

at times his positive line of argument is muffled by refutations and differing interpretations. Nevertheless, Long's book deserves a careful reading and will elicit important discussion and questions. Some that I as a New Testament scholar would raise are: How is Scripture best understood as a source of revelation? By appealing to key isolated passages as Long does? And/or by being attuned to the way theology and truth are conveyed in larger narratives?—Thomas D. Stegman, *Boston College School of Theology and Ministry*.

MANICAS, Peter T. *Rescuing Dewey: Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism*.

Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. xxviii + 322pp. Cloth, \$85.00—Peter Manicas is a sociologist, political theorist, and philosopher at the University of Hawaii who well represents a tradition of Dewey studies feeling left behind by the surge of postmodernist pragmatism. If this tradition has a core, it takes Dewey's empirical naturalism seriously, and if it has a genealogy, it traces back to Columbia University's production of many pragmatic naturalists who then populated other universities (including Buffalo, where Manicas received his PhD). Fellow travelers include notable interpreters of Dewey such as John E. Smith, Paul Kurtz, Joseph Margolis, Ralph Sleeper, Beth Singer, James Gouinlock, Larry Hickman, Steven Rockefeller, and Raymond Boisvert. Disagreeing with the claim that Dewey was not radical enough, this "right-wing" aspect of Dewey scholarship did not join the rush toward linguistic relativism, could not endorse Rorty's conversational pragmatism, and would not help with multicultural political correctness. For Deweyan naturalists, knowledge of an external world is no hoax and cultures do not fix meaning, and Rorty's admonishment that pragmatists must discard the notion of experience altogether was just too much.

Manicas's volume collects fifteen articles and book chapters from twenty-five years of Deweyan explorations. The first six chapters describe Dewey's pragmatist understanding of natural science and social science, culminating with an account of Dewey's naturalization of epistemology. The next five chapters explain Dewey's theory of liberal and participatory democracy. The last four chapters situate Dewey in the larger contexts of contemporary philosophy and political theory. The cumulative effect of these chapters is striking: Manicas would rescue Dewey from his misguided friends by describing a Dewey even more philosophically and politically radical than most have yet appreciated.

Dewey's naturalism is no reductive scientism, but it is a form of fallible scientific realism, as Manicas explains in the opening chapter on "Pragmatic Philosophy of Science and the Charge of Scientism." Dewey agnostically refrained from knowing whether the tiniest bits of matter really answer to our theoretical descriptions. Yet that humility does not

compromise his broad and liberal naturalism, since it will not claim that nature must exclusively consist of its smallest parts. An empirical naturalism finds reality where it is experienced: there are many levels and orders of experienceable nature, and pragmatism forestalls any quest for priority, any urge to discover which aspect of nature is more real than the rest. Dewey also reforms the foundationalism of empiricism. Dewey replaces the medieval quest for ontological priority and the Enlightenment quest for epistemic priority with the test of practicality in future experience. Much of the hum-bug and “paranormal” of naïve conviction dissolves in the light of adequate empirical inquiry. Science’s sophisticated methods do not discover the “truly real” nature, but it does discover the more relevant natures.

With this pragmatism in place, naturalism can be truly radical, by refraining from eliminating hard-to-reduce experiences as unreal and refusing to categorize hard to explain values as noncognitive. Dewey did argue that experience is thoroughly natural where sensitive organisms live and how values are genuine features of environments inhabited by intelligent organisms. Organisms are natural—biologists would be surprised to hear otherwise—so everything organisms do is natural as well. By understanding how experiencing and valuing are essentially matters of what complex organisms are doing, psychology and sociology are grounded naturalistically. Beliefs are practical tools. It simply is not the case that only a belief can justify another belief; beliefs are formed and tested under practical learning conditions which can justify them. Manicas’s chapters on Dewey’s roles in American psychology and American social science are valuable reminders about pragmatism’s role as the original American cognitive science. Unfortunately, Dewey’s pragmatist cognitive science and its underlying organic functionalism and social behaviorism were replaced by postwar methodological solipsism, extreme logicism, and mechanical computationalism. Only recently has cognitive science rediscovered the idea that mind is not trapped in the brain and minds are not Turing machines.

The chapter on “Culture and Nature” protests against postmodernism’s antinaturalistic approach to culture. Once again, Dewey’s naturalism is more radical. To deny that a mind is a separate individual matter is not an embrace of any idealism. Meanings and intentions are habits of anticipating responses of nature or of other people to our conduct. Once societies stabilize collective belief into networks of symbols, mind (not consciousness) is primarily a property of those cultural networks, not properties of brains by themselves. Try becoming a mind all by yourself. One’s mind is essentially one’s interpretive mode of dealing with the rapid flow of symbols in the ambient culture, just as one’s perception is essentially one’s sensory mode of dealing with the rapid flow of features in the ambient environment. Interpretations are practical tools. It simply is not the case that only an interpretation can justify another interpretation;

interpretations are tested (or discarded) under cultural conditions which can justify them.

Dewey's radical politics flows from his psychological, sociological, and cultural theories. Manicas's own politics seems to be at least as radical as Dewey (the comparisons between Dewey and Marx are mostly favorable). But Dewey's radical politics is not violent revolutionary politics; revolution is a failure of intelligence, not to mention ethics. Chapters such as "John Dewey: Anarchism and the Political State" and "John Dewey and the Problem of Justice" answer critics who can only read a hopelessly utopianism or strictly managerial politics in Dewey. While politics is a culturally engineered structure, all citizens can be political engineers. Social organization is in our "nature" to the extent that we have any nature; put another way, culture is part of our nature. Politics is a useful technology for maintaining social order, and humans have explored the widest variety of political systems. We can deliberate about politics because we can be intelligent about shared values. The capacities of people for self-government cannot be predetermined in advance by any myth of innate moral evils or cognitive faults. It simply is not the case that rights must have some nonnatural origin; rights are formed and tested under social conditions which can justify them. Only actual living experiments in self-rule, supported by education in running cooperative communities, can eventually locate any hard limitations to democracy.

Manicas makes numerous helpful reminders, especially in "Liberalism's Discontent" and "Democratic Hope," that politics in the hands of pragmatism is as strenuously realistic as one could want. Those who want government to float freely above actual moral and cultural conditions (yes, that means too many liberal political theorists) are the idealists, not the pragmatists. For Dewey and Manicas, democracy is not about government; that notion mistakes the tool for the task. The purpose of democracy is sustaining the moral community, where "moral" amounts to "equal opportunity for a rewarding life as a social being." There is no a priori or foundational justification for democracy; if you do not want to live in anything like a moral community, you do not want to fool around with democracy.

This volume is the most wide-ranging discussion of core issues in Dewey's philosophy that has been published in many years. The high level of scholarship, technical polish, and useful citation is uniformly sustained through each and every chapter. Excepting only aesthetics and ethical theory, admirers of Dewey will find profitable and penetrating examinations of Dewey's thought on the key philosophical questions which any pragmatism must tackle. Those desiring only an entryway into one or another aspect of Dewey's system will also find chapters most relevant to their inquiries.—John R. Shook, *Center for Inquiry and University at Buffalo*.