

William James on Religious Saints and Verifying the God Hypothesis

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ABSTRACT

William James proposed a Science of Religions in his Varieties of Religious Experience in order to fulfill his promise that pragmatic empiricism could illuminate the meaning and truth conditions of religious ideas. Most commentators have focused either on his “will to believe” defense of faith, or on his analysis of the power of mystical inspiration. A unifying interpretation is assembled, synthesizing his kind of pragmatism, his fascination with mysticism, and his application of Science of Religions to religious saints. Religious saints generate live hypotheses about society moving towards the ideal moral order. People can participate in that momentous opportunity for progress with their own moral lives. Although James’s Science of Religions permits interdisciplinary inquiry into religious experience, and especially the moral energy of inspired saints, his hopes for verifying hypotheses about God cannot be fulfilled.

Keywords

William James, American pragmatism, religion, philosophy, science

Religious hypotheses

William James repeatedly claimed that his pragmatism could methodically verify hypotheses about God. His books *The Will to Believe* (1897) and *Pragmatism* (1907) resist scientific materialism, strict empiricism, and philosophical rationalism in order to protect the individual faith and moral energy fostered by the religious life. Yet James surprisingly proposed a Science of Religions in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) asking three disciples to cooperate for making religion empirically scientific: psychology, history of religion, and philosophy. Psychology investigates mystical states and

their effects on religious people. History of religion shows how personal faith inspires religious revivals and produces ethical reforms. Philosophy selects convictions about divine matters which may prove to be compatible with scientific knowledge as well as empowering for social progress.

James's Science of Religions identifies "saintly ventures" trying to improve society which are best fitted for experimental test by "moral saints" trying to increase humanity's well-being. Many moral saints do succeed, but what does their success say about God? On James's own principles, this Science of Religions can confirm saintliness as a reasonable mode of social reform, but it cannot verify what those saints think about God. Philosophers needn't worry that their role in Science of Religions amounts to theological apologetics. More generally, scholars participating in James's Science of Religions can stay agnostic about the existence of God. Scholars should not be indifferent to James's valuable studies into the role of religious saints for the ethical progress that religion can encourage. Applying pragmatism to religion requires taking the dynamic aspects of the religious life most seriously.

How can James's pragmatic method show how religious ideas of God could become "verified"? James's search for evidence of God has received much attention, but it has also been regrettably misinterpreted. James himself tells us how he conceives of the process of religious verification in the opening chapter of *The Will to Believe*:

If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, and the only means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientific hypothesis is that which 'works' best; and it can no otherwise with religious hypotheses.

(WB, xii; Works WB, 8)¹

Keeping in mind James's pragmatism, a hypothesis wouldn't be a static representation trying to correspond to fixed realities. James sets up no hypothetical vision of God or propositional definition for God in his writings: only living religions make their proposals about what "God" may mean for humanity. James sets aside metaphysical statements and theological creeds, seeking religious hypotheses instead. Pragmatism always seeks the real meaning of something in potential consequences within people's lives. What is a religious hypothesis about the universe, then? It evidently cannot be about the way that the actual universe is, since religion, according to James, is always discontented with world and proposes how to change it. A religious hypothesis therefore concerns the way that the world should become, not the way it already is.

1. Citations to James's writings are indicated by the standard convention: the original publication first, followed by its publication in Harvard edition of *The Works of William James*. Citations to *The Thought and Character of William James* use TCWJ.

How would one go about verifying an idea about what should be? We cannot understand what a verifiable religious hypothesis could possibly look like until this question is answered. No correspondence test could supply verification, since nothing yet exists to which the idea could correspond. Also notable is the way that religion isn't intent on tracking and transforming the natural universe. That's science's field of work. Religion is concerned with the universe insofar as that includes the human world. The realm of persons and their conduct, not just the motions of material things, is the field for the work of religions. James provokes us to ask, How would a religious hypothesis proposing what should be done in the human world manage to receive experimental verification? Also relevant is the way that the moral world does not have a reality over and above real persons and their conduct, in James's view. Avoiding that reification of an abstraction, we are now looking at this specific Jamesian question: How would a religious proposal about the way persons should conduct themselves receive experimental confirmation?

Continuing to apply James's quotation from *The Will to Believe*, a religious model of personal conduct is supposed to be experimentally tested by the active faiths of individuals, "freely expressing themselves in life." The dynamic power of faith, as expressed in their lives making a genuine difference to the future of the world, is the experimental test of the religious proposal for conduct. In James's pragmatism, a model of conduct plays the role of the hypothesis, while the lived faith in that model is its test. The truth-maker serving as the basis for a verification of a religious hypothesis is therefore literally a maker-of-truth: an individual makes a religious hypothesis and makes it real in their ongoing lives. For James, strictly speaking, a religious hypothesis is nothing but an individual's own religiosity, and the verification of that religiosity lies in the future changes to the world which that individual's religiosity produces. The religious hypothesis is a live hypothesis, in a literal way: the religious hypothesis is alive. The religious hypothesis *is* the religious person, not some idea or theory, and that person's religiosity proposes to make real in the human world precisely what is capable of verifying that hypothesis.

Before going further, close notice must be taken of the way that James's pragmatic theory of the religious hypothesis reverses the usual order of things. One would expect that the role of the hypothesis would be played by faith, while the experimental test would be lived conduct. Simpler sayings about religion and faith in James's popular lectures do sound like that. Yet James actually reverses that expected sequence for his deeper reflections on religiosity. Faith is the experimental test, not the hypothesis to be tested. Nearly every commentator on James, hostile or friendly, has mixed things up from the start. James does not help matters, to be sure. He earnestly wants to figure out a psychological way to make faith reasonable, and justify the mysti-

cal experiences behind faith, in the face of sternly skeptical opposition from rationalism and materialism. It is easy, too easy, to then suppose that James wants to philosophically validate mystical states and devout faiths, too. After all, doesn't he try to make the "will to believe" quite reasonable?

James did strive to defend the power of faithful belief against the corrosive skepticism of his rationalistic and scientific age. But, as we shall see, his defense is designed to protect faith because it is so useful as an experimental test, a test of something else that is not a faithful conviction. Faithful belief is a phase of an experimental test of a religious model of conduct, not the other way around. After all, James repudiates the notion that just any faithful belief could be easily justified by its production of useful actions. He dispels that crude caricature of pragmatism:

if we practically did believe everything that made for good in our own personal lives, we should be found to be indulging all kinds of fancies about this world's affairs, and all kinds of sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter. Your suspicion here is undoubtedly well founded.

(Prag 77; Works Prag, 42–43)

James's pragmatism does insist that reasonable beliefs are those which in the long run, and on the whole, work best together with all beliefs proving their worth as well. As we shall explore, what James precisely means by "working best" requires careful examination of James's writings on religion.

All this talk of verifying religion with evidence sounds like natural theology, where matters in the observable world serve as evidence for the reasonableness of affirming God's existence. But we see that James could not be attempting another natural theology, since he rejects cosmological, teleological, and other such arguments: "If you have a God already whom you believe in, these arguments confirm you. If you are atheistic, they fail to set you right" (VRE, 437; Works VRE, 345). If we stubbornly persist in assuming that James is trying to make intelligible the notion of empirically verifying God, many difficult questions erupt, starting with this one: How could just one God get proven "true"? James may not be able to figure out which of four possibilities prove more likely: (1) every god gets pragmatically "verified" for that god's believers, so pragmatism can't get at objective truth but only religious subjectivism; (2) many gods get pragmatically "verified" by many religions' believers, so humanity must accept polytheism; (3) one supreme (but vaguely conceived) deity gets pragmatically "verified" so many religions have to be about this one god; or (4) the pragmatic standards for "verification" turn out to be tacitly presumed ideals that conveniently "verify" just one religion's god, making all other religions false.

James was sensitive to these potential difficulties, and he never intended to get lost in their mazes. Instead, he proposed a Science of Religions in *The*

Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). His Science of Religions culminates in his proposal to pragmatically study the core of all religions: the saints, the religiously motivated people strenuously trying to live out their models of ideal conduct in light of God's supreme order. In James's grand vision for an interdisciplinary Science of Religions, several disciplines are essential: anthropology, psychology, philosophy, sociology, religious biography and autobiography, world history, and the history of social reform. This label of "Science of Religions" can sound wrong to us now, since it has come to mean the interdisciplinary scientific investigation into religious experience, belief, and practice. James applauded, and contributed to, this narrower scientific enterprise. Yet his program for the Science of Religions is far wider. It includes philosophically sifting religious hypotheses in light of scientific knowledge, designing sensible religious hypotheses having real world consequences, and studying the experimental tests of those hypotheses in the course of cultural history.

Including investigations of the lives of religious saints in Science of Religions seems especially misplaced. Biographical explorations of saintly lives is usually the work of hagiographical religious history, while psychological studies of religious fanatics today is more about diagnosing the effects of mental illness or mass hysteria rather than tracking the effects of God on the human spirit. Saintliness and science hardly sounds like an appropriate or productive pairing. Nevertheless, James expected saintliness to prove to be the key to understanding the legitimacy of religious knowledge.

What I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends itself, then any theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand accredited. If not, then they will be discredited, and all without reference to anything but human working principles. (VRE, 331; Works VRE, 266)

Saintliness, for James, is the key to religious inquiry and verification. It is not each moral Saint's personal idea of God which is the candidate hypothesis for verification. Instead, the entire life of the moral Saint is what constitutes the religious hypothesis. The pragmatic test in the field of religion is not empirical correspondence with some divine reality in any simplistic sense. Mystics are not going to verifiably discover God with any amount of experiential perception or personal satisfaction. The appropriate test is not convergence in the scientific sense either, because James does not expect saints to eventually converge on the identical vision of the supreme order, as if they were scientists converging on the molecular structure of sugar. The saints are experimenting with their God hypotheses, in a sense. But what exactly is a hypothesis of God, for James?

This article argues for a radical interpretation of James's pragmatist analysis of religious truth. James often speaks as if his religious pragmatism can verify beliefs in God's existence, and hence confirm for reason what faith proposes. However, his pragmatic method his *Science of Religions* cannot go that far. James occasionally speaks as if a hypothesis of God is an idea that God exists, but his own psychology of inquiry cannot agree with equating the two. An idea or belief is not a hypothesis, on James's own pragmatist principles. A hypothesis is much more than an idea, and in the realm of religion, James's *Science of Religions* shows why a religious hypothesis capable of verification must be a living being capable of making a difference to the human world. The religious saints turn out to be the live hypotheses, literally speaking. Their hypothetical lives can become verified in the process of their proven capacity to evolve society to better fit the ideal unseen order that saints take to be supreme. In so far as the human world evolves towards that ideal order, the Saint's lives have worked, and enjoy verification: saintliness is quite reasonable in proportion to its positive difference to the social order. Unfortunately for James's own personal hopes, the existence of God cannot be verified along the way.

Religious experience

Because James is so concerned to restrain "medical materialism" and dictate where science must respect experience, his views on mysticism are taken to be the essence of his pragmatist view of religion. Most of James's early commentators on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, such as colleagues James Leuba and Josiah Royce, focused on James's psychological and philosophical defenses of mysticism. James does need a psychological account of the origins of God hypotheses. Is the origin of an idea also the grounds for its justification? James's colleagues took James to be an empiricist about mystical experiences. But James himself warned against misinterpretation here. Whether science can explain mystical experiences in natural terms or not, that has no bearing on the real religious significance of those experiences. Regardless of their ultimate causes, the personal transformations caused by these mystical experiences are the genuine engines of religion. In *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, he wrote: "If the *fruits for life* of the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize it and venerate it, even though it be a piece of natural psychology" (VRE, 237; Works VRE, 193).

As Wayne Proudfoot (2004) emphasizes, James's antagonism against scientific naturalism was quite real, but he did not stake his pragmatic justification of God's reality directly on an anti-scientific defense of mystical experience for its own sake. Again, James was not an empiricist seeking justification for God's existence in the experiential origins of convictions about God. He doesn't even appeal to his own radical empiricism anywhere in *The Varieties*

of *Religious Experience*, so he isn't that interested in depicting religious experience as metaphysically secure. Convictions about God and an unseen moral order must find their eventual justification elsewhere in human experience. T.L.S. Sprigge can't see any greater role for mystic saints than their experiences of contacts with the divine. James is a "religious realist," according to Sprigge (2005), who thinks that God is real because an actual God is the best explanation for the reality of mystical experiences. But James never argued that the evidence of God lies in mysticism. Mystics are not automatically the saints who receives his endorsement. Saints are mystics, but not all mystics are saints. Saints, as mystics, think that they make contact with a wider realm of super-consciousness, but that supposed contact only generates hypotheses about God, and do not constitute direct evidence for God, according to James. As explored in the next sections, James goes out of his way to repeatedly deny that mystical events, conversion experiences, or mental states of faith constitute any sort of objective evidence for God. Science cannot discredit the value of mysticism out of materialistic disdain, but the value of religious experiences for the religious cannot constitute any sort of empirical evidence proving God, either. Experience is at most suggestive, not conclusive. Only future experience in the course of inquiry plays the role of confirming justification. Being in a mental state of faith and devout conviction does not, by itself, have enough conceptual structure to form a hypothesis for inquiry.

The faith-state may hold a very minimum of intellectual content. ... It may be a mere vague enthusiasm, half spiritual, half vital, a courage, and a feeling that great and wondrous things are in the air.

(VRE, 505, Works VRE, 398)

Faith is surely the arousal of moral energy and enthusiasm for reform, but this energy surge is not the same as the hypothetical plan of action. Undergoing mystical or salvific experiences is never treated by James as a form of inquiry. If the evidence of mystical experiences and faith states was supposedly crucial evidence of God for James, then why does he insist that the infinite, all-powerful, and all-controlling God of so many mystics doesn't deserve priority? Once again, excessive focus on experience for its own sake is responsible for misunderstanding why James keeps going back to the lives of the saints. The saints hold their religious convictions because of religious experiences, but those subjective experiences and faith states cannot also play the role of verifying evidence for God.

More careful commentators understand the crucial role for religious conviction in dynamic action out in the wider world, but they think that only lone religious believers are in any position to search for, or find, a God. James's "will to believe" argument makes it easy to suppose that James defends what might be called "personal theism"—just the reasonableness of religious indi-

viduals in their personal god-belief is what requires philosophical defense. Many commentators take this line of interpretation; an example is George Graham (1992). There is an excuse for supposing that James regarded the religious life as a personal venture in which one's own resources are all there is to ever decide the question, and one can therefore only decide for oneself. James's doesn't seem much interested in justifying God to anyone and everyone in most of his religious writings. *The Will to Believe* only urges religious convictions for those able to regard God as a live option already. James's other writings on religion also emphasize the personal and subjective character of religious experience, religious faith, and the religious life.

Better commentators on James recognize his concern to locate reasonable grounds for objectively believing in God's reality, although the experiences of people are the ultimate origin of all relevant evidence for religion. Excessive focus on personal religious experience can distort the accounts of otherwise highly reliable commentators, however. Gerald Myers (1986, 450–470) sees how James searches for ways to make subjective religious quests for salvation and immortality more objectively valid through the pragmatic method of demanding consequences, but saintliness isn't identified as important. Eugene Fontinell (2000, 141–142) also rightly says that faith in God, for James, isn't limited to beliefs about divine influences on subjective experience, but can extend to all of society's success in advancing the ethical life for everyone. Fontinell falls short by similarly attending to personal immortality and salvation and failing to give due attention to the crucial role of saintliness for understanding the most potent forms of religious experience. John E. Smith, in his Introduction to *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, correctly identifies the role of saintliness for all society, rather than exalting saints for their personal faith: "Actually, James was less interested in assessing the life and character of this or that saintly figure than he was in determining the degree of influence exercised by the saintly form of spirituality on the life of mankind" (Works VRE, xli).

Henry Levinson correctly identified the lives of the saints as the core of religion's power and contribution to human well-being. Yet he missed the way that James expected the greatest influence of the saints is supposed to be on entire societies and civilizations as wholes, and not merely on the lives of religious people. Levinson says, "The saintly methods were habitual ways of doing things for the sake of salvation or well-being, which was *the* religious problem in Western culture as James understood it." (Levinson 1981, 128) Levinson treats salvation as primarily a personal matter, however; James regarded religion's capacity to propel the ethical progress of all humanity as the great religious problem. For James, there is something about the way that saints live their lives for the sake of the rest of humanity that connects their god-belief with objective evidence, evidence objective for all humanity, able to

support the reasonableness of religion. Ellen Kappy Suckiel (1996) correctly sees James's overriding concern for the search for the perfect moral order in the religious lives of the saints, yet fails to connect this ethical search with the lives of the saints themselves in a fruitful way. As she well sees, how the saints successfully feel that they personally come close to moral perfection (in unity with the divine, or in their own moral conduct) isn't what James is driving at. But Suckiel can say little more. G. William Bernard gets no farther; he writes, "the saints, as embodiments of the fruits of religion, are the exemplars of the religious life; therefore, if these religious geniuses are successes, then so is religion" (1997, 312). Failing to take this statement seriously, Bernard returns to asking how such personally valuable mystical states have any epistemic relevance to the real existence of a genuine God, and so the lives of the saints fade from view. Of all commentators, Michael Slater (2009) elevates the exemplary lives of the saints to the most central position in James's overall philosophy and science of religion. Slater shows how the pragmatic value of not just the personal transformations of the saints' lives, but the wider moral transformations of the social world effected by the lives of the saints, best ties together James's work in "The Will to Believe," "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," and *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Sami Pihlström (2013) concurs, and helpfully clarifies how James expected that saintly moral ideals aren't so much dictated by religions as they are supported by encouraging divinities.

James does try to establish his case that many progressive and prophetic saints are engines of ethical reform within religion, and by extension, within entire cultures over time. Even the better commentators think that James was content to stop his philosophical analysis of religion there. If so, then his *Science of Religions* amounts to this position: saints are pragmatically useful for religion, religion is pragmatically useful for culture in general, therefore saints are justified by their fruits, and the convictions about God held by saints are justified by implication. Yet this pragmatic schema can't be the whole story. It omits two crucial issues: Why do these admirably useful saints attempt what they do and succeed where they do? And how does an actually existing God connect with the work of the saints, over and above the obvious fact that saints personally think that God exists? We are still searching for the relevant sort of "real consequences" in the world which the God hypothesis must have in order to arouse verification. What precisely is it about these religious saints that they can supply the means to empirically verify God? Put most sharply, what exactly is a hypothesis of God?

Hypothesizing God

Let's return to fundamentals of pragmatism. James openly sets himself this question: How would a hypothesis involving God be verified?

On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it, so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths. (Prag, 299; Works Prag, 143)

We may immediately set out some clarifications. Elsewhere, James is careful to say that no unique God hypothesis has pragmatism's attention. There is no such thing as "*the* hypothesis of God." There are as many God hypotheses as religions and mystics. Further, it is entirely possible, on pragmatic grounds, that many God hypotheses satisfactorily work in peoples' experiences. James adds that a working God hypothesis should "combine satisfactorily" with other God hypotheses and with well-established natural knowledge. Philosophy is essential to the work of the Science of Religions. Philosophy can design comprehensive God hypotheses that capture most or all of what works in more specific God hypotheses. James describes this collaborative philosophical work:

Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions. Both from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations. By confronting the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous. Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave a residuum of conceptions that at least are possible. With these she can deal as *hypotheses*, testing them in all the manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested. ... I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort might not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science. (VRE, 455–456; Works VRE, 359–360)

Religious hypotheses worthy of inquiry, like scientific hypotheses, are capable of working across the widest variety of human experience. Because pragmatism is about proposing and testing hypotheses in terms of their capacity to guide experience to some expected outcome, James regarded pragmatism to be well suited for dealing with the claims of religious people about God.

In short, she [pragmatism] widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact—if that should seem a likely place to find him. Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as "not true" a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What

other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with concrete reality? (Prag, 80; Works Prag, 44).

This passage is typical among James's confident claims that his pragmatism will verify God. However, let's apply his pragmatism carefully. Assembling the earlier points about what a God hypothesis must be able to do, together with James's expectations for practical religious experiences, an idea of God cannot be a candidate hypothesis for verification unless it satisfies these minimum criteria:

- a. A person must seriously entertain an idea of God—it must be a 'live option'.
- b. This 'live option' about God must not only seem credible, it must also be motivational towards some kind of activities.
- c. This motivating idea of God must help guide action towards some intended practical consequences in peoples' experience.
- d. This idea of God must supply some sense of the fulfillment of that practical work, some sign that the idea has properly done its work.

In short, we need religiously motivated people with working ideas about God that result in motivated practical activity producing objectively observable results. Fortunately, humanity provides an endless supply of just these sorts of religious agents.

Pragmatism has to postpone dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in the long run. The various overbeliefs of men, their several faith-ventures, are in fact what are needed to bring the evidence in. (Prag, 299–300; Works Prag, 144)

So many over-beliefs, so many faith ventures, to put to trial! Neither philosophy nor religion have to be responsible for generating ideas about the divine. The discovery of the subconscious in the 1880s permitted James to begin to see that experiences and ideas operate in more parts of the brain than just those responsible for conscious self-awareness. Unusual mental states are the unbidden and uncontrollable source of religious emotions and ideas. However, the origin of ideas and emotions do not determine their truth. Having already taken the pragmatic turn away from passive empiricism, James denied that the manner of origin of ideas mattered much to their validity. Only the practical consequences of unusual mental states are relevant.

Saintly convictions about God

However, having ideas about God is not enough. Plenty of people have disturbing, abnormal, mystical, and disassociative experiences that they cannot attribute to the self-conscious will, but these experiences supply no motivation or guidance. In short, their strange experiences do not result in "faith-ventures" because they don't result in any faith.

Here, religion makes its expected distinction between unusual mental states generally, and religious experiences that seem to particularly have to do with a wider and more supreme reality. James more or less follows what he takes to be religion's manner of making this distinction. Of those strange experiences that do result in some sort of faith, James separates out the mystical experiences, with their characteristic features: they are ineffable, noetic, transient, and passive (VRE, 380–381; Works VRE, 302–303). And there are many varieties of mystical experiences. James is especially wary of monistic mysticisms, as his philosophical inclinations dictate. He cannot deny that monistic mysticisms may be connecting with that “wider consciousness” of the divine. However, he does not appreciate monistic religions as pragmatically valuable, for two primary reasons. First, monism tends to support the idea that God has but one essential and homogenous character, but this idea is not conducive to generating diverse hypotheses about God's demands. Second, monism tends to diminish any motivation to take action, but this quietism is not conducive to motivating enough moral energy for faith-ventures.

Fortunately, there are other kinds of mystical hypotheses to work with. James prefers pluralism: there are multiple cosmic forces at work in the world. Pluralism (sometimes labeled as polytheism) avoids the quietism of inaction (so unethical for James!). Pluralism supplies some personal comfort that you can contribute to the destiny of the whole world even if you don't get saved or rewarded yourself; pluralism permits a degree of indeterminism and some free will to pursue real possibilities; and pluralism holds out the opportunity to create salvation of the world gradually, piecemeal, from the valuable contributions of each person. Pluralism in metaphysics permits meliorism in action. Meliorism depends on a conviction that one can make a difference, on a strong motivation to make a difference, and on some extraordinary supply of personal energy for doing extraordinary things.

Religions innately understand the crucial force of moral energy set loose on the world. Mystical states in particular are identified and shaped by religions so that they can be put to good use. When a release of energy transforms a person in both spirit and conduct, religion watches for “conversion” or “enlightenment.”

James's close study of mystical conversions across many religious traditions brings him to a constructed archetype of the saint. Religions have fresh life because of mystical states, religions have fresh powers because of religious saints, and religions are transformed over generations by reforming saints. To test religion fairly is to test saintliness.

What I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends itself,

then any theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand accredited. If not, then they will be discredited, and all without reference to anything but human working principles. (VRE, 331; Works VRE, 266)

Saints are religious and ethical pioneers with devotion to high social ideals and dedication to special personal virtues. What can account for these saints? James proposes that these saints rely on their felt connection with a divinely supreme order. He defines the essence of religion in terms of what the saint experiences, and what any person participating in saintliness can experience:

Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto. This belief and this adjustment are the religious attitude in the soul. (VRE, 53; Works VRE, 51)

Ordinary believers accomplish their harmonization through faithful assent to creeds and rituals that guide adjustment with that unseen order, while the saint accomplishes that harmonization directly in extraordinary mystical experience. That is why religion is capable of releasing far more moral energy in a saint than in a typical believer.

Aside from the mystical origins and moral energies of sainthood, James is reticent to declare that all saints are oriented towards the same religion or God, or that all saints follow the same recipe for success. Pluralism of saintliness is the rule (VRE, 377, Works VRE, 299–300), yet James is still able to suggest a pragmatic test of saintliness, no matter what specific form it may take, because saints have much in common, such as their mystical tendencies. Does their common experience yield any kind of verification of God?

But now I proceed to add that mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the deliverance of their particular experiences, if we ourselves are outsiders and feel no private call thereto. ... The fact is that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional mood. We have no right, therefore, to invoke its prestige as distinctively in favor of any special belief, such as that in absolute idealism, or in the absolute monistic identity, or in the absolute goodness, of the world. (VRE, 424–426, Works VRE, 336–337)

Having admitted that mysticism cannot help verify any kind of God, James could have halted at this point (and many commentators stop here as well). If mystical states have so little specific content in themselves, and the materials for motivating a God hypothesis for a faith venture are supplied by the enveloping religious culture of the mystic, then every religion can easily 'confirm' its creeds. The philosopher would have little more to say.

Saintliness tested

James's Science of Religions does not stop at this stage, resigned to mystical subjectivism and religious relativism. There is still something very special about saints, over and above their mystical and religious status.

Mystical states indeed wield no authority due simply to their being mystical states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us *hypotheses*, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the truest of insights into the meaning of this life. (VRE, 428; Works VRE, 339)

James still earnestly hopes that mystical states, faith states, can be transformed into religious hypotheses, to permit objective empirical verification.

Here, at the transition from the psychological chapter on Mysticism to the next chapter on Philosophy in *Varieties*, James throws the burden for carrying his Science of Religions onto the shoulders of philosophy. Philosophy must take a closer look at the role of saints and the power of their lives. Saints may sound different because they can't agree on how to describe their faith experiences, and they differ further since they usually operate within one or another religious tradition, but philosophy can try to discern an underlying commonality of purpose inside of Sainthood.

The subject of Saintliness left us face to face with the question, Is the sense of divine presence a sense of anything objectively true? We turned first to mysticism for an answer, and found that although mysticism is entirely willing to corroborate religion, it is too private (and also too various) in its utterances to be able to claim a universal authority. But philosophy publishes results which claim to be universally valid if they are valid at all, so we now turn with our question to philosophy. Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the religious man's sense of the divine? (VRE, 43; Works VRE, 340)

The chapter on Philosophy explains how genuinely viable and live options of saintliness can be filtered from the vast mass of mystical states and faithful religious opinions. After philosophy's temptations towards metaphysical fancies and rationalist deductions of God are overcome and renounced, philosophy can return to the empirically scientific and the observable effects of religious faith. Philosophy can thereby find the best candidates for James's genuine saints: saints who have both the vision and energy to transform the outer word according to an ethical plan from their inner world. Philosophy, in short, elevates for consideration momentous and genuine options for melioristic testing. James now can work with an archetype of the saint on a faith-venture. This saint-venture has the logical form of a religious hypothesis. Not the mystical states, not the Saint's

personal transformation, not the Saint's particular religion, but the Saint's life *in its entirety* constitutes the religious hypothesis and leads towards the means of its empirical verification. The saint's life is the practical God hypothesis.

Here, where we examine the lives of the saints, it turns out that pluralism is not chaos. Saints tend to live out similar lives pursuing similar general things.

When we survey the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there; but the feelings on the one hand and the conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives.

(VRE, 504; Works VRE, 397).

Precisely because saints don't just have ideas of God, but they experience what they take to be live connections with God, their religious experiences are profoundly motivating. Saints are people susceptible to mysticism who suffer deeply from a separation from the Good, and then they are converted into motivated actors because they suddenly feel part of an ideal unseen order of supreme good that must be further realized in the human world. This is the pattern of all of religious life (VRE, 507–508; Works VRE, 400).

Saints aren't just people who have found personal relief and satisfaction through religious experience. Many mystics achieve that. Saints aren't simply interested in their own salvation; it is the possibility of salvation in general for the many, and not personal salvation for one, which their religion drives at. And religion works, if it works, through the lives of the saints. James already clearly said what he meant about the lives of the faithful serving as the experimental tests of religion in *The Will to Believe*. James does not treat a God hypothesis as an isolated idea believed by a religious person. Only "the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life" constitute what gets experimented upon. Faith in itself is no hypothesis, in a fully pragmatic sense. A saint's conviction that the whole world is the field of divine action is what makes his own life relevant to that widest dramatic scene. James pivots the objectivity of the God hypothesis on that universal relevance to faith:

Only when this farther step of faith concerning God is taken, and remote objective consequences are predicted, does religion, as it seems to me, get wholly free from the first immediate subjective experience, and bring a *real hypothesis* into play. A good hypothesis in science must have other properties than those of the phenomenon it is immediately invoked to explain, otherwise it is not prolific enough. God, meaning only what enters into the religious man's experience of union, falls short of being an hypothesis of this more useful order. He needs to enter into wider cosmic relations in order to justify the subject's absolute confidence and peace. (VRE, 517–518; Works VRE, 407)

A real, live hypothesis—a hypothesis capable of making a real difference to the long-term objective conditions of the world—is religion's proper func-

tion. How does faith in God enter into real relations with the universe? Faith, as a belief about a divine world, or as a mental state of feeling saved, cannot. The only thing that we ourselves can control which enters into real relations with the religious world is our own conduct. The only thing that religion can place into real relations with the world is the saint. The saint is therefore the actual religious hypothesis, because only the saint could be religion's experimental proposal. Religion is not ultimately about individual salvation or subjective faith for its own sake. Religions form saints as their empirical test, and the empirical test of saint hypotheses is the practical results in society from their faith. Faith is the experimental test, not the belief which gets tested.

According to James's overall Science of Religions, the lives of the saints of any religion all fulfill the requirements for being a hypothesis awaiting potential verification. They seriously live out their conception of a divine moral order, it is deeply motivational towards their activities, those activities guide action towards intended practical consequences in other peoples' experience, and their lives are the model for success by bringing about changes in the human world that align with the divine order.

As explained in the first section, Science of Religions cannot follow the expected pattern of "hypothetical faith experimentally justified by observed results." Religious hypotheses cannot take the same form as scientific hypotheses. A scientific hypothesis is a conception about how the universe already is working. A static theory in a scientist's mind can more or less represent how nature already is. Religion operates in a profoundly different way. Religion is not about how the world already works, so it doesn't try to represent what is already going on. Religions are profoundly dissatisfied with what is presently going on. Religions aren't essentially about what is already real – they are about what should be real. Furthermore, religions don't treat their ideal visions of what should be as hypotheses, since no religious person thinks that an ideal vision is already real in the world. Religions aren't "verified" by showing how that ideal vision corresponds to reality. It never does. In science, a static hypothesis can in turn be used to conduct experiments confirming how nature does work. In religion, there is no religious hypothesis like that.

Religions do predict how the world can work better, using a model of exemplary conduct. What is that model of conduct? It is nothing other than the life venture of the saint. The saint is the model – the model is not a vision of a non-existent world order. When James describes the value of saintliness, he doesn't talk about the unseen moral order in the next world, but the impact of saints on this world:

When they do succeed, they are far more powerfully successful than force or worldly prudence. Force destroys enemies; and the best that can be said of prudence is that it keeps what we already have in safety. But non-resistance,

when successful, turns enemies into friends; and charity regenerates its objects. These saintly methods are, as I said, creative energies; and genuine saints find in the elevated excitement with which their faith endows them an authority and impressiveness which makes them irresistible in situations where men of shallower nature cannot get on at all without the use of worldly prudence. This practical proof that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint's magic gift to mankind. (VRE, 358–359; Works VRE, 286)

It is the faith-venture of the saint which permits the experimental conditions testing religion: does the saint's life actually help bring about what should be? The saint's own exemplary conduct is the religious hypothesis: can this mode of ideal conduct make the world a better place? The saint does not arrive on the scene to figure out how the world works, but to make the world work differently.

The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required. (VRE, 518; Works VRE, 408)

And James frankly announces his theory that the faithful are exactly what is making a real difference to the universe through their saintly conduct. He writes, at the end of his Conclusion to *Varieties*, "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?" (VRE, 519; Works VRE, 408).

Again, it is not some static idea entertained intellectually by the rational mind which is the God hypothesis for religion. The religious hypothesis is the living saint, and the saint's whole life is the test: does the saint's conduct guide society towards fulfillment of that ideal supreme order? That is the supreme question of the validity of meliorism. After James wrote *Varieties*, the rest of his years found him proclaiming at every opportunity that we have within our power the means to improve the human condition. His profound book *Pragmatism* continued his quest for an experimental religion for social ethics that most intimately depends on each and every one of us.

Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become. It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism. Some conditions of the world's salvation are actually extant, and she cannot possibly close her eyes to this fact: and should the residual conditions come, salvation would become an accomplished reality.

(Prag, 286; Works Prag, 137)

The value of a God hypothesis cannot lie in the subjective experience of personal salvation of the saint. We must look to wider experience, the collective

experience of humanity as a whole. We can objectively tell whether saintly conduct is leading us towards fulfillment of a religion's supreme order of goodness. We may not personally prioritize the saint's religion ourselves, and our loyalties may lie with some other religion, or no religion. All the same, the advancement of a religion couldn't be invisible to us, even if we wish that wasn't happening. We can even objectively observe how religious saints manage to do their religious work, and gain some insight into their lives, because we ourselves know what it is like to fight and sacrifice for realizing our own ideals. There is only a gradual degree of difference between a religious saint and moralistic actor (Prag, 286–287; Works Prag, 137–138). Religion in the traditional sense isn't even required to appreciate the power of devout moral energy. Each person has an opportunity to be a small moral saint, if they feel connected devotion to some supreme ideal order that makes them sacrifice for it. Anyone can help 'save' the world, or if the notion of salvation sounds too religious for some, we can surely take risks and make sacrifices to help improve the world.

Here, James asks his most philosophical question: Are you willing to get up and join the fight? James is, naturally:

I find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying 'no play'. I am willing to think that the prodigal-son attitude, open to us as it is in many vicissitudes, is not the right and final attitude towards the whole of life. I am willing that there should be real losses and real losers, and no total preservation of all that is. I can believe in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not the whole. (Prag, 296; Works Prag, 142)

Not surprisingly, James makes sure that every person has an opportunity to participate in the religious life and the objective verification of religious commitments. If you don't help create the evidence that could verify religious claims, you can't complain that you didn't have access to justificatory evidence. Science shows how objective it can be by simply saying to any skeptic, Come look for yourself, and see what we see. Just as the willfully blind can't complain about lacking evidence they refuse to see, the willfully faithless have no right to complain about lacking religious evidence they refuse to experience for themselves. On the contrary, everyone has the right to believe, and the right to verify religion for themselves. How could religion hold itself to more objective standards than that?

Pragmatic Religion

James wanted his pragmatism to show a real God can be verified through the fruitful labors of true believers. But when his entire philosophy is applied to this task, it turns out that no belief in God can be verified, because a belief in God's existence cannot be a verifiable hypothesis, according to his Science of Religions.

No features intrinsic to mystical states or essential to faith states will serve to identify God. The entire history of fanatical believers only displays a bewildering cacophony of demanding deities. If a simplistic “if it works it’s true” sort of pragmatism could somehow suffice for identifying the God that humanity could objectively know, then his proposal for a Science of Religions would be superfluous to the task of verifying the correct religion and knowing which God really exists. To his credit, James knew better. He tempered his enthusiastic public lectures about “verifying God” with a sophisticated multi-disciplinary inquiry into the way religions and religious lives actually work. His Science of Religions cannot verify the existence of any God, or the general idea of non-natural realm of cosmic consciousness. It can attempt the more modest task of showing how personal devout faith needn’t be unreasonable, and revealing where the religious life may be reasonable.

In a vague sense, people need to get “religious” about morality. Society’s moral order is hardly something without momentous consequences, and we cannot be agnostic and indifferent about sustaining it. Equally as momentous and forced are the urgent occasions for ethically reforming society. Everyone has every right to be empowered to participate in the ethical reform of their society, so long as a live hypothesis presents itself and some momentous opportunity for progress is available. The role of the “saint” finds its place here, whether religious or secular: the saint can precipitate wide commitment to a genuine ethical option for reform that promises deliverance from a social problem by developing society towards an ideal moral order. The saint’s lively hypothesis becomes our own, and we can undertake a committed social inquiry of reform by working together.

Religious saints are the live hypotheses about God, quite literally. Their lives are shaped into the form and function of a hypothesis. Their hypothetical lives are verified in the process of their capacity to evolve society to better fit the ideal unseen order that saints take to be supreme. In so far as the world evolves towards that ideal order because of their transformative power on society, the saint’s lives are verified and their religious convictions have worked. In James’s Science of Religions, the saints are religion’s ways of undertaking ethical inquiry, and unless the saints are fully committed to their moral cause, their ethical reforms couldn’t happen. As far as religion is concerned, then, the saints are reasonable expressions of religiosity. James may be on solid ground here, so far as understanding the work of religion in the world. But what does any of this actually say about the right ethics, or the true God, if there is one?

James keeps going back to this question: Is there a living god? We see how James thinks that the experimental test of religion comes down to a test upon God, trying to verify that “God is real since he produces real effects” (VRE,

517; Works VRE, 407). James proposes psychological means for accounting for the capacity of human consciousness to overlap and commune with a wider cosmic consciousness that he wants to believe is God, or part of God. Saints can't help believing. What about the rest of us? Has James established a widespread right to believe in God through his Science of Religions? Our answer must be negative.

There is a logical disconnection between pragmatically committing to saintly lives and objectively knowing that a God is involved. After all, a commitment to a saint need only amount to a commitment to the saint's vision of a better moral order—where that vision of a moral order came from, or whether the one true God is helping us along the way, need not matter to the rest of us. After all, the specific origin of an inspirational ethical reform doesn't set the terms for its verification. James strenuously denied that the origin of an idea sets the terms of its validity. Isn't it quite revealing that James doesn't assign to philosophers, so crucial in his Science of Religions, any responsibility for figuring out if mystical states are genuine contacts with God? He may believe that God's real effects are evident in mystics' subjective transformations. But James knows better than to place so much weight on that subjective point.

The Science of Religions has to inquire more deeply into the next objective phase of mysticism, when it develops into the saintly venture. Here, the fact of the matter one way or the other about God's real effects drops out of the pragmatic calculations. The strictly subjective cannot be experimented upon. Fortunately, even if a saint may be mistaken about an alleged divine origin to a moral vision, that subjective error can't destroy the practical value of trying to make that vision a reality in own social world. If a vision of moral reform is validated in the course of human events, it remains validated regardless of inspirational origin. We needn't declare a saint to be utterly delusional, either—an individual can be personally reasonable for interpreting their subjective experience in provably fruitful ways. But philosophy needn't agree with that interpretation in any reasonably objective sense.

It may forever remain the case that the nonreligious are reasonable for not believing in God precisely because they haven't had those experiences themselves. In *The Will to Believe* James specifically exempts atheists from his argument—religion can't be a live option for atheists. Is it really all that curious that James never tries to make the atheist look foolish, or convert the atheist to belief? He does target the arrogant scientific materialists who say that no amount of religious conviction could ever be reasonable for anyone. But the simple nonbeliever isn't the target of James's arguments. An atheist can see how some saintly lives can be valuable instruments for truly valuable reforms, without having to fully endorse those saints' religion or believe in God as

well. Besides, the atheist can also point to nonreligious social reformers acting out of secular devotion to high moral principles. Religious saints remain optional instruments of reform, as far as philosophy can tell. James's conviction that religious saints will always be more effective doesn't prove that they will always be more ethical or beneficial to humanity in the long run, and their saintly powers on earth can't establish the reality of divine powers.

James provides further grounds for doubting whether a real relation with a God is what is going on. Look at the way that conceptions of God have had to change, due to cultural change on earth, not rethinking going on in heaven.

What with science, idealism, and democracy, our own imagination has grown to need a God of an entirely different temperament from that Being interested exclusively in dealing out personal favors, with whom their ancestors were so contented. Smitten as we are with the vision of social righteousness, a God indifferent to everything but adulation, and full of partiality for his individual favorites, lacks an essential element of largeness; and even the best professional sainthood of former centuries, pent in as it is to such a conception, seems to us curiously shallow and unedifying. (VRE, 346; Works VRE, 277)

The ways that ethical progress has occurred across many centuries—as hesitant, partial, and intermittent as it has been—arouses reasonable doubts that any god is participating. The gods of the past seem so unsatisfying to us now. Why must we try to dimly perceive a real deity behind so many false idols? Are the world's gods really large enough, even today? While James isn't wrong to point out how many gods have grown, he also seems to say that the world's moral progress is probably changing its gods, not the other way around. As religious saints propose better and better gods, we may be grateful for the updates, but philosophy needn't agree that the "one true god" is actually at work in all these saints.

Each century's saints manage to confirm either their own era's notions of proper divinity and what this divinity wants, or at most advances the morality of this God just a bit in the direction of ethical progress. We owe much of our advanced ethical position today to these incremental efforts from the past. Yet most saintly figures aren't incremental at all, exemplifying conservatism instead, and the (few) progressive saints are only incremental, lends confidence to an alternative secular explanation, that nothing more than human inspiration and thinking is doing the real work. Of course religious people project their highest ethical aspirations and ideals on the divine order—that is characteristic of religion. Saints convinced that confirmation is arriving from the divine cannot constitute good evidence for God's participation and reality. Who is really creating the evidence here? Science of Religions shouldn't endorse the religious biases which it studies. Religious saints may actually be imagining gods to suit their visions of the moral order, so "confirmations" at

most bear on that visionary moral order, and not on utterly fictional gods. After all, only imaginative convictions about God, and not any actual divine power, suffices to explain the occasional and incremental improvements to the human world made by religion under the best of worldly circumstances.

Although James's *Science of Religions* is theoretically capacious enough to consider all religions, old and new, he does blatantly display his own moralist biases. His pluralistic openness to diverse religions in theory isn't matched by much ethical pluralism in practice. James warns philosophers away from formulating some final ethical system on their own in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" in *The Will to Believe*. Only the future course of humanity's moral trials and experiments in living can confer credibility to surviving ethical priorities. All the same, James knows well how he is a philosopher of his own times. There always is a substantial ethical preference revealed in his selection of exemplary saints, as he emphasizes saints who are progressive reformers, reformers who helped push the course of history towards his own progressive ethical vision. He may be strongly pluralistic about religions in general, but he is hardly ideologically neutral. James is admirably ecumenical when he surveys so many fascinating mystics and revivalists across the world's religions, but those displaying the most valuable saintliness are on another level. He especially prefers saints who helped their societies overcome the enslavement, degradation, and domination of peoples. Commentators rightly observe how James's saints lean towards humanism, and often sound like enlightened Protestants—in short, if they are somehow similar to his own Boston Brahmin heritage. James evidently applies his own ethical standards of progress, philosophically tipping the scales as he walks through his *Science of Religions* in the chapters of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

Philosophers participating in his *Science of Religions* won't necessarily agree on ethical standards of progress. Should both conservative and progressive philosophers take part, to ensure some measure of ideological neutrality overall? James's requirement that the breadth of human experience must carry great weight cannot help progressive philosophers, interestingly. Conservative saints do propose religious reforms that fit with much of human experience and knowledge, as it stood during their own lives. In fact, conservative saints offer religious and moral visions that by definition fit better with far more peoples' experiences of their social worlds, since that's exactly what conservatism accomplishes. James's preferred saints are always in the tiny progressive minority during their lives, and they typically enjoy approval late in life or long after they have died. Perhaps that's how progressivism has to identify its greatest heroes, after a better world has struggled into birth.

But how could *Science of Religions* discriminate among would-be saints today, objectively discerning those with worthy religious hypotheses? It

doesn't seem possible, without premising some worldly consensus on secured ethical values (such as basic moral principles or crucial human rights) to its philosophical considerations. Disregarding some such ethical consensus, a retrospective Science of Religions sorting out exemplary saints that led to our current world devolves into ethical hagiography, unable to be as experimentally helpful as James had hoped. A prospective Science of Religions, again ignoring some ethical consensus, would promptly shatter and schismatically divide over which ethical vision for the world is preferable, and devolve into rival moral theologies. James's Science of Religions at most can show how to validate as reasonable the efforts of selected saints by selected ethical standards, and advance those ethical ideals with further saintly efforts. Where there is significant moral progress for humanity, religious saints may be involved, but ultimately our ethical judgments figure out which saints are the genuine saints. Science of Religions can only retrospectively identify genuine moral saints, and it is powerless to verify the existence of any sort of God.

To people who want to live religious lives, the most that Science of Religions can say is something like this. While saintly figures (and you yourselves in saintly moments) aren't unreasonable for taking divine inspiration seriously for morally transforming the world, the world will retain the right to pass ethical judgments upon your efforts. You may worry about God's judgment, but as far as the world's wise judgment can tell, only your psychological conviction is really involved, and not any sort of objective divinity. Nothing about any God can receive verification through your efforts to alter the course of history into future.

Science of Religions ends up as philosophically agnostic as each of the contributing disciplines were from the outset. We have no way of knowing whether a religious person is right to believe in God, if even it remains quite true that each person's right to believe can move the world. Ultimately, we remain responsible for the moral world, not science alone, for experimentally deciding which saintly vision proves reasonable. Whatever the destiny of religion, it would be very much in the spirit of James for him to ultimately encourage us to fulfill this living responsibility.

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