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JONATHAN EDWARDS'S CONTRIBUTION TO JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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In the fall of 1894 Dewey had his thirty-fifth birthday and started his new responsibilities as the head of the philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy department at the University of Chicago. His philosophy had begun its mature phase as well. Its main lines and foundational principles were freshly laid down; Dewey would proceed to confidently apply his theories of mind and knowledge to a variety of practical issues from education to politics. In two important writings published in that year of 1894, an article titled "Ego and Cause" and a short book on *The Study of Ethics*, Dewey announced his detailed views on free will and moral responsibility. These views, with only minor adjustments, were foundational principles of Dewey's moral theory in later works such as *Ethics* (1908) and *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922). By the early 1890s Dewey's position on free will was clear. The ancient debate between determinism and libertarianism was bankrupt, he declared, because neither position could fully account for our practice of deliberating choices and taking responsibility for the consequences of our choices.

In a manner strongly reminiscent of Jonathan Edwards, Dewey aimed his heaviest attack at the libertarians by arguing that an independent "will" or "ego" charged with exercising the power of choosing is a mythical creature. The only meaningful sense of "willing" is embodied in acting: the whole person wills in acting, and therefore freedom or lack thereof is a property of the person, and not of any part or aspect of a person. In this person-centered account of freedom, Dewey also took a stand against incompatibilists who use determinism to deny freedom. Again taking Edwards's view of these matters, Dewey argued that the determinist cannot appeal to the existence of motives prior to willing in order to show why choices cannot be free. Surely motives cause willing; but one's motives remain one's own, and hence responsibility encompasses

one's motives. Dewey would not permit, any more than Edwards could, a separation between one's motives, one's willing, and one's self that permits responsibility and control to be taken from the person. Dewey and Edwards both advanced an agent-centered theory of responsibility, which has been fairly rare in modern philosophy.

These agreements might be coincidences. However, beyond these common views themselves, we can look more closely at Dewey's argumentative methods, which further mirror Edwardsean tactics found in *Freedom of the Will*. We can also review Dewey's intellectual origins, which trace back to the New Divinity tradition inspired by Edwards which was maintained in Dewey's home state of Vermont after the Civil War. After explorations of these two factors it can be more confidently asserted that the mature Dewey did intend to uphold the Edwardsean criticisms of free will that he absorbed as a young man. The final section of this essay will explain why Dewey found Edwards's position attractive, even while Dewey's universalism and progressivism brought him to a very different understanding of the role of moral ideals in developing personal character. Dewey could never have been a whole-hearted follower of Edwards's Calvinistic Christianity as the nineteenth century was ending. However, Dewey's moral and social philosophy was a useful and robust compromise with the Puritan heritage that carried Edwards's thought into the progressive movement of the new twentieth century.

1. Liberty is Not Indifference

The latter sections of part two of *Freedom of the Will* develop Edwards's attacks on some rival Arminians[1] who defended free will. These libertarians appealed to a feeling of indifference to show that the will has the power to choose among motives. Such libertarians must assume that in such cases, none of the motives involved are sufficient to cause the will to choose. In fact, to avoid a necessary connection between any motive and the will, the will must be *indifferent* to them all. Indifference is Edwards's label for the condition of the will or mind that is suspended apart and aloof from the push or pull of motives. Section six of part two begins by setting out this version of Arminianism and its appeal to indifference.

> A great argument for self-determining power, is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to determine our wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented: the will (as is supposed) has its choice to make between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind; and the will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice.[2]

Edwards quickly forces this Arminian tactic of indifference into a difficult trilemma. To avoid the threat of an infinite regress of free choices if it were supposed that a free choice to choose was first required (exposed in section one of part two), and to avoid abandoning the principle of sufficient reason by leaving the will's eventual choice unexplainable, it seems that the Arminian can only claim that the will simply chooses which motive shall prevail. Edwards strongly suspects that this last option amounts to merely hopeful words that collapse on analysis into either of the first two options. How can a person act in either of two ways when he does choose to act, without supposing that this choice is completely uncaused? "To suppose that the will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, either to determine itself, or to do anything else, is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing."[3]

In the next section Edwards explores further this strange state of mind called "indifference." He rightly explains why the Arminian must describe this state of indifference as "perfect indifference"[4] since no existing motive must be strong enough to attract a choice. Whether this lack of sufficient strength is the case because no motive, in this state, has any attraction (then why call it a motive?), or because multiple motives are perfectly balanced in strength (highly unlikely), is irrelevant. Either situation leaves the will absolutely unmoved, not only prior to choosing, but also *right at the very moment of moving*. "Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium."[5]

Having disposed of this paradoxical notion of freedom of indifference, Edwards offers his own view, which is not just consistent with the logical demands of reason but also more congruent with our actual experiences of willing. Unwilling to let stand the Arminian primary appeal to feelings of freedom in willing, Edwards presents his portrait of the will as always choosing for some motivational cause. A master of compelling imagery, not to be equaled in American philosophy until William James's illustrations in his 1890 *Principles of Psychology*, Edwards describes the accidental selection of a chessboard square. This process of looking, reaching, and touching one square lacks forethought or design but always has some sufficiently compelling and concrete motive at every stage.[6]

Dewey's arguments in both "Ego as Cause" and *The Study of Ethics* are remarkably similar to these arguments of Edwards, tracking their steps and even borrowing some terminology. In both writings Dewey's main target is the libertarian who requires that the moment of choice be undetermined by any pre-existing motive or preference. This

libertarian believes, like the typical Arminian of Edwards's time, that moral responsibility for an act requires a willful choice to perform that act which was not determined by anything else.

In current terminology, this requirement is commonly called "the principle of alternative possibilities" and is usually defined in this manner: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if, in the process of deciding to act, he could have done otherwise. We are asked by this principle to imagine that the entire history of the universe (including the person deciding) up to the moment of choosing is insufficient to completely determine which choice is made; either choice could follow from that history. The same person (not two different people with two different sets of motives, habits, and characters) must be able in that moment to really choose either action contemplated. The libertarian who relies on this principle of alternative possibilities, from Dewey's perspective, is relying on a *freedom of indifference*:

> We are . . . told that . . . a man cannot be responsible unless at the time when he acted he could equally well have acted otherwise than as he did act, and this without any change of character and motive. We are told that self-blame, remorse, etc., are inexplicable without this freedom of indifference.[7]

Dewey well understands how most of his academic readers must be sensitive to the notorious history behind this phrase "freedom of indifference." He does not pause to define or illustrate its meaning, taking for granted the well-worn controversies denoted by this label. He also takes for granted that any libertarian who knows that history would now want to avoid falling into that trap so well laid by Edwards. But Dewey finds every contemporary libertarian getting firmly ensnared regardless, even though in its ordinary sense, the principle of alternative possibilities does provide grounds for excusing actions by the whole person.

> Just so far as a man believes that he was forced to act as he did act, he excuses himself—and rightly; the act was not himself at all, it was the external compulsory force that really acted. The condition of responsibility, that the deed be the concrete will or unified self, is absent.[8]

For Dewey, the excusing grounds must be entirely *external* to the normal processes of decision and action. The libertarian unfortunately obscures this proper interpretation of the principle of alternative possibilities.

> The confusion comes in when absence of adequate self-motivation is substituted for absence of external compulsion. "I might have done otherwise"—that consciousness is itself my miserable condition, my blame or remorse, and not simply a condition of it; . . . but what it means is not that I might arbitrarily or with no different self have

> done otherwise, but that the sole reason for my acting as I did lies in myself, is attributable to no external cause.[9]

Dewey goes on to explain that unless my action is identified with myself, I can never be held responsible for any action at all. This conclusion is hardly the libertarian's preferred result. Of course, if I were a different person, with different preferences, goals, and habits, I could have chosen differently. According to both Edwards and Dewey, that undoubted fact will not justify taking away my responsibility for my actual action. It should be noted that while Dewey's position is agent-centered, it should not be confused with an "agent-causal" view more recently advanced. The "agent-causal" theory identifies the agent as the ultimate cause for a decision. From Dewey's perspective, this theory only relocates the indifference problem upon the agent, and hence is unable to dispel the mystery of a self-caused motivator.

Dewey's diagnosis of the libertarian's confusion reveals precisely where the libertarian abandons the whole person as the center of responsibility. Whatever the label—the will, the ego, etc.—the libertarian always seeks an agent inside the agent. To avoid the disastrous appeal to indifference, the libertarian must instead find a cause of a volition, that is not the whole person, and is not already controlled by motives. However, what the libertarian finds is just what Edwards suspected: a will/ego that is mysteriously self-caused.

> The libertarian . . . puts great stress upon choice between alternatives; as I understand (or if I understand) him, the possibility of such choice is the essence of freedom. Now, in order to avoid pure undeterminism (or the freedom of indifference), it becomes necessary to find a cause for this preference of one alternative over the other. What is the cause of the choice of one rather than the other? The ego simply as ego in general may be (ex hypothesi) the cause of the volition; but exactly the same ego cannot be the cause of two different and even quite opposing effects; there must be some difference in the cause when it operates to bring about one effect from that which would be operative in case the other is effected. I say, "cannot be" and "must be"; the reader will please understand this not in a dogmatic sense, but as expressing my difficulty; I do not see how identically the same cause, with no additional qualification whatever, can be regarded as a sufficient explanation of the choice of a rather than of b, except upon the basis of indifferentism.[10]

Dewey, no more than Edwards, will tolerate any notion of human self-causation that lifts free choice entirely above the natural order and out of the reach of causal explanation. Kant's theory of the transcendentally good will must therefore be rejected, and even fellow pragmatist William James receives Dewey's condemnation for falling into this libertarian trap.[11]

Dewey hypothesizes that the libertarian constructs the trap of alternative possibilities and then eagerly jumps in to get caught only because she has accepted the determinist's mechanistic account of the will caused to choose by other forces. For quite independent reasons Dewey does believe that neither theological determinism or scientific determinism could be established, but that is not relevant to Dewey's disapproval of the determinist's account. That account likewise separates the operation of the will from the person's action, which is sufficient from the start to disintegrate personal responsibility, and therefore neither the determinist and libertarian can give a proper account of personal responsibility. Dewey does believe in the existence of real responsibility, and he could be labeled as a "compatibilist" who holds that determinism cannot obstruct freedom. However, unlike Dewey, many compatibilists today prefer to reject the principle of alternative possibilities.[12] Few compatibilists since Dewey would agree with him that freedom or the lack of freedom is only a property of the whole person's intelligent conduct. They accordingly interpret the principle of alternative possibilities as also applying to components or moments within the process of deliberate action.

To summarize, Dewey's rejection of libertarianism closely parallels some of Edwards's most devastating tactics, in both argumentative moves and terminology. Dewey's refusal to locate the grounds of freedom in any *component* of a person's action also parallels Edwards's demand that a person should be judged free or unfree only according to whether that person is able to act as he wills. Because we naturally associate Dewey with the modern movement of pragmatism and its harsh repudiation of both traditional theology and philosophy, how could these shared views and methods signify any deep influence of Edwards upon Dewey? To answer this question, the formation of Dewey's intellectual outlook deserves examination.

2. Calvinism and Universalism

When Dewey was fourteen and growing up in Burlington, Vermont, its First Congregational Church introduced a new minister of impeccable credentials. Lewis Orsmond Brastow (1834–1912) was a graduate of Bowdoin College and Bangor Theological Seminary, centers of orthodoxy. Brastow's first ministerial assignment was the South Congregational Church in St. Johnsbury, Vermont, interrupted by service in the Civil War as a U.S. Army Chaplain for the Vermont 12th Infantry. During Brastow's tenure in Burlington (1873–1884) Dewey had ample opportunity to absorb Brastow's theology, not only because Dewey's puritanically pious mother ensured regular attendance, but also because Dewey found Brastow's emerging liberal views a relief from stern Calvinism. After Dewey entered the University of Vermont at the age of fifteen, his

philosophy professor Henry A. P. Torrey echoed Brastow's insistence that religion and reason are not only compatible but mutually supportive. Dewey happily attended the First Congregational Church during his undergraduate years and whenever he was visiting home for some years after.[13]

Although Torrey's own philosophy tended towards a mixture of romantic idealism with Scottish intuitionism, there is no evidence that Brastow similarly appreciated that mixture's support for libertarian notions. Quite the opposite: liberal as Brastow was for his times, especially due to his open support for universalism, his liberality did not extend to consorting with anti-Calvinist doctrines of Unitarianism or libertarian free will. Brastow's professor at Bangor was the legendary Enoch Pond, disciple of Edwardsean Nathaniel Emmons. Pond was one of last true defenders of the New Divinity movement and a lingering representative of the almost extinct group of Exercisers.[14] Although Pond would have been appalled at Brastow's later universalism, Brastow would not depart from the orthodox tenet of justification by faith alone and he kept a safe distance from any Arminian entanglement with free will and justification by works. When Brastow's powerful defenses of universalism finally proved too overwhelming to combat at a distance, the Yale Divinity School respected his heritage and orthodoxy enough to call him to be Professor of Practical Theology and Homiletics in 1885.

Brastow's views echo the Exercisers' stance, following Edwards, that the mental faculties are a unity and act together. Religion is not based solely on the intellect, or on emotions, or on the will. "Religion is realized only as 'the unity of the soul revealed in feeling, willing, and knowing,' and that soul in its unity becomes the organ of the revealing activity of God."[15] Brastow is similarly dogmatic about the soul's destiny. He has no hesitancy or qualifications to place upon the Calvinist creed that the soul's salvation cannot in any way depend on itself.

> It is the teaching of the New Testament that there is but one provision for man's salvation. . . . It is necessary to be saved. One may not beg the whole question at the outset by denying his moral need. The salvation, too, must come from without. The problem finds an objective solution. One may not assume airs of personal sufficiency and propose to do for himself whatever saving there needs to be done.[16]

Dewey's Christian education during those crucial years of exploration and questioning was guided in part by a near-orthodox theologian trained in the Edwardsean and New Divinity tradition. Dewey would have known the standard Edwardsean attacks on free will with close familiarity, and was evidently capable of repeating them a little over a decade later in his publications. The mature Dewey had found no

reason to depart from this stance on libertarianism. However, Dewey's insistence upon assigning responsibility to the whole person, while thoroughly Edwardsean, led Dewey down an unexpected path of reasoning about the role of ideals in moral conduct.

One significant guide down this new path was Brastow's universalism and its deliberate turn away from another Edwardsean legacy of separating the church of true Christians away from the wider society. Universalism should, according to Brastow, bring all people together into communities of mutual support and trust; yet predestination and limited atonement only open unbridgeable chasms between people. Edwards was also wrong to embrace enthusiasm and sudden conversion; Brastow's portrait of repentance and moral growth is corporate and gradualist. We grow in faith and virtue together as a community over lifetimes. This vision of progressive universalism was certainly more consistent with real life in upstate Vermont, where town hall democracy and the American instinct for equality obviously flourished. Dewey's later reminiscences upon formative influences emphasize these clashing features of New England life, Puritan Christianity and small-town democracy.[17] Universalism was an obvious way to overcome the dualism between the morally worthy and the damned.

Another dualism is prevented by Edwards's position on free will, which eliminates any need to postulate a mysterious will or ego separate from the web of natural relations. Only in college did Dewey begin to dimly see, in the romantic idealism of S. T. Coleridge and the intimidating German idealists studied by Torrey, the possibility that Edwards was also right about pantheism. As Dewey recollected years later, James Marsh's edition of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, so influential upon the pedagogy at the University of Vermont, was another counter-balance to Calvinism.[18] Marsh's introduction emphasizes the significance of Coleridge's views for the free will controversy then animating New England Protestantism, which would thus have been familiar to Dewey. Coleridge demanded that the only freedom that is practically relevant for human life is grounded in the intelligent will. This connection between reason and will is a clear anticipation of Dewey's own theory of moral responsibility.[19]

In Dewey's graduate courses at John Hopkins University with Hegelian George S. Morris, he became convinced that the essence of morality is self-realization, which expressly requires an organic unification of each person with God. As functioning parts of God (following the metaphor of the body and its internally organized organs/tissues/cells) we are always embedded in many larger wholes of varying scope that sustain our growth as Christians towards perfection. One major consequence

of this organic idealism is a social psychology to replace individualistic psychology, so that the social institutions of culture, especially language and cooperative activities, are responsible for providing life and meaning to our mental states and processes. Ideas have no significance whatsoever just because they happen to be in one's mind, *and neither do ideals*. Moral ideals cannot be pursued by individuals in isolation and ignorance of one another. Ideals are sustained by institutions that teach them, and therefore self-realization is achievable only where communities of self-realizers are progressing together. Just as Brastow taught that salvation comes through faith, but faith's specific shape must vary widely across peoples due to divergent historical and cultural variations, Dewey saw that ideals are never fixed and permanent but instead evolve within communities.

This theory of progressive self-realization stands opposed to the traditional Puritan doctrine of total depravity, moral helplessness, and divine revelation of commandments. Dewey came to see that although Edwards was right about free will and the locus of moral responsibility, his psychology was quite inadequate for grasping the role of moral ideals in choice. It cannot be a simple matter of choosing obedience or disobedience to some given set of moral rules. According to a morality of fixed ideals,

> No moral value attaches to their working-out, or formation. It may belong to the attitude taken towards them, to their choice or rejection, but nothing more. But, in our actual experience, no such separation exists between forming and choosing an end of action. Our moral discipline consists even more in the responsibility put upon us to develop ideals, than in choosing between them when made. The making of plans, working them out into their bearings, etc., is at once a test of character and a factor in building it up. But this is an impossibility if the ideal is something given towards which will is to be directed—if it lies outside the normal process of volition. . . . With a fixed ideal, they must lie outside, be mere means, and moral meaning is found simply in the selection of one or other of the ends given ready-made. Deliberation has no intrinsic moral significance.[20]

When Dewey says that deliberation actually does have moral value because it can modify or create ideals, he certainly cannot intend to portray deliberation as somehow suspending volition to survey possible indifferent ideals before selecting one. Deliberation (also called reflection or inquiry) is Dewey's way of understanding how the mind can be volitionally active even while overt action is temporarily halted in doubt about what to do next. Dewey's theory of the process of inquiry, gradually liberated from Hegelian idealism in the early 1890s, cannot be adequately explained here,[21] but it is designed to explain how we are

responsible for intelligently selecting ideals to follow in the actual situations we encounter daily. Of course, most situations only call for acting on previously formed ideals so deliberation is typically infrequent. But what is necessary to see in Dewey's approach is that the formation of possible ends and the selection of one to follow are not two separate events, but interpenetrating stages in a continual process. "On our theory, the emergence of the ends and the final choice are facts of exactly the same order, being only an earlier and a later stage, in time, of the definition of an impulse in its relation to the self."[22] Dewey regards the creative intelligence as necessary for moral responsibility. In early writings he says that "freedom consists in choosing the moral good." With much-needed elaborations, Dewey's mature moral philosophy expresses this notion as follows.

> Reflection presents and weighs alternatives. A thinking being is free in a sense in which no unthinking being could be free, even if fully endowed with "free will." For a reflecting agent can present to himself the consequences of a proposed act; he does not have to wait till the consequences are externally and irretrievably produced to see whether they are desirable or undesirable. If on reflection, the consequences are seen to be adverse, the proposed line of action, if dropped for preference or the bent of disposition, is shifted to some other alternative, which is then weighed. Just in the degree in which one is gifted with the habit of reflection, in that degree he is capable of acting in the light for a foreseen future instead of being pushed from behind by sheer instinct or habit.[23]

We have seen how Dewey regarded the intrusion of mechanistic causality and external forces into moral psychology as erroneous, and this passage more clearly offers the teleological alternative. Moral deliberation, like any purposive deliberation, aims at some concrete goal in particular situations. People act for the sake of future outcomes, and explanations of their intentional behavior are incomplete without reference to such possible future events.

Teleological explanations of actions have long been out of favor in philosophy, since it seems easy enough to suppose that talk of non-existent future states of affairs can be replaced by presently imagined possible states of affairs, and such actually existing visions are suitable for causal roles in deliberation. Dewey would not be entirely satisfied with this reduction, but in any case his moral theory does not depend on satisfactorily resolving this debate. It is only necessary for Dewey to offer a theory of moral deliberation, impossible to fully elaborate here, that sees intelligence in the range of forethought upon the consequences of various possible ideal commitments. This theory does not violate the Edwardsean warning against indifferent or unnatural wills, and

remains fully naturalistic. On Dewey's theory, moral responsibility is enhanced to the degree that the capacity for intelligent deliberation is enhanced, and such intelligence is exactly the sort of thing that the moral education provided by culture is able to more or less furnish to everyone. This moral education does not, and should not, produce total moral conformity—that is why free communication and intelligent deliberation by citizens in a democracy is still vitally needed to have a peaceful society. Democracy is Dewey's eventual bearer and genuine meaning of the promise of universalism and self-realization.

3. Social Progressivism and Moral Responsibility

Dewey's communitarian theory of self-realization implies that moral responsibility is never truly an exclusively personal achievement (or failure). Moral responsibility, like all cultural capacities, is an acquired function as a person grows into the roles of adult life. This communitarianism explains why Dewey was adamant upon his Edwardsean point that past external causes for a person's character growth cannot excuse one from personal responsibility. Dewey did not adopt a social psychology and institutional morality essential to a progressive program of social reform only to let personal responsibility evaporate.

In *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922) Dewey again falls back on the principle that the person is an agent which acts on the surrounding environment just as much as it acts upon her. With this principle, Dewey can show how moral growth is the growth of a mutual relationship between the self and the social environment. Unfortunately, Dewey is confronted with two traditional notions of "social reform" that correspondent to the two traditional combatants of libertarianism and determinism.

> There are two schools of social reform. One bases itself upon the notion of a morality which springs from an inner freedom, something mysteriously cooped up within personality. It asserts that the only way to change institutions is for men to purify their own hearts, and that when this has been accomplished, change of institutions will follow of itself. The other school denies the existence of any such inner power, and in so doing conceives that it has denied all moral freedom. It says that men are made what they are by the forces of the environment, that human nature is purely malleable, and that till institutions are changed, nothing can be done. Clearly this leaves the outcome as hopeless as does an appeal to an inner rectitude and benevolence. For it provides no leverage for change of environment. It throws us back upon accident, usually disguised as a necessary law of history or evolution, and trusts to some violent change, symbolized by civil war, to usher in an abrupt millennium. There is an alternative to being penned in between these two theories. We can

> recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social. Then we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are in truth forces in man as well as without him.[24]

Dewey's social progressivism strives to enhance personal responsibility through programs of social intervention (like education). But by taking either of the two traditional view of responsibility, the idea of "personal responsibility through social intervention" is utterly impossible and contradictory. From the libertarian side, no amount of social intervention could be relevant to the powers of personal choice; while from the determinist side, the more that one's society is involved, the less responsibility could one person have. Dewey's Edwardsean education correctly diagnosed the fundamental error behind these opposed positions, and it pointed the way for transcending this impasse. Dewey's agent-centered theory of personal responsibility is explicitly designed to be compatible with the social theory that this responsibility originates and grows only in the supportive context of others in social institutions from the family to the school to the state.

As Dewey embarked on his career as a university professor of philosophy in 1884, he would no longer permit the universality of Christian ideals to be threatened by denominational strife or God's selective grace. We are all already in God. Christ retreated in Dewey's religion to teacher of ideals, and God itself, having no place outside of nature, no salvation work to do, and no judgment to perform, gradually became just a placeholder for our highest moral commitments. God we can do well enough without; what we must pragmatically have to live are shared moral ideals that sustain meaningful lives. In this way Dewey's religion attenuated to the moralistic piety of Social Gospel themes by 1900, and a secular humanism in *A Common Faith* (1934). But Dewey's constant faith, in the responsible powers of moral intelligence for the social good, was a genuine faith that worked for the progressive movement. Some responsibility for that success belongs to Jonathan Edwards.

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NOTES

1. Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609), minister and divinity professor at the University of Leyden, led a theological revolt against the strict Calvinistic principles of predestination and unconditional election. Arminians agreed that only through God's grace could people be saved, but held that sinners can freely accept or reject God's grace. The Synod of Dort (1618–1619) judged Arminianism to be heresy, and formulated the five points of Calvinism, labeled by the acronym TULIP: total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints. Although Arminianism in the American colonies of Edwards's time was openly preached by very few, Edwards did not fail to notice how some ministers encouraged the notion that people are partially responsible for determining their spiritual fate.

2. Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 195.

3. Ibid., p. 198.

4. Ibid., p. 206.

5. Ibid., p. 207.

6. Ibid., pp. 198–199.

7. Dewey, "The Study of Ethics," in *Early Works*, vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), vol. 4, p. 344. Hereafter references will be made to the *Early Works* (*EW*) and *Middle Works* (*MW*) followed by volume and page numbers.

8. *EW* 4: 344.

9. *EW* 4: 344–345.

10. Dewey, "Ego as Cause," *EW* 4: 92.

11. *EW* 4: 95.

12. Only a couple of samples from the vast literature on the principle of alternative possibilities can be mentioned. A good overview is John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 2; see also Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 4.

13. Joseph Ratner investigated the intellectual influences on Dewey in Burlington, and his findings have been essential for subsequent biographers. In a letter to Francis C. Becker, Ratner reports that "the Pastor Brastow was quite an extraordinary intellectual, his sermons were courses of lectures and Dewey was unquestionably deeply attracted to and by him. Brastow left B. for a professorship in Yale Divinity in 1884. From 1873 to 1882 Brastow stirred up a hornet's nest of theological-orthodoxy controversy—Brastow was trying to liberalize the doctrine and succeeded within ten years in so successfully beating down Yale that the latter invited him as prof. These years are Dewey's growing up years and he breathed the stuff in without any effort. The Vt. univ. professors—nearly

to a man congr. ministers—were in the liberal-orthodox brawl officially and semi-officially; Dewey's phil. prof—Torrey—was a member of Dewey's church and very active in it at that time and till his death." *The Correspondence of John Dewey, vol. 3: 1940–1953*, ed. Larry A. Hickman (Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, forthcoming), #07171, 7 December 1946.

14. For an overview of the New Divinity movement's final phase see Allen C. Guelzo, *Edwards on the Will: A Century of Theological Debate in America* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), pp. 272–278.

15. Brastow, "The Religious Factor in Education," *New Englander and Yale Review*, vol. 43 (January 1884), p. 23.

16. Brastow, "Provision and Method of Salvation," *New Englander and Yale Review*, vol. 41 (November 1882), p. 751.

17. See George Dykhiuzen, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 40–43.

18. This account is related in Corliss Lamont, *Dialogue on John Dewey* (New York: Horizon, 1959), pp. 15–16.

19. James Marsh, "Editor's Introduction" (1839), reprinted in *Aids to Reflection*, *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, vol. 9 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 491–529. On Coleridge and free will, see Mary Anne Perkins, *Coleridge's Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 189–204.

20. *EW* 4: 259.

21. See John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), chaps. 3 and 4.

22. *EW* 4: 260.

23. *MW* 6: 465–466.

24. *MW* 14: 9.