

THE APA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES 1901–1910

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1. Introduction

For over two millennia, Western philosophy has concerned itself with issues of truth, beauty, and justice. Although some may complain that in recent decades professional philosophers have unduly narrowed their focus to issues of linguistic truth and meaning, the presidential addresses delivered during the first decade of the twentieth century demonstrate that philosophers were equally concerned with broader philosophical issues. Their topics covered a wide range of themes including beauty, moral judgment, and philosophy of religion. Nonetheless, one can also discern in the first years of the American Philosophical Association (the APA) the seeds for the narrowing of focus as evinced in addresses such as “The Purposes of a Philosophical Association,” given by James Edwin Creighton (1901–1902), in which he claimed that at American Philosophical Association meetings, philosophers should eschew discussion of practical issues such as how to teach philosophy. Most of the addresses in that first decade were consistent with Creighton’s emphasis, as evinced by the focus Frank Thilly (1900–1901; 1901–1902; 1912–1913) placed on the problems of induction and mind/body dualism in “The Theory of Interaction” and “The Theory of Induction,” with no real consideration of the practical import or application of those issues.

Indeed, Creighton and several other presidents in the first decade of the APA displayed more concern with the reputation of philosophy than about any responsibility to address social or existential problems. To some extent, it is natural for presidents of a professional philosophical association to devote their addresses to metaphilosophical concerns such as the state of the profession, philosophical methodology, and the purpose of philosophy.

Concern with the reputation of philosophy is directly relevant to the creation of professional philosophical associations. As other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and political science were declaring their independence from philosophy, philosophers were also concerned about the narrowing of their field. For that reason, philosophers who read Volume 1 today may find it profitable to consult the wealth of scholarship on the history and effects of professionalization more generally.¹

It might be fruitful to reflect a bit on what Creighton and other philosophers sought to accomplish through the process of professionalization. In the thirteenth century, a “profession” was the act of taking the vows of a religious

order. In our more secular age, a profession is commonly defined in dictionaries as an occupation requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences. Professionalization is the socio-historical process through which an occupation becomes professionalized. In the nineteenth-century United States, professionalization came to mean the establishment of an autonomous association that would set standards and qualifications for a well-defined, generally white collar, middle-class occupation. As these associations were founded, it was imperative that each one distinguish its “professional” practitioners from “amateurs” in the field and establish its autonomy as the sole arbiter of the distinction it created. In academia, professional associations have tended to correspond to specific disciplines within the organizational structure of research universities, which emerged at the same time as the new professional associations. Indeed, to carry out their functions of distinction and demarcation, professional associations must exercise some form(s) of discipline upon their members and, indirectly, upon non-members.

Exploration of the difference between an amateur and a professional philosopher reveals a bit more about the purposes of professionalizers. The term “amateur philosopher” seems to be of rather recent origin.² To think about the difference, one might consider how the citizen soldier of the colonial period compares with the Civil War officer trained at West Point, or how the early nineteenth-century midwife compares with the mid-nineteenth-century medical doctor. In both of those trades, professionalization ushered in greater technical sophistication that imperfectly correlates with improvements in actual results.

Probably few of us would prefer to live in a society in which many people died of infections that are now easily cured, but professionalization of medicine alone did not dramatically reduce the infant mortality rate. That required substantial improvements in diet and living conditions. The staggering death tolls of battles like Shiloh and Gettysburg might lead one to question the value of professionalization of the military. In both cases, it was important that the increased technical sophistication of professionalization did not give birth to a new form of scholasticism, in which practitioners were so cloistered from the rest of humanity that they lost empathy for the human effects of their techniques. Medical doctors must look beyond the examination room to the living conditions of their patients; officers must look beyond tactical maps to the carnage on the battlefield and the suffering of soldiers and their families.

Originally, “amateur” connoted one who pursued a calling out of love for the subject matter, rather than as a moneymaking career. In this sense of the term, Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William Torrey Harris are prime examples of amateur philosophers in the United States. It is worth noting that Harris, editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and a founding member of the St. Louis Philosophical and Literary Society, believed he was pro-

fessionalizing American philosophy by surpassing the technical sophistication of American transcendentalists such as Emerson and Thoreau and by founding the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, in 1867. To some extent, the transcendentalists seemed to agree with Harris on that point.³ At the very same time, however, Harris thought the transcendentalists were too concerned with abstract verities; he sought to give American philosophy a stern push in the direction of practicality. Specifically, Harris and his cohorts believed philosophy should give meaning to the lives of individuals by inculcating self-understanding. They talked a good deal about how the study of philosophy and classic literature could help people identify their vocations, understood as their purpose for society, and thereby achieve personal fulfillment as they pursued it. In his life, Harris set a good example of what the St. Louis Hegelians had in mind. He was active in educational reforms, serving as superintendent of the St. Louis public school system from 1867 to 1880, and was United States Commissioner of Education from 1889 to 1906; in politics, he weighed in on issues of race relations and American imperialism.⁴

Thus, it makes sense to see the work of the St. Louis Hegelians as an early movement toward the professionalization of American philosophy even though, by 1900, their work was neglected by professionalizing American philosophers who held university positions. With the exception of pragmatists such as John Dewey (1905–1906) and James Hayden Tufts (1905–1906; 1914–1915; 1934–1935), many of those who founded the Western Philosophical Association (the WPA) in 1900 and the APA in 1901 sought to separate social reform and political activity from scholarly pursuits. This brings us to certain divisions that existed among the early professionalizers.

The St. Louis Hegelians believed that philosophy would gain respectability by being “scientific,” but they tended to understand that term to mean that philosophy should strive to be systematic. Dewey, Tufts, and most of the other presidents in the first decade of the APA agreed that philosophy should be scientific, but saw it as experimentation in laboratory settings. Indeed, a primary motive for the founding of philosophical associations was to lend credibility to philosophy by providing a safe harbor in which “professional” philosophers could demonstrate their scientific objectivity. This meant that the founders of the professional associations sought to demonstrate that their research was not motivated, and thereby not biased, by a political agenda. With the exception of those like Dewey and Tufts, this meant that philosophers’ involvement in social and political reform efforts should be narrowly circumscribed.

2. Inaugural Addresses of The APA

Frank Thilly of the University of Missouri delivered the first two addresses of a professional American philosophical association, the WPA, because he was in-

strumental in its founding in 1900. He was well acquainted with efforts at professionalizing philosophy from his graduate and post-graduate years before arriving at Missouri. Berlin and Heidelberg, where he did his graduate studies, were German centers of academic philosophy conducted at its highest levels. His subsequent two years as a philosophy fellow at Cornell University under the supervision of Jacob Gould Schurman further impressed upon him the merits of establishing a truly professional corps of philosophers in America. Schurman had founded *The Philosophical Review*, and Creighton, another Schurman protégé at Cornell, founded the APA the year after Thilly founded the WPA (the APA and the WPA later merged in 1920 to form The American Philosophical Association [The APA]). After Thilly moved east to teach at Cornell in 1906, he was elected, in 1912, to the presidency of the APA as well.

In his 1901 address, “The Theory of Interaction,” Thilly focused on the relationship between mind and body, specifically the theories of parallelism and interactionism. He asserted that based on logical and physical laws—the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of identity, the principle of causation, and the conservation of energy—there can be no cause without an effect or effect without a cause. Mind and matter are two completely different forms of existence, so a mental state cannot cause a physical state, or vice versa. For these reasons, parallelism asserts that there is no causal relationship between mind and matter.

The principle of the conservation of energy states that energy cannot be lost, but this does not preclude the possibility that energy in the material realm might be transformed into a different type of energy in the mental realm. Thus, Thilly argued, this physical law does not rule out interaction between mind and matter: “The state of consciousness is not a cause in the sense of producing or creating anything out of itself. It is a cause in the sense of being an element without which another element called a physical occurrence cannot take place” (1:11). He continued:

Parallelists deny interaction because they believe it contradicts the law of the conservation of energy, the causal law, and the alleged law that no physical occurrence can have anything but a physical occurrence as its cause. But interaction does not contradict the first two laws properly understood, and the last law is not true. The old-fashioned thinker reasoned by analogy that, because his consciousness caused movements, consciousness was the sole cause of movements in the world. The new-fashioned thinker reasons by analogy that, because physical changes cause movements in the inorganic world, physical changes must be the sole causes of movements in the organic world. (1:12)

Thilly concluded that interaction does not contradict any scientific laws. Experience tells us that mind does interact with matter.

In Thilly's second address to the WPA the following year, "The Theory of Induction," he addressed the question of induction: What is the nature of induction and what is its validity? He began by acknowledging that most would agree that induction is the derivation of a general conclusion from particular facts. He noted that some prefer to exclude unscientific induction, simple enumeration, but not everyone agrees with that. Some distinguish between perfect induction, which is certain, and imperfect induction, which is merely probable. Although scholars describe it in different ways, Thilly claimed that there is general agreement that induction is based on the assumption of the general uniformity of nature. Some see this assumption as a postulate of our thinking, while others see it as a product of experience.

Thilly set out to address these issues by making his own observations about the definition of induction and its characteristics. He began by stating that induction is a process of conscious inference, and agreed with the general consensus that deduction draws a particular conclusion from a universal, and induction does the opposite. Whether a particular inference is induction does not depend on the truth of the conclusion, because there are cases of hasty, unreliable induction. Induction is not necessarily limited to finding causal relationships; it merely finds regularity of relationships, some of which may be causal. Some believe "induction seeks to discover the inner, necessary relations existing between things" (1:18), but Thilly disagreed.

Thilly disagreed with those who define induction as "forming hypotheses, drawing their consequences, and verifying them" (1:20). For him, that process is a mixture of induction and deduction.

How do we know when an inductive inference is valid? He asserted:

In other words, we reach the greatest possible certainty for our particular inductions when we subsume them under generally accepted principles, or prove them deductively. That is why sciences become more and more deductive in the course of time. (1:22)

When we discover a causal connection between two phenomena, this is not induction because causation is a necessary connection. When we ask how we can prove induction, we are asking for deductive certainty. "Induction, therefore, may be proved by assuming the law of uniformity. We are warranted in leaping from part to whole by the regularity, or orderliness, or uniformity of nature" (1:23). But how do we know that nature is uniform? We can only muster inductive proof for the uniformity of nature. Because we have experienced uniformities, all of nature must be uniform. Or, rather than an assumption about the whole of nature, we might mean by the uniformity of nature merely that we expect an experience to recur in the future. If we experience something a number of times, we begin to

expect it to continue to recur. This is “the psychological ground of our inductive inference” (1:24). Inductive proof is based on this “feeling of expectation” (1:24).

Creighton outlined his conception of the purpose of the association that he worked so hard to establish. According to him, the APA would serve a social purpose, and that alone could be of scientific benefit, but it must do more than that. When Creighton talked about philosophical progress, he clearly equated progress with the notion that philosophy must become increasingly scientific.

Creighton asserted that philosophical progress is a goal:

In the first place, I would ask you not to suppose from my remarks that I regard the new Association as a kind of universal panacea for all the ills from which philosophy suffers. An association can only act as one cooperating agency among others, or, at most, prove a stimulus to the forces which are essential for progress in philosophical work. (1:30)

He continued, saying that scientific progress requires “conscious cooperation between a number of individuals” (1:31). Philosophers are engaged in a search for truth. Communal inquiry helps us avoid subjectivity. Although some complain that philosophy had become too focused on its history, Creighton argued that knowledge of the history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophical progress. Rather than study the past less, we should focus on historical study that informs us about current problems:

The history of philosophy is only intelligible when read in the light of present-day problems. Not only is it true that, from a strictly philosophical standpoint, the study of the thought of the past can never be anything more than a means to the better comprehension of the problems of the present time, but, in itself, the former remains to a large extent incomprehensible except as its disputes and questionings are brought into relation to our own problems, and interpreted in their light. (1:32)

While Creighton saw value in the study of the history of philosophy, he saw it as secondary to the solution of philosophical problems. Indeed, he believed that study of the history of philosophy should be in service to contemporary philosophy. More than anything, he emphasized that knowledge is gained through social interaction as well as individual study. He saw the facilitation of that social interaction as the primary purpose of the association. Philosophers have been slow to catch on to the social nature of their work because they are dogmatic and because they hold their views emotionally. One reason the association is more important is because philosophers have given up the effort to deduce a system from first principles and now rely more heavily on induction. For

that reason, philosophy must now start from experience. This requires philosophers to reach out beyond their own limited experience (1:33–34).

3. Perspectives on Philosophy

The early presidents of the APA and the WPA took their opportunities to draw attention to their visions for philosophical work and their preferred systems of philosophy. Idealists, naturalists, empiricists, and pragmatists each took their turn at defending distinctive principles of their philosophies.

In “External Point of View Philosophy and Its Correlations,” Alexander Thomas Ormond (1902–1903) articulated a plausible, rational alternative to the “external point of view,” according to which mind knows the world and its objects from an external vantage point. He believed the external point of view had been thoroughly discredited by skepticism, and that philosophy must vindicate itself with a plausible point of view in order to regain credibility. Indeed, Ormond believed that philosophers place too much faith in the mind’s ability to impose a rational scheme upon the world because they misunderstand the relationship of the mind to the world. This error is manifested in philosophers’ proclivities toward “over-subtlety” and “over-abstraction,” “for it must be admitted that the philosopher’s most besetting fault is a tendency to hypostasize abstractions” (1:47).

By a “philosophical point of view,” Ormond meant one that philosophers can occupy fully enough to translate any inquiry into philosophical terms. He claimed that Kant’s Copernican Revolution provides exactly that by teaching philosophers that they must focus on how the world conforms to mind, abandoning all efforts to determine how the mind corresponds to the world. This gives philosophers an internal point of view because it prevents them from presuming that they can occupy a position outside of the world. For Ormond, the Copernican Revolution established that consciousness is central to the world.

Next, Ormond moved beyond exposition of Kant to a more creative project, the articulation of a unique method for philosophy. He began by asserting that the central core of consciousness is endeavor, more specifically, the “*endeavor to realize*” (1:51). For Ormond, this demonstrated that the first data of consciousness is will. To avoid the question of whether will or idea is the primary foundation of the self, which Ormond described as the dichotomy of Schopenhauer versus Plato, he proposed that will and idea are combined in reason, which is both ideational and volitional. Although he did not provide a definition of knowledge, it is clear from many passages that his post-Kantian philosophical context makes knowledge a mental construction rather than a mere reflection of a world over and apart from the mind. Knowledge is the process through which the “mind reduces its world to terms of its own experience” (1:50).

Finally, Ormond was concerned with the problem of demarcation, specifically that of distinguishing philosophy from science. Although “philosophy bakes no bread,” he conceded, it can and should serve a practical role. By providing objective knowledge of the world, science solves many practical problems, but it tells us nothing about truth, beauty, and goodness. Philosophy, on the other hand, provides knowledge of the inner meaning of things by focusing on the “concepts and analogies” by which the subject makes the world intelligible. In so doing, philosophy gets at the inner meaning of things and addresses higher, albeit practical, concerns such as “the ultimate meaning of life.” As Ormond summarized, “we will say, then, that while philosophy bakes no bread, it does, in connection with religion and art and science, promote an ideal of living that makes it very much more worthwhile that bread should be baked” (1:56). He concluded that philosophy and science play complimentary roles, providing us with practical knowledge in both a mundane sense and in a higher sense (1:53–56).

In “The Problem of Metaphysics,” delivered to the WPA, Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge (1902–1903; 1911–1912) also grappled with the problems of the legitimation and demarcation of philosophy, focusing specifically on metaphysics. For Woodbridge, metaphysics was indispensable. Although they deny it, even when scientists such as Ernst Mach and Rodney Brooks question the conceptual assumptions of their scientific fields, they engage in metaphysical speculation and demonstrate its continued importance. Thus, Woodbridge saw metaphysics as an entirely separate field of knowledge from science. Science reveals the laws of the physical world through experimentation; metaphysics reveals the nature of reality through definition of concepts. He went on to assert that metaphysics is also separate from religion, and took umbrage with the “suspicion and the hope that metaphysicians are really poets or theologians in disguise” (1:64). Metaphysics, for Woodbridge, was a purely theoretical and logical endeavor.

In order to make progress, Woodbridge asserted, metaphysics must follow the lead of recent work in logic and epistemology in their return to “the immediate facts of life” for its subject matter (1:61). Much as Creighton asserted, Woodbridge believed that the study of history helps us understand our present situation and present problems. Specifically, from the history of metaphysics, Woodbridge averred that we have learned of:

the weaknesses in the evolutionary conception and in traditional terminology, the futility of the distinction between appearance and reality, the necessity of an independent metaphysics, the need of a logic of definition, the non-explanatory character of much of metaphysical knowledge, with a recognition of the value of such knowledge, the metaphysical failure of the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics. (1:66)

He went on to assert that there may very well be other lessons, but these lessons seem particularly important.

Woodbridge's debt to Aristotle was apparent as he derived five fundamental problems of metaphysics, to wit: to define individuality, continuity, purpose, potentiality, and chance. In so doing, he believed that he had stated "the problem of metaphysics in terms of its most essential elements, and in independence of its concrete content" (1:72). Indeed, he maintained, "a complete definition of these concepts would be a very close approach to the complete definition of reality" (1:72).

Although Josiah Royce (1903–1904) focused on "pure pragmatism" in his "The Eternal and the Practical," his address was a direct response to the newly emerging philosophy of pragmatism as seen in William James's (1906–1907) *The Will to Believe*, Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, and F. C. S. Schiller's *Humanism*.⁵ As James and the other pragmatists would agree, Royce held that pragmatism in its simplest form can be traced to a variety of ancient sources, and that elements of it can be seen in Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason, Fichte's ethical idealism, and Hegel's discussions of the resolution of conflicts between theoretical and practical reason.⁶ As Royce opined, "pragmatism is ancient, is human, has been faced countless times before and will be considered countless times again, so long as men labor for the good, and long for the true" (1:78). Rather than a "startling new discover[y]," Royce held that he was dealing with a philosophical point of view, "old religions and social orders already made familiar to the wise men of yore" (1:78). Emphasizing pragmatism's history facilitates Royce's analysis of what he saw as the central doctrine of all pragmatisms, steering clear of exegesis of recent texts.

Royce had some special credibility regarding the task he had set for himself. He already had an impressive publishing career, and, as he explained, he had embraced pragmatism himself, publishing article based on that point of view in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1881.⁷ By 1903, he had also been a colleague of James at Harvard for eleven years, a fact no doubt well-known to his audience. However, in an effort to navigate above recent controversies about pragmatism, Royce stated that he would focus exclusively on a question of "eternal importance": "How far is our knowledge identical with an expression of our practical needs?" (1:79). In what followed, Royce argued that pragmatists underestimate our need for truths that transcend temporal, practical needs.

Tellingly, Royce explained that he alloyed his pure pragmatism by supplementing it with a concept of "actual truth" (1:79). "Within its limits," he asserted, pure pragmatism is "a partial statement of the truth" (1:80). Indeed, he provided a weighty laundry list of ways in which he still agreed with pragmatists. In short, he still believed that individual need shapes our mind's construction of its objects, that individuals actively perceive their world in search of solutions

to immediate problems in concrete situations, and that this is not a finished world, but is one in the making. In a later passage, Royce declared allegiance to the view that all thinking is action because it is an adjustment to a present experience. Despite all that he had in common with pure pragmatism, and even one of the current variety, for example, Dewey, Royce interjected “that my only final hope, as a seeker of truth and as a human being, is in the eternal” (1:80). The eternal, argued Royce, follows from the fundamental human need for companionship.

Because companionship is one of our deepest human needs, Royce argued, we want our particular pragmatic truths to be true for others, as well as for ourselves. Stated in another way, when we claim that a belief is true, we want to claim more than that it meets our current conscious, need because we want others to agree with us. To illustrate this point, Royce talked about the commitment that current pragmatists have to the truth of the theory of evolution. They claim that pragmatism is a corollary of evolution, demonstrating that philosophy and science have been reconciled, and thereby bequeathing exclusive credibility to pragmatism as a theory of truth. According to Royce, the then-present-day pragmatists abandoned pure pragmatism by claiming that the theory of evolution had been proven true in a more ultimate sense than pure pragmatism provides.

According to pure pragmatism, we can only say that a truth is true in our present situation, but the doctrine of evolution must be based on data collected from a vast number of objects, many of which existed a long time ago. Because of our fundamental need for companionship, Royce added, it is perfectly natural for pragmatists to want others to agree with their truth claims about evolution and about pragmatism itself. Indeed, opined Royce, “pure pragmatism would be, after all, a lonesome kind of doctrine” (1:88). We all want to be able to assert agreed upon standard truths, to be authorities on some topics.

This yearning for timeless truth, according to Royce, is part of what it means to be a rational being. Our rationality is bound up with our sociality:

In brief, to believe that my judgment is true, is to believe that another point of view than my present point of view, in case this other point of view is what it ought to be, actually confirms my own judgment about this object. This other point of view, however, is a point of view that relates to the same object, or else it could not be conceived as confirming my judgment about this object. (1:92–93)

The cognitive actions of finite beings are different from their other actions, Royce claimed, precisely because they believe their cognitive constructions ought to be seen as true by other beings like themselves. Our socio-rational nature requires us to be “more than pure pragmatists” (1:93). Moreover, for our truths to satisfy our natural needs, they have to be true, not only for ourselves or

for a large number of people, but for an invariant, eternal single self, of which finite selves are partial functions. For Royce, without such a single self, we cannot have a coherent conception of truth. Otherwise, our cognitive constructions, our truth claims, are no more than singular attitudes, and not truths in any sense of the term. As Royce, phrased it, “if there is such a self, our need to make judgments that can be true or false is satisfied. If there is no such self, no judgment is either true or false” (1:97).

Thus, for Royce, “everything is practical; and everything seeks nothing whatever but its own true self, which is the Eternal” (1:96). It is not difficult to imagine how pragmatists might counter Royce’s criticism. No doubt, they would deny the existence of Royce’s absolute self or that individuals possess the natural needs Royce describes. Moreover, they would object that he equivocates on “truth.”

In “The Mission of Philosophy,” George Trumbull Ladd (1904–1905) declared that the “peculiar sphere of philosophy” should be to seek and find the “rational union” of the two worlds, the world of facts and the world of values (1:127). Although Ladd was critical of Kant, he accepted Kantian dualism, which is, of course, the traditional philosophical dualism dating back to the pre-Socratics. He rejected Kant’s phenomenal realm, claiming that judgments of fact are not judgments about phenomena, but about the “actual qualities and relations of things and selves” (1:127). However, even value judgments, i.e., “aesthetical, ethical, and religious” issues, are judgments about facts that occur in experience. Philosophy’s mission is to sort through the apparent conflicts between the two kinds of facts, and to harmonize them through rational examination because “the undying faith of humanity, is in a certain Oneness, or Unitary Being, which shall somehow both respond to, and explain, the totality of human experience” (1:127). There is no final conclusion to this task; it is a “progressive realization” (1:128). Every generation must engage in this task anew as science discovers new facts and as cultural conditions change. Rather than a “lifeless, substantial unity,” Ladd had in mind “a living functional unity” (1:131). Man must be a growing self, “And what is true for the individual is true for society” (1:131).

Philosophers must study the discoveries of the particular sciences in order to recognize their ontological implications and to explain those implications to scientists and others. Thus, philosophers have to be willing to learn from scientists and teach them that science is as much “a theory of Reality” (1:134) as are more traditional philosophical subjects such as aesthetics, ethics, and religion. When philosophers fulfill the mission of philosophy, all of these disciplines work together to provide us a conception of “a perfect ethical Spirit” (1:135). Ladd emphasized that although we live in an ever-evolving world of particular things, the evolving universe is also a cosmos. By “cosmos,” Ladd seems to have meant that reality is a progressing, rational unity.

In this, we see the remaining vestiges of Ladd's liberal, Congregationalist theology combined with his vision of a developing society. This mindset is also evident in his comments on epistemological issues. Contra Kant, Ladd maintained that all knowledge requires the involvement of all faculties—"intellect, feeling, and will"—and, "cognitive judgment[s]" are "temporary solution[s]" problems (1:133). Here Ladd harkened back to his 1894 *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*,⁸ speaking of the individual as a rational, but also spiritual, unity with functional faculties, who must constantly adapt himself to a world that is forever in the making.

Dewey's 1905 presidential address, "Beliefs and Realities," centered on an ongoing debate between pragmatists, such as himself, and realist and idealist philosophers in America. Although Dewey was already well-established as an expert on public education and the philosophy of education, this address offered a wide-ranging assessment of philosophy itself. Indeed, this may very well be the most densely packed and perhaps provocative address in Volume 1.⁹

Dewey's primary philosophical concern was reductionism. More specifically, he argued that philosophers tend to reduce all human experience to knowing experience. Twenty years earlier, he had begun to address this tendency with his conception of the "psychological standpoint," according to which everything that appears, or more accurately occurs, in experience is real because, as finite creatures, we cannot occupy a position beyond human experience in order to make extra-experiential judgments about reality.¹⁰ In addition, experiences, dreams, optical illusions, feelings, and imaginings, etc., are all real experiences, according to Dewey, that function in a wide variety of ways in our everyday lives. Rather than discount non-knowing experiences as though they are barren of philosophical import on the assumption that they have little, if any, connection to extra-experiential reality, Dewey encouraged philosophers to acknowledge and reflect upon the full range of human experience. Indeed, for Dewey, human experience is the philosophers' exclusive, albeit expansive, realm of study. Thus, by the time of this presidential address, the psychological standpoint and its implications had been a persistent theme in Dewey's writings for some time, perhaps most famously in his 1896 *The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology*.¹¹ The key point, for Dewey, was always to argue for a richer philosophical conception of experience, which is, at once, a metaphysical, epistemological, and even a vocational point because it includes the recommendation of a broader conception of the philosophical craft. This sheds a great deal of light on passages like the following within the presidential address at hand:

Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and transcendentalist, materialist and spiritualist, defining this universe in as many differing ways as they have different conceptions of the ideal and method of knowledge, have been at one in their devotion to an identification of reality with something which

connects monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook. (1:160)

This passage highlights Dewey's concern that many different schools of philosophy, and perhaps that most philosophers, were guilty of reducing experience to knowing experience. This theme persisted throughout his mature works.

In the title of another 1905 essay, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," Dewey announced a new name for the psychological standpoint, emphasizing the full philosophical import of his conception of the philosopher's task.¹² In that work, Dewey continued to argue that philosophers must appreciate the full range of human experience in order to understand it. As an example, for Dewey, emotional experiences are equally real and important as knowing experiences, to both the individual and to the philosopher.

Returning to Dewey's presidential address, however, we should pay some attention to a frequently overlooked footnote. When Dewey said above that idealists are guilty of this reductionism, he hastened to add an exception to that general rule:

I except Hegel from this statement. The habit of interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged and purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit. This is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian exegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and of mechanical existence to *Geist*, to life in its own developing movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased view of Hegel. At all events, I wish to state the debt to Hegel of the view set forth in this paper. (1:170n4)

This passage helps us understand Dewey's point more deeply. He was arguing that Hegel, of all philosophers, held the same expansive meaning of experience. Dewey made this point by distinguishing Hegel from philosophers that he called "neo-Kantians." Elsewhere, I have argued that Dewey dubbed at least some of the British neo-Hegelians, such as Thomas Hill Green, as neo-Kantians because they sought to ground knowledge in an unknowable thing-in-itself, thus reducing reality to a realm that, in principle, cannot be experienced and, at the same time, devaluing quotidian experience.¹³ In this way, these philosophers elevate the realm of logical universals to an unknowable ground of knowledge and cast aspersions on the experience of the "common man" (1:159).

On the other hand, according to Dewey, Hegel provided an example of a logic of lived experience by subordinating logical and "mechanical existence" to "life in its developing movement" (1:170). Dewey maintained that Hegel resisted the Kantian temptation to posit a thing-in-itself to ground knowledge. Nonetheless, Dewey also made clear that his allegiance, or non-allegiance, to Hegel is

not the point. Never a disciple of any philosopher, Dewey merely deemed it to be important to acknowledge a crucial debt to Hegel.

Perhaps most importantly to his audience, Dewey's presidential address was part of a sustained attack on the "epistemological industry," an attack worth considering in some detail.¹⁴ This returns us to the main thrust of Dewey's address, which was that philosophers should move beyond epistemology-centered philosophy because it unduly narrows their task. Even so, Dewey also lamented that the then-current pressures of professionalization were reinforcing this narrowing of philosophy to something unrecognizable to "the common man" because it is useless to him. While "the professional man, the philosopher" nobly engages in a search for truth through "passionless imperturbability" and "absolute detachment," the common person rightfully ignores him. As philosophers (epistemologists) retreat into their metaphorical laboratories, examining beliefs without regard for how they actually function within complex, evolving situations fraught with ethical and existential import, beliefs appear as discrete objects of analysis. This in turn leads the philosopher/epistemologist to assume, "ready-made and finished reality" must somehow correspond to beliefs so observed. In this way, the philosopher/epistemologist forgets, "beliefs are personal affairs, and personal affairs are adventures, and adventures are, if you please, shady." In stark contrast, the common person formulates, asserts, and acts on beliefs in a world "of affections," with "the gallantry of adventure, the genuineness of the incomplete, the tentative" (1:160).

If Dewey can be said to make a metaphysical point in this address, it was that there is not a finished reality for the philosopher/epistemologist to discover and define, because "the world has meaning as somebody's, somebody's at a juncture" (1:160). Again, according to Dewey, none of us can escape human experience in order to talk about what exists behind or beyond it. Philosophers, just like the common person, should face the world as we actually experience it.

In Tufts's address, "Some Contributions of Psychology to the Conception of Justice," given to the WPA in 1906, his longstanding interest in social justice and philosophical conceptions of justice was on full display, as was his debt to "Professor Dewey" (1:179). Much like Dewey, Tufts emphasized the individual's social context, eschewing formal conceptions of equality, rights, and justice that are removed from everyday life, in favor of the concrete realization of equitable and just social conditions. Having worked closely with Dewey at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904, Tufts was also profoundly influenced by the Hegelian contextualization of the individual and recent developments in psychology. As one reads the address, it becomes apparent that Tufts's commitment to institutions such as Hull House, the Institute for Juvenile Research, and the State Housing Commission was based on a philosophical outlook that champions the common person.

Tufts opened his address by arguing that the individual must be understood as developing from and living within a complex web of heredity and environmental inheritances. Perhaps borrowing directly from Dewey, he described this realization of man's social and biological nature as "the psychological standpoint." Our gradually increasing understanding of the implications of that standpoint has been accompanied by a measured evolution of law and systems of justice, leading to a more painstaking circumscription of individual responsibility. Whereas "in early Germanic law the person was held responsible with little if any regard to his intent or personal agency" (1:179), now, when adjudging liability, we must not only consider who actually committed the crime, but also the social resources, or lack thereof, that entered into the individual's moral maturation. Consideration of actual social conditions, rather than exclusive focus on an individual's deed, allows society to move from merely abstract to concrete justice, an unequivocal advance for Tufts.

This discussion took Tufts to a consideration of distributive justice, inauspiciously, in the midst of the severe economic recession of 1906, which rapidly devolved into the 1907 Bankers' Panic.¹⁵ No radical, Tuft began with a nod to the importance of private property, but claimed:

our present system of distribution . . . results in such vast inequalities that we no longer count our millionaires, on the one hand, and, on the other, there are estimated to be in this most favored country ten millions of persons in poverty. (1:179–180)

Although the American economic system purports to treat all persons as equals, for Tufts, that claim only makes sense when we view individuals in abstraction from their actual conditions. When we are honest about those conditions, he argued, it is clear that the playing field is tilted rather severely. Although he flirted with socialist ideas in this address, he was at most a social democrat, leery of utopianism of any kind. He freely admitted, "no distribution of property is likely to be just" (1:183), and, in a reference to President Theodore Roosevelt's political platform, conceded that Americans seems to want nothing more than a "square deal"—a modicum of equal opportunity—rather than equality of outcome (1:183). Tufts was uncritical of this American attitude toward distributive justice and even suggested that it was a sign of social health because psychology and religion both correctly warn of the dangers of being overly concerned with material wealth.

Rather than a redistribution of material wealth, Tufts advocated for a more equitable distribution of social resources. He shifted gears to a high note, lauding progressive democracy's rudimentary provision of urban parks, libraries, and public health services to the disadvantaged, and closed the address with a

benign argument for more universal public education, albeit an education based on the vision of social justice that Tufts offered:

The basis for social justice in this sphere of mental goods is therefore an education which shall awaken mental and social interests; the superstructure of justice which we may hope will rise is a satisfaction of these interests by social means. (1:185)

Put simply, Tufts's vision of social justice was that every individual should be given the resources each needs to fully develop its own aptitudes and talents. He claimed his recommendation was based on a realistic, rather than pessimistic, view of American society, one that upholds its democratic values without lapsing into mere paternalism because, in a democracy, "what is done through public agencies" is done "by the people" (1:186).

In his 1906 address, "The Energies of Men," James's iconoclastic approach to philosophical and religious issues was on full display. A medical doctor and psychologist by training, James was quite open to the scientific study of religious experience and volition, as evinced in works such as *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), *The Will to Believe* (1897), and his Gifford Lectures, published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902).¹⁶ James also voiced his approval of the work of Gustav Fechner, famous as a founder of experimental psychology, but also for his willingness to take religious experience seriously as a subject of scientific study. Both men sought to study human experience in its entirety, including mystical experiences that other scientists did not take seriously.

James opened his address with an explanation of his preference for functional, over structural, psychology, the former of which he described as being the "physician's attitude" (1:193). Structural psychology, according to James, is analytical, while functional psychology is clinical. From this distinction, one can surmise that James considered the former speculative, and the latter empirical. Having made that distinction rather summarily, James focused on what he considered to be a conception of functional psychology, at least as understood by the common person, which he described as "the *amount of energy available* for running one's mental and moral operations" (1:194). He conceded that scientists ignore the conception, probably because of its vagueness, but it was enough for him that it was a common conception. We are all familiar with the notion that we have reserves of energy that normally go untapped, often described as a "second wind," thus it is a legitimate topic of study.

James was interested in the phenomenon of second wind. "*Excitements, ideas, and efforts*, in a word, are what carry us over the dam" (1:195). In "hyperesthetic conditions," we have a heightened sensitivity to our environment. "Habit-neurosis" inhibits us, leading us to give into a certain amount of fatigue. We have to learn to push through this in order to realize our full power.

Speaking of the emotions and energies that accompany experiences, which may spur individuals to rise to the occasion or fail, James remarked:

Even here we are witnessing (some of us admiring, some deploring—I must class myself as admiring) the dynamogenic effects of a very exalted political office upon the energies of an individual who had already manifested a healthy amount of energy before the office came. (1:196)

This remark might have been an allusion to Theodore Roosevelt, United States President from 1901–1909, and infamous for his inability to be inactive.

James gave examples of great energy and endurance during wars and the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. He also talked about people who show great energy and endurance characterized by a “morbid impulse” (for example, bulimia, dromomania). “Sprees and excesses” can be temporarily medicinal (1:198). Asceticism can also be dynamogenic: “Ignatius Loyola’s spiritual exercises,” “the Yoga system” (1:198–199).

Our will is “the manometer of our faiths” (1:202). What we are willing to do shows the strength of our faith in something. James talked about how suggestion and asceticism (methodical or unmethodical) can liberate stored energy, and then talked about how ideas can do the same (1:202). Not all ideas will do this. It must be a “live idea” to the particular person. A religious oath, a religious vow, a pledge, a promise to a sweetheart, or one’s word of honor can be dynamogenic. “Fatherland,” “The Union,” “Holy Church,” the “Monroe Doctrine,” “Truth,” “Science,” “Liberty,” Garibaldi’s phrase “Rome or Death,” etc., are so many examples of energy-releasing abstract ideas, and he emphasized that all of these ideas have an essential “social nature.”

Conversion experiences can release energies because they remove inhibitions, giving us feelings of freedom and power. Beliefs challenge our will. James talked about “optimistic religions”—“New Thought,” “Christian Science,” “Metaphysical Healing,” or other forms of spiritual philosophy—that do not depend on “fear thought” (1:204).¹⁷ Interestingly, he ended on a quasi-Aristotelian note:

I have thus brought a pretty wide induction to bear upon my thesis, and it appears to hold good. The human individual lives usually far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energizes below his maximum, and he behaves below his optimum. In elementary faculty, in coördination, in power of inhibition and control, in every conceivable way, his life is contracted like the field of vision of an hysteric subject—but with less excuse, for the poor hysteric is diseased, while in the rest of us it is only an inveterate habit—the habit of inferiority to our full self—that is bad. (1:205)

James's study raises two problems for pragmatic philosophy: "that of our powers" and "that of our means." We need a "topographic survey . . . of the limits of human power" (1:206).

4. Professional Philosophers at Work

Despite Dewey's admonition to philosophers to avoid entanglements and dead-end entrapments set by utterly abstract and artificial intellectual puzzles, the puzzling would not be deterred. Professionalization meant specialization, and if a philosopher cannot control the technical terms and delimited scope of a specialized problem, what was the point of professional philosophy?

Walter Bowers Pillsbury's (1906–1907) presidential address, "The Ego and Empirical Psychology," tackled a set of assumptions about the substantial self, assumptions tracing back to Descartes and Hume:

Of the reasons that have been given for assuming a distinct mind, three are most prominent: (1) For the known there must be a knower; (2) the mental states can receive unity only from a unitary substance, and that we do not find in mental states; and (3) in a series of discrete mental states, such as Hume assumed to constitute mind, there can be no continuity, no real identity. (1:212)

The first principle is a typical insistence of idealists. Idealists who insist that known objects must be metaphysically united with the knower are not consistent, because within mental knowledge, they abruptly demand a divide between the known idea and the knowing self, a divide so great that only a knowing self could overcome. Furthermore, this principle leads to an infinite regress problem. How does the knowing self know its ideas that constitute its knowledge? There must be something else within this knowing self's consciousness to represent that relationship between the known ideas and the knowing of them, and so on, leading to an infinite series of more and more stages of internal representations. (Readers may recognize an analogy to the Aristotelian Third Man problem.) To prevent the infinite regress, it is sufficient to admit that ideas can relate to, and "know" each other in the relationship within consciousness.

This reasoning assists with the dissolution of the second principle upholding a substantial self. How would a self provide the allegedly required unity? Mental states enjoy a degree of unity in continuity, to be sure, but what would unity within a self provide? Unity within a whole self would dissolve what is admittedly genuine, namely the distinctiveness and discreteness to mental states. Finally, a substantial self absorbing and unifying discrete mental states could not really yield identity. Adding something to each and every mental state would not erect a general sense that they all have a common basis. Pillsbury faulted a lack of cooperation between theorizing about the mental functions that thought per-

forms, and postulating structures that organize the mind: “structure and function must be brought together and made parts of a single whole” (1:214).

Pillsbury went on to remind his audience that the brain retains remembered experiences, which in turn shape and interpret new ongoing experiences; therefore, no ideas are entirely original in perception and no cognitive function operates aloof from that ongoing groupings and re-groupings of experiences. He further suggested that our perception of a continuous and identical self is due to the way that our distinctive selves for private and public engagements all depend on this core mass of accumulated interpreted experience. A preoccupation with that core brought to subjective focus for its own sake, however, does not really reveal any “substantial” foundation for everything mental. He asserted, “self-consciousness, then, as an individual as opposed to a social fact, is not a mystery or even a privilege; it is a luxury, a satisfaction of idle curiosity, and that by quite simple means” (1:212). What about the genuinely empirical self, so far as scientific psychology can understand it? This is Pillsbury’s thesis:

The self is merely all that we are and know, organized, self-unified, and self-identical, a growing vital unity that as a whole is effective in every experience. When it is directed toward the control of action, we know it as will; when choosing from the many stimuli that offer, as attention; when interpreting the stimulus, as perception or judgment; when constructing new forms from old experiences, as reason. But it is the same everywhere, always active, and active in very much the same way in every kind of mental process. (1:224)

Harry Norman Gardiner (1907–1908), like Pillsbury, directed his discussion, in “The Problem of Truth,” against metaphysical presumptions that make truth more of a mystery than a concrete achievement. His initial target was absolute idealism, which expects all truths to cohere within a single vast interconnected system. That whole system is admittedly unknowable, so erecting a criterion for any particular truth that it be a part of this system is unworkable in practice. True propositions should be recognizable as individual truths, regardless of the proper place in any system, and irrespective of how they stand in logical relations to other truth:

Truths differ in value and significance; some are trivial, some perhaps sublime. But, apart from special theory, there is no apparent reason why a proposition about even so trivial a circumstance as the present state of the weather—which indeed may be important enough on occasion—should not be as true as the truest propositions about such exalted objects as the existence of God, the constitution of the universe, and the destiny of the human soul. (1:230)

If propositions can be true taken singly, then a true proposition picks out, not all of reality or reality in general, but exactly that portion of reality intended by the meaning of the proposition. This implies an intellectual relation between proposition and fact, which is a kind of representationalism, but it takes a neutral approach, prejudiced toward neither idealism nor dualism. Pragmatism fails to do justice to the way that most true propositions answer to facts without any possibility of human verification. Additionally, pragmatism counter-intuitively takes verified facts to depend on the means of verification, but then there is no explanation why pre-existing facts should be verifiable. Finally, pragmatists want truths to be relative to someone or another's own needs, but they inconsistently want their pragmatist theory to be universally and logically valid.

Frank Chapman Sharp's (1907–1908) address, "The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment," was concerned with the question of whether assigning truth or falsity to a moral judgment can be rightly done independently of individual attitudes about that judgment. Sharp affirmed that this can be done, and impartiality is, therefore, the needed methodological step. An objective judgment appeals to facts of the matter about the situation in question, facts that can be ascertained from an impartial perspective, omitting subjective interests.

Moral judgments are not inferred from facts, but they make reference to relevant justificatory facts. Furthermore, if all of those facts stand unaffected regardless which person happens to examine them, then that moral judgment can be considered to be objective. Hence, what one member of a community can impartially judge to be right, any member of that community should be able to judge as right. This requirement of consistency applies to each person individually as well: a reasonable person must reconsider two moral judgments if they cannot both be objectively correct.

In the ordinary moral life of intuitive judgment, by contrast, four basic kinds of criteria for moral conduct appear to be widely operative. We sometimes appeal to the greater good achieved. Sometimes we demand vengeance in defense of what is right, regardless of whether any additional good may come of it. At other times, our aesthetic sense of the beauty or idealized form to an action earns our admiration. Finally, a direct sense of antipathy or revulsion attaches to kinds of conduct to immediately convey their wrongness.¹⁸

Sharp then subjected these four bases of common-sense moral judgment to his test for moral objectivity. Vengeance promptly fails; impartiality cannot license retaliation for its own sake. The aesthetic ideal cannot be universalized either without destroying too many good people. As for eudaimonism, although we have universalizable duties to increase the good of others when we are able, that cannot go so far as pure altruism (for some must be deserving of keeping charity). With moderation in mind, "choose always the greater good" is the single general principle that can pass the test of objectivity (1:263).

The address of Hugo Münsterberg (1908–1909), “The Problem of Beauty,” reproached philosophers for largely ignoring aesthetics and the philosophy of beauty. Although psychology has been assisting, too many rival theories fail to agree on the phenomena to be explained, or the principles available to explain the beautiful. What almost all have in common is the assumption that whatever the content of the aesthetic experience, or the psycho-physiological processes generating those experiences, it is precisely a sense of lingering pleasure or enjoyment that characterizes beauty. The way that psychology has been allowed to analyze phenomena down to passing feelings and sensations is behind that misleading presumption.

First, the aesthetic phenomenon is nothing like what the psychologist describes it to be. It is unified (no subject-object division appears) and it is reliably objective (instead of fleetingly subjective). Furthermore, the aesthetic is available everywhere that experience goes, if we willingly take it to be of aesthetic interest. In fact, every will’s determination to live in a real ordered world (and not a cacophony of sensations) proves that such a reality must be eternally objective compared to the subjectivity of personal desire. That harmonization, that beauty, reigns supreme:

The beautiful may be pleasant and agreeable but it is never beautiful because it is agreeable. It is beautiful because it is perfect, because every demand which is raised in its manifoldness is completely satisfied by the will of the other parts. The objective satisfaction resulting from the will to have such a perfect self-agreeing world is the only aesthetic attitude; the subjective satisfaction resulting from the chance desires of the personality is the practical attitude which may change with every man and with every hour and which lies below the level of aesthetics. (1:280)

The grand harmonization of wills as an ideal and as a reality is an absolute value, which transcends ethics as well as any aggregation of personal satisfaction. Any artwork, if it has genius in it, is an individual expression of will directing the mind toward that ultimate value.

Similarly, science’s drive to systematically reconstruct all things into a logical system of interrelated entities is an expression of this same willful drive to absolute harmony in unity:

The aesthetical value of beautiful unity and the logical value of connected existence are thus equally fulfillments of the over-personal, absolute demand for the self-realization of a world in this chaotic experience. (1:287)

By coincidence rather than design, Arthur (Schauffler) Oncken Lovejoy’s (1908–1909; 1916–1917) address, “The Obsolescence of the Eternal” took an antagonistic position over against Münsterberg’s affirmation of absolute totali-

ties. Lovejoy defended an evolutionary metaphysics, of not merely change and development over time, but the addition of real positive characters and beings to the total cosmos. Against materialism and its conservation laws, Lovejoy defended dualism, claiming that the emergence of qualitative experience from early organisms added just those original positive realities to physical realities.

Lovejoy argued that qualitative experience cannot even be predicted from, much less reduced to, physical arrangements of matter in this way:

Suppose that in the course of the redistribution of matter and energy, sentient organisms have already appeared; suppose that in one of these organisms there is about to occur the first rudimentary experience of color-vision; and suppose that there hovers above the scene, at the moment, [Pierre-Simone] Laplace's perfect physical calculator, a being fully acquainted with the quantity of matter and energy present in the universal system and with the unchanging laws of their distribution, but destitute of any experience or idea of any of the secondary qualities. . . . He will also know, as a detail of this distribution, that there will occur just that arrangement of moving parts in the ether and in what we now call the rudimentary eye of the organism, which *we* know to be the invariable correlate of the sensation of red. But *he* will not know anything of the sort, nor have the least ground, in his perfect acquaintance with the laws of his qualitatively uniform system, for suspecting that anything so strange is about to happen as the sudden appearance of sensible redness in the universe. (1:302)

This sort of argument has reappeared in each generation.¹⁹

Lovejoy next argued that metaphysical eternalities cannot have any real relationship with events proceeding in time; hence, the eternal lacks any explanatory power to account for temporal processes. Supernatural eternalities are powerless to affect the evolving world, and some type of eternal transcendental Self behind mental appearances must be similarly bereft of control over our mental life. Eternal Selves, whether divine or human, cannot have any practical utility for making real-world moral decisions, either.

Lovejoy's diagnosis for this philosophical obsession with the metaphysically eternal goes back to theological struggles with resolving the problem of evil so that divine goodness may be assured. However, we should ask, why the philosopher must misuse reasoning to try to save both the eternal and the temporal:

There are, I incline to think, only two types of philosophy that quite thoroughly know what they are about—Oriental illusionism and thoroughgoing temporalism—Shankara and Heraclitus. And between these alternatives I do not find it possible to hesitate. The eternal is, then, I think, the

characteristic but not necessarily incorrigible distemper of adolescent metaphysics. So long as the belief in it has prevailed, it has produced in philosophy logical irresponsibility, an unwholesome sort of otherworldliness, and an intellectual priggishness based upon the idea that the philosopher was dealing with a finer, higher, more elegant class of realities than those with which the common man or the scientist were concerned. (1:311)

The topic of evolutionary philosophy was the subject of “The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution,” given by John Grier Hibben (1909–1910). Befitting the centennial of Darwin’s birth, which provided the theme to many academic addresses around the country at that time, Hibben offered some assessments of the impact of evolutionary thought.

Three philosophical concerns were raised by Darwinian evolution, which have taken clearer forms, but still await answers. First, while humanity arose from non-human animals, to what extent did we evolve to be more than just animals, and acquire some higher worth? Our capacity for self-knowledge and potentially endless self-progression as a species appears to be unique among animals. Second, are there any legitimate teleological factors within human nature, even if external destinies are not compatible with evolution? After all, human beings are able to freely plan and executive vast designs and modifications to anything and everything, intelligently shaping the world through our own goals. Third, can the processes of life be comprehended to the point where all features of conscious and intellectual life are just physiological? Hibben held out hope that biology would discover the orderly regularities within all processes of life, down to the molecular level. He believed that thought would be understood to be an organic process, lawfully organizing nervous energies for living an active life.

Hibben finally identified a fault with philosophers, such as Bergson and James, who first suppose that anything conceptual must be rigid and alien to the flux of experience. Knowledge, especially scientific knowledge wielding its flexible and growing concepts, can successfully interpret experience without being false to it.

This decade’s final presidential address was delivered by psychologist Carl Emil Seashore (Sjostrand) (1909–1910). His address, “The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion” sought a deep relationship between enjoyable self-expression, the role of play for the healthy realization of life in activities, and the essential role religion play in the developed life. He elucidated the deep connection between play and religion in this manner:

Religious life is the crown of life. It is the richest and most varied of our natures; yet it involves no faculty which is peculiarly or specifically religious. It is through our senses, our memory, our reasoning, our feelings,

and our actions that we are religious. Then if play is the means of growth and a large source of enjoyment, as has just been maintained, it is this for religious life just as it is for social, ethical, or business life. And this is my thesis: Play is a preparation for religious life, and one of the chief means of its realization. We become religious through play and to be religious is often to play. (1:343)

He found the essence of the religious life in the transformative energies released by imaginative performances, elevating play to a level of entrancing “fascination”:

The most effective play is characterized by the experience of fascination. . . . This element of fascination or elation with mental intoxication may be seen in some degree in all play, be it the romping of the infant, the adolescent mating plays, the sport of youth, or the successful pastime of the adult. And this element of fascination and elation is one of the characteristics of religious life. . . . Religious devotion, religious faith, religious fervor, from that of the ignorant believer to that of the dominating seer and prophet, reveal this trait. The history of conversion, revivals, and great religious movements need not be reviewed to substantiate this claim. (1:344)

Seashore enumerated several additional personal and social benefits from religious performances in play, such as the development of personality, social fellowship, finding joy in life, and appreciating mysterious and transcendent matters in a relatable way.

Notes

1. See for example, Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of Authority* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860–1930* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); Richard Ohmann, *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); James Campbell, *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association* (Chicago: Open Court, 2006).

2. See Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy*; and Kuklick, *Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).

3. An 1872 entry in Bronson Alcott’s journal related that philosophical discussion was superficial in Boston. According to Alcott, “philosophy is published in St. Louis”;

see *The Journals of Bronson Alcott*, ed. Odell Shepard (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), p. 444. It seems Emerson agreed with Alcott, which is why he encouraged Thomas Davidson to go to St. Louis in 1868; see Davidson, “Autobiographical Sketch,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 8 (1957): 532. Accounts of Alcott’s and Emerson’s trips to St. Louis are also instructive on this point; see Henry A. Pochmann, *German Culture in America; Philosophical and Literary Influences, 1600–1900* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 271–272; Alcott, *The Journals of Bronson Alcott*, p. 340; Henry Brokmeyer, *A Mechanic’s Diary* (Washington, D.C.: E.C. Brokmeyer Publisher, 1910), pp. 229–233; and Emerson, vol. 5 of *The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 421–422, 514, 521.

4. Denton Snider (1841–1925), one of the leading members of the St. Louis Hegelians, decided that his vocation was to be a writer of books. Indeed, he published more than forty books, but also worked for Harris as a public school teacher and administrator, worked briefly in Jane Addams’s Hull House, and was an indefatigable public lecturer on classical literature and philosophy. Henry Conrad Brokmeyer (1818–1906) is another interesting example. A co-founder of the St. Louis Philosophical and Literary Society, Brockmeyer also served in the Missouri legislature, on the St. Louis Board of Aldermen, and even served a term of lieutenant governor of Missouri (1877–1881). For more on the St. Louis Hegelians’ conception of philosophy, see James A. Good’s Introduction to *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867–93)*, 22 vols. (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 2002); Good, “The Value of Thomas Davidson,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 40 (2004): 289–318; and Good, “The St. Louis Hegelians and the Lost *Bildung* Tradition in American Philosophy,” in *The St. Louis Philosophical Movement*, ed. Britt-Marie Schiller (St. Louis: Webster University Press, 2009), pp. 9–26.

5. William James. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897); John Dewey, et al., *Studies in Logical Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903); F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1903).

6. William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1907). For recent sources on pragmatism in German idealism, see James A. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The “Permanent Hegelian Deposit” in the Philosophy of John Dewey* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); and Daniel Breazeale, “Fichte’s Conception of Philosophy as a ‘Pragmatic History of the Human Mind’ and the Contributions of Kant, Platner, and Maimon,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 62 (2001): 685–703. Royce’s interpretation of Hegel is also relevant to the relationship between pragmatism and idealism. For an interesting recent article on that topic, see John Kaag, “American Interpretations of Hegel: Josiah Royce’s Philosophy of Loyalty,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26 (January 2009): 83–101.

7. Royce, “Kant’s Relation to Modern Philosophical Progress,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 15 (October 1881): 360–381.

8. Ladd, George Trumbull, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory: A Treatise of the Phenomena, Laws, and Development of Human Mental Life* (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1894).

9. This essay was previously examined, through a different lens, in Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 236–237.

10. Dewey, *The Psychological Standpoint* (1886), in vol. 1 of *The Early Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), pp. 123, 125, 127. For more on the development of Dewey's conception of the psychological standpoint, see Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 134–137. Shook provides further insight into Dewey's use of the psychological standpoint in *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), pp. 44–46.

11. Dewey, *The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896).

12. Dewey, *The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism* (1905), in vol. 3 of *The Middle Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 158.

13. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, pp. 137ff.

14. Dewey first used the term “epistemological industry” in “Psychology and Philosophic Method,” initially published in the *University Chronicle* 2 (1899): 159–179 (California). This essay was reprinted separately as “Consciousness” and Experience, in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1910), pp. 242–270.

15. For a fascinating account of the interplay between the rise of pragmatism and the profound post-Civil War economic transformation, see James Livingston, *Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

16. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt, 1890); *The Varieties of Religious Experience; A Study in Human nature; Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902* (New York: Modern Library, 1902).

17. William James called this “healthy-mindedness” in *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt, 1890); *The Varieties of Religious Experience; A Study in Human nature; Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902* (New York: Modern Library, 1902).

18. One is reminded here of psychologist Jonathan Haidt's current classifications for bases to moral judgments; see his *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).

19. Today's philosophers may recognize the essentials of the knowledge (“Super-scientist Mary”) argument offered by Frank Jackson in “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 127–136.