THE APA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES DURING THE 1960s

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1. Introduction

The 1960s is widely regarded as a decade when analytic philosophy became thoroughly American and consolidated its dominance over philosophy in America. If that perception has some validity, it cannot be confirmed by the presidential addresses delivered during this period. Americans hardly had a monopoly over the presidential offices in the three divisions of The American Philosophical Association (The APA), as ten of the presidents during this decade were foreign-born. The addresses themselves, taken as a group, are not characterized by typical analytic themes with much frequency.

If there is any safe generalization to be made about this decade's addresses, we could point to the manner in which almost all of them offered broad surveys about each president's approach to philosophy in general or about the president's preferred philosophical movement, rather than narrow investigations into specialized technical problems.

2. Philosophy Unified?

Some philosophers, such as John Daniel Wild (1960–1961), even forecasted reunifications among philosophical movements. His address, "The Exploration of the Life-World," sought common ground on empirical matters. Appealing to William James (1906–1907) and his radical empiricism for inspiration, Wild urged philosophical appreciation for ordinary lived experience and close study of its features. Much of pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology, and even ordinary language philosophy could at least agree to methodically investigate the human life-world and its primal significance. One vast chasm remained: the radical divergence between the world described by rational and scientific discourse, and the world that living beings like us actually experience (7:7).

Denying that philosophy should subordinate itself to the sciences, Wild asserted the undeniable realm of "world facts." World facts have a reality as humanly interpreted and value-laden events making an undeniable impact on us, because we all live through them. By contrast, scientific facts largely lack that meaningful structure. Their meaning also arises from our interactions with reality, but strictly controlled and regulated by methods and instruments. Universal

objectivity can be acquired and accessed by everyone, at the price of omitting almost everything of immediate vital importance to each individual.

Having sharply dichotomized scientific facts apart from world facts, Wild outlined the role of interpretation for understanding world facts:

> The interpretation of such world facts must, therefore, fall into two distinct steps: first, finding out what these events meant to the persons involved in their lived existence; and second, searching for their real meaning. Such an interpretation will not be exclusively concerned with objects. It must be concerned with "subjective," or better, with intentional factors as well. It will avoid the traditional concepts of substance and subject, and will recognize that human existence is always stretched out into a world field. It will not subsume historic events under laws of succession, and then place them in a neutral objective frame. It will seek rather to discover types or structures of lived existence in the open horizon of the life-world. It is dealing with free beings capable of choosing styles of life and global world interpretations of their own. Hence it will aim not at prediction and causal control but simply at understanding. (7:10–11)

Phenomenology is central for discerning features of experience, having only a fleeting, contingent, or illusory existence as far as objective science is concerned, which are necessary to the humanly lived world:

> The philosophical phenomenologist will be especially concerned with the clarification of those structures like time, history, freedom, death, and world itself which seem to belong necessarily to human existence, and thus to make any world version possible. (7:13)

In the lived world, divides between the subjective and objective are not fundamental, and no mode of truth takes priority, not even scientific truth. The charge of mere "subjectivism" has no jurisdiction there. Superior authenticity is the better test for humanistic interpretations than the perspective from any scientific confirmation. The life-world has ontological and epistemic priority. Wild offered his reasons:

> First, the basic data of the sciences are first found in the life-world, as I have indicated. Second, life cannot be lived without overarching philosophic interpretations of the world which are beyond the proper scope of science. Man is a philosophic animal who can evade or postpone philosophic issues while he is doing science. But he cannot postpone them indefinitely as he exists in the world, and reflects seriously on his existence.

> The world requires global answers. For these and other reasons, I believe that the world horizon is prior and more inclusive. (7:18)

Another proponent of phenomenology viewed the relationship between the life-world and the natural world quite differently. Marvin Farber's (1963–1964) "The Philosophical Interest in Existence" found no difficulty with the notion of natural experience. He warned against the design of a special "philosophical anthropology" to encompass stretches of existence treated inadequately by naturalistic anthropology. His warning was stark and pointed—philosophers offering descriptions of "pure" experience arrive at features more theological than existential. Philosophical anthropology "is really a redesigning of a long-familiar traditional view of man, resting upon the hopes of many centuries" (7:208).

If disconnected from the environing world, mind inflates to transcending and absolute dimensions. However, it is not the satisfyingly simple religious realm, but the frustratingly complex social realm, where we are most human:

> No account of existence is apt to be more one-sided and incomplete than one concerned with human existence. . . . A descriptive survey of human existence without mention of the actual nature of economic processes and social relations is seriously incomplete and may well be misleading. One is far closer to knowing human beings fundamentally by seeing them in factories and in the fields, in fulfilling professional functions, and in their competitive business undertakings. . . . How does this view of man compare with characteristic portrayals of man under the heading of "philosophical anthropology?" The emphasis often shifts to the supertemporal or nontemporal, to the "essential," and away from the basic facts of natural experience. (7:209)

For Farber, seeking an unnaturally existential ontology only manages to "inject mystery into ontology" (7:217). Existence, however manifest, and not experience, is the genuine basis for philosophy. "The processes of physical nature and of the experience of real persons in the social and natural world constitute the starting-point for a real ontology, and not a fictional ego" (7:219).

Other presidents similarly grappled with ways to situate the relationship between science and philosophy. Socio-cultural mediators are apparently needed.

Perhaps there is a role for art? In his address, "Remarks—Mainly about Knowledge and Reality," Barnett Savery (1960–1961) argued that in the same way that philosophers and scientists attempt to describe reality with their words, artists, too—whether they be writers, painters, musicians or sculptors—attempt to describe reality with their work. In fact, artists may more successful in their descriptions of reality than their scientific and philosophical counterparts.

Savery explored the nature of knowledge and defended the realization that knowledge does not require certainty; it is not contradictory to suggest "I know, but I may be wrong." Further, although knowledge has a descriptive character, it also has performative aspects. To say that one knows is sometimes to say that one has a certain state of mind, which is a description; but to say that one knows can also be a performative utterance, like a promise:

> In many cases of knowing, we do guarantee evidence, reasons, grounds, [and] justifications for our statements. These performances that support our statements help us distinguish instances of knowing from instances of belief. (7:28)

Further, the pragmatist may be right about knowledge in that it is a "relative rather than absolute concept" (7:31). Savery expressed concern about the concept that only logical and scientific knowledge is "proper" and he was downright skeptical of the proposition, "all 'cognitive' expressions must be expressed in propositional form" (7:31). If true, of course, art is in a much better position to capture such truths than science or philosophy, and not only can art describe reality, but it can do so more successfully than philosophy and science—at least when it comes to such truths.

Savery went on to show how art composed at a certain time expresses the philosophical attitudes of that time. Take, for example, "the Parthenon expresses the idea of the finite and the bounded" (7:33), found in Greek philosophy. Dante's *Divine Comedy* gives us a clearer picture of the Christian worldview than perhaps any of the medieval philosophers. The Baroque style and its "world of structure, matter, and motion" (7:34) reflected rationalism; representationalism, which gave us "the world of reality, of flesh and blood, with all its sensuousness and quality" (7:34), reflected empiricism. It was an era of anti-intellectualism in which Romanticism was born. In our current era, where the most accurate descriptions of reality are mathematical formulas, which seem to be "nonrepresentational," perhaps the artist is best suited to "explain" the nature of reality. Perhaps, in fact, "reality is the imitation of art" (7:34).

Ernest Addison Moody (1963–1964) was similarly prepared to look to the social world for mediating factors between the sciences and philosophy. He focused on language in "The Age of Analysis." His address speculated about the future of philosophy—specifically analytic philosophy—by ruminating about its past and analyzing its present state. Moody was particularly critical of, and pessimistic about, his impression that it seemed to be solely about linguistic analysis.

Since C. D. Broad wrote *Scientific Thought*,[1] analytic philosophy (which he called critical philosophy) has become almost exclusively interested in the logical analysis of language. The virtue of this approach is that analytic philoso-

phy need not compete with other disciplines as its purpose is to examine the language in which those disciplines express their discoveries. The downside is that analytic philosophers could not resist the temptation to look in the mirror and examine the language in which they were expressing their examinations, which lead to useless questions like "what is the meaning of 'meaning'" and left little time to spare for their original task.

Analytic philosophy did not begin this way. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were concerned with the analysis of facts in their "quest for the elementary bed-rock for empirical knowledge" (7:228) and thought it was "possible to discover constituents and basic structural features of the world" (7:229). However, thanks to Gottlob Frege and *Principia mathematica*,[2] it became clear that explicating the logical form of sentences could eliminate certain philosophical difficulties (for example, Alexius Meinong's golden mountain[3]) and might even reveal "basic structural traits of the world" (7:229). Thus, the focus on language began.

Logical positivism made short work of the latter suggestion, soon "proclaimed the thesis that the only subject matter of philosophy is language" (7:231), and took to the task of rendering metaphysics meaningless and formulating the syntax of science. Moreover, the only alternatives to this approach focused on language as well: the latter Wittgensteinian analysis of language based on the assumption, "meaning is use" and "the phenomenological description of the *Lebenswelt* [life-world] pursued by continental philosophers" (7:230). And so, philosophy found itself:

> in somewhat the same position as the theologians of the later fourteenth century, whose theological language had turned out to be another self-contained world which could not be tied to the object of religious belief. . . . Its residual language game, which continued to be played within secluded university walls for two centuries, came to be scorned and derided by a society that had turned elsewhere to re-establish contact with the realities language is supposed to describe. (7:231)

The criticisms of the purely linguistic approach to philosophy under consideration are obvious and biting. It fails to provide answers to the religious, moral, and political questions society cares about. We teach courses on these topics, but nothing learned is applicable to real life. When teaching a course on ethics, for example, we point out the shortcomings of every ethical theory and thus establish that no moral theory is an effective guide for everyday life. Moreover, we are more interested in illustrating our methods and confining them to trivial imaginary cases than we are in applying them to more significant, difficult, real-world problems.

While the atomic bomb "threatens to annihilate the human race," all you can find in philosophy journals are disagreements between "the devotees of ordinary language and those of constructed linguistic systems" (7:233). To respond, philosophers might suggest that philosophy has always just been about the examination of language; but, in fact, it has not. They might point out how logic and philosophy of mathematics have clarified problems in the empirical sciences, for course it has—but of course, logic and mathematics do not exhaust all of philosophy. There is nothing useful, or even philosophical, about describing how people talk in various circumstances.

As an alternative to analytic philosophy, there is what C. D. Broad called "speculative" philosophy, whose:

> object is to take over the results of the various sciences, to add them to the results of the religious and ethical experiences of mankind, and then to reflect upon the whole. The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some general conclusions as to the nature of the universe, and as to our position and prospects in it. (7:227)

Fortunately, contrary to common understanding, it does not presuppose analytic philosophy. In fact, the reverse is true.

Need we despair? Moody saw a parallel between the then-modern situation and situations of the past, in which realism gave way to conceptualism, nominalism, and finally, to skepticism. But at the end of such stories—of Greek philosophy, of medieval philosophy, and the Renaissance—comes a new conceptual framework that enters the scene to reset the process and start things all over again. Perhaps there is hope; perhaps a new cosmological framework is on the horizon. Besides, there is no way "for us to foresee what use may be found for the fruit of our labors in the philosophical world-frame of the future" (7:239).

In his address, "Essences, Attributes, and Predicates," Henry Siggins Leonard (1963–1964) drew attention to a feature of modern logic, the logic of variables and binding operators, to show how a continuity between philosophy and science can be recognized. Leonard first complained that much of recent logic had presumed that characterizing and classifying are mutually entailing, but this only holds for artificial logical languages that diverge from English and other ordinary languages. In English language subject-predicate sentences, subject terms may not denote and predicates may not entail existence. For Leonard, no analytic attributive entails existence or non-existence. He supplied another illustration of separating the analytic from existence, pointing out how most modern logical systems agree on the argument, "if for every x, x is P, then for some x, x is P," which in turn says that at least one thing exists (7:260). Yet this is a metaphysical claim. Leonard supplied further examples to make his points that es-

sences do not entail existences, and not every attributive identifies an attribute. Leonard's more generous and philosophical language showed how to treat predicates that are occurrences of attributive terms; essences dictate how things are to be conceived; some true attributions can be excluded from a thing's essence, and some attributes of a thing are not true unless it actually exists.

In seeming defiance of Moody's critique of language-focused analytic philosophy, Leonard offered up an alternate logical language that he thought more accurately parallels ordinary English and was "more suited to the purposes of metaphysical inquiry than are the object languages associated with most modern styles of logic" (7:271). He called it "language W," which seemed to primarily be constructed to avoid certain existential problems that appear in modern logical systems, such as the fact that, to ascribe a property to something entails that that thing exists—which makes statements like "Santa Claus lives at the North Pole" or "Santa Claus does not exist" quite problematic. To solve such problems, he divided attributes into those that entail existence, those that entail nonexistence, and those that are neutral regarding existence, such that "X exists" is neither analytic nor self-contradictory.

Every singular sentence can be converted into a subject-predicate sentence. However, in language W, they do not entail existence: "All general terms are treated as attributive terms and all single subject-predicate sentences are regarded as characterizing rather than as classifying" (7:253) (this is a necessary addition to avoid the aforementioned existential problems because set membership entails existence.)

Leonard also proposed two quantifiers: square quantification and round quantification. A squared universal statement (denoted ⌜For every possible *x*, *x* is P⌝) is true relative to whether the squared statement ("For every possible x, x is P") is true regardless of how that statement is interpreted; a squared existential statement (⌜For some possible *x*, *x* is P⌝) is true if the original statement is true on at least one interpretation. Round quantification denotes that something actually exists, so that ⌜For every actual *x*, *x* is P.⌝ is synonymous with ⌜For every possible *x*, if *x* exists, then *x* is P.⌝ (7:259).

Leonard also introduced an "essence-abstractor," which allows one to identify essences and thus ascribe properties to fictional entities; thus, "an illustrative subject-predicate statement would be, Pegasus is essentially an *x* such that *x* is a horse" (7:261). (However, Leonard is quick to point out that the ontological argument for God's existence does not work in language W; something exists essentially only if it actually exists.) He concluded by introducing the "attribute-descriptor," "'the attribute in virtue of the possession of which *x* is such that'" (7:268) and looking at the way definite descriptions function in language W. If nothing else, Leonard demonstrated "what the object languages of modern

logic are really like, how they differ in fundamental ways not only from English but from one another" (7:271).

In "Reflections on the Possibilities of Metaphysics," William Henry Werkmeister (1964–1965) tried to defend the relevance of metaphysics to modern philosophy by articulating metaphysical questions that modern philosophy raises and spelling out different metaphysical approaches to answering them. The modern concentrations in philosophy—logical positivism, existentialism, etc.—lead to metaphysical questions themselves. Metaphysics' notion that meaning requires verification cannot be verified; philosophy's notion that reason is useless can only be reasoned to. So, both leave open metaphysical questions to be answered. Moreover, the question of why there is something rather than nothing, questions about the nature of mind, the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe, the distinction between living and nonliving things, and the question, "in what sense is human reason capable of understanding reality?" are all metaphysical questions yet to be answered.

But what is metaphysics? Aristotle called it the study of Being. "Being" remained an ambiguous term interpreted in many ways. Christian Wolff is faulted for metaphysical futility when pronouncing such obscure things as "everything that is possible is what it is" (7:282). However, metaphysics need not be done in this way. Kant inspired two different approaches: Schopenhauer's conjectural metaphysics (which unfortunately remains conjectural), and a personalistic metaphysics that "revers[ed] the Kantian order" (7:283) by making the person the key to understanding reality. Hegel, inspired by Descartes's approach, conceived of truth as self-certitude, and made "the crucial fact of metaphysics knowledge itself," knowledge "verifies itself to itself," and is a "self-manifestation of the Real" (7:283). Then there is Heidegger's approach, who thought that the Greeks had confused "Being" and "to be," and who understood the latter in terms of *Dasein*. "The essence of *Dasein*, being synonymous with existence, lies, of course, in its 'to be'" (7:284). When Heidegger is pressed for an interpretation of this "to be," he replied: "*Es ist es selbst*"—it is itself. It is what it is! A less illuminating conclusion has seldom been drawn from so prolonged and tortuous an argument as we encounter in *Sein und Zeit*[4] (7:284).

Some metaphysical questions may never be answered and some may be unanswerable; but we need metaphysics to even try to figure out which is which. Language analysis can play an important role in the latter task as well as other tasks of metaphysics, such as ontology (an analysis of "the categories of Being" (7:285)). Werkmeister closed by articulating the two steps such an analysis would require: "the recognition of the categorical differences of the various strata of the Real, and the recognition, also, of the uniqueness of the categories belonging to each stratum" (7:286), and then "to ascertain whether or not there

exists also a categorical structure that relates the various levels one to another and thus provides categorical context and continuity from level to level" (7:287).

Edwin Arthur Burtt (1964–1965) similarly wished to sort out which kinds of metaphysical or speculative inquiries still possess relevance. His address, "Truth, Understanding, and Philosophy," defended philosophical speculation against several charges. Do the speculative elements to a philosophy fail to admit full empirical validation? No philosophical position admits of such conclusive demonstration. Do the speculative aspects to a philosophy yield an overall view of the universe?

No one tackling large philosophical issues will fail to take a broad perspective over what counts as most relevant for selective treatment. Granted, the trans-empirical and universal approaches found in speculative thought are too often paired with over-confident claims to superior truth. Instead, wiser speculations generate comprehensive understandings instead of dogmatic knowledge:

> Today a philosopher can no longer speculate in the way in which he was expected to in the past. He cannot be a super-scientist or a super-theologian or a super-poet or a super-anything else. But he can understand what the scientist, the theologian, the artist, the man of affairs, is accomplishing as each of them performs his chosen task. To win such understanding he does not need to master an extensive range of detail in any of these areas; it is enough to reach the point where he grasps the essential role of each in the over-all adventure of man and its reflective interpretation. (7:303)

Alfred Stern's (1965–1966) defense of the "spiritual" had much in common with Burtt's support for the "speculative." Stern's "What Are Spiritual Phenomena?" sought a moderate and sensible role for these matters. Distinguishing spiritual phenomena apart from narrower religious matters and from abstract theological issues liberates the spiritual for philosophical inquiry. If philosophy resists the concretization of the spiritual, its essential role is revealed:

> It is my contention that there is no spiritual being, no spiritual reality, for it is impossible to find a spiritual phenomenon which, as far as its being is concerned, is not either psychical or physical, or both at the same time. What characterizes the spiritual is not being, not reality, but meaning. As "spiritual," we designate all phenomena which have one thing in common: to mean something other than they are in their immediate reality. (7:357)

He clarified his view thusly: "One of the characteristics of spiritual matters is that their meaning remains identical, even when their physical and psychical

substrata undergo certain changes" (7:364). He offered many examples of spiritual matters. A compelling example is the meaning to a literary work, which cannot be reduced either to its physical preservation (any number of physical substrates will serve), or to any mental instantiation (it is preserved even while no one is contemplating it).

Another president attempting to elevate a philosophical standpoint above limitations set by categorical divisions was Paul Weiss (1966–1967). In "Separate and Equal, but Integrated," Weiss highlighted the excesses inherent in both ontology and criticism. Ontology will seek systemic finality; however, criticism will not commit with finality. The opposition of the two leaves them both inadequate and self-refuting:

> Neither empiricism nor ontology fully exploits its characteristic virtue. Both are incomplete, but neither can nor is willing to say so. The ontologist is unable and unwilling to acknowledge the reality of the world in which he speaks and lives, while the empiricist cannot and will not affirm what it is on which he depends in order to be intelligible. (7:403)

They cannot be blended or merged, but ontology and criticism can be integrated when both realize how much they need each other. Ample and accommodating pluralities, not a rigid monism, will be their product.

Herbert Marcuse (1968–1969) also pronounced unfavorable verdicts against business-as-usual academic philosophies, with a rebellious tone. In "The Relevance of Reality," he denied that any philosophy purporting to describe human-independent realities must be impotent to influence any realities. Concepts important to philosophy ultimately derive from actual manifestations of those concepts in historical events surrounding philosophers:

> All philosophy, no matter how abstract and speculative, constructs its conceptual universe with the material provided by a particular historical universe, which remains operative even in the purest abstractions and speculations—not as sociological conditioning "from outside," but as the very stuff of which concepts are made. By virtue of this situation, the philosophical concepts remain inextricably ideological: their universality remains a particular one, confined by the historical situation. (7:558)

Philosophy can no longer evade its struggle with ideology. The human quest for reason and freedom (as foretold by Marxism) is the reality most relevant to every field of philosophy, including linguistic analysis, aesthetics, epistemology, and history of philosophy:

> The abstract, universal Telos of the philosophical quest is now translatable into the real Subject of history: it is emerging in the global struggle against the powerful international and national policies of domination and exploitation which tend to converge beyond all boundaries and particularities; and the rebellion against these policies assumes an equally universal character. (7:560)

Like Marcuse's Marxism, Frederick Ludwig Will's (1968–1969) pragmatism located the relationship between mentality and reality in life's practical activities. In "Thoughts and Things," he protested against that supposedly inner "theatre," where intentional thought resides "as a Cartesian mind or a Hobbesian brain" (7:570). Thought's independence gets excessively prioritized to the point where its mere presence to a self-conscious self is sufficient for its validity. Whether thoughts (be they material or spiritual in nature) successfully represent anything real beyond thought inevitably becomes the unsolvable epistemic puzzle. That some ideas may accurately represent objects is not enough for knowledge, since that lucky coincidence is not the same thing as justifiably knowing that a correspondence actually holds.

Information about the world is conveyed to us, but the utility to considering the information as representations does not also license status as true or false (7:575). There is nothing about conceptual thought (or language) guaranteeing that it can be perfect for, or even adequate to, what gets conveyed in experience. Fortunately, thinking depends on things in the world, not the reverse. "Thinking is an activity which we engage in not only in the world of things, but by means of things in this world, supported and sustained by them" (7:583). Will proceeded to draw out pragmatist implications to this view of thought for epistemic notions of verification, empiricism, deduction, and induction.

In "A Kind of Materialism," Stuart Newton Hampshire (1969–1970; 1990–1991) examined the philosophy of a philosopher (whose identity he kept secret until the end), interpreting him as a particular kind of materialist (regarding philosophy of mind). This philosopher suggested that human beings, their behavior and the mentality behind it, are to be studied and explained scientifically in the same way as everything else—by looking at the materialistic mechanisms that lie behind them. Of course, many of these explanations lie beyond our current scientific knowledge, but such mechanisms undoubtedly exist and such explanations are accurate.

Although accounting for the behavior of others in this way is easy, the question remains whether materialists can turn such reasoning back upon themselves to explain their own mentality in this way. Scientists' perception of the sun is different from children's because their knowledge alters their perception. In a similar way, if a materialist has a thought, considering the physical mecha-

nisms that lie behind the thought alters that thought (or, we might say, leads to a new thought). However, here a problem enters the scene, for the philosopher's understanding of that thought in materialist terms is a mental event too, which is explicable in materialist terms. Realizing this will change the thought itself, leading to yet another thought, having yet another materialist explanation—an infinite regress. Thus, the (yet to be revealed) philosopher's suggestion for another (Copernican-like) paradigm shift (in which we come to understand all mentality in materialistic terms) is problematic because it seems impossible.

The philosopher Hampshire had been describing turned out to be Spinoza, who maintained, "every idea is united with a particular modification of the body, and also . . . that, in reflection, ideas can be made the objects of other ideas up to any level of complexity" (7:604). However, Spinoza did not appear to recognize the infinite regress to which these notions, taken together, lead. So:

> the classical materialists are wrong in supposing that the two orders of explanation could properly be reduced to one . . . because . . . they write only from the standpoint of scientific observers of men [meanwhile forgetting] that, as they observe, their own thought involves thought about its causes, and that its changes [also] have to be explained in these terms. (7:605)

Hampshire concluded:

> It follows that we should never ask whether a type, or a particular specimen, of human behavior, or of feeling, are finally and properly to be explained by physical, or by psychological, causes, as if this was a proper exclusive disjunction. (7:606)

In "Philosophical Disagreements and World Views," William Thomas Jones (1969–1970) argued:

> the wealth of proposed solutions generated for any particular philosophical problem, be it in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics, can be accounted for, at least in part, by differences in the worldviews of philosophers. (7:613)

Jones began by describing what he calls "dimensions"—continuums on which one falls regarding assumptions about a topic (such as how friendly one is regarding Abraham Lincoln or how disposed one is to believe in plots). If you consider where you fall on every possible dimension, then that is your "worldview." Jones then gave three examples of where conflict in dimensions generates divergent philosophical conclusions: the (1) immediacy/mediation, (2) continuity/discreteness, and (3) static/dynamic dimensions. For example, different worldviews regarding the latter will lead to differing views regarding change. To one, change is an illusion or paradox; to the other, belief in stability is only generated by psychological insecurity.

Different views regarding continuity/discreteness makes a person see the world in a different way; one will see it as a collection of discrete entities (for example, Hume's billiard balls), the other sees it (and its "objects") as a merging continuous whole with no sharp distinctions (for example, Hegel's bud, blossom, fruit). This difference can motivate many philosophical differences, for example: different theories of truth (correspondence versus coherence) and of mind (regarding the difference, or lack thereof, between the mind and its object). Further, one will see infinite regressions, whereas the other does not. In political philosophy, one will value individuals, and the other the state or populous. In logic, one will place all propositions into categories (for example, contradictions and non-contradictions); the other will think such categories are "tentative and provisional" (7:620). This difference even generates different approaches to philosophy (which seems to point at the analytic continental divide):

> Logicians with discreteness-orientation complain that logicians with a continuity-orientation introduce muddle and confusion by refusing to draw sharp distinctions. Logicians with continuity orientation charge that logicians with a discreteness-orientation over-simplify. . . . An investigation that terminates in discrete segments, however minute these segments are, will never adequately represent the continuities they perceive. (7:620–621)

The immediacy/mediation "dimension is . . . an array of possible orientations . . . ranging from a preference for what is at a distance, objective, and neutral . . . to a preference for direct communion, empathy, and involvement" (7:621). One person seeks an experience that is "lived through" or "personal" and another person seeks an experience that is "witnessed from outside . . . [that generates] knowledge about" (7:621). Although many are between the extremes, on one end, we see an emphasis on objective facts, formal proofs, and a quest for an ideal scientific language (for example, logical positivism); on the other, we have those who seek an ideal "language of poetry and mysticism, in which we express our insights and intuitions" (7:622). This leads to different approaches to argumentation (which again seems to point to analytic/continental divide).

Those in the middle ground can, at least sometimes, communicate with (or at least understand) both extremes. While convergence on one dimension within one school might generate an "internally harmonious" school, a simultaneous disagreement on another might generate conflict within that school, and lead to "radically different philosophical schools" or even "conflict within a philosophical system" (7:624). For example, persons orientated toward both discreetness and mediation will see themselves as individuals in a world of objects with the desire and ability to capture the world, and its objects, with language. However,

change from "mediation" to "immediacy" and now "language is perceived as a barrier to be overcome . . . so that the philosopher can experience the world immediately; i.e., as it really is, undistorted by language" (7:626). Unfortunately, this leads to frustration: the immediacy orientation, and corresponding distrust of language, makes one think this cannot be done.

3. Reason and Truth

Several presidents selected core topics that involved reasoning, knowledge, self-knowledge, logic, science, or truth.

Abraham Irving Melden's (1961–1962) address was entitled, "Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact." His focus centered on the possibility of moral knowledge and the status of moral reasoning. He pointed out an initial puzzle about giving reasons for moral "oughts." True facts, even if relevant to a situation calling for a moral judgment, are insufficient for justifying a moral claim. As it is sometimes expressed, an is-ought logical gap looms. As Melden put it, truth-claims apparently cannot be moral reasons (7:65).

Only facts already possessing a special status beyond truth, facts that are morally relevant in a compelling manner, could be reasons for moral action. But what sort of oddly compelling facts could these be? For example, Charles Leslie Stevenson's (1961–1962) pattern of analysis for normative statements of the form "I like x; do so as well" might state a compelling good, but, of course, frequently it cannot. Solicitations (and imperatives, etc.) may be persuasive, but not because a genuine moral reason has been given (7:65–68). Evidently, all such compelling urgings must depend on the recipient's prior assent or commitment to something like "I want x," but that is the very thing to be justified by the giving of moral reasons that, in turn, must somehow rest on facts (7:73).

Melden had little sympathy for ethical naturalism. He did object to the psychological doctrine that acting and believing must be strictly separated:

> I wish to take exception to the contrast frequently drawn between reasons for doing and reasons for believing. According to this contrast the former cause agents to do, the latter cause minds to conclude or infer; and, since these are radically distinct functions of intelligence, reasons for doing and reasons for believing are mutually exclusive groups of items. (7:73)

Reasons for believing that x should be done are describable facts. It is not their static truth, but their dynamic relevance in a particular situation that makes them reasons to act for a person. A person who has never had any wants or commitments cannot be factually reasoned into acquiring them. However, the quest of ethical naturalism is mistaken. Real people already do have such motives; what they need for concrete actions are reasons for believing morally relevant facts to

that situation. Many questions remain (7:76), but moral philosophy deserves a fresh start.

In "Rational Action," Carl Gustav Hempel (1961–1962) also delineated and explored some of the philosophical questions raised by the critical and explanatory aspects of the concept of rational action. He first suggested that we avoid determining the rationality of an action by judging the rationality of the beliefs upon which it is based. Instead, we should determine whether the action in question offers the optimal prospects for achieving the actor's desired goal, given the beliefs the actor has. Making the rationality of an action relative to the beliefs the actor has will be more useful when explaining certain types of human behavior, especially when delineating between people whose actions make sense given their beliefs and those who do not.

Of course, the rationality of an action given a person's beliefs is not always easy to ascertain—such as when an actor does not have a specific end state in mind or when there is uncertainty involved. For example, suppose someone has a choice between (1) having an equal chance of winning a platinum ball versus an lead ball, or (2) an equal chance at a gold ball versus silver. Whether it is rational to choose (1) or (2) depends on whether it is rational to maximize one's minimum (choosing (2) means silver is the worst one can do) or to maximize their maximum (not choosing (1) eliminates the greatest possible gain: platinum).That just depends on what type of calculus you adopt. But when it comes to using rational action as an expository concept, we do not want to make William Dray's mistake and think that if reported reasons are to explain why someone did an action, then they must be good reasons.[5]

Sometimes, people act for irrational reasons. Although it is somewhat accurate to suggest that if someone acts rationally, they are in a certain dispositional state, this cannot be the whole story, because one has the dispositions one has due to the objectives or beliefs that one has. A physical body that is electrically charged does not merely have a disposition to behave in certain ways under various testing procedures; instead, it has such dispositions because it has the property of charge. Likewise, people do not merely have the disposition to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances, but behave that way because they have certain beliefs and objectives (although Hempel did not conceive of belief in any kind of platonic or dualist sense).

However, the discovery of persons' dispositions, for example, through observing their behavior, cannot independently reveal their beliefs and objectives, because such things are epistemically interdependent. If we have other reasons for knowing what persons' objectives are, we could draw a rational conclusion about their beliefs based on their actions. However, one and the same action could be indicative of two different sets of beliefs or objectives. (To use another example, a man may rob a bank because he wants to get rich and he does not

think he will get caught, or because he is so poor that he does not care whether he gets caught.)

Moreover, to derive someone's beliefs based on that individual's actions and unknown objectives almost always assumes that the person is behaving rationally—that is, the person is following the course of action that offers the best chance of success. But of course, a person may not always act in a way that offers the best chance of success—again, people do not always behave rationally—thus, an agent's actions will not always be indicative of the agent's beliefs. In fact, the assumption of rationality may make such explanations function like ideal gas laws. Very few things behave exactly as such laws describe, but the laws do give us gross approximations of what to expect. Even then, it is not clear how we should understand what it means to suggest that an agent has certain beliefs and objectives at a given time. After all, agents may hold beliefs that they are not currently consciously entertaining. Moreover, an agent may not recognize a simple logical relationship between beliefs; an individual may believe A, and that belief may entail B, but the same person may not believe B. An individual may even believe one statement and not another, without recognizing that both statements express the same proposition. So, we cannot even understand beliefs as assentions to propositions, but only as assentions to statements. These problems notwithstanding, one may find some explanatory power in the concept of consciously rational agents—whose actions are rational given the objectives and beliefs, which they consciously take into account at the time.

Theories based on mathematical models for maximizing expected utilities also have explanatory power in specific and carefully controlled experiments. However, we are still far from fully understanding rational action. It is something perhaps historians should take into account when they draw conclusions about beliefs and goals of an historical person based on the assumption that the person being critiqued was acting rationally. This is perhaps the best we can do for now, but that does not mean that we need ignore the identified limitations or that other procedures do not need to be developed.

In "Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception," after a quick history of the hostility toward science in philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century and in continental philosophy, Maurice Henry Mandelbaum (1962–1963) criticized the then-modern notion of a strict divide between the domain of the sciences and the domain of philosophy. Specifically, he was critical of the idea that philosophic theories of sense perception should be independent of what scientists say about the objects we perceive.

Mandelbaum was responding to philosophers such as G. E. Moore, Susan Stebbing, and Gilbert Ryle, who ignored philosophical problems about our knowledge of the material world raised by scientific descriptions and concepts (for example, molecular movement and the existence of electrons) and the rele-

vance of scientific discoveries about the functioning of our sense organs to those questions. In this vein, they neglect to appreciate that our common sense perception does not reveal many things (for example, that light reflecting objects is necessary for sight) and that scientific explanations do not merely fill in details concerning that which we already know. Both facts are, in fact, philosophically important. If, unlike Ryle, we choose examples beyond close medium-sized objects, and instead, think of our perception of (for example) stars, and what science reveals about them (for example, despite what our perception tells us, we are not seeing a tiny, but a very large object), we realize that direct realism is not always the epistemically preferable theory. (While Ryle raised objections to such arguments, they seem to stem from his misconception of the nature of philosophy itself, which he saw as a discipline limited to the analysis of concepts and whether they legitimately belong in certain disciplines. While this approach can certainly be enlightening, it does not exhaust philosophical approaches or even give the correct results.[6])

The conflict regarding what geologists and theologians say about, for example, the age of the earth cannot be dissolved by restricting certain concepts to certain disciplines. What one says is true and the other says is false; this is shown through science. This is also the case regarding matters of fact and physical descriptions; the conflict between a common sense and a physicist's description of a table cannot be reconciled by restricting certain concepts to different domains. The relationship (and conflict) between these descriptions is important to identify and doing so could help us evaluate the causal theory of perception and the tenability of direct realism. All in all, while "it is possible to be too solemn and deferential when we consider 'Science,' it is also possible to succumb to an unwarranted distrust of the sciences, placing too great a trust in the concepts of everyday life" (7:144).

After some opening remarks about his personal journey from logical positivism to "logical empiricism," in "The Power of Positivistic Thinking," Herbert Feigl (1962–1963) argued that although logical positivism goes too far in eliminating every kind of metaphysics, if appropriately liberalized, it can solve a number of vexing philosophical problems (for example, the skeptical problem) and justify a common-sense view of reality—what he calls a "realistic ontology of common sense and of science" (7:179). Saying that he had considered alternate titles such as "The Rise and Decline of Logical Positivism," Feigl addressed attempts to describe and then resolve the tensions between empiricism and logical positivism.

Early on, logical positivism took on the metaphysicians and theologians. However, instead of hearing that their beliefs were unwarranted, the metaphysicians and theologians were surprised to hear the positivists—armed with the

weapon of Occam's razor and respect for an instrumentalist view of science—declare that theology and metaphysics simply made no sense.

Later, the verificationist notion of meaning was introduced by positivists: nothing is meaningful unless it can be verified. This allowed logical positivism to rightly spot "the verbal sedatives that were offered (unintentionally) in place of genuine scientific explanations" (7:160). Although many object that this principle is self-refuting because the principal itself cannot be verified and is thus meaningless, Feigl suggested that there are many ways to avoid this criticism. One maintains, "the meaning criterion is a *proposal* and not a proposition; and that as a proposal it is to be judged in view of its fruitfulness" (7:182). Feigl simply revised the criterion to suggest "the cognitive meaning of a factual statement consists in its truth conditions" (7:182).

The problem with logical positivism (one shared even by those who propose alternatives to it like Karl Popper), is that it fails to distinguish between different kinds of metaphysics or transcendence, and in rightly dismissing one, it wrongly dismisses them all. Feigl offered three distinctions:

> (1) The *innocuous* transcendence involved in ordinary assumptions about the past, the future, physical reality, and other minds. (2) The *precarious* transcendence of "far out" hypotheses in the natural and social sciences [for example,] current cosmology, speculations regarding the origin of life, or theories in depth-psychology. . . (3) The *pernicious* transcendence which results in unanswerable questions, unsolvable problems, or inscrutable mysteries. (7:183)

While dismissing metaphysical notions of the third kind, old-line positivists would also throw out "the other two 'babies' with the 'dirty bathwater'" (7:183).

For example, it would correctly point out the ridiculousness of unanswerable pseudo-problems like the skeptical problem and the problem of other minds, which indeed are ridiculous. After all:

> it is only through surreptitious and self-deceptive steps that [one] arrives at the sort of philosophical doubt that questions our right to believe in the existence of such quite ordinary things as physical objects, other persons' mental states, [or] the occurrence of past or future events. (7:184–185)

But it would do so by declaring the problems meaningless in the name of strict verificationism, and, in turn, it had to dismiss questions about the structure of the universe and the existence of other minds as meaningless, and thus dismissed common sense theories such as atomic theory and the existence of other minds. In other words, "the transcendence involved in the realism of ordinary life and of science is quite innocuous, only rarely precarious, and never pernicious!" (7:190). And yet, as a consequence of dealing with the pernicious problems, the positivist dismissed them all. (This was true of both nineteenth- and

twentieth-century positivism and mistakes that seemed to lead to this overzealous verificationism were those like failing to appreciate "the logical difference between the confirming evidence and the truth conditions of our knowledge claims" (7:187). Or, like Popper, positivism failed to realize that although induction cannot be proved, it can be vindicated, per Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948) (7:189).

This positivist dismissal is not necessary; there are easier ways out of the pernicious problems that do not involve suggesting that they are meaningless or taking out every other metaphysical suggestion with them. The problems demand more proof than is logically possible to provide; they fail to realize that we are not limited to our experiences, but instead we can use our intellect to compare hypotheses. The pernicious problems are "not meaningless but so outrageously improbable as to be safely dismissed as false" (7:191). In short, the hypotheses that correspond to our common sense are the best—most parsimonious and plausible—explanations. So, to avoid the pernicious problems, we need not dismiss them as meaningless, along with them and every other metaphysical notion. Finally, Feigl delivered his conclusion:

> The meaning criterion of the logical positivists, if appropriately liberalized, permits us within the frame of the hypothetico-deductive, inductive, and analogical procedures of cognition to countenance as harmless the transcendences involved in ordinary realism. . . . The primary aim of the positivists was to restore to philosophy a natural and reasonable view of the world. But in their zeal to purge philosophy of all pernicious metaphysics, they overshot their goal. They used Occam's razor so radically that they nearly cut away the very core of science itself. (7:193)

In "A Metaphysical Paradox," Stephen Gregory Vlastos (1965–1966) similarly tackled philosophical puzzles about predicates and essences. He attempted to sort out what Plato must have meant by his seemingly paradoxical statement that the Forms of objects (which are non-physical abstract objects) are more perfectly real than the objects that instantiate them. How could a physical bed, which I know exists, exist less than an abstract object? How, in fact, can existence occur in gradations?

The word "real," Vlastos argued, is ambiguous, and its meaning is not always synonymous with existence. One can rightly say "these flowers are not real" without denying their existence, but instead, merely be pointing out that they are artificial. Of course, Plato never explicitly distinguished between these senses of real, but one need not explicitly make a distinction to employ it. After all, children use and understand rules of language that they cannot articulate. Indeed, Plato

uses this sense of the word when he speaks of the "really good and noble man" and of existing Greek constitutions not being "really real" (7:339–340).

Fortunately, this sense of real admits of gradations—just as we need it to in order for it to help us make sense of Plato's linguistic behavior and resolve this apparent paradox. Indeed, his language in the *Republic* (end of bk. 5) makes it clear that he thinks the Forms *and* their instances exist. Vlastos asserted, "where the 'is' is clearly existential, it is applied distributively to each, and conjunctively to all grades of reality" (7:341). Alternatively, the phrase "really real" does not assert, but categorizes the kind of existence that the Forms have (and that their instances lack).

Why is this important to Plato? You want to look to a real flower (not an artificial one) if you want to know what flowers are really like, and if you want to love something of greater value. The same is true of the Forms. If you want to know what beauty is, look at the Form—the genuine article—not something that merely resembles it. Likewise, the proper object of love is the Forms, not their instances. While the latter do exist, they are not the genuine article.

Vlastos had already defended the former (epistemic) doctrine in print,[7] but went on at length to defend the latter here (presumably for the first time). Passages in Plato, where he speaks of loving the Forms, are often skipped over by philosophers (in the same way embarrassing passages in the Old Testament were skipped over by Vlastos's mother). Yet, this love even plays a key role in the great argument of the *Republic*, which suggests that the good man at his worst is still happier than the bad man at his best, because the philosopher loves them:

> The Forms . . . but are themselves the focal points of a most uncommon experience, which [Plato] discovered for himself and found incomparably more satisfying than any other. The Forms are 'more real' than their instances in that sense as well. (7:344)

This brings us back around to what Vlastos found (and has always found) most troubling about this paradox: the confidence—the certainty—with which Plato thought he could prove it:

> The gravest flaw in the theory . . . issues from his imperfect understanding of that very experience which meant more to him than any other vision of Form. For if he had understood it as deeply as he felt it, how could he have thought of it as certifying cognitive and even political infallibility? What troubled me about Plato's metaphysical paradox when I first came across it was his confidence that he could prove it. Now that, understanding his paradox better, I admire it all the more, I think that I was right to be troubled. The mystic is the last person in the world who can afford to be an authoritarian. (7:347–348)

Julius Rudolph Weinberg (1964–1965) selected another major philosopher as the subject matter for his address, "The Novelty of Hume's Philosophy." As the transitional figure toward philosophical naturalism even greater than Spinoza, Hume was able to select out combine crucial logical, psychological, and empirical views already accessible from earlier Greek and medieval systems in an original manner.

Weinberg discussed historical antecedents and Hume's versions of these views: (1) denying, "causality and causation are intuitively or demonstratively certain" (7:313); (2) affirming, "we have no idea of cause, objectively considered, other than constant conjunction" (7:318); (3) claiming, "universal propositions which would suffice to make an induction certain or probable could not be logically certified" (7:321); (4) defending how we have "no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities" (7:323); and (5) holding that we should doubt "a single identical substance persisting numerically unchanged throughout psychic life" (7:326). While naturalism remains indebted to Hume, important parts of his philosophy can be relegated to obsolescence, such as his extreme nominalism and skepticism.

Philip Ellis Wheelwright (1966–1967) pondered philosophical and psychological issues about one's self and the selves of others in his address, "On the Meaning of 'You.'" He promptly reminded his audience that neither the *I* nor the *you* can be isolated and treated apart from the other, and promised to show that their dialogical relationship thoroughly grounds our ability to conceive, and believe in, the existence of other selves. The first section asserted that any *you* is contingent on an *I-you* experience (*Erlebnis*) (7:419). This *you* is reciprocally conceived as an *I*, just as one considers one's self to be an *I*. A *you* is always addressed directly; we do not speak of an absent person as a *you*, but as a *he* or *she*. No *he* or *she* is ever an *it*, but only a potential *you* (7:422). As one further point, the *you* has no plural (7:422)—we properly use "they"—a *you* and another *you* do not form a class with its own self-character (7:423). Section two explored how the use of *you* presupposes the belief in the existence of other selves (aliosubjectivity) (7:423). Dialogical aliosubjectivity is held in the context of an actual encounter among people: "You are a conscious self." Conceptual aliosubjectivity is propositional: "He is a conscious self" or "There are conscious selves other than myself." In section 3, Wheelwright defended his overall view:

> My central thesis is that the dialogical judgment is prior—both existentially and epistemologically prior—to the conceptual judgment in either of its forms, general or particular. . . . aliosubjectivity must be dialogically encountered before it can be conceptually understood; and that the truth of the conceptual judgment is rooted in the truth, partly discovered

> and partly affirmed as a primordial act of living faith, of the dialogical judgment. (7:424)

Wheelwright concluded with tentative observations about the crucial roles for child-parent interactions in the psychological development of the capacity for appreciating others as selves to be addressed as *you*.

In "Metaphysical Presuppositions of Induction," Everett John Nelson (1946–1947; 1966–1967) argued:

> causal necessity is synthetic, that it must hold between events in virtue of their properties, and that it is, therefore, a necessary condition of the soundness of induction . . . [and] accordingly [that] among the necessary conditions of empirical inference is the truth of propositions that assert more than is given in or confirmable by sense experience. (7:431)

In other words, he argued that empiricism is a non-empirical doctrine. He started by reviewing Hume's problem of induction, namely, that it entails that the foundation of empirical inference is a non-logical causal necessity. He did not deny a difference between induction and deduction, but he did suggest that a proper formulation of an inductive argument, which makes explicit the (non-empirical) rules that govern it (effectively adding them as premises), makes the argument deductively valid. He raised the question in terms of whether propositions like "this A is B" serve as evidence for propositions like "All A are B." Indeed, they do, but only if we also have a rule in virtue of which the former confers some probability on the latter—a Principle of Induction (7:432).

There are two kinds of universal propositions: lawlike or nomic ("all crows are black") and non-law-like, or accidental ("all chairs in this room are brown"). The former supports subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals ("if this cardinal were a crow, it would be black") and the latter do not ("if this chair were in the room, it would be brown") (7:433). What accounts for this? Either they differ in their relation to the other propositions or they differ in their nature. However, the former explanation seems inadequate because a set of propositions that assert nothing more than a constant conjunction cannot support a conditional. (That would make it more than the sum of its parts.) A nomic universal asserts something an accidental one does not—that being an A is sufficient or necessitates being a B (7:433). This is further evinced by the fact that an accidental universal being false requires a counter example (a non-brown chair in the room), whereas a nomic universal can be false without one; if there merely *could be* a non-black crow, the nomic proposition "all crows are black" is false (7:433).

The connection nomic propositions assert is a necessary connection, but not (*pace* rationalism) a logically necessary one; thus the necessity called for is synthetic. Such a connection asserts "a relation between the properties of A and B such that an instance of A is sufficient to or necessitates an instance of B" (7:436). Such a relation must be causal, so nomic universals assert causal rela-

tions. Although synthetic necessity is troubling to some, it undoubtedly exists (for example, if anything is colored, it is extended); and although Nelson did not pretend to know how we acquire knowledge of such truths, we clearly have it. Necessary connection cannot be abstracted from constant conjunction; nevertheless, we understand what "A necessitated B" means.

So what are the necessary conditions for instances of A that are B to soundly infer, "all A are B"? Nelson suggested that enumerative induction can provide a principle of induction that suggests a causal connection in virtue of properties, with a principle like this: PI. → .G/A_1B . . . A_nB=*a/b*. It follows deductively, "the probability judgment itself . . . given n instances of AB, is probably true to the degree *a/b*" (7:438). But that is not the inductive conclusion; the inductive conclusion is not about the degree to which the evidence supports a statement, but it is the statement itself. We drop the evidence, as it were, and we assert only the conclusion in alignment with a "Principle of Inductive Detachment" (7:438). When we see a rapidly falling barometer, we do not conclude "it's probably going to rain given the falling barometer" but simply "it's likely going to rain." And so, this principle of induction serves as a kind of hidden premise in inductive arguments by which we derive that their conclusions are likely. (Nelson had no answer to the question of whether the principle is true.)

So "the uniformity theory of law and of causation is untenable, [and] a Principle of Induction postulating only the existence of uniformities is inadequate" (7:439). The latter fact is made even clearer by the realization that, among other things, even if one knew that all existing crows (past, present, and future) are black, one could still not know whether the nomic universal "All crows are black" is true. Why? Because the evidence set of all existing crows would not reveal whether "if there was one more crow, it would be black" is true or false. It tells us nothing about counterfactuals.

Nelson closed with a few speculative suggestions about the unity of objects—what makes a collection of properties an object (and not just a set of properties that happen to "go together") and keeps it distinct from other objects. We do, he suggested, have a prime example of such an object: ourselves. As well, it can serve to help us understand how events can be related in exactly the same way—in terms of causation. In the same way that there are "real bonds," which hold between my properties that make me a person, there are real bonds that hold between events that generates causation (7:442).

In his address, "Diversity," Gustav Bergmann (1967–1968) hoped to develop an "articulate ontology of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic" (7:504), which can ground the truth of propositions in arithmetic. He was especially concerned with accounting for the ontology of sets (which he calls "classes"), which can help make sense of statements like 2 + 3 = 5. However, he would show, this

cannot be accomplished without the introducing "diversity" into his ontology along with yet another ontological principle: the principle of selection.

Bergmann started by describing the history of his quest to ground propositions of arithmetic, vaguely hinting at problems that he has encountered, and suggesting his main problem was a bloated ontology. In his ontology, there are "things," "facts," and "subsistents." Things are simple. Only facts have constituents (which are things). Universals are things and they have properties. It is a principle of ontology, Bergmann suggested, "what is presented exists." To be presented with a thing is to be presented with its type, or form. It follows, therefore, that forms exist; they are a subsistent. A tie ("nexus") is also a subsistent, and among them is exemplification, which ties things into atomic facts (for example, a particular exemplifying green) (7:496).

This is as far, Bergmann said, as his critics allowed him to go ontologically—but that did not stop him from going further. Instead of "true" and "false," he categorized facts into those that are "actual" and those that are "potential." These he called "modes" (7:497). He defended their place in his ontology by suggesting that they do three jobs:

(1) They make sense of how one can think of something that doesn't exist.
(2) They "can give a realistic account of perception" (7:497).
(3) They help us make sense of belief and disbelief, and reconcile the fact that correspondence is the nature of truth and yet coherence is our only criterion of truth (7:498).

They also help us make sense of necessities, which brought him to his next point: logical connectives—most certainly negation and binary conjunction—are presented to us in perception.

When we consider two colors, green and blue, we are presented with them not being the same. So we have "four entities, the two things, their being diverse, and the complex of which these three are the constituents" (7:501). Diversity is what we have to add to make the set, a set; without diversity, it's a single object instead of a set. Why? Because if thing 1 and thing 2 are not diverse (i.e., distinct), they are the same object.

Although diversity is similar to exemplification, it is different. Two diverse things exemplify diversity; a thing and a form do not (even though they are not identical). In short, diversity makes possible the existence of classes, for objects in a class must be diverse (from each other).

Finally, in an effort to deal with the problem of infinite sets, Bergmann introduced his principle of selection. "There is an enumeration character for each selection, whether finite or infinite" (7:503). This principle cannot be proven; this is why it is a principle. But he also suggests that the "actually infinite" is something that we can say exists but which we cannot actually conceive.

4. Values, Aesthetics, and Ethics

Normative and axiological topics were the subject of several addresses during the 1960s, a decade that saw some of the twentieth century's leading thinkers on aesthetics and ethics rise to presidencies in The APA. This was an "age of analysis" as several presidents openly admitted; the philosophical explorations of values during this decade reflected that age no less than the exploration of topics like knowledge and truth. Another worry on almost all presidents' minds when they dealt with values was the is-ought gap between facts and values.

Isabel Payson Creed Hungerland (1962–1963), delivered "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts." Aesthetic descriptions of an art object cannot serve the same function as, nor have the same value as, descriptions of the ordinary features of things that we use to discriminate them apart. Aesthetic descriptions and their validity require separate logical analysis, not to be assimilated to justifications for asserting propositions or entailment relations between propositions. Talk of criteria for ascriptions is confusing and unhelpful, especially in aesthetics. Hungerland claimed that there are, properly speaking, no criteria for aesthetic ascribings, even though such ascribings have preconditions, and aesthetic ascriptions have truth conditions (7:155). Furthermore, although aesthetic ascriptions can seem just like descriptions made from "normal" perspectives by "normal" observers in appropriate situations, they cannot be reduced to such descriptions. There remains an essential role for an observer's peculiar "mental stance" (7:157) encompassing such matters as common sympathies, snobberies, outlooks, personal history, training in certain arts (7:157).

This stance on aesthetics appears to ally with subjectivism rather than objectivism, as Hungerland admitted (7:158), yet it cannot be classed with subjectivism, since aesthetic ascriptions are not fully reducible to reports of subjective impressions, feelings, emotions, attitudes, and the like. On the other hand, Hungerland denied objectivism since aesthetic ascriptions should not be based on specific and isolatable features that any object could display to just anyone. They have more to do with the sort of psychologically holistic experiences studies by gestalt psychology (7:163). Aesthetic ascriptions are not determined by someone having taking a pre-specified standpoint—those ascriptions instead recommend that we come to take a certain perceptual viewpoint (7:165). Aesthetic judgments can be justified by non-arbitrary support from a cultural milieu of like-minded people, even if there are no truth conditions to be given for them.

Henry Nelson Goodman's (1967–1968) address, "Art and Inquiry," agreed with Hungerland that the discrimination and evaluation of art objects cannot be reduced to the passive recognition of static features, or be answerable to whatever counts as the "normal" manner of observing the perspectival properties of things. Only the active intellect, inquisitive and exploratory, can do justice to fulfilling the aesthetic purposes that art objects embody. Seeking only disinterested pleasures or special emotions only fails to do justice to art; better to say

that art is distinguished by satisfactions sought in them (but not necessarily gained, in the case of disturbing or poor art). The contribution of the inquisitive aesthetic evaluator is crucial, but it is necessary to reject a presumed dichotomy between the cognitive and the emotional. In aesthetic appreciation, the emotions can function cognitively during inquiries into art (7:454). Indeed, appropriately controlled emotions drive the evaluations central to any inquiry, not excluding scientific inquiry.

The modulation of cognitive emotions is mainly conducted through symbolism; Goodman outlined core features to symbolic systems, such as syntactic and semantic density and relative repleteness. Exercising our symbol skills beyond immediate need is the entryway to the artistic world and the delights of playful discovery. Goodman concluded by accounting for typical features of art appreciation and the art world with his account of aesthetic inquiry.

James Louis Jarrett Jr.'s (1967–1968) address, "Literary Functions, Roles, Masks," discussed and evaluated a variety of theories about the artistic craft of writing. Should writing simply exemplify "the" craft or the formal criteria for writing? Should writing instead convey and induce in readers the author's subjective thoughts and feelings? Perhaps the artist's task is to arouse pre-approved social sentiments, or the dominant ideologies or theologies of the times. On the other hand, perhaps the artistry arises from a confessional stance taken by the artist. How much do the roles adopted by authors, or the intentions of authors, dictate the reader's interpretations?

Critics fully awakened to the ample opportunity to judge a literary work by not just the author but the author's role, status, or intention, are then empowered to pass verdicts more about those factors and purposes than any intrinsic merits to the work. Such verdicts, so easily rendered, can, in turn, next license judgments of sincerity/insincerity upon an author. Is this a case of committing the "intentional fallacy"? (7:474). On the other hand, why could an author not honestly deliver on a promise to provide what the intended audience wants from a literary work? Having paid due respect to so many variables when attending to the literary value of a work, Jarrett offered his typology for categorizing authors, using such labels such as: "as entertainer, as prophet, as game player, as reporter, and as spellbinder" (7:477). We must be willing to enter into relationships with authors in their masks. "Writers and other artists play many parts, vary in how they see their true function, wear a multiplicity of masks; and part of what it is to come to see, to listen, to read aesthetically is to accept, nay to delight in this variety" (7:488).

Turning from presidential addresses on aesthetic appraisals to addresses concerning moral appraisals, we do well to begin with Charles Leslie Stevenson (1961–1962). He directly tackled problems surrounding the questions of subjectivism and relativism attaching to value theories in his address, "Relativism and

Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value." He first pointed out how descriptive terms are rarely relative in all respects; typical terms can be relative in one respect yet not in another, depending on how the term is applied within a broader context. This, in turn, shapes the way that "relativism" may be applied. Asserting that relativism is the approach to some set of terms concerning some topic or another is way to basically claim that those key terms are all relative terms (7:112). However, the warning that terms are never "relative" in themselves must be heard.

Asserting that relativism concerning the basis of values usually involves taking "X is good" to mean "X is approved by ____" (7:112).The relativism arises because the circumstances or situations those people find themselves are omitted from the analysis of "good," so that only the people involved (and their beliefs, intuitions, attitudes, and so on) are referenced. Stevenson aimed to "contrast a relativistic theory of value with a simplified version of the view that I have worked out in my *Ethics and Language*. . . . the so-called non-cognitive view" (7:114).

Unlike naturalistic subjectivism's focus on mere feelings, which cannot account for genuine disagreements over an issue, expressions by two people of their divergent attitudes toward something are at least directed toward the same independent thing, and can be supported by reasons to believe that those attitudes are justified (7:115–116).

Stevenson took great pains to emphasize how his approach makes room for the crucial role of reasons supporting approvals, reasons that are themselves beliefs about appropriate attitudes taken toward things. He then asserted:

> when we claim that the factual reason, R, if true, would justify or help to justify the evaluative conclusion, E, we are in effect making another value judgment, E', of our own—the latter serving to evaluate the situation that we shall have if the facts of the case include those that R purports to describe. (7:121)

That long and complex chains of value judgments undergird our specific evaluations of concrete matters before us should not be surprising. What should be more surprising is that anybody should not only assent to relativism but try to live by it. Stevenson concluded:

> A consistent relativist, when asked what is good or right, et cetera, would in effect discuss only what is or was considered good or right, et cetera, and thus would himself stand committed to no value judgments whatsoever. He would be a non-participant on evaluative issues—as no man, in practice, can be. (7:123)

Arthur Campbell Garnett (1960–1961), like Stevenson, found the dynamic life of commitment to be the ultimate ground for evaluative judgments. Garnett selected "Freedom and Creativity" for his theme. Freedom is usually conceived as freedom from restraining conditions. However, eluding restraint, by itself, has no positive value, and presupposes that this freedom is the opportunity for creative action, which is the true bearer of value. He found creativity in the living activity of every biological organism, and levels of self-determination characterize behavior as it becomes more purposive and self-directed. In humanity, creative action is a far better candidate for the supreme good in life than pleasure or reason. Creativity is (usually) pleasurable, and reason is needed to guide creativity. Creativity is always valued in and for itself, but one person's exercise of free creativity can degenerate into blind habit, and it can limit or harm that of others. Creativity is, therefore, always limited by its earlier manifestations, internally and externally. That is why acts of will are always delimited and incomplete rather than utterly free from conditions.

Feeling as if we do something on a spontaneous whim reflects situations where habits are so balanced or inconsequential that any choice will do. Such a choice seems radically "free," yet those kinds of choices are not really exemplary of free creativity. We do experience a sense of creative willing when we partially deviate, for good reasons and purposes, from familiar habits in pursuit of who we think we really are and ought to be. Reasons for acting have more to do with the future than the past. Moral judgment exemplifies that creativity in the name of the true self.

> Thus moral judgment, when clear-sighted, endorses the creative intention but demands that it shall express the full capacity of the rational self for creativity—that expression which sees its own activity as truly creative only so far as the variety and order it creates facilitate the efficiency of creative activity wherever else it is expressed. The outcome of this analysis is that *it is good that men should be free*, provided that their freedom is not only a freedom from external restraints upon the self, but also a freedom of the creative impulse within the self to find its own expression, guided by the fullest possible illumination of its own intelligence, and sufficiently independent of the determining influence of habit structures that canalize activity in accord with pre-established norms and goals. (7:48)

Our capacity to take responsibility for our actions is predicated upon our prior developed capacity to look after and take responsibility for our own self as it should be. Worry over determinism cannot deflate this account of responsibility, according to Garnett. Whatever prior conditions prevail prior to decisions, they cannot be regarded as determining decisions. While necessary prior condi-

tions for deliberately creative acts must have been present, sufficient conditions were not; creative volition is the extra needed factor for creative decisions. That volition is a purposive manifestation of the self in the present moment, and not any abandonment to chance or irresponsibility. Besides, no determinism is proven by logic or evidence, so we are free to assert the value of our moral responsibility as a robust act of self-creativity without fear of contradiction.

William Klaas Frankena's (1965–1966) address, "On Saying the Ethical Thing," appealed to Peter Frederick Strawson's notion of creative philosophical work in addition to descriptive or elucidatory work. Metaethical inquiries into the meaning and justifications for normative judgments should be normative themselves, in the sense that metaethics can recommend certain understandings of moral language, especially where they might avoid the ambiguities of ordinary moral discourse (7:377). Moral discourse largely consists of appraising, commending, criticizing, prescribing, and so on; ethical naturalists and intuitionists try to reduce or eliminate those modes of discourse in favor of factual matters and only disagree over where (in nature, or in the mind) those matters are located. Stevenson sketched his emerging view like this:

> a normative judgment entails a claim that one who takes a certain point of view and is rational within that point of view (that is, knows the facts, is clearheaded, et cetera) will take a certain attitude, perform a certain action, or at least subscribe to the same judgment. (7:387)

Moral judgments are not really factual assertions about matters, but rather acts of approvals adopted from a certain reasonable point of view (7:387). Approvals may be more or less well supported by reasons, of course, so disagreements over judgments can be cognitively pursued and (possibly) resolved by rational persons.

Vivian Jerauld McGill (1968–1969) announced from the outset of his address, "Scientific Ethics and Negotiation," that his position on ethics was:

> a cognitive, naturalistic theory of ethics, which we shall also call pragmatic. By "cognitive" we mean that moral judgments can be construed as true or false, and that some can be known to be more probable than others. "Naturalistic" signifies that moral judgments are susceptible of confirmation by the methods of the empirical sciences and observation. . . . the best policies and right decisions can be arrived at only by the give and take of opposing parties, in terms of probabilities pertinent in every way to the realizing of common interest. (7:513)

Like other presidential addresses of this decade on normativity and morality, McGill made his own complaint against the supposed divide between the cogni-

tive and the emotional. Emotions can and should have their reasons, of course, so cognitivism has an advantage over emotivism. He selected Stevenson's established view (without citing his presidential address), favoring non-cognitivist emotivism, for criticism. Just because we cannot really "demonstrate" the truth of moral judgments cannot mean that we never have good reasons for them, or that they cannot really be true or false (7:515).

McGill thought cognitivism to be overturned by considerations that moral judgments are more like imperatives than descriptions, so they are not knowable and, therefore, they cannot be true or false. He pointed out that the normative force to a recommendation rests ultimately on appropriate reasons available for asserting it, and not the mere way it was asserted. Those reasons are in the realm of facts, facts made relevant by the situation calling for an evaluation. Is this a violation of the is-ought dictum? Here, McGill appealed to John Dewey (1905–1906):

> An effective answer to the doctrine that ought cannot be derived from is, we believe, was stated by Dewey on many occasions. It is fallacious to infer the desirable from the desired only when the desirable is taken to be an incorrigible absolute, and it is forgotten that the desired can become more and more desirable as it is appraised in larger contexts of causally related events and probabilities. (7:519)

Those who ignore the crucial role of context in normative appraisals can be launched into a pursuit of the ultimate or intrinsic good, to finally settle reasons on firm foundations. Ethics, then, confronts the equivalent of foundationalism or the problem of the criterion, as in epistemology. Ethical principles are not premises for deducing specific normative judgments valid in all circumstances. Rather, their validity resides in their (so far) established utility for guiding the success of our practical activities in the long run for most or all people.

McGill advocated for a scientific ethics, but cautioned:

> in recommending a scientific ethics we include under "scientific" not only bodies of known propositions and their proofs, but also the process of discovery, the choice of problems, subject matter, methods, goals, having the broad purpose of serving human needs of all kinds, including the contemplation of truth. Ethics, similarly, is understood as a process of discovery as well as justification of moral judgments and ethical principles. (7:523)

Concluding, he proposed, "negotiations be taken as a model for ethics" (7:526).

Richard Booker Brandt's (1969–1970) "Rational Desires" got started by considering the issue of intrinsic values, values for which it is rational for a person to desire for their own sake. This way of approaching intrinsic values is far

narrower than the traditional philosophical search for values intrinsically good for all people no matter their rational states of mind. Brandt defined a "rational desire" first, as "one that is *not irrational* . . . one . . . not irrational to have." He used the term rational desire "for any desire that survives confrontation with vivid awareness of relevant facts" (7:635). The origin of acquired desires, and the maintenance of authentic desires, can be explained in terms of what were then considered speculative areas of psychology, for example, he asserted, "stimulus generalization is involved in the formation of desires and aversions" (7:644). He also discussed how the pruning and diminishment of irrational desires can be accomplished.

Brandt endorsed the distinction between claiming that something happens to be desired and asserting that something is desirable. Saying that something is desirable implies that it would be desired by people trying to be maximally rational about it. By extension, something is intrinsically valuable if it would be desired by a person who is successfully rational.

Our final address, by Roderick Milton Chisholm (1968–1969), tackled theodicy in "The Defeat of Good and Evil." Chisholm assumed that there are such things as intrinsic goods (pleasure, happiness love, etc.) and that they are states of affairs. Furthermore, we say that some state of affairs more generally can be intrinsically good (or evil) where it entails the existence of an intrinsic good (or evil). Citing earlier work with Ernest Sosa, in which they set forth a value calculus,[8] he summarized their conclusions as follows:

> We have assumed, of course, that the relation of being intrinsically better is one that is asymmetric and transitive. And we have also assumed the following: that all indifferent states of affairs are the same in value; that all good states of affairs are better than their negations; and that all bad states of affairs are worse than their negations. (7:536).

Applying the value calculus to good and evil, Chisholm discussed the balancing off and defeat of good and evil. He explained that even if a wider whole contains something quite good in itself, yet that whole is not good, the good part is balanced, but not eliminated, by its context (7:537). As to evil, analogously:

> There will be a whole with a good part and a bad part; these parts will exclude each other; the whole itself will not be bad; but it will be worse than its good part. We needn't say, however, that the whole has a good part; for if a whole is not bad and is worse than one of its parts, then the part that it is worse than will be a part that is good. If the whole is neutral, then the badness of the part will be counterbalanced; if the whole is good, then the badness of the part will be outweighed. . . . When evil is balanced off, we

> may yet regret or resent *its* presence in the larger whole. . . . But if goodness is ever defeated by a whole that is bad, then we may well regret or resent the very part that is good. . . . But if badness is ever defeated by a whole that is good, then, as I have suggested, we may well be thankful for the very presence of the part that is bad. (7:538–541)

Regarding theodicy, Chisholm made some observations: First, an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God could not have created a world containing only intrinsic goods. Second, If God must create a world that is absolutely good, it can contain regrettable evils so long as they are defeated evils. However, no theologian is in a position to know that we live in an absolutely good world. Indeed, for all anyone knows, we might be in an absolutely evil world that is defeating all its goodness (7:545–546).

Notes

1. C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

2. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia mathematica*, 2nd ed. 3 vols. (Cambridge, UK: The University Press, 1925–1927).

3. Discussed in Meinong's *Über Gegenstandstheorie* (1904). For an English version, see *On the Theory of Objects*, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. Roderick Chisholm (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 76–117.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Being and time) (Halle ad Saale, Germany: M. Niemeyer, 1927); published in English as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper, 1962).

5. See William Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 122, 124.

6. Mandelbaum cited Gilbert Ryle's *Dilemmas* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1954).

7. Gregory Vlastos, Degrees of Reality in Plato, in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, eds. Renford Bambrough and Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, and Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 1–19.

8. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, "On the Logic of 'Intrinsically Better,'" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (July 1966): 244, 249.