing purposive is derived or constructed from mechanism, because mechanism does not have explanatory priority or ontological exclusivity. Instead, mechanical chains of causes depend on unifying wholes, such as the living processes of organisms.[6]

More scientifically realistic than Kant's transcendental idealism, *Naturphilosophie* offered a naturalistic way to explain how knowledge is possible. The reason why knowledge is conditioned by the knower is because the knower is directly conditioned by what becomes known: the knower is already immersed in the knowable world as a constituent dynamic entity engaged with similarly energies. Hegel, following Herder and Schelling, disputed Kant's denial of objective reality to natural purposiveness. In Schelling's hands, and Hegel's as well, no veil of phenomena, and no

[5] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, pp. 156-157.

[6] F. W. J. Schelling, "Introduction" (1799) to *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, trans. Keith Petersen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 200.

metaphysical consciousness, separates mentality from externality—knowing already encompasses the knower and the known.[7] If this worldview is a 'transcendental' or 'absolute' idealism, it is as naturally realistic as possible after jettisoning the unknowable thing-in-itself, as Beiser details:

> First, Schelling continues to identify the absolute with nature in itself or the *natura naturans*. This is his formula for the absolute in itself, the indifference pole of the subjective and objective, and not only one pole or appearance of the absolute. Second, Schelling continues to identify the doctrine of absolute idealism with the standpoint of *Naturphilosophie*, which, he says, expresses not one side but the whole principle of subject–object identity. Third, Schelling does not abandon but develops in detail his program for the "*physical explanation of idealism*," which will derive the self-consciousness of the Kantian–Fichtean 'I' from the powers of nature as a whole.[8]

That physical explanation of idealism's unity of knowing mind and known world requires that Nature's powers are continually active and productive, on Schelling's theory. As productivity, whatever is produced only appears to be an object with its own qualities. In truth, products themselves still change for the duration of their existence, and their qualitative factors pass into further products sooner or later, while nature as a whole is never ceasing to develop and evolve.[9] Beiser describes the resulting *Naturphilosophie*:

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[7] Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Hegel's Appropriation of Kant's Account of Purposiveness in Nature," in his *Philosophical Legacies: Essays on the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and Their Contemporaries* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), pp. 163-178; John Laughland, *Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), p. 45.

[8] Frederick Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 559.

[9] Schelling, "Introduction," pp. 207-208.

> All of nature, then, is a giant natural purpose that consists in myriad smaller natural purposes. According to this concept, there is no fundamental difference in kind between the ideal and real, the mental and physical, since they are only different degrees of organization and development of living force. Mind is very organized and developed matter, and matter is less organized and developed mind. It is important to see that such an organic concept does not abrogate the mechanical, whose laws remain in force as much as ever; but it does see the mechanical as a limiting case of the organic. While the organic explains the parts of nature with respect to the whole, the mechanical simply treats these parts in relation to one another, as if they were somehow self-sufficient. The mechanical explains a given event by prior events acting on it, and so on ad infinitum; the organic explains why these parts act on one another in the first place.[10]

For this *Naturphilosophie*, a suitably naturalistic account of mind's own development under entirely natural conditions can maintain the unification of knowing self and known world, that unification which Materialism cannot deliver, Dualism abandons, and Idealism distorts. Forging that non-dualistic account cannot be assigned to the empirical sciences, or to *a priori* reasonings. As Schelling foresaw, and subsequent philosophy of nature illustrated, naturalism would remain unsettled by sciences using different explanatory methodologies and philosophers appealing to divergent conceptual analyses. A mechanistic scientific paradigm (in physics, say) can inspire mechanistic programs in other sciences, advancing materialism but retarding a unified theory of mind and knowledge. Scientific naturalism is more philosophical by attempting to adjudicate among scientific methodologies, proposing compromises where it can, but it cannot guarantee that the sciences together would yield a theory of knowledge with their own resources.

[10] Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, p. 157.

Philosophy of nature, with its wider scope than scientific naturalism, has the responsibility for discerning what is fundamental to all successful science, searching for a conception of nature best accounting for science's progress. When philosophy of nature also requires that a conception of nature drawn from the sciences adequately accounts for mentality and its knowing capacities, then Nature Philosophy is undertaken. Like Herder and Schelling, Dewey held that this Nature Philosophy will be an Organic Realism of the most dynamic sort, although he abandoned their stance that nature as a whole has purpose. The common premise to Idealism, Materialism, and Inert Realism is the assumption that reality is most regular and already regulated for appreciation by knowers. In *Experience and Nature* (1925), Dewey rejects that common premise and all rivals to Organic Realism in no unclear terms:

> Concerned with imputing complete, finished and sure character to the world of real existence, even if things have to be broken into two disconnected pieces in order to accomplish the result, the character desiderated can plausibly be found in reason or in mechanism; in rational conceptions like those of mathematics, or brute things like sensory data; in atoms or in essences; in consciousness or in a physical externality which forces and overrides consciousness. (LW 1: 47)[11]

The philosophical remedy is the least intellectualist and the most empirical: "experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and points to a different metaphysics" (LW 1: 47).[12]

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[11] Citations to *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–1990) use these abbreviations: *The Early Works* (EW), *The Middle Works* (MW), or *The Later Works* (LW), followed by volume and page number.

[12] Arguing that Dewey had no metaphysics, because those generic traits only pertain to experience, is contrary to his stated views and to logic. Dewey expressly locates generic traits in fundamental reality, not just what happens to be experienced as existing, for the separation between reality and what is experienced is precisely what Dewey wants to eliminate, not the entire idea of experience itself,

What is reality like? "For every existence in addition to its qualitative and intrinsic boundaries has affinities and active outreachings for connection and intimate union. It is an energy of attraction, expansion and supplementation." (LW 1: 187) This is the natural habitat for mentality.

**Natural Intelligence**

For Dewey, mind is unified with nature—there is nothing unnatural about mentality. Nature does not intrinsically consist of mind, because nature does not have any intrinsic consistency. Dewey had no metaphysics of substance or essence; reality does not consist of anything homogenous. Mind does not intrinsically consist of nature, because there is nothing that mind consists of. Dewey had no psychology or phenomenology for mentality in or for itself. All the same, mind is unified with nature.

Lacking an interest in reducing one to the other, Dewey offered a different mode of unity for mind and nature. That unity defies dualism not by postulating monism, but by affirming traits common to both mind and nature. Those generic traits found among all natural events—such as change, movement, dependency, and contingency—cannot be universals or free-standing properties, so no ontological "stuff" or Urgrund could be derived or constructed from them. Generic traits are not objects of scientific knowledge—no science is responsible for detecting or confirming them, as any scientific inquiry (and any other human endeavor) only presupposes them and relies upon them. Whatever happens to exist displays for naïve observation those persistent traits, but there is nothing real composed solely of those traits, those traits cannot point to any deeper mode of reality, and there is nothing taking ontological

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by whatever name 'experiencing' is given. His Nature Philosophy concerns reality, and that is why generic traits must show up in experience. If that point is granted, then one can appreciate how experience is entirely natural, and quibbling over whether Dewey has a metaphysics becomes moot. For a contrary view, see Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Ghosts Walking Underground: Dewey's Vanishing Metaphysics," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 40 (2004): 53-81.

priority by possessing only those traits. Dewey never proposed a dual-aspect ontology or a property-dualistic ontology, he dismissed any Spinoza-style metaphysics, and he rejected metaphysical absolutism in all forms. But mind is thoroughly unified with nature.

The second chapter of *Experience and Nature*, titled "Existence as Precarious and Stable," expressly announces Dewey's Nature Philosophy of Organic Realism:

> Nothing but unfamiliarity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses their sequential order, and mind the order of their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies. Processes may be eventful for functions which taken in abstract separation are at opposite poles, just as physiological processes eventuate in both anabolic and katabolic functions. The idea that matter and mind are two sides or "aspects" of the same things, like the convex and the concave in a curve, is literally unthinkable. (LW 1: 66)

Dewey's Organic Realism specifically proposes that "natural events" are the philosophically ultimate constituents of nature, presupposed by all successful sciences while permitting the mentality-naturality unification.

> That to which both mind and matter belong is the complex of events that constitute nature. This becomes a mysterious *tertium quid*, incapable of designation, only when mind and matter are taken to be static structures instead of functional characters. (LW 1: 66)

This mind-nature unity is not a secret kept from mind, or a mystery penetrated by mystical states or pure reason. Not only can ordinary minds come to understand this unification with nature, intelligence can appreciate and value that natural unity. Unintelligent philosophies deny or disvalue that unification, and disrupt intelligence's pursuit of its proper work. An intelligent philosophy

preserves that unity by constructing a rounded-out worldview that does not fail to include intelligence itself. This kind of philosophy, what we have labeled as Nature Philosophy, fosters a "reflexive" worldview keeping intelligence intelligible so that it does not become a mystery to itself. A wisely intelligent philosophy additionally encourages intelligence to highly prioritize its methodical application, not for its own sake or the sake of contemplation, but for its contributions to everything else capable of being valued. This kind of philosophy can constitute an "organon"—a comprehensive philosophy of knowing and living that includes logic itself.

Dewey's prolegomena, *Experience and Nature* (1925), introduces his version of Organic Realism. The full organon is elaborated in the core triad of works: *Art as Experience* (1934), *A Common Faith* (1934), and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938). Twenty propositions capture this organon's essential features.

## I. Metaphysics for Mind

1. There are several generic traits common to all existences which provide fundamental categories for ontology.

2. Among the fundamental categories for ontology are function, sociality, growth, and purpose, which are all as real as anything else.

3. Mind—whether at levels of sentience, intelligence, intellect, or reason—shares in some characteristics common to all existence and has an integral cosmic standing and significance.

4. The complex functions of mind are embodied in creative engagements with environing contexts, which includes other life.

## II. Intelligence is Social

5. Intelligence is manifest in proficiency of conduct, however categorized as technological, cultural, or moral.

6. Reflective, logical, and theoretical matters are not independent from other matters for intelligence's practical concern.

7. Human life is thoroughly natural, including the development of personhood, social life, and cultural institutions.

8. Philosophy should help constitute an organon of and about knowledge concerning all intelligible matters.

III. Nature is Beneficent

9. Nature has regular patterns and cycles which, while chaotic and unpredictable at times, can sustain causal conditions for good things and good living.

10. Laws of nature are intelligible aspects of nature, not ontologically distinct from the course of natural events or supernaturally imposed upon nature.

11. The intelligibility of nature is itself part of nature, and our capacity for intelligence is part of that intelligibility.

12. Although nature is perilous, nature's intelligibility beneficially supports the pursuits of social intelligence to fulfill ends and realize ideals.

IV. Morality is Universalizable.

13. Human individuality is developed through participation in social intelligence's realization of ideals through cultural advancement, where communication and art are predominant.

14. Voluntary self-improvement and self-control are key moral virtues consonant with freedom, social progress, and civic order.

15. Cultural/moral progress through intelligence increases the intelligibility of nature and increases the degree of unity with nature's intelligibility.

16. Personal morality is unified with social ethics, and communing and communication can enlarge that unification to potentially encompass all peoples.

V. Ethics is Harmonizing

17. Ethics for each individual is coordinate with growing harmony with nature.

18. There is nothing to fear from cosmic malevolence, predestined fate, or death, and there is no afterlife.

19. One's growth in intelligence is proper participation in the development of cosmic intelligibility and harmonization.

20. Though life is short and full of struggle, one's reasonable life has the support of the growing cosmic order and the significance of contributing to that order.

These twenty propositions were not due to his convergence with the pragmatisms developed by Charles Peirce and William James in the late 1890s and early 1900s. They are not the products of Dewey's own development of what he called "experimentalism" during the late 1890s and early 1900s. Rather, they are among his earliest philosophical doctrines driving his emerging system, dating from his undergraduate and graduate years, and they animate his writings during his first decade (1884–94) as a philosophy professor.

In 1894, the year that he left his first professorship at the University of Michigan to go to the University of Chicago, he published an article titled "Reconstruction." Thanks to the advance of both biological and physical science, and the modern scientific spirit itself, all reality is nothing but energy:

> Now we see the universe as one all-comprehensive, interrelated scene of limitless life and motion. No bound can be put to it in imagination or in thought. No detail is so small that it is not a necessary part of the whole; no speck is apparently so fixed that it is not in reality a scene of energy. (EW 4: 102)

Another article from that time, "The Superstition of Necessity" (1893), reduced 'necessity' to a logical relation, rendering the idea of 'part' dependent on a 'whole.' There are no causal necessities in nature, and there are no rigid basic units awaiting assembly into wholes. Only a provisional explanation resorts to connecting a chosen cause with its necessary interesting effect, to be replaced when a complete explanation discovers the dynamic whole that develops those supposed 'parts' (EW 4: 20-21). In Schiller's words, "all the laws of mechanics, whereby that which is properly only the object of the productive intuition becomes an object of reflection, are really only laws for reflection. Hence those fictitious notions of mechanics..."[13]

Dewey retained this understanding of dynamical and holistic reality in his later works. Its view of causality implies, for philosophy of science, not only that mechanical 'necessity' has limited explanatory value, but also that science cannot rest upon theories explaining separate objects linked by external necessities. Nature Philosophy infers that mechanistic paradigms falsify reality, 'explaining' only hypostatizations instead of nature. Mechanical accounts work well enough for limited purposes where controlled conditions permit, as befits their subsidiary role within purposeful engagements with nature. It is mechanism, not purpose, which only exists for the knowing mind: "only a philosophy which hypostatizes isolated results and results obtained for a purpose, on a substantiation of the function of being a tool, concludes that nature *is* a mechanism and only a mechanism" (LW 4: 198). What does not require the projection of mind is the natural existence of "a

[13] Schelling, "Introduction," p. 203.

cumulative integration of complex interactions" or, put another way, "the integration of a multitude of processes toward a single outcome" (LW 4: 197). Those traits of wholes maintaining their integrity are not imposition of design by a spectator mind, but rather the natural processes from which mentality itself is born and through which mentality has productivity.

Dewey's Organic Realism therefore finds that everything needed for purpose—with natural histories, integrations, qualities, contingencies, finalities, and ends as its evident characters—is an objective feature of reality (LW 1: 82-84, 264.) Although purpose may not predominate over all of nature and nature as a whole has no purpose, it remains the case that nothing about nature is alien to purpose, nature can cooperate with purpose, and practical intelligence has a natural home. These principles were also central to *Naturphilosophie* and its blossoming into German Organicism, the worldview which nurtured Dewey's entry into his philosophical career.

**German Organicism**

While an undergraduate student at the University of Vermont during 1875–79, Dewey was immersed in one of the rare American outposts of German idealism, romanticism, and organicism. The professor of philosophy, H.A.P. Torrey, required students to read Marsh's edition of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* and *The Remains of the Rev. James Marsh.* When Herbert Schneider and other Columbia colleagues presented Dewey with a copy of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* at a birthday party late in life, Dewey recalled that the book "was our spiritual emancipation in Vermont." He added that "Coleridge's idea of the spirit came to us as a real relief, because we could be both liberal and pious; and this *Aids to Reflection* book, especially Marsh's edition, was my first Bible."[14]

[14] Dewey as quoted by Herbert W. Schneider in Corliss Lamont, ed., *Dialogue on John Dewey* (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), p. 15. Consult James A. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 104-105.

Coleridge declared that religion must agree with reason, prioritized practical reason over speculative reason, and equated religion's truths with the practical judgments of human life.

> But if not the abstract or speculative Reason, and yet a reason there must be in order to a rational Belief—then it must be the Practical Reason of Man, comprehending the Will, the Conscience, the Moral Being with its inseparable Interests and Affections—that Reason, namely, which is the Organ of Wisdom, and (as far as man is concerned) the Source of living and actual Truths.[15]

Religious truth is truth evident within our lives or it is nothing at all. Coleridge affirmed that "Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation: but a *Life*; not a *Philosophy* of Life, but a life and a living Process."[16]

Although Coleridge's Christian faith was traditional, his philosophical tenets were liberal, freeing Christians from outdated Protestant theology. Coleridge's intense study of Schelling reverberated throughout his works. Both Cartesian dualism and Lockean empiricism could be overturned, Coleridge asserted, not only on philosophical grounds but on scientific grounds as well. He wrote in *Aids to Reflection* that "the dogmatism of the Corpuscular School, though it still exerts an influence on men's notions and phrases, has received a mortal blow from the increasingly dynamic spirit of the physical Sciences."[17]

Vermont's university became an outpost of religious and philosophical liberality amidst the doctrinaire Calvinism of Congregationalism, thanks to James Marsh's presidency from 1826

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[15] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, with a preliminary essay by James Marsh (Burlington, Vermont: Chauncey Goodrich, 1829), p. 115. See Charles I. Armstrong, "Organic Vagaries: Coleridge's Theoretical Work" in his *Romantic Organicism: From Idealist Origins to Ambivalent Afterlife* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 51-80.

[16] Ibid., p. 131.

[17] Ibid., p. 239. Consult Paul Hamilton, *Coleridge and German Philosophy: The Poet in the Land of Logic* (London: Continuum, 2007).

to 1833. During his training at Andover Theological Seminary, Marsh had rejected arid intuitionist empiricism and embraced German idealism. He was among the first American scholars to read Kant, Herder, and Schelling in their original German, not far behind Samuel Taylor Coleridge's similar precedent in England. At Vermont, Marsh embraced Coleridge and Herder openly, transforming the University of Vermont for generations to come. Marsh's philosophy colleague Joseph Torry, H.A.P. Torrey's uncle, composed the memoir of Marsh for the volume *The Remains of the Rev. James Marsh* in 1843, relating Marsh's introduction of Coleridge's philosophy to America with his 1829 edition of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection.*[18] According to the elder Torrey, "The position of Coleridge, that the Christian faith is the perfection of human intelligence, was one which he adopted from the fullest conviction of its truth."[19] During the 1860s and 1870s, H.A.P. Torrey held his uncle's philosophy chair and ensured that the liberal Christianity of Coleridge and the philosophy of Marsh was venerated by university students, and Dewey was among the most receptive.

In 1941, fifty-five years later, Dewey remembered that formative influence of Torrey's tutelage and Marsh's philosophy. In Dewey's recollection, Torrey privately admitted his pantheism to Dewey (LW 5:148), a potentially scandalous confession only to be shared among sympathetic friends. As for Marsh, Dewey particularly recalled how Marsh was conveying an Aristotelian view more than a Kantian view (LW 5: 185). Dewey made special note of that Aristotelianism because of its large role in Germany's organicism, which in turn guided Dewey's appreciation for the scientific worldview that organicism made possible. Marsh's collected essays in *The Remains* elaborate a sophisticated natural philosophy and proto-

[18] Consult John Beer, "James Marsh's Edition of 1829 and the American Reception," in the Introduction to *Aids to Reflection* by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. cxvi-cxxviii. See also Samantha Harvey, "Coleridge's American Revival: James Marsh, John Dewey and Vermont Transcendentalism," *Symbiosis: A Journal of Anglo-American Literary Relations* 15 (2011): 77-103.

[19] Joseph Torrey, "Memoir of the Life of James Marsh," in *The Remains of the Rev. James Marsh* (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1843), p. 119.

scientific psychology. Life displays nature's universal powers in an integrated form:

> We are constrained, in endeavoring to form a conception of the one principle of life, which thus organizes itself in the harmonious development of its manifold organs and functions, to represent it to ourselves as a power that, in relation to its organism, is *all in every part*, interpenetrating all its organs in the *totality of its vital energy*, working in all towards the same end, limiting the measure and adapting the form of each of its distinguishable agencies to every other, and thus effecting the *unity of the whole* in the manifoldness of its parts.[20]

Speaking specifically to human agency, Marsh declares: "As in nature, every power and every principle of living action has its distinctive character and produces its appropriate fruits, so in the moral world there is the same unvarying relations between our principles of action and the consequences which flow from them."[21] It is impossible for the will to do anything by itself, and hence it cannot be anything by itself. "As the most obscure and hidden powers of nature cannot act without producing distinguishable results according to fixed and invariable laws, so the human will can act outwardly and put forth a power for the attainment of any end, only by an agency combined with that of nature, and in conformity with its laws."[22] Reasoning itself is a manifestation of life's natural powers.

> In its immediate relation to the understanding and will, that is, to the personal self and self-consciousness, it [reason] is the law of our nature, given to us, and working in us, as the organific power of life works in the organization and growth of a plant, or of our bodily systems, independently of our

[20] Marsh, *The Remains of Rev. James Marsh*, p. 210, italics in original.
[21] Ibid., p. 429.
[22] Ibid., p. 430.

> own personal contrivance or purpose. ... It is the actuation in us, of that universal power which is the real ground and actual determinant of all living action, and one with the power and life of nature.[23]

Dewey appeals to Marsh in one of his earliest articles, "Soul and Body" (1886) to support his view that "soul" and "body" are related as "function and organ, as activity and instrument" (EW 1: 112) just as Aristotle proposed. Marsh states:

> We recognize the body, each as his own body, and the life of the body, as *his own life*. It belongs to him, as a part of his being, as the *outward form* and *condition* of his *existence in space*. ... It is not merely an *organ*, or material *mechanism*, to be conceived as distinct from our personal self, but *it is our proper self as existent in space*, in the order and under the laws of *nature*.[24]

A more naturalistic description of the soul could not be desired—after comprehending the activities of the bodily individual in their full significance, there is nothing left over, there remains nothing for an inner "psychical" or "spiritual" self to be. Dualism is insupportable.

As for his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins, Dewey's professor of philosophy was the most knowledgeable exponent of German Idealism in America during the 1870s, George Sylvester Morris. Morris was no transcendental idealist in the wake of Kant, nor an adherent of Hegel's sprawling system. He regarded himself as an absolute idealist, but his system is best classified with organicist absolutism, because Morris filtered Hegel through his own philosophy professor's worldview: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg.[25] The leader of Germany's Aristotelian revival from his position at the

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[23] Ibid., p. 361.

[24] Marsh, *Marsh, The Remains of Rev. James Marsh*, pp. 256-257, italics in original.

[25] Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 110-112. The fuller narrative about Dewey, Morris and Trendelenburg is in John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), pp. 23-26.

University of Berlin, Trendelenburg offered an attractive alternative to Hegelian dialectics. Dewey's homage to Morris did not fail to mention that decisive guidance:

> Although Trendelenburg had incorporated within his own teaching the substantial achievements of that great philosophical movement which began with Kant and closed with Hegel—the ideas, for example, of the correlation of thought and being, the idea of man as a self-realizing personality, the notion of organized society as the objective reality of man—he had taken a hostile attitude to these positions as stated by Hegel and to the method by which they were taught. While Professor Morris was never simply an adherent of Trendelenburg, he probably followed him also in this respect. At least, he used sometimes in later years to point out pages in his copy of Hegel which were marked "nonsense," etc., remarks made while he was a student in Germany. It thus was not any discipleship which finally led Mr. Morris to find in Hegel (in his own words) "the most profound and comprehensive of modern thinkers." He found in a better and fuller statement of what he had already accepted as true, a more ample and far-reaching method, a goal of his studies in the history of thought. (EW 3: 7)

Trendelenburg's Aristotelianism exemplifies all twenty tenets of Dewey's Nature Philosophy. Trendelenburg's own education descended from Schelling, as Frederick Beiser recounts:

> Though Trendelenburg would constantly refer to Plato and Aristotle as the sources for the organic worldview, it is not from them that he first learned about it. Before he began his studies of classical philosophy in Leipzig in 1824, he would have heard about it probably sometime in 1823, from the lectures of his teacher in Kiel, Johann Erich von Berger. Berger was an enthusiastic student of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, which had attempted to revive the classical

> ideas of Plato about nature. The young Schelling was an admirer of Plato's *Timaeus*, and even wrote in his early years a commentary upon it; it is not going too far to say that this was the inspiration for his *Naturphilosophie*. Thus Schelling was the ultimate source of Trendelenburg's knowledge of the organic worldview. Though Trendenlenburg would often take issue with Schelling in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, he still had major debts to him, however indirect.[26]

Morris's own recollection of Trendelenburg, published in 1874, enumerates the tenets of this Nature Philosophy. Morris first credits German idealism's founding by Leibniz, who identified matter with active force.[27] Morris then recounts Trendelenburg's understanding of the crucial metaphysical role to be played by this dynamic view of the world.

> Modern science is demonstrating with ever increasing completeness the universality of motion in nature. ... On the other side, thought depends in all its phases on the ideal counterpart of motion. ... The terms and processes of the abstract or logical understanding, such as distinguishing, combining, classifying, inferring, its ideas, such as causality, finality, all imply ideal or constructive motion, the counterpart of external motion. Motion, then, would seem to satisfy the first of the requirements for the desired principle mediating in knowledge between thought and being, the requirement, namely, that it be common to both thought and being.[28]

As for the place of vital life in the world, Trendelenburg assigned it no lesser status, as Morris highlights:

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[26] Beiser, *Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 32-33.

[27] George S. Morris, "Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg," *The New Englander* 33 (April 1874): 287-336, at 295.

[28] Ibid., pp. 319-320.

> The notion of purpose, inherent end, as manifested in organic existence, is for Trendelenburg the second fundamental notion in philosophy. Motion—the efficient cause—forms the basis and becomes in the organic sphere the material of purpose—the final cause—and thus philosophy and nature are carried up above the purely mathematical and physical realm into the organic and ethical. There is differentiation, but not opposition. The real categories receive a new and profounder significance, but do not disappear, when permeated by and in the realm of the organic.[29]

With mind reconciled with reality, philosophy must harmonize with science:

> Trendelenburg's positive aim was the establishment of a philosophical theory which could stand the test of comparison with the results of modern science, nay, more, which should be confirmed by and, so far as practicable, founded on those results. Recognizing fully the necessity of experience for all concrete knowledge, respecting the various positive sciences as sovereign within their respective spheres, he sought in philosophy the common band which should unite these sciences, and not a speculative principle which should produce them a priori. Philosophy was to be, in some sense, the one eye overseeing them all, the one mind comprehending them in their mutual relations and as parts of one ideal whole; it was to recognize in the case of each science, whether concrete or abstract, its place and use in the whole organism of knowledge; it was to be consummated in an "organic conception of the universe" of thought and being. But philosophy was not to dictate to positive science what its

[29] Ibid., p. 324.

> methods or its results should be; it should not attempt to control scientific fact.[30]

Without citing the precise source, Morris translates another passage of Trendelenburg as follows: Philosophy "furnishes principles for the beginnings of the special sciences, establishes harmony among their results, and maintains a living rapport among them ; she is thus at once a priori and a posteriori; the latter, became it is in the other sciences that she finds her material, and the former, since she must go beyond and above the material thus furnished in order to seize and exhibit the living band that unites the whole."[31] Morris halts his translation of Trendelenburg and adds in his own voice, "Philosophy must then bear a due relation to the real and to the ideal; she can be neither purely empirical nor purely a priori. Ideal-realism will be her proper name."[32] Trendelenburg's vision for philosophy's proper task remained central to Dewey's mature philosophical organon of his Organic Realism.

Dewey received a double dose of organicism while a student at Johns Hopkins, thanks to his other philosophy professor, G. Stanley Hall. (Although Dewey took logic with Charles S. Peirce, yet another American philosopher who imbibed deeply from Schelling, that encounter apparently had little effect.) By the 1870s, neurology and physiological psychology were growing confident that purpose can be a respectably scientific explanation alongside mechanism. Hall's graduate course on psychology used Wilhelm Wundt's preeminent textbook, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* (1880), which relied on purposive functionality to explain the workings of the nervous system, an organicist approach already familiar to Dewey.[33]

To overcome the dualism of mind and body without elevating mind itself to an Absolute or reducing the mental to a

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[30] Ibid., pp. 297-298.

[31] Ibid., pp. 316-317. Consult Gershon Rosenstock, *F. A. Trendelenburg: Forerunner to John Dewey* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1964).

[32] Ibid., p. 317.

[33] John R. Shook, "Wilhelm Wundt's Contribution to John Dewey's Functional Psychology," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 31 (1995): 347-369.

physical substance, Wundt had sought their underlying dynamic unity. During 1865–68 he concentrated his studies on logic and philosophy of nature, taught courses on the logic of natural science and philosophical results of natural science, and published a book on physics and causality. In subsequent decades Wundt described his monism as extremely broad because it follows the example of Spinoza, and he acknowledged that Schelling's key idea of development was important to his own work.[34] He accordingly developed his own version of Nature Philosophy, defending the natural reality of purposive processes, simultaneously neurological and psychological, exhibited by living organisms.

Dewey's early article "Soul and Body" (1886), already mentioned in its connection with Marsh, repeatedly cites Wundt to assert that physiological psychology finds "the psychical immanent in the physical; immanent as directing it toward an end, and for the sake of this end selecting some activities, inhibiting others responding to some, controlling others, and adjusting and coordinating the complex whole, so as, in the simplest and least wasteful way, to reach the chosen end." (LW 1: 96)

**Experience and Nature Philosophy**

Dewey elaborated that psycho-physical unity upheld by organicism in subsequent decades. By the time that he composed *Experience and Nature*, he refers to "body-mind" as the proper characterization of complex organisms, where neither body nor mind can exist without the other.

> Unless vital organizations were organizations *of* antecedent natural events, the living creature would have no natural connections; it would not be pertinent to its environment nor its environment relevant to it; the latter would not be usable, material of nutrition and defense. In similar fashion, unless "mind" was, in its existential occurrence, an

[34] Saulo de Freitas Araujo, *Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology* (Dordrecht and New York: Springer, 2016), p. 93, 128-130.

> organization *of* physiological or vital affairs and unless its functions developed out of the patterns of organic behavior, it would have no pertinence to nature, and nature would not be the appropriate scene of its inventions and plans, nor the subject-matter of its knowledge. (LW 1: 217-8)

The underlying unity of organism is a metaphysical unification for Dewey in the sense that bodies having organization are evident and undeniable, both ontologically and epistemically prior to any inquiry or theorizing about them. Organization cannot be rightly denied by any science or philosophy because Dewey classifies it as a commonly found and generic trait of existence (LW 1: 196).

This empirical metaphysics, characterized by further statements such as "the reality *is* the growth-process itself" (LW 1: 210) grounds a nature philosophy asserting that nature and mind share deep commonalities, thereby explaining nature's congeniality for mind:

> The world is subject-matter for knowledge, because mind has developed in that world; a body-mind, whose structures have developed according to the structures of the world in which it exists, will naturally find some of its structures to be concordant and congenial with nature, and some phases of nature with itself. The latter are beautiful and fit, and others ugly and unfit. Since mind cannot evolve except where there is an organized process in which the fulfillments of the past are conserved and employed, it is not surprising that mind when it evolves should be mindful of the past and future, and that it should use the structures which are biological adaptations of organism and environment as its own and its only organs. (LW 1: 211)

This Organic Realism dooms its rivals' notions of mind and matter: "The vague and mysterious properties assigned to mind and matter, the very conceptions of mind and matter in traditional thought, are ghosts walking underground." (E&N 74)

What is real, not just what is experienced, is the basis for body-mind. Body-mind, according to *Experience and Nature*, does not emerge from experience, as if Dewey thought that experience exhausts reality in an agreement with Idealism. If Dewey really held that body-mind only emerged from experience, he could have easily said so, but he did not. (Notice that his logical claim that the subject-object distinction only arises within experience, often confused with the mind v. body distinction by Dewey interpreters, is not the same as his ontological claim about body-mind.) Dewey was no Idealist, because he consistently denied that "experience" is a candidate for ontological priority over nature itself. What is that nature of reality? "Qualitative individuality and constant relations, contingency and need, movement and arrest are common traits of all existence." They are "the traits and characters that are sure to turn up in every universe of discourse" and "ineluctable traits of natural existence" (EW 1:308). It is necessary to add, despite Dewey's most explicit avowal here, that those generic traits are not merely traits of experience, or traits found in experience: precisely as they are universally experienced, they are first and foremost traits of existence. In the revised first chapter for the 1929 edition of *Experience and Nature*, Dewey boldly stated the stance of Organic Realism: "experience is of as well as in nature." Trying to forestall a dualistic interpretation of this view, he added: "It is not experience which is experienced, but nature stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth." (EW 1: 12-13)

Few statements by Dewey have seemed more pregnant while so ambiguous. An ontological interpretation would credit nature as "it is" with some sort of substantial experiential character, as if we knew what experience is intrinsically like and attributed that to qualities or properties imbuing natural entities, but Dewey never endorsed that notion. Aside from its generic natural traits, what gets experienced possesses no inherent "what-it-is-like-ness" to separate

it off from anything and everything else in existence. How and why matters do matter as experienced does involve a sentient organism, but that is a matter of contingent relations, not essential categories. Sentience is not responsible for the existence of what is experienced or for the generic traits of experienced things. Dewey never held that experience is contained within, or constitutes, minds. Quite the opposite: the 'subjective', the 'self', and 'consciousness' occurs within experience as one of its partial manifestations, while the subjective-objective difference arises within experience where it can be noticed and managed. (LW 1: 23-24, 179-180)

Due to the broad commonality between mentality and naturality, what mindful conduct accomplishes has the complicit engagement of nature's processes in every respect, in an evident or hidden fashion. That commonality and complicity is what Dewey is pointing to when he speaks of that 'unity' of mind and universe, which in turn requires that all mental capacities serve that interactivity. Naturalism can fulfill this requirement so long as it stays perspectival and pluralistic.[35] Since thought and reflection are activities as phases of interactions with and through nature, a dichotomy between nature's own ways and intelligence's directed ways has no ultimate standing for a wisely intelligent philosophy. Intelligence cannot be unnatural, and intelligence's guidance of activity cannot be against nature. Unintelligent ways are unnecessarily destructive, to be sure. Describing some activity as "human" lends it no honorific or exalted status. Intelligence is ennobling, but not all-empowering. Guiding an activity intelligently actually makes but a miniscule difference to the immensities of nature, and that difference only makes much of a difference to organic forms where they are living. As Dewey reminds us, the power "Intelligence will [n]ever dominate the course of events" (LW 1: 325-6). Still, mind's "power and achievement" still "implies a unity with the universe that is to be preserved" (LW 1: 313). Once again, Organic Realism locates normativity in nature, in the preservation

[35] For a classification of Dewey's worldview alongside contemporary alternatives, see John R. Shook, "Varieties of Twentieth Century American Naturalism," *The Pluralist* 6 (Summer 2011): 1–17.

and enlargement of mind-nature unity, which can only be pursued through intelligence.

Our desires and ideals, in themselves, are not automatically true to nature and they may become false to nature, betraying our unity within nature. An unintelligent philosophy would permit that betrayal. Loyalty to our natural home calls for intelligence—so that meeting needs and fulfilling ends are effectively accomplished in concert with nature. Intelligence is no mere means to achieving values, and values are not immune from intelligent revision. That much would be admitted by an intelligent philosophy. A wisely intelligent philosophy goes further: the exercise of intelligence itself is the naturally human process of deepest import for anything else worthy of commitment and devotion. To the extent that significant ends are objects of devout commitment, those ends must receive transmutation through intelligence to be intelligible—to be humanly realizable.

From Dewey's early period to his final works, his educational and ethical theories explained why the significance of personal learning and moral growth must not be reduced to preparations for future stages of this life. The ongoing development of intelligent life constitutes its own justification, no matter how limited one's individual contribution may be. Dewey's *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics* (1891) identifies the ultimate interests of life:

> As society advances, social interest must consist more and more in the free devotion to intelligence for its own sake, to science, art, and industry, and in rejoicing in the exercise of such freedom by others. (EW 3: 319)

This "free devotion of intelligence" is necessary for the enjoyment of anything else worthy of human life. If there is a *summum bonum* for Dewey's Organic Realism, it is liberated intelligence. Intelligence is never just *about* nature—intelligence *is* nature in its most potent forms. Intelligence is all the freer for engaging with the cooperative aspects of its natural home, which

Dewey called "God" in *A Common Faith*.[36] The creative choices and pursuits of intelligence, which are productively powerful as anything rather than subordinate to necessity, is Dewey's resolution of the problem of freedom in a natural world.[37] And one's participation in the development of intelligence is nothing less than an incorporation into the growth of the greatest good to reality itself.[38] Dewey's realistic worldview can organically fulfill Kant's postulates of God, Freedom, and Immortality in a most natural way.

[36] John R. Shook, "A Unity with the Universe: Herder, Schelling, and Dewey on Natural Piety," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religious Naturalism*, edited by Donald Crosby and Jerome A. Stone (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming).

[37] Dewey's article "Philosophies of Freedom" (1928) says of freedom: "... we may say that a stone has its preferential selections set by a relatively fixed, a rigidly set, structure and that no anticipation of the results of acting one way or another enters into the matter. The reverse is true of human action. In so far as a variable life-history and intelligent insight and foresight enter into it, choice signifies a capacity for deliberately changing preferences. The hypothesis that is suggested is that in these two traits we have before us the essential constituents of choice as freedom: the factor of individual participation." (LW 3: 96)

[38] To be part of the *summum bonum* of reality cannot imply that one has achieved a state of ultimate value, or that intelligence possesses intrinsic ultimacy, two extravagancies which Dewey denied (LW 14: 77).