PHILOSOPHERS DURING WARTIME AND PEACETIME, 1941–1950

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1. Introduction

The tumultuous 1930s were gone but not forgotten. Academics were watching as war seemed to be returning Europe to savagery at the beginning of the 1940s, and they began pondering the destiny of their civilization. By 1941, the number of democratic countries in the world had dropped to thirteen, and only two among them counted as great powers.[1] Yet America seemed unwilling to defend England, much less Europe, or any other continent, from totalitarianism and military dictatorship.

Would autocracy be the actual fate of Western civilization and all civilizations? If philosophy could truly speak to fundamental matters of universal concern, now was the time.

2. The Stage Prepared

The generation of The American Philosophical Association (The APA) presidents who served during the 1940s, almost all born between 1884 and 1900, had experienced World War I and then the Great Depression during the first half of their careers. Entering seniority and leadership positions during the 1940s seemed inauspicious by comparison. To whom could they turn for examples of steadfast wisdom? Many among this generation had been influenced by pragmatism or progressivism, or their combination. Yet their champion, John Dewey (1905–1906), was determined to take an isolationist stance, exemplified by his March 1939 editorial entitled, "No Matter What Happens—Stay Out."[2]

On 7 December 1941, Dewey looked out upon Cooper Union's crowded auditorium, filled with listeners eager to hear his scheduled talk, "Lessons from the War in Philosophy."[3] If they knew that this planned session was gathered to discuss World War I, they didn't care, as that day's news from Pearl Harbor filled their thoughts. However, Dewey refused to say anything about the new war, and said that philosophy cannot guide unfolding events or usefully judge them afterwards.[4] What use was pragmatism as a public philosophy?

Few philosophers defended pragmatism after episodes like that. Only Dewey's student, Herbert Wallace Schneider (1948–1949), stands out as a progressive and cosmopolitan leader among this decade's presidents, and he made his own greatest impact on world affairs during the 1950s and 1960s. In all fair-

ness, the other schools of philosophy in America were not much help either. Idealism had been dominant for several decades, but the great idealists had all left the scene due retirement or death by 1940. The rationalist and relationalist personalisms of (Percy) Brand Blanshard (1942–1945) and Charles Hartshorne (1948–1949) were philosophically impressive yet politically impotent. Hans Reichenbach (1947–1948), the only other president from the 1940s of much note, was the first representative of logical empiricism to be so honored, and the first of many from that analytic genre to ignore social and political values altogether in a presidential address.

With the exception of only Schneider, Blanshard, Hartshorne, and Reichenbach, none of the other presidents who served during the 1940s were great expositors of their schools of thought. They comprise an undistinguished assembly, to be blunt. They were exemplary figures in their discipline for academic expertise and thoughtful scholarship, but beyond the merits to their instruction and erudition, little of consequence survives. This group mostly counted among that "Lost Generation" that came of age during World War I—fated to fall "in between": both too late and then too early, not quite card-carrying endorsers of world-shaking ideologies and worldviews, only borrowing from philosophical systems around them as best they could. The best among them were syncretic, while the rest were at most eclectic. All of them were destined to be front and center for a global stage of conflict and carnage unworthy of any generation.

3. Philosophers in Wartime

Charles William Hendel (1940–1941) delivered his "Reflections on the Spirit of Man" in December 1940, as Europe's new war raged. He used that backdrop of death and destruction to point the finger of blame on materialism and its resignation to the proposition that might makes right. Materialism can stay busy tracking the shifting tides of strength, making predictions about which side may win, but materialism must be unable or uninterested in knowing which side should win. Materialism breeds cynicism and quietism:

> There is a dispiriting view of history and humanity in the world today. The present phenomenon in human affairs is seen simply as another instance of the rise and fall of empires. It is the age-old shifting of power from some nations possessed of it to others that are not. (5:3)

Worst of all, this spectator stance toward events on a global stage loses sight of individual people trying to know right and wrong, and who are fighting for the good and the true. The importance of the human spirit fades away, when all we

look to is how much control can be exerted over nature's fruits and how much control humanity can exert over itself.

Much was promised by the "scientific" spirit of inquiry and technology to make life better. Much was promised by a philosophy of technology applied to humankind itself. Hendel's generation, spellbound by a fresh violent application of technology, seems enthralled by a philosophy that materialized all values:

> For it is believed that man's everlasting problem is that of adapting himself to the conditions of his physical environment and a social existence. Real needs such as food, clothing, shelter, sexual, and other necessities, these are what call the tune and supply the motifs of the dance of life. There is no real value in anything else, which we must consequently dismiss as absurdity and an impediment to progress. (5:10)

This pragmatic materialism accepts historical and cultural relativism, which demoralizes the masses and reduces elites to fatalistic impotency. The only figures empowered by that paralyzed social body are those "men of destiny," as Hendel called them, who ignore lessons of history, feel certain that they ought to rule, and expect to write the history books. Hendel preferred the spiritualization of values, so that they are appreciated as timelessly and universally valid. Only then, he contended, could a different destiny be envisaged for free and dignified peoples establishing their own political orders and lasting civilizations. Whether the collisions among cultures and religions, each morally certain about its cosmic mission, are less violent than any materialistic war, Hendel did not pause to consider.

America would soon enter World War II, and its educational institutions braced for the sweeping changes sure to arrive. The Congress on Education on Democracy, held in 1939 at Columbia University, was the occasion for President Roosevelt's declaration, "education for democracy cannot merely be taken for granted. . . . That the schools make worthy citizens is the most important responsibility placed upon them."[5] The philosophical question, "What is the pedagogy that truly makes worthy citizens?" went unanswered.

In his address, "Pot Shots at Present Pedagogy," Benjamin Apthorp Gould Fuller (1940–1941) could not foresee how the American university would be dramatically transformed before the decade was over, but he was quite sure that educational change had already gone too far. As Hendel did, Fuller faulted pragmatism, in the guise of "progressive education" (5:27). The best college experience should remain just as his own had been at Harvard forty years earlier—professors exemplifying scholarship in teaching more than publishing, curricula emphasizing humanistic and cosmopolitan values, very few electives, and small class sizes to liberalize the mind instead of large vocational courses to

train the body. Progressive education prioritizes the most expansive accessibility of the masses to the narrowest of practical goals: functioning in an industrial and over-managed capitalist economy. All sense of history and perspective gets lost, and no one can properly evaluate, must less wisely judge, the great events of the present day. Progressive education can only adjust the individual to the present social situation; nowhere does anyone receive guidance about adjusting society to the enduring needs and rights of the individual. Fuller's list of strident complaints was a prescient catalogue of every call of alarm over the "crisis in American education" heard during the rest of the twentieth century.

Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff (1940–1941) also had the moral ideals of civilization on his mind, as evinced by a book on that theme that he published soon after delivering his presidential address, "Conviction and Tolerance."[6] Divisive and inconclusive ethical theories seem unable to guide the moral conscience, if modern peoples should still be said to possess such a spiritual thing. Mere conviction becomes fanatically evil, so intelligent judgment must balance moral zeal, yet excessive intellectualizing tolerates too much and struggles too little.

Tsanoff offered a different way to balance conviction and tolerance: remain loyal to one's own moral convictions, yet respect the right of all others to that same devotion. The remaining danger is bland toleration of indifference, not caring what motivates others, which restrains us from hurting their feelings yet prevents us from taking them seriously. Invoking Josiah Royce (1903–1904), Tsanoff charged the loyal conscience with a higher duty to incorporate others' view of the good into estimations of moral duty (5:74). The implication that there is no final discharge of duty, that what shall be morally right will develop into the future, represents the unification of conviction with tolerance.

Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna (1941–1942), only the second woman president of The APA as of that date, delivered her address, "Cultural Relativism and Science," just three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Perceiving the anti-pragmatist tenor among some philosophical colleagues, she staunchly defended empirical science in general and the social sciences in particular. Her career had been mildly favorable toward pragmatism and its grounds in the behavioral study of humanity.

Psychology, ethnology, and anthropology appreciate cultural relativity only through their approaches to human universals permitting any culture at all. Science is not relativistic in spirit; neither must it be only concerned for the transient and expedient. It seeks to understand the natural order with tentative theories, unfettered by mythical or ideological dogmas. Invoking Dewey, De Laguna called for the scientific spirit to further pervade and unify a disjointed proto-culture labeled as "Western civilization" (5:96).

Cultural relativism can degenerate into a learned hopelessness that nothing can be done about inter-cultural conflicts. But the social sciences are still human

sciences if conducted properly: understanding another culture, as a trained ethnologist can, demands a higher level of tolerance from a due respect for the dignity and merit to all forms of human life. The ethnologist's home culture hardly fulfils that respect; the indigenous population under study may not even conceive of it. Where does it comes from, then? Cultural relativism cannot say, but the scientific spirit can: there is a universal order to be found across humanity's cultural ways that can be appreciated in its own right, an order setting high humanistic standards of moral conduct owed all peoples, regardless of whether they too recognize that order. The sciences, thanks to that humanistic valuation of culture as culture wherever it flourishes, are elevated above mere relativism themselves, and enter into ownership by all humanity as a common possession and a common good.

In "Materialism in Democracy—Democracy in Culture," Ephraim Edward Ericksen (1941–1942) also invoked pragmatist Dewey along with William James (1905–1906) as he defended another social science, economics, as a noble search, not only for grounding individual rights, but also for the investigation of proper conditions of wider social cooperation. Mere competition as zero-sum conflict has never been the story of economic progress. Quite the opposite: the more that the economic spirit enervates a culture, the more each person's eyes are lifted up toward opportunities to benefit large groups first and foremost.

The individual has economic rights only to the extent that all do, a thoroughly democratic result on both practical and ideal levels. Ericksen called for economics to frankly acknowledge its principled spirit, forever displacing the notion that economics has nothing to say about social values. Only conservatism benefits from an economics chained to cold facts and iron laws, profiting from the dehumanization of citizens and the poverty of civic life. Calling for the socialization of industry is the opposite of government or corporate tyranny over labor; it is the only opportunity to foster the democratic experience of the people. Economics for a democratic culture should measure progress not in monetary terms, but by "the quality of human life and the sharing of what is best in human experience" (5:121).

The December 1941 meetings of The APA were the last major gatherings of the association for several years. No academic conferences could be confidently scheduled or well attended between 1942 and 1945 because of wartime restrictions on travel; most buses, trains, and airplanes could not be spared for ordinary civilian use.

Elijah Jordan (1941–1943) had been elected at the 1941 Western meeting, but could not attend, although he sent his undelivered 1942 presidential address, "Concerning Philosophy," for the usual publication in *The Philosophical Review*. Jordan evidently was in a severe mood, and targeted pragmatic materialism again for stern censure. His survey of modern philosophy treats it as a

"monstrosity" deserving only the label of "atomic mysticism" (5:130). The quest for universals was abandoned and being was forgotten:

> The fundamental fact that meets us now is a world in chaos, a cosmic chaos, a *contradictio in substantia* [objection in nature] for which there is no description black enough. Falling into the pit of subjectivism has left us without a morality, no vestige of character remains. For a mess of garbage man has sold his soul to the business man, and the world of reality is sold out. So there is no obligation, for there is nothing to be responsible *to*. God died, and the world dissolved, when man found his destiny in himself. And the responsibility for the situation is philosophy's. (5:142)

He then delivered a resolute verdict of condemnation upon empiricism and pragmatism as sobering as any:

> Our scientific thought has abandoned the search for the realities of existence, and has sought nothing but technical means and processes by which the realities and the values could be reduced to terms of our interests, forgetting that for interests there is neither substance nor law, neither reality nor value. And while we have in our egoistic stupidity insisted that the world should come to terms with our subjective purposes, the world has laughed in our face and has gone its own way, which is not the way that human wish or subjective motives would have it, but a way determined by its own inertia, and so leads to no end. And our refusal to see and follow the reality to the end that the reality be made conscious of its destiny has left us without a destiny. (5:142)

Jordan's sobering address was the last one received until World War II was ending.

Daniel Sommer Robinson (1943–1944) was elected president of the Western Division at its 1942 meeting, but delivery of his address had to wait until the 1946 meeting. Donald Sage Mackay (1942–1943) did not deliver a 1942 presidential address either, as that Pacific Division meeting had been canceled, as were the 1943 and 1944 meetings. Mackay's paper, "The Illusion of Memory," was sent to *The Philosophical Review* for publication in the summer of 1945. While Jordan longed for stable being, Mackay celebrated its departure. His observations on the specious psychological presence of the past lead him on to skeptical questions about the supposed indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. No substrate of being is left, but only persistent patterns of relations for science to postulate and explore.

Victor Fritz Lenzen (1943–1945), a popular professor of physics, was elected Pacific Division President by mail ballot in early 1943. However, since meeting cancellations persisted, his paper, "The Concept of Reality in Physical Theory," was published in 1945. In it, he agreed about the scientific reliance upon theoretical constructions. He affirmed that physical space is "a form of relatedness of events," a characterization that "leaves its structure undefined" (5:207).

Blanshard was elected at the 1941 Eastern Division meeting held just weeks after Pearl Harbor. That meeting, anticipating the coming wartime strictures, agreed that officers may serve an additional year if necessary. Blanshard sent a letter to division members in 1943, asking if officers may serve a third year during 1944, since meetings and elections were still impractical; he received that consent. Blanshard was the only functioning president of The APA during the war years, holding his office from the December 1941 division meeting until spring of 1945, serving over three full years—by far the longest term of office of any president to date. His letter to the membership after the hoped-for meeting in February 1945 (again canceled) included a call for an election of officers. He added, "we have held office longer, lived a more shadowy existence, and lived it in more shadowed times, than any other officers the Association has had. May that unenviable record remain unique!"[7]

A mail ballot then elected William Kelley Wright (1945–1946) to the presidency in the spring of 1945. The publication of presidential addresses was delayed until mid-1945, and the first meeting of The APA to be held after the war was the Pacific Division's meeting in December 1945.

Philosophers were hardly silenced during the war, however, as articles in *The Philosophical Review* and a few other philosophical journals were evidently inspired by current events. George Hartmann of Columbia University's Teacher College obtained seventy-five replies from noteworthy philosophers across the country to a questionnaire on pacifism, publishing his summary as "The Strength and Weakness of the Pacifist Position as Seen by American Philosophers."[8]

Under Blanshard's presidency, a handful of The APA committees carried on, and delegates were sent to participate in sporadic activities of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). A report to the ACLS, "Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945," was prepared by Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1936–1937) and later published in 1947.[9] Brightman made special mention of a major project of The APA, the Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education, which was led by Blanshard and successfully conducted through small meetings in several states during the war despite travel difficulties. The Commission also received additional commentary from communications by postal mail. Blanshard submitted a lengthy report about that commentary with numerous excerpts from many philosophers, providing revealing insights about conflicting perspectives on philosophy's continued relevance.[10]

Later in 1945, Blanshard, along with Curt John Ducasse (1939–1940), Hendel, Arthur Edward Murphy (1950–1951), and Max Carl Otto (1929–1930) published a consequential volume of reflective essays titled *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities*.[11] Blanshard's opening essay in that volume not only noted the rift still separating pragmatists from non-pragmatists over the value of metaphysics, but it also highlighted the growing chasm between those two camps and the camp of positivists, who entirely dismiss all treatment of values and ethics from philosophical consideration.

Was this war within philosophy unresolvable?

4. Philosophy at War with Itself

Blanshard sent a presidential address, "Current Strictures on Reason," for publication in *The Philosophical Review*, in 1945. Recalling how he had started this paper's composition in late 1942, he tried to revive memories of how fragile everything seemed during the war's darkest days. The life of reason, justice, and truth, could have been lost—possibly lost forever.

Even after the tide had turned and victory was grasped, Blanshard remained attuned to cynical voices on all sides that reason had been impotent, was still impotent, and must forever be impotent to direct humanity's affairs. Nothing external or objective really controls what people think and judge, these voices announce as the revealed wisdom of the day. He insisted on holding out hope for reasonableness:

> To be reasonable implies at the least that there is an objective truth and right which we can at times apprehend, and that if our thought follows a certain course, it is because it is laid under constraint by the objective pattern of things. (5:177)

Blanshard then identified three schools of academic thought that deny the possibility or efficacy of this reasonableness: the naturalists, the psychoanalysts, and the positivists.

The naturalist, according to Blanshard, claims that all cognitive processes are dictated by natural laws, so all judgment occurs by strict compulsion from internal neurological conditions. That determinism presumably eliminates the opportunity to be guided by objective matters instead. Naturalism cannot eliminate reasonableness so easily, however. Rational necessities have a reality independent from all laws of nature and psychological events, Blanshard affirmed, and his proof appealed to an inner feeling that one is guided by those objective necessities while one is reasoning, and not anything under one's own mental control.

The next opposition to reasonableness comes from the psychoanalysts and allied explorers into the psychological depths of emotionality, who conclude that reason is controlled by feelings, and such deep feelings like loves, desires, and fears are beyond conscious control. Blanshard easily granted the perennial contest between reason and emotion, but he hastened to point out that reason must have some objectivity and influence for us, for if it were so inconsequential, we would hardly notice the unreasonableness of so many emotional episodes.

The third kind of opposition to reasonableness, from the positivists, admits external realities but denies that we could form a final intelligible worldview from our limited access through observation. Reason can demand that we discern the true framework of the world, but it will forever be disappointed. Not even logic has a basis in external realities. Reason and logic are not decisive for actual empirical work of settling on just-good-enough descriptions of what we can contingently and conventionally agree about the world. Blanshard could only state his final rationalist assertion to conclude this paper: "all necessary propositions must be taken to assert of existence and that no factual propositions are altogether contingent" (5:193).

Blanshard turned out to be the last of the presidents of The APA from that mighty school of idealism, which had held sway over philosophy in America for three generations; but he did not get the last word. The final words from those wartime years happened to come from successive pragmatist-minded presidents: George Perrigo Conger (1944–1945) and Wright.

Conger was unable to deliver his address, "Method and Content in Philosophy" until the division's first meeting after the war, in May 1946. His address, like Blanshard's, reflected the wartime years that shaped its theme, as philosophy pondered its fundamental options and available directions. Unlike Blanshard, however, Conger was unwilling to place the full burden of philosophy's purpose and destiny in the hands of any single philosophical movement, even one so distinguished as rationalism. Instead, he called for a truly comprehensive philosophy striving to take all methodologies and perspectives into proper account. Not only would that comprehensive philosophy unify scientific fields and integrate social ethics on a planetary scale, it would incorporate all religion as well:

> a truly comprehensive philosophy may adumbrate and begin to suggest a truly comprehensive religion. The great religions, too, or, more accurately, their theologies, are partitionings of a manifold—the same old manifold, the universe—common to them all. In a planetary culture, the old walls behind which the adherents of each particular religion huddled, or on which some sat and looked down on others, or through which many a devoted missionary tried to force his way, are bound to crumble. In their place eventually we shall have one landscape, whether it is garden or rub-

> ble. With a comprehensive philosophy, we shall be able to press toward the ideal . . . it is the function of each of the great religions to bring out the best in the others. (5:316)

Wright's address comported well with Conger's, similarly calling for a joint philosophical effort of the widest possible scope and impact. The ultimate division within philosophy, Wright said, was not between schools, but between temperaments. The great philosophers exemplify magnanimity, a generosity of intellect eager to encompass all knowledge and wisdom, something that no science or religion could or should attempt. Even among philosophers, few have tried, while many have bailed, shrinking away from that daunting task.

Only now, at "The End of the Day," as Wright titled his address, can we perceive the close of the glorious period of Modern Philosophy:

> With the close of the nineteenth century, the last rays of the setting sun seem to have disappeared, and to have been followed by the slowly dimming twilight of the present. The five most significant philosophers of the past twenty years, perhaps some of you will agree with me, have been Samuel Alexander, Henri Bergson, Dewey, George Santayana, and Alfred North Whitehead [1931–1932], all born over eighty years ago. What younger men show promise of becoming their equals? (5:256)

Philosophy will go on, of course, but which temperament will prevail? Wright continued:

> Philosophy will always occupy a considerable domain, including at least metaphysics, epistemology, theoretical ethics and aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. In addition to these subjects, magnanimous philosophers, with their broader and less specialized outlook, will continue to cooperate with the technicians in every field of human inquiry and activity in which adjustments to new situations must be made upon an extensive scale. In every situation involving reflective adjustments, realists, idealists, instrumentalists, and philosophers of every school will be able to offer suggestions. Nothing that is of real human significance, whether in the realm of pure essences and subsistents, or in that of practical emergencies, can be alien to the interest and sympathy of a magnanimous philosopher. (5:259)

Yet Wright saw no magnanimous philosophers among his generation. Whom did he see?

> In contrast to the magnanimous philosopher, a minute philosopher fails to arrive at any constructive interpretation of the world and humanity in their

> mutual relationships. Even if a philosopher is magnanimous in his own thinking, he may fail to make his constructive outlook intelligible to his students or the readers of his books, and so he may be a minute philosopher so far as his influence upon other persons is concerned.
>
> Among minute philosophers I mean to include those who seek to know more and more about less and less, who confine their attention to trifling problems which throw no light upon any significant aspect of human life or of the world as a whole. (5:259)

Instead of creativity, there is only the shifty business of intense concentration and stubborn consistency. The arid scholasticism of analytic philosophy was becoming the dominant tenor, but it had plenty of company. Keeping your head down at one's own bench was to be the uninspiring offspring of that "PhD Octopus" that James had warned against,[12] and that anti-humanistic scientism rewarded by professionalization and politicization of research. Worse, Wright admonished, that stifling atmosphere of conformity is a breeding ground for the "triflers, cranks, debunkers, and pedants" (5:266), who parasitically dispense pseudo-knowledge under the guise of profundity.

As Wright did, we may ask ourselves which sort of temperament prevails in our own times. Our answer may be as dispiriting as his was. All the same, no generation is deprived of great challenges and moral causes, if only one would be willing to look up and around. Forward-looking philosophers tried to find their bearings as their clouds of war dispersed.

5. Philosophers in Peacetime

The years 1946 and 1947 brought immense relief at the arrival of peace, but intellects remained unsettled while the possibility of global cooperation seemed remote. If it were possible, an even greater threat to humanity had emerged, as the Atomic Age dawned upon a surprised world. How would philosophy prove relevant to these alarming times? A pragmatic spirit dominated the presidential addresses during these years, even if an optimistic outlook could not.

To William Ray Dennes (1945–1946) fell the opportunity to deliver the first presidential address in person to colleagues at a division meeting in four years, in December 1945. Entitled "Conflict," it began with these sobering words:

> That violence breeds violence is not a new discovery. . . . But few expected that the resultant tensions would be anything like as menacing as they have been rendered by the invention of explosives which exceed the destructive force of TNT not by a factor of 2, or of 10, or even of 100, but by a factor

> approaching 1,750,000 pound for pound. It is not hysterical rhetoric but the soberest of facts that leads us to recognize the probability that unless effective international control is achieved within ten or twenty years several nations will possess large stocks of devices by which they could shatter and roast to death, within an hour or so, half the population of a country like ours besides obliterating its cities. And if (as seems, fortunately, doubtful) means should be discovered to confine close to the surface of the earth the flow of radioactive gases released by the explosion of these instruments, their horrible (and in many cases lingering) destructiveness would be further multiplied. The problems which consequently face us are not new in kind; but the increase in their intensity and urgency is staggering. The word is on the lips of every responsible man and woman that we human beings, hundreds of millions of us and of many nations, must either find ways to resolve our major disagreements effectively, and pretty quickly, or we shall very probably soon destroy ourselves. (5:225)

It may appear that conflicts over values ultimately go back to theoretical disputes, the obstinate belief systems to which we cling. If so, then disagreements appear to be irresolvable, for each belief system will assume the privilege of determining facts for themselves. However, because values are at stake, people are most practically concerned with realizing those values for life—should we be surprised to discover that many of the same values are widely prioritized, and disputes are actually about the best means to achieve them? This practical matter can be intelligently approached with far-reaching inquiries into the actual consequences of optional policies and practices. Coordinating those inquiries and synthesizing the results for application to human ends would require philosophy's creative reconciliation. It is not the pacification of competing powers over life that demands philosophy's attention, but rather the testing and harnessing of competing theories of life.

Robinson was also convinced of the practical utility of philosophy in human affairs. He had published *Political Ethics* in 1935,[13] and would publish *Principles of Conduct* in 1948.[14] A philosophical grasp on science's general depiction of the world is essential to working with science's theoretical implications as they race ahead of familiar moral and political principles. His address, "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age," contrasted unifying positivism, scientific relativism, and process metaphysics. Whichever scientific philosophy proves the most adequate may depend on its applicability to the incredible technological powers recently acquired at the atomic and subatomic levels. Nature can no longer be depicted as aloof and static for describing and mapping; scientific experience is now about technological scrutiny and transformation of nature for our multiplying ends. The distinction between pure and applied science is invis-

ible to ethics as well, which has the right to scrutinize all implications for the acquisition of knowledge:

> The ethical principle that in the technological development of pure knowledge those implementations of natural power which would promote the common good are right, whereas those that would destroy it are wrong is probably universally acceptable among thinkers concerned with ethics.
>
> Such a principle implies a definite restriction upon technological developments of scientific knowledge, and that is precisely what the ethical conditioning of science means. (5:293–294)

This "ethical conditioning of technology" (5:296) can refocus philosophy on the opportunities for advancing human progress once again.

Katharine Everett Gilbert (1946–1947) looked to art and aesthetics, especially poetry, for guidance on human welfare and progress. The full meaning of life offered by the most powerful ideas enthralling and enchanting humanity can be divulged by bold poetry. That is why "important poetic fiction may, by its apparent intense unreason throw light on those metaphysical first principles that Whitehead says 'mutely appeal for an imaginative leap.'" (5:326) An ongoing conversation between poetry and philosophy should make fruitful contributions to our ethical quandaries as well.

In "The Role of a Philosopher," Marten ten Hoor (1945–1947) similarly found a predominate responsibility to negotiate among other disciplines and creative endeavors rather than to seek some ultimate reality or supreme method. Those lofty, but illusive, goals would not impose order among philosophers, not even among specialists in logic or metaphysics, and could not impress non-philosophers, who only detect irrelevant abstraction instead of concrete relevance. The philosopher of ethics, a practical-minded and multi-disciplinary ethics, should make the greatest impact on human conditions:

> Since social institutions are intended to promote the realization of values, the social sciences must of necessity be based on ethics. The moralist and the social scientist should therefore cooperate in the translation of moral wisdom into social practice. Obstacles to such cooperation are the deterministic philosophy of social institutions professed by some social scientists, the preoccupation of others with the mechanics of social processes, and the mutual professional isolation and antagonism of social scientists and philosophers. That the problems of the individual and of the social institution are so disparate and so unrelated as to forbid this cooperation is not an acceptable objection. (5:381)

Reconciling the ideal and real, as the "intellectual conscience of the social theorists" (5:382), will require not only an interdisciplinary competence but also a linguistic reform. Novel but unnecessary terminologies, excessive confusion and carelessness, ignorant repetition of old ideas, and sheer verbalism as a substitute for elucidation only worsens the isolation of professional philosophy from academia as well as reality itself.

Exercised properly, philosophy could increase world understanding as well as the understanding of the world, according to Cornelius Krusé (1947–1948). His address, "What Contribution Can Philosophy Make to World Understanding?," was delivered at a joint meeting of the Eastern Division and the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Columbia University (5:408). Krusé took this opportunity to discuss the newly formed United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its ambitious goals for international cooperation on education, science, culture, and communication. These aims are entirely consistent with democracy as a way of life and politics.

Where does philosophy fit in? Philosophers have been defending absolute values or subjective values for millennia; is there any practical alternative? As far as the real world of human affairs is concerned, what is needed is a discerning inquiry into "universal" values: concrete values already accepted and pursued by most peoples around the world. Universality may appear to be a poor substitute for assured certainties, whether of the transcendent or intuitive sort. All the same, certainties have not proven their solidity or practicality. Moreover, they have been responsible for tyrannies. Universality could do better asserted Krusé:

> It must not be supposed that search for values of universal validity carries with it, as is so often feared, the rejection of diversity in world outlook and way of life. Quite the opposite is true. The true philosopher will be a lover of plurality, rejoicing in man's diverse ways of conceiving his place and destiny in the world. It is not uniformity but orchestrated unity which the world is in need of. (5:404)

Abram Cornelius Benjamin (1947–1948) appreciated the universality of the philosopher's domain, yet that level of generality leaves plain communication behind, resulting in "Philosophy, the Cult of Unintelligibility." Sorted by temperament and technique, Benjamin surveyed over a dozen sects and schools of thought, each trying to pair intelligibility with terminology, with varying degrees of success. Truly creative and speculative philosophy will not be delimited by common sense or ordinary language where new ideas are needed, just as science could not be restricted, and unfamiliar situations are encountered:

> The philosopher must use his technical language because what he wants to say is something which the average man does not want to say because he has never been confronted with the necessity for saying it. The language of the common man is adequate to the situations with which he is in immediate contact, since it was devised to communicate about just such states of affairs, and he will realize its insufficiency only when his experience has broadened to include situations which cannot be adequately described in these terms. (5:444)

That experimental spirit can be lost, however, if the speculative philosopher retreats into a "rationalistic, deductive method of exposition and justification" (5:444), makes "attempts to clarity terms by reducing them to other terms which are equally obscure" (5:445), or retreats into tedious repetition in book after book. Philosophy's remaining hope is to open paths into new realms and clearly explain show how one may get there and back again.

6. Specialization and Fragmentation

As philosophers entered the last three years of a tumultuous decade, the post-war boom was expanding prosperity, colleges and universities were swelling with students, and disciplinary demands seemed more urgent than before. Most presidential addresses narrowed to topics from one area of philosophy or another, such as epistemology, philosophy of science, or naturalism.

Everett John Nelson (1946–1947; 1966–1967) offered "A Defense of Substance," taking substance to be the locus of causal powers exemplified in regular laws of related events. Causal power cannot be reduced to any number of qualities or relations, and surely irreducible to mere constant conjunctions. Power itself may be 'indefinable' (5:357) but substantial powers need be hypothesized in order to account for the verifiable regularity of conditional patterns of events: "any evidence that the data of experience occur according to stable law or in an orderly manner is evidence of the existence of substance as a ground of that law or order" (5:358).

Reichenbach also chose empiricism and rationalism in their basic forms as unacceptable extremes for his address, "Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of Philosophical Error." Empiricism and rationalism take their extreme forms because rationalism first adopted the degree of necessity and certainty obtainable in mathematics as the standard of knowledge, while empiricism demanded that same high standard from experience:

> The empiricist has always attacked rationalism by the argument that the rationalist neglects the contribution of sense observation to knowledge. But

> in developing his own philosophy, the empiricist unconsciously accepted the fundamental thesis of rationalism, according to which genuine knowledge has to be as reliable as mathematical knowledge, and thus was pushed into the hopeless position of proving that empirical knowledge was as good as mathematical knowledge. (5:421)

Empiricists were thus forced toward either naïve materialism or empiricist skepticism. Naïve materialism would be scientific but ends up crudely metaphysical instead; empiricist skepticism abandons all hope of justifying anything scientific. Empiricism must abandon the rationalist standard of knowledge.

Ironically, mathematical physics has shown the way for empiricism. Mathematics itself offers analytic truth unable to describe any reality. However, the theoretical choice among geometries to describe the universe liberates science from logical guarantees, while synthetic rules yielding probabilities through induction by enumeration are able to guide predictive knowledge of future events. Only by the early twentieth century was science's own liberation from rationalism unavoidably obvious. Until then, philosophers could get away with interpreting science as each pleased, permitting their tacit preference for rationalism to distort what they could understand about the experimental sciences.

The solution to philosophy's blindnesses is now clear:

> What, then, can we do to build up a better philosophy? The study of error should help us to find the truth. Since philosophy is dependent on science, we should make this dependence the conscious condition of our work: we should know that the nature of knowledge can be studied only through analysis of science. The idea of a philosophical theory of knowledge that derives the general outlines of knowledge from the structure of the mind, or from an insight into the nature of being, should forever be abandoned. There is no ontology, no separate realm of philosophical knowledge that precedes science. Theory of knowledge is analysis of science. Philosophy does not contribute any content to knowledge; it merely studies the form of knowledge as exhibited in the work of the scientist and examines all claims to validity. In so doing, the philosopher will know that all he can strive for is a philosophy of the knowledge of his time. (5:429)

A franker statement of scientific philosophy could not be found. What happens to normative philosophy?

> The philosopher, who had to renounce setting up the principles of physics, will be ready also to renounce setting up the fundamental ethical imperatives. His task can only consist in a logical analysis of moral behavior,

> comparable to his analysis of cognitive behavior. He will point out the significance of implications for moral behavior, of the relations connecting the different volitional aims, making one aim subordinate to another; and he will emphasize the necessity of studying psychology and sociology to everyone who wants to combine volitional aims into an ordered system. Without the results of these sciences, implications between volitional aims cannot be set up, since these implications depend on the synthetic knowledge comprised by psychology and sociology. As in the theory of knowledge, the work of the philosopher in the field of ethics will essentially consist in establishing order, in making explicit the logical controls of a field of behavior so controversial and so indispensable. (5:429)

Lest anyone accuse Reichenbach of abandoning the tenor of his times and the knowledge that the world has barely survived yet another crisis, he did defend his philosophy's quest for universality:

> The sober study of truth is deprived of the glamour of artistic creation; but it carries the advantage of paving the path to universal agreement, of setting up results that eventually will be exempt from controversy and attack. It is the path of science on which the philosophy of logical analysis is marching. Though less attractive to the romantic mind, the adoption of scientific method will appear the inescapable consequence of an unprejudiced study of the history of philosophy; it is the only successful path open to the philosophy of the twentieth century. (5:430)

By coincidence, the next address was delivered by a philosopher similarly concerned for philosophy's relationship with science, but who arrived at a diametrically opposed position. Herbert Wallace Schneider (1948–1949) spoke about "Metaphysical Vision," and offered to metaphysics an opportunity for a very different destiny than becoming just an aspect of science:

> So metaphysics, too, could be a science—the science of ontology. It could ask with more precision and persistence than is ordinarily profitable, what the world is. . . . True propositions could thus be systematized not merely as logical statements, but as descriptive of states-of-affairs. These states-of-affairs would be the data for an analytic ontology, without benefit of any postulates or presuppositions other than the general rules of scientific method. No cosmology, theology, value theory, or transcendental deductions need complicate its wholehearted devotion to types of being. No claims to primacy or to ultimacy need embarrass its modest place among other sciences. There is no reason, therefore, why ontology could not be

> scientific enough to satisfy the fussiest logician. On such austere and possibly barren ground metaphysics could, if it chose, eke out its little life among the sciences. (5:457–458)

Surely metaphysics can have a wider vision that that! Would metaphysics turn away from its futile rationalism only to be reduced to sterile empiricism? Never!

> Is it any temptation to a metaphysician to live peacefully on such terms among scientists, when he might do battle gloriously among philosophers?
>
> For philosophers, unlike scientists, live contentiously, and what they euphemistically call "dialectic" is usually disputation. Their inquiries are not peaceful and cooperative, but rather the occasions where opposites meet, and their "associations" are meetings for exhibiting such oppositions. It is in this environment that at least *modern* metaphysics has chosen to live. It never has both eyes on its own field of inquiry, but always one eye on the other philosopher. It is habitually critical and not merely analytical. It lives by self-criticism, hesitation, evaluation, and complication. To its own particular concern with being it brings the added load of its own history and of human experience in general. Its ambition is not merely to be true but to be empirical as well; not merely to understand how things exist but to report man's experience with existence. Thus it struggles with a double interest in man and in nature. It tries to be scientifically philosophical. Whereas any ordinary philosopher is systematically contentious, the metaphysical philosopher is contentiously systematic, for he insists on putting the whole of human experience into scientific form and at the same time putting the whole of science into the form of human experience. (5:458)

Philosophy is not fated to merely be a sub-domain of scientific method, but it should resolutely be scientifically philosophical in a much broader sense:

> I would conceive philosophical metaphysics as a peculiar method of binocular vision which can be applied to any subject matter, not for the sake of integrating knowledge systematically, but for the sake of illuminating by its plurality of perspective those aspects of a particular being which no one science or any other art can reveal. Though the method may be conceived systematically, there is no systematic application of it, no universal insight, no insight into reality as such, no wisdom-in-general. For the correlation of perspectives is achieved not in a third type of system which synthesizes science and experience, but in practice and imagination. Philosophic insight, like intelligence, is not expounded in treatises, for it cannot

> be formulated systematically; it exists piecemeal in practical judgment, critical ability, and poetic imagination. (5:463)

Schneider's pragmatist respect for pluralism and perspective, and for empirical integration over dialectical systematization, was echoed by another pragmatist, Donald Ayres Piatt (1948–1949). Piatt similarly called for philosophy to become more scientifically oriented without getting absorbed into science's methodologies and theories. If science is truly liberating, and all science is ultimately to be applied science, then science should be absorbed into the radical social efforts to relieve suffering and injustice. The bondage to which Piatt referred in his "Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage" is the loss of empowerment that our social structures have imposed on us, without much knowledge or consent of individuals. Wasn't the point of reason and knowledge to be human liberation?

> Human bondage gives point and poignancy to the thesis that the main concern of philosophy should be the nature of the world with man in it as its central fact. This is simply because man is man, man is the central fact, and there is no getting away from him. To take man as central is to take his problems seriously, and this requires recognition that the problem of knowledge and the problem of valuation are not at bottom two problems but are one and the same problem. (5:480)

The stunning successes of science demand readjustments not merely between human beings and nature, but between people and their social environments. If we live in an "Age of Anxiety" (5:472), philosophy's rationalist neglect for real human problems only makes matters worse. Philosophy can reassert its opportunity to empower us:

> By turning its attention away from things as they are to the way in which things are connected in passage, and by giving man an appreciable control over things in passage, science has imposed a heavy responsibility upon philosophy, the responsibility for becoming scientific about the ends of life as well as about the means for achieving these ends. The objective need-demand situation makes the philosophical enterprise perform a genuine service, mediating between the rich complexity of human life as immediately experienced and suffered and the objective causal structure exhibited by the sciences. So it is that a kind of pragmatism has emerged in our inquiry as a hopeful tertium quid between philosophy and human bondage, pragmatism signalizing the militant faith of the "I" in creative human intelligence. (5:481)

7. Philosophy and Science

Other presidents of the 1940s had the significance of science on their minds. If philosophy were restored to significance because of science, then the matters that science is able to find and verify as significant must have crucial importance. Paul Marhenke (1949–1950) selected for his topic "The Criterion of Significance" in order to demand the strictest criteria for anything significant that any science or philosophy is capable of declaring. A declarative is significant only if it satisfies the grammar and orthography rules of a language and be capable of clear expression in ordinary idiom.

Marhenke dismissed the notion that esoteric language used in some metaphysical systems is meaningful despite its untranslatability into ordinary language. If esoteric expressions are meaningful, he declared, then someone who genuinely understands their meaning would produce that meaning in ordinary idiom: "Anyone who has mastered the esoteric idiom and knows what is being said is ipso facto in a position to communicate his knowledge in the language he shares with the rest of us" (5:515).

Put plainly, Marhenke justified his claim that esoteric metaphysics is meaningless unless a translation into ordinary language is produced on the grounds that meaningful metaphysics is evidently translatable into ordinary language. If ordinary idiom commonly finds tautologies positively informative, Marhenke has said something significant about significance to his audience.

Marhenke next rejected theories from Bertrand Russell and Moritz Schlick, holding that sentences obtain their significance by expressing non-psychical propositions, or truth conditions, by pointing out that we could not tell what proposition or state of affairs could be responsible for any sentence's meaning until we first knew its significance; so significance holds priority. He went on to criticize Rudolf Carnap's verifiability criterion for empirical meaning, noting that one "cannot devise an observation test until you know the meaning of the sentence you are going to test" (5:525)

Albert Edwin Avey (1949–1950) focused on epistemological considerations about truth and falsehood in his address, "Truth and Falsehood, Mostly Falsehood." Philosophies have little difficulty proposing a bewildering variety to concepts of truth and knowing truth, without sufficiently attending to falsity and error. Saying a great deal about the reality of truth without explaining the origin of error raises suspicion that little has been accomplished on the matter of attaining knowledge or thinking that objectivity is possible. Realisms do not handle the problem of subjectivity well, while pragmatisms and idealisms appear to require either that there is no knowledge, or that there is no error.

The relationship of the knower to reality is the basic issue, and there these problems reappear in different guise. Is that relationship fatalistically or deter-

ministically settled by reality itself, or does human freedom have a role? Dualism would account for that freedom of the knower to deviate from an accurate grasp of reality, but it would also permit a complete disconnection, so far as anyone could tell, even between separate minds. Monism imposes events on a passive mind unable to see error; dualism allows events to be so different from reality that minds cannot locate truth.

> The problem of error is clearly a phase of the problem of the One and the Many in the structure of Reality. The difficulty with excessive monism is that it stifles the possibility of error. This we reject not from the ethical point of view. If it could be made intelligible as interpretation of fact we could accept it even though counter to what we might approve. But our problem is not ethical; it is epistemological and ontological. Errors occur, and we ask, how is it possible that they should occur? What structure does a reality have which allows this? On the other hand if there is no unity whatever how can any fact refer to any other? (5:566)

Truth and falsity must be a relativistic, conditional, and pluralistic matter. "Critically considered, all discourse operates within the confines of mentality. Whether there is any reality beyond these confines is an unanswerable question." All the same, "mind does transcend any particular event which is within its ken; especially does thought transcend sensation" (5:570):

> the causal interplay of the subjective and individual with the objective and general must be due to the existence of some kind of common denominator, some basic principle of continuity between the two. All monistic metaphysics holds this to be the case, whatever name is given to ultimate reality. The escape from solipsism through the concept of causality then means that so far as the ultimate unity is concerned there is a sense in which there never is any isolation. (5:571)

Avey hastened to explain that we may never know that ultimate unity, of course—whether idealism or materialism is correct, we will not be in a position to verify conclusively. However, the connectedness of knowledge to real matters within our range of active experience as it grows does permit both the possibility of error, and hence of truth.

I conclude this survey of the 1940s with two presidential addresses delivered in 1949 by two eminent thinkers of their generation, Hartshorne, a process metaphysician, and mystical empiricist Walter Terence Stace (1949–1950). Hartshorne began his address, "Chance, Love, and Incompatibility," by announcing that each of the three principles named in his title apply universally to all reality. Chance and love have other categories with which they are incompatible, and still others that must be related (such as chance presupposing incom-

patibility and correlating with necessity), but Hartshorne was ultimately interested at the compatibility of chance and love in mutual tension with each other. On the way to exploring that mutual compatibility, he discussed too many philosophical topics and puzzles to recount here. He did insist on a pragmatic view of knowledge, and the partial openness and particularity of the future, setting the stage for his affirmation of free will:

> We say that knowledge is for the sake of prediction and control. But prediction and control, if taken without qualification, exclude one another. One predicts an eclipse, but does not control it. One controls—from moment to moment—one's conversational utterances, but just to this extent one does not predict them. To predict is to renounce further control; to hold open for control is to renounce prediction. If I predict what I shall say tomorrow, I imply that I shall tomorrow make no decisions concerning my speech; for the decisions must already have been made. If Beethoven had predicted one of his symphonies, he would have created it already; and if a psychologist had predicted it, he would have been just such a composer as Beethoven and assuredly no psychologist. The predicter of Newton must be at least a Newton. Such absurdities may help to teach us that—as Dewey has been contending for nearly half a century—the basic function of knowledge is not to focus a mental camera on the future but to discover what *present* limited potentialities, that is to say, partial indeterminacies, are given for resolution in the future. The resolution itself will be the coming of the future, and to talk of predicting its form is to suppose that something can be settled while it is still unsettled. The object of knowledge is not the future as determinate, but present realities as materials from which alone the future can be made. (5:490–491)

What Karl Popper had pointed out in a conference paper in 1948 (but did not publish until years later[15]) about prediction and prophecy in the social sciences, Hartshorne here proclaimed to be valid over the range of all possible human knowledge, including metaphysics. Human decisions are both concretizations of past contributing conditions and explorations of emerging potentials extending into the future.

Love is a supreme value, but like everything else, it has no guaranteed reality and must take its chances, so to speak, with potentials and opportunity. "Tragedy is thus inherent in value" (5:502), and affirming love's value is no exception, so no theodicy of perfection can be reckoned. All the same, the correlation of chance and love permits the (partial) realization of all human values that can be achieved. Chance and love can only receive ongoing mutual adjustment seeking the attainment of an ultimately aesthetic standard:

> This adjustment requires that destructive conflict arising from incompatibility of values should be mitigated without paying too high a price in loss of individuality, from which spontaneity, chance, and danger cannot be eliminated. It is through love that tragedy is, not indeed wholly prevented, but made bearable and given whatever beauty it is capable of. The love that can do this is that which expects to share with others the sufferings from which no actuality, human or superhuman—subject as all must be to chance and incompatibility—can entirely escape. Such love is not, as Plato thought, the search for the supreme beauty. In its highest human and superhuman forms it simply is that beauty. (5:503)

Stace shall be permitted to have the last word of the decade for our survey of the 1940s. Regarding science itself, religion should no longer resist. Stace was more concerned for "Naturalism and Religion." Shall the scientific worldview of naturalism, confident in its discoveries of so many interconnections among the universe's phenomena, finally dismiss supernaturalism? Naturalism may try, but mystical experience still asserts a relationship with an utterly non-natural kind of reality, insisting that it alone connects with that reality in a way that no other mode of knowledge can. Religion must prove to be immune from absorption into the naturalistic web of explicable forces and events.

Stace had a narrow view of what may count as religious experience, yet he expansively allows that most people may have a taste of it:

> Religious experience, at its highest point, is identical with mystical experience. And since practically all men are capable of religious experience in some degree, it follows that practically all men are capable of mystic experience in some degree. Although we usually class only a very few rare and very exceptional men as "mystics," and the rest of us as non-mystics, yet there is in fact no such hard and fast line. It seems likely that the religious consciousness of the ordinary so-called non-mystic is in reality a lower degree of, or a diluted and perhaps impure version of, the mystic consciousness. (5:536)

The ineffability, non-rationality, and unnaturality of such experiences are fused together, not inferred. The ineffable must be unnatural and nonrational since the natural is conceptualizable (a precondition for rationality and naturality), but the mystical experience never is conceptualizable.

However, what is devoid of conceptualization is not automatically devoid of any quality or positive reality in itself (as most of the world's mystics themselves admit). Just because language must apply only sets of negations to the supernatural does not mean that the mystical experiences themselves consist of

absences and negations. Why should mystical experiences conform to either positive or negative language, when they usually do have positive content, regardless of what any *via negativa* theology might try to say about them? No Apophatic theology could know that all mystical experiences are essentially quite similar in voidness, for the possibility of comparison requires applicable concepts, of which there are admittedly none.

The mystic personally knows next to nothing about these experiences as well, but at least it can be understood what their content is not, and it is, by all accounts, not like natural conceptualized experience That is why letting these experiences gesture at the supernatural is still sensible and cannot be ruled out. That is also why letting mystics apply symbolism and metaphor must not be ruled as nonrational.

Theology's popular descriptions of God for lay people are, therefore, just as much hostile to religious experience as any scientific naturalism. The symbolic language from mysticism is primarily about "the inner subjective experience of the mystic" (5:547), and will not necessarily reveal any objectivity or truth about the supernatural as well, even if mystics assume so.

Nevertheless, Stace argued that despite its subjectivity:

> the value of the religious experience is intrinsic, and not merely instrumental; second, that it is sui generis, and cannot be reduced to moral or any other value; third, that it is the supreme value of human life, transcending all other values, precisely as the religious man claims. (5:550)

Once again, misguided theology is the greater obstacle to this affirmative mystical stance, by getting trapped into mistaken claims that the superiority of the mystical implies the unreality of the natural:

> I say that mystics do not necessarily object to a naturalistic and subjectivistic interpretation of the mystic experience; that there are world-religions which actually interpret it in precisely that way; and that therefore the common assertion that an objectivist interpretation is absolutely bound up with the religious consciousness and cannot be rejected without doing violence to that consciousness, is nothing but a Western or Christian provincialism, not essential to religion, and no necessary part of the universal religious spirit of man. (5:553)

Stace then drew out the surprising implications to this overall stance toward religious experience. The subjectively mystical experience must affirm the supernatural, yet this subjectivity cannot dissolve or devalue the natural world. Mystics must be religious about their experiences, but those experiences are

naturally human all the same. Therefore, it unnecessary for naturalism to reject religiosity, and religious naturalism is the common inheritance of humanity.

Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 49.

2. John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens—Stay Out!," *Common Sense* 8 (March 1939): 11.

3. John Dewey, Lessons from the War—in Philosophy, in *The Later Works, 1925–1953*, vol. 14, *Essays, Reviews, and Miscellany, 1939–1941*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: SIU Press, 1988), pp. 312ff.

4. John Patrick Diggens, *The Promise of Pragmatism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 2.

5. Quoted in I. L. Kandel, *The Impact of the War upon American Education* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 10.

6. Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff, *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1942).

7. "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association of 1944–May 1, 1945," *The Philosophical Review* 54, no. 4 (July 1945): 369–399, at 397.

8. George Hartmann, "The Strength and Weakness of the Pacifist Position as Seen by American Philosophers," *The Philosophical Review* 53 (1944): 125–144.

9. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945," *The Philosophical Review* 56 (1947): 390–405.

10. Brand Blanshard, "From the Commission's Mailbag," *The Philosophical Review* 54 (1945): 197–259.

11. Brand Blanshard, et al., *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

12. William James, "The PhD Octopus," *Harvard Monthly* (March 1903), http://grammar.about.com/od/classicessays/a/The-Ph-D-Octopus-By-William-James-Classic-Essays.htm (accessed 03 March 2015).

13. Daniel Sommer Robinson, *Political Ethics: An Application of Ethical Principles to Political Relations* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1935).

14. Robinson, *The Principles of Conduct: An Introduction to Theoretical and Applied Ethics* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948).

15. Karl R. Popper, Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences, in *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963/2014), pp. 452–466.